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Critical Mass Governance: Reforming Environmental Multilateralism to Fit the New World Order

Luke Kemp, PhD Candidate

Panel:Prof. Janette Lindesay (Panel Chair)Dr. Karen HusseyDr. Rob Dyball

The Failings of Multilateralism

• A lack of leadership.

• A lack of ‘fit’.

• What happened to the ‘Global Deal’?

• A tale of two protocols….

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Legal zombies:

the worst kind of living dead

United we Stand, Divided we Stall

• The US Ratification Straitjacket.

• Directional Leadership.

• A world without a Hegemon.

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A Multipolar World

• Rise of the BRICs.

• A change in norms and rules.

• A shift to consensus.

• Specific reciprocity and ‘the global package’.

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The Alternatives

• Retreat to the Region!

• Muddle through with Multilateralism.

• Minilateralism: “an idea whose time has come”(Dryzek 2012)

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Research Questions

1. How can the issue of US ratification and/or participation be effectively addressed within an effective international architecture for environmental governance?

2. How can effective environmental governance without the United States (or other recalcitrant states) be enabled though; major international institutions, decision making processes, and an operational legal treaty.

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Thesis Structure

• Introduction.

• Article 1- Realpolitik and reform (UNEP).

• Article 2- Voting in the UNFCCC.

• Article 3- Weighted voting in MEAs.

• Article 4- A 2015 Agreement Without the US

• Conclusion

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Methods

• Participant observation (Rio+20, COP18, COP19 and numerous others).

• Interviewees with key, informed stakeholders.

• Literature review.

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Methodolgoy

• Systems thinking- influence diagrams.

• Political feasibility- output legitimacy.

• Scenario building.

• Hegemonic projects (Elkers et al 2009).

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Realpolitik and Reform

• The Debate over a World Environment Organisation (WEO).

• Function- to implement or not to implement?

• Form- Whither the WEO?

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POSITIVE PERCEPTION OFUNEP'S EFFICACY

LEVEL OFFINANCING

LEVEL OFAUTHORITY

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LEVEL OF UNEPSUCCESS IN

OPERATIONS +

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WILLINGNESS TOCHANGE UNEP'S

FORM

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US WILLINGNESS TORATIFY

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNALMANAGEMENT AND POLICY

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FinancialFeedback

AuthorityFeedback

The UNEP Conundrum: Failure to the Failures

Scenarios for UNEP after Rio

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• Incremental upgrade (and hope).

• UNEP Unknown

• A Critical Mass WEO

• A Critical Mass WSDO

Framework for the Future

• Consensus, rule-beating and failure.

• Voting as a consensus-builder.

• Is globalism necessary?

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Implementing Voting

• Blockers and pushers.

• To amend or not to amend?

• Adopt the Rules of Procedure?

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Institutional Dimensions

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LEVEL OF POLITICALFAILURES FROM

CONSENSUS

LEVEL OF PATHDEPENDENCY

LEVEL OFPOLITICALPRESSURE

USE AND/OR DISMISSALOF VETO RIGHTS

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DESIRE FOR CHANGE IN UNFCCCDECISION MAKING

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FAMILIARITY OFALTERNATIVES

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LEVEL OFINSTITUTIONAL

MEMORY

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LEVEL OF INFORMATION ABOUTDECISION MAKING

ALTERNATIVES

USE OF VOTING INRELATED BODIES

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LIKELIHOOD OFINSTITUTIONAL

LEARNING

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2015 Feedback

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FamiliarityFeedback

DISMISSAL OF VETO RIGHTS(OCCURRENCE OF RULE

BEATING)

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Scenarios for Decision Making Change

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AMENDMENTS TO THECONVENTION

ADOPTION OF RULES OFPROCEDURE

3/4 MAJORITY VOTE

CONSENSUS

NON-UNIVERSALRATIFICATION

UNIVERSAL RATIFICATION

DUAL INSTITUTIONS

MAJORITYVOTING

ALTERNATIVE A OFDRAFT RULE 42.1

ALTERNATIVE B(CONSENSUS) OFDRAFT RULE 42.1

LAYERED VOTING

DOUBLE QUALIFIEDMAJORITY VOTING

PANDORA'SBOX FEARS

INTERESTS OF THEPOWERFUL

COMPLEXITY OFNEGOTIATING

PROCESS

LEVEL OF DEBATE OVERANNEX SYSTEM

LIKELINESS OF BLOCKSOCCURRING

COMMON BUTDIFFERENTIATED VOTING

LEVEL OFFAMILIARITY

PERCEPTION OFPOLITICAL

FLEXIBILITY

LEVEL OF CONCERNOVER FINANCIAL

MATTERS

Consensus as a Fix that Fails

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LEVEL OF AGREEMENTUSE OF INTERLINKED

CONSENSUS DECISIONMAKING

LEVEL OFGEOPOLITICAL

DIVISIONS

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-

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R

B

Giving Environmental Negotiations Weight• The alternatives to multilateralism:

- Regionalism isn’t ready.

- ‘Minilateralism’= a false interpretation.

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Common but Differentiated Voting

• Mitigation and Population and vulnerability.

• Leadership, democracy and legitimacy.

• A contagion for MEAs?

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Common but Differentiated Voting

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Blocs Weighted Vote

EU 25.298%

The Umbrella Group 9.467%

AOSIS 1.979%

BASIC 20.678%

EIG 2.817%

LDCs 16.562%

AILAC 0.859%

ALBA 0.698%

G-77 49.052%

With or Without (the) US

• US participation: the elephant in the plenary.

• Treaties and executive agreements.

• Options for:- Ratification.- Non-ratification.

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A Toolbox for Paris

• Pledge and review?

• Measures against non-parties

- Penalties.

- Incentives.

• From the bottom-up?

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A Critical Mass Movement

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THE CORE- Pledges- Review Process-Financing-Adaptation-Consensual-Legally Binding?

Opt-Out Protocols

REDD+

Market Based Mechanisms

Loss and Damages

Research and Development

Short-term Pollutants

Strong and Weak CMG

• Strong CMG:- Avoids US participation.

- EU and Chinese leadership.

• Weak CMG: - Fragmented approach with voting.

- Unblock the issues, build momentum.

- Avoids US ratification.

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The Common Threads

• Moving without the US (sort of).

• Breaking interlinked consensus.

• A dynamic view of international agreements.

• Politically feasible at all levels.

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A New Multilateralism

• Minilateral speed, multilateral frame.

• Coalitions of the willing.

• From Hegemon to Hegemons.

• Participation= most dynamic.

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As the World Changes

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EFFECTIVENESS OF CRITICAL MASSGOVERNANCE

IMPACTS OF GLOBALENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

STATE OF HUMAN HEALTH ANDWELLBEING IN DOMESTIC

CONSTITUENCIES

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NATION-STATEWILLINGNESS TO JOIN

CRITICAL MASSAGREEMENTS

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Questions….

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