1 george mason school of law contracts ii anticipatory breach f.h. buckley [email protected]

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1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley [email protected]

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Page 1: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

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George Mason School of Law

Contracts II

Anticipatory Breach

F.H. Buckley

[email protected]

Page 2: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

When is performance due?

When can the seller sue for the price?

When can the buyer sue for the goods?

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Page 3: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Mutual Conditions

When can the seller sue for the price? UCC § 2-507: Tender of delivery is a

condition of the buyer’s duty to pay

When can the buyer sue for the goods? UCC § 2-511; Tender of payment is a

condition to the seller’s duty to tender

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Page 4: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Buyer’s Problem

Buyer agrees to pay seller $2M for custom-made machinery which can only be used by buyer

This will take a year to make and the cost of production is $100K per month.*

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*There is no time-value of money here

Page 5: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Buyer’s Problem

Buyer agrees to pay seller $2M for custom-made machinery which can only be used by buyer

This will take a year to make and the cost of production is $100K per month.

After a few days, buyer decides he can’t use the machine. Advise buyer.

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Page 6: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Buyer’s Problem

After two months, buyer decides he does not want the machine. Advise buyer.

If buyer sticks to the contract he’ll pay $2M for a worthless machine.

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Page 7: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Buyer’s Problem

After two months, buyer decides he does not want the machine. Advise buyer.

If buyer sticks to the contract he’ll pay $2M for a worthless machine.

If seller sticks to the contract he’ll spend $1.2M to make $2M, for a profit of 800K

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Page 8: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A Coasian Solution

After two months, buyer decides he does not want the machine. Advise buyer.

If buyer sticks to the contract he’ll pay $2M for a worthless machine.

If seller sticks to the contract he’ll make 800K

So there’s a bargaining surplus if seller stops production

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Page 9: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A Coasian Solution

After two months, buyer decides he does not want the machine. Advise buyer.

If buyer sticks to the contract he’ll pay $2M for a worthless machine.

If seller sticks to the contract he’ll make 800K

Seller will require at least $800K to terminate

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Page 10: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A Coasian Solution

After two months, buyer decides he does not want the machine. Advise buyer.

If buyer sticks to the contract he’ll pay $2M for a worthless machine.

If seller sticks to the contract he’ll make 800K

Buyer will pay up to $2M to terminate

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Page 11: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A Coasian Solution

After two months, buyer decides he does not want the machine. Advise buyer.

If buyer sticks to the contract he’ll pay $2M for a worthless machine.

If seller sticks to the contract he’ll make 800K

The parties will terminate for a price between $800K and $2M

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Page 12: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Unilateral Repudiation?

What if we gave the buyer the unilateral right to terminate the contract?

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Page 13: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Unilateral Repudiation?

What if we gave the buyer the unilateral right to terminate the contract? In that case, could the seller ever

begin performance without an assurance of payment?

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Page 14: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Mitigation?

Suppose that the buyer immediately tells the seller he can’t use the machine and will not take delivery, but will offer seller $800K in damages.

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Page 15: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Mitigation?

Suppose that the buyer immediately tells the seller he can’t use the machine and will not take delivery, but will offer seller $800K in damages.

What if seller nevertheless produces the machine and on tender demands payment of $2M?

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Page 16: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Mitigation?

Suppose that the buyer immediately tells the seller he can’t use the machine and will not take delivery, but will offer seller $800K in damages.

What if seller nevertheless produces the machine and on tender demands payment of $2M? The principle of mitigation:

Restatement § 350(1) See Illustration 1

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Page 17: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Summing up

Buyer should not be permitted to terminate unilaterally

However, a bilateral termination agreement may be efficient

If Buyer repudiates the agreement, the principle of mitigation will prevent the seller from inefficiently running up the tab

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Page 18: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

So why do we need Anticipatory Repudiation?

Suppose Buyer repudiates the agreement, and ten months later insists on full performance by the seller?

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Page 19: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

So why do we need Anticipatory Repudiation?

Suppose Buyer repudiates the agreement, and ten months later insists on full performance by the seller? Restatement § 251: seller may suspend

performance on repudiation

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Page 20: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour 799

Lord Campbell

Page 21: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

If a man promises to marry a woman in December and marries another woman in May, when is he liable for breach of promise?

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Page 22: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

If a man promises to marry a woman in December and marries another woman in May, when is he liable for breach of promise? Short v. Stone, p. 800

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Page 23: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

When were Πs duties to begin?

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Page 24: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

When were Πs duties to begin? When did Δ send his letter of

repudiation?

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Page 25: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

When were Πs duties to begin? When did Δ send his letter? When was the action brought?

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Page 26: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

When were Πs duties to begin? When did Δ send his letter? When was action brought? When did Π enter into his contract

with Lord Ashburton?

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Page 27: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la Tour

When were Πs duties to begin? When did Δ send his letter? When was action brought? When did Π enter into his contract

with Lord Ashburton? Could Π bring his action prior to the date

when his duties with Δ were to begin?

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Page 28: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Suppose that Π had been required to wait to June 1 before terminating the contract What if Π had been offered alternative

employment on May 22 Could he accept this without breaching his

contract with Δ?

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Page 29: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Suppose that Π had been required to wait to June 1 before terminating the contract What if Π had been offered alternative

employment on May 22 Suppose that he could take the position

with Lord Ashburton without breaching his contract with Δ? Does it follow that he can sue before June 1?

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Page 30: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Suppose that Π had been required to wait to June 1 before terminating the contract What if Π had been offered alternative

employment on May 22 Suppose that he could take the position

with Lord Ashburton without breaching his contract with Δ? So why wait? De la Tour was about to travel.

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Page 31: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Suppose that Π had been required to wait to June 1 before terminating the contract What if Π had been offered alternative

employment on May 22 Suppose that he could take the position

with Lord Ashburton without breaching his contract with Δ? Why permit him to sue before June 1? UCC § 2-610(b)

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Page 32: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Suppose that Π had been required to wait to June 1 before terminating the contract What if Π had been offered alternative

employment on May 22 Could Hochester have turned down the

Ashburton offer and sued De la Tour for full damages? UCC § 2-610(a)

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Page 33: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Must the innocent party communicate his acceptance of the repudiation?

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Page 34: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Hochster v. De la TourThe “much more rational” standard

Must the innocent party communicate his acceptance of the repudiation?Restatement 256

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Page 35: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

Is an offeror bound before his offer is accepted? Can the offeror revoke his offer at any

time prior to acceptance?

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Page 36: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

Is an offeror bound before his offer is accepted? Can the offeror revoke his offer at any

time prior to acceptance?

What is the logic behind the requirement of mutual assent?

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Page 37: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

What is the logic behind the requirement of mutual assent?

It’s not just that the parties mutually assent, but they must both know that the other has assented.

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Page 38: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

What is the logic behind the requirement of mutual assent?

Otherwise a possibility of a false start

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Page 39: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

It’s not just that the parties mutually assent, but they must both know that the other has assented. Need to communicate revocation of

acceptance Objective test of assent

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Page 40: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

The need for commercial certainty Full communication to the other party

tends to eliminate misunderstandings

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Page 41: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

The need for commercial certainty Full communication to the other party

tends to eliminate misunderstandings

Commercial certainty and anticipatory repudiation When is the seller to mitigate?

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Page 42: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

The need for commercial certainty Full communication to the other party

tends to eliminate misunderstandings

The presumption against options

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Page 43: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

The presumption against options You give me an option to buy 100 oz of

gold at $900/oz on August 1 next. If the price of gold is less than $900 at that

time the option is valueless. If the price of gold is above $900 at that

time, the option is “in the money” and is worth 100*(PriceAugust 1 - $900)

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Page 44: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

The presumption against options You give me an option to buy 100 oz of

gold at $900/oz on August 1 next The option is valuable and one should

not presume that it is given away for free

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Page 45: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

Options and anticipatory repudiation When the market is volatile, can an innocent

buyer get an option? Assume that:

Contract price is 100 Price on seller’s repudiation is 100 Price on date for delivery is 150 Buyer assets that he did not accept repudiation when

price was 100 and claims damages of 50

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Page 46: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

A bit of contract review

Options and anticipatory repudiation When the market is volatile, can an

innocent buyer get an option? Buyer assets that he did not accept repudiation

when price was 100 and claims damages of 50 UCC § 2-610(a): a commercially reasonable

time

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Page 47: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

UCC § 2-610

Is this in any way qualified by 2-609?

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Page 48: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt 802

Δ agrees to sell land to Π at $160K, closing June 30 Contingent on buyer obtaining zoning

for an asphalt plant

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Page 49: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning” In an effort to keep the thing moving, an

offer to purchase at $142.5K

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Page 50: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning” In an effort to keep the thing moving, an

offer to purchase at $142.5K

Δ rejects the offer of $142.5K on June 9

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Page 51: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning”

Δ rejects the offer of $142.5K on June 9

Π purports to proceed with the purchase at $160K on June 14

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Page 52: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning”

Qu. Did Πs repudiate the contract on May 21?

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Page 53: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning”

Qu. Did Πs repudiate the contract on May 21? Not “a clearly implied threat of

nonperformance”

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Page 54: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning”

Qu. Did Πs repudiate the contract on May 21? Aliter chill efficient renegotiations?

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Page 55: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

Letter of May 21: “we decided to withdraw the request for rezoning”

Qu. Did Πs repudiate the contract on May 21? Restatement §§ 250-51

Should the Δs have cured the problem?

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Page 56: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

If a fuzzy repudiation is permitted, the innocent party is given an opportunity to chisel the innocent party

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Page 57: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

If a fuzzy repudiation is permitted, the party in breach is also given an opportunity to chisel the innocent party

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Page 58: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

If there had been a repudiation, did the Πs retract it in time?

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Page 59: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Flatt v. Schupt

If there had been a repudiation, did the Πs retract it in time? Restatement § 256(1) Revocation of

repudiation is effective if communicated “before the injured party materially changes his position”

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Page 60: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

What about Lak? 812

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Page 61: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

What about Lak? 812

The seller offered to close “as is” The seller had acted reasonably and had

left open the possibility of further negotiations regarding the ambiguity

What’s the difference between a standard of reasonable behavior and a good faith standard? Cf. United Artists at 813

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Page 62: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Was there a clearly implied threat of nonperformance in Decker at 811?

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Page 63: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Was there a clearly implied threat of nonperformance in Decker at 811?

We’ll get right on it…

Could both parties have done something differently?

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Page 64: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

What about Bonebrake at 812?

Were the buyers acting reasonably?

Would a different result create a problem of opportunism?

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Page 65: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

What if you think your supplier is Insolvent?

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Page 66: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Insolvency

Presumptive grounds for repudiation under Restatement § 252

Right to assurance of performance. Restatement § 251.

Seller’s Remedy in UCC § 2-702

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Page 67: 1 George Mason School of Law Contracts II Anticipatory Breach F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy

Presumptive grounds for repudiation under restatement § 252

Right to assurance of performance. UCC § 2-609

Seller’s Remedy in UCC § 2-702 Bankruptcy Code Sec. 365

(a) The trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.

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George Mason School of Law

Contracts II

Remedies

F.H. Buckley

[email protected]