1 . A Working Peace System

DAVID MITRANY

David Mitrany (7881J-7975) was a Romanian-born academic whospent most 01 his adult lífe in Britain and the United Slates. DuringWorld War 11,Mitrany thought seriously about the shape of the post-war world and how lo prevent fulure wars. The result of his reflectionwas a pamphlel entit/ed A Working Peace Syslem, whích he pub-lished in London in Ihe summer of 1943, Iwo years before the end ofIhe war. In Ihis pamphlet, Milrany argued for a transforméflion of theway people lhink about international relalions, particular/y the pre-vention of war. His "functional alternalíve" aimed at wor/d, not Euro-pean, unity. Nevertheless, il had a profound effecl on European ac-livists and ear/y integralion Iheorists, especial/y the neofunctionalísts(see Chapters 75and 76). .

Milrany saw the division of Ihe world ínto "competing políticalunits" as 'he root of inlernational conflict. A world federal govern-menl, he argued, would elíminale these divisions but would be impos-sible to establísh given the modern "disregard for constítutions andpacts" and continuing nationalísm. Mitrany cal/ed, instead, for a func-tional approach that would "over/ay polítical divisions with a spread-ing web of international activities and agencies, in which and throughwhich the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually inte-grated. " Functional integration would be pragmatic, technocratic, andflexible; it would cjelíberately blur distinctions between national andinternational, public and priva te, and political and nonpolitical. Asfunclional agencies were formed and joined, national divisions wouldbecome less and less important. Ullimalely, a central a'uthority mighlcoordinale the various agencies, but such a government would not be

Reprintcd from A Working Peace System (Quadrangle Books, 1966). Copy-right 1966 by The Society for a World Service Federation. Notes omined.

94 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 95

necessary to successful intemational re/ations, and might nol be desir-abJe. Here Mitrany parted with many other functiona/ists (such asMonnet) and ,he neofunctionalists who believed federal institutionswere essential to the success of functionaJ integration.

and settlement which students of international affairs eall "peacefulchange." But they themselves,taking the form for the substance, alltoo onen thought of it mainly as a matter of cbanging frontiers. Weshall have to speak of this again, but what peaceful change shouldmean, what the modern world, so dosely interrelated, must have forits peaceful deve1opment,is some system that would make possibleautomatic and continuous social action, contin.ually adapted tochanging needs and conditioRS,in the same sense and of the samegeneral nature as any other system of government. Its characterwould be the same for certain purposeSj only the range would benew. It is in that sense that the League'swork has in truth been inad-equate and ineffectivc,as one may readily see if one reflects whethera change of frontiers now and then would reaUyhave led to a pl~ace-fuIand cooperativeinternationalsociety. .

A close fcderation is supposed to do just what the Leagueproved unable to do, and in a set and salid way. But to begin with,can we take a systemwhich has worked well in one field and simplytransplant it to another, so much wider and more complex? Federa-tions have still becn national federationsj the jump from .,pationalstates to international organization is infinitelymore hazardous thanwas the jump from provincial units to national fed~.rations.None ofthe eiements of neighborhood, of kinship, of history are there toserve as steps. The BritishEmpire is bound dosely by old ties of kin-ship and history, but no one would suggest that there is-among itsparts much will for federation. Yetapatt from this matter of whetherthe federal idea has any great prospects, there is the more importantquestion whether it would have any great virtues in the internationalsphere. lf the evilof conflierand war springs fram the division of theworld into detached and competing politieal uliits, will it be exor-cisedsimply by changing or reducíng the línes of division?Any potit-ical reorganization into separate uDitsmust sooner or later producethe same effectsj any international system that is to usher in a newworld must produce the opposite effect of subduing political divi-sion. As far as one Cilnsee, tbere are only tWoways of achievingthatend. One would be through a world state which would wipe out po-lítical divisionsforcibly; the other is the way discussedin these pages,which would rather overlay polítical divisionswith a spreading webof international activities and agencies, in which and through whichthe interests and life of all the narions would be gradually integrated.That is the fundamental change to which any effectiveinternationalsystem must aspire and contribute: to make international govern-ment coextensive with international acrivities. A League would betoo loose to be able to do it; a number of sectional federations

. THEGENERALPROBlEM

The need for some new kind of intemadonal system was beingwidely canvassed before the Second World War,.in the measure inwhich the League of Nations found itselffrustrated in its attempts toprevent aggression and to organize peace. Some blamed this failureon the irresponsibilityof small stateSjothers rather the egoism of the.Great Powers. Srillothers imputed the League'sfailure more directlyto weaknesses in its own constitution and machinery: the proper in-gredients were there, but the political dosage was inadequate. lt wasespeciallyamong those who held this viewthat the idea of a wide in-ternarional federation began to be embraced as a new hope.

Federation se~medindeed tbe only altemative to a Leaguetriedso far for linking,together a number of polítical units by democraticmethods. lt would mean án association muchodoser than was theLeague, and its adv6cacy therefore takes it for granted that theLeague failed because it did not go far enough. In what way wouldfederadon go further? Federarionwould be a more intensíveunion ofa less extensive groupj the constitutional ties would be doser. Sec-ond, certain acrivitieswould be more definitely anq actively tied to-gether. More definite common aerion is dearly the endj the formalarrangements which the federalists put in the forefron.t would bemerely a necessaryadjunct, to ensure the reliableworking of the fed-eral undertakings. And that is as it should be for, leaving formal ar-guments aside, it is plain that the League failed not from overstrainbut from inanition. It might have done more about sanctions, butthat would not have been enough. Even if the League's action for"security" had been more fearless, that would not by itseUhave suf-ficed to give vitality to an international system that was-to last andgrow. To achieve that end, such a system must in some important re-spects take over and coordinate activities hitherto.controlled by thenational state, justas the state increasinglyhas to take over acdvitieswhich until now have been earried on by local bodies; and like thestate, any new international authority could under present conditionsnot be merely a police authority.

We reatize now that the League failed because, whatever thereasons, it could not further that process of cominuous adjustment

96 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 97

would. on the contrary. be too tight to be welded irito something likeit. Therefore when the need is so great and pressing. we must havethe vision to break away from traditional political ideas, which inmodern times have always linked authority to a given territory. andtry some new way.that might take us without violence toward thatgoal. The beginningscannot be anything but experimental; a new in-temational sYstemwill need. even more than national systems. awide freedom of continuous adaptation in the light of experience. Itmust care as much as possible for common needs that are evident.while presuming as little as possible upon a global unity which is stillonly latent and unrecognized.As the late John Winant well said in alecture at Leeds in October 1942: "We must be absolute about ourprincipal ends (justiceand equality of opportunity and freedom). rel-ative and pragmatie about the mechanieal means used to serve thoseends .

The need'for a pragmatie approach is all the greater becauseweare so clearly in a period of historieal transition. When the state it-self. whatever its form and constitution. is everywhere undergoing adeep social and political sea-change. it is good statesmanship not toforce the new international experiments into some set familiar formowhich ",ay be léss relevant the more respectable it seems. but to seeabove all that these' experiments go with and fit into the generaltrend of the time.

When one examines the general shape of the tasks that are fac-ing usoone is; to begin with. led to question whether order could bebrought into them by the device of formal written pacts. Why didwrinen constitutions. declarations of rights. and other basic chartersplay such a great role during the nineteenth century? The task of thattime. followingthe autocratic periodowas to work out a new divisionof the sphere of authority. to determine new relationships betweenthe individual and the state. to protect the new democracy.These re-lationships were meant to be fixed and final. and they had to rest ongeneral principies. largelyof a negative character. It was natural andproper that all that should be laid down in formal rules. meant to re-main untouched and permanent. In much the same way the new na-tion state was in world societywhat the new citizen was in municipalsociety; and with the increase in their number. the liberal growth ininternational trade and cultural and social intercourse. the resultingintemational rules and a host of wrinen treaties and pacts sought.like the national constitUtions.to fix the formal relationship betweenthe sovereign individual states and their collectivity; which in thiscase also was expected to be fixed and final. with internationallawas a gradually emergingconstitution for.that political cosmos.

Viewedin this light. the Covenant of the Leagueis seen to havecontinued that nineteenth-century tradition. It was concerned aboveall with fixing in a definite way the formal relationship of the mem-ber states and in a measure also of non-members. and only in 11verysecondary way with initiating positive common activities and aerion.The great expectation. security. was a vital action. but a negativeone; its end was not to promote the active regular life of the peoplesbut only to protect it against being disturbed. Broadlyone might saythat the Covenant was an attempt to universalizeand codify the tulesof international conductogradually evolved through political treatiesand pacts. and to give them general and permanent validity. It wasndther unnatural nor unreasonable to follow up that nineteenth.-cen-tury trend and try to steady intemational relations by bringing themwithin the framework of a written pactoone provided with setrulesfor its working. But when it .came to going beyond that. the League'could not be more or do more than what its léading members wereready to be and do. and they were ready to do but linle in a po!;itiveway. Ir was indeed characteristic of the post-Armistice ptriod1918-19 that even the victors hastened to undo their common eco-nomic and other machinery. such as the Allied Shipping tontrol.which had grown and served them well during thewar. And that wasat a time when within each country government action and controlwere spreading fast, causing many a private international activity

. alsoto becut downor cut off.In otherwords.theincipientcommonfunctions. as well as many old connections. were disbanded in the in-ternarional sphere at the very time when a common constitution wasbeing laid down for it. It was that divorce between lifeand form thatdoomed the League from the outset. and not any inadequacy in itswrittenrules. .

Hence it is pertinent to ask: Would another written pace,if oolymore elaborate and stringent. come to grips more cIosely with theproblems of our time? Let us by way of a preliminary answer notetwo things: First. the lusty disregard for constitutions and pacts. forsettled rules and traditional rights. is a striking mark of the times. Inthe pressure for sochilchange no such formal ties are allowed to standin the way.either within the severalcountries or between them. It is atypical revolutionary mood and practice. If it does not alwaystake theoutward form of revolution. that is because the governments them-selvesact as spearheads of the trend. and not only in countries ruledby dictatorships. Those who lead in this rush for socialchange pridethemselves indeed on their disregard for forms and formalities. Theappeal which communism. fascismoand nazism had for youth in par-ticular and for the massesin generallies in no small degree in that po-

98 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 99

Ihical ieonoclasm.At the tum of the nineteenth century the radicalmasseswere demandingsenled rules and rights,and Napoleon couldplay the trump card of constitutional nationalism against the auro-cratie rulers.Now the massesdemand socialaction without regard toestablished~rights," and the totalitarian leadershave been playingthestrong card of pragmatic socialísmagainst constitUtionaldemocracy.

That universal pressure for social reform, in the second place,has uuerly changed the relation of nationalism to internationalism,in a way that could be promising if rightly used. In constitution-mak-ing there was a parallel betWeenthe two spheres, but nothing more,for they belonged politically to different categories. The nineteenth-

. centurynationalismrestedmainlyon culturaland othe{differentialfactors, and the creation of the nation state meant inevitablya break-ing up ofworld.unity. A cosmopolitan outlook spread rapidly, butthe nations at the same time balked at international political organi-zation and control, and they could justify thar refusal by seeminglygood principie. At presenr the new nationalísm rests essentially onsocial.factors; these are not only alike in the various countries, thusP!lradoxicallycreating a bond even betWeentotalitarian groups, butohen cannot make progress in isolation. At many points the life ofthe nation state is overflowing back into that common world whichexisted before the rise of modern nationalism. At present the lines ofnational and internarional evolution are not parallel but converging,and the tWospheresnow belongto the samecategory and differ onlyin dimensions.

In brief, the function of the nineteenth century was to restrainthe powers of authority; that led to the creation of the "politicalman" and likewise of the "polítical nation," and to the definitionthrough constitutional pacts of their relation to the wider políticalgroup. The Covenant (and the Locamo and Kelloggpacts) was stillof that species essentially, with the characteristic predominance ofrules of the "thou shall not" kind. The function of our time is ratherto developand c;oordinatethe social scope of iluthority,and that can-not be so definedor divided. Internationally it is no longer a questionof defining relations betWeenstates but of merging thetn-the work-day senseof the vague talk about the need to surrender some part ofsovereignty.A constitutional pact could do liule more than lay downcertain elementaryrights and duties for the membersof the new com-munity. The cOmmunityitselfwill acquire a living body not througha wriuen act of faith but through active organic development. Yetmere is in this no fundamental dispute as to general principies andultimate aims. The only question is, which is the more immediatelypracticable and promising way: whether a general polítical frame-

work should be provided formally in advance, on some theoreticalpartern, or leh to grow branch by branch from aétion and ex~rienceand so find its natural bent. .

. THE FUNCTIONAl AlTERNATIVE

Can these vital objections be met, and the needsof peace amI socialadvance be satisfied, through some other way of associating the na-tions for common action? The whole trend of modern govemmentindicates such a way.That trend is to organizegovernment along thelines of specificends and needs, and according to. tbe conditions oftheir time and place, in lieu of me traditional organization on the ba-sis of a set constitUtional division of jurisdiction and of rights andpowers. In national government the definition pf authority and tbescope of public action are now in a continuous flux, and art: deter-mined less by constitutional norms than by practical requircments.The instances are too many and well known to need mentioning; onemight note only that while generally the trend bas been towardgreater centralization of services, and therefore of authority; undercertain conditions the rev.crsehas also occurred, powers and duriesbeing handed over to regional and otber autborities for the betterperformance of certain communal needs. The same trend is power-fullyat work in the severalfederations, in Canada and Australia, andespecially in tbe United States, and in tbese cases it is all the morestriking because tbe division of authority !ests on writteó constitu-tions which are still in being and nominallyvalid in full. Intemation-ally, too, while a body of law had grown slowly and insecurelythrough rules and conventions, some common activities were orga-nized through ad hoc functional arrangements and have \Vorkedwell. The rise of such specificadministrative agenciesand la,,'5 is thepeculiar trait, and indeed tbe foundation, of modeni govemment.

A question whicb might properly be asked at tbe outset in con-sidering the fitness of tbat method for international purposes is this:Could such functions be organized internationally without a compre-hensive political framework? Let it be said, first, that tbe funccionalmethod as such is neither incompatible with a general constitUcionalframework nor precludes its coming into being. It only followsBurke's warning to the sheriffsof Bristol that "government is a prac-tical tbing" and tbat one should beware of elaborating constitutionalforms "for the gratification of visionaries." In national states andfederations the functional development is going ahead without muchregard to, and sometimes in spite of, the old constitucionaldivisions.

100 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 101

lEin these cases the constitUtionis most conveniendy left aside, maynot the method prove workable intemationally without any immcdi-ate and comprehensive constitutional framework? lE,to cite Burkeagain, it is "always dangerous to meddle with foundations," it isdoubly dangerous now.O~r political problems are obscure, while thepolitical passions of t~ t;m~ al"ebUnding.One of the misfortunes ofthe League experiment was' that a new institurion was devised onwhat have proved to be outwom premises. We might also recollectthat of the constitutional changesintroduced in Europe aher the FirstWorld War, fine and wise though they may have been, none has sur-vived even a generarion. How much greater will that risk of futilitybe in Europe after the Second World War, when the split within andbetwc:ennarions will be much worse than in 1919? We know noweven less about the dark historieal forces which have been stirred upby the war,whilc:in me meantime the problenis of our common soci-ety have been distorted by fierceideologieswhich we could not try tobring to an issuewithout provoking an irreconcilabledogmatic con-flict. Even if an aetion were to be to some extent handicapped with-out a formal political framework, the fact is that no obvious senti-ment exists, and none is likely to erystallize for some years, for acQmmonconstitutional bond.

ln sueh c;onditions;1oYpre-arranged constitutional frameworkwould be taken,wholly out of the air. We do not know what, if any-thing, wiIJbe;n eommon--except a desperate craving for peaee andfor the conditions of a tolerable normal life. The peoples may ap-plaud declarations of rights, but they wiIJeall for the satisfaetion ofneeds. That demand for action could be tumed into a historie oppor-tunity. Again we might take to heart what happened to the U.S. in1932-33 and think of what ehances the Roosevelt administrationwould have to have had to aehieve unity, or indeed to survive, if in-stead of taking immediate remedial acrion 'it had begun by offeringconsriturional rc:forms-though a common system was already in be-ing. A timid statesman might still have teied to walk in the old consti-tUtional grooves; Me. Roosevelt stepped over them. He grasped boththe need and opportunity for cenmilized practical aerian. Unemploy-ment, the banking collapse, flood control, and a hundred other prob-lems had to be dealt wjtb by nati()1)almeans if they were to be dealt

, with effectively,andwith,lasting results. '

Tbe significant point in tbat emergency action was tbat eaehand every problem was taekled as a practical issue in itself. No at-tempt was made to relate it to a general tbeory or system of govem-mentoEvery function was left to generate otbers graduaUy,like tbefunctional subdivision of organic cells; and in every case the appro-

priate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual perfor-mance. Yet the new funetions and the new organs, taken together,havc:revolutionized the American polítical system. The federal gov-ernment has become a national govemment, and Washingtonfor thefirst time is really the capital of America. In the process, many im-provements in, tbe personnel and machinery of government bavecome about, and many restricrivestate regulations have melted away.More recentlythere has been heal"dthe significantcomplaint that theties between dties and their states are becoming looser, while thosewith the national government become ever ~tronger. No one hasworked to bring this about, and no written act bas either prescribedit or eonfirmed it. A great constitutional transformation has tbustaken place without any changes in the Constitution. There havebeen complaints, but the matter-of-courseaccepraneehas been over-whelming. People have giadly aceepted,the servieewhen they mighthave qucstioned the theory. The one attempt at direct constitutionalrcvision, to increase and liberalize the membership of the SupremeCourt, was bittcrly disputed and defeated. Yetthat proposal involvedin effectmuch lessof a constitutional revolution than has t.!teexperi-II\cntof the TenncsseeValleyAuthority. The first would not have en-surcd any lasting ehange in the working of the American govero-ment, whereas the second has really introduced into the politicalstructure of the United States a new regional dimension unknown tothe Constitution. ' &

ln many of its essential aspects-the urgeney of the materialneeds, the inadequacy of the old arrangements, the bewilderment inoutlook-the situation at the end of the Second World War wiUre-semble that in America in 1933, though on a wider and deeper scale.And for the same reasons the path pursued by Mr. Roosevelt in 1933offers the best, perhaps the only, chance for gening a new interna-tionallife going. It will be said inevitably that in the United States itwas relarivelyeasy to follow that Uneof aerion beeause it was in factone eountry, with an establísbed Constitution. Functional arrange-ments could be aecepted, that is. because in many fields the federalstates had grown iñ the habit of working together. That is no doubttrue, but not the most significant point of the American experiment;for that Une was followed not beeause the functional way was soeasy but becausethe eonsritutional way would have been so difficult.Hence the lesson for unfederated parts of the world would seem tobe this: If the eonstitutional path had to be avoided for the sake of ef-fectiveaction even in a federation which already was a working po-lítical system, how mueh less promising must it be as a starting modewhen it is a matter of bringing togcther for the first time a number of

.,

102 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACESYSTEM 103

varied, and sometimes antagonistic, countries? But if tbe constitu-tional approacb, by its very circumspectness,would hold up the startoEa working internarional system, bold initiative during the periodoEemergency at the end oE the war might set going lasting instru-ments and habits of a common internationalliEe. And though it mayappear rather britde, rhat Eunctionalapproach would in Eactbe moresolid and deEínitethan a formal one. lt need nor meddle with founda-tions; old institutions and ways may to some extent hamper recon-struction, butreconstruction could begin by a common efEortwith-out a fight over established ways. Reconstruction may in this fieldalso prove a surer and less costly way than revolution. As to tbe newideologies, since we ,could not prevent them we must try to circum-vent them, leaving it tOthe growth of ncw habits and interests to di-lute them in time. Our aim must be to call Eorthto the highest possi-ble degree the active forces and opportunities Eorcooperation, whiletouching aslittle as Possible the latent or active points oEdifferenceand opposition. -

There is' one other aspect oE the post-war period which hasbeen much discussed and has a bearing on this point, and whichhelps to bring out the difference in oudook between the two methodscontrasted here. Much has been heard of a suggestion that when thewar ends we ~ust have first a period of convalescence and that thetask of permanent reorganization will only come after that. It is auseful suggestion, insofar as it may help to cIear up certain practicalproblems. But it could also be misleading and even dangerous if thedistinction were taken to justify either putting offthe work of inter-national government or differentiating between the agencies bywhich -chenew internati'onal activities are to be organized, intonurses for convalescenceand mentors for the new life. A cIean divi-sion in time between two such periods in any case is not possible, forthe period of co~valescence will be different Eordifferent activitiesand.ends; but, above all, except Eorsuch direct-and exceptional con-sequences ofrhe war as demobilization andtbe rebuilding of dam-aged areas, th~ needs of society will be tbe same at once after tbe waras later on. Tbe only differencewill be the pracrical one of a priorityof needs, the ki!1dof differencewhich might be brought about by anysocial disturbance-an epidemic or an earthquake or an economiccrisis-and die-u~gencyof taking action. For the rest, one action andperiod will merge into the other, according to circumstances. Seedand implements wiUbe as urgent Eorensuring the food supply of Eu-rope and Asia as the actUáldistribution oErelief,and indeed more ur-gent if tbe war should end after a harvest. Again, both relief and re-

construction will depend greatly on the speedy reorganizatíon andproper use of transport, and so on.

Both circumstances point again to the advantage of a func-tional pracrice and to the disadvantage, if not the impossibility.oEacomprehensive attempt at political organization. To obtain suEficientagreement for some formal general scheme would, at best, not bepossible without delay; at the same time, acrion'for relieEand recon-struction will have to start within the hour after the ceasefire.The al~ternatives would be, if a comprehensive constitUtional arrangementis desired and waited for, either to put the immediate work in thehands oEtemporary international agencies or to leave it to the indi-vidual states. The one, in fact, would prepare Eorthe other. Except inmattets of relief-the distribution of food, fuel, and dothing and alsomedical help-ad ho, temporary agencies could have no adequateauthority or influence; all of what one might call the society-buildingacrivities, involving probably considerable planning and reorganiza-tion within and between the several countries, would fall upon theindividual states again, as in 1919, when they competed and inter-fered rather than cooperated with each other. to the loss oE.¡:hemall.Yet it is vital that international activity should be from the outset inthe same hands and move in the same direction after the war as later;otherwise the chaoces of building up an internacional system wouldbe gravely prejudiced. It is certain that one oEthe chief reasons forthe failure of the League was that it was given a formal authority andpromissory tasks for the future, while the immediate, urgent, andmost welcome tasks oEsocial reconstrucrion and reform were left tobe attended to by national agencies. Later efforts to retrieve that mis-take only led to a series of barren economic conferences, as by thattime the policy of each country was set hard in its own mold. It is in-evitable with any scheme of formal organizarion that the nationalstates should have to re-start on their own, ílnd natural therefore thatrefuge should be sought in the idea of a period oEconvalescencewhile the full-fIedgedscheme is worked out and adopted. But func-rional authorities wQuldnot need such polítical hospitalizadon, withits arbitrary and dangerous division ~f stages; they would merelyvary, like any other agency anywhere and at any time, the emphasisof their work in accordance with the changing condition of theirtask, continuing to control and organize transport, for instance, afterthey had rebuilt it, and in the same way taking each task in handwith a plan and authority for continuing it. Tbe simple fact is that a1lthe re-starting of agriculture and industry and transport will either bedone 00 some pre-arranged common program or it will have to be

104 DAVID MITRANY

done, for it could not wait, on disjointed local plans; it will be doneeither by pre-established international agencies or it will have to bedone by local national agencies-and the agencieswhich will act inthe supposed convalescence period will also be .those to gather au-thority and accepranceunto themselves.

o The BroadUnes of FunctíonalOrganizaríon

The problem ol our generation, put very broadly, is how to weld to-gether the cornmon interestsof all without interferingunduly with theparticular ways of each. It is a parallel problem to that which faces usin national society,and which in both sphereschallengesus to find analrernative to me totalitarian panern. A measure of centralized plan-Dingand control, for both production and distributi~n, is no longer tobe avoided, no'maner what the form of the state or the doctrine ol itsconstitution. Through all that variety of political forms there is agrowing approximation in me working ol goveroment, with differ-ences merely of degree and of dctait. Liberal democracy needs a re-definition of the public and private spheresof action. Butas the Uneofseparation is always shifting under the pressure of fresh social ncedsand demands¡"it must be left free to move with those needs and de-mands and canoot be fixed through a constitUtional re-instatement.The only possible principie ol democratic confirmation is that publicaction should be undertaken only where and when and insofar as theneed for common aedon becomesevident and is acceptedfor the sake

. of the comm~n g9Od.In that way controlled democracycould yet bemade the' golden mean whereby social needsmight be sj1tisfiedaslargely and iusdy as possible, while stillleaving as wide a residue aspossible for the frel;choice of the individual; "

That is fully as true for the international sphere. It is indeed theonly way to combine, as well as may be, international organizationwith national freedom. We have already suggested that not all inter-ests are common to all, and that the common interests do not con-

. cern all countries in the same degree.A te¡:ritorialunion would bindtogether some interests which are not of commolJ,.concero to thegroup, while it would inevitably cut asunder some interests of com-mon conceen to the group and those outside it. The only way toav~id that twice-arbitrary surgery is to proceed-bymeans of a naturalselection, binding together thos~ interests which are common, wherethey are common, and to the extent to which they are common. Thatiunctional selection and organization of international needs wouldextend~and in a way resume, an international development which

AWORKINGPEACE SYSTEM 105

has been gathering strength since the latter part of the nineteenthcentury.The work of organizing international public servicesand ac-tivitieswas taken a step further by the League,in its health and drug-control work, in its work for refugees, in the experiments with thetransfer of minorities and the important innovations of the Leagueloan system, and still more through the whole aedvity of the ILO (In-ternational Labour Organisation). But many other activities and in-terests in the past had been organized internationally by privateagencies-in finance and trade and production, etc., not to speak ofscientific and cultural activities. In recent years some of these al:tivi-ties have been brought under public national control in various coun-tries; in totalitarian countries indeed all of them. In a measure, there-fore, the present situation represents a retrogression from the recentpast: the new tUrotoward self-sufficiencyhas spread from economicsto the things of the mind; and while flyingand wirelesswere opcningup the world, many old links forged by private effort have beenforcibly severed. It is unlikely that most of them could be resumednow except through public action, and if they are to operate as freelyas they did in prívate hands they cannot be organized oth~ise thanon a nondiscriminating functional basis.

What would be the broad lines of such a functional organiza-tion of international acrivities?The essential principie is that acrivi-tics would be selected specificaJly and organized separately-eachaccording to its nature, to the conditions under which it itls to oper-ate, and to the needs of the momentoIt would allow, therefore, allfreedom for practical variation in the organ.ization of the severalfunctions, as well as in the working of a particular function as needsand conditions alter. Let us take as an exampletbé group of func-tions which fall under communications, on which tbe success ofpost-war reconstruction will depend gready. Wbat is the proper ba-sis for the internadonal organizadon of raiJwaysystems? Clearly itmust be European, or rather continental, North American, and soon, as that gives tbe logical administrative limit of coordination. Adivision of the Cominent into separate democratic and totalitarianunions would not achieve the practical end, as political divisionwould obstruct that necessary coordination; while British andAmerican participation would make the organization more cumber-some without any added profit to the function. As regards shipping,the line of effective organization whicb at once suggests itself is in-ternational, or intercontinental, but not universal. A Europeanunion could not solve the problem of maritime coordination with-out the cooperation of America and of certain otber overseas states.Aviation and broadcasting, a third example in the same group,

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106 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 107

eould be organized effeetivelyonly on a ""iversal scale, with per-haps subsidiary regional arrangements for more local serviees.Suehsubsidiary regional arrangements eould in faet be inserted at anytime and at any stage where that might prove useful for any part ofa funetion. Devolutionaeeording to need would b~as easy and nat-ural as centralization, whereas if the basis of organization were po-lítical every such change in dimension would involve an elaborateconstitutional re-arrangement. Similarly,it eould be left safely to bedetermined by practieal considerations whcther at the points wherefunctions eross each other--sueh as rail and river transpon in Eu-rope and Ameriea-the two aetivitiesshould be merelJ eoordinatedor put under one control. '.

Thcsc are relatively simple examples. The (unetional eoordina-tion of production, nade, snd distribution evidently would be morecomplex~ ellpecially as they have been,built up on.a competitive basis.But the experience 'witf1 intemational canels, with the re-organiza.rion of the shipping, cotton, and steel industries in England, not tospeak of the even wider and more relevant exp~rience with economiccoord~nation in the two world wars-all showsthat the thing can bedone and that it has always been done on slich funetional lines. Nofixe~ rule; is nee~ed; and no rigidpattern is ddirable for the organi-zation .oftheseworking functional strata. .

A 'certain degree of fixity would not be out of place, however, inregard to more negative functions, especially those related to law andorder, but also to any others of a more formal nature which are likelyto remain fairly static. Security, for instance, ,could be organized onan interlocking regional basis, and the judicial function likewise,with a hierarchy of courts, as the need may arise-the wider acting ascouns of appeal from the more local cóuns. Yet, even in regard to se-curity, and in addition to regional arrangements, the elasticity inher-ent in funcrional'organization may prove practicable and desirable, ifonly in the period oi transition. Anglo-American naval cooperationfor the policing óf the seas may prove acceptable for a time, and itwould CUtacross physical regions. Agreement on a mineral sanctionwould of necessity mean common action by those countries whichcontrol the ~ain sources; and other such eombinations might befound useful for any particular task in hand. That is seeurity only fordefense; security arrangements were conceived usually on a geo-graphical basis beca use they were meant to prevent violenee, andthat would still be the task of sanetions, etc., based on some regionaldevolution. But in addition there is a growing functional devolutionin the field of social security in conneetion with health, with the drugand white slave traffic, with crime, etc. In all that imponant field of

social policing it has been found that coordination and eooperationwith the poliee of other eountries on functional lines, varying witheach task, was both indispensable and practicable. There is no talkand no attempt in all this to eneroaeh upon sovereignty, but only adetaehed funetional association which works smoothly and is al-ready accepted without question. '

Howcver that may be, in the ficld of more positive active func-tions-eeonomic, social, cultUral-whieh are varied and ever chang-ing in structure and purpose, any devolution must, like the main or-ganization, follow funetionallines. Land transport, on the Continentwould need a different organization and agencies should the railwaysafter a time be displaeed by roads; and a Channeltunnel would drawEngland into an arrangemen.t in which sh¡; does not at present be-long, with a corresponding change in the governing Qrgan.

Here we discover a cardinal virtue of the fun<;t.ionalmethod-

what one might call the virtue of technical self-determination. Thefunetional dime1ls;olls, as we have seen, determine its appropriate or-ga"s. Ir also reveals through praetice the nature oí the action re-quired under given conditions, and in that way the potIJers I,!eededby

. the respective authority. The funetion, one might say, determines theexecutiveinstrument suitable for its proper activity,and by the sameprocess provides a need for the reform of the instrument at everystage. This would allow the widest latitude for variation betweenfunctions, and also in the dimension or organization ef the samefunction as needs and conditionschange. Not only is there in all thisno need for any fixedconstitutional divisionof authority and power,prescribedin advance, but anything beyond the original formal defi-nition of scope and purpose might embarrass the worki.ng of thepractical arrangements. .

o The Question of Wider Coordfn.ation

The question will be asked, however, in what manner and to whatdegree the various [unctional agenciesthat may thus grow up wouldhave to be linked to each other and articulated as parts of a morecomprehensive organization. It should be clear that each agencycould work by itself, but that does not exclude the possibility ofsome of them or all beingbound in some way together,if it should befound needfulor useful to do so. That indeed is the test. Asthe wholesense of this particular method is to let activitiesbe organized as theneed for joint action arises and is accepted, it would be out oí placeto lay down in advance some formal plan for the coordination ofvarious functions. Coordination, too, would in that sense have to

.,

108 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 109

come about functionally. Yet certain needs and possibilitiescan beforeseen already now, though some are probable and others onlylikely,and it may help to round off the picture jf we Jook into this as-pect briefly.

cording to its nature, its authority or its influence to make of such or-ders a means additional to internanonal public works, etc., for deal-ing with periods or poekets of unemployment. Coordination of sucha general kind may in some cases amount almost to arbitration oEdifferenees bctWeen functional agenciesj regional boards or councilslike those of the Pan-American Union might be used to adjust or ar-bitrate regional differences.

4. Beyond this there remains the habitual assumption, as we,~ave already said, that internacional action must have some overallpo/itical authority above it. Besides the fact that such a comprehen-sive authority is not now a practical possibility, it is the central viewof the functional approach that such an authority is not essential forour greatest and real immediate needs. The several functions couldbe organized through the agreement, given specifically in each case,of the national governments chiefly interested, with the grant of therequisite powcrs and resourceSj whereas it is clear, toemphasize theprevious point, that they could not allow !iuch organizations simplyto be prescribed by some universal authority, even if it existed. For anauthority which had the title to do so would in effect be hardly lessthan a world governmentj and such a strong central organism wouldinevitably tend to take unto itself rather more authority than thatoriginally allotted to it, this calling in turn 'for the checks and bal-ances which .are used .in federal systems, but which would be difficultto provide in any loose way. If issues should arise in anyafunctionalsystem which would cal! either for some new departure or for the re-eonsideration of existing arrangements, that couldbe done only incouncil by all the governments conceroed. Insofar as it may be de-sired to keep alive some general view of our problems,and perhaps ageneral watch over the policies of the several joint agencies, somebody of a representative kind, like the League Assembly or the gov-erning body of the ILO, could meet periodically, perhaps elected byproportional representation from the assemblies of the memberstates. Such an assembly, in which all the states would háve a voice,could discuss and v.entilate general policies; as an expression of themind and will of public opinionj but it could not actually prescribepolicy, as this might turo out to be at odds with the policy of govero-ments. Any line of aetion recommended by such an assembly wouldhave to be pressed and secured through the policy-making machineryof the various countries themselves.

1. Within the same group of funetions probabJy there wouldhave to be coordination either simpJyfor teehnical purposes or forwider functional ends, and this would be the first stage toward awider integration.To take again the group concerned with communi-cations-rail, road, and aír transport in Europe would nccd technicaleoordina.tion in regard to timetables, connections, etc. They mayneed aJso a wider f,mctional coordination if there is to be some dis-tribution of passenger and freight traffic for the most economicper-formance-whether that is done by a superior executiveagencyor bysome arbitral body, perhaps on the lines of the Federal CommerceCommission in America. Sea and air traffic across the Atlantic orelsewhe¡-e,though separatclyorganizcd, probably would also benefitfropt a similar,typeoEcoordination.Again, various mineral controJs,if they should be organized separatcly,would need some coordina-tion, though this arbitrary grouping of "minerals" would be less tothe point tha.t the coordination of specifiemínc(als and other prod-uc"tswith possibJe substitutes-of crude oi! with synthetk oiJ, oícrude rubber with syntheticrubber, and so on.

2. The next dégreeor stage might be, if found desirable; the co-ordination ofseveral gro,!ps of fúnctionaJaj;encies.For instance, thecommunications'agencies.maynot only work out some means of aCt-ing together in the distribution oí orders for rolling stock, ships, etc.,but they cóuld or s~ouldwork in this through any agenciesthat mayhave come,into.being for controlling' materials and production, orthrough some intermediary agency as a clearinghouse. There is noneed to prescri~ any partero in advance,or that the pattero adoptedin one case should be followed in aJl the others.

3. The coór(Jinationof such workirig functiorial agencieswithany internationalplannÍ1tgagenties would present a third stage, andone thar brings out s'omeinterestingpossibilities,shouTdthe ideas foran international investmt:rltboard or an international developmentcommission, as an advisory' organ, come to fruition. One can seehow such a developmentcommission might help to guide the growthof functional agencies into the most desirable channe1s,and couldwatch their inter-re1ationsand their repercussíons. And an invest-ment board could guide, for instance, th~ dis.rri,butionof orders forships, materials, etc., not only according to the besteconomic use butaJso for the purpose of ironing out cyclical trends. It could use, ac-

These, then, are the several types and grades of coordinationwhich might develop with the growth of funaionaJ activities. Butthere is, finally,in the polítical fieldalso the problem of security,ad-

110 DAVID MITRANY A WORKlNG PEAa SysrEM 111

mitredlya crucíal problem, lor on irs being solvedeffecrivelythe suc-cessfulworking of the other activitieswill dependoAt the same time,rhe general discussion of functional organization will have served tobring our rhe tcue place and proportion of security, as something in-dispensablebut also as something incapable by itseUol achievingthepeaceful growth of an international society. It is in fact a separatefuncrion like the others, not something that srands in stern isolation,overriding all the orhers. Looking at it in this way, as a practicalfunction, should also make it cIear that we would not achieve muchif we handled it as a one-sided, limited problem-ar present roo olten

..summed up in "German aggression." German aggression was a par-ticularly vidous outgrowth of a bad general system, and only a radi-cal and general change of the systemitsell will provide continuous se-curity for aU. In this case also it would be useful to lay down someformal pledgesand principies as a guiding líne, but rhe practical or-ganization would have to foJ)owfuncrional, perhaps combined withregional, lines.That is 4111the more necessaryas we know better nowhow many elemenrsbesides the purely military cnter into rhe makingof security. The various lunctional agencies mighr, in iact, play animponant role in that wide aspect of security¡ they could both watchover and check such rhings as the buildingof srraregicrailways or theaccumulation of straregic stoc~s in metals or grains. Possibly theycould even be used~very properly and effecrively,as a lirst line of ac-tion agailJst threatening aggression, by.the1r wirhholding servicesfrom those who are causing rhe trouble. They could apply such pre-ventive sanctions more effectivelyrhan if this were to wait upon rheagreement arid acrion oí a number ol separate governments¡and theycould do so as partof their practical duries, and thereEorewith lessolthe political reacrions caused by polítical acrio~.

voice in control, thar would be really to hark baek to the outlook ofpolítical sovereignty. In no functional organization so far have theparries interested had a share in control as "by right" of their sepa-rare existence-neither the various local authorities in the LondonTransport Board, nor the seven states concemed in the TVA [Ten-nessee Valley Authority]. An in any case, in the transition froIDpower politics to a functional order we could be weUsatisfied if meconrrol of the new international organs answered to some of the mer-its of each case, leavingit to experience and to me maturing of a newoutlook fa provide in time the necessarycorrectives.

. THROUCiH FUNCTIONAL ACTIONTO INTERNATlONAL soclrn

D Representation;n Cootrpls

One aspect likely to be cJpse1yexamined is that .of the structure of theEunctional ~ontrols, ¡lnd here again the initial diEficulty will be thatwe shall have.'to break away from attractive traditiotial ideas if weare to work out the issueon its merits. It is n~t in (he nature of rhemethod that repreSenrittion on the controlling bodies should be dem-ocratic in a politicaf sense, full and equal ior aU. Id~ally it may seemthat all functions should be organized on a worldwide scale and that

all states shóuld have a voice in control. Yet the weight oi reality ison the side of making the jurisdicrion oE the various agencies nowider than the most effective working limits oE the function¡ andwhile it is understandable that all countries might wish to have a

o TheWayof NaturalSelection

One cannot insist too much that such gradual functional develop-ments would not create a new system, howeVerstrange they mightappear in the light of our habitual search foroa unified formal order.They would merely rationalize and develop what is already thece. InaU countries social activities, in the ",idest sense of the term, are or-ganized and reorganized continually in that way. Suf because oEthelegalistic strueture of the state and of our poHti~1 outlook, whichtreat nárional and international society as 'two diíferent worlds, so-cial nature; so to speak, has not had aéhance so far to take itscourse. Our social activities are cut off arbitrárily at the limit of thes.tate and, if at all, are allowed to be linked to the same activitiesacross the border only by means of une.ertainand cramping politicalligatures. What is here proposed is simply mat these polítieal ampu-tations should eease. Whenever useful or necessarythe several activi-ties would be released to funedon as one unit throughout the lengthoi ebeir natural course. Nadonal problems would then appear, andwould be treated,. as what they are-the local segments oí generalproblems.

o Epilogue

Peaee will DOtbe secured ií we organize the world by what divides it.But in the measure in which such peace-building activities developand sueceed, one might hope that the mere preventioD oí conflict,

112 DAVID MITRANY A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM 113

crucial as that may be, would in time fal! to a subordinate pl:.ce inthe scheme of intern:.tion:.1things, while we would turo to wbat arethe real t;1sksof our common society-the conquest of poverty andof disease and of ignorance. The stays of political federation wcreneeded when life was more local and internation:.l.activities stillloose. But now our social interdependence is all-pervasive and all-,embracing,and ifit be so org:.nized tbe 'políticalside will also growas part of it. The elementsof a functional systemcould beginto workwithout a general polítical authority, but a polític:.1autbority with-out. active social functions would remain al1empty temple. Societywill develop by our living it, not by policing it. Nor would a~y polít-ical agreement survive long under ec;onomicco~petition, but eco:.nomic uriificationwould build up the foundation for polítical agrec-ment, even if ir did not Dlake it sUpCrfluou$.In any case, as thingsare, the political \vay is too ambitious. We cannot start from an idealplane but must be prepared to make many attempts from many,poims, and build tbings and mend tbings as we go along. The essen-tial thing is tbat we should be going together, in the same direction,and tbat weget into step now.

would create increasinglydeep and wide strata of peace-not tbe for-bidding peace of an alliance, but one tbat would suffuse the worldwith a fertileminglingof common endeavor and achievemeot.

Tbis is not an argument against any ideal of formal union, ifthat should prove a possible ultimate goal. It is, above all, a plea forthe creation now of the elements of an active internacional society.Amidst the tragedy of war one c~n glímpse al$o the promise of abroader outlook, of a much deeper undecstanding of the issues thanin 1918. It is because tbe peoples are ready for action that they can-not wait. We have no means and no standing to WQ.rkout some fineconstitution and try to impose it in time upon tbe world. But we dobave "the.standing and the means to prepare for immediate practical

. 'action. We do not know wbitt will be the sentiiitentsof the peoples ofEurope and of .other continents at the end 'of the war, but we doknow what their needs wili be. Any' polítical scheme woúld start adisputation; 01lYworking arrangement would raise a hope and makeforconfidenceand patience. . .

The functional way may seem a spidtless so.lution-and so it is,in the scnsethat it detaches from the spirit the things which are of thebody. No advantage has ac~rued to anyone when economic andother social activities are wedded to fascist orcommunist or otherpolitical ide~logies; their progeny has always 'beeo coofusion andconflictoLet tl!esethings appear quite starkly for what ther. are, prac-tica.1household tasks, aod it will be more difficult to mak&!'them intothe hous~hold idols of "national interest" and "national Qonor."Theideological movements oEour time, because of theirindiscriminatezeal.,have sometimes been compared to religious movements. ,Theymay be, but at their core was not a promise of life hereafter. Thethings which are truly of the spirit-and therefore personal to the in-dividual and to the nation-wiU not be less winged for being freed in"their turn from that worldly ballast. Heoce the argument that op-poses democracy to totalirarianism does not call me real issue. It ismuch too simple. Society is evecywherein tcavail because it is every-where in transidon. lts problem after a century of laissezfaire philos-ophy is to sift aoew, in the light of new economic possibilitiesand ofnew social aspirations, what is private from what has to be public;and io the latter sphere what is local and nadonal from what is wider.Aod for that task of broad social refinement a more discriminatinginstrument is needed than the old polítical sieve. In me words of astatement by the American National Policy Committee, "Part of thedaring required is the daring to fiod new forms and to adopt them.We are lost if we dogmatically assume that the procedures of the pastconstitute the only true expression of democracy."

Cooperatiol1 for the common good is the task, both for the sake oEpeace and of abettee life, a!ld for that it is essential t~t certain inter-ests and activities should be taken out of the tnoo,j'of competitionand worked together. But ir is not essential to make that cooperationfast to a territorialauthority,and indeedit wouldbe senselessto doso when the number of those activiriesis limited, while their range isthe world. "Ecooomic areas do not always run with political areas,"wrote the New York Times (February 26, 1943} in commenting onthe Alaska Highway scheme, and such cross-countcy cooperationwould simplymake frontiers less important. "Apply tbis principie tocerrain European areas and the possibilities are.dazzling." If it besaid mat all that may be possible in war but hardly in peace, that canonly mean that practically the thing is possible but that we doubt

. whether in normal times there would be the polítical ~iII to do it.Now, apart from everythingelse, the functional method stands out asa solid touchstone io that respectoPromissory covenants and chartecsmay remain a headstone to unfulfilled good inteotions, but the func-tional way is action itself and therefore an inescapable test of wherewe stand and how far we are willing to go in building up a new inter-national sociery.It is not a promise to act in a crisis, but itself the ac-tion mat will avoid the cdsis. Evecy activity organized in that waywould be a layer of peacefullife; and a sufficieot addition of th<'"111