085 medenilla vs csc

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Medenilla vs CSC Facts: - Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II. - In 1987, Medenilla was detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and Manpower Management. - Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued within the DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued. Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer. On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position. - On January 27, 1989, respondents Amparo Dellosa, Rosalinda Juria and Marita Burdeos together with Matilde Angeles, Catalina Espinas, Alicia Nercelles and Ramon Racela, all of whom are employees in the Human Resource Training and Material Development Division, Administrative and Manpower Management Service of the DPWH, jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the appointment of the petitioner to the position. They allege that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of them should have been appointed to the said position. - The task force on reorganization dismissed the protest on August 2, 1989. The CSC reversed and held that petitioner was not qualified to the position. It held that petitioner’s eligibility is based on PD 907 (cum laude), and that she was only a contractual employee while protestants were all permanent employees. - The CSC also held that “that in the event of there occurring a vacancy, the officer next-in-rank must, as far as practicable and as the appointing authority sees it in his best judgment and estimation, be promoted . . . and that it is only in cases of promotion, where an employee other than the ranking one is promoted, is the appointing power under duty to give "special reason or reasons" for his action . . . .- CSC held that petitioner was not qualified and limited the appointing authority’s choice to the 3 protestants.

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Page 1: 085 Medenilla vs CSC

Medenilla vs CSC

Facts:- Petitioner Ardeliza Medenilla was a contractual employee of the Department of Public Works

and Highways (DPWH) occupying the position of Public Relations Officer II.- In 1987, Medenilla was detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for

Administration and Manpower Management.- Pursuant to Executive Order No. 124 dated January 30, 1987, a reorganization ensued within the

DPWH and all the positions therein were abolished. A revised staffing pattern together with the guidelines on the selection and placement of personnel was issued. Included in the revised staffing pattern is the contested position of Supervising Human Resource Development Officer. On January 2, 1989, the petitioner was appointed to the disputed position.

- On January 27, 1989, respondents Amparo Dellosa, Rosalinda Juria and Marita Burdeos together with Matilde Angeles, Catalina Espinas, Alicia Nercelles and Ramon Racela, all of whom are employees in the Human Resource Training and Material Development Division, Administrative and Manpower Management Service of the DPWH, jointly lodged a protest before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting the appointment of the petitioner to the position. They allege that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of them should have been appointed to the said position.

- The task force on reorganization dismissed the protest on August 2, 1989. The CSC reversed and held that petitioner was not qualified to the position. It held that petitioner’s eligibility is based on PD 907 (cum laude), and that she was only a contractual employee while protestants were all permanent employees.

- The CSC also held that “that in the event of there occurring a vacancy, the officer next-in-rank must, as far as practicable and as the appointing authority sees it in his best judgment and estimation, be promoted . . . and that it is only in cases of promotion, where an employee other than the ranking one is promoted, is the appointing power under duty to give "special reason or reasons" for his action . . . .”

- CSC held that petitioner was not qualified and limited the appointing authority’s choice to the 3 protestants.

- Petitioner’s MR was also denied by the CSC holding that the protestants are more experience and that her educational background is not enough to warrant a declaration that she is more qualified.

Issues: W/N petitioner is qualified? YES

Ratio:Re petitioner’s experience

- The SC found that petitioner possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and requisite educational background. The CSC itself even considered the petitioner's PD No. 907 eligibility appropriate for the position.

Page 2: 085 Medenilla vs CSC

- The SC held that petitioner possesses the requisite experience for the position. The petitioner, not only was a cum laude graduate from the University of the Philippines, she has also acquired plenty of experience in the field of Human Resource Development

- The public respondent failed to consider that the petitioner, in her one year and seven months experience with Guthrie-Jensen was engaged in research relating to performance appraisal systems and merit promotion systems which duties are all related to Human Resource Development.

Re next-in-rank rule- CSC’s contention that the petitioner must possess superior qualifications in order to be

preferred over the protestants was not considered by the SC. (However, it still found that petitioner does indeed have superior qualifications as she was a UP cum laude graduate, ranked #1 in a department-wide training, was commended as a facilitator during the Second Congress of Women in Government, got high grades in her MBA from DLSU, highly satisfactory work with DPWH etc.

- CSC relies on Section 4 of R.A. 6656, which reads:Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for appointment to new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or if there are not enough comparable positions, to position next lower in rank.

- According to the SC, this does not mean that old employees should automatically be appointed in case of a vacancy. The preference given to permanent employees assumes that employees working in a Department for longer periods have gained not only superior skills but also greater dedication to the public service. This is not always true and the law, moreover, does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government service.

- The CSC’s reliance on Millares vs Subido is also misplaced as it has already been superseded by newer decisions holding that the the next-in-rank rule is not absolute; it only applies in cases of promotion. And even in promotions, it can be disregarded for sound reasons made known to the next-in-rank.

- In this case, the contested position was created in the course of reorganization. The position appears to be a new one. The applicability, therefore, of the next-in-rank rule does not come in clearly. Besides, said rule is not absolute. There are valid exceptions.

- Granting for the sake of argument that the case involves a promotional appointment, the next-in-rank rule must give way to the exigencies of the public service. The intent of the Civil Service Laws not merely to bestow upon permanent employees the advantage arising from their long employment but most specially, it is to foster a more efficient public service. Any other factor must, therefore, yield to the demand for an effective government, which necessarily entails the appointment of competent, qualified and proficient personnel.

On the CSC’s authority- If the appointee is qualified, CSC has no choice but to attest the appointment. . It is not within its

prerogative to revoke an appointee on the ground that substituting its judgment for that of the appointing power, another person has better qualifications for the job.