1 biosecurity in the international futures programme of the oecd david b. sawaya oecd international...
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Biosecurity in the International Futures
Programme of the OECD
www.biosecuritycodes.org
David B. SawayaOECD International Futures Program
Matrahaza, HungaryMay 13, 2006
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A Global Outreach
OECD Member CountriesCountries/Economies Engaged in Working Relationships with the OECD
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What is the International Futures Programme?
Established in 1990
Provides the OECD with early warning of emerging issues, pinpoints major developments, and analyses key long-term concerns to help governments map strategy
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Risk Management in the International Futures
Programme
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Driving forces Demography
– population growth, ageing, migration, urbanization The Environment
– climate change and its impact on natural disasters and infectious diseases
Technology– connectedness, technological change
Socio-economic Developments– concentration, income disparities, shifts in regulation
capacities
A number of forces are modifying the risk landscape
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Major Recommendations
Research has led to a number of recommendations for action:
Adopt a new policy approach to risk management.
Develop synergies between the public and the private sectors.
Inform and involve stakeholders and the general public.
Strengthen international co-operation.
Make better use of technological potential and enhance research efforts.
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Trends in Bioagent cases (20th century)
Source: W. Seth Carus, “Working Paper: Bioterrorism and Biocrimes” (Center for Counter-proliferation Research, National Defense University, Feb 2001 Revision of 1999)
Terrorist CriminalOther/
UncertainTotal
1990’s19 40 94 153
1980’s3 6 0 9
1970’s3 2 3 8
1960’s0 1 0 1
20th Century Total27 56 97 180
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Risk Issues For Biotechnologies- Dual Use Technologies -
How do we maintain an open democratic society and maintain security at the same time?– How do we maintain scientific openness?
Can we even effectively control dual-use equipment, materials, and information?
What measures need to be taken to assure the public that the desired level of security has been achieved?
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Conference on Responsible Stewardship of the Life Sciences
Meeting in Frascati, Italy in September of 2004
55 participants from government, academia, industry, public research organizations, scientific societies, and the science publishing field
Discussion of how to achieve a balance between scientific freedom and security concerns
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What behaviour patterns for what tools?
A spectrum of individual behaviour is the object of oversight tools:
– Psychopathic, sociopathic, criminal (national laws, treaties)
– Negligent or thoughtless (laws, guidelines, principles)
– Right-minded professionals with a narrow view of the consequences of their work (voluntary codes)
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Creating Tools for Managing Oversight
Formal treaties, agreements or arms control conventions among governments
– ex: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Consensus pacts among voluntary partners to the agreement
– ex: Australia Group export control program (non-binding)
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Tools for managing oversight
National Legislation
– ex: Japan’s Infectious Disease Law (2003), US Patriot Act (2001), Singapore’s Biological Agents and Toxin Bill (2005)
Informal agreements among individuals or non-state actors
– ex: Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct, Guidelines, Principles
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Codes of Conduct
Target Audience: scientific communities, research funding agencies
Mechanism: raise awareness of problem, provide guidance on professional best practice
Utility: one tool among others to address the issue of dual-use
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Why use Codes?
To raise individual scientists’ awareness of their personal responsibilities
To ensure funding agencies and administrative oversight bodies of common approaches to potential problems
To reassure the public
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What are the problems with Codes?
A sense of ownership by individuals (who drafted the Code?)
What measures of enforcement do Codes have? If none, how useful are they?
What sanctions are foreseen if code is not followed?
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What should a Code look like?
Avoid national, regional or cultural preoccupations
It should be drafted with specific communities in mind
It should provide both professional standards and an means to empower teams to act to enforce the Code
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Frascati Conclusions
The impact of existing security systems on delivering the twin goals of protecting science and the public in an age of terrorism need to be further evaluated.
There is a need for a more transparent and better informed debate to consolidate existing activities, including through the provision of a more comprehensive information resource.
Existing regulatory frameworks need to be bolstered with self-regulation measures .
www.biosecuritycodes.org
Biosecuritycodes in French
Biosecuritycodes in Japanese
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Biosafety vs. Biosecurity Need to establish a common international
understanding of key terminology
In English the difference is often poorly understood and the term biosecurity is used in a number of different ways:– for protection against non-native species in
Oceania– as protection of livestock from infections in
rural communities– the protection against the malicious misuse of
pathogens in the security community)
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Biosafety vs. Biosecurity Problem in translating the terms into other
languages: – In many languages the distinction between
safety and security does not exist. – This clearly represents a problem when
translating biosecurity and biosafety, and may pose a serious problem when attempting to compare legislation across borders.
OECD’s network and non-member connections to survey the ways in which the two terms are translated into other languages (inter alia – French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, German)
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Open Question:Are Codes Effective?
There is very little no consensus as to the efficacy of codes because evidence is scattered and poor
Post studies on the effectiveness of self regulatory mechanisms, in the life sciences and other domains, at curbing intentional and unintentional misuse of resources.
A new web forum allowing users to discuss experiences in implementing and using codes of conduct and other voluntary regulatory agreements in the life sciences and other areas.
