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Mitigation of Climate Risk and Adaptation to Climate Security In Israel and the Middle East: Policy Measures toward Geopolitical Cooperation and Regional Transformation

Joel Adam GordonJoel Adam Gordon

Editor: Carmit Lubanov

August 2017

AEJI CCS|NS|RS Synthesis Report no. 1

AEJINewSeriesonClimateChangeStrategy,NationalSecurityandRegionalSustainabilityCCS|NS|RS2017

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AEJICCS|NS|RSSynthesisReportno.1:

MitigationofClimateRiskandAdaptation

toClimateSecurityInIsraelandtheMiddleEast:

PolicyMeasurestowardGeopoliticalCooperationand

RegionalTransformation

JoelAdamGordon

Editor:

CarmitLubanov

August2017

ThereportwasinitiatedandconductedbyAEJIwithcooperationoftheInternshipprogramoftheInternationalMAProgram-ThePorterSchoolofEnvironmentalStudies,TelAvivUniversity.


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TableofContentsTableofContents.......................................................................................................................2AcronymsandAbbreviations......................................................................................................3Abstract......................................................................................................................................4Introduction................................................................................................................................5Background.................................................................................................................................7Chapter1:ClimateChangethroughtheSecurityPrism.............................................................91.1.ThePowerofClimateChange.........................................................................................91.2.InternationalPerspectives:AContinuumofconcern....................................................101.3.ConflictconstellationsandSecuritystressors...............................................................141.4.HumanandSocialSecurityunderClimateChange........................................................16

Chapter2:RegionalPerspectivesofClimateChange...............................................................202.1.ClimatepredictionsandEnvironmentalpressures........................................................202.2.RegionalSecurityThreats:EarlyWarningSigns.............................................................222.3.MigratoryPressuresandClimateRefugees...................................................................242.4.WaterStressandFoodInsecurity..................................................................................25

Chapter3:NationalPerspectivesofClimateSecurity..............................................................273.1.Israel’sCarbonFootprintandthePoliticsbehindtheParisAgreement........................273.2.Israel’sSecurityStance..................................................................................................303.3.PolicymakingPrinciplesinIsrael....................................................................................31

Chapter4:PolicyImplications..................................................................................................334.1.NationalSecuritytowardsaClimatecompatiblefuture...............................................334.2.IDFClimateStressOperations(CSOs)............................................................................344.3.FromStagnationtoInnovation......................................................................................35

Chapter5:PolicyRecommendations........................................................................................385.1.ANewGovernanceToolkit............................................................................................385.2.LeveragingforGeopoliticalCooperationandRegionalTransformation.......................395.3.FuturePerspectives.......................................................................................................40

Conclusion................................................................................................................................42Annex........................................................................................................................................44Annex1a:GlobalMigrationResponsetoClimateShocks.......................................................44Annex1bNetMigration:Egypt,Syria,Sudan(2012)..............................................................44Annex2aIsraelandEuropeanUnion1960-2013....................................................................45Annex2bIsraelandEuropeanUnion1960-2013.....................................................................46Annex2cIsrael,France,ItalyandSpain1960-2013................................................................47Annex2dIsrael,CyprusGreeceandMalta1960-2013............................................................48Annex2eIsrael,Egypt,Jordan,LebanonandSyria1960-2013...............................................49Annex3aIsraelandtheOECD1972-2016...............................................................................50Annex3b:IsraelandtheOECD1960-2016...............................................................................51Annex4:IsraelandtheEuropeanUnion(1990-2014)............................................................52References................................................................................................................................53


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AcronymsandAbbreviationsAEJI AssociationofEnvironmentalJusticeinIsraelCNA CorporationCenterforNavalAnalysesCCF ClimateCompatibleFutureCCL ClimateChangeLeadershipCSAG ClimateSystemsAnalysisGroupCSOs ClimateStressOperationsEEA EuropeanEnvironmentAgencyENSO ElNiñoSouthernOscillationFAO FoodandAgricultureOrganizationGHGs GreenhouseGasEmissionsIEA InternationalEnergyAgencyICCI InternationalCryosphereClimateInitiativeICCIC IsraeliClimateChangeInformationCenterICT InformationandCommunicationsTechnologyIDF IsraelDefenseForcesIDMC InternalDisplacementMonitoringCenterIFP-EW InitiativeforPeacebuilding–EarlyWarningAnalysistoActionINDC IntendedNationallyDeterminedContributionIPCC IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeIISD InternationalInstitutionforSustainableDevelopmentJ.O.E JointOperatingEnvironmentMEMAs MiddleEastern-MediterraneanAlliancesMFA IsraelMinistryofForeignAffairsMoEP MinistryofEnvironmentalProtectionMRF MaryRobinsonFoundationMRV Measurement,ReportingandVerificationNASA NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationNII NationalInsuranceInstituteofIsraelOECD OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment UNEP UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgrammeUNFCCC UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChangeUNGA UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyUNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugeesU.S.DoD UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefenseWFP WorldFoodProgrammeWGBU GermanAdvisoryCouncilonGlobalChangeWHO WorldHealthOrganizationWMO WorldMeteorologicalOrganization


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AbstractThepaper aims to provide a base for future assessments of "Climate Changeand Security" in

IsraelandtheMiddleEast.ThelinkagesbetweenclimatechangeandNationalsecurityarediscussedvis-

à-vis the current geopolitical landscape and associated transboundary challenges. Current climate-

securitychallengesincludemigratorypressures,climaterefugees,waterstressandfoodinsecurity.The

studyemploystheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)frameworkof"ClimateMitigation

and Adaptation" to assess prospects for climate-security in the region. Preliminary findings correlate

Israel’s potential role in climate-security politics to positive economic benefits. Climate Change

Leadership (CCL) offers an alternative pathway for regional cooperation and geopolitical stability

throughthepromotionofMiddleEastern-MediterraneanAlliances(MEMA’s).Foremostthisvisionaligns

to a core strategic national masterplan – Leveraging for Geopolitical Cooperation and Regional

Transformation – designed to strengthen Israel’s commitment towards a Climate Compatible Future

(CCF). To help achieve this future, the final chapter suggests policy recommendations to promote

geopolitical cooperation and regional transformation in response to the socio-economic and

environmentalpressuresofanthropogenicclimatechange.


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IntroductionThroughahistoricallens,theopeningchapterpresentsthesecurityprisminitsbroadest

scopebyrevealing“ThePowerofClimateChange.”Givenitsfar-reachingparameters,climate

change acts as one of themain drivers of change across societies and civilization. From the

complexandinterconnectedcontoursofclimatechange,alsoemanateawide-rangeofsecurity

risks.Internationalperspectivesreinforcea“ContinuumofConcern”inpurviewofrecentpolicy

developments,includingthefindingsoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimatechange(IPCC);

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the International

Energy Agency (IEA); and the European Environment Agency (EEA), in addition to other

organizations/actors.Thechapterconcludeswithasummaryofthemainconcernsconcurrent

to the climate change literature and discourse, accounting for threats to human and social

security.

Chapter2turnsattentionto“RegionalPerspectivesofClimateChange,”which include

“early warning signs” from identified climate security threats in the Middle East and North

Africa. In relation to the surrounding geopolitical landscape and associated transboundary

challenges, climate predictions exert tremendous pressures. Security threats are both socio-

economicandenvironmentalinnature,including“MigratoryPressuresandClimateRefugees”

and “TransboundaryWater Stress and Food Insecurity.” Given thematrix of Israel’s ongoing

“Security Stance” and current “Policymaking Principles,” climate change presents a threat to

Israel’sNationalSecurity(Chapter3).Thissecuritythreatconnectsto“Israel’sCarbonFootprint

and the Politics behind the Paris Agreement,” which continue to highlight an underlying

absenceofclimatechangemitigationandadaptation,asreflectedbyIsrael’sfailuretomeetits

IntendedNationallyDeterminedContribution(INDC)setatCOP211inParis.

In response to the current state of affairs, the implications for policymakers are

substantial. Security analysts should also begin to incorporate the serious geopolitical

consequences of climate change into decision-making processes.Within a new environment

committed to a Climate Compatible Future (CCF) lies the potential for a shift from political

121stConferenceoftheParties(SeeSection3.1:"Israel’sCarbonFootprintandthePoliticsbehindtheParisAgreement.")


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stagnation to technological innovation, as Israel comes to realize the significance of climate-

securityleadership.InordertostrengthenIsrael’sNationalSecurityandworktowardsregional

stability,securitystrategiesandpolicymeasuresmustcalibratetoanewvisionof“Geopolitical

Cooperation and Regional Transformation,” through which mutually beneficial alliances can

evolve.Byadopting“ANewGovernanceToolkit”thatfullyidentifiestheclimate-securitynexus,

Israel can implement effective policy measures to stem the tide of anthropogenic climate

change.


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BackgroundClimatechangemaybeoneof themost important issues facinghumancivilization,or

perhaps even life on earth, yet a status quoof inaction anddelay continues to ring true for

many governments across the world (Gartzke 2012; Furman et al. 2015). Rigorous

multidisciplinary research examining quantitative data displays a strong correlation between

past climatic events and human conflict, which “appears to extend across the world,

throughout history, and at all scales of social organization” (Hsiang et al. 2013). The links

betweendramaticglobalandregionalimpactshavebeenwidelydocumented:

Climatechangewillincreasinglybeawide-rangingriverofglobalsecurity.Itwillactasa

threat-multiplier, exacerbating weakness and tensions around the world. It can be

expectedtoworsenpoverty,haveasignificantimpactonglobalmigrationpatterns,and

risk tipping fragile states into instability, conflict and state failure (UK Cabinet Office

2008).

Despitethesewarningsandrisks,globalpolicymakershaveremainedprimarilypassive.This

attitudehasservedtodeepentheprospectivelongevityofharmfulanthropogenicimpacts,

originatingfromhumankind’sextensivecarbonfootprint(Padgettetal.2008).

Scientific data indicates “The relentless rise of carbon dioxide” and confirms that the

currentrateofclimatechangeisunprecedentedinhumanhistory(Fabry2015):

Anthropogenic activities are contributing increased heat to the climate system.

Warmingoftheclimatesystemisunequivocal,andsincethe1950s,manyoftheobserved

changesareunprecedentedoverdecadestomillennia(IPPC2014).

The inherent inertia of earth’s climate system guarantees that a certain degree of climate

changeisalready“locked-in”–eveniflevelsofgreenhousegasemissions(GHGs)werecurbed

significantly – many aspects of climate change and its associated effects will continue for

centuries (IPCC2001; IPCC2014). It iswidelyacknowledgedby the scientific community that

theprobabilityofabruptconsequencesfromthetriggeringof“tippingelements”intheclimate

system is increasing (Lenton et al. 2008).Within this century, a variety of tipping elements

couldreachtheircriticalpointinresponsetoanthropogenicclimatechange(Seeannex1).By


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the same token, the archaeological record points to the degree towhich climatic variations

have triggered large-scale disruptions in the past (Adger & Brooks 2003). Such events likely

contributed to the collapse of earlier civilizations and heavily influenced human migration

patterns(SeeHaugetal.2003,Binfordetal.1997,Cullenetal.2000).

Thesecurityrisksarisingfromclimatechangeunderlinetheneedforpoliticalleadership

andeconomicplanningcommittedtowards“keepingcarbondioxideandothergreenhousegas

levelswithinarangethatwillnotleadtothebiospherechangingstatesdrasticallytoonethat

maybemuchlessconducivetohumanlife”(Dalby2014).Todatethereisno“silverbullet”for

human-inducedclimatechange2intheageoftheAnthropocene3(Pinder2014;Lempert2015;

Cho2016).

2http://www.seccca.org.au/human-induced-climate-change/3Earthscientistssuggestthatwenowliveinaneweraofnaturalhistory,theAnthropocene;onemarkedbytheemergenceofanewseriesofgeological,biologicalandclimatologicalforcingmechanismsinthebiosphere(Zalasiewiczetal.2010).


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Chapter1:ClimateChangethroughtheSecurityPrism1.1.ThePowerofClimateChange

Thecontoursofclimatechangearebroadandcomplex.TheIPCC’sFourthAssessment

Reportstates:“Climatechangeimpactswillspreadfromdirectlyimpactedareasandsectorsto

otherareasandsectors throughextensiveandcomplex linkages” (Parryetal.2007).Climatic

variables act as a “macro-driver” for a wide range of environmental parameters, which is

typifiedbyoverall increases in the intensity (and insomecases frequency)ofdroughts, fires,

heat waves, storms, floods and epidemics (Barnett & Adger 2007). Hurricane Katrina (2005)

exemplifies the early climate trends of this century; it killed more than 1,800 people and

dislocated another 270,000, caused eight billion dollars in damages, and took offline critical

energy infrastructures (Busby2016).More recently, SuperstormSandy (2012) left 8.5million

peoplewithoutpowerandcausedseveralbilliondollars’worthofdamage in itswake(Busby

2016).

Climate change is reallocating the global distributionof precipitation, thereby shifting

rainfall patternswithin andacross continents (Dore2005). Soil erosionbywindandwater is

increasing, inturnreducingsoilmoisture,whiletherateofcoastalerosionhasalso increased

withglobalwarmingtrends(Brevik2013;Rouxetal.2013;Zhangetal.2004).Onlandmuchof

theavailableheatgoesintodrying,therefore,droughtsmaybemoreextensiveinthefuture;a

naturaldrought should set inquicker,becomemore intense, andmay last longer (Trenberth

2014).Althoughextensive, thenumerousdangersalreadyobservedanddocumentedare just

thetipoftheiceberg.Countriesmustalsocontendwiththeunknownrisksthatmayemergevia

high-impactclimaticevents.Duetounquantifiableuncertainties,sciencestillcannotdelivera

fulldistributionofoutcomeswhendealingwithclimatechangeprojectionsandimpacts(Dessai

andHulme2004).

Climate-associatedimpactsareinherentlynon-linear;therefore,positivefeedbackloops

intheclimatesystemcouldleadtoaseriesofuncontrollablecascadingeffects(Schneider2003;

Le Page 2010). The melting of glaciers and permafrost could increase global sea levels by

severalmeters,while the collapseof theNorthAtlantic thermohaline circulation (THC) could


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fuel a new scale of climate “shocks” and “surprises”4(ICCI 2017; Vellinga 2002). Large-scale

shiftsintheAsianmonsoonpatternsandtheElNiñoSouthernOscillation(ENSO)phenomenon

also appear to beon thehorizon (Loo et al. 2015). Combining several of these changes (the

melting of the polar ice sheets, shutdown of the thermohaline circulation, weakening of

monsoon patterns etc.) might trigger a “cascade of destabilizing events” (Karas 2003; See

Annex1).

1.2.InternationalPerspectives:AContinuumofconcern

In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 5 and the United Nations

Environment Programme (UNEP)6 set-up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC): “To provide policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate

change, its impacts and future risks, andoptions formitigationandadaptation” (IPCC2013).

Mitigation principally refers to emissions reduction, while adaptation takes place through

“adjustmentstoreducevulnerabilityorenhanceresiliencetoobservedorexpectedchangesin

climate,whichinvolveschangesinprocesses,perceptions,practices,andfunctions”(Brownet

al. 2007). According to UNEP, mitigation includes “using new technologies and renewable

energies,makingolderequipmentmoreenergyefficient,orchangingmanagementpracticesor

consumerbehavior”(UNEP2017).

Since the IPCC’s inauguration and the subsequent call formitigation and adaptation,

otherorganizationshave followedsuit suchas theUnitedNationsFrameworkConventionon

ClimateChange(UNFCCC).TheUNFCCCestablisheditsagendaaccordingtoArticle2:

TheultimateobjectiveofthisConvention…istoachieve…stabilizationofgreenhousegas

concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic

interferencewiththeclimatesystem(UNFCCC1992). Article2alsoestablishedthenotionof

“commonbutdifferentresponsibilities”whenitcomestotacklingclimatechange.TheIPCCis

currently in itsSixthAssessmentcycle,whichwillproduce itsSixthAssessmentReport (AR6),

4Theseinclude“unexpectedandpotentiallydisruptivesingleeventsaswellasconjunctionsofeventsoccurringsimultaneouslyorinsequence”(NationalResearchCouncil2013).5https://www.wmo.int/pages/index_en.html6http://www.unep.org/


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while the UNFCCC directed the Paris Climate Agreement during 2015-2016, to which 194

Partiessignedand137haveratified(IPCC2017;UNFCCC2017).ThroughtheIPCC,theUNFCCC

orsimilarinstitutions,theframingofclimateandsocietyrelationsstronglyinfluences“theway

theircoevolutionisinterpretedandrespondedto”inthesocio-politicalsphere(Hulme2009).

In2003,afulldecadepriortothereleaseoftheIPCC’sFifthAssessmentReport(AR5),7

oneofitscontributingauthorshypothesizedthat,“[both]inlessdirectways,butalsothrough

direct processes such as territorial losses through rising sea levels, climate changemay be a

national security issue” (Barnett 2003). The widespread ramifications of climate change are

concurrenttothesecuritydiscourse,wherebyclimatechangecouldconstituteadirectnational

security threat to a country’s homeland, or equally threaten its overseas or international

interests (Busby 2008). Climate change is essentially a global threat that extends beyond

borders,ideologiesandcultures(Brown&Crawford2009).Ontheotherendofthespectrum,

climateprotectionisarguablya“globalpublicgood”(Grasso2004).

The security nexus is complex and dynamic,with past processes such as colonization

andwar influencingpresent insecurities (Barnett&Adger2007).At the same time, “ongoing

processessuchasclimatechangeandtradeliberalizationshapefutureinsecurities,”whichcan

widenthegenerativeparameterstiedtoconflictorigins(Barnett2003).Sincetheearly2000s,

the climate-security nexus has gained momentum and validity. Several reports have

emphasizedtheneedtoviewclimatechangethroughasecuritylens,since“…withoutresolute

counteraction, climate change will outstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities within the

comingdecades,which could result indestabilizationandviolence, jeopardizingnational and

internationalsecuritytoanewdegree”(Klein&Huq2003;WBGU2007).

The reclassification of climate change into a “global threat to stability and security”8

emerged in earnest during 2007, when the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA Corporation)9

characterizedclimatechangeasa“potentialthreatmultiplierforinstabilityinsomeofthemost

volatileregions intheworld,presentingsignificantnationalsecuritychallengesfortheUnited

7https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/8https://www.adelphi.de/en/news/climate-change-global-threat-stability-and-security9https://www.cna.org/


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States” (BoardMA2007). In2007, theGermanAdvisoryCouncilonGlobalChange (WGBU)10

forecasted“climatechange todrawever-deeper linesofdivisionandconflict in international

relations:”

Triggeringnumerousconflictsbetweenandwithincountriesoverthedistributionof

resources,especiallywaterandland,overthemanagementofmigration,orover

compensationpayments(WBGU2007).

The UNFCCC’s 2007 charter likewise informed policymakers to take measures to avoid

“dangerous” interference in the climate system, since such impacts constitute a “threat to

security” (Barnett 2003). The following year saw the European Commission affirm these

sentimentstoestablishasenseofUSandEUconsensusonthethreatlevel:“Climatechangeis

bestviewedasathreatmultiplierwhichexacerbatesexistingtrends, tensionsand instability”

(Solanaetal.2008).

Great Britain andGermany represent two of strongest proponents of climate change

policy. In 2008, the United Kingdom Cabinet Office presented its National Security Strategy

report, which underlined climate change as potentially the “greatest challenge” to global

stabilityandsecurity,andthereforetonationalsecurity:

Tackling its causes, mitigating its risks, and preparing for, and dealing with its

consequencesarecriticaltoourfuturesecurity,aswellasprotectingglobalprosperity

andavoidinghumanitariandisaster(UKCabinetOffice2008).

TogetherBritishandGermanpoliticians11haveledthesubsequentcallforpoliticalengagement

with similarly decisive remarks: “Climate changewill reshape the geopolitics of theworld in

whichwelive,withimportantconsequencesforpeaceandsecurity”(Diezetal.2016).By2012,

the then UK coalition government12had further intensified this view, referring to climate

change as “…both a creator of new threats and a ‘threat multiplier,’ magnifying existing

weaknesses and tensions around theworld” (Harris 2012). This concrete statement followed10WGBUisbranchoftheEuropeanEnvironmentAgency(EEA).http://www.wbgu.de/en/press/press-releases/2007-12-15-press-release/11DavidMiliband(BritishLabourPartypolitician)andFrank-WalterSteimeier(GermanForeignMinister).http://www.politico.eu/article/miliband-time-to-put-planet-first-on-climate-change/12https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/climate-change-international-action


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thepublicationofaninfluentialgovernmentreportreconceptualizingthemeaningofnational

securityinthe21stcentury:

Oursecurityisvulnerabletotheeffectsofclimatechange[…]Sotheconceptofnational

security in 2010 is very different or what it was ten or twenty, let alone fifty or a

hundredyearsago(UKCabinetOffice2010).13

Across theAtlantic, theJointOperatingEnvironmentsimilarly listedclimatechangeasoneof

themainsecuritythreatsfacingthemilitaryinthenext25years(J.O.E2010).Morerecently,in

theBriefing Book for aNewAdministration (2016), the Climate and Security AdvisoryGroup

(CSAG)warned:"Climatechangecanbeadriverof instabilityandtheDepartmentofDefense

mustpayattentiontopotentialadverseimpactsgeneratedbythisphenomenon(CSAG2016).

At the start of 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis emphatically highlighted the

climate-securitynexusbeforetheSenateArmedServicesCommittee:14

Climatechangeisachallengethatrequiresabroader,whole-ofgovernmentresponse…I

will ensure that the Department of Defense plays its appropriate role within such a

responsebyaddressingnationalsecurityaspects(Mattis2017).

Healsostressedtheneedfordivestmentfromfossilfuelsbyadvocatingrenewableandclean

energies,aspartofthenewfounddrivetowardssecurityandstability(Burke2016).

Mattis has long viewed climate change as a threat to U.S. security operations and

nationalsecurity,aswellasglobalstabilityingeneral(Revkin2017):15

Climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are

operatingtoday…ItisappropriatefortheCombatantCommandstoincorporatedrivers

of instability that impact the security environment in their areas into their planning

(WerrellandFemia(2017).

WhileMattis’sstanceonclimatechangehasreceivedmuchpraise fromU.S.military leaders,

President Donald Trump has opted to disengage from climate-security diplomacy by13https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/climate-change-international-action14https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/15https://climateandsecurity.org/2017/03/16/release-u-s-military-leaders-applaud-secretary-mattis-clear-eyed-view-on-climate-change-and-security/


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announcing that theUnitedStatedwillexit theParisAgreement.16DespitePresidentTrump’s

emphaticmovetodistancetheUnitedStatesfromtheinternationalclimatepolicyarena,other

worldleadersincreasinglyrecognizethatclimatechangeproducesacontinuumofconcernthat

isonlysettoproliferatewithtime.Irrespectiveoftheill-timedmotionofPresidentTrump,the

recordbooksillustratethattheinternationalcommunityisstillyettouniteindecisiveactionon

theclimatechangefront.

1.3.ConflictconstellationsandSecuritystressors

In 2007, WGBU identified four specific “conflict constellations” related to climate

change–“Waterstress,foodinsecurity,naturaldisastersandmigration”(WGBU2007).Water

resourcesencompassthebasicfabricofsurvivalandthefunctioningofsociety:

Water stress revolves around the complex causal relationship between hydro-

climatology and water-related political relations, which depends on socio-economic

conditions and institutional capacity, aswell as the timingandoccurrenceof changes

andextremesinacountryandabasin(Scheffran&Battaglini2011).

The relationship betweenwater, energy, agriculture and climate is increasingly falling out of

balance,inturnjeopardizingfood,waterandenergysecurity.17

According to experts, climate change “claws”18at the four pillars of food security19

(Nelson et al. 2010; Wheeler & Von Braun 2013). The United Nations Emergency Relief

Coordinator, StephenO’Brien,has cautioned theUNSecurityCouncilof the imminent riskof

famine in Yemen, Somalia and South Sudan, since climate change is set to increase the

vulnerabilityofglobalfoodsystemsandregionalsupplychains(O’Brien2017;Wheeler&Braun

2013).Whenitcomestofoodsecurity,“climatesurprises”couldfurtherdestabilizevulnerable

regions and disrupt globally integrated systems, such as grainmarkets (WFP 2017; National

Research Council 2013). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) conclude that climate16https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord17http://www.gracelinks.org/2380/the-impact-of-climate-change-on-water-resources18https://gnightearth.com/2013/09/08/how-climate-change-claws-at-the-four-pillars-of-food-security/19Thefourdimensionsoffoodsecurityincludeavailabilitytofood,accessibility(economicallyandphysically),utilization(thewayitisusedandassimilatedbythehumanbody)andstabilityofthesethreedimensions(Bisas1996):http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5188e.pdf


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change has impacted and will increasingly affect social security and health – via physical

impacts on ecosystems, agro-ecosystems, agricultural production, food chains, incomes and

trade –which together determine levels of economic and social impact on livelihoods, food

securityandnutrition(FAO2016).

The motivations for migration can be multiple, and it remains a challenge to

differentiate between “economic pulls and environmental pushes” (Reuveny 2007).

Nevertheless, there is increasing evidence that migration is a possible response not only to

poverty and social deprivation, but also to environmental hardship (Scheffran 2010). Since

2008,anaverageofnearly27millionpeoplehasbeendisplacedannuallyby“naturalhazard-

relateddisasters”–oneofWGBU’sidentified“conflictconstellations”(IDMCenter2014).Inhis

2006 study, Refugees, Climate Change, and Instability, Idean Salehyan concludes that

“environmental stress can lead to migration itself, or it can lead to refugee-producing civil

unrest”(Salehyan2005).Similarly,theWGBUpredictsthatanincreasein“forcedmigration”by

climate changewould createmore “migration hotpots” around theworld, each becoming a

potential “nucleus” for social unrest (WGBU 2007). In effect, “migrationmay constitute the

mostcriticalsocietalresponsetoclimaticperturbations”(FeitelsonandTubi2017).

Analysts argue that climate change migrants and refugees can destabilize aspects of

resourcedistributionsuchasfarmland,housing,water,employment,andbasicsocialservices

byincreasingcompetition(Carius2006).Migrationwavesmayprovokeoutbreaksofconflictin

transitandtargetareasandinsomecasesenvironmentalmigrantsareperceivedtoupsetthe

“ethnic balance” in a region (Scheffran and Battaglini 2011; Reuveny 2007). Furthermore,

refugeesoriginatingfromconflictzonesor“environmentally-induced”civilwarslinktoahigher

propensityforengagement inorganizedviolenceandcross-borderattacksagainsttheirhome

government (Salehyan2005).Overall,migratory pressuresmay jeopardize the safety of local

populations,whileaddingtotheburdenofnationalsecurity.

In 2013, the National Academy of Sciences reported that climate change is likely to

produce consequences beyond “the capacity of the affected societies or global systems to

manage and have global security implications serious enough to compel international

response” (National Research Council 2013).Within this context, Darfur represents a “tragic


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exampleofthesocialbreakdownthatcanresultfromecologicalcollapse”20(Mazo2009;UNEP

2007). Environmental stress is strongly linked to “increased severity, duration and collateral

damage”inrelationtooutbreaksofconflict,althoughthesefactorsaremoreofastimulusthan

facilitator (Brown&Crawford2009).While climate change is bynomeans the sole causeof

conflictclustersandsecuritythreats, itcontributestothemixof“existingsocioeconomicand

environmentalvulnerabilitiesthatcanleadtoahumanitariancrisis”(Das2016).

Given the synergistic nature of climate effects such aswater scarcity, food insecurity

andmigratorypressures,thesefactorsmaystandtopiercetheverypillarsofeconomicstability

andthefabricofnationalsecurity.Thenexusbetweenclimatechangeandsecuritystemsfrom

the interactions between prolonged droughts, crop failures, disintegration of agricultural

livelihoods,ruraldislocation,migrationtocitiesandaweakeningsocialfabricbroughtaboutby

theperpetuationofdisenfranchisedsectorsofthepopulation.

1.4.HumanandSocialSecurityunderClimateChange

Human security21functions through “multiple processes operating across space, over

time,andatmultiplescales(Barnett&Adger2007).Itreferstotheconditioninwhichpeople

and communities have the necessary capacity to navigate stresses, which may affect their

needs, rights, and values, thus “shielding people form critical and pervasive threats and

empoweringthemtotakechargeoftheir lives”(Alkire2003;Ogataetal.2003).Recentyears

have seen climate change repeatedly characterized as a “conflict accelerant” or “threat

multiplier,” which jeopardizes human security and poses a substantial risk to stability and

sustainabilityinyearstocome(IPCC2007).

The IPCC’s FifthAssessmentReportmarks the first instanceof integrating thehuman

securitydimensionsofclimatechangeintoaformalchapter(Gleditschetal.2014).Thereport

extends the traditional framework of security by incorporating economic, cultural, livelihood

and migratory dimensions into the climate change discussion (Adger et al. 2014). Climate

20Regionalexpertsacknowledgetheenvironmentalcontributiontotheconflict,butalsowarningof“thedangerofoversimplifyingDarfur”(Butler2007).21http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdf


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changesignifiesadevelopingcauseof“livelihoodcontraction,”onthebasisthatitwillcontinue

to contract the livelihoodsofmanypeople,bywayof land lossesanddeclining returns from

humanusedland(Barnett&Adger2007).Livelihoodsecurityconnectstopersonalsecurityand

securityfromviolence,whichtogetherformthebasisforafunctioningsystemofsociety.Under

pressures from scarce resources and limited wellbeing, there is an increased propensity for

peopletoengageinviolenceasan“alternativelivelihoodstrategy”(Young&Goldman2015).

Concomitantly, climate change develops as a threat to human security22that may

heighten the risk of violent conflict, especially in regions prone to instability and already

susceptible to outbreaks of war. The IPCC views conflict as exacerbated by specific stress

factors:

Vulnerable regions facemultiple stresses that affect their exposure and sensitivity as

wellastheircapacitytoadapt.Thesestressesarisefrom,forexample,currentclimate

hazards,povertyandunequalaccesstoresources, food insecurity, trends ineconomic

globalization,conflict,andincidenceofdiseasessuchasHIV/AIDS(IPPC2007).

Violentconflictshares linkstohumaninsecurity,andvice-versa,whilevulnerabilitytoclimate

change also fits into the insecurity mix (Barnett 2006). As the 2006 Stern Review attested,

“Climate-related shocks have sparked violent conflict in the past,” and conflict presents a

seriousrisktoareassuchasCentralAsia,WestAfrica,theNileBasin,andbyproxytheMiddle

East (Stern 2006). Given the wrong set of conditions, the associated socio-economic and

politicalstressofclimatechangecanerodethefunctioningofcommunities,theeffectivenessof

institutionsandthestabilityofsocietalinfrastructures(Barnett&Adger2007).

Through a meta-analysis examining populations in the post 1950s era, Hsiang et al.

substantiate that large deviations from normal precipitation and mild temperatures

systematically increase the risk of many types of conflict, often substantially, and that this

relationshipappearstoholdoveravarietyoftemporalandspatialscales(Hsiangetal.2013).

Theauthorsconcludethatclimaticchanges influenceconflict throughmultiplepathwaysthat

22Humansecuritydependsonasystemwhereeachrationalindividualcalculatesthatitismoreprofitablenottorebel(Gough2002).


18

may differ between contexts; therefore, innovative research to recognize thesemechanisms

needstobecomea“topresearchpriority”(Hsiangetal.2013).SecurityanalystsintheUnited

Statesechothisviewpointthroughtheirsharedagenda;attemptingtosynthesizethecurrent

stateof knowledgeand thegeopolitical atmosphere inorder to account for thegeostrategic

implicationsofthepoliticalenvironment,as“climatechangepolicybecomesanincreasinglytop

tierissueininternationalrelations”(Busby2016).

TheIPCC’s2007Reportnotesthatpoorcommunitiesareoftenlimitedintheiradaptive

capacities,withheavydependencyonclimate-sensitiveresourcessuchaslocalwaterandfood

supplies (Parry et al. 2007). Social conflicts at all scales and levels appear susceptible to the

impactofclimatechange,andmultipledimensionsoftheclimatesystemhavethecapacityto

influence a range of outcomes (Hsiang et al. 2013). Social cohesion is one determinant of

resilience,whileseveralfactorsdetermine“entitlements”toeconomicandsocialcapital,which

inturngovernthecapacityforsocietytoadapttoclimatechange(Barnett&Adger2007).The

“architecture” behind entitlements is temporally and spatially complex due a multitude of

factors, such as distant atmospheric polluters, regional-scale climatic processes and the

dichotomybetweenup-steamanddown-streamwaternetworks(Adger&Kelly1999).

Theconsequencesofclimatechangereflecttheeconomic,humanandsocialcapitalofa

nation; shaped by access to resources, information and technology, social cohesion, and the

abilityandeffectivenessofinstitutions(Barnett&Adger2007).Climatechangeimpactspresent

chronic and episodic challenges to state capacity and to the fundamental welfare of

populations,atascalethatraisesquestionsofstatestability.Inturn,theresilienceofsecurity

unitsandsocialinstitutionsplaysakeypartinoffsettingtheeffectsofnationaldependenceon

“climate sensitive natural resources” and in curtailing extant bioregional and geopolitical

vulnerabilities(Barnett&Adger2007).

Inresponsetorecognizedconflictpressures,theUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly2009

report identified a series of “conflict minimizers” – Climate mitigation and adaptation,

economic development, democratic governance and strong local and national institutions,

cooperation,preventivediplomacyandmediation (UNGA2009).Whena governmentand its

policy measures function constructively across society and respective sectors (energy,


19

environmentetc.),thereisagreaterlikelihoodofmeetingthefollowing“strongstate”criteria

(Kahl2006):

Effective administrative hierarchies, control of the legitimate use of force, ability to

mediate impending conflicts before they turn violent, andmore capability tomanage

environmentaldegradationandchange(SeeHaugeetal.2001;Esty1999;Rose1976).

Consequently, in a state aligned to strong liberal-democratic values, “both the structural

conditionsandlivelihoodfactorsthatincreasetheriskofviolentconflictarereduced”(Barnett

&Adger2007).

The act of reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is akin to “a social and

technologicalproblemwithsocialandtechnologicalsolutions”(Gillard2016).Localizedscarcity

maygeneratepoliticaltensions,butitcanalsoyieldtechnologicalorsocialinnovationthatmay

manage any tendency toward conflict and alleviate pressures placed upon human security

(Gartzke 2012). Climate security derives its effectiveness from connective capacity, regional

interlinks, presence on the ground and anticipatory capabilities. In response to the

exacerbation of climate change and the unpredictability of weather patterns, practical

infrastructureprovisionandimprovementsinadaptivecapacitycanstrengthenhumansecurity.


20

Chapter2:RegionalPerspectivesofClimateChange2.1.ClimatepredictionsandEnvironmentalpressures

Israel faces distinct pressures from climatic effects projected to affect the

Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East. In the last few decades, anthropogenic climate

changehas significantly impacted theMiddle East: Since1950 therehasbeenan increase in

aggregatetemperatures,adecreaseinthenumberofcolddays,andanincreaseintheamount

ofwarmdays(Zhangetal.2005).Inthefuture,thesouthernpartoftheeasternMediterranean

and theMiddle Eastmaybe exposed to 2–3monthsmore combined tropical nights andhot

days,whilethenorthernpartcouldexperienceincreasedheatwaveamplitudesrangingfrom6-

10degreesCelsius(Zittisetal.2016).

Regional climate changemodels for the EasternMediterranean also predict a further

increase in the frequency and duration of severe droughts. The observed wintertime

Mediterraneandryingoverthelastcenturycorrespondsto“theregion’ssensitivitytoauniform

globaloceanwarmingandtomodestchangesintheocean’szonalandmeridionalseasurface

temperature (SST) gradients” (Weinthal et al. 2015; Hoerling et al. 2012). Consequently, the

IPCC has identified the Mediterranean region as a climate change “hot spot,” with most

countriesoftheEasternMediterraneanalreadyexperiencingtemperaturerises;accompanied

bygrowingratesofdesertification,increasesinfreshwaterscarcity,forestfires,andincreasing

droughtfrequency(Solomon2007;Loizidouetal.2016;Hoerlingetal.2012).

BasedonIPCCmodels,thewarmingtrendsofrecentyearsaresettocontinue.Average

temperaturesinIsraelaresettoriseafurther1.5oCwithinthenextfewyears;reaching5oC

towardstheendofthecenturycomparedto1960-1990levels(MoEP2010).Thelargestformof

climate change, however, corresponds to a decrease in precipitation in the Eastern

Mediterranean and the Middle East caused by a decrease in storm track activity over the

EasternMediterranean (Evans 2009).While precipitation is predicted to decreaseby 20%by

2050,sealevelriseintheMediterraneanisestimatedtohitonemeterby2100,following0.5

metersby2050(Evans2009;MoEP2010).


21

Reports from the Israeli Climate Change Information Center23indicate that rising sea

levelscould leadtoflooding inTelAvivasfareastas IbnGvirolStreet(ICCIC2012).Similarly,

thefrequencyandlengthofextremeweatherevents,suchasexceedinglywetordryyearshas

increasedandrelatedeventslikedroughts,heatwavesandfloodsarelikelytoescalate(Brown

&Crawford2009).Between the yearsof 2003/2004 to2010/2011, Israel suffered7 yearsof

consecutivedrought, surviving “theMediterranean’sworstdrought in900years,”whichwas

consistentwithglobal trends thathaveseen the tenwarmestyearson recordalloccursince

the year 2000 (OECD 2011; Sharon 2016; NASA 2015). Natural climatic variability cannot

accountfortheincreasingfrequencyofwintertimedroughts intheMediterranean24(Hoerling

etal.2012).

Intermsofregionalhydrology,thecombinationofhighertemperaturesandlowerlevels

ofprecipitationwillreducetheflowofriversandstreams.IntheMiddleEast,climatechange

willbringastreamofnegativeconsequences,especiallyforagriculture,riverflowsandtherate

at which groundwater aquifers replenish (Brown & Crawford 2009). Furthermore, increased

rainstorms,erosionandrunoffwillaffectthenaturalratesatwhichaquifersrecharge,adding

further water stress to the region. Israel’s National Report under the UNFCCC warned that

water supplymay severely decrease, falling by 60% of 2000 levels by 2100,which has been

reinforcedbytheMinistryofEnvironmentinsubsequentreports(Pe’er&Safriel2000;Gabbay

2001).

TheMiddleEast’s transboundary riversprovideabout60%of its freshwater supplies,

whichtheWorldBankreportsasthehighestrateofdependenceoninternationalbasinsinthe

world (Hamdy2005). Tomakemattersworse, these transboundary rivershaveasymmetrical

upstream and downstream power relations, which further complicate access to and control

over water resources (Lowi 1993). Under conditions ofmoderate temperature increase, the

EuphratesRiverwouldcarry30%lesswaterthanatpresentandtheendofthecenturycould

seetheJordanRivershrinkingbyupto80%(Brown&Crawford2009).Additionalimpacts,such

23http://www.sviva.gov.il/English/env_topics/climatechange/Adaptation/Pages/ClimateChangeInformationCenter.aspx24Withinthepast20years,theregionexperienced10ofits12driestwinterssince1902(Hoerlingetal.2012).


22

asreducedflowstoLakeKinneretandreducedrechargeofgroundwateraquifers,arelikelyto

problematizethecolossaleffectsofclimatechangeinIsraelandtheMiddleEast(OECD2013).

In sum, climate change is highly likely to influence Israel’s water resources, while

agriculture, biodiversity and public health are extremely vulnerable to changes in climatic

conditions (ICCIC 2011). Due to the unequal distribution and scarcity ofwater in theMiddle

East,thereisanunderlyingreasonforitsclassificationasalong-termsecurityconcernlinkedto

climatechange.Strategicpolicyneedstoanticipatethewidespreadandinterconnectedimpacts

of climate change, including the threat of multi-decadal megadrought. As illustrated, these

impactsarealreadyvisibletodayandwillfurtherintensifyinthedaystocome,withprobable

damagesmoresevere in theMiddleEast than inother regionsof theworld.Policymeasures

necessitateformulationandimplementationsoonerratherthanlater.

2.2.RegionalSecurityThreats:EarlyWarningSigns

The Middle East qualifies as a probable climate change conflict-zone. In part, this

prognosis is due to its history of conflict and existing water stress (Bromberg 2009).Water

resourceshavelongrepresentedan“additionaldimension”connectedtothefateoftheMiddle

EastPeaceProcess(Scheffran&Battaglini2011;MFA2017).Inaregionalreadyconsideredthe

world’smostwater scarce, climatemodels arepredictingahotter,drier and lesspredictable

climate(Mrasek2008).

In the international discourse, climate change exhibits familiar characteristics, as “an

amplifierofexistingsocial,economicandecologicalproblematics”(Gillard2016):

Exacerbating threats caused by persistent poverty, weak institutions in resource

management and conflict resolution, fault lines and a history of mistrust between

communities andnationsand inadequateaccess to informationand resources (UNGA

2009).

IntheMiddleEast,suchfaultlinesremainprecariousunderageopoliticallandscapesensitiveto

environmental challenges. According to the International Institution for Sustainable

Development (IISD), thismix “impedesgreaterefficiency,undermines innovative solutions to

regional problems and fosters a zero-sum approach to sharing scarce resources” (Brown &


23

Crawford2009).The legacyofconflict in theMiddleEast, coupled to the lackofcooperation

and underlying distrust between nations and common internal conflicts, multiplies the

challengesofclimatechangeconsiderably.SecurityisaconstantconcernintheMiddleEast,as

evidencedbyongoingeventsinSyria(SecurityCouncilReport2017;SeeAnnex1b).Giventhis

atmosphere, it is probable that several dimensions of climate changewill strongly influence

futureprogressanddevelopmentintheregion.

Thepervasiveriskfactorsassociatedtoclimatechangeareliabletointeracthazardously

with the ecological and social systems of Israel, and theMiddle East at large (Aytzim 2017).

While Israel’sgeopoliticalentanglement isdistinctive, Israel’secologyandclimateareamong

themost fragile on the planet (Alterman 2015). In the absence of staging substantial policy

intervention – ceteris paribus – the country could be set to face insurmountable levels of

destabilization.Riskfactorsorientatearoundthesensitivityofresourceslikefreshwater,reefs,

fisheries and soils to heightened climate variance,which in turn affects the extent towhich

peoplerelyuponnaturalresourcestomeettheirdailyneeds(Wentz2016).Theimpactofthis

relationship influences the responsive capacity of social systems, as individuals adapt to

resourcefluctuations(IPCC2017).

The challenges ahead are potentially overwhelming, and include “disruption of

agriculture, low lying areas flooded by rising seas, higher risk of conflict over resources,

increasedrefugeflows(bothintheLevantandinEgypt,)andallthesecuritythreatsthatfollow

(Brown & Crawford). Once the adverse impacts of climate change coalesce with existing

divisionswithin Israeli society and theMiddle East at large, there is increased likelihood for

securitydisruptionsandlivelihoodcontractions,inadditiontofurthergeopoliticalinstability.

Over time and across biomes, climate change increases the propensity for severe,

pervasiveand irreversible impacts forpopulationsandecosystems.Globalwarmingthreatens

the long-term conditions for cooperative solutions in the Middle East. Warming is set to

increasethelikelihoodandintensityofdroughtsintheregion,inturnreducingtheconditions

tofacilitatepeaceandsecurity.ClimatechangeloomslargeovertheMiddleEastandthreatens

to “redraw the maps of water availability, food security, disease prevalence, population


24

distribution and coastal boundaries,” which will compound the already extensive security

challengesfacingtheregion(IPCC2007;Brown&Crawford).

2.3.MigratoryPressuresandClimateRefugees

Since 2010 the impacts of climate change on external migration to Israel has touched the

outskirtsofnationalsecuritydiscussions.TheIsraeliClimateChangeInformationCenter(ICCIC)

explicitlylinkclimatechangetothethreatof“climaterefugees”fromSub-SaharanAfrica(ICCIC

2012;Weinthal et al. 2015; See Annex 1b). Such conclusions stem from the recent surge in

Africanmigrantsandasylumseeks,with60,000refugeeshavingcrossed into Israelbywayof

Egyptsince2005(HumanRightsWatch2014).25Droughtanddesertificationacrossmuchofthe

Sahelhaveunderminedagriculturalandpastoral livelihoods,addingfurtherpressurestowell-

established migratory routes between Libya, Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali to the

Mediterraneancoast,EuropeandIsrael.(Heinrigs2010;Werz&Conley2012;Femia&Werrell

2013).

IntheMiddleEast,themostrecentinfluxofrefugeeshasoriginatedfromtheongoing

conflict in Syria, with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) listing

620,441 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan alone (WHO 2014; See Annex 1). Additionally,

largenumbersofundocumentedrefugeesfromLibyaandYemenalsoresideinJordan,adding

to the costs of housing and public services, while placing further stress on local resources,

which together heightens the level of domestic social conflict (Weinthal et al. 2015; Fagen

2009). According to the UNHCR,26migratory pressures and “the adverse effects that climate

change may have on natural resources, may spark conflict with other communities, as an

increasingnumberofpeoplecompeteforadecreasingamountofresources”(UNHCR2015).

The ICCIC recommends “Israel to take steps to insulate itself from instability, such as

strengthening its border barriers and defenses,” in tandem to the proposed building of “sea

fences” along the Mediterranean and Red Seas, with added law enforcement along border

zones(ICCIC2013;Udasin2012;Udasin2014).ThesemeasurescanenhanceIsrael’sgeopolitical

25https://www.hrw.org/world-report/201426http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html


25

and economic security, as witnessed through the construction of a border fence across the

Israel-Egyptian border that has effectively closed the migratory routes taken by African

refugeestoenterIsrael(Fiske2013).Atthesametime,however,therootcausesofmigration

andtheirinterconnectionstoclimatechangemustgobeyondtheconventionalsecurityagenda

and analysis. In this light,ThePaths to Sustainability coalition in Israel encourages increased

efforts for regional collaboration in the advancement of agricultural efficiency and water

management(Milrad-Givon2012).

2.4.WaterStressandFoodInsecurity

Water resources have long formed a strategic issue in the Middle East due to the

transboundarynatureofwatersupplies,oftenleadingtodisagreementsthatcoincidewithland

disputes (Scheffran & Battaglini 2011). Across the Middle East, water scarcity poses a

“perennial threat” to socio-economic security – home to more than 7% of the world’s

population; the region is endowed with little more than 1% of the world’s renewable

freshwatersupply(Michel&Yacoubian2013).Disproportionatedistributionofwaterresources,

whether naturally occurring or artificially induced, or a combination thereof, is intrinsically

linkedtofoodinsecurity.

FordecadesIsrael’swatermanagementstrategyinrelationtoitsdomesticandregional

contourshasbeenframedasa“nationalsecurityissue”Weinthaletal.2011).Incontrast,the

securitizationofmigrationisarelativelyrecentphenomenon,whileclimate-securityisstillinits

infancy. One of themost contentious areas has been the sharing of the Jordan River basin

amongIsrael,Jordan,Lebanon,SyriaandthePalestinians,raisingissuesofequity(Phillipsetal.

2007).Inessence,theregion’sconflictsorientatearoundlargelypoliticaldifferences,inwhich

water-related problems add an additional dimension to interactions, which may yield

cooperativepathwaysorfurtherdriveconflict(Shuvaletal.2007).

WaterresourceslinkfundamentallytopeaceeffortsintheMiddleEast.Climatechange

surfaces above all environmental and resource-based factors, thus making it a principle

determinant of stability in the region.At the same time, the future long-term conditions for

cooperative progress in the Middle East may also decline due to “population growth,


26

overexploitation and pollution” (IPCC 2007). TheMiddle East is the world’s youngest region

withitsdemographictrendsbeingbothacauseandaconsequenceofrapidpopulationgrowth

(Dhillon & Fahmy 2008; Constant & Kraetsch 2010). Given this added level of pressure to

resources,climatechange is likelytohinderthenegotiationoftransboundary issuesandmay

obstructthemediationofpeaceagreementsintheregion.

Followingtheglobalfoodcrisisof2007-2008,basicfoodpricesinmanycountriesacross

theMiddleEastskyrocketed.Thesedevelopmentscausedpublicbudgetstoplungeintodeficit,

addingfiretothefuelofpopulardiscontentthatculminatedintheArabSpring(Breisingeretal.

2012).Sincelate2010,16ofthe22countriesintheArabworldhaveexperiencedsomeformof

popularrest(Michel&Yacoubian2012).Itiswidelyagreedthatspikesinglobalfoodpricesare

a“proximate factor”behindrecentescalations in theMiddleEast,whichare tied toextreme

global weather events (Johnstone & Mazo 2011). By 2011, the Global Assessment Report

estimatedthat1millionSyrianshadbeenleftextremely“foodinsecure”bythedroughtsinthe

region;theworstdroughtintheinstrumentalrecordwhichresultedinwidespreadcropfailure

andamassmigrationof farmingfamiliestourbancenters (Erianetal2011;Femia&Werrell

2013;Kelleyetal.2015).

The attached human and economic costs are astronomical, with the U.N having

estimated the figure for people driven beneath the poverty line in Syria to be upwards of 2

million (Worth 2010). Admittedly, state policies in Syria maintained a high economic

dependenceonagriculture, leading to theover-exploitationofgroundwater resources,which

inflamedthecriticalstateofaffairs(Feitelson&Tubi2017).Nevertheless,politicalrebellionand

civilianuprisinginSyriaisinpartduetostressedwaterresources(Plumer2013).Risingwater

scarcityandfoodinsecurityholdthetitleof“TheAchillesheelofhighergrowthprospects” in

theMiddleEast(Devlin2014).


27

Chapter3:NationalPerspectivesofClimateSecurity3.1.Israel’sCarbonFootprintandthePoliticsbehindtheParisAgreement

On November 14 2016,27Israel ratified to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.28

Political leaders established a somewhat artificial goal of preventing global greenhouse

emissionsfromreachingconcentrationsthatwouldcauseglobalaveragetemperaturestorise

twodegreesCelsiusabovepre-industrializationlevels(JonesandMace2016).Accordingtothe

InternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),lowcarbontechnologiesandefficiencysolutionswillrequire

approximately$13.5trillionofinvestmentby2030inordertosecuretheoverallclimatechange

pledgesattachedtotheParisAgreement(IEA2015).

The gradual decarbonization of the energy supply is targeted in the coming decades

through price mechanisms for carbon, trade emissions permits, carbon taxes and other

incentivestokeephydrocarbonsintheground;inadditiontotechnologicalinnovationtoeither

sequester carbon dioxide underground or to have some chemical or biological process for

takingitoutoftheair(Busby2016).However,eveninapost-ParisAgreementworldofalleged

‘carbon pledge commitments,’ a lack of concord surrounds climate change discussions and

much of the debate circumvents corresponding action steps (Jones & Mace 2016).

Notwithstanding the international community conceded that it was preferable to have “an

imperfect,operationalagreementthantoholdoutforaperfect,fullyequitableone,whichmay

neverbeattained”(Tal2016).

Irrespective of the arguable merits of the Paris Agreement, Israel has declared its

intentiontosoftenitscarbonfootprint:

Israelintendstoachieveaneconomy-wideunconditionaltargetofrecuingitspercapita

greenhouse gas emissions to 7.7 t CO2e by 2030,which constitutes a reduction of 26

percentbelowthelevelin2005of10.4tC02epercapita.Aninterimtargetof8.8tCO2e

percapitaisexpectedby2025(INDC2015).29

27http://www.sviva.gov.il/English/ResourcesandServices/NewsAndEvents/NewsAndMessageDover/Pages/2016/11-November/Israel-Ratifies-Paris-Climate-Agreement.aspx28http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php29http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/Israel%20First/Israel%20INDC.pdf


28

Despite supposedly mounting pressure exerted by the Paris Accord and other international

agreements,climatechangepolicyfailstomeet itsprimacyinIsrael’spoliticalsphere.Aclear

disconnect30exists between the climate change and security targets framed by the Israeli

government(Proaktoretal.2016).Todate,effortstocounterIsrael’sever-increasinggrowthin

nationalemissionshavebeenlittlemorethan“symbolic”andanyvisiontotransformIsraelinto

alow-carboneconomyremains“nebulous”atbest(Michaels&Tal2015;Tal2015).

Worldwide,thecommercialandresidentialbuildingssectoristhelargestcontributorto

GHGs, accounting for approximately one-third of emissions and 60% of global energy

consumption (IEA2013). In Israel, thepower sector accounts for approximately 50%of total

GHGemissions,whilethetransportsectorcontributessome19%(IsraelEnvironmentBulletin

vol.42).ItisimportanttonotethatcalculationsofNationalGHGemissionsexcludeIsrael’sfuel

mix.ThisnotableexclusionreflectsadegreeofgovernmentbiasinappointingIsrael’sElectricity

Authority to submit the country’s carbon reduction targets – “…even though it is completely

disengaged fromareas such as transportation, fuel production, agriculture and construction”

(Tal2016).

Israel contributed8.8 tCO2ein2013,up from3.1 tCO2e in1960 (WorldBank2017). In

comparison, the respective figures for theEuropeanUnionaresignificantly lower.TheWorld

BankData Catalog31indicates that Israel is heading in thewrong direction in terms of GHGs

emissions(SeeAnnex2).32AccordingtoIsrael’sformerMinisterofEnvironmentalProtection:

Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is an especially difficult challenge in Israel, a

country undergoing economic growth against a backdrop of continuous increases in

bothpopulationandenergyconsumption(GiladErdan2009).

However,economicgrowth trade-offarguments seematbestaweak justification for Israel’s

recent and current per capita emissions, which remain significantly higher than the largest

30CriticsoftheParisAgreementhavebeenquicktopointoutthatitis“hardlyapanacea,”sincecurrentemissionpledgesfailtosecuremeetingthepreventativethreshold(2oC)forcataclysmicfeedbackcyclesandchaoticweatherconditions(Tal2016).31http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/32IntheEU,GHGsdeceasedby23%(1990and2014)whileGDPgrew46%inthesameperiod(Handrichetal.2015).


29

countries sharing Mediterranean coastlines (See Annex 2c). For these reasons, Israel’s

contributory role toannualGHGsneedsevaluatingprimarilywithinacloser regional context,

through comparison surrounding Middle Eastern countries and nearby Mediterranean

neighborssuchasCyprus,GreeceandMalta(SeeAnnex2dand2e)

Israel does not represent amajor carbon emitter in global terms, dwarfed by carbon

footprintgiants likeChina,USAand India.33Nevertheless, Israelwouldbe illadvisedtoassign

theproblemofclimatechangetothemajorglobalplayers.Suchastancewouldfailtoreflect

regional nuances and existing inequalities, which may provoke backlash from its regional

neighbors.Ifpolicymakersresumealargelypassiveroleinfutureclimatechangenegotiations,

Israel is more likely to be held in poor regard by the majority of Arab countries, and seen

primarilyasanextensionoftheWesternworld.Israel’scontroversialstandingasa“goodglobal

citizen” in the eyes of its neighborsmay exacerbate existing tensions that could deepen the

current fracture line in international politics; quite literally the future may bring “rising

temperaturesandrisingconflicts”(Brown&Crawford2009).

Cases suchasDarfurandespeciallySyriamakeaprima facie case for theneed for “a

more holistic climate justice-orientated adaptation approach to prevent situations in which

simmeringtensionscanoverflowintoconflict”(Das2016).Thedrivetoexhibitpositive“global

citizenship” and build a sense of “climate justice”34adds extra impetus to the campaign to

reducegreenhousegasemissions (Brown&Crawford2009). Israelhas thecapacity toplaya

constructiveroleintheinternationalclimatechangearena.SinceIsraelisthelargestpercapita

emitter in the Levant35largest per capita emitter, policymakers would be misinformed and

misguidedtosettleforabackseatroleinclimatechangenegotiations.

33Togetherthesecountriescontributeapproximately50%ofglobalemissions.34Aconceptbuiltontheplatformofequitabledevelopment,humanrights,andenvironmentaljustice–climatejusticefocusesontheunequalburdenofclimatechangeimpactsonthemostvulnerableandseekstosafeguardtheirrights,particularlybypromotingmoreequitableandfairallocationofsuchburdensatthelocal,national,andinternationallevels(O.Das2016).35WeincludeIsrael,Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,PalestineandSyria.


30

3.2.Israel’sSecurityStance

Effective climate change policies require a long-standing investment in an enduring

vision for security and prosperity. Short-term economic and political stresses typically

overshadow this achievement. In Israel, “competing economic priorities and the wider

international hesitation to transition to a low-carbon economy” subdue progress in climate

mitigation and adaptation (Michaels& Tal 2015). TheMinistry ofDefense is one part of the

equation; military expenditure in Israel consistently topples more than 15% of central

government expenditure (the highest rate among developed nations), which significantly

derailsprovisionforaclimatechangebudget(WorldBank2017;SeeAnnex3a).

Israel’s main perceived security threat stems frommilitary attack. In turn, the Israel

Defense Forces (IDF) constitutes the central institution of national security, with a standing

armyof168,000soldiers(MFA1999;Brown&Crawford2009).Consequently,theIDFremains

prominent in the Israeli public sphere and receives preference in the allocation of human

resources, budget and time (Reut Institute 2013). Evidently, exorbitant levels of military

spending bring significant opportunity costs, as day-to-day national security challenge

complicatelong-terminvestmentopportunitiesinclimatechangefunding(Schueftan2015;See

Annex 3b). Furthermore, on the fiscal side, “Section 17 of the cabinet’s decision specifically

intimatesthatnoothermoniesforgrantandloanswillbeallocatedtofurtherclimatechange

mitigation”–ostensiblyforatleastanotherdecade(Tal2016).Thelatestgovernmentdecision

alsostipulatesthatanyclimate-changerelatedmeasuresmustmeeta“cost-benefit”standard,

whichisnotclearlycharacterized(Tal2016).

ThenationalsecurityframeworkprovidedbytheReutInstitute36pinpointsanewreality

thatmaybeonthehorizon.ItseesapotentialfutureinwhichtheUnitedStatesisincreasingly

relegatedfromitspositionasIsrael’s“stablerock;”duetorecentU.S.engagementsinIraqand

Afghanistan and its growing energy independence, coupled to the rise of China and Russia,

which lessen U.S. interest in events in Israel (Reut Institue 2013). This development has

repercussionsacrosstheboard, includingthedomainofclimatepolicywhereinbyaddressing

36http://reutgroup.org/en/?SubjectId=62&Page=2


31

the security issues in a more comprehensive fashion Israel stands to gain from boosting its

overall“softpower”and“superpower”statusintheMiddleEast,irrespectiveofU.S.influence

(ReutInstitute2013).

Policymakers argue that Israel faces national security challenges unique in scope and

quality, which require a full harnessing of national resources (Reut Institute 2013).

Nevertheless, taking action on climate change stands to serve the best interest of Israel’s

nationalsecurity,since“…[Israel]cannothavefoodsecurity,watersecurityandenergysecurity

–oranyformofnationalsecurity–withoutclimatesecurity”(Harris2012).Giventhecountry’s

preoccupation with national security concerns and its ascribed geographic vulnerability to

climatechange,theabsenceofthe issuefromIsrael’spoliticalcalculusremainsverymuchan

anomaly(Michaels&Tal2015).

3.3.PolicymakingPrinciplesinIsrael

Forthevolumeswrittenaboutthe“dangers”ofclimatechange,theIsraeligovernment

hastakencomparativelylimitedactiontoaddresstheseconcerns(Stern2010).Briefly,in2009,

there was some recognition from Israel’s leaders of the potential trade benefits and

geostrategicopportunitiesofadoptingclimatechangepolicyandrhetoric,inadditiontoserving

asapublicrelationstool(Michaels&Tal2015).Atthetime,MinisterErdandeclaredthatIsrael

wouldserveas“aregional laboratoryandcenterofexcellenceforclimatechangeadaptation

technologies and renewable energy” (MoEP 2009). Despite reaffirming the potential to

“transform Israel into abeta site for climate change technologies,” sucha visionhasnot yet

cometopass(ShuliNezer).37

Part of the explanation lays with major natural gas deposits discovered in 2009 and

2010 offshore of the port of Haifa. The transition to natural gas transformed the country’s

domesticenergysupplyandenabledIsraeltobecomeanenergyexporter,whichconsequently

further deflated themarket for renewable energy (Shaffer 2011). Since 2004, a total of 2.3

trilliondollarshasbeeninvestedinrenewablesglobally,38witharecord$286billioninvestedin

2015,more thansix times theamount invested in2004 (Croneetal.2016).Given itsnatural37SeniorDeputyDirectorGeneralforIndustryinEnvironmentProtectionMinistryinIsrael.38http://fs-unep-centre.org/publications/global-trends-renewable-energy-investment-2016


32

availabilityofsolarenergy, Israel isbehindthetimes (SeeAnnex4).Policymakershavetaken

few steps to subsidizeor promotemarkets for solar energy,with fewexceptions to the rule

suchastheAshalimSolarThermalPowerStation.39Despitesluggishnesstopursuewide-scale

solargrids, Israel is theglobal leaderpercapita insolarwateruse, saving twomillionbarrels

worthofoilayear;demonstratingthefutureenergysavingpotentialofrenewables(Moskowitz

2010). To date, senior decision makers remain decidedly disengaged from implementing a

nationalstrategicmasterplanforclimatechange,reflectedbyanover-dependencyonnatural

gas(Alterman2015).

Strategizing for perceived risks should in theory shape the climate change policy-

packagethatthegovernmentofIsraelcommitstodeliveringinthedecadesahead.Inpractice,

however,climatechangesecurityhasbeende-prioritized;despiteanunderlyingawarenessof

thescopeofrelatedthreats–“Israel’spolicymakersacknowledgethatclimatechange isreal,

but have [largely] failed to integrate its implications into national policy” (Norgaard 2011).

Policymakers have grossly overlooked the security components of climate change and

downplayed the interconnectedness of threats and risks to Israel’s future, thus delaying the

transitionfrommitigationtoadaptationandstallingtheshiftfromsoftwaretohardware(Cam

2012).

For a variety of reasons, climate change continues to rank lowon the Israeli security

agenda,and thereare few indications that this is set tochange in thenear future (Alterman

2015). The climate-security nexus has failed to gain sufficient traction in the arena of

governmentpolicymaking.Inessence,therehasbeenade-prioritizationintherealmofIsraeli

policymaking, in terms of programming priority and financial support. The lack of a

comprehensive climate change strategy remains a prevalent default of Israel’s governance,

whileanationalenergymasterplanisyettomaterialize(Tal2016).

39http://www.brightsourceenergy.com/ashalim-solar-project#.WYCFjoiGN1v


33

Chapter4:PolicyImplications4.1.NationalSecuritytowardsaClimatecompatiblefuture

It is in Israel’s self-interest to address the security implications of climate change by

adoptingaseriesofpolicymeasures:atthenationallevel,inbilateralregionalrelations,andat

themultilaterallevel;inwaysthatadvocateaclimateleadershippositionintheMiddleEast,in

conjunctiontotheregion’ssensitivegeopoliticaldynamics.

The current domestic impasse and failure to provide an adequate climate-security

budget requires new approaches and reprioritization. Policymakersmust realize that climate

policymeasuresorlackthereofwillimpact“people’slives,livelihoods,assetpowerandpower

dynamics”inamyriadofways,whichcallsforagovernmentapproachthatinstillsthe“donot

harm principle” (Rüttinger et al. 2015). An approach consistent to these principles requires

steps,to“distributebenefitsandresourcesinaconflict-sensitivewaythatdoesnotaggravate

tensionbetweencommunities”orraisegeopoliticalredflags.Israel’spolicymakersmustbegin

tofactorintotheequationtheattachedsecuritybenefitsofapreventativeandprecautionary

climatechangepolicy(Rüttingeretal.2015).

The framing of climate change risks by the scientific community, and the way those

framings inform theapplicationof strategicpolicy constitutes a keyareaof research (Weber

2006).Researchandpolicydevelopmentgoalsshouldbededicatedtowardsbetterquantifying

andaccountingforthefullsetofclimaterisks,includingpotentiallycatastrophicimpactsoflow

or unknown probability; whether it be ocean acidification or changes in ocean currents and

circulationbelts(Busby2016;Feelyetal.2004;Rahmstorf2000).Riskmanagementpolicyand

the precautionary principle dictate that the government should address the security risks

inherenttoclimatechange(Dabelko2009).Theseinclude“tailrisks”(lowprobabilitybutvery

high impact),and“fat tails;”40otherwisereferredtoas“BlackSwan”events–“The impactof

thehighlyimprobable”(Busby2016;Nassim2007).

Astrictlyscientificandsecurityagenda,intheabsenceofholisticgovernmentpolicyand

a wider contribution from the social sciences, may lead to a rigid climate change agenda.

40Irregularlyhighlikelihoodofcatastrophicconsequences.


34

National security policy can function effectively by employing flexibility, appropriateness and

accuracy, and evolving in tandem to surrounding environmental fluxes by accounting for

climatechange(ReutInstitute2013).Atpresent,thereisanalarmingcall for increasedcross-

departmentalcooperationtoaddresstheimpactofclimateandenvironmentalchangeonthe

dynamicsofIsrael’snationalsecurityfront.Thegovernmentplaysacriticalroleinfosteringthe

conditionsinwhichIsraelicitizenscanactinwaystopursuethelivestheyvalue(Sen2001).The

sharedroleofgovernmentpolicymakersisinterconnected,they“supplement”and“reinforce”

each other and their instrumentality is only maximized when all are in place (Sen 20011;

BarnettandAdger2007).

Oncelegitimatepolicymeasuresbegintotakeshapeviaeffectivemechanisms,thestate

canfunctionbetterasawhole.Peoplegainopportunitiesforpersonaldevelopmentandreduce

their anxiety about the future. Conflict resolution mechanisms tend to be effective, and

economiestendtogrowandpovertylevelstendtofall(Sen2001Furthermore,thegovernment

isbetterequipped toprovide“protectiveguarantees” toassistpeoplewhen their livelihoods

suddenly contract; whether through the National Insurance Institute of Israel (NII),41 The

MinistryofSocialAffairsandServices,42orprovisionfromrelatedpractices.

4.2.IDFClimateStressOperations(CSOs)

TheU.S.DepartmentofDefense2014ClimateChangeAdaptationRoadmapidentifiesa

hostofthreatstosecurityoperations:

Sealevelrisemayimpacttheexecutionofamphibiouslandings;changingtemperatures

and lengthened seasons could impact operation-timing windows; and increased

frequencyofextremeweathercouldimpactoverflightpossibilityaswellasintelligence,

surveillanceandreconnaissancecapability(U.S.DoD2014).

Israel’s defense operators will encounter similar interventions to their operations and must

assessthelongandshort-termimpactsofsealevelriseon“navalbases,low-lyingairfields,and

energyinfrastructure”(Paskal2009).

41https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Benefits/Pages/default.aspx42http://www.molsa.gov.il/Units/Wings/agafSpecialJobs/Documents/shirutim%20mitavim_eng.pdf


35

FollowingtheNationalResearchCouncil2013strategyproposaltotheU.S.Intelligence

community,theIDFcouldadoptasystemofperiodic“stresstesting”toassesstheperformance

of physical, socioeconomic and political conditions under different climate change scenarios

(NationalResearchCouncil2013).Thisformofsimulationinvolves“analyzingthelikelyeffects

of an event at some projected time of occurrence in terms of key variables affecting

susceptibility,coping,response,andrecoveryorthefailurethereof,andthelikelyresponse”–

takingintoaccountnationalandregionalconfigurations(NationalResearchCouncil2013).Such

amechanismprovidesakeytoolforsecurityanalystsbyidentifyingweaknessesandblindspots

inoperationalsystems,whicharecrucialtoplanningforpotentialclimatedynamics.

ClimateStressOperations(CSOs)maybeactivatedbyindicationsthat“eventlikelihood,

exposure,or susceptibility is increasingor that thecapacity to respondadequately tocertain

kinds of climate events is declining,” in a given suspect zone or vulnerable area (National

Research Council 2013). Information and data gathered can assist intelligence operatives to

conduct national security risk analysis catered to anticipating susceptibilities and forecasting

social,politicalandsecurityconsequences.

4.3.FromStagnationtoInnovation

Attheoutsetofapproachingclimatechangemitigationandadaptationmeasures, it is

prudent that policymakers factor in both scientific and anthropological indicators. This

combinatoryapproachismorelikelytoaccountfortheenvironmentalandsocietalimplications

ofclimatechangeinthe21stcentury.

Tothisday,thephysical impactsofclimatechangeremainmorewidelydiscussedand

betterunderstoodthantheimpendingsocio-economicandculturalimpacts(Adgeretal.2013).

The government has an obligation to spearhead a re-engagement of economics, political

science,internationalrelations,demography,developmentstudiesandanthropologytoenable

policymakers to assess the causes and consequences of climate change in the Land of Israel

(Gemenneetal.2013).Sinceasearlyas2000,ProfessorDannyRabinowitz43haspropelledthe

43Authorof“HereitComes:HowtoSurviveClimateChange”(TranslatedfromHebrew).Rabinowitzwasthefirsttocointheterm“HomoSapiensCombustans–TheBurningMan.”https://homocombustans.com/about-2/


36

much-neededparallelengagementfromthesocialsciencesby investigatingthesocio-political

nexusandidentifyingthedistributionalinequitieslinkedtoclimatechange(Rinat2010).Onthe

samenote,thegovernmentshouldseektofortifythedistributionandabundanceofrelevant

resourcesinordertosatisfytheneedsandvaluesofitscitizens.

Israelneedstoemploysystematic,comparativeandcross-scaleresearchtoenhanceits

understanding of the links between climate change and national security (Barnett & Adger

2007). An interagency framework is more prepared to anticipate the social and political

ramifications of climate events and better qualified to instill a system for monitoring and

analysis(NationalResearchCouncil2013).Focusingonreducingcarbonemissionsremainsthe

keypriority;tothisend,initialstepshavebeguntowardsestablishinga“NationalMRVsystem

formeasuring,reportingandverifyingGHGemissions”(IsraelEnvironmentBulletinvol.42).

Adaptivecapacityrefersto“thepotentialorabilityofasystem,region,orcommunityto

adapt”(Smit&Wendell2006).Severalmechanismsdeterminetheseboundaries,including:

Theabilitytoaccesscommoditymarketsandlabormarketsandthepricespaidonthese

markets,theabilityofcommunitiestopoolresourcestocollectivelyrespondtochange,

access to information, population health, and the existence and effectiveness of

nationalandinternationalpoliciesandmeasurestosustainresourcesandlivelihoodsin

vulnerableplaces”(Barnett&Adger2007).

Atpresent, Israelexertssignificantadaptivecapacity,withtheadventofmassivedesalination

plantson itsMediterraneancoastline,whichhas relievedwater scarcity from its statusasan

existentialissue(Tal2011).Desalinationhasincreasedtheflexibilityofthewatersupplyhelping

todecoupleIsrael’swatersupplyfromclimate,therebyreducingvulnerabilitytodroughtsand

offering solutions for transboundary water tensions (Feitelson et al. 20111). However, if

relations between Israel and Palestine fail to improve, water diplomacy and transborder

cooperationbetween IsraelandJordanmust insteadsetanexampleforclimatediplomacy in

theMiddleEast(Monshipouri2015).

Israel has the capacity to leverage geopolitical gains from investing in climate change

adaptation-strategies–harnessingthepowerof itstechnologicalbaseanditsentrepreneurial


37

networks–tobecomealeaderintheregion.FortheStateofIsrael,“enhancementofadaptive

capacity represents a practical means of coping with changes and uncertainties in climate

(including variability and extremes),” thus acting as a mechanism to facilitate “threat

minimizers”inthefaceofcompoundingrisksandproliferatingdangers(Barry&Wandel2006;

UNGA2009).Intheagriculturalsector,climate-smartagriculturalpracticesandbetterirrigation

methods can help to conserve water; thereby adding to the efficiency gains and water loss

minimizationachievedvialarge-scaledesalinationfacilities(Al-Otaibi2015).

Israeli businesses also excel in smart grid technologies, transition methods to

InformationandCommunicationTechnologies (ICT)andenergymanagement.Climatechange

presents new opportunities for policymakers to accelerate efficiency mechanisms by

encouraging researchmethods and launching communications systems designed to enhance

theIsrael’stechnologicalpowerbase.Adaptivestrategiestominimizesecurityrisksandmitigate

potential conflicts include strengthening institutions, economic wealth, energy systems and

othercriticalinfrastructures(Scheffran&Battaglini2011).

Itemergesthatthereisanever-growingneedfora“whole-of-governmentapproach”44

united in a joint effort to install corrective policy and allocate sufficient funds towards

confronting the prescribed “Climate Conundrum” (Gan 2016). As noted by Israel’s Chief

Scientist,Dr.SinaiaNetanyahu:

Adaptationwillhavetobemainstreamedintodecisionmakingineveryfieldbydifferent

authorities and a coordinating body will have to be established to lead the

implementationprocessandcoordinatebetweengovernmentministriesand public

authorities(Netanyahu2016).

Furthermore,alleffortsshouldfollowa“noregrets”45philosophy(Siegel&Jorgensen2011).

44Awhole-of-governmentapproachcanadvancetheobjectivesofmultipleagencies,avoidduplicationofeffort,andmakebetteruseofscarceresources(NationalResearchCouncil2013).45http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/world-resources-report/no-regrets-approach-decision-making-changing-climate-toward


38

Chapter5:PolicyRecommendations5.1.ANewGovernanceToolkit

Multilevelgovernanceequatestoacollectiveefforttosolvepublicproblemsbymerging

the localwith thenational.46This kindof system creates interactive layers of governance, as

representatives interact across different levels of government (vertical coordination) and

amongrelevantactorsatthesamelevel(horizontalcoordination)(Huntjens&Nachbar2015).

At present, numerous attempts on the part of sub-state entities, municipalities,

corporationsandcommunitiesaretakingtheinitiativetomakestepstowardsbecomingcarbon

neutralandimprovingsustainability(Hoffmann2011).Suchconnectivityandflexibilitybetween

entities have already formed part of the architecture behind emerging modes of climate

governance(Scheffranetal.2012).Amultilevelgovernanceapproachtoclimatechangeshould

adopt a “context-specific” approach,which takes into account the operating environment of

thelocalgovernmentandotherstakeholders;inordertoachieveeffectivecooperationacross

all levels, with joint information production and exchange (Huntjens & Nachbar 2015). This

approachisdesignedtobridgethegapbetweentop-downandbottom-upprocesses,sincetop-

down planning is unlikely to factor in micro-level vulnerabilities of climate change andmay

sidestepkeycommunityrelationsortensionsduetovestedinterests(Taenzleretal.2012).

Israel needs to employ a new governance toolkit for climate change mitigation,

adaptationandprotection.Policymakersandsecurityexpertsmustemploy strategic, tactical,

operationalandreflexivetools inongoingandfutureassessmentsofclimatechange impacts.

Policymakerscanhelpfacilitatethemovetowardsincreasedcooperationthroughtheadoption

ofmoreinclusiveandreflexivegovernancemechanisms;producingmeasurableoutcomesthat

can be monitored and updated. Improved cooperation in policy circles will inform relevant

governmentalbodiesandstakeholdersofthemeritsofanationalclimatechangemasterplan,

simultaneously promoting wider public awareness and preempting the formation of further

obstaclestoclimatechangeremediation.

46Thetermcharacterizestherelationshipbetweenpublicactorssituatedatdifferentadministrativeandterritoriallevels(Huntjens&Nachbar2015).


39

5.2.LeveragingforGeopoliticalCooperationandRegionalTransformation

In several ways, Israel can leverage for geopolitical stability and new economic

opportunities by developing its regional and global presence in the arena of climate change

policy.Asaprerequisite,Israelmustsolidifyitsnationalclimatechangeplan.

Themovefromstagnationtoinnovationshoulddevelopstateactorsandprivateagents

committedtonationaltargets,armedwitharepertoireofclimatechangetoolsandcomposite

awarenessof the climate-security spectrum. In somedomains, theprivate sector candeliver

thegreatest impact,but in therealmof regulation, financeand information, thegovernment

has a pivotal role to play. At the same time, policymakers should seek to harness the

transformative power of education by promoting climate justice and engaging the public in

climatestewardship47(MaryRobinsonFoundation2017).Raisingawarenessonclimatechange

may help to cultivate a closer culture of “conservation and conversation”48in Israel, which

couldfacilitateenvironmentalactivismandbetterresourcemanagementatlocalandnational

scales.

Developments in climate change adaptation tools can be leveraged in international

marketsandfordiplomacymeans,asresearch,data,equipmentandexpertiseareincreasingly

networked and exchanged (Wagner et al. 2015).Other nations in theMiddle Eastmust also

learn to adapt to the idea of climate change networks and recognize that to “overcome

diverging interests it is important to build coalitions among those with mutual interests”

(Scheffran2008).Ideally,suchoperationsshouldfuse“reciprocity,exchange,incentives,trust,

andopenness” inordertosupportsharedgoals, towardsthedevelopmentofMiddle-Eastern

Mediterranean Alliances (MEMA's) (Wagner et al. 2015). It will take a collaborative effort

between the government and private sector to strategize an effective adaptation pathway;

however, the underlying policy approach must first pave the way towards successfully

upgradinganoutmodedclimatechangeplan.

If Israel seeks to maintain its sizeable contribution to humanity, relative to its size,

resourcesandpopulation,inadditiontosecuringaviableandsustainablefuture,soundpolicy

47http://www.mrfcj.org/principles-of-climate-justice/48Gordon(2017).


40

principlesdictatetacklingclimatechangewithimmediacy(ReutInstitute2013).Israelcantake

strides towardsminimizing security risks bymoving from “conflict to cooperation in climate

policy;” seeking inter-ministerial policy motions and regional interactions set towards

mitigation, adaptation and resolution (Scheffran & Hannon 2007). As the “Start-Up Nation”

seeks tooptimize its strategic investments, climatechangemustbecomeoneof theareasat

theforefrontofIsraelipolicyandnecessaryresourcesshouldberallied(Senor&Singer2009).

Theremainingstrategicdilemmaultimatelylieswithcalibratingtheappropriatelevelofpolicy

interventionandresourceallocation,givencompetingprioritiessuchasmilitaryexpenditure.

5.3.FuturePerspectives

The future configuration of global politics and security in Israel and theMiddle East

interlinks to energy consumption patterns and the carbon footprint of cities, food systems,

infrastructure and buildings (McGregor et al. 2013). Policymakers should begin to envision

climate change as a potential geopolitical stabilizer as opposed to a probable jeopardizer.

Electricityconservationshouldbecomeasharedstandardwithfurtherincentivesprovidedfor

theadoptionofgreenbuildinginfrastructure.

Agenuineshiftinperspectivesandapproachescanhelptoadjustpolicyeffortstowards

incentivizingcarbonreductionandpromotingIsraeliclean-techinglobalmarkets.Channelizing

andincentivizingpositivetradedevelopmentsforIsraeliclimatechangetechnologieswillplaya

key role inmultiplying the investmentof intellectual energies and revolutionizing the “island

mentality”49of many nations within the Middle East, as they recognize the advantages of

cooperation and reciprocity. Meanwhile, socio-technical transitions and socio-ecological

resilience50mustincreasinglyformpartofthefabricofgovernancemechanisms.

ThedegreetowhichtheIsraeligovernmentpreparesandrespondstothesecurityrisks

ofclimatechangewilldeterminetheimpactlevelsofmigratorypressures,waterscarcity,food

49Israelremainsanisolated“energyisland”withnoconnectiontoneighboringgridstoaccommodateusagespikesorotheremergencies(AlonTal),whiletheMiddleEastisgenerallypartitionedinitsresourcedistributionandconnectivity–unliketheEU.50Fromaholisticperspective,sustainablesecuritymeanscalibratingcurrentchallengestotheunderlyingneedtosupporttheplanet’scorelife-sustainingecologicalfunctionsinthefuture,whichalsomeansdecouplingeconomicgrowthfromclimatechangeexacerbationandresourcedepletion.


41

security and climate disaster events; establishing the overall resilience of the State of Israel.

Climatecontingencyplanning isanecessity in Israelandpolicymakersshouldstrivetobuilda

climate-resilienteconomyby integrating thediplomatic-securitydimensionof climate change

intothenationalsecurityagenda.Theprioritizingofacrediblemitigationandadaptationplan,

inconjunctiontomaneuveringforstrongergeopoliticalcooperation,willbettersituateIsraelto

dealwiththesecuritychallengesposedbyclimatechange.Throughleadershipandexchange,

Israelcanexercisethenecessarytools formitigatingrisksandcapitalizingupontheemerging

socio-economicanddiplomaticopportunitiespresentedbyclimatechange.

Aclimateadaptationmindsetshouldsteadilybecomethepolicynormandbringwithit

freshgovernancemethodstowardsaNewNationalClimatePlan–LeveragingforGeopolitical

CooperationandRegionalTransformation.Israel’snewprecedentrevolvesaroundstrategizing

foraccountabilityandresponsiveness,whiletargetingpeacebuildingandpeacekeepingefforts

towardsaclimate-resilienteconomyandclimate-protectedsociety.


42

ConclusionPartofthegovernment’slong-termobjectivesshouldincludebuildinginterregionaland

intergenerationalsecurityandjusticeinIsraelandtheMiddleEastbymakingclimatechangea

top security priority. National security plays out on many fronts, both domestically and

internationally,andtobeeffectivepolicymeasuresmustrecognize,anticipateandpreparefor

themulti-dimensionalimpactsofclimatechange.

Climate change can evolve into an opportunity for working towards geopolitical

stability,asopposedtosurrenderingtoregionalinstability.Thiscriticalshiftispossibleundera

new fabric of governance that takes to heart the full set of risks at hand, whereby climate

changemitigation, adaptation and protectionmeet their primacy. Once climate contingency

planning starts to solidify, security mechanisms can develop through different avenues to

createamoreclimate-protectedsociety,inwhichsecuritychallengesandenvironmentalvalues

coalesce.

Climate-securityhingesuponfourkeydirections:

1. Multi-levelgovernance

2. Newenergypathways

3. IDFClimate-stressOperations(CSOs)

4. Climatestewardship

§ Multi-level governance holds the key for climate riskmitigation and strengthening of

climate-security.For regionalcooperationtodevelop,nationalpolicymakersmust first

come togetherunderaunited front todefendagainst climatechange.Anew formof

diverse governance, equipped with a flexible toolkit to match, can help bridge the

knowledge gaps necessary for employing effective security and sound social policies.

Inter-ministerial initiatives and cross-departmental cooperation can send the right

signalsforMiddle-EasternMediterraneanAlliancesandwiderclimatechangecoalitions.

§ New energy pathways can be fashioned by channelizing the power of Israel’s

technological and entrepreneurial networks toward climate change mitigation and

adaptationbeyond thecountry’s immediateborders.The returnson Israeli clean-tech


43

can help to fuel a renewable revolution closer to home, enabling real investment

towardsIsrael’sIntendedNationalDeterminedContribution(INDC)CO2level.

§ IDF Climate Stress Operation (CSOs) can strengthen border barriers and security

defenses, fortify border zones and “sea fences,” and help identify weaknesses and

blindspots in operational systems. Incorporating climate-security into the military

budgetcanhelptooffsettheanticipatedcost-tollofclimaterefugees,whiletempering

climatechange“hotspots.”

§ Climatestewardshipreflectsthepowerofthepeople,seekingtoelevatetheroleofthe

individual citizen towards carbon-reduction. Environmental education can facilitate

empowermentacross localscales,ascitizenscometo internalizetherealityofclimate

changevis-à-vistheirowncarbonfootprint.Climatestewardshipisoneofthefirstlines

ofdefenseagainstclimatechangeandsetsthepathtowardsreachingclimatejusticein

aclimate-protectedsociety.

Climate-security needs to be intact to strengthen long-term commitments toward peace

andprosperity in theMiddleEast.Progress towards thisgoalalsomeans thatabettersocio-

economicbalanceandsustainablefuturedrawcloser.Takingstepstowardstrengtheninglong-

term security –within Israel's borders – and consolidatingpositive regional transformation–

acrosstheMiddleEast–holdsthekeytoneutralizingtheimpactsofclimatechange.Thetime

hascomeforclimatechangetotakeitsprominentplaceatthesecuritytable.


44

Annex

Annex1a:GlobalMigrationResponsetoClimateShocksGlobalannualforcedmigrationasafunctionoftimeandWAISscenario

SourceNichollsetal.2008(WAIS:WestAntarcticIceSheetcollapse)

Annex1bNetMigration:Egypt,Syria,Sudan(2012)

Netmigrationisthenettotalofmigrantsduringtheperiod,thatis,thetotalnumberofimmigrantslesstheannualnumberofemigrants,includingbothcitizensandnoncitizens.Dataarefive-yearestimates.

Source:UnitedNationsPopulationDivision,WorldPopulationProspects.


45

Annex2aIsraelandEuropeanUnion1960-2013CO2Emissions(metrictonspercapita):Carbondioxideemissionsarethosestemmingfromtheburningoffossilfuelsandthemanufactureofcement.Theyincludecarbondioxideproducedduringconsumptionofsolid,liquid,andgasfuelsandgasflaring.

IsraelandEuropeanUnion:CO2Emissions2013

Source:CarbonDioxideInformationAnalysisCenter,EnvironmentalSciencesDivision,OakRidgeNationalLaboratory,Tennessee,UnitedStates.


46

Annex2bIsraelandEuropeanUnion1960-2013GNIpercapita,Atlasmethod(currentUS$):GNIpercapita(formerlyGNPpercapita)isthegrossnationalincome,convertedtoU.S.dollarsusingtheWorldBankAtlasmethod,dividedbythemidyearpopulation.

IsraelandEuropeanUnion:GNIpercapita2013

Source:WorldBanknationalaccountsdata,andOECDNationalAccountsdatafiles.


47

Annex2cIsrael,France,ItalyandSpain1960-2013CO2Emissions(metrictonspercapita)

Israel,France,ItalyandSpain:CO2Emissions2013



48

Annex2dIsrael,CyprusGreeceandMalta1960-2013 CO2Emissions(metrictonspercapita)

Israel,CyprusGreeceandMalta:CO2Emissions2013



49

Annex2eIsrael,Egypt,Jordan,LebanonandSyria1960-2013CO2Emissions(metrictonspercapita

Israel,Egypt,Jordan,LebanonandSyria:CO2Emissions2013



50

Annex3aIsraelandtheOECD1972-2016

Militaryexpenditure(%ofcentralgovernmentexpenditure)

IsraelandtheOECD:CentralGovernmentmilitaryexpenditure2015

Source:StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI),Yearbook:Armaments,DisarmamentandInternationalSecurity.


51

Annex3b:IsraelandtheOECD1960-2016Militaryexpenditure(%ofGDP)

IsraelandtheOECD:Militaryexpenditure(%ofGDP)2016

Source:StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI),Yearbook:Armaments,DisarmamentandInternational.


52

Annex4:IsraelandtheEuropeanUnion(1990-2014)Renewableenergyconsumption(%oftotalfinalenergyconsumption):

Renewableenergyconsumptionistheshareofrenewablesenergyintotalfinalenergyconsumption

IsraelandtheEuropeanUnion:RenewableEnergyConsumption2014

Source: World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database from the SE4ALL GlobalTrackingFrameworkledjointlybytheWorldBank,InternationalEnergyAgency,andtheEnergySectorManagementAssistanceProgram.


53

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AEJI New Series on Climate Change Strategy, National

Security and Regional Sustainability CCS|NS|RS 2017

For further information contact us:

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The Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI) is a non-partisan, independent body, research and resources oriented center, set up in 2009. The center focuses on the inter-connectedness of society, environment and the decision-making framework in Israel to produce policy recommendations that are real and acceptable while promoting the strengthening of democracy, equality and environmental justice values. It also aims to promote active deliberated civic participation especially of minorities and residents of the periphery.

The Association is active in four main areas:The Association is active in four main areas:A. Initiating of researches and working papers on environmental justice core issues, including climate policy and governance, social economy, resilient communities, methodology of inequality indexes.B. Data collection aimed to establish informative infrastructure on socio-economic aspects of environment and climate for researchers, policy advisors and decision-makers.C.C. Development of policy tools that promote a policy based on the values of democracy, equality and environmental and climate justice.D. Increasing civic participation in matters of environmental justice and decision-making processes regarding environment and society, as well as empowering civil society especially among vulnerable groups such as women, minorities and residents of the periphery.