1 From the publication series of KCCRC

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Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center

Iranian Influence and interference in Southern Kurdistan: Reasons and most potent and effective principles

From the publication series of KCCRC

This article is an edited translation of the original in Kurdish. Translated by (Shkow Sherzad).

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Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center

All Rights Reserved for:

May 2018

Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center

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Arkan Ahmad Jaff

Contents:

Introduction

Part 1Historical relations between Kurds and Iran and the international relations strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1.1 - Kurdish territory and the deep and historical roots of Kurdish and Iranian relations1.2 - International relations strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Part 2The status of Iraqi Kurdistan׳s geography and diplomacy and its impact on Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan

2.1 - Iraqi Kurdistan׳s geography and the boundaries of Iran׳s security belt 2.2 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi government2.3 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region and the Iranian opposition.2.4 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region and states that present a threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Part 3Internal politics and the political space for Iranian influence and interference in the Kurdistan Region3.1 - The foundational condition of Iraqi Kurdistan and the political space available to the Kurdistan Region׳s political parties.

3.2 - The political differences of Kurdistan Region׳s Political Parties.3.3 - The economy of the Kurdistan Region3.4 - The will and advantages for both sides to conduct bilateral relations. 3.5 - Nationalism and the development of the idea of independence in the Kurdistan Region.

Summary: Bilateral relations between the Kurds and Iran have deep roots dating back to pre-Christian antiquity. Over this time relations between the two sides have experienced periods of increased and decreased ties. Iran throughout its history has attempted to keep its bilateral relations with the Kurds active and worked to enhance its power over the region at all costs. After the First World War and the splitting of Kurdistan into four constituent parts, three parts of Kurdish territory fell outside the state of Iran. Nevertheless, given the vast border Iran has with Iraq it has always attempted to maintain bilateral relations with the Iraqi Kurds so that it can use the ties as an advantage when facing off against Iraq. Iran has been successful to a great extent in its strategic objectives in regards to the Iraqi Kurds. For example, it was able to use the Iraqi Kurds to apply pressure on the former Iraqi regime to settle border issues in the 1975 Algiers Agreement. The success of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 and the subsequent break out of the Iran-Iraq war forced a distinct period of bilateral relations between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds. The 1991 Iraqi Kurdish revolt against the Iraqi government furthered this recent period in bilateral relations with Iran and continued until the collapse of the Iraqi Ba׳athist regime in 2003. The destruction of the former Iraqi system ushered in the latest period of ties between the two sides. Although

Iranian Influence and interference in Southern Kurdistan: Reasons and most potent and effective principles

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this period has faced numerous challenges and obstacles, it has developed into a fruitful relationship in which strength and power over the Iraqi Kurdish territory mark Iran׳s current status in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and therefore has awarded the Iranians a position whereby they can influence the political direction of the Iraqi Kurds. The guiding principle of this research is historical analysis and the collection of data via dependence on books, magazines and internet sources. The questions that this paper is aiming to answer are the following;1. What are the most potent and effective principles of Iranian influence and interference in the Kurdistan Region? 2. To what extent does it affect Iran׳s power in the Kurdish region and does it open the door for further political interference by Iran. 3. To what extent do these strong and active principles impact the bilateral relationship between the two sides. 4. Can Iranian influence and interference in the Kurdistan Region be ended? The paper is working on the hypothesis that in its attempts to find ample opportunity for bilateral relations the Kurdistan Region itself has provided the groundwork for Iran to achieve its objectives readily. Hence, the Kurdistan region׳s efforts in strengthening bilateral ties are critical reasons for the continued strengthening of the relationship between the two sides on the one hand and the enhancement of Iranian influence and interference in Iraqi Kurdish territory on the other.Key terms: Kurd, Iran, Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian desire of power in the Kurdistan Region, The reasons for Iranian political influence and interference in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Introduction: In both Iran׳s Pahlavi period and that of the Islamic Republic the country has always kept a close eye on the revolutionary movement in Iraqi Kurdistan and has continually worked to increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdish territory. In its dealings with the Kurdish Region of Iraq Iran has worked to promote its interests. In truth, the

principles and reasons behind the strengthening of Iranian influence in the Kurdish Region of Iraq are in large part due to the actions of the Iraqi Kurds themselves. For that reason, Iran׳s status and its ability for control in Iraqi Kurdistan are more to do with these policies and underlying reasons than reasoning owing to some distinct historical period. Hence, whenever and wherever there is a strengthening of the underlying causes for Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan Iran׳s status and power in Kurdish territory in turn increases, and vice-versa. That is why this paper aims to discuss the reasons and principles behind Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. This paper is important because it will inform readers of the reasons and origins behind Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan in general and in particular that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper will also provide a more precise picture for politicians and academics alike to review their political policies towards regional and international states on the one hand, and develop their understanding of the internal reasons driving the phenomenon on the other. This understanding will aid decision makers to increase, strengthen and improve bilateral relations where the causes of Iranian influence owing to Iraqi Kurdish policy are advantageous and correct those policies that disadvantage bilateral ties. With this objective in mind the guiding principle of this research is historical analysis and the collection of data via dependence on various sources. The paper divides between an introduction, three parts and a conclusion. The first part is titled, «Historical relations between the Kurds and Iran and the international relations strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran». This part further divides into two sections; firstly discussing the Kurdish territory and the historical origins od bilateral relations between the Kurds and Iran and secondly debating the international relations strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second part of the paper is titled, «The geographic and diplomatic relations status of the Kurds and its impact on Iranian influence in the Kurdistan Region.» With the second part further dividing into four subsections; the first subsection debates the geographic status of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and its importance to

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the borders of Iran׳s security belt. The second subsection explores the relations between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi government. The third subsection discusses relations between the Kurdistan Region and the Iranian opposition. And the last subsection concludes this part of the paper by examining the connections between the Kurdistan Region with states that present a threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. The last section is titled «Internal politics and the political space for Iranian influence and interference in the Kurdistan Region». The third part of the paper then divides into five further subsections studying first, the foundational condition of the Kurdistan Region׳s political parties and the political space available to them. Second, The political differences of Kurdistan Region׳s Political Parties. Third the economy of the Kurdistan Region.Fourth, the will and advantages for both sides to conduct bilateral relations.Lastly, the notion of nationalism and the ideological development of independence in the Kurdistan Region.The hope is that this paper benefits readers, and it is also important to mention that no research is free from criticism.

Part 1Historical relations between the Kurds and Iran and the international relations strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

1.1 - Kurdish territory and the deep and historical roots of Kurdish and Iranian relationsThe Kurds have close ties to Iran as a result of factors including but not limited to; religion, language and a shared history.(1) According to historical sources, the Kurds are a member of the Aryan race, and at the same time, the name «Iran» in Persian suggests the ‹land of the Aryans׳. For that reason, there is an argument to suggest that the Kurds are of Iranian background. Historians support this case by arguing that Iran is the motherland of the Kurds (2), that the Kurds are the most Iranic people of Iran,

and most likely the first peoples to set foot on Persian soil. (3) These historians also point out that the Kurds themselves believe that in a historical perspective they are natives of Iran and integral members of the Persian civilisation. (4)Furthermore, Linguists note that the Kurdish language which is Indo-European at source is later a branch of the Farsi language group. Iranian linguists use this fact to support their case that Kurdish and Farsi are one of the same and that the two languages do not have separate and distinct roots. To further this position, these scholars explain that century-old sources that talk about the Kurdish people rely upon on Farsi (Iranian language) and that early sources produced by the Kurdish people also use Farsi. They point to the «Sharafnama» by Sharafkhan Bitlis as an obvious example. These scholars believe that the promotion of Kurdish as a separate language to Farsi began at the end of the 19th century as one of the first signs of Kurdish nationalism. (5)In this regard, Richard W. Cottam observed that «Those Iranians that have a strong understanding of history know very well that there is a strong link between their history and that of the Kurds». He continues his observation by claiming that all Kurds of the Middle East are of Iranian origin not only the Kurds of Iran. (6) Iranian academics go further arguing that throughout ancient history the Kurdish lands were dependent on that of Iran and that Kurds as a people have themselves at one time or another have governed the whole of Iranian territory. They explain that the Kurds believe themselves to be descendants of the Medes a civilisation that ruled Iran from 700 to 550 BC. Relying on this viewpoint, these scholars explain that the capital city of the Median Empire was Ecbatana which was close to the modern Iranian town of Hamadan. For their part, the Iranians understand the Median Empire to have been the first in a chain of empires that have in the past ruled the territory of Iran. Hence, via this reading of history the Kurdish people did, in fact, rule Iranian lands as the Medes. Owing to this reading of history the Iranians believe that the promotion of

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Kurdish independence is a new phenomenon that was initially spurred by the colonisation of the region by foreign states namely Great Britain and later by United States intervention and influence. The Iranian scholars argue that these foreign powers aimed to use the ideology of nationalism to divide and rule the Middle East. (7) This underlying philosophy has guided Iranian policy towards the Kurds settled in Iran. Distinct from other neighbouring states hosting Kurdish populations Iran has officially recognised the presence of a Kurdish people in Iran. However, they have not identified the Kurds as a people of different or distinct nationality. Instead, Iran sees them as a group amongst many other groups that make up the Iranian identity. (8)This Iranian view of the Kurds was evident when the Kurdish war of independence collapsed after the signing of the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran forcing the Kurds to flee Iraq and seek refuge in Iran. The leader of Iran at the time Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi responding to the displaced Iraqi Kurdish peoples explained his displeasure with them being in refugee camps for an extended period and advocated that given their shared lineage and language with the Iranian people they should be free to leave the refugee camps and mix with the people of Iran. (9) The collapse of the Iranian monarchy in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran developed a new policy towards separation attempts believing it to be a direct violation of Islamic principles. In response to Khud Mukhtari Ayatollah Khomeini addressed the Kurdish question of Iran and reiterated his support for a unified Iran by saying «I have always explained that in Islam there are no ethnicities, languages, nations and borders. All Muslims, be them Sunni, or Shi׳a, are equal brothers and all benefit from the rights awarded them by Islam.»(10)Hence, it is clear that Iran has always viewed the Kurds as a part of the Iranian nation and identity and by consequence regards Iraqi Kurdistan as former Iranian territory. Its policies towards the Kurdish Region of Iraq is one of keeping it close to the Iranian sphere of influence.

1.2 - International relations strategy of the Islamic Republic of IranSince the return of Imam Khomeini to Iran and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran has followed the concept of «neither east nor west». This announcement issued initially as a Fatwa was designed to outline Iran׳s neutral stance in the Cold War and that it would neither support the Soviet Union nor would it support the United States, a doctrine that later became enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (11)The Constitution of the Islamic Republic Iran dedicated Articles 154 ,153 ,152 and 155 of part 10 to the issue of international politics. In respect to the neutral stance of Iran article 152 states; «The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to the hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States» (12)What is more, an international strategy of Iran is to export the Islamic revolution across the globe. For this reason, in the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution Imam Khomeini ordered the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of which one of its founding aims was to export the idea of the Islamic revolution abroad. Imam Khomeini׳s vision was one that transcended the borders of Iran and sought a global Islamic revolution. (13) Furthermore, according to the Iranian Constitution, Iran׳s international strategy is to refrain itself from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations while at the same time the Constitution reserves Iran׳s right to act in self-defence to protect itself from foreign oppression. In this regard article 154 of the Islamic Republic of Iran׳s Constitution says, «The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly,

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while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the Mustad׳afun (oppressed) against the Mustakbirun (oppressors) in every corner of the globe.» (13)Therefore, Iran presents the international activities that it conducts as support for the struggle of the oppressed and as attempts to export its revolution. By relying on this constitutional perspective, the Iranian foreign ministry has attempted and continues to strive to increase Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan by spreading its revolutionary message via various methods. In the period of the Iran-Iraq War Iran built its relationship with the then Iraqi Kurdish leadership via operation Ramadan. (14) After the Iraqi Kurdish elections of 1992 Iran reinforces its relations with the Iraqi Kurds by establishing its first office in Iraqi Kurdistan in the capital city of Erbil and called it the ‹Erbil Office for Relations with Iran׳. This trend continued with similar offices opening in the cities and towns of Sulaimania, Duhok, Salahadin, and Darbandikhan. These offices aimed to establish relations between the Kurdish political parties and Iran as well as offering humanitarian aid to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi Kurdish population at large. (16)Following this Iran gave the responsibility of those tasks to its official consul and representatives in the region and publically and successfully engaged with the Iraqi Kurds on matters to do with the arts and culture, science and academia. (17) Via its consul in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq Iran has been able to run many Iranian book fairs, artistic and drama exhibitions in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as well as running various Farsi language courses for residents of Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, there have also been many academic exchanges between the two sides with numerous Kurdish and Iranian universities signing memorandums of understanding to further scientific research. (18) In the media field, the Sahar TV network plays an essential role as it works to send pro-Iranian news to citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan and also covers Kurdish developments in line with the Islamic Republic of Iran׳s worldview. For the reasons outlined above, Iran believes that by enshrining its actions in the doctrines of

‹exporting the revolution׳ and ‹supporting the struggles of oppressed peoples׳ its international activities cannot be defined as interference with the affairs of foreign countries. Instead, Iran believes it is carrying out a vital constitutional obligation. This belief leads Iran to view itself as an international actor that is defending humanity against oppressive world powers. As a byproduct, Iran sees it as its obligation to aid the Kurdish people from oppressive regimes like the Ba׳athist regime of Saddam Hussein and the global superpowers that seek to use them in their international politics. Therefore, Iran has demonstrated in with its actions that it is following this policy path when it comes to dealing with the Kurds generally and the Iraqi Kurds in particular. It has continuously increased its influence and status amongst the Iraqi Kurds and the broader Kurdish community.

Part 2The status of Iraqi Kurdistan׳s geography and diplomacy and its impact on Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan

2.1 - Iraqi Kurdistan׳s geography and the boundaries of Iran׳s security belt The security of the Middle East is dependent on the states that make up the region. Any turmoil or trouble that effects one country will, in turn, affect the security of the Middle East at large.

Iraqi Kurdistan as a quasi-state in the region controls a geopolitically strategic territory that sits in the centre of the Middle East. (20) Many observers view Iraqi Kurdistan as an entity that enjoys relations with the Kurds in Iran, Syria and Turkey. Moreover, the territory that the Iraqi Kurds control is rich in resources and hosts a chain of mountain ranges such as the Zagros mountains, which stretches from Iran through Iraqi Kurdistan to eastern Turkey. (21) Given these geopolitical realities, it is easy to understand why Iran views the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as an integral part of its national security belt and hence, has a vested interest in the preservation

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of political stability in Iraqi Kurdistan. (22) This reality for the Iranians is evident to observers that pay close attention to relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. In meetings between Kurdish politicians and Iranian officials, the Iranians openly express the interdependence of security between both Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran. For this reason, Iran has attempted to protect its internal security and that of Iraqi Kurdistan via increasing its influence in the Iraqi Kurdistan and interfering when necessary in the internal affairs of the Iraqi Kurds. Iran feels threatened by the existence of this Iraqi Kurdish territory as on the one hand, Iran fears the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in Iraqi Kurdistan will spur Iranian Kurds to also seek the same political outcome from Iran as the Iraqi Kurds would enjoy. (24) On the other hand, it fears instability in Iraqi Kurdistan and has continuously used its foreign policy to prevent it. Hence, to protect it׳s stability Iran has worked to protect the security of the Iraqi Kurds.

The most prominent threats facing Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan are;1) Active Iranian opposition groups compromising the security of Iran’s border. 2) Instability and insecurity in Iraqi Kurdistan and it spilling over to Iran.3) Increased foreign influence in Iraqi Kurdistan from foreign powers that are hostile to Iran like the United States and Turkey. (25)

Iran uses influence and interference in Iraqi Kurdistan to achieve it׳s security goals because it believes instability in Iraqi Kurdistan is an opportunity for other states to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan, which in turn would have a negative impact on the internal security of Iran. To remedy this threat, Iran has installed a network of spies and informants in Iraqi Kurdistan.(26) In this regard, a former Iranian foreign minister Dr Ali Akbari while giving a seminar in 1996 explains that the security of Iran remains enshrined in the peace and security of the entire Middle East region and that this principle is the driver of Iranian foreign policy. (27)

In 2003 when the former Baathist regime in Iraq came to an end, Iran became the first foreign state to open a consulate in Erbil. (28) In the same manner, Iran became the first international state to send its forces under the command of Qasim Sulaimani to Iraqi Kurdistan to aid the Kurds when the Islamic State took over swathes of northern Iraq in 29) .2014) The Iranian assistance went so far as to assist the Iraqi Kurds in defending Makhmur, and in that assistance, Iran lost numerous officers. In fact, Iran believes that they were the primary protectors of Erbil and if it weren׳t for them the Kurdish capital would have fallen to the Islamic State. (30)

The Iraqi Kurds for their part showed their respect and gratitude to Iran for their assistance in two ways. First, they sent direct and special correspondence from Massoud Barzani the former President of Iraqi Kurdistan, to the Iranians to thank them for their assistance. And secondly, this gratitude was reiterated in a press conference in Erbil when the Iranian Foreign Minister visited the city. (30)

2.2 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Iraqi Government.Since the establishment of the Iraqi state and the inclusion of Kurdish territory in the creation of that state conflict and strife have been an ongoing feature of relations between both the Kurds of Iraq and the Iraqi State as well as between the states of Iraq and Iran. (32) In the early days of the Iraqi state relations between the Kurds and the government of Abdul-Karim Qasim soured and Iran was quick to seize this opportunity to establish its links with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. To make contact with the Kurds of Iraq Iran sent Iranian officials from its embassy in Baghdad, namely Isa Bijman (an Iranian Kurd and leading figure in Iran’s SAWK agency). The delegations set up meetings with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership via the then secretary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Ibrahim Ahmed. (33)What is more, the Iranians later set up direct meetings with the then Kurdish leader Mullah

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Mustafa Barzani via Mansour Pour ( another Kurdish member of Iran’s SAWK agency). Following on from these meetings Iran established a base for its SAWK agency in Iraqi Kurdistan under the command of Mansour Pour to develop better relations between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran. Through this base, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership sent their requirements for their war against the Iraqi government to the Iranians, and the Iranians in the most part provided for the Iraqi Kurds. (34)Isa Bijman openly expressed that Iran was a critical player in the Iraqi Kurdish war against the Iraqi government. He explained that Iran provided for all the Iraqi Kurdish requirements. The country treated the wounded Iraqi Kurds in Iranian hospitals, sent Iranian soldiers to assist the Iraqi Kurds, set up wireless communications in Mansour Pour’s base, and had radio communications equipment made in Germany and sent to the Iraqi Kurdish mountains to be used by the Iraqi Kurds. (35)In 1970 when negotiations restarted between Iran, Iraq, and the Iraqi Kurds Iran became unhappy with the direction and attempted to force the talks to collapse. The then Iranian leader Mohammed Reza Shah sent a letter to Mullah Mustafa Barzani via Sheikh Baba Ali (the son of Sheikh Mahmoud) inviting the Kurdish leader to Tehran. The Iranians subsequently promised that they would continue to provide the Iraqi Kurds with anything they required if they pulled out from the negotiations. In this regard, Mullah Mustafa and Baba Ali visited Iran on the 15th January 1970 to discuss the situation with the Shah of Iran. This Kurdish delegation came away with a promise of full Iranian assistance for their struggle against the Iraqi state. (36)At the onset of the Iran-Iraq war relations between Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan soured as a result of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan׳s engagement in negotiations with the Iraqi government. The poor relations between the two sides continued until the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan׳s talks with Baghdad collapsed. For its part, Iran decided to favour the Kurdistan Democratic Party over the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and increased its engagement it engagement and assistance to them as the Kurdistan Democratic Party had not engaged in talks with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. (37)

Following the Iraqi Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi State in the spring of 1991 and the establishment of the government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq relations between the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad were non-existent. In fact, the two sides saw each other as enemies, with each posing a security threat to the other. Owing to Iran׳s poor relations with Iraq the country continued with its doctrine of organising and assisting dissident groups within Iraq. As a result, the Iranians used the unique geopolitical environment of this period to increase its status and influence in Iraqi Kurdistan.The next significant geopolitical shift in the region came with the 2003 Iraq war which resulted in the collapse of the Iraqi Regime of Saddam Hussain and the power shift in Iraq from the minority Sunni Arabs to the majority Shi׳a Arabs. (38) From the start of this new Iraqi regime, the Iranians offered religious, cultural, political, military and economic assistance to the new Iraqi leadership. This new found friendship between the two states derived, on the one hand, from the fact that the new leaders in Baghdad were former Iraqi dissidents who had spent long periods residing in Iran and receiving support from the Iranian government. And, on the other, from the fact that both sides now shared a common religious and sectarian heritage. (39)Hence, regardless of the fact that Iran continuously tries to maintain and strengthen its relations with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq the Iranian state is now more prone to side with the Iraqi state in disagreements that erupt between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Iraqi government. Moreover, it continuously attempts to seek compromise from the Iraqi Kurds when settling disputes between the two sides. In this regard, Iran offers support to the Iraqi government by applying economic pressure on the Kurds via the closing of border crossings among other forms of coercion. In summary, Iran continually assisted the Iraqi Kurds while Iraq was under the regime of the Ba׳athist party. It used the opportunity to increase its status and influence in the Kurdish Region of Iraq by opening offices in cities across the region of which the decision-making office for the Ramadan operations was perhaps the best example. However, post2003- the Iranian

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attitude has shifted to one of support for the new Iraqi government, while at the same time trying to maintain relations with the Iraqi Kurds and preserve its influence in the region.

2.3 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region and the Iranian opposition.Another primary cause of Iranian efforts to seek influence and interfere in the affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan draws from the fact that Iran hosts an internal Kurdish population with an active political movement. The Kurdish question in Iran is a matter of much concern for the Iranians, and thus they attach great importance to the issue. As a result, the Iranians have been and continue to be in a continuous effort to restrict and dismantle the Kurdish opposition parties in Iran. Iran believes that the actions of these Kurdish groups create insecurity in the border regions with Iraqi Kurdistan and therefore Iran has no option but to station troops at the border regions on their side of the border. And by consequence to ensure the security of Iran, the Iranians must seek policies that force the Iraqi Kurds to secure the shared border from their side. These policies usually take the form of influence and interference in the military affairs of the Iraqi Kurds. (40) Since the leadership of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Iran has continued to follow a policy of support for the Iraqi Kurds in their struggle against the Iraqi State. The Iranians offer this support on the condition that the Iraqi Kurds assist them in their efforts to weaken and dismantle the Kurdish parties and Kurdish movement as a whole in Iran. The agreement between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds has proved fruitful to some extent for both sides. A document held by the Iranian SAVAK agency dated 24th August 1963 explains that while giving a press conference in Germany Jalal Talabani communicated that the Kurdish leadership in Iraq believe that the Kurds of Iran should not conduct any political activities against the Iranian State. (41) Moreover, in 1966 the leader of the Kurdish movement in Iraqi Kurdistan the late Mullah Mustafa Barzani warned the Iranian Kurds that any activity they conduct against the Iranian state would be considered treasonous against the Kurdish revolution as a whole. (42)

The agreement between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran resulted in the confinement of the Kurdish political parties in Iran. What is more, in 1968 the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan assassinated some of the leading figures of the Kurdish Movement in Iran like Abdullah Moaini. According to some accounts, the arrest and assassination of Abdullah Moaini occurred in the Iraqi Kurdish city of Sulaimania. His body was then given to the Iranian government and put on display in the predominantly Kurdish Iranian town of Mahabat. (43) Therefore, under the leadership of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Iran was able to mostly insulate itself from the Kurdish revolutionary parties within Iran by working to increase its influence with the Kurdish revolutionary movement in Iraq. It was able to achieve security in the mountainous border regions with Iraqi Kurdistan by trading Iranian support for the Kurds against the Iraqi state for Iraqi Kurdish support for Iran against the Kurdish movement in Iran. In 1979 the Islamic Revolution of Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeini swept away the old guard and ushered in a new Islamic political reality in Iran. During the turmoil of the revolution, the Kurdish parties in Iran clashed with government forces and were able to take control of numerous Kurdish towns and cities. In an attempt to regain control of the country Imam Khomeini issued a statement describing the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran as the party of the devil and issued a religious decree outlawing the party. (44) Hence, the new Islamic Republic of Iran quickly came to grips with the threat posed to it by its Kurdish population and like the regime before it offered the Iraqi Kurds Iranian support in their struggle against the Iraqi state on the condition of Iraqi Kurdish assistance with Iran׳s Kurdish problem. (45) Iran hoped that with Iraqi Kurdish support it could silence the Kurdish-Iranian nationalist groups in Iran. (46)The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq agreed to this condition quickly, and an agreement in this regard signed between Massoud Barzani and Mustafa Chamran in 1979 established that the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq would support the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps militarily against the Iranian Kurdish Nationalist. (47) The other dominant Iraqi Kurdish political

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party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, chose to refrain from engaging militarily with the Iranian Kurds and decided not to accept the agreement proposed by the Iranians. (48) This issue remained a sticking point between Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan until the geopolitics of the region changed once again with the 1991 Iraqi Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi state. (49) The Kurdish uprising of 1991 resulted in the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government and posed a new threat to the Iranians. Iran feared that with the establishment of Kurdish quasi-state the Iranian Kurdish parties would now have access to unregulated territory outside of Iran to plan operations against them. Iran, therefore, considered this new reality as one of the most prominent threats facing the borders of the Iranian state. (50)An Iranian delegation visited Iraqi Kurdistan in 1993 to remedy the Kurdish threat. On their visit, the Iranians received pledges from Iraqi Kurdish leaders that they would not allow the Iranian Kurds space within their territory to plan and carry out operations against Iran. However, feeling that this was not enough of a guarantee, the Iranians established numerous official representation offices with the aim of using them as external resources to combat any activity that the Iranian Kurdish parties conduct within Iraqi Kurdistan. (51)The Kurdish civil war that erupted between the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was another challenge for the Iranians. The civil war caused instability in Iraqi Kurdistan and by consequence allowed space for the Iranian Kurds to carry out their activities. The Kurdish civil war alarmed the Iranians so much so that they were forced to increase their pressure on the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to stand against the Kurdish groups of Iran whom the Iranians considered counter-revolutionaries. In meetings with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in August 1994, the Iranians warned the Kurds that; «If Iranian Kurdish security is compromised as a result of actions by enemies of the Iranian state within Iraqi Kurdish territory then the security of Iraqi Kurdistan will also be compromised by actions of enemies of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iranian Kurdish territory.» (53)

What is more, Iran continuously engaged in cross-border operations to dismantle resources of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran. On one occasion in July 1996, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard attempted to capture the leaders of the Kurdish movement in Iran by attacking their bases and infrastructure in Koya. (54) They also forced the Iraqi Kurdish parties to stop radio broadcasts that were being transmitted by the Kurdish parties of Iran from Iraqi Kurdish territory. In March 2015, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran announced that they planned to restart their operations against the Iranian state. (55) Iran responded harshly with General Salam, the deputy commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, issuing a warning to the Kurdish Regional Government. The General statement read;«We warn the proxy governments of the region and the political leadership in northern Iraq that they need to keep the pledges they have made to the Iranian state. We will not hesitate to destroy any region that poses a threat to the national security of our country.» (56) The Kurdish Regional government responded with a statement the following day. The Kurdish Regional Government condemned the announcement by General Salam and described the threats as unhelpful to bilateral relations. (57)A more pressing concern for the Iranians when it comes to the Kurdish movement in Iran is that they believe the United States and Israel are using it as a tool to destabilise Iran. Moreover, they argue that the United States and Israel are funding and equipping the Iranian Kurds in this regard. (58) Hence, the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Shamkhani, made a statement regarding the planned 2017 Kurdish independence referendum. In the announcement, he referred to the current military and security agreements between the Iraqi Kurds and Iran and threatened that Iran was ready to pull out of all deals. He said;«The breaking away of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq would spell the end of all agreements between us. Moreover, to protect its shared border [with Iraqi Kurdistan] from the activities of counter-revolutionary [Iranian Kurdish] forces Iran would be prepared to review its relations with the Iraqi Kurds and change the nature its

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engagement.» (59)Therefore, there is an argument to suggest that Iran has used the presence of Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan as a pretence to increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Furthermore, the Iranian government has expressed openly to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan that had the Iranian Kurds not used Iraqi Kurdish territory Iran would not have felt the need to interfere in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs. The Iranians have also expressed that Iran has no problem with the political system in place in northern Iraq (whatever the Kurds choose). They argue that their sole issue is that Iranian Kurds also use the territory in their conflict against the Iranian state (60).

2.4 - Relations between the Kurdistan Region and states that present a threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran.Since its beginnings, the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraqi Kurdistan has sought relations with foreign states. The Iranian government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi held excellent links with the Iraqi Kurdish movement until the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975. The Iranians in this period also enjoyed positive relations with the United States and Israel making it even acceptable for the Iraqi Kurds to develop relationships with these two states. In fact, the connections were so productive that on occasion the Kurds received support from the United States and Israeli via the then Iranian government. (61) In 1972 it was the Shah of Iran that gave the leader of the Kurdish movement Mullah Mustafa Barzani the news that the United States had pledged its support and assistance to the Iraqi Kurds (62) which resulted in a 16 million dollar aid package to the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. (63) Following the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 numerous SAVAK agency documents fell into the hands of the new Iranian government and at the same time, the Iranian ceased their relations with the United States and Israel and identified both nations as the most prominent enemies of Iran and the world. (64) The relations between

the United States and Iran further soured after some pro-Khomeini Iranian students stormed the United States embassy in Tehran on the 4th November 1979 and held United States officials hostage. (66)Following the Kurdish uprising against the Iraqi state in 1991, the Kurds worked to build and restructure their relations with foreign nations. Iraqi Kurdistan׳s desperation for relations with foreign states opened the door for foreign countries to enter Iraqi Kurdistan and consequently made Iraqi Kurdistan another geopolitical space where international rivalries were played out. From the onset, Iraqi Kurdistan׳s open door policy to foreigners made Iran feel uneasy and threatened, and by consequence, Iran worked harder to increase its presence and influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. (67) As the Iraqi Kurds developed their international relations with the likes of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United States, and Israel Iran felt increasingly threatened as it views these states and its most notable foreign competitors. To remedy the threat, Iran worked to increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and interfered in internal Iraqi Kurdish political process to pressure the Kurdish government away from these relations and as a result, reduced the threat that these relations presented to Iran. In more recent years Iran views the developing economic and political ties between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan and the increased influence that the Turkish government has over the Iraqi Kurdistan as a cause for concern for its political and economic interests. (68) This anxiety became more apparent after the Iraqi Kurds joined the oil economy 2013 via the construction of an oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan through Turkey to the Ceyhan port. These developments evidenced how close relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey had become. For the Turks relations with the Iraqi Kurds played well. On the one hand, it worked to decrease Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and on the other it worked to reduce the political activity of the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey. The Iranians saw the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq as the party that had allowed Turkish influence to grow in Iraqi Kurdistan and therefore as a countermeasure worked with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the central Iraqi

14

government to forward Iran׳s economic interests in the country and by consequence its influence as a whole in the country. (69) Saudi Arabia also presented a challenge for the Iranian government as it had perpetually tried to take advantage of the presence of Islamic groups in Iraqi Kurdistan to build its relations with the Iraqi Kurds. (70) Saudi Arabia is one of Iran׳s leading rivals in the Middle East and therefore meant Iran had to direct its foreign policy at countering these attempts at influence by Saudi Arabia. Hence, Iran has worked tirelessly to strengthen its relations with the religious parties, groups and individuals in Iraqi Kurdistan. To this end, Iran intentionally invites notable Islamic movements and Islamic individuals within Iraqi Kurdistan, like the Shafi׳i congress to its annual International Islamic Unity Conference (71)Since 1991 the United States has proved to be a staunch ally of the Iraqi Kurds and has played a significant role in its political, economic and social development. (72) United States influence is so strong in Iraqi Kurdistan that during the Kurdish civil war of the 1990׳s the United States was able to prevent both Iraqi Kurdish parties from accepting Iranian mediation to stop the violence by threatening to withdraw its support for the fledgeling region. (73) To avoid Iranian influence in the Kurdish civil war, the United States invited both Kurdish leaders to Washington in September 1998 and mediated between them. By the end of the visit, peace was restored with both sides agreeing to the Washington Agreement. (74) Iran views this increase in United States influence in Iraqi Kurdistan as a significant concern and threat. In particular, the fact that the United States worked to prevent Iranian influence in the civil war at a time when Iran has on many occasions played the role of mediator between Kurdish factions and parties made the Iranians extremely uneasy. Kurdish relations with the United States has continued to expand. In 2003 the Iraqi Kurds proved to be a significant ally in the campaign to topple the former Iraqi Ba׳athist Regime. In turn, the United States has been a vital ally for the Iraqi Kurds in their quest for the establishment of federalism in the post-Saddam Iraqi state. With United States support the Iraqi Kurds were able to force the Iraqi government to formally accept

the Kurdish Region as a formal autonomous Iraqi region in the Iraqi constitution. (75) Iran believes the United States is interested in Iraqi Kurdistan for numerous reasons; first, the United States wants to counter the dominance of the Shi׳a community in Iraq. Second, the is the existence of a connection between the Kurds and Israel. Third, the United States intends to weaken the government in Baghdad by using the Iraqi Kurds as a tool. Fourth, to support the Iranian Kurds in their opposition to Tehran. Fifth, the United States wants to use Iraqi Kurdish territory as a military and intelligence base against Iran. And sixth, because the United States has economic interests in Iraqi Kurdistan׳s oil market. (76)For these reasons, Iran views the presence of the United States in Iraqi Kurdistan as a direct and severe threat to Iran. Compounding this fear is the fact that the United States also has military bases in Afghanistan meaning Iran feels that the United States has intentionally worked to surround Iran militarily. (77) To oppose the threat from the United States, Iran works to increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and uses its pressure cards to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kurdish Region reducing the United States based threat to them. Another concern for Iran is the Israeli interest in Iraqi Kurdistan. For Iran, the source of Israel׳s interest in Iraqi Kurdistan is because the central Iraqi government presents a significant obstacle to Israel in its foreign policy objectives for the Middle East. Hence, Israel works to strengthen its position amongst the Iraqi Kurds and aims to separate Iraqi Kurdistan from the rest of the Iraqi state so that Israel can use Iraqi Kurdistan as a foreign policy base. (78) Iran׳s concern when it comes to Israel is that it fears that Israel intends to set up stations in countries and regions that border Iran. For the Iranians, Israel׳s moves on Iraqi Kurdistan fall in line with this Israeli foreign policy objective. (79) In fact, Iran understands that Israel wants to open military bases in the Kurdish mountains to sow the seeds of division between the different Iranian communities, to spy on Iran׳s nuclear program, and to use them to launch military operations into Iran against its nuclear program whenever an opportunity presents itself. (80)

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Therefore, to protects its security from foreign threats Iran is in a continuous race against other actors to better its relations with Iraqi Kurdistan. Realpolitik obliges Iran to strengthen its status and influence in Iraqi Kurdistan so that it can continue to have some semblance of control over the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan and by consequence keep its border with the Iraqi Kurds protected from foreign influence.

Part 3 - Internal politics and the political space for Iranian influence and interference in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

3.1 - The foundational condition of Iraqi Kurdistan and the political space available to the Kurdistan Region׳s political parties.

The conditions in which the Iraqi Kurdistan established itself and the political space in which the Iraqi Kurdish political parties function has been rife with opportunities for the Iranians to interfere in its internal politics and by consequence widened Iranian influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Following the Kurdish uprising of 1991 and the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government Iran maintained its interest in the region and played a direct role in shaping the issues and politics that the Kurdistan Regional government was involved. This Iranian hand in the affairs of the Kurdish Regional government is identifiable with a historical account of Iraqi Kurdistan. The collapse of the Iraqi monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of Iraq in 1958 under the leadership of Abdulkarim Qasim was the first time that Kurdish rights in Iraq were officially recognised and relations between the Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdistan was normalised. However, the friendly relations between the two sides was short-lived. Relations between the two soured as the political space available to the Iraqi Kurds was gradually decreased. The situation became so severe that the leader of the Iraqi

Kurds Mullah Mustafa Barzani decided to leave the Iraqi capital and headed back to the Kurdish mountains of northern Iraq. (81) For the Iranians, this breakdown of relations between Baghdad and Erbil served as an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of Iraq and Kurdistan. Iran seized the opportunity by using its SAVAK agency to make contact with the notable figures in the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. (82)This new Iranian connection and the souring of relations between the Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government forced the Kurdistan Democratic Party (the only Kurdish party at the time) to move its political activities from Baghdad to Tehran. Iran for its part used the opportunity to build further relations with Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the Iraqi Kurds by allowing the opening Kurdistan Democratic Party representation offices in Iran in 1964 and officially recognised Shamsadin Mufti as the formal representative of Mullah Mustafa in Iran. (83) In the same year, the then leader of the SAVAK agency Hassan Pakravan with the assistance of Isa Pijman visit Haji Omaran to meet with Mullah Mustafa. (84) The Iranian relationship with the Iraqi Kurds culminated with Iran opening direct offices and relations with the Kurdish revolutionary movement in Iraqi Kurdistan with the intention of offering assistance to the Kurds. These initial relations between the two sides come to an end with the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975 between Iran and Iraq and the subsequent collapse of the Kurdish revolutionary movement in Iraq. In the prelude to the Iranian revolution when protests against the Iranian monarchy gained pace, in October 1978, the acting leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Qiada Moqda, announced the Kurdish Party׳s support for the Iranian revolutionaries and, in this regard, sent a delegation to Paris to meet with Imam Khomeini. Following the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Kurdistan Democratic Party sent a second delegation led by Idrees Barzani to meet once again with Imam Khomeini in the Iranian town of Qom. The fact that the commission was welcomed by Imam Khomeini personally signalled that the party was free to continue their activities within Iran. (85) As a result, the interim leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party

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met on the 10th November 1979 at the Zewe camp near the city of Urmia to hold their party conference. At the Conference Massoud Barzani was selected as the party leader. (86) With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the Kurdistan Democratic Party worked with the Iranians to create allied forces to fight against the Iraqi state from Iraqi Kurdish territory. (87)From its establishment, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan maintained an antagonistic stance towards Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and thus at the onset of civil hostilities in Iran the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Jalal Talabani made contact with the leadership of the Iranian revolutionaries and expressed his parties support for their Islamic revolution. (88) As the Islamic revolution of Iran progressed and hostilities spread across the country, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan took the opportunity to; first transfer the majority of its bases and activities from Syria to Iran. Second, use Iranian territory and the revolutionary disorder of Iran to shift its military commanders back into Iraq (89). And third, to move its official politburo headquarters to the Iranian village of Nawzang. (90)To assist the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan directly, the Iranians summoned Jalal Talabani to Tehran for talks lasting twenty-two days (- 1979/07/23 1979/08/16). In his visit to Iran, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan met with numerous Iranian leaders amongst them Imam Khomeini and his deputy Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri. In their meeting, the Iranians pledged to provide the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan with all necessary assistance for their struggle. (91) To this end, Jalal Talabani placed Dr Fuad Massoum as his official ambassador in Tehran to relay of correspondence between the two leaders. (92) Relations between Iran and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan hit a stumbling block with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. However, after the collapse of negotiations between Iraqi state and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1983 the Party once again transferred its bases of activity to Iran. (93) What is more, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan went on to work in military alliance with Iran against the Iraqi state. The most notable allied operation between the two sides was their joint attack on the oil wells of Kirkuk in October 94) .1986)

The military alliance between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Iranian state worked to re-warm relations between the two sides and once again allow the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to use Iranian territory to achieve their objectives against the Iraqi state. Moreover, relationships between the two parties developed to such point that the Iranians allowed the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to open official representation offices in Tehran, Kirmashan, Sardasht, and Razaya. (95) Furthermore, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war prompted the Iranians to work to establish an Islamic movement in Iraqi Kurdistan. To that end, Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri met with Hussain Maronsi in a refugee camp in Karaj and asked that he work with notable religious figures of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to establish an Islamic Party in the region and as a result, he founded the Islamic Army of Kurdistan. (96) Also, at the close of 1983 Sheikh Mohammed Barzinji a notable religious figure in Iraqi Kurdistan was displaced to Iran from Iraqi Kurdistan as a result of Iraqi state pressure. While in Iran he worked with the Iranians to establish the ‹Army of the Quran׳, the military wing of the Movement for Islamic Relations. (97) In 1987 the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja faced anti-government protests and civil disorder. The subsequent brutal crackdown by the Iraqi government forced the displacement numerous notable religious individuals from the country to Iran including Omer Abdulaziz, Osman Abdulaziz, Ali Abdulaziz, Amed Kaka Mohammed, Sheikh Sadiq Sargati and Said Ahmed Abdulwahab. The then Iranian Prime minister welcomed these religious refugees, and while they were in Iran, the men met in the Iranian town of Sinah at the home of Sheikh Mohammed Barzinji. Ayatollah Khamenei attended the meeting and after much discussion decided to change the name of their party from ‹Movement for Islamic Relations׳ to the ‹Islamic Movement of Kurdistan׳. The following day the party used the Dar Al Hussain mosque in Sinah to announce their new name. (98)Hence, an observation into the history of prominent political parties of Iraqi Kurdistan immediately reveals that all the parties have maintained strong connections with the Islamic

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Republic of Iran and have worked continuously to strengthen these ties. These relationships make clear that each of the Iraqi Kurdish political forces outlined above has contributed to the increasing influence Iran enjoys in Iraqi Kurdistan, and for Iran, the Kurdish parties and their internal struggles and requirements have given the Iranians sufficient space to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan.

3.2 - The political differences of Kurdistan Region׳s political partiesFollowing the coup d׳etat of Abdul Salam Arif and the collapse of the government of Abdul Karim Qasim in 1963, Mulla Mustafa Barzani unilaterally signed an agreement with Abdul Salam Arif in February 1964 and sparked disagreement within the Kurdistan Democratic Party. (99) Some of the dissatisfied members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party such as Ibrahim Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, Nawzad Ahmed and Omer Mustafa openly expressed their dissatisfaction and announced that they would not abide by the agreement and that they would instead continue to seek military ends until they achieved self-government for Kurdistan. This significant difference between the different wings of the Kurdistan Democratic Party increased tensions within the Kurdistan Democratic Party. (100)The tensions within the Kurdistan Democratic Party reached a crisis point in April 1964. Ibrahim Ahmed׳s wing of the party held the Sixth Kurdistan Democratic Party conference in the town of Mawat on the 9th April 1964 with the meeting deciding to unseat Mullah Mustafa Barzani as the head of the party. In response, Mullah Mustafa Barzani׳s wing of the party held the Sixth Kurdistan Democratic Party Congress on the 9th June 1964 in the town of Kaladze. The occasion was used by Mullah Mustafa Barzani to fortify his position by using the members of party congress to pass a decision to expel Ibrahim Ahmed׳s wing from the party. (101) Following this, on the 13th July 1964, Mullah Mustafa Barzani sent military forces to his party headquarters in Isawe in the Mawat Region of Iraqi Kurdistan to oust Ibrahim Ahmed׳s wing from Iraqi Kurdistan. Ibrahim Ahmed and his

followers were subsequently pushed out of Iraqi Kurdistan and forced to retreat to Iran. Mullah Mustafa immediately asked the Iranians not to accept the men as per their bilateral agreement. The Iranians responded by satisfying both sides. On the one hand, they assisted Mullah Mustafa (102) and on the other to show that the Iranians were friends of the Kurds they welcomed Ibrahim Ahmed׳s wing (103) disarmed them and relocated them to a factory near Hamadan province. (104)The divisions within the Iraqi Kurdish leadership opened the door for Iran to strengthen its influence among the different wings of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and by consequence within the Kurdish movement and the Iraqi Kurdish territory as a whole. To this end, the Iranian leadership summoned Ibrahim Ahmed to Tehran for meetings with the Iranian leadership and in these meetings promised him full Iranian backing. (105) Moreover, Iran unhappy with Mullah Mustafa׳s agreement with Abdul Salam Arif sent a correspondence outlining their feelings about the deal to the Iraqi Kurdish leader. (106) It was these Iranian actions that Jalal Talabani later blamed for causing division and disagreement among the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. (107)The next significant development in Iraqi Kurdish politics came with the establishment of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in 1976. Naturally, the two Kurdish parties became rivals, and this rivalry became a pretext for both the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to seek deeper alliances with Iran. By consequence, both parties became the driving force behind Irans continuously increasing influence in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs. (108) Furthermore, following the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran the new Iranian regime also views the Kurdish political rivalry as an opportunity to increase its sphere of influence and therefore immediately worked to attract the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Iran׳s foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurds continued in this manner, and during the second half of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran successfully lured the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Following this, the Iranians strengthened their ties with both Kurdish parties by establishing the Joint Operation Ramadan command centres, which placed the Kurdish

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parties directly under Iran׳s political and military influence. (109) To stabilise its newfound control the Iranians invited delegations from both parties to Tehran. The delegations led by Jalal Talabani and Idrees Barzani met on 8th November 1986 with Iranian officials and with Iranian assistance reached a bilateral peace agreement. (110) Iran increased its support to the Kurds following the establishment of the Kurdistan Front in May 111) 1987) and also played a significant role in the organisation and execution of the Iraqi Kurdish uprising of 1991, the planning of which was carried out on Iranian soil. Moreover, Iranian military officials from the headquarters of the Ramadan Operation played an immense role in the logistical planning of the uprising. (112)Following the success of the Iraq Kurdish uprising, the subsequent Iraqi Kurdish elections left the Iranians feeling aggrieved and went as far as to threaten revenge. (113) However, the Iranians continued to understand the geopolitical importance of Iraqi Kurdistan and in wanting to maintain its influence used the Kurdish civil war as another opportunity to interfere in and influence Iraqi Kurdish affairs. In this regard, Iran became one of the first international states to attempt to mediate this Iraqi Kurdish crisis by demonstrating its readiness to host both leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani. (114) For Iran acting as a mediator between the two Kurdish parties allowed it further space to expand its influence and ability to interfere in Iraqi Kurdish affairs. Iran׳s general involvement in the Kurdish civil war meant that it was an influential player in the internal Kurdish conflicts when it chose to take sides. (115) For example in the early clashes between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, the Iranians famously sided with the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. Moreover, in the civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Iranians were a decisive force in establishing the location of the final border between the two sides. (116) In its attempts at mediation, Iran׳s aim was also to raise its status amongst the residents of Iraqi Kurdistan. (117) In 1994, an Iranian delegation from the headquarters of Operation Ramadan visited the Iraqi Kurdistan to hold meetings with Jalal Talabani and other significant Iraqi Kurdish

political figures. (118) The visit came after the collapse of talks in Tehran between the two Kurdish parties conducted with the mediation of the United States. According to Nawshirwan Mustafa, the next attempt at conciliation by Iran was «to send the message to the United States that Iran could achieve what the Americans couldn׳t and that Iran׳s influence over the Iraqi Kurdish leaders was higher than the Americans.» To this end, Iran was able to instigate secondary talks between the two Kurdish parties in October 1995 and achieve an agreement by the end. (119)Iran׳s influence over the Iraqi Kurds was such that following the agreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; it was also able to mediate an agreement between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan in 1997 and between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Socialist Party. What is more, Iran was also able to oversee the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.(120) It is for this reason that the sidelining of Iran in the final agreement that ended the Kurdish civil war between the Kurdish parties that was signed in Washington became a cause for Iranian concern. The Iranians viewed the United States intervention as a direct threat to Iranian hegemony in Iraqi Kurdistan and by consequence a threat to Iranian national security. (121)Hence, it is clear that Iran׳s ability to influence and interfere in the affairs of Iraqi Kurdish matters connects to the political rivalries between the internal Kurdish factions. The splintering of the Kurdish polity maximised Iran׳s ability to interfere in the affairs not only of the individual political parties but ultimately the Kurdistan Regional Government.

3.3 - The economy of the Kurdistan RegionThe Kurdish market is highly dependent on imported goods because its economy is neither self-sufficient, independent, or stable. Furthermore, the region is landlocked and has no

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independent access to the sea; instead, it shares land borders with Iran. Turkey and Syria. For this reason, Iraqi Kurdistan has established deep economic connections with its neighbouring states, in which those nearby states flood Iraqi Kurdish markets with their products. For the Iranians, the -513kilometre border with Iraqi Kurdistan presents a two-fold economic advantage. Firstly, it allows Iran to take advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan׳s landlocked nature to export its products to the Iraqi Kurdish market and secondly, it can take advantage of Iraqi Kurdistan׳s geopolitical location as a stepping stone to other foreign markets. (122) To support this cross-border economic relationship Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan enjoy crossing points at Parwez Khan, Basmakh, and Haji Omaran. Hence, Iraqi Kurdistan is a crucial commercial outpost for Iran and therefore is wary of any attempt by Turkey, it׳s number one economic competitor in Iraqi Kurdistan, to encroach on its export market in the region. (123) Iraqi Kurdistan has also worked hard to build this financial relationship with Iran, a relationship which the Kurds also benefit significantly. This economic relationship between the two sides was as present during the Iraqi Kurdish civil war as it is today. (124)For these reasons, Iran is in a continuous struggle to also increase its economic influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, this financial relationship that has developed between the two sides has proved to be an excellent pressure card for the Iranians against the Iraqi Kurds. (125) Anytime Iran becomes unhappy with the political direction within Iraqi Kurdistan it closes its border crossings putting pressure on Kurdish markets. This Iranian policy was evident after the Kurdish Independence Referendum of 2017. Once the poll was carried out on 25th September 2017 against the wishes of the Iranians, Iran closed its border crossings to force the Kurds to nullify its results. Therefore, the Iranians have established themselves as a cornerstone of the Kurdish economy and uses this position to enhance its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and uses Iraqi Kurdish dependence on the Iranian trade and infrastructure to interfere in its political process.

3.4 - The will and advantages for both sides to conduct bilateral relations. The relationship between the Kurdistan Freedom Movement in northern Iraq and Iranian interference in the Kurdistan Region was not merely as a result of Iranian pressure. On occasions, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership also desired Iranian interference because the intervention offered advantages to both sides. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi consistently tried to use the Iraqi Kurds to his advantage when Iran applied pressure on the government in Iraq. The Kurds sought friendly and reliable relations with Iran so that they could get their message to the outside world via Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and also use the Iranian state as a bridge to gain access to its economic and military requirements. As mentioned in previous sections the Iraqi Kurds were successful in this regard as they did, in fact, receive the finances and weapons they required from outside powers like the United States and Israel via their Iranian neighbours. (126)Moreover, after the 1975 Algiers Agreement and the subsequent Islamic Revolution in Iran the two rival Iraqi Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan competed with each other to make contact and build relationships with the leadership of the revolution. (127) Hence, both parties subsequently made contact with the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini, and declared their party׳s support for his rebellion. As the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan had not enjoyed friendly relations with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi׳s government, it became the first Iraqi Kurdish political party to contemplate ties with the Iranian revolutionaries. In this regard, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani, sent correspondence to both Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri and later sent a letter to Imam Khomeini. (128)The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan׳s courting of Imam Khomeini and the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries was also evident when Imam Khomeini was in exile in the French town of Neauphle-le-Château. While Imam Khomeini was in France the leadership of the Patriotic

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Union of Kurdistan sent a delegation consisting of Dr Fuad Mahsoum, Adil Murad, and Ahmed Bamarani to meet with him. In the meetings, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan expressed to him the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan׳s readiness to assist him and his revolution in any way that they can. They also offered their assistance to get Imam Khomeini back into Iran via the Iraqi Kurdish mountains. (129) In response to the offer made to him by the representatives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Imam Khomeini asked the delegation what they wanted in return? To which the representatives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan responded that the collapse of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi regime was as vital to them as it was to the Islamic Revolution and therefore all that they wanted in return was for Imam Khomeini׳s revolution to succeed. (130)The Kurdistan Democratic Party also attempted to make contact with Imam Khomeini. The leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Massoud Barzani paid a visit to Europe but was unable to meet with the Iranian Revolutionary on account of an assassination attempt on the Kurdish leader in Vienna by agents of the Iraqi government on 22nd January 131) .1979) Once the Iranian Revolution was complete, the Kurdish parties reiterated their full support to the Islamic Republic of Iran by sending delegations to Iran and sending letters of congratulations to the Iranian revolutionaries and the people of Iran. (132)The bilateral relationship further developed during the Iran-Iraq war. During the conflict, the Kurdistan Freedom movement and the Iranian government worked together against the Iraqi government with each side assisting the other with the aim of reaching their respective personal goals and objectives. The Iranians used the relationship firstly, to suppress the ambitions of the Iranian Kurds. Secondly, to apply pressure on the Iraqi government. Thirdly, to create a second front in the Iran-Iraq war in the north of Iraq to keep the Iraqi Army occupied while it attacked the south of the country, And lastly, to collapse the Iraqi government and replace it with an Islamic government. The Kurds, on the other hand, used the relationship to move their ambitions for self-rule forward by working with

the Iranians to collapse the Iraqi government. (133)The 1991 Iraqi Kurdish paradigm shift to self-government and the subsequent Iraqi Kurdish civil-war saw the Kurdish parties competing to build relations with foreign states to strengthen their internal political positions. (134) In this regard, the Kurdish parties of Iraqi Kurdistan worked to form alliances with the Iranians and by consequence brought Iranian influence into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. During this period the Iranians concerned themselves with bringing the Iraqi Kurdish hostilities to an end and in so doing courted the Iraqi Kurdish political parties. For example, when during that period a Patriotic Union of Kurdistan delegation visited Iran the Iranians greeted them by saying «Welcome to your own home». (135)Good relations between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds were mutually beneficial. The Iranians and the Iraq Kurdish factions were in a constant effort to better their relationship to reap its benefits. Hence, the overthrow of the Iraqi government in 2003 and the creation of a new federal Iraq was a unique opportunity for both sides to improve relations further. As a message of friendship to the Iraqi Kurds, the Iranians became the first foreign state to open a consulate in the capital city of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. (136)Therefore, it is clear that both the Iranians and the Iraqi Kurds willed the development of robust bilateral relations. This mutual desire has played well into the Iranian policy of building its influence in and ability to interfere in Iraqi Kurdish affairs.

3.5 - Nationalism and the development of the idea of independence in the Kurdistan Region. Throughout modern history, the Kurds have worked for the establishment of self-rule for themselves. These Kurdish efforts have played out in many ways but most notably via revolution and conflict. After the First World War in 1918 and the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, the Kurds awaited the fulfilment of the treaty׳s promise to establish an independent Greater Kurdish state. However, when all was said and done the hope

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was not met. Instead, the promised Kurdish land became divided between Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. As a result, the Kurds of the Middle East, troubled by the reality that befell them at the close of First World War developed a nationalist doctrine with the objective of establishing an independent Kurdish state. After the success of Abd al-Karim Qasim׳s Iraqi coup with the support of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (the sole Kurdish party at the time), the Kurdish party decided at its fifth congress to retain its position to seek Iraqi Kurdish self-government. The Iraqi Kurdish refusal to depart from this position became the precursor for the collapse of relations between Iraq׳s Kurds and the new Iraqi government culminating in an armed conflict in 1961 between the two sides. (137) The Iranians were also against the Iraqi Kurdish position for self-rule as they feared the territorial integrity of Iran if the Iranian Kurds pursued the same policy objective. (138)Kurdish nationalism and their notion of self-rule entered a new phase following the 1991 Iraqi Kurdish uprising, the subsequent Iraqi Kurdish elections of May 1992 and the establishment of the Kurdish National Assembly, which voted for the establishment of federalism for Iraqi Kurdistan in October 139) .1992) These developments troubled Iran further with the then Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani announcing that Iran could not ignore the Iraqi Kurdish elections if it results in the collapse of the Iraqi state. (140)Iran made its feelings clear on the issue during its efforts to mediate in the Iraqi Kurdish civil war. The Iranian representative made clear that its refusal to help the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was because the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was assisting Iranian Kurdish parties that were opposed to Iran and also proposing the establishment of an independent Greater Kurdistan that threatened the territorial integrity of Iran. Moreover, the Iranians were aggrieved that the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan hanged maps of Greater Kurdistan within their offices and headquarters which the Iranians also viewed as a direct threat. (141) What is more, Sardar Masjidi said in regards to Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan that «We have a

traditional strategy towards Kurdistan that we will not hold back. It is essential for us to be active there and whenever our bilateral relations head towards the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, which is the dream of every Kurd, then we will distance ourselves from this outcome.» (142) From this, it is clear that the Iranians have from the onset tried to minimise the impact of Iraqi Kurdish success in gaining self-rule on its indigenous Kurdish population. In confronting and preventing threatening Kurdish advances towards independence, the Iranians have held meetings with the Turks on numerous occasions. (143)It is important also to mention that the Kurdish question in Iraqi Kurdistan is one of the most critical foreign policy issues for Iran, Turkey and Syria. (144) To insulate themselves from the threat posed by the establishment of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran and Turkey held meetings every six months in the 1990׳s to confront the threat posed to them by the establishment of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Between 1992 and 1994 these parties met on five occasions and agreed to support the unity of Iraq and oppose the establishment of federalism in that country. Regarding Kurdistan, the three sides decided that they would resist the Kurdish nation-building process, fight any attempt at redrawing the map of the Middle East in favour of the Kurds and stand against the use of the Kurds as a pressure card against established regional states. (145) Moreover, Iran is of the view that the establishment of a Kurdistan as a country in the region is part of Israel׳s expansionist foreign policy and by consequence believes that any future Kurdish state would be in alliance with Israel threatening Iranian interests. (146)In reality, across the region, 25 million Kurds look to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a symbol and sole example of a recognised Kurdish political order. (147) This reality is the reason behind Iran׳s continuing efforts to gain influence in this region. It is important to note, as mentioned previously, that Iran has in the past given the thumbs up to Kurdish self-rule in Iraq. However, it has always maintained that the Iraqi Kurds must achieve this in the confines of the Iraqi state. If Kurdish ambitions work to break Iraq up, then Iran has warned that it will not be

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happy and will not remain silent on the issue. (148)On the subject of the Iraq war of 2003, it remains evident that Iran was always against the invasion and overthrow of the former Iraqi regime, yet Iran has taken advantage of the invasion turning it into a golden opportunity for themselves. Since the attack, Iran has spread its influence across Iraq and worked to change the nature of Iraq from a threatening enemy to a close ally and friend. (149) It is important also to note that Iran was the first international state to accept the new geopolitical reality and officially recognise the new governing council in Iraq following the overthrow of the old regime and to send a delegation to meet with that new Iraqi government. (150)The last two decades of Iraqi history has been geopolitically turbulent, not least for Iraq׳s neighbouring states. Over this time Iran has anchored its Iraq policy on the preservation of Iraq׳s unity and territorial integrity. That is why the last two decades have seen Iranian policy favour the strengthening of the Iraqi governing infrastructure against the consolidation of Kurdish decentralised control. Whenever Iraqi Kurdistan׳s politics is in support of the Iranian policy bilateral relations between the two are improved, but whenever the Kurds seek political steps against the Iranian viewpoint, then they are met with harmful political interference to influence the Iraqi Kurds to move back in line with Iranian policy objectives. (151)This Iranian position was evident during the Iraqi Kurdish Independence Referendum of 2017. During the campaigning phase, Iran made its position clear that it was against the referendum as it would cause the break up of the Iraqi state. The commander of the Iranian Army, Mohammad Bakri, on a visit to Turkey made clear publically that the Iraqi Kurdish Independence Referendum could not be accepted. What is more, the Secretary of Iran׳s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani warned Iraqi Kurdish leaders that if the proposed referendum were carried out, then the Kurds would be isolating themselves. Furthermore, he explained that Iran viewed any attempt at dividing the state of Iraq as a colonial plan and Iran would, therefore, work to preserve the unity of Iraq. Qasim Sulaiman,

who is in charge of Iran׳s Iraq dossier, also warned strongly against the carrying out of the referendum explaining that it would have adverse effects on the political and security relationship of the Iraqi Kurds and Iran. (152)Following the Iraqi Kurdish independence referendum, the Iranian government responded indirectly. Many of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties explain that their loss of control over the disputed territories on 16th October 2017 was as a result of Iranian backed Iraqi military action spurred by the execution of the referendum. Hence, the Iranians have worked at every juncture to prevent increased Kurdish self-rule. The Iranians have met every Iraqi Kurdish step towards autonomy and independence with an element of resistance. Where it has not made a direct intervention, it has worked to increase its influence in the Iraqi Kurdish establishment to stop further strides forward in a direction not favoured by Iran.

Conclusion1) Iran has maintained the view that the Iraqi Kurds are a part of the Iranian people and that Iraqi Kurdish territory is historical geography separated from Iran in previous years. Therefore, Iran believes it must keep the Iraqi Kurds onside and that it must maximise its efforts to retain and increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan2) Under the policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution, The Islamic Republic of Iran has employed every effort to maintain and increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan while at the same time preserving its status amongst the Iraqi Kurds. Iran׳s reasoning for this is the strategic and geopolitical importance of Iraqi Kurdistan. 3) During the period of the Ba׳athist regime of Iraq Iran worked hard to assist the Iraqi Kurdistan Freedom Movement and by consequence had managed to build a high status for itself amongst the Iraqi Kurds. However, following the collapse of the Ba׳athist regime of Iraq in 2003 Iran has changed its position when mediating issues between Baghdad and Erbil in support of the government in Baghdad and has worked continuously to achieve Iraqi Kurdish compromise when settling these issues. To reach agreement on the part of the Iraqi Kurds

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Iran has assisted Baghdad in all manners while employing economic sanctions on the Iraqi Kurdish government by closing border crossings with them. 4) The existence of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has given the Iranians ample reason to work to increase its influence and ability to interfere in Iraqi Kurdish affairs. Iran has always maintained that had the Iranian Kurds not used Iraqi Kurdish territory for their political activities against the Iranian state then Iran would most likely have no reason to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan. 5) The Islamic Republic of Iran is in constant competition with international and regional powers for increased influence and status within Iraqi Kurdistan and as a result, works to improve its ability to interfere and use its pressure cards in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs. The purpose of Iran׳s efforts is to keep the Iraqi Kurds in line and to have the ability to confront any international or regional threats to Iranian territory that may arise from the Iraqi Kurdish region. 6) The political parties within Iraqi Kurdistan were a significant cause when it came to allowing Iran to gain and strengthen its foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan. Looking at the history of each of the prominent political parties within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region it is clear to see that each maintains strong ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran that they consciously work to strengthen these ties. With neither the Kurdish political parties or the Iranian government desiring the relationship to sour it is clear that the Iraqi Kurdish political parties are an essential pillar for Iran in its efforts to increase its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan. For Iran, the desire of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties to maintain strong relations with it presents a golden opportunity for Iran to use the Iraqi Kurdish political parties to

interfere in the internal affairs of Iraqi Kurdistan efficiently. For the Iraqi Kurdish parties, a positive relationship with the Iranian government has meant strong Iranian backing and support for their causes. 7) Rivalries and conflicts among the Iraqi Kurdish political parties presented Iran with a unique opportunity to gain further influence in Iraqi Kurdistan and interfere in the affairs of the Iraqi Kurdish political parties and later the government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Moreover, to achieve this influence, Iran presented itself as a mediator of the Iraqi Kurdish conflict.8) In the economic sphere, Iran has established and entrenched itself well in the Iraqi Kurdish market. What is more, while it gains a financial advantage from this relationship it also uses Iraqi Kurdistan׳s economic dependence on Iran to increase its influence in the Kurdistan Region further. Iran often uses Iraqi Kurdistan׳s economic reliance on Iran as a threat and pressure card against the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. On occasions, this avenue is also exploited by Iran to interfere in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs.

9) In its dealings with Iraqi Kurdistan Iran has followed a policy against Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish independence as these two doctrines present a threat to Iran and its territorial integrity. Hence, whenever the Iraqi Kurds have taken steps closer to freedom and the realisation of Kurdish nationalistic goals Iran has stood firmly against the developments. Furthermore, Iran uses these developments as the reasoning behind its attempts to interfere in internal Iraqi Kurdish affairs.

Arkan Ahmad Jaff obtained his MA in Iran and he is an expert on Iranian contemporary history

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