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Internal Document

Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes

Learning from UNICEFs Experiences of Water

Well Drilling

2nd

EditionNovember 2009

Dr Kerstin Danert

Skat, Switzerland

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To date over 70 people have contributed specifically to the production of this document through

interviews and group discussions. They should be appreciated for their frankness and

encouragement as UNICEF embarks on the challenging journey to develop, disseminate and

ultimately adopt the Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes.

Six individuals require particular mention, for without them this report would not be what it is today.

Rupert Talbot has unfailingly given his support, shared his experiences and wisdom and provided

detailed comments on draft reports. With a sharp sense of humour Peter Wurzel pointed out

pertinent issues. Mohamed El-Fatih scrutinised the first draft, pointed out contradictions and

omissions and provided a reality check on a number of issues. Ray Rowles must be credited for his

keen observations. Paul Edwards provided an extremely thorough critique of the final draft. And I

extend a particular thanks to Raj Kumar Daw, who pointed out some gaps in the first edition of this

report, particularly with respect to the role of NGOs in India.

And of course, this document has drawn on the efforts in the field and in offices of others who have

struggled to improve practices, influence policies and reduce drilling costs for the last 30 years.

Please allow me to also appreciate the Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) Cost-Effective Boreholes

Flagship working group for their inputs before and during this assignment.

Thank you!

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper reviews experiences from the history of UNICEFs involvement in water well drilling and draws

out lessons on how to improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Borehole provision. It has built on the work of

numerous professionals within UNICEF, who have been committed to improving the cost-effectiveness of

water well provision over the years. The author undertook interviews and held group discussions with over

70 stakeholders and reviewed numerous UNICEF reports as well as the Supply Division procurementdatabase.

UNICEF operates in a highly decentralised manner and is more akin to a confederation of organisations

than one organisation as a whole. Country programmes comprise cooperation between UNICEF and the

host Government and are not dictated by headquarters. Country programme offices are responsible for

raising considerable amounts of their own funds. UNICEF country programme design, reporting and

accountability are more to the donor than to UNICEF headquarters.

The main phases of UNICEF WES work can be categorised as demonstration (1946 to 1967); development

(1968 to 1980); clarification (19801992); decline (19931999). The author refers to the period from

2000 onwards as an early renaissance period. Today UNICEF WES (now known as WASH) finds itself in

transition: building on its past, having lost momentum, human capacity and some of its institutionalmemory and re-establishing itself as a key player in the sector. UNICEF WES expenditure has increased

from less than US$ 2 million per year in the 1940s to 1960s, to over US$ 300 million in 2008.

UNICEF was one of the pioneers of borehole drilling for rural water supplies in India, commencing in

response to the 1966/67 drought in Bihar. Over 25 years, Government drilling programmes were

supported by UNICEF, as private sector rig manufacture and drilling capability grew. UNICEF India set the

benchmark for what could be achieved. Unfortunately what was a low cost solution for India ($700 to

$1,500 per well) became a high cost solution for sub-Saharan Africa ($3,000 to $30,000 per well).

The India success has been attributed to a combination of political will; continuous support by external

support agencies; a strong industrial base; skilled human resources; the involvement of the private sector;

an extensive programme of work; informed technical choice; good logistical control; standardisation; goodcommunications and infrastructure; as well as effective monitoring and evaluation. However, many of the

ingredients of Indias success are barely there or completely absent in sub-Saharan Africa.

Over the years, UNICEF has produced several guidelines, toolkits and handbookssome of which provide

pertinent information with respect to cost effective water well drilling. Unfortunately, these do not seem to

be well used by UNICEF WES staff.

This short study confirmed the interest among UNICEF stakeholders in working according to a code of

practice for cost-effective boreholes (COP). Interviewees responded very positively to the concept, noting

that a protocol which is independent of personalities is much required in the organisation. There are a

number of practices of particular concern. The technology selection process, whereby drilled boreholes are

often considered as the first choice, is not always appropriate and could be improved. UNICEFs response to

emergencies can result in the procurement of drilling equipment which may not even be deployed.

Groundwater resource issues are not always taken fully into consideration and the long term sustainability

of water supplies is not always fully considered when supporting the provision of new sources.

In the past, there was considerable emphasis on the procurement of drilling equipment for UNICEF and

Government programmes. From 1999 to 2007, over US$ 23 million was spent on procuring drilling

equipment through Copenhagen alone. Evidence from Nigeria and India suggest that the productivity of

Government and UNICEF owned equipment is low. There is no full inventory of drilling rigs owned, or

supplied by UNICEF. Data on rig productivity is not readily available.

UNICEF Country reports reviewed provide information about the number of people served, but do not

always include the technologies used. Detailed records and analysis of UNICEFs work are not

systematically collated in one place but rather tend to remain at country level. It is difficult to determine

the inputs and outputs, and therefore determine value for money of UNICEF support to the sector.

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It is anticipated that UNICEF will continue to play a key role in supporting the provision of rural water

supplies. Water well drilling is one of the key policy areas that UNICEF needs to support in a highly

professional manner. However, monitoring and control mechanisms within the organisation seem to be

lacking; programme development is at country level and reporting is primarily to donors. There are

currently relatively few incentives to ensure that wells are drilled cost-effectively and reported on in a

transparent manner. The COP could raise the level of professionalism by setting out clear procedures to be

followed as well as defining minimum standards and clear reporting requirements.

Guidance material with respect to rural water supplies already exists within UNICEF but appears to be little

referenced by staff and sometimes not known of. The COP therefore needs to be championed within the

organisation, and requires a solid roll-out strategy as well as strong reporting mechanisms.

The study recommends the following for the successful and development of the COP:

1. Determine the location, number and type of UNICEF-owned and UNICEF-supplies rigs in the past 7

years. Undertake an analysis their productivity where data is available.

2. Establish a process whereby procurement of drilling equipment is cleared by UNICEF headquarters

or an expert panel.

3. Determine the extent to which existing guidelines are used by country staff and why (or why not).

4. Consider introducing a mandatory system for documenting technology selection decisions which

takes the full range of water supply options into consideration.

5. The Code of Practice for Cost-Effective Boreholes should include guidance on: rig management

system; drilling rig technology; data and hydrogeological mapping; procurement and contract

management; payment; and supervision and quality assurance.

6. Develop clear and transparent reporting mechanisms which include a simple set of indicators that

all countries report on with respect to borehole drilling.

7. Develop a plan for the roll-out of the COP, and establish mechanisms to support UNICEF offices to

introduce it and establish monitoring systems.

In addition, it is recommended that UNICEF considers developing a code of practice or strategy for

operation and maintenance of improved water supplies, and groundwater resources management.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................. 1

2 CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................................................... 1

3 WET, WES AND WASH ....................................................................................................................................... 2

3.1 CHANGING PHASES WITHIN UNICEF ............................................................................................................................ 23.2 THE INDIA INFLUENCE................................................................................................................................................. 33.3 FINANCE.................................................................................................................................................................. 53.4 HUMAN RESOURCES.................................................................................................................................................. 6

4 EXISTING GUIDELINES, TOOLKITS AND HANDBOOKS ......................................................................................... 6

4.1 UNICEFWATER HANDBOOK (1999) ........................................................................................................................... 64.2 UNICEFAQUAPLUS GUIDELINES.................................................................................................................................. 94.3 NATIONAL (UNICEF)GUIDELINES.................................................. ....................................................... ....................... 94.4 UNICEFWATER QUALITY HANDBOOK..................................................... ........................................................ ............. 9

5 UNICEFS APPROACHES TO WATER SUPPLY ........................................................................................................ 9

5.1 THE TECHNOLOGY SELECTION PROCESS......................................................................................................................... 95.2 EMERGENCIES................................................ ......................................................... ................................................ 105.3 GROUNDWATER WATER RESOURCES AND CHEMICAL WATER QUALITY.............................................................................. 115.4 SUSTAINABILITY OF WATER SUPPLIES.......................................................................................................................... 11

6 UNICEF-SUPPORT OF BOREHOLE DRILLING ...................................................................................................... 12

6.1 RIG PRODUCTIVITY.................................................................................................................................................. 126.2 RIG TECHNOLOGY..................................................... ......................................................... ...................................... 146.3 DATA AND HYDROGEOLOGICAL MAPPING.................................................................................................................... 156.4 PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT.................................................. ......................................................... . 156.5 PAYMENT.............................................................................................................................................................. 166.6 SUPERVISION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE.......................................................................................... ............................ 16

6.7 SUPPORTING THE PRIVATE SECTOR............................................................................................................................. 177 REPORTING AND TRANSPARENCY ................................................................................................................... 17

7.1 INTERNAL AUDIT,MONITORING AND EVALUATION........................................................................................................ 177.2 UNICEFGLOBAL WASH REPORT............................................................................................................................... 187.3 UNICEFCOUNTRY OFFICE REPORTS........................................................ ........................................................ ........... 187.4 SYNTHESIS OF INFORMATION AND TRANSPARENCY........................................................................................................ . 18

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 20

9 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 21

ANNEX 1 NIGERIA ..................................................................................................................................................... 24

ANNEX 2 SUDAN ....................................................................................................................................................... 25

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FIGURES,TABLES AND BOXES

FIGURE 1WATER PIPES PROCURED BY UNICEFFOR TSUNAMI RELIEF IN INDONESIA........................................................ 2

FIGURE 2UNICEFWESEXPENDITURE 1990TO 2008 ............................................................................................... 6

FIGURE 3THREE DRILLING RIGS -PURCHASED BY UNICEFFOR TSUNAMI RELIEF IN INDONESIA -WAIT TO BE DEPLOYED...... 10FIGURE 4UNSAFE INDIA MARK IIINSTALLATION....................................................................................................... 11

TABLE 1EXAMPLES OF RIG PRODUCTIVITY RATES...................................................... ........................................................ ........... 13TABLE 2UNICEFSUPPLY DIVISION (COPENHAGEN)PROCUREMENT OF DRILLING EQUIPMENT (1999TO 2007) ................................... . 14TABLE 3EXAMPLES OF POOR DRILLING SUPERVISION................................................................................................................... 16TABLE 4UNICEFWESWATER SUPPLY ACHIEVEMENTS (SOURCES:UNICEF,2006B;2007B;2008C AND UNICEF,2006G;2007D AND

2008D) ...................................................................................................................................................................... 19

BOX 1DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF HANDPUMPS IN THE 1980S.................................................................................................. 4

BOX 2TECHNICAL &LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO IMPROVE COST-EFFECTIVENESS (UNICEF,1999) ................................... ............. 8BOX 3PROBLEMS SUSTAINING HANDPUMPS.............................................................................................................................. 12BOX 4CHALLENGES FACED BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS.................................................................................................................. 17

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1 Introduction

UNICEF is a key player in the Water and Sanitation Sector, operating in about 100 countries around the

globe. This paper reviews experiences from the history of UNICEFs involvement in water well drilling from

which it draws out lessons on how to improve the Cost-Effectiveness of Borehole provision.

The paper draws on The WET History 1946 to 1986by Martin Beyer (1986), which was part of the UNICEFhistory project, and WATER a matter of life and healthby Maggie Black and Rupert Talbot (2005).

Preparation of the paper was carried out under the umbrella of the Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) as

part of its Cost-Effective Boreholes (CEB) flagship. This flagship aim is that policies are adopted and

practices followed which bring about cost-effective borehole provision in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper

thus also draws upon key analytical work undertaken by the flagship of over the last five years.

Preparation of this paper involved a desk review of UNICEF country reports, country assessments,

evaluations and notes for the record from a limited number of countries1. Interviews were held with over

70 key informants (including UNICEF headquarters and supply division staff as well as current and former

WES staff from country programmes)2. In addition, a short field visit was undertaken in Nigeria in March

2008, and a number of interviews were held with key stakeholders in Uganda. The UNICEF Supply Division

procurement database (1999 to 2007 data) was also reviewed.

Please note that in order to maintain confidentiality, the sources of certain quotations and opinions are not

given in this paper.

2 Context

UNICEF contributes to the realisation of childrens rights to survival and developmentincluding reducing

the morbidity and mortality of women and children. It is against this background that UNICEF offices

around the world support the improvement of water and sanitation services through various programmes

and projects. Water well drilling is one of the technical options for improving water supply that UNICEF

supports.

UNICEF operates in a highly decentralised manner and is more akin to a confederation of organisations

than one organisation as a whole. Country programmes comprise cooperation between UNICEF and the

host Government and are not dictated by headquarters. UNICEF country offices enjoy considerable

autonomy whilst guided by the broader organisational strategies such as the medium-term strategic plan.

Partnerships are a central feature of UNICEFs effortsand are with governments, intergovernmental

organizations, international financial organisations, non-governmental organisations and academic

institutions, (UNICEF, 2006a).

Emergency programmes are a key part of UNICEFs work (and funding base). UNICEF often begins (or

recommences) involvement in the water and sanitation sector in response to an emergency (eg India,

Uganda, Southern Sudan, Darfur, and more recently the tsunami affected countries). Over time the

programme moves away from emergency and into recovery and development interventions.Although country offices receive base funding from headquarters as regular resources (Figure 2), they need

to supplement this revenue with funds sourced within the country, from the region, or from other UNICEF

offices including headquarters. The host government usually has influence on the content of the country

programme. UNICEF country programme design, reporting and accountability tend to be to the donor.

Accountability to UNICEF headquarters is weak. It has been suggested that these reporting mechanisms,

coupled with lack of adherence to clear guidelines regarding acceptable practices sometimes foster too

much freedom. As one interviewee explained Some donors have a moral obligation to fund UNICEFand

in some cases fund anything.

1Sudan, India, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Ethiopia (see reference list)

2The author used her professional judgement to select individuals from among the relevant stakeholder groups

(National and local Government, UNICEF current and former staff, NGOs, private contractors, consultants, donors).

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The type of support that UNICEF provides

for the drilling of water wells has changed

over time and varies considerably: from

large comprehensive WASH programmes

to limited but targeted interventions. The

question of how to bring about cost-

effective service delivery, and cost-effective water wells in particular, is not

new. Since the late 1960s numerous

sector professionals have been involved

in making improvements on the ground,

discussing key issues, writing papers and

memos, and challenging senior

management regarding particular policies

and practices within UNICEF. The

development of a code of practice for

cost-effective boreholes builds on this

work.

Interviewees responded very positively to the concept of a code of practice for cost effective boreholes.

There were four particularly pertinent responses by interviewees which should be mentioned:

UNICEF needs a protocol for decision-making that is strong and independentof personalities3.

UNICEF needs to follow a written policy and systematic procedureregarding which circumstances

to procure rigs and other items.

We *UNICEF+ need to sort out what appears to some people as random drilling of boreholes.

Country representatives require clear guidelinesfor drilling programmes, with examples.

3

WET, WES and WASH

3.1

Changing Phases within UNICEF

Over the years, UNICEF has changed the name and abbreviation for its work in the sector from Water

Supply and Environmental Sanitation (WET) to Water, Environment and Sanitation (WES) to Water and

Environmental Sanitation (also WES) to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). This document uses WASH

and WES depending on the context.

Beyer (1987) refers to three main phases of the UNICEFs water and sanitation work:

1. 1946 to 1967Demonstrationprojects.

2. 1968 to 1980Developmentof technologies, targets and policies.

3. 1980 to 1986Clarificationof objectives and links with primary health care (PHC) and the child

survival and development revolution (CSDR).

Given that Beyer published in 1987, it would be fair to say that the third phase continued up to the early

1990s, roughly corresponding with the end of the International Water Supply and Sanitation Decade

(IWSSD). The period 1967 through to the mid 1980s witnessed the growth of the UNICEF WES programme

in India, which raised access to safe water supplies through water well drilling in particular (section 3.2).

The IWSSD contributed towards a shift from a project approach to that of countrywide programmes.

However, elements of demonstration, and project approaches in opposed to programmes still continue up

3Note that 2004 report on UNICEF Strengths and Weaknesses (UNICEF, 2004a) refers to personal preferences of

agency managers in determining how multilateral [World Bank, Regional Development Bank, WHO and UNICEF]

organisations operate in the field.

Figure 1 Water Pipes Procured by UNICEF for Tsunami Relief in Indonesia

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to today. The progression of the IWSSD witnessed a gradual shift in emphasis in UNICEF WES from

hardware to software (Talbot, 2008). The earlier technological focus, with its emphasis on water well

drilling and handpumps in particular, gave way to a focus on maximizing health and other benefits from

water through integration of water supply with sanitation, health and education programmes, and

striving for long term self-sufficiency through the empowerment of communities to manage their own water

supply schemes UNICEF(1999).

Several stakeholders (eg Baumann, Loveless and Talbot, 2006) refer to the late 1990s as a period of decline

of WES within UNICEF. There were procurement scandals related to water-related supplies and the

discovery of arsenic in drinking water in Bangladesh (provided with UNICEF support). These further

dampened an already declining interest in WES, which UNICEF management no longer perceived as a

relevant to UNICEFs broader agenda, and in which donor interest had also declined. UNICEF was focusing

much more on rapid, high impact results such as immunisation and oral rehydration as well as child

protection, HIV/AIDS and the education of girls. This shift transformed itself into reduced interest in

funding of water well drilling programmes. Thus water supply, and drill rigs specifically, were no longer

centre stage in UNICEFs development agenda.

Following an audit in 1996, new procurement procedures and control mechanisms were introduced into

UNICEF. Although necessary, they reduced, deterred or eliminated valuable communication betweencountry/field offices, supply division and the manufacturer on issues such as specifications, conditions of

use, after sales service, training and warranties. Feedback from the recipient directly to the manufacturer

for product improvement was seriously frowned upon while the alternative routing via supply division in

Copenhagen was cumbersome (Talbot, 2008). With the exception of Iraq and DPR Korea, there were few

drilling rig purchases within UNICEF by the late 1990s.

From about 2003 onwards, UNICEF Country Offices once again started to procure drilling equipment for

UNICEF programmes and in response to emergencies. Unfortunately the competence in UNICEF with

respect to water supply, and the skills required for running borehole drilling programmes in particularly are

no longer as they were in the past (Talbot, 2008).

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with clear targets for water and sanitation, coupled with thenew WASH strategy and commitment to establish WASH programmes in 63 countries and a significant

increase in WASH expenditure suggest a fifth phase, which I shall refer to as an early renaissanceof WASH

within UNICEF. The decision by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) that UNICEF would be the

cluster lead for emergencies has further fuelled this change. Today UNICEF WASH finds itself in transition:

building on its past, having lost momentum, human capacity and some of its institutional memory and re-

establishing itself as a key player in the sector.

3.2

The India Influence

The UNICEF India programme, work undertaken by a sizeable number of NGOs as well as the Indian

Government was highly successful in raising access to safe water supplies through water well drilling

(Jaitley and Daw, 1995). This success influenced thinking and practices within UNICEF and beyond.

Up to the mid 1960s cable tool rigs were the only machines used for water well drilling in India. Although

they were inexpensive to purchase and operate, they were slow in hard rock, typically penetrating about

one meter per day (Black and Talbot, 2005). The Scottish missionary John MacLeod is credited with

changing this when he saw the potential of the down-the-hole hammer (DTH) drilling technology whilst on

leave in England (Jaitley and Daw, 1995). This insight, coupled with financial support from the British

charities Oxfam and Water on Want, ushered the Halcro-Tiger drilling machines into India in 1965. They

were originally to provide irrigation water for farmers. Over the following years a sizeable number of NGOs

adopted the DTH drilling technology, in particular to drill for drinking water supplies.

The 1966/67 Bihar drought and famine triggered a step change in UNICEFs involvement from small-scale

humanitarianism to a major development input, and catalysed UNICEFs involvement in water well drillingfor rural water supplies in India (Black and Talbot, 2005). Concerns about dropping water tables led to the

decision to develop water sources in hard rock terrains and UNICEF assisted in the procurement of fast, up-

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to-date hard rock drilling equipment. From 1969, a total of 125 down-the-hole-hammer (DTH) drilling rigs

were introduced by UNICEF. The rigs, with support trucks and spares were delivered to various states in

the early 1970s and used to drill to depths of 60m (although the early rigs had the capacity to drill to

200m). Conventional cable tool rigs were also sought for particular areas. In order to prevent a monopoly

of supply, rigs were procured from Atlas Copco (Sweden), Halco (UK) and Ingersoll Rand (USA) all of which

also had a manufacturing base in India (Black and Talbot, 2005).

The official commitment to rural drinking water supplies in India which was established in the 1970s

emphasised safe domestic water supplies. This was driven by the link between unsafe water supplies

and epidemic disease. It led to an almost exclusive focus on the exploitation of groundwater by drilled

boreholes and installed with handpumps. However, the 1974 evaluation of the UNICEF-assisted

programme revealed that 75% of handpumps on the new boreholes were not working, which spawned the

development of more suitable handpump technology (Black and Talbot, 2005), as summarised in Box 1.

Box 1 Design and Development of Handpumps in the 1980s

The 1980s witnessed considerable innovation and development with respect to handpump design and

ultimately led to the Village Level Operation and Maintenance (VLOM) concept, pioneered by Saul

Arlosoroff with his UNDP-World Bank team. The India Mark II handpump was developed through apartnership between the Indian organisations MERADO, Richardson and Crudas, and UNICEF. The project

was based on the mutual understanding that India needed an improved handpump and that all parties

would work towards this goal. It was clear, that once the research work was finished, the design would be

put in the public domain.

The India Mark II faced problems due to inadequate corrosion resistance and was difficult to maintain and

repair. This drove David Grey and John Chilton in Malawi to experiment with alternatives which led to the

development of the Afridev pump as part of the UNDP-World Bank handpump project. The India Mark III,

which followed in the heels of the India Mark II was in many respects a response to the Afridev pump.

When the new drilling technology was introduced into India, the emphasis on private sector participation

was not as prominent as it is in development thinking today. Initially a number of NGOs and UNICEF owneddrilling equipment. UNICEF rigs were later donated to the Government. UNICEF remained heavily involved

in the management of these rigs and the purchase of spares. UNICEF Indias development model focused

on building the capacity of State Government Water Boards and public health engineering departments

with drilling equipment, maintenance workshops and training. Although there was little direct attention

given to private drillers, it was hoped that local rig manufacture and private sector drilling would take off

(Black and Talbot, 2005). In contrast, the development of handpump technology was done in partnership

with the private sector from the outset.

Over the years drilling technology was copied locally. The extent of Government funding for borehole

drilling for domestic water and the market for agricultural and industrial wells helped the private drilling

market to accelerate. It has been estimated that by the late 1980s some 70 - 80% of wells were drilled by

the private sector (Ali, 2008; Talbot, 2008). In contrast, state-owned equipment was ageing and operatingcosts had climbed significantly (Black and Talbot, 2005). Private contractors responded quickly and

efficiently to the 1987 drought, and in some cases output was three times higher than that of Government

(Black and Talbot, 2005). In 1992, UNICEF essentially withdrew from supporting drilling activities in India,

having assisted in pioneering, developing, assuring quality and monitoring for 25 years.

The revolution in handpump design and their availability through the private sector in India (Box 1) were

instrumental for improving domestic water supplies. Meanwhile, small submersible pumps and cheap

energy, coupled with relatively low drilling costs spawned a massive growth in the private installation of

water wells for agriculture. Unfortunately, the extensive uptake of the drilling and pumping technology for

irrigation, coupled with lack of regulation has resulted in declining groundwater levels in many parts of

India (Nigam, Gujja, Bandyopadhyay and Talbot, 1996). Although borehole drilling was a leap forward interms of increasing access to safe domestic water supplies, it has also had unintended consequences on

groundwater resources.

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In his presentation at the International Groundwater Conference in Addis Ababa, Talbot (2004) made it

clear that the Indian borehole revolution was successful due to:

The combination of hard-rock drilling technology and India Mark II handpump.

And the key ingredients of:

political will;

continuous support by external support agencies;

a strong industrial base;

skilled human resources;

the involvement of the private sector;

an extensive programme of work;

informed technical choice;

good logistical control;

standardisation;

good communications and infrastructure;

Effective monitoring and evaluation.

In many ways, the India experience set the benchmark for UNICEF of what could be achieved with respectto borehole drilling. Unfortunately, what was a low cost solution for India (US $700 to $1,500 per water

well) became a high cost solution for sub-Saharan Africa ($3,000 to $30,000 per water well).

This marked difference has many causes. Firstly, sub-Saharan Africa does entirely not sit on crystalline rock

but rather on a variety of formations with different drilling requirements. Secondly whereas the India costs

reflect wells installed with handpumps, the higher-end costs in sub-Saharan Africa include deeper wells

with motorised pumps. Finally, and of critical importance is the fact that many of the ingredients key for

success in India (listed above) are not in place in sub-Saharan African countries. Extensive and predictable

work programmes, continuous external support and investment in human resources have been strikingly

absent in the water sector of many sub-Saharan African countries for a long time. Involvement of the

private sector is also relatively recent in many countries, while infrastructure is very often poor. With theexceptions of Nigeria and South Africa, the industrial base is also relatively low. Put in simple terms, to

date, the India model has not transferred to sub-Saharan Africa as hoped.

3.3

Finance

Between 1946 and 1967, UNICEF spent less than US$ 2 million per year on WES activities (Beyer, 1987).

Expenditure had increased to US$ 50 million by 1980. The years 1982 to 1984 saw an annual spend of

about US$ 70 million, which reduced to US$ 58 million in 1985 (Beyer, 1985). Between 1985 and 1989, the

average annual WES expenditure was US$ 68 million.

Figure 2 shows UNICEF WES expenditure between 1990 and 2006. Following a peak in 1993, WES

expenditure dropped significantly up to 1999. This corresponds with the period that has been termed the

decline of WES in UNICEF. Regular Resources (i.e. UNICEF WASH core budget) remained fairly steady at an

average of US$ 33 million between 1990 and 2006, rising to just over US$ 50 million in 2007 and 2008. The

increase in expenditure from 2003 to 2006 is primarily due to the significant increase in Emergency

Resources, with Other Resources (i.e. funds from Donor partners) also rising significantly in 2007 and 2008.

In 2008, for the first time, UNICEF WES expenditure was over US$ 300 million.

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Figure 2 UNICEF WES Expenditure 1990 to 2008

In 2007 and

2008, WES

expenditurecomprised 10%

and 11% of

total UNICEF

expenditure

respectively

(Source: Data

provided by

UNICEF WES

New York in

May 2009).

3.4

Human Resources

During the period of the decline of WES in UNICEF (see 3.1), the organisation lost substantial skills in water

well drilling and its management. UNICEF is well known for recruiting some of the best in-country staff for

its WES programmes. However, some interviewees for this study were concerned about weaknesses in

UNICEF WES staff capacity with respect to borehole drilling programmes and procurement of handpump

supplies. It was also pointed out that since WES is part of the Child Survival and Development Department,WES staff may be supervised by professionals who are not familiar with WES.

In addition, several informants raised concerns about the lack of systematic orientation of new UNICEF WES

staff. According to UNICEF Headquarters, orientation of WES staff is an area that they are currently seeking

to address. The year 2007 saw a the launch of a global mapping survey of UNICEF staff, with screening

tools developed to assess external candidates and generic job profiles updated. In 2008, WASH professional

staff comprised 375 people (UNICEF, 2008a).

4 Existing Guidelines, Toolkits and Handbooks

UNICEF WES has produced a number of guidelines, toolkits and handbooks, which are summarised in this

chapter. They are a valuable resource and contain excellent information. However, not all staff membersknow about these publications and some of them do not appear to have been widely circulated.

4.1

UNICEF Water Handbook (1999)

The UNICEF (1999) publication entitled Towards Better Programming A Water Handbookis a practical

guide for implementing the (1995) WES operational strategies. It comprises five chapters:

(1) Water and Sustainable Development;

(2) Community Participation and Management;

(3) Cost and Cost Effectiveness;

(4) Water Technologies and

(5) Maintenance of Water Supply Systems.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

$300

$350

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

%ofExpenditureonEmergencyResources(ORE)

Expenditure(millions)

Regular Resources (RR) Other Resources (ORR)

Emergrncy Resoures (ORE) % emergency

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Chapter 3 - Cost and Cost Effectiveness provides guidance on technical and logistical considerations to

improve cost-effectiveness (Box 2). On the whole, the guidance given is good although issues of verticality,

casing and casing installation as well development are not included. It refers to the use of private sector

contractors and even states that it may be necessary to support the private sector through incentives for a

limited period. The handbook refers to the importance of an attractive market size for investment and

mentions the importance of capacity building of government for effective monitoring and supervision of

contractors. In an earlier draft of the handbook (in 1998), there was an additional chapter, entitledReducing Drilling Costswhich was not included in the final version.

Chapter 4 - Water Technologies - sets out design options, constraints and choices. It favours the selection

of groundwater abstraction with a handpumpinstalled in small-diameter well. System design options are

grouped into single point, standpipes and household connections. Problems of over-abstraction of

groundwater from agriculture and industry are mentioned. Protected springs are also mentioned and

rainwater collection is given as a solution particularly where they are no other options. Surface water is

considered as almost always polluted, and household water treatment is not mentioned at all.

Chapter 5 - Maintenance of Water Supply Systems - states that the most common institutional

arrangement for operation and maintenance is the three-tier system involving handpump caretakers, pump

mechanics and more highly trained mechanics. Although the handbook points out the need formodifications, few alternatives are given. At five pages, this key chapter is very brief and lacks discussion of

community follow-up or retraining. It reflects common practices at the time the manual was written.

Although the 1999 handbook has not been replaced, several interviewees question whether it is used, and

it was certainly not referred to in Nigeria or Uganda. It has been suggested that although the handbook

was circulated within UNICEF, it was not properly introduced to staff.

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Box 2 Technical & Logistical Considerations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness (UNICEF, 1999)

Even when considering only one technical option, that of the water well handpump, a variety of cost-saving

measures can be applied. The largest single cost item in the handpump option, and one which acts as a constraint to

expansion, is the drilling operation and drilling success rate. Correct choice of drilling equipment, drilling area, and

drilling rig movement can reduce overall costs. Selection of the right equipment depends on the geological

conditions and anticipated drilling depths. Proper surveys prior to drilling can contribute significantly to cost

reduction. For example, in Nigeria the failure rate in the government programme, due to inadequate surveys, hasbeen particularly high with a number of boreholes running dry after a short period of time. Since drilling costs are

the single major component of cost, actions to optimize the use of surveys, rig movement and monitoring can have a

major impact. Experience suggests that improvements can be made in the purely technical and engineering aspects

for lowering costs of a water well with handpump. Some key factors are:

Yield of the well- The target yield in water well design should be only that required by the handpump to be

installed, which is usually in the range 750 to 1,000 litres an hour. Taking additional measures to increase the yield

to, say, 2,000 litres an hour "just in case," is unnecessary and often costly. This practice can become a major drain on

resources, especially in projects drilling large numbers of water wells.

Diameter and depth of the well- Doubling the diameter of a well, or increasing its depth will substantially increase

the costs. In most situations, the diameter of the well is the sole function of the handpump to be installed (100mm

to 125mm diameter water well is sufficient for most handpumps). The depth range of the wells should be defined by

scientific investigations and proper surveys in accordance with the design yield.

Equipment selection- Commonly there is an over-specification of equipment required for drilling "just in case" it is

needed. Large equipment not only requires greater capital investment but also means higher running costs, as seen

from the example of Ethiopia in the table below.

Big Rigs vs. Small Rigs

Rig Type Capital Cost

(US$)

Daily Depreciation (over

7 years, US$)

Consumables per metre

(US$)

Fuel per Hour Cost (US$)

Big Rigs 700,000 274 81 57

Small Rigs 520,000 204 43 23

Equipment selection should be based on the diameter of the wells to be drilled, the average depth to be drilled, the

geological formation to be drilled and the accessibility of the drilling sites. For wider coverage smaller rigs should be

used with larger rigs for drilling in certain areas only.

Standardization- Non-standardization of drilling equipment, materials and handpump models increases the spare

parts requirements, increasing operation cost. The successful expansion of the rural water supply programme in

India, for example, was due to a great extent to the use of one type of handpump, the India Mark II. The production

of hardware, the design of maintenance systems, and the spare parts procurement and distribution systems were all

built around this one pump, simplifying and improving the cost effectiveness of the programme.

Logistics- The timely availability of materials, particularly imported items, can also help reduce costs. If economies

of scale are to be realized and drilling costs reduced, there should be sufficient advance planning and lead time for

obtaining the supplies. In one large long-running UNICEF-supported drilling programme, spare parts are ordered

eight to ten months in advance. Developing countries also need to be provided some form of "certainty" of financial

support from donors to enable proper logistical planning. If financial support for programmes is cut or reduced mid-stream, the costs of rural water supply increases considerably. Idle rigs, due to poor logistics, add significantly to

costs. There are numerous examples of rigs which are technically capable of drilling 100 wells a year producing only 5

or Reducing rig downtime, efficient back-up service, operating a shift system so that water wells are completed

without stopping, and planning rig movements based on logistical and not political considerations can also reduce

costs.

Productivity- Low productivity with high systems costs adds to the unit cost of a water point. There is often a case

for building an incentive system for local staff to increase output. This will have to be carefully designed to fit in the

institutional and wage structure in cases where the water supply is provided by government teams so that it does

not conflict with the sustainability of the overall government programme.

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4.2

UNICEF Aquaplus Guidelines

In 2008, UNICEF Headquarters circulated a CD to UNICEF WES staff with resource materials entitled

Aquaplus. It comprises 5 chapters: introduction, water quality, reconnaissance, groundwater and surface

water. The guidelines do not appear to have been widely distributed or extensively used.

4.3

National (UNICEF) Guidelines

UNICEF has been involved in the preparation of WES guidelines and manuals in many countries for a long

time. Examples include the Extension Workers Manual for Uganda, Drilling Standards in India and the

production of 14 guidelines on the construction of water and sanitation facilities in Southern Sudan

(UNICEF, 2007b).

It is unfortunate that many of these manuals appear to remain in country. An example is the WES Manual

for Southern Sudan, which is considered to be a key document, and of potential use to other countries.

However, one needs to travel to Lokichokio in Northern Kenya to obtain a hard copy. Few manuals from

country programmes are currently available through the UNICEF Intranet, and there seem to be no

procedures for ensuring that hard or even soft copies are sent to Programme Division. Lack of systematic

sharing within UNICEF is likely to lead to a duplication of effort and undermines one of UNICEFs potentialstrengths given its global reach.

Questions have been raised by interviewees regarding UNICEFs in-house capacity in some countries to

assure the quality of the numerous guidelines produced by country programmes.

4.4

UNICEF Water Quality Handbook

UNICEF has recently finalised a new water quality handbook for field staff and partners (UNICEF, 2008b)

which has been circulated to all WES staff.

5 UNICEFs Approaches to Water Supply

5.1

The Technology Selection Process

UNICEF has a history of supporting the drilling of boreholes, which is often the first choice technology for a

programme. Given the relatively high cost of a borehole source, particularly when compared to improving

a traditional well or protecting a spring, there is a need to question whether the apparent preference for it

is justified. Interviewees cited five main reasons for preferring boreholes:

Firstly, in many countries, there is a commonly held view that a drilled water-well fitted with a

handpump provides a safer supply than any other source.

Secondly, many stakeholders think that boreholes can be uniformly applied.

Thirdly, appreciation, or detailed knowledge of alternatives, such as upgrading traditional wells or

rainwater harvesting can be lacking. There appears to be a lack of attention to what households arealready doing themselves, and how these can be built upon, or how they affect attitudes to new

facilities.

Fourthly, boreholes are seen as a way of providing water sources quickly.

Finally, UNICEF may simply follow the existing, and well entrenched technology of preference of its

partners, which is often the borehole.

In Sierra Leone, for example, the speed of the programme to drill wells for rapidly returning refugees was

taken as the most important criteria in technology selection. Drilling of boreholes was intended to tap

groundwater at greater depths in areas that cannot be served with hand dug wells. However, boreholes in

fact were being drilled in areas that could be served by hand dug wells, and in some cases already were

(Keast, 2002). In Nigeria boreholes have for long been considered to be the first choice technology, despitethe countryslong history of using hand dug wells.

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There has been a strong emphasis on borehole drilling in Southern Sudan, despite the fact that almost half

of the country is practically covered by water for half the year and that there many springs, which would be

relatively cheap to protect. Chawla (2003) states that between 1999 and 2002 UNICEF stepped up borehole

drilling in Southern Sudan, which included better management of drilling rigs and contracting the private

sector. However, Chawla (2003) points out that drilling boreholes is incredibly expensive, and that cheaper

alternatives need to be created.

Within UNICEF there appears to be a need for greater consideration of other water supply optionsalongside drilled boreholes as part of a clear and rational process for technology selection. In order to avoid

providing an inappropriate water supply for a particular location, the decision of whether to drill a

borehole, improve a traditional well or consider some other option needs to be made systematically, and

on a case by case basis. The alternative is running programmes in which the number of boreholes to be

drilled is defined and locations are sought, rather than finding suitable solutions for rural dwellers. The

former is more likely to lead to top-down decision-making rather than a more responsive approach. It also

has negative implications on cost and long-term viability of the supply.

5.2

Emergencies

Ensuring access to safe water supplies is one of the key aims of

UNICEFs Core Commitments to Children (CCC). When a sudden

disaster strikes, the first concern is to reach the affected people

as quickly as possible. As stated in section 5.1, borehole drilling

is considered as a mechanism to rapidly provide safe water.

However, it does not always work out so well.

Two examples are the emergency response to the 2004 Tsunami

in which drilling rigs were procured by UNICEF. In Sri Lanka, the

Tsunami funding enabled the Government to revamp its aging

fleet of drilling equipment but the rigs were purchased without

any inclusion of after sales service or training. The long term

funding and technical obligations to operate and maintain theequipment seem not to have been adequately considered by the

Government or UNICEF (Baumann, Loveless and Talbot, 2006).

In the case of Indonesia, four rigs were ordered and three

arrived, some ten months later (Figure 3). The rigs were

supposed to drill 250 boreholes in unspecified locations but were actually not used for 18 months, and later

only to a limited extent. Their relevance to the programme is now under question (Booth, 2008). It should

be noted that the total UNICEF funds allocated to WASH component of Tsunami response was US$ 66

million, of which half was earmarked for supplies and equipment.

Baumann, Loveless and Talbot (2006) point out that in Sri Lanka and Indonesia no fully-fledged WASH

programmes were in place at the time of the 2004 Tsunami. Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans(EPRPs) were not in place either. Turnover of the rapidly deployed staff was very high, with a lack of time

spent on analysis of the situation. These problems, coupled with a lack of checks and balances within

UNICEF clearly affected the decision-making process, leading to expenditure of over US$ 1.7 million on

drilling equipment that has been highly underutilised.

These examples illustrate the realities of operating under pressure to deliver results and how easy it was to

procure drilling equipment within UNICEF without a long term plan in place. Drilling equipment has an

expected lifespan of about ten years, and it is thus very questionable as to whether it should be purchased

as a short-term emergency solution. Decisions taken in the emergency phase have implications on later

work.

Figure 3 Three Drilling Rigs - Purchased by

UNICEF for Tsunami Relief in Indonesia -

Wait to be Deployed

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5.3

Groundwater Water Resources and Chemical Water Quality

Rupert Talbot (2008) eloquently cites the example of India where water coverage targets were made, but

have backslid considerably due to a lack of consideration of water quality and declining groundwater

levels as well as to inadequate focus on operation and maintenance issues. Black and Tabot (2005)

highlight the plight of domestic water users in several parts of India, where UNICEF was directly involved in

improving access to groundwater for over 20 years. Faced with competition for resources from agriculture

and industry, countless boreholes have been abandoned, as they are no longer deep enough.

India is not an isolated case, working for UNICEF, Salone (2004) raised concerns about the sustainability of

groundwater resources in Darfur, which is now being monitored. Consideration of groundwater resources

should not be overlooked.

Chemical water quality is another environmental issue that needs to be considered at an early stage.

Fluoride, arsenic and iron in groundwater can render it unfit, or undesirable for human consumption.

Nitrate contamination is a problem which is still being uncovered and better understood. In the past

UNICEF, has been more concerned with water supply than water quality issues. However, increasingly the

organisation is involved in arsenic mitigation work, water safety planning and water quality surveillance and

mapping (UNICEF, 2007c). For example, in 2007 UNICEF India undertook a critical review of its role withrespect to water resource management in consultation with Government and other partners (UNICEF,

2008b).

Given the importance of chemical water quality to the suitability and sustainability of drilled water wells, it

is important that it is properly considered when planning to support borehole drilling programmes.

5.4

Sustainability of Water Supplies

Although groundwater supplies will continue to be a major source of improved water supplies for rural

populations in the developing world, it is becoming increasingly apparent that boreholes fitted with

handpumps are no panacea. I have already mentioned the backsliding with respect to coverage in India as

pumps went out of service (see section 5.3). The Rural Water Supply Network (RWSN) estimates that aboutone third of handpumps in Africa are not working at any given time. Breakdown rates in some countries are

actually be much worse than this (Harvey, 2007).

Figure 4 Unsafe India Mark II Installation

The 1980s witnessed UNICEF engineering

professionals focus on technical

sustainability. There was a lack of concern

regarding the social or economic

acceptability of the installed water supply

facilities (Black and Talbot, 2005).

Examining more recent experiences, it isclear that the political pressure to provide

new water points is high, as is the desire to

show results quickly. Examples from

Liberia, North and Southern Sudan and

Nigeria illustrate that this is not necessarily

cost-effective in the long term (Box 3).

If improved water points cannot be sustained for their expected lifetime (about 8 years for a pump and 20

years for a borehole), then investments have clearly been wasted. There appears to be a growing

consensus that breakdown of improved water points is heavily influenced by a combination of four

problems:

(i) Top down approach of supplying boreholes fitted with handpumps.

(ii) Poor quality construction in the first place.

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(iii)Insufficient investment in operation and maintenance compared to new construction.

(iv)Lack of spare parts and skills to maintain the facilities.

(v) Poor management by the users, which is often linked to inadequate training and lack of follow-up

support.

Box 3 Problems Sustaining Handpumps

In the post-war transition period in Liberia, UNICEF supported the construction of hand dug wells installed with

handpumps for schools (from 2004 to 2006). A rapid assessment (Keast, 2005) found that 38% of the 22 schools

visited did not have a working water point and a further 24% did not work all year round4. Some wells had been

drilled too shallow, others had poorly installed handpumps, handpumps theft and lack of maintenance. Of particular

concern was the lack of handpump tools and spares and complete lack of training regarding pump maintenance and

repair. The programme moved at a high pace, and did not give due concern to the engagement with water users, or

maintenance. In parallel, UNICEF was supporting a national handpump maintenance programme, but progress was

extremely slow.

UNICEFs work in North Sudanhas included the construction and rehabilitation of water sources, in combination

with training of Government staff and water users in management, as well as O&M. However UNICEF (2006b) states

that in North Sudan: there was inadequate technical and managerial capacity at the state and locality levels for the

construction, supervision, monitoring and quality assurance of facilities. This does not bode well for quality of worksor sustainability. However, the ECHO-funded evaluation of WES emergency response in the Blue Nile, Utility and

Upper Nile States indicated that facilities funded in 2004 and 2005 were still functioning well. It is not clear whether

this is still the case today.

In Southern Sudan, poor access to communities has been a major constraint. UNICEF (2006b) states that this has

lead to high borehole costs. Rigs and consumables (including gravel pack and cement) have been flown in to drilling

sites. Access to spare parts and maintenance of handpumps installed in such isolated places is highly questionable.

In the case of Nigeria, Keast (2007) cites handpump breakdown rates as typically above 50% and often much higher.

He continues to point out that poor sustainability is due to a top-down approach to rural water supplies in

Government programmes, poor initial quality of boreholes and handpump installations as well as the lack of a viable

maintenance system and spare parts supply chain. By 2005, key Government stakeholders in Nigeria had recognised

the problem of high breakdown rates (Keast, 2005). In 2007, UNICEF Nigeria was undertaking considerable efforts toinstitute Village Level Operation and Management (so-called VLOM). They report that the functionality of water

points in focus communities of: Kwara State has improved from 53% to 98%; Zamfara State is reporting 100% (up

from 38% in 2006) and in Kebbi State, the functionality of boreholes improved from 12.3% to 88% UNICEF (2006e).

There is recognition within UNICEF of the importance of sustainability of water supplies, which the 2007

WASH report noted as a key challenge for 2008 and beyond (UNICEF, 2007c). Further, the new Dutch-

funded programmes in East and Southern Africa use the sustainability of outcomes as the primary

determinant of success (UNICEF, 2006f). However, it will take time for this to be fully translated into clear

policies and procedures with respect to operation and maintenance. Some UNICEF country programmes

still appear to be providing improved water supplies where spares are scant, or completely absent, and

where there is no clear system for providing follow-up support to communities.

In order to ensure that boreholes are cost-effective, the long term functionality of the facilities needs to be

taken very seriously before wells are even drilled.

6 UNICEF-Support of Borehole Drilling

6.1

Rig Productivity

Over the course of its 25-year involvement in India (1967 to 1992), UNICEF supplied 330 drilling rigs, at a

total cost (at the time of purchase) of US$ 33 million (UNICEF, 2000). By the end of this time, the

Government was in a position to fund and manage its own rural drinking water programme (Black and

4Note that this was not a statistical sample of the 1,100 schools in the programme. They were sampled from 5 out of

15 counties and were relatively easy to access from Monrovia.

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Talbot, 2005). Nowadays, most drilling is undertaken by the private sector. Despite this, UNICEF India

actually procured over US$ 310,000 worth of drilling related items from 1999 to 2007.

In order to be cost-effective, a mechanised drilling rig should complete at least 100 water wells in a given

year. In reality, production rates are often considerably lower than this, leading to higher amortization

costs and therefore higher drilling costs. Table 1 shows relatively low rig productivity machines were

operated by UNICEF directly, through the Government, or hired out to NGOs.

Table 1 Examples of Rig Productivity Rates

Institution/Location/Time Frame (Reference) Rig Productivity

RWASSA-UNICEF/Nigeria/1990 to 2000 (Wurzel, 2001) 33 boreholes/rig/year (fleet average)

RWASSA-UNICEF /Nigeria/2000 (Wurzel, 2001) 10 boreholes (TH-10 fleet)

Private sector/India/1990s ((Wurzel, 2001) ~150 boreholes/rig/year

UNICEF/Southern Sudan/2006-2007 (anon) ~10 boreholes/rig/year

Although there were high levels of expenditure recently on drilling equipment, spares and consumables

over the last eight years in Sudan (US$ 6,850,000) and Ethiopia (US$ 5,100,000) there is no available

analysis of rig productivity. In Nigeria, a Rig Information Management System (RIMS) was established in

1995 (data included from 1989 onwards) and enabled Wurzel (2001) to generate the data presented in

Table 1. A similar management tool in India to measure performance against a set target of borehole

numbers5and meters drilled, and monitored the distance travelled by each rig. Analysis of the data in this

system was instrumental in showing the irrelevance of investing in higher-capacity drilling machines (Black

and Talbot, 2005). It is not clear whether such systems exist and are utilised in Sudan and Ethiopia, or other

countries.

At one time, UNICEF was the largest purchaser of water well drilling rigs globally, and the UNICEF fleet of

equipment set performance and quality standards (Talbot, 2008). Now, Government owned drilling rigs arerenowned for their low productivity rates and poor maintenance. In Nigeria for example, by 2001, more

than half the UNICEF/Government of Nigeria drilling fleet, estimated to have cost between US$ 5 to 7

million was no longer operational due to lack of use for long periods, lack of State funds, as well as the

natural aging process, with rigs ranging from 6 to 17 years old ( Wurzel, 2001). Three new rigs were

procured by UNICEF Nigeria in 2000/2001 at a cost of US$ 827,863 (Annex 1). Since then no new drilling

rigs and only a very limited number of spares have been procured for Nigeria through UNICEF. In Uganda,

there has been a similar shift with private sector drilling preferred over government ownership.

It is frequently argued that public-owned rigs are necessary for emergencies or use in inaccessible areas.

However the reality is that public-owned drilling equipment is frequently diverted to undertake drilling for

local elites or politicians. Wurzel (2001) points out that it was common for underpaid drill crews to drill

private boreholes in Nigeria.

Despite the arguments against Governments or UNICEF owning rigs, UNICEF supplied over US$23 million

worth of drilling equipment (rigs, compressors, trucks, spares and consumables) to the public sector and

UNICEF between 1999 and 2007 (Table 2)6. To take a rather cynical quote from one of the interviewees:

There is nothing quite like buying a drilling rig when you have extra cash [to spend in a programme]

(anon). Further details for expenditure on drilling equipment in Sudan and Nigeria are given in Annex 1 and

2. In North Sudan, poor absorptive, technical and managerial capacities by national and local governments

are cited as reasons for not achieving planed results (UNICEF, 2006b; UNICEF 2007b). Despite this, UNICEF

has procured considerable drilling equipment and consumables for Government from 2004 up to 2008.

5In the case of the new generation hydraulic operated rigs, the target was 150 boreholes per rig per year.

6The Procurement Services Programme in UNICEF has also been used by Governments to purchase drilling related

items over years. The extent of this has not been explicitly documented.

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Table 2 UNICEF Supply Division (Copenhagen) Procurement of Drilling Equipment (1999 to 2007)7

Consignee Country Name Expenditure (US$) Consignee Country Name Expenditure (US$)

Sudan 6,849,073 Central African Republic 109,723

Iraq 5,820,318 Dem. Rep. of Congo 80,026

Ethiopia 5,408,798 Afghanistan 60,619

Sri Lanka 1,000,926 Djibouti 50,994

Nigeria 827,863 Lao, People's Dem. Rep 32,081

Angola 594,854 Pakistan 22,908

Ghana 432,666 Chad 21,861

Kenya 424,396 Madagascar 21,189

Indonesia 402,178 Mali 15,610

India 313,803 Equatorial Guinea 10,140

Nicaragua 237,334 Burkina Faso 8,773

Myanmar 157,458 Cote D'Ivoire 6,220

United Rep. of Tanzania 135,068 Maldives 3,975

Sierra Leone 122,674 Niger 3,530

Liberia 122,317

Grand Total 23,297,375

UNICEF originally owned and managed a drilling fleet in Southern Sudan (dates not clear), with the

justification that there was no Government and that private sector capacity was inefficient. Later, as the

emphasis shifted to the private sector, UNICEF opted for an approach whereby contractors were paid for

the successful completion of ten boreholes.

UNICEF appears to still own drilling rigs in a number of countries (including Liberia and Indonesia as well as

southern Sudan), but a full inventory is not available from the organisation.

6.2

Rig Technology

Oversized rigs raise the cost of borehole drilling considerably and concerns regarding over-specified drilling

equipment are not new. Black and Talbot (2005) refer to the purchase of drills of extraordinary capacity

for drilling at speed, which were too unwieldy and over-equipped in India in the late 1970s8. Wurzel (2001)

found that the mean drilling depth for a fleet of Ingersoll-Rand TH-10s used in Nigeria from 1990 to 2000

was 33 meters despite the fact that these rigs are designed to drill to 180 meters. Keast (2002) refers to

the use of inappropriate drilling rigs used in UNICEFs work in Sierra Leone, and that the equipment cannot

reach many of the sites located by UNICEF and its partners.

Smaller rotary, or percussion rigs are often able to drill drill more efficiently than large rigs and can reachmore locations, particularly where road networks are poor (Keast, 2002). Smaller, mechanised, all terrain

rigs at lower cost are now available on the international market and can drill wells at a significantly lower

cost. However, UNICEF WASH staff are not fully aware of the guidance that has already been issued to

encourage the use of smaller drill rigs.

Hand drilled, or manually drilled wells are an option in specific environments (soft formation and shallow

groundwater). UNICEF Chad has supported manual drilling since for a number of years. Since 2004,

UNICEF Niger has been piloting manually drilled wells for domestic use. UNICEF Nigeria undertook a study

7

Note: Figures extracted from approx 18,000 rows of WES Procurement data. Analysis was undertaken by the author of this paperby examining supplier names and short text. Note that geophysical equipment is not included in the analysis.8A case in point is the 30 ton CP 700 rig with the capability of drilling to 300m that drilled hundreds of 60m holes over many years

a situation that could be compared to using a sledgehammer for brass tacks.

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of manual drilling, which revealed that it is widely practiced in the country (an estimated 30,000 wells) but

that one state Government contracts hand drillers (Adekile and Olabode, 2008).

Since late 2008, UNICEF Headquarters have been supporting the mapping of hand drilling potential, and are

also working with partners to try and raise the profile of manual drilling among stakeholders.

6.3 Data and Hydrogeological Mapping

A good knowledge of national, and more localised hydrogeology is a major asset to improving the cost-

effective of water well drilling. In the case of the UNICEF India programme, drill logs were fairly

rudimentary comprising depth, diameter, yield and casing installed: the sheer volume of output was

such that a more sophisticated well log was not viable and probably not needed [250,000 handpumps were

installed per year at one point]. One soon built up a picture of depths to drill and yields in a given area

(Talbot, 2008).

Inadequate attention to the collection and collation of data from drilling is simply a lost opportunity. In

terms of good practice, UNICEF Southern Sudan has been involved with establishing a drilling database

although it is not clear how effectively it is being maintained now that it has been handed over to

Government. It would be useful for UNICEF to link their partners to other organisations (such as the

International Association of Hydrogeologists) with expertise on data and hydrogeological mapping.

6.4

Procurement and Contract Management

UNICEF has no standard contracting practices between countries, there is limited capacity for contract

management and UNICEF systems are not idea for construction type contracts. One programme officer

explained that in order to contract a drilling company, terms of reference, rather than a bill of quantities

had to be included in the UNICEF financial system, PROMS. In some countries, UNICEF contracts lack

penalty clauses and damages, or they are not enforced and contractors are not held to account. UNICEF

Supply Division in Copenhagen is in the process of developing guidelines on construction.

UNICEF country offices lack guidance regarding preparation of drilling contracts. Each country office is

responsible for developing contracts with Government, or for UNICEF direct use. Clearly contracts need tofit to the national (or even State) scenarios. However given that national standard contracts can be weak,

this is an area that requires careful attention.

The extent to which country programmes support lump sum contracts, or payment according to bills of

quantities for drilling is not clear. Currently UNICEF Uganda (contracting directly) pays lump sum contracts,

whereas UNICEF Nigeria (contracting through State Government) pays according to a bill of quantities, but

does not pay for dry wells (which appear to be a contradiction). Payment for water well drilling according

to a bill of quantities can be difficult. One problem is that in the case of short term funding (often

emergency funding), there are concerns that funds will remain unspent at the end of the funding period, or

that they will be overspent. Apparently full expenditure of funds is a management indicator within UNICEF,

and under-expenditure will thus reflect poorly on the country office. As funds tend to be programme or

project specific, overspending is not an option.

Clearly there is some debate regarding the most suitable contracting approach for particular conditions.

Guidance as to the pros and cons of these different approaches may enable UNICEF staff and its partners to

take informed decisions in this area.

Two good examples of good practices with respect to UNICEFs experience of drilling procurement and

contract management are as follows:

In order to deal with the disparate drilling prices, align tender processes and try to reduce costs,

the major donors in Chad (including UNICEF) issued their tenders together.

UNICEF Nigeria have supported and tried to strengthen the Governments Due Process for contract

award, oversight and certification including pre-qualification, call for tenders, tender evaluationand award. Since 2007 all UNICEF funded drilling activities in Nigeria are contracted out (by

Government) to the private sector.

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6.5

Payment

Delays in payment of contractors for completed works (under UNICEF supported programmes) were raised

as an issue in Uganda and Nigeria. In Uganda, some delays were for a couple of years and the reasons

could not be fully clarified. In Nigeria, the problems were shorter in duration, and related to lack of

counterpart funding by Government. Due to the fact that drilling is a highly capitalised business, and that

many companies do not much cash flow, long delays in payment can be devastating for a contractor. This isan issue that should not be overlooked.

6.6

Supervision and Quality Assurance

Drilling, whether through the public, NGO or private sector requires adequate supervision. Drillers can

bamboozle you too many supervisors are straight out of university. Supervisors need to be trained in the

field so that they understand what they are doing Ray Rowles (2008). Within the professional drilling

industry it is widely recognised that ideally, a supervising hydrogeologist should be on site full time.

However, due to financial constraints and priorities, this level of supervision is hard to find in many

countries.

In the case of the UNICEF India programme, the sheer scale of the intervention meant that it was difficult to

focus on quality work. Quality was a trade off for performance in terms of numbers. At the peak ofUNICEFs engagement, a team of 10 people was undertaking supervision. Table 3 provides more recent

cases where drilling supervision has been completely lacking, or poor in UNICEF supported WES

programmes. A typical challenges of drilling supervision is that the supervisor is often in the pocketof the

contractor, i.e. dependent on him for transport, and even food and accommodation. Concerns over lack of

drilling supervision expertise in sub-Saharan Africa have are raised by Danert et al (2009). Inadequate skills

in drilling supervision by UNICEF or its partner organisation will have a bearing on the success of UNICEF

drilling programmes. This is therefore a key area that needs to be considered.

Table 3 Examples of Poor Drilling Supervision

Country (year) Drilling Supervision and Consequences

Sierra Leone(2002)

WES section recommended that a national hydrogeologist be hired to supervise a drillingcontractno consultant was hired. The contract specified a borehole log would be submitted to

UNICEF before casing for approval. As there was no supervisory staff travelling with the drill crew,

some boreholes collapsed while waiting for approval. Field visits to 25 out of 30 boreholes drilled

under the UNICEF Sierra Leone drilling programme in 2002 found that 40% were completely or

partially out of service despite the fact that most of them were less than 6 months old. It was

concluded that the drilling company had not fulfilled the terms of its contract9and does not appear

to have the capacity to do so in the future (Keast, 2002).

Southern Sudan

(2006/7)

Supervision of borehole drilling in Southern Sudan has been difficult due to poor roads and insecurity

(UNICEF, 2006b). The Government (former SPLA), who had apparently received some training,

undertook supervision of borehole drilling in Southern Sudan. However, this was clearly no

substitution for skilled hydrogeologists. The supervisors were subsequently expected to construct the

platforms.

Sudan (Darfur)

2004

Drilling technique is poor design of borehole is poor: no gravel pack, no development pump test

[sic] does not follow any particular procedure (Salome, 2004). Statement refers to the NWC/WES

water well drilling.

Uganda (2008) Informants in Uganda have raised concerns about the contract management and supervision

procedures currently utilised by UNICEF in Northern Uganda. Part of the problem is that supervision

is supposed to be undertaken by district government, who lack time and do not have the required

supervision skills. UNICEF relies on verifying that works were completed after construction.

9Inspection revealed the following: improper grouting and sealing on some boreholes, despite its specification in the contract;

others yielded suspended solids in the water, probably due to poor borehole development, poor/no gravel pack and/or broken

screens; visible signs of non-vertically and dry boreholes. Poor installation of the Kardia pumps resulted in cylinder failure, shortpumping strokes, reduced pumping efficiency. There was even a case of the pump not being installed directly over the borehole.

Pump aprons with no slope, raised edges or drains had been installed. This, combined with unsealed boreholes raised the risk of

contamination considerably. The apron design however, had not been specified in the contract.

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6.7

Supporting the Private Sector

The extent of private sector capacity in the borehole-drilling sector varies. Some countries have more

national expertise, while others are still heavily reliant on foreign companies. The private sector should not

only survive, but also flourish, which can be a challenge. Box 4 summarises some of the key problems faced

by private drilling contractors in particular. Note that these challenges are not pertinent to UNICEF

programmes, but rather to the sector as a whole and have a significant bearing on how UNICEFprogrammes can work well.

Box 4 Challenges faced by private contractors

Setting up in business can be extremely difficult. There are many examples of people with the skills, but not the

finances to invest. There are challenges with the banking sector (short repayment times and high interest rates) across

the sub-Saharan Africa in particular and difficulties of showing sufficient collateral to obtain credit (Danert et al, 2009).

Studies by RWSN and others have raised the issue of lack of skilled personnel (drillers, supervisors, technicians) in the

public and private sector in many sub-Saharan African countries (including Ethiopia). Unfortunately, this is part of a

wider global trend, which sees reduced emphasis on practical skills development and apprenticeships eg Some people

coming into UNICEF have never been on a construction site.

Importation of equipment and spares can be difficult if contractors do not have foreign connections. Regulation onnumber of employees and equipment is demanding in some countries and lacking in others. Equipment productivity is

also a problem for pri