1 adaptive key pre-distribution model for distributed sensor networks author: c.-s. laih, m.-k. sun,...
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Adaptive key pre-distribution model for distributed sensor networks
Author: C.-S. Laih, M.-K. Sun, C.-C. Chang and Y.-S. Han Source: IET Communications, vol. 3, no. 5, pp.723-732, 2009. (Impact Factor = 0.751)Presenter: Yung-Chih LuDate: 2010/08/20
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Outline
Introduction Proposed Scheme Performance Evaluation Security Analysis Conclusion
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Introduction(1/3)
Distributed Sensor Network
Base station
location finding system
mobilizer
transceiver Unit
sensing unit processing unit
sensordigital/analogconverter
microprocessor
storage device
power unit
Powergeneration
Sensor Architecture
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Introduction(2/3)
key agreement protocol Key pre-distribution:
Keys are distributed to all sensor nodes prior to deployment.
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Introduction(3/3)
Constraints Limited energy consumption Low transmission range Limited Memory overhead
Requirements High network connectivity Robust resilience against node capture Low communication overhead
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Eschenauer-Gligor Scheme(1/3) Key pre-distribution phase
Key poolKeys
Key identifier
Key poolKeys
Key identifier
Key ring(k keys)
H-sensor
Key identifier = key mod 232
Kci = EKx(ci) Kx = K1 ,…, K⊕ ⊕ k
ci = H-Sensor ID
H-Sensor : L-Sensors ID 、 L-Sensors key identifiers and Kci
L-Sensor : k keys 、 key identifiers and Kci
:L-Sensor
L-Sensor : Low-end sensorH-Sensor : High-end sensor
L. Eschenauer and V. Gligor. “A Key-Management Schemefor Distributed Sensor Networks.” In Proc. 9th ACM Conference on Computerand Communication Security, pp.41-47, Nov. 2002.
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Eschenauer-Gligor Scheme(2/3) Shared-key discovery
Key ring(k keys)
H-sensor
:L-Sensor
Step1: Each L-sensor Broadcasts a list of key identities.
Step2: L-sensor runs a challenge-response protocol if L-sensor find the common key.
Eki(α)
Eki(α)
α = Dki[Eki(α)]
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Eschenauer-Gligor Scheme(3/3) Path-key establishment
Key ring(k keys)
H-sensor
:L-Sensor
Ekc(kp)
Ekc(kp)
Ekp(α)
α = Dkp[Ekp(α)]
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Proposed Scheme(1/5)
Shamir’s threshold scheme
PT: prime number PT ≧ a0
t : degree of polynomial a0 : group key
Example:
t=3 ; a0=1234 ; n = 6
g(x) = 94x2+166x+1234
(1,1494);(2,1942);(3,2578);
(4,3402);(5,4414);(6,5614)
g(x)
= 94x2+166x+1234
g(0) = 1234
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Proposed Scheme(2/5)
Key poolKey pool
S1S1
S2S2
SvSv
Sub-key pool
……
……
……
….
|S| :the number of keys in key pool v :the number of sub-key poolsGK: group key|d| = |S| / v
sk = sub-keyID = sub-key identifierskij = gi(IDij) i=1,2,…,v j=1,2,…,|d|
g1(x) GK1
g2(x) GK2
gv(x) GKv
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Proposed Scheme(3/5)
Key pre-distribution phase
Key ring
(τ keys and key ID)
S1S1
S2S2
SvSv
……
……
……
Sub-key pool
sensor
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Proposed Scheme(4/5)
Shared-key discovery phase
H-sensor
:L-Sensor
Step1: Each L-sensor Broadcasts a list of key ID.
Step2: L-sensor runs a challenge-response protocol if L-sensor find the communication key.
q’: the number of common keysEski(α)
Eski(α)
α = Dski[Eski(α)]
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Proposed Scheme(5/5)
Shared-key discovery phaseStep1 ︰ Each L-sensor computes their respective bonus key rings
Step2: Each L-sensor Broadcasts a list of group key ID.
Step3: L-sensor runs a challenge-response protocol if L-sensor find the communication key.
q’: the number of common keys
Key ring
(τ keys and key ID)
bonus key ring
(w group keys And group key ID)
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Performance Evaluation(1/4)
a. number of groups v = 30,size of the key pool |S| = 10000, size of key rings τ = 75
b.value of threshold t = 2, size of the key pool |S| = 1000, size of key rings τ = 40
Connectivity
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Performance Evaluation(2/4)
Local connectivity
Network connectivity
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Performance Evaluation(3/4)
Connectivity
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Performance Evaluation(4/4)
Communication overhead
a. EG scheme
b. Proposed scheme
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Security Analysis
Resilience against node capture
a. τ =40 and p =0.33
b.τ =40 and p =0.5
p: local connectivity
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Conclusion
Dependent keys High connectivity It is able to adjust its system
parameters