1 development and application of hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the korea railway...
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1
Development and Application of Hazard Analysis
& Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway
International Railway Safety Conference 2008
Denver, Colorado
October 5-10, 2008October 5-10, 2008
Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi
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About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute
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• Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government
• 254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division
• Key research area
- Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering,
railway policy & operation
• National projects
High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway,
design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction
• National safety R&D program from 2004
• Homepage : www.krri.re.kr
About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute
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I Introduction
Contents
II Risk Assessment Procedure
III Hazard Identification
IV Risk Assessment Model Development
V Conclusion
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Background
1. Introduction
• Cyclic occurrence of major train accidentsCyclic occurrence of major train accidents - 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities- 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities
- 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities- 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities
- 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities- 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities
• Environmental changes in Korea - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004 - Structural reform of railroad industries - Electrification of conventional lines - Preparation of TCR & TSR
• ““Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004 - Focused on the risk-based safety management- Focused on the risk-based safety management - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control
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1. Introduction
Research Objective
Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed
the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models
for the Korea Railway.
- Developing procedure of the risk models
- Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.
Research Objective is to introduce
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ConstructioConstructionn
2. Risk Assessment Procedure
Common Approach Risk Management
Railway System
Techniques/
Technology
Context
Organization
Operation
ConceptConcept DesignDesign ExploitationExploitation DemolitioDemolition n
SystemSystemDefinitionDefinition
RiskRiskManagementManagement
RiskRiskAnalysis Analysis
RiskRiskDefinitionDefinition
RiskRiskEvaluationEvaluation
RiskRiskReductionReduction
ModificationModification
MaintenanceMaintenanceSystem Life CycleSystem Life Cycle
Risk Management Process
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2. Risk Assessment ProcedureNational Railway Risk ManagementSystem Architecture
Safety Evaluation
National SafetyNational SafetyManagementManagement
SystemSystem
SafetyControl
Measures
HazardAnalysis
Construction of Safety
Infrastructure
Safety Management
SE Management Concept Design Design Production Operation Evaluation
1. National Safety Policies (NSP)
2. National Safety Objectives (NSO)
3. National Safety Organization (NSOR)
4. National Safety Integrated Plan (NSP)
5. National Safety Information Sys. (NSI)
6. Nation RiskAssessment Sys. (NRA)
7.National Education & Training Sys, (NET)
8. National Accident Investigation Sys, (NAI)
9. Training & Supplyfor Safety Specialist (TS)
10. Safety P.R. Sys. (SPR)
11. InfrastructureSafety Inspection (ISI)
12. Infrastructure Safety (IS)
13. Railway Rolling Stock Safety (RS)
14. Train Operation Safety & Train Protection (TR&TP)
NSO Evaluation
NSO Evaluation
SPR AppropriatenessEvaluation
NRA Establishment Establishment of
Basis Direction for NRANRA Construction
NRA Operation & Management
NRAUtility Evaluation
NETUtility Evaluation
TSUtility Evaluation
NAIUtility Evaluation
NSP Evaluation
NSI Evaluation
NSPEvaluation
TR&TP Safety PerformanceEvaluation Operation
IS Safety PerformanceEvaluation
IS Safety PerformanceEvaluation Operation
ISI Sys. Appropriateness Evaluation
Establishment of Basis Direction for NET
Establishment of Basis Direction for NAT
Establishment of plan for NSP
Establishment Of National Safety Objectives
NSOR Design
SPR Establishment
NET Establishment
TS Establishment
NAI Establishment
NSP Establishment
NSI Design
Resource Construction & Distribution
NSOR Construction
SPR Construction
NET Construction
TS Construction
NAI Construction
NSI Construction
Resource Management
NSOR Management
SPR Operation
NET Operation & Management
TS Operation & Management
NAI Operation & Management
NSP Operation Management
NSI Management
Construction ofOperation Basis for NSP
Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP
Construction ofBasis for NSP
NSP Management
Establishment of Basis Direction for NSO
Establishment of Basis Direction for NSOR
Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP
Establishment of Basis Direction for NSI
IS Hazard Analysis
TR&TP Hazard Analysis- Terror, illegality
RSHazard Analysis
Establishment of TR&TP Safety Design Requirements
Establishment of IS Safety Design Requirements
Establishment of RS Safety Design Requirements
ISI Plan Establishment
Construction of TR&TPSafety Certification System
Construction of ISSafety Certification System
Construction of RSSafety Certification System
ISI Sys.Modernization
TR&TP Safety Certification System Operation
IS Safety Certification System Operation
RS Safety Certification System Operation
ISI Sys.Operation
Establishment of Basis Direction for TS
Establishment of Basis Direction for SPR
Analysis of ISI Problems
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2. Risk Assessment Procedure
Railway Risk Assessment Procedure
Railway Accident Railway Accident
Appearance ScenariosAppearance Scenarios
Railway Accident Railway Accident
Appearance ScenariosAppearance Scenarios
FTA Model FTA Model FTA Model FTA Model
Railway Accident Railway Accident
Progress Scenarios Progress Scenarios
Railway Accident Railway Accident
Progress Scenarios Progress Scenarios
ETA Model ETA Model ETA Model ETA Model
Casu
al A
nalysis
Co
nseq
uen
ceA
nalysis
Hazard Identification Hazard Identification Hazard Identification Hazard Identification
Defining the Initiating Hazardous EventsDefining the Initiating Hazardous EventsDefining the Initiating Hazardous EventsDefining the Initiating Hazardous Events
Development of Accident Scenarios Development of Accident Scenarios Development of Accident Scenarios Development of Accident Scenarios
Risk Evaluation & ReductionRisk Evaluation & Reduction
HazardousHazardous
EventsEvents
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Hazard Identification Procedure
System definition and boundary settingSystem definition and boundary settingSystem definition and boundary settingSystem definition and boundary setting
Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriersIdentifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriersIdentifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriersIdentifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers
Developing accident appearance scenariosDeveloping accident appearance scenariosDeveloping accident appearance scenariosDeveloping accident appearance scenarios
Developing accident progress scenariosDeveloping accident progress scenariosDeveloping accident progress scenariosDeveloping accident progress scenarios
Accident scenario managementAccident scenario managementAccident scenario managementAccident scenario management
Setting up objective of hazard identification & its boundary
Including the definition of measures which stops the increases of accident
Defining relationships among hazardous events, hazards and barriers.
Considering the relevant key influential factors.
Drawing up hazard log.
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
System & Boundary Definition
Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project
According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”,
The scenarios were divided into the five main areas
1) Train collision accident,
2) Train derailment accident,
3) Train fire accident,
4) Level crossing accident,
5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Hazardous Event IdentificationRailway
Category Hazardous Events
TrainCollision
Misrouted train Mistaking in dealing points, point faults, mistaking in dealing blockage, interlocking system faults
Faults in driving Signal/direction violation, signal fault, mistaking in dealing braking system, braking system fault, over speeding
Abnormal train Train separation, car rolling, train stop, backward moving
Obstacles on the track
External obstacles, parts from train/freight falling, infrastructure collapsing/obstruction
Level Crossing Accident
Being trapped in level crossing
-Engine stop-Deviation of pathway-Gangway blocking-Lack of propulsion/braking-Violation entry-Limit interference -Breaking or detour
Crossing during warning signal
Breaking through or detour the
barrier
RailwayTraffic
Casualty Accident
People struck/crushed Striking with train, Striking with objects
Trip/Slip Trip/slip during train boarding/alighting, Trip/slip by train emergency braking/emergency start
Falling Falling from train, Falling from platform during train boarding/alighting
Caught/Dragged Caught in a train door, Caught between platform and train
Others Electric Shock, Burn, Suffocation
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Railway Accident Appearance Scenario
Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes.
• Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events
- Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events
- Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events
• Underlying CausesUnderlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions
- Human Management Factors
- Technological Factors
- External Factors
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Immediate Causes Underlying CausesHazardous Event
Railway Accident Appearance Scenario
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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios
Railway Accident Scenario
Critical factors influencing accident severity
were identified in the accident progress scenarios”
Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Risk Measure Method
Collective RiskCollective Risk ((Average Number of FWI/yearAverage Number of FWI/year))
==
FrequencyFrequency ((Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occursAverage frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs))
XX
ConsequencesConsequences (the number of FWI/scenario sequence)(the number of FWI/scenario sequence)
1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries
Risk assessment model : the form of a cause and consequence analysis: using fault trees and event trees.
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Data Population
• Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database.
• Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills
• Many thousands of records are reviewed and classified
• Where data was not available,
Use was made of:
- Human error probability assessments
: using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)
- Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway.
- Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.
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4. Risk Assessment Model DevelopmentRailway Risk Assessment & InformationManagement System (RAIMS)
RAIMS
AccidentAnalysis
Accident Search
EnvironmentAnalysis
Hazard Analysis
Damage Analysis
Options Analysis
RiskAnalysis
Event Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Human FactorAnalysis
Safety RequirementVerification Management
Safety RequirementManagement
Railway SystemManagement
Safety RequirementChange
Management
RequirementTraceabilityManagement
SystemManagement
User Management
Code Management
ClassificationManagement
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Web-Based Accident Analysis Subsystem
• One purpose is to provide
- Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents
- Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the public
• This system is composed of three modules
1) Accident input module.
2) Accident analysis & statistics module
3) Hazard management module.
Environment Analysis Accident Analysis Accident Statistic Analysis
• Application running on the web
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Risk Analysis Subsystem
• Dedicated railway risk assessment software package
- Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis
• The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach
- Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor.
- Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees,
which can be developed by a fault tree editor.
- Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern.
• Windows-based application
Event Tree Editor View ET/FT Linking approach Fault Tree Editor View
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA) Module
• Supporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors
• Used under the railway risk assessment framework
• Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process.
• Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB
• Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping
factors (PSFs)
General Information Input Error Analysis & Quantification Reporting Results
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Railway Accident Risk Assessment Results
• Railway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea• Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp.. • The total risk: 217 FWI per year
• The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences. • Railway casualty accident
: Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls)• Train accidents
: Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events
: Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.
Accident Category Risk (FWI)
Train collision accident 0.6744
Train derailment accident 3.6898
Train fire accident 14.1
Level crossing accident 16.94
Railway traffic casualty accident 161.138
Railway safety casualty accident 20.742
Total 217.284
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4. Risk Assessment Model Development
Future Development of the Risk Model
The model is being prepared currently and will include:
• Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model
• Improved level of human factors modeling
• Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques
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5. Conclusion
This study has proposed
• Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway
• Application of their application to the Korea railway
The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway
Which will
• Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance
• Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls
• Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction
• Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes
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Thank you!