07 saving the phenomena

► 7.1 Empedocles of Acragas � ch.7 pg.1 ►

é Rene Mario Micallef, 08-Jun-03 5:25 PM

7. SAVING THE PHENOMENA

7.1 Empedocles of Acragas

7.1.1 INTRODUCTION Sap. The philosophers we are going to discuss in this section all tried to ’save the phenom-

ena…– any ideas what that might mean? Men…s Phainomenon in Greek means ’what appears, what manifests itself to our senses…–

does that have anything to do with what we are saying? Sap. Yes, considerably. Think about Parmenides. Did he ’save the appearances…, that is, did

he give value to what the senses tell us about the world around us? In other words, did he give value to what is manifested to our senses by the things around us?

Tank Not really. He believed that things are the way our mind, thinking logically, portrays them, and if our senses give us a different picture, we should just dump that picture.

Sap. Exactly. What happens after Parmenides is that you have three groups of thinkers. Some defended Parmenides… idea that all things are one and that there is no movement or diversity in that One. Some tried to revive old ideas from the Milesians, the early Py-thagoreans or Heraclitus, with some modifications that often did little to face the Eleatic critique. Others opted for pluralism. What this means, in essence, is that they opted out of the search for one single arche , to which everything can be reduced. They thought that there is more than one thing from which the universe originated and is made, and these many original things cannot be reduced to one thing that is more basic or primi-tive.

The interesting thing is that some of the basic ideas of Parmenides about being remain unchanged in these philosophers. Even if there is more than one ’being… in the universe, these few or many beings behave like a multitude of Parmenidean ’Ones…. They are not created or destroyed, nor transformed. In the case of Empedocles, we have four ’roots… (rhizomata), or as later authors would call them ’elements… (stocheia). They are the four elements we have already met before: Air, Fire, Earth and Water. Empedocles does not try to reduce them to one which is more basic (as Water was for Thales, Air for Anaxi-menes, and Fire (to some extent) was for Heraclitus). The four elements are all basic, eternally co-present. Each of them has the characteristics of Parmenidean being: they are not created or destroyed, they are not transformed into something else. They do not undergo change. They are nevertheless different from one another: this is what plural-ism has allowed us to maintain from our sense experience. But yet, you may think, with only four different things in the universe, the diversity allowed must be very little! How, therefore, does Empedocles account for all the change and all the diversity that, according to our senses, are present around us? With more than one basic stuff, Empe-docles can explain all this by saying that these elements (or ’roots…, as he would say) mix together in different proportions to give rise to all the things we meet in our daily live through the use of our senses. Cats, dogs, batteries, trains, sandwiches– all are com-posed of the four elements mixed together in definite proportions. Interesting to note here is that this view entails two levels of ’being…– what are they?

Whiz We have the elements that are unmixed and the other things that are mixtures of ele-ments.

Sap. O.K. Things on one side, elements on the other. More than simply being mixed or un-mixed, what is the main difference between these two types of being?

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Men…s The elements are eternal, unchanging, stable. The other things that are made of the elements come and go, they are unstable, they change. They break up into the ele-ments and reform.

Sap. Exactly. The elements truly Are, with a capital ’A…. Cats, dogs, sandwiches ’are… with a small ’a…: they exist for some time, then perish. This is because they are little more than chance mixtures of the elements. O.K. This type of distinction will persist in Philosophy for quite some time. The things that are postulated by our minds ’Are…. They ’exist… in the strong sense of the term, as Parmenides understood it.

Lee Why do you say ’postulated by our minds…– That sounds very Parmenidean! But we do see the elements– Water, Earth and so on!

Sap. True. When we see a body of water, it is a case of having a lot of Water (the element) on its own. This is because a body of water (visible) is a thing made up of parts of the element Water (invisible). But when Water (the element) is mixed with other elements, say to constitute a flower, we don…t see a body of water. We can only postulate, using our mind, that one of the constituents of that flower is water. The element is not visible, it is not accessible to our senses (unless when present in large quantities unmixed). Hence, the elements as constituents of nature are entities we come to know not by the use of our senses, but rather theoretically. As I was saying, the elements Are, while the things that manifest themselves to our senses ’are…– Things ’exist… in the weak sense of the term– they simply ’happen to be for some time…. However, they still have some sort of existence– we have not simply denied that they are there– we have not thrown the evidence given by our senses down the drain, as Parmenides did. Hence we have ’saved the phenomena…. Simply ’saved… them. At the cost of considering them inferior be-ings. Before delving any more into the ideas of Empedocles, maybe we could learn something more about who this person was.

Tank I…ve got that here. So he was a medic, it says, from Acragas in Sicily (today Agrigento), born around 500 BCE. He founded a MEDICAL school that survived for several decades, even though he had no PHILOSOPHICAL successors, and hence is said to have founded no Philosophical school. He is renowned for his strong support of democracy, and is said to have challenged the aristocracy who tried to establish an oligarchic government in the city. Empedocles was a good orator, and also a good writer: he wrote two long poems in hexametre, called ’Peri Physeos… (On Nature) and ’Katharmoi… (Purifications).

Sap. That…s great. Let us now have a look at some of the fragments that I selected. Inciden-tally, we have a lot of fragments remaining from this thinker, and from now on we tend to have copious fragments from the writing of the main authors. Hence, for our purposes, we need to select the bits most relevant to our discussion.

7.1.2 FRAGMENTS (DK NUMBERING)

. 121 121RRotts, LRvtea Rn d HRi nsa R

(8) And I shall tell you another thing. There is no creation of substance in any of the mortal things, nor any cessation for them of baneful death. They are only a mingling and interchange of what has been mingled. Substance is but a name given to these things by men. R. P. 165. (13) And in the Whole there is nothing empty and nothing too full. (14) In the Whole there is nothing empty. Whence, then, could anything come to increase it? (16) For even as they (Strife and Love) were formerly, so too they shall be; nor ever, I think, will boundless time be emptied of that pair. R. P. 166 c. (17)[‘ ] But come, listen to my words, for it is learning that increases wisdom. As I said before, when I declared the aims of my discourse, I shall tell you a twofold tale. At one time it (the uni-



verse) grew together to be one only out of many, at another it parted asunder so as to be many instead of one; -- Fire and Water and Earth and the mighty height of Air; and apart from these, of equal weight in all directions, dread Strife, too, and Love in their midst, their equal in length and breadth. [‘ ] For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different prerogative and its own peculiar nature, but they gain the upper hand in turn when the time comes round. And nothing comes into being besides these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been passing away continually, they would not be now, and what could increase this Whole and whence could it come? How, too, could it perish, since no place is empty of these things? There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become now this, now that and like things evermore. R. P. 166.

. 121 1 1RRi r,styfRthRsCa Rmt,3 t,R

(17) I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time it grew to be one only out of many; at another, it divided up to be many instead of one. There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing away. The coming together of all things brings one generation into being and de-stroys it; the other grows up and is scattered as things become divided. And these things never cease continually changing places, at one time all uniting in one through Love, at another each borne in different directions by the repulsion of Strife. Thus, as far as it is their nature to grow into one out of many, and to become many once more, when the one is parted asunder, so far they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they never cease changing their places continually, so far they are ever immovable as they go round the circle of existence [‘ ] (21) Come now, look at the things that bear witness to my earlier discourse, if so be that there was any shortcoming as to their form in the earlier list. Behold the sun, everywhere bright and warm, and all the immortal things that are bathed in heat and bright radiance. Behold the rain, everywhere dark and cold; and from the earth issue forth things close-pressed and solid. When they are in strife all these are different in form and separated; but they come together in love, and are desired by one another. For out of these have sprung all things that were and are and shall be -- trees and men and women, beasts and birds and the fishes that dwell in the waters, yea, and the gods that live long lives and are exalted in honour. R. P. 166 i. (26) For they prevail in turn as the circle comes round, and pass into one another, and grow great in their appointed turn. R. P. 166 c. There are these alone; but, running through one another, they become men and the tribes of beasts. At one time they are all brought together into one order by Love; at another, they are car-ried each in different directions by the repulsion of Strife, till they grow once more into one and are wholly subdued. Thus in so far as they are wont to grow into one out of many, and again di-vided become more than one, so far they come into being and their life is not lasting; but insofar as they never cease changing continually, so far are they evermore, immovable in the circle. (27) There (in the sphere) are distinguished neither the swift limbs of the sun, no, nor the shaggy earth in its might, nor the sea, -- so fast was the god bound in the close covering of Harmony, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular solitude. R. P. 167. 28

. 121 1u1Ri l3 n d , R

(105) (The heart), dwelling in the sea of blood that runs in opposite directions, where chiefly is what men call thought; for the blood round the heart is the thought of men. R. P. 178 a (107) For out of these are all things formed and fitted together, and by these do men think and feel pleasure and pain. R. P. 178. (117) For I have been ere now a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a dumb fish in the sea. R. P. 182. (118) I wept and I wailed when I saw the unfamiliar land. R. P. 182. (119) From what honor, from what a height of bliss have I fallen to go about among mortals here on earth. (120) We have come under this roofed-in cave.

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(121) ... the joyless land, where are Death and Wrath and troops of Dooms besides; and parching Plagues and Rottennesses and Floods roam in darkness over the meadow of Ate. (132) Blessed is the man who has gained the riches of divine wisdom; wretched he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his heart. R. P. 179. (133) It is not possible for us to set God before our eyes, or to lay hold of him with our hands, which is the broadest way of persuasion that leads into the heart of man. (140) Abstain wholly from laurel leaves. (141) Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans! (143) Wash your hands, cutting the water from the five springs in the unyielding bronze R. P. 184 C. (144) Fast from wickedness! R. P. 184 C.

7.1.3 DISCUSSION

. 121u121RRotts, LRTtea Rn d HRCnsa R

Sap. Fragment 8 shows his Parmenidean conception of being; frr. 13,14 indicate (according to one interpretation) his belief that there is no void. In fragment 17, Empedocles ex-plains clearly his ideas about the universe. There are four elements, Water, Earth, Fire and Air, and with them two forces, Love and Strife (or Hate), mentioned in Fr. 16. Love brings different elements together to form things (mixtures of elements). Strife breaks up things to reform the elements. Looking at the picture from another angle, we see that Love breaks up the elements from themselves in the pure form, Strife brings the ele-ments together in their pure form from parts present in mixtures. Love aggregates (unites) things, Strife aggregates (unites) elements.

Whiz Why is there 4 elements only? Sap. We can only guess an answer to that. Maybe because he simply sought to utilize and

bring together the archai of his predecessors. Maybe because he started off as a Py-thagorean and the number 4 (the tetrad) had a particular significance for him. Maybe because he followed Hesiod who also had 4 elements in his cosmogony.

Men…s What level of being do Love and Strife have? Are they material or not? They are not Things, nor are they Elements!

Sap. That is a very good question. It is one of the main problems with Empedocles… theory. WE would say they are non-material forces. But I doubt whether Empedocles would pos-tulate something like that. They must have been, for him, some sort of tiny material link-ages, that keep together parts of the elements. But if they are material, the problem comes up again: what links the linkage to the element? Do we need a further bond to link them to the elements? If yes, this seems to be a never-ending story, an ’infinite re-gress problem… as Philosophers say. If no, then these linkages (Love and Strife) must be ’sticky…. And so, if we can have sticky material, why not simply postulate that the ele-ments themselves are ’sticky… and do away with Love and Hate? In other words, if Love and Hate are material things, they simply complicate the picture but do not explain much.

. 121u1 1RRi r,styfRthRsCa Rmt,3 t,R

Lee The second group of fragments are quite hard to understand. They speak of a cycle, of things coming together into one, and breaking up again– but he seems to speak about something more than this or that thing–

Men…s He speaks about a Sphere, or ’Harmony…. This seems to be a state where all the ele-ments are mixed together to form one big thing bound together by Love.



Sap. Correct. The history of the cosmos is cyclical, and the first stage of the cycle consists of the Sphere, where all is mixed up together. This reminds us of the Parmenidean sphere, but it is composed of 4 elements, mixed, and bound by Love. At a certain point, Strife enters the Sphere, and it start to break up. What happens next? This has been a point of contention between philosophers for quite some time, especially in the 1960…s. Some claim that Empedocles had a 4-stage cycle, other that it was 2-stage.

The 4 stage cycle is as follows: (1) Sphere (elements mixed, united by Love); (2) Age of Hate (Strife): Strife enters the Sphere, and it starts to break up; (3) Chaos (total scatter-ing of the elements; (4) Age of Love (love brings together the elements again and starts to constitute things– eventually more love leads to (1). The cosmos as we know it is neither totally scattered (3), nor totally united (1), but partially united, partially scattered. Hence, according to some, in (2) and (4) universes such as the one we know are cre-ated, according to other interpreters, this happens only in (4). In (3), according to one in-terpretation, we get the elements separated out into 4 masses1.

The 2 stage cycle is as follows: (1) Sphere; (2) Cosmos in balance. In (2) we have the introduction of Strife in the Sphere leading to its breaking up, but this does not end up in total scattering (Chaos) because at a certain point, a balance between Love and Hate is reached. Eventually, Love gets the upper hand again and the cosmos is glued together to obtain the sphere once again.

Whiz What is the big difference between the two cycle? There seems to have been a big dis-cussion going on about it!

Sap. Empedocles… cycle is an interesting attempt to describe the history of the universe, and it is interesting to note how he differs and resembles the mythical cosmogonies, such as that of Hesiod. To make a proper comparison, the interpretation (2-or-4-stage) is very relevant, since they have different religious consequences: in the 4-stage cycle, Evil (Strife) does dominate over Good (Love) at stage (3); in the 2-stage cycle, Evil never gets total control though Love does (1). The big difference lies in whether you think Love is the more powerful force or whether you think both forces are equally powerful.

Tank What does religion have to do with it? Sap. As is the case in the other naturalists, this is not a ’purely… scientific theory. It is a cos-

mogony, and like that of Hesiod, it has religious consequences. Frr. 21 and 27 speak of gods. Remember, Genesis 1 has a similar account where God creates the Cosmos from a Chaotic state. We cannot forget the religious background of Empedocles and the reli-gious relevance of describing the history of the universe in examining such an issue. The two-stage cycle is more religiously ’optimistic…– the world never falls ’totally… from grace. In the four-stage cycle there is a great need of ’redemption…. Which brings us to another problem in Empedocles. In the poem ’On nature…, he does not sound particularly religious: he is quite a materialist. In his other poem, ’Purifications…, he sound very reli-gious– Take a look at fragments 117-121, 132,133,140, 141, 143, 144. Does the word ’purifications… make sense as a title to such prescriptions?

. 121u1u1RRi l3 n d , R

Lee I think so, yes. The last ones resemble the religious prescriptions of the Pythagoreans, through which the soul is liberated from the body. The first ones speak of a sort of fall; they remind me of the Pythagorean idea that we are souls entrapped in a mortal body. We were once free, living in ’bliss…, and we ended up in this ’roofed-in cave…, this ’unfa-miliar land…. Then, there is the idea of reincarnation (fr. 117).

1 Others would represent (3) as a multitude of particles of the 4 elements, all scattered, separated by void. This view would entail that Empedocles believed in the existence of void, and would tend to have a different explanation of frag-ments 13, 14.

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Sap. Very true. So Empedocles is here speaking about humans being immortal souls, and he is prescribing ways of how they can purify themselves to return to freedom from the body. This is the sort of language we find in ’Purifications…. Is this compatible with what we had in ’On Nature…?

Tank Not really. If there are souls in the universe, we must have a different type of being. They are not Elements, nor Things, nor Forces like Love and Strife.

Sap. If you look at frr. 105 and 107 from ’On Nature…, we have a very materialist vision of hu-mans: they are like other things, they are mixtures of the elements. By the way, for Empedocles, the elements are sentient (they can sense things) so by the water part in us, we can perceive the water in the other things around us, and so on. So, clearly if we humans are simply mixtures of the ’roots…, as ’On Nature… suggests, there is nothing special with our ability to think and to perceive: these are powers already present in the roots from which people are made. However, in the other poem (’Purifications…), we are souls, and the material part (our body) is just an unnecessary and unwelcome addition. It is not easy to reconcile the Empedocles of the two poems; some say ’Purifications… is a later work, a result of a ’religious conversion… in old age. Others say ’Purifications… is a juvenile work, written when he was a Pythagorean, before he developed a more ’scien-tific… and ’materialist… vision of the universe. Maybe there is another way to understand both, but we shall not go into this. Let us move on to Anaxagoras–

7.2 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae

7.2.1 INTRODUCTION Whiz Anaxagoras was another scientific fellow. He came from Clazomenae (Asia Minor),

where he was born around 496 BCE. He went to Athens at the height of the Golden Age, and was councillor to Pericles. With him, Philosophy was introduced to this city, which was to become the capital of Ancient Philosophy soon enough. As could be ex-pected, his new ideas found opposition from the conservative Athenians, and when Pericles started to lose his political grip on the city, Anaxagoras was soon targeted. He was accused of impiety (rejecting recognized gods, introducing new divinities), reputedly because he said that the Sun and the Moon were not divine beings, but simple physical entities. To avoid capital punishment, he retired in Ionia, and died in 428 BCE circa.

Sap. Let…s start straight away with his cosmology. We already know he was a pluralist, so he believes in many beings. Again, his basic elements are mixed to form Things, and we have the two types of Being as in Empedocles: Elements and Things. The obvious questions now are: What are his ’elements…? How many are they? – Any answers? Let…s see the fragments before.

7.2.2 FRAGMENTS (DK NUMBERING)2

. 1 1 121RRN Ca Ri t3 a t3 a ya , R

(1) All things were together, infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small too was infi-nite. And, when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished for their smallness. For air and aether prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for amongst all things these are the greatest both in quantity and size. R. P. 151. (2) For air and aether are separated off from the mass that surrounds the world, and the sur-rounding mass is infinite in quantity. R. P. ib.

2 From: Freeman, K., 1948. Ancilla ot the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, ’Fragmente der Vorsokratiker“. Harvard University Press. Cambridge (Massachusetts). USA.

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(3) Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being cut. But there is also always something greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each thing is both great and small. R. P. 159 a. (4) And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many things and of all sorts in the composite products: the seeds of all Things (chremata), with all sorts of shapes and colours and savours (R. P. ib.), and that men have been formed in them, and the other ani-mals that have life, and that these men have inhabited cities and cultivated fields as with us; and that they have a sun and a moon and the rest as with us; and that their earth brings forth for them many things of all kinds of which they gather the best together into their dwellings, and use them (R. P. 160 b). Thus much have I said with regard to separating off, to show that it will not be only with us that things are separated off, but elsewhere too. But before, they were separated off, when all things were together, not even was any colour dis-tinguishable: for the mixture of all Things (Chremata) prevented it: the mixture of the moist and the dry, the warm and the cold, the light and the dark, and of much earth that was in it, and of a multitude of innumerable seeds in no way like each other. For none of the other things either is like any other. And these things being so, we must hold that all Things (Chremata) are in the whole. R. P. 151. (5) And those things having been thus separated off, we must understand that all of them are nei-ther more nor less; for it is not possible for them to be more than all, and all are always equal (in quantity). R. P. 151. (6) And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off. (7) ... So that we cannot know the number of the things that are separated off, either in thought or in fact. (8) The things that are in one cosmos are not divided nor cut off from one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm. R. P. 155 e. (9) ... as these things revolve and are separated off by the force and swiftness. And the swiftness makes the force. Their swiftness is not like the swiftness of any of the things that are now among men, but in every way many times as swift. (10) How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh? R. P. 155, f, n. I.

. 1 1 1 1RRN Ca R(tl,R

(11) In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and there are some things in which there is Nous also. R. P. 160 b. (12) All other things partake in a portion of everything, while Nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now ex-tends over a larger space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated off from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from

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anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it. R. P. 155. (13) And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place from all that was moved, and so much as Nous set in motion was all separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the revolution caused them to be separated much more. (14) And Nous, which ever is, is certainly there, where everything else is, in the surrounding mass, and in what has been united with it and separated off from it. (15) The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and the bright) went out towards the further part of the aether. R. P. 156. (16) From these as they are separated off earth is solidified for from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more than water. R. P. 156. (17) The Hellenes follow a wrong usage in speaking of coming into being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, but there is mingling and separation of things that are.

7.2.3 DISCUSSION

. 1 1u121RRN Ca RCt3 a t3 a ya , R)Ct3 trt3 a yra AR

Tank So we have infinite things both in number and in size, it seems. The things are made of seeds, according to some fragments. But it is not very clear–

Sap. O.K. There are two words in Greek for ’thing… being used. I think we can make a distinc-tion between visible Things (Chremata, sing. Chrema), and the ’things… they are made of, which he sometimes refers to as the ’seeds… (Spermata, sing. Sperma) of Things, as in fr. 4. Later authors have called his basic elements ’homoiomerie…, literally ’similar-parts…. Now it is not clear whether there are infinite seeds or homeomeres. Cetainly, there are infinite Things (Chremata), that result from the seeds. We may say that there is an INDEFINITE number of seeds.

Now, all things are together at the onset. All seeds are mixed in one big primordial mass (remember Empedocles… sphere!). When the Things of the world we know separate from this mass, they contain a portion of all the different kinds of seeds present in that mass. Things differ from one another because they are composed of different proportions of seeds. But they all contain a sample of all the different seeds. Interestingly, Anaxagoras claims that no matter how finely we divide these Things, they will always contain a sam-ple of all seeds, and they will always retain the proportions found in the original Thing, hence. This means that the seeds are so fine they can never separate out. They are ’in-finitely… divisible, and hence TEND to be infinitely small. Similarly on growth, all things re-tain a portion of all seeds, in the original proportions.

Men…s That sounds strange. If the seeds are infinitely small, they must take up no space! That…s what Zeno argues, doesn…t he? So how can Things made up of seeds take up space?

Sap. Infinite divisibility is truly problematic. But in frr. 1 and 3, what is suggested is that if you divide one thing, you get two, from two you get four, and so on: no matter how may times you repeat the division, you are going to get finite numbers of resulting things. So though the seeds TEND to be infinitely small, they do not need to ACTUALLY be infinitely small. What is important here is that the proportions are kept intact, so that things do not alter upon division.

Whiz Why does there need to be a portion of all seeds in all things? Sap. Fr. 10 could help explain this. Things can grow from what is similar, so for hair to grow, it

absorbs the seeds from the food (which the hairy fellow consumes) in the right propor-tions. The food…s composition is altered, but it still has a sample of all the seeds, even

► 7.2 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae � ch.7 pg.9 ►


though many seeds in its bulk have gone to replenish the hair. Now, the thing is not that simple. There are many interpretations of Anaxagoras regarding what the ’seeds… are. According to one view, the seeds are miniature things. So there is a miniature piece of hair in the food we consume, and that is what makes the hair grow. Another interpreta-tion (which I favour) has it that the seeds are corporeal properties. That is: a seed is a measure of whiteness, redness, harshness, smoothness, warmth, coldness, bitterness, sweetness– By this interpretation, when hair grows from food, the typical properties of hair are absorbed from the food (its colour, ’feel…, smell, taste– ). Some of these corpo-real properties are present in large quantities and determine the properties we can note: say, there is a huge number of seeds of whiteness in a white sheet of paper. Even so, since all things contain all the seeds, there must be some seeds of blackness, yellow-ness, etc., even in a white sheet of paper. Seemingly, this interpretation makes more sense than the first one, which entails there are seeds of elephants, cars, spaceships, and even Napoleon Bonaparte in a simple sheet of white paper. Yet the first interpretation is also plausible if understood in this sense: every Thing may be a universe in itself, containing people and plants and cities and everything. So in a plant, say, there is a mini-universe, in which there are plants and people and the like. The plants within the plant would themselves be mini-mini uni-verses, and so on to infinity. Similarly, the plant is part of a universe, the universe we live in. But the universe we live in could be contained in a macro plant, planted in a macro garden within a macro universe. And the macro universe could well be situated in a macro-macro plant, and so on to infinity. In this sense we can see that when a hair nourishes on, say, a piece of bread, the universes within the bread fuse with the uni-verses within the hair to make them grow; what does not conform goes to constitute the universes within the egested part of the bread. And this happens at all levels, micro and macro, at the same time! On both interpretations we can understand why later authors call the ’seeds… ho-meomeres. Everything is made up of similar parts, be they universes or corporeal prop-erties. On the first interpretation, a universe is made of micro universes that are similar, indeed identical (except in size) to it. So the whole is similar to the part. On the second interpretation, all things are made of similar units: corporeal properties. If you cut up a sheet of white paper, you still get the same proportions of whiteness to blackness to yel-lowness etc. And a white paper is similar to an elephant, since the elephant too is made up of the same corporeal properties. Well, the elephant has more greyness, of course (unless it…s a white elephant!).

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Lee Let us put aside for now the multi-universe interpretation. If the seeds are corporeal properties, they are very ’Parmenidean… beings: they do not change though they consti-tute all things through their mixture. They are eternal, while the things that form out of them are perishable.

Sap. Sure. Let us forget the other interpretation. The idea that the seeds are property bearers is not new: in Empedocles, the elements represent the wet, dry, warm and cold. There are obviously more properties we note in the world, so Anaxagoras multiplies his seeds to include them. What is missing from the picture? What else does Empedocles mention besides the four ’roots…?

Tank Love and Strife– the forces that bring them together and separate them– Sap. Right. In Anaxagoras, as we said, we have a primordial mass from which things are

separated. What separates them is not Love or Strife, but a divine intellect, Nous. The Nous is clearly a different sort of being altogether. It is not made of seeds, but ’unmixed…. Nous does not contain a portion of everything. Nous is a sort of god that kick-starts the

► 7.3 The Atomists � ch.7 pg. 10 ►


separation process: it knows and governs all, and penetrates the things present in the universe. As a primary centrifugal rotatory force, it sets the universe in motion; seeds then aggregate or disperse accordingly. Besides, it is present in living organisms as a vi-tal principle, explaining our ability to know, think, perceive. It is clearly distinct from the other material things, such that we may consider it non-material. So here, Anaxagoras is postulating a different form of being that is distinctly non-material. Now, we do have some problems with this Nous. Later authors have called it a deus ex machina. Does anyone know what that is?

Men…s It literally means a ’god coming from a contraption…. In plays, a poor playwright who is incapable of thinking up a great plot sometimes softens shockingly incredible develop-ments in his plot by introducing someone from nowhere to make some big change in the events or in the attitudes of the characters. In ancient times, they used scenic machines to fly ’gods… into the play and these intervened to change the situation radically.

Sap. Anaxagoras… Nous is a deus ex machina because s/he does not act finalistically (or teleologically, as philosophers say). What this means is that the Nous does not have any purpose, scope, end, towards which s/he is guiding the universe. The Nous simply sets the universe in motion, full stop. It seems to have been introduced simply to explain how the system got started, and then the system works on its own so the Nous goes into hid-ing. So, the critics say, Anaxagoras has a great materialistic universe set in place, but because he has some question marks as to how the process started, and about how life can result from this mixture of material properties, he introduces a totally different entity. This is not satisfactory. If you want a material universe, get rid of the Nous. If you want the Nous, then give it a better role in your universe, or so the critics say. And, as we shall see, Plato and Aristotle too introduced their version of Nous in their universes but reserved for it a more significant role.

7.3 The Atomists

7.3.1 LEUCIPPUS AND DEMOCRITUS: INTRODUCTION Sap. We have had some great Philosophers from Italy with the Eleatics and the Pythagorean

schools, but the Milesian school survived and at times produced some great thinkers. From Miles we have once more some very interesting ideas coming up with Leucippus and his disciple Democritus (originally from Abdera, in Thrace). These Philosophers, known as the ’Atomists… believe that void does have some form of existence. Like Melis-sus from nearby Samos, their universe is infinite, but it is not a filled-up space, a ’ple-num…. It is an infinite three-dimensional void that contains tiny particles, ’atoms…, so-called because they are deemed indivisible (a-tomos means ’un-cuttable…).

Leucippus was in his prime (i.e. was about 40 years of age) about 430 BCE, Democritus about 420 BCE. Very little writings of Leucippus survive; he is reputed to have founded the school and coined the basic terminology, while Democritus is thought to have fully developed the theory and presented it clearly in his writings. Democritus travelled a lot, and is said also to have spent some time living in Athens. He gathered knowledge from all over the Greek world, about all sorts of matters. He wrote profusely on many subjects ranging from Music to Maths to Ethics, but unfortunately very little fragments from his Physics and Cosmology survive. We do have a large amount of moral sayings and max-ims, though. To make for the lack of fragments regarding the Atomists… ideas on Physis, we shall give a number of testimonies about Atomism from later authors.

► 7.3 The Atomists � ch.7 pg.11 ►


7.3.2 TESTIMONIES AND FRAGMENTS (DK NUMBERING)3

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(Testimony from Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle…s ’De Caelo…, 242, 21, quoting Aristotle“s ’On Democritus“) Democritus believes that the nature of the eternal things is small beings unlim-ited in multitude. As a place for these he hypothesises something else, unlimited in size, and he calls the place by the names ”void– or ”infinity–, and he calls each of the substances ”atoms– or ”what is–. He holds that the substances are so small that they escape our senses, and they come in many different shapes and sizes. Out of these elements (for he considers such things as ’ele-ments“) he derives and combines the things that are visible and perceivable. They hit one an-other and move within the void according to their differences in shapes and in the other proper-ties mentioned and as they move they collide and become entangled in such a way as to cling in close contact to one another, but not so as to form from them a substance that is truly one and unique in kind; for it is very simple-minded to suppose that two or more things could ever be con-sidered one. The reason he gives for atoms staying together for a while is the intertwining and mutual hold of the primary bodies; for some of them are angular, some hooked, some concave, some convex, and indeed with countless other differences; so he thinks they cling to each other and stay together until such time as some stronger necessity comes from the surrounding and shakes and scatters them apart. (Testimony from Aristotle, Metaphysics, I.4.985b4) Leucippus and his associate Democritus hold that the elements are the full and the void; they call them what is and what is not respectively. What is full is solid, what is not is void and rare. Since the void exists no less than the body, it fol-lows that what is not exists no less than what is. The two together are the material causes of ex-isting things. And just as those who consider the underlying substance to be one explain other things as its modifications (and postulate rarefaction and condensation as the origin of those modifications), in the same way that these men too say that the differences [in their elements] are the causes of other things. They hold that these differences are three—shape, arrangement and position; being, they say, differs only in "rhythm, touching and turning" of which rhythm is shape, touching is arrangement and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in ar-rangement, and Z from N in position. (Testimony from Aristotle, De Generatione, 1,8,325a23ff.) Leucippus and Democritus have de-cided about all things practically by the same method and on the same theory, taking as their starting-point what naturally comes first. Some of the ancients had held that the real must neces-sarily be one and immovable; for, said they, empty space is not real, and motion would be impos-sible without empty space separated from matter; nor, further, could reality be a many, if there were nothing to separate things. And it makes no difference if any one holds that the All is not continuous, but discrete, with its parts in contact [the Pythagorean view], instead of holding that reality is many, not one, and that there is empty space. For, if it is divisible at every point there is no one, and therefore no many, and the Whole is empty [Zeno]; while, if we say it is divisible in one place and not in another, this looks like an arbitrary fiction; for up to what point and for what reason will part of the Whole be in this state and be full, while the rest is discrete? And, on the same grounds, they further say that there can be no motion. In consequence of these reason-ings, then, going beyond perception and overlooking it in the belief that we ought to follow the ar-gument, they say that the All is one and immovable [Parmenides], and some of them that it is in-finite [Melissus], for any limit would be bounded by empty space. This, then, is the opinion they expressed about the truth, and these are the reasons which led them to do so. Now, so far as ar-guments go, this conclusion does seem to follow; but, if we appeal to facts, to hold such a view looks like madness. No one who is mad is so far out of his senses that fire and ice appear to him to be one; it is only things that are right, and things that appear right from habit, in which mad-ness makes some people see no difference. Leucippus, however, thought he had a theory which was in harmony with sense, and did not do away with coming into being and passing away, nor motion, nor the multiplicity of things. He con-

3 Testimonies from various sources (as stated), adapted. Fragments (indicated by a letter and a number in brackets) from: Freeman, K., 1948. Ancilla ot the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, ’Fragmente der Vorsokratiker“. Harvard University Press. Cambridge (Massachusetts). USA. (D## indicates a fragment from Democritus, L## a fragment from Leucippus.)



ceded this to experience, while he conceded, on the other hand, to those who invented the One that motion was impossible without the void, that the void was not real, and that nothing of what was real was not real. "For," said he, "that which is strictly speaking real is an absolute plenum; but the plenum is not one. On the contrary, there are an infinite number of them, and they are in-visible owing to the smallness of their bulk. They move in the void (for there is a void); and by their coming together they effect coming into being; by their separation, passing away." (L2) Nothing happens at random; everything happens out of reason and by necessity. (D156) Nothingness exists just as much as Being.

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(D9) It has often been demonstrated that we do not grasp how each thing is or is not. Sweet ex-ists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention. Atoms and void alone exist in real-ity. . . We know nothing accurately in reality, but only as it changes according to the bodily condi-tion, and the constitution of those things that flow upon the body and impinge upon it. It will be obvious that it is impossible to understand how in reality each thing is. (D11) There are two ways of knowledge, one genuine, one imperfect. To the latter belong all the following: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The real is separated from this. When the imperfect can do no more� neither see more minutely, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor perceive by touch with greater clarity � and a finer investigation is needed, then the genuine way of knowledge comes in as having a tool for distinguishing more finely.

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(D189) The best way for a man to lead his life is to have been as cheerful as possible and to have suffered as little as possible. This could happen if one did not seek one“s pleasures in mor-tal things. The right-minded man is he who is not grieved by what he has not, but enjoys what he has. He is fortunate who is happy with moderate means, unfortunate who is unhappy with great possessions. (D191) Cheerfulness or well-being is created in man through a harmonious life and moderation of enjoyment. Excess and want are forever changing and cause great disturbance in the soul. Souls that are stirred by great disturbances are neither stable nor cheerful. Therefore one must keep one“s mind on what is attainable, and be content with what one has, paying little heed to things envied and admired, and not dwelling on them in one“s mind. Rather, you should consider the lives of those in distress, reflecting on their intense sufferings, in order that your own possessions and condition may seem great and enviable, and you may, by ceasing to desire more, cease to suffer in your soul. For he who admires those who have, and who are called happy by other mortals, and who dwells on them in his mind every hour, is con-stantly impelled to undertake something new and to run the risk, through his desire, of doing something irretrievable among those things which the laws prohibit. Hence one must not seek the latter, but must be content with the former, comparing one's own life with that of those in worse cases, and must consider oneself fortunate, reflecting on their sufferings, in being so much better off than they. If you keep to this way of thinking, you will live more serenely, and will expel those not-negligible curses in life� envy, jealousy and spite.

7.3.3 DISCUSSION

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Sap. Take a look at the testimony from Simplicius (he says it…s from a book on Democritus written by Aristotle, which has not survived till present). Lee, maybe you could sum up the main points.

Lee The universe consists of Atoms and Void. Atoms are very small indivisibles, they are not perceivable. Atoms come in different shapes and sizes. Atoms move in space, and collide. At times the collisions cause the atoms to aggregate.



Atom aggregates constitute the things we can perceive. Such things have an inferior form of being because they are ephemeral4.

The aggregates hold together due to the shapes of the atoms (they are ’sticky…), and fall apart when hit by other atoms/clumps of atoms.

Sap. Very good. But you…ve missed out on one little detail. What regulates the making and breaking of perceivable things (atom aggregates)?

Tank He mentions ’necessity…. Sap. Fine. We have that again in fr. L2. ’Necessary…, in Philosophy, means ’cannot be differ-

ently…; it is the opposite of ’contingent… (i.e. can be in a different way). 1+1=2, that is nec-essary. ’I feel hungry even though I…ve been nibbling all day…: for most of us, that is con-tingent– I might just as well feel nauseated with all the food I have eaten. But for Leu-cippus and Democritus all that happens in the universe is necessary. We call this view ’Determinism…. The past can only have been one way, and the future is pre-determined by the past. There is no freedom, no way in which the predictable sequence of events could alter. Our actions too lack freedom: we are machines, and we act according to our programming and according to the influences we have from an external universe that works like a clock, all the gears locking neatly into one another. We shall see why in a moment. Let us for now delve into Aristotle…s testimony from Metaphysics.

Whiz Aristotle goes into the question regarding the existence of void. The void is non-being, it is the absence of matter, but it does exist as an empty space in which ’what-is… (i.e. the atoms) exist. D156 (further down) states this quite clearly.

Furthermore he states that things differ because they are composed of atoms which dif-fer in shape, arrangement and position. So a thing composed of two atoms may differ from another thing made of two atoms because (a) the atoms composing the two things may be different in shape, (b) if not, the atoms may be arranged differently, (c) if not, the two things still have different positions in space so they differ because they occupy a dif-ferent space.

Sap. That…s an interesting interpretation of Aristotle…s terminology that in turn seeks to inter-pret Leucippus… obscure terms: ’rhythm…, ’touching… and ’turning…. It need not bother us too much. In other testimonies we have the differences between atoms listed, and here most authors give three: SIZE, SHAPE and POSITION. Size is taken to be indicative of bulk, or magnitude (from modern Physics we know size is also directly proportional to mass if we suppose all the atoms to have the same density). O.K. Now comes the toughest tes-timony (don…t worry: I shall explain this one!): Aristotle…s De Generatione. First thing to note: there is a first part and a second part. The first part speaks about the Eleatic puz-zles regarding change and plurality. The second part presents the Atomists… solution. The predecessors of the Atomists assure that void is not real, it does not exist and this results in some very weird consequences. The Atomists claim that void exists, and avoid such problems.

What problems? What we have here is a super-summary of Parmenides, Zeno, Melis-sus and the Pythagoreans. The Eleatics argue convincingly that if there is no empty space, nothing can move and all must be one big clump. While some philosophers (the Pythagoreans) say that there are differences within this clump, others (the Eleatics) in-sist that there are no differences and it is a homogenous whole, the Parmenidean One. Zeno (we have his argument against the divisibility of the One summarised in this testi-mony) takes it with the Pythagoreans because if there is nothing to separate things (no void), we have a difficulty with placing the boundaries (assuming that everything is made

4 From other testimonies we learn that according to the Atomists, the universe comes into being when the clumping of a few atoms gives rise to a vortex motion that creates a rotating mass attracting other atoms. The known universe and the things insides evolved from such masses.



of the same one stuff, as monism requires). As we said, the first solution to this problem came from Empedocles who said that things are not made of the same one basic stuff (he is a pluralist), but rather they are made out of 4 different ’roots…; hence we can have boundaries (because deep down, we have radical differences in the basic components of things that allow us to distinguish between one thing and another). Thus, with Empe-docles we can have differences between things in the universe. However, the problem was not adequately solved till the event of Atomism. To explain movement/change and differences, we need to postulate the existence of void. With Atomism we finally have a theory that is truly ’in harmony with sense…, a theory that really ’saves the phenomena…. As Aristotle notes, Zeno…s arguments do seem rationally correct, but it would be crazy to believe them and disbelieve your senses. Leucippus saves the phenomena of coming to be (birth, generation), death (perishing) and change through his treatment of the void (note that Aristotle…s book from which we get this testimony is entitled, in full, ’De generatione et corruptione… � i.e., ’On coming to be and perishing… � and so the whole work focuses on these phenomena).

But how does Leucippus do this? Aristotle says that he distinguishes between what is real ’strictly speaking… and what is real ’loosely speaking…. The plenum is real, it truly ’ex-ists…. Void has an inferior form of existence, it exists as the absence of matter, the ab-sence of the plenum. Now the plenum, for Leucippus, is the atom, it is not an infinitely huge bulk of stuff (as Melissus… One) but a tiny particle that has no void inside. Atoms differ, and clumps of atoms (that form things) differ all the more. That…s where differ-ences come from.

Tank Excuse the gut feeling, but isn…t this all obvious? What are these Philosophers babbling about? Atoms with empty space– why did it take them so long to come to this? What is the problem with the existence of empty space– it…s not a material object, it…s simply empty space. Big deal!

Sap. Well, we take all this to be obvious because the results of this discussion have become commonplace and we take the world to be made of atoms and void since we are tod-dlers. I mean– it…s in our culture, in every physical explanation we give. The Greeks were not familiar with this, and indeed, Atomism was soon buried and left there for many centuries to come. It was real tough for them to believe in the existence of void. ’Nature abhors void… is a principle that was used since time immemorial to explain phenomena related to the formation of vacuums. There were endless arguments in the Middle Ages about the existence of void– I…ve recently met one reconstructed from around the year 1200 in Umberto Eco…s recent historical novel ’Baudolino… (Ch. 26). The Greeks and Romans didn…t have the number zero (how can zero be a number, they would have said– it is no number at all!), and this has been the basis of the row about the millen-nium celebrations due in 2001 not 2000 (since there is no year ’0…, our calendar starts from 00,00 hrs on 1st January of the year 1– add 2000 and you get 1st January 2001!). It…s funny how your theories about the world make you see things differently from people holding different theories. The Greeks had certain assumptions about void that made them see things differently from us. Interestingly, when we look around us, we see air, which for us is a big void with some sparse particles roaming around. When the Greeks looked around them, they saw a fluid, less dense than water, but still a fluid filling up everywhere. When we look at the starry sky, we see planets roaming in void, and that resembles the common person…s idea of atoms and empty space. When the ancients looked up at night, they saw planets roaming in a special fluid they called ’ether…. For them, empty space was nowhere to be found. If you tried to create it, the container would collapse. Now the atomists are claiming that not only in outer space and in air there is void, with atoms clumped here and there, but that even solid stuffs like iron rods



and bricks are made of atoms and void! That…s too incredible for the ancients. But, fun-nily enough, it does save the phenomena! Not as crazy as Parmenides, surely!

Let…s get back to the Determinism bit, now. Men…s, do you remember something from your ’O… level Physics?

Men…s Depends– Sap. Newton…s laws of motion, maybe– ? Men…s Vaguely– F=ma, and that sort of stuff you mean? Sap. Yes. How does that work? Newton uses the word ’body…. How do bodies behave? What I

mean to say is this: if you have a body x with mass m which is at position p at time t and moving in direction d at velocity v, can we calculate where it will be at time t+1minute if it does not collide with some other body?

Men…s Sure... if you know your equations! That…s how they send satellites into space and cruise missiles to their targets– they get computers to do it nowadays–

Sap. And if there are other bodies around with which it may collide, can we predict the out-come all the same?

Men…s If you have the same information about these other bodies, you can calculate the resul-tants, and predict where each body would end up.

Sap. While working these problems, have you ever thought how determinist this whole con-ception of Physics is? We assume it in all our calculations regarding moving things. But if our universe were made up of atoms and void, and atoms behaved as Newtonian bod-ies, then a mega-supercomputer that contains all the information about all the atoms at a certain time t could calculate their positions at any time in the past or in the future. They couldn…t be anywhere else but in the calculated places: this is NECESSITY. And if we are made of atoms, and atoms behave in this way, all our actions would be predictable: we would not be free in the least. If so, we could not be blamed for bad actions, nor praised for good deed: we couldn…t have done otherwise.

The Atomists were clearly aware of this problem that survives to this day. Are we simply material beings within a deterministic material universe? Or are we some sort of ’soul… or ’mind… that is free from this determinism to which our bodies are subjected? If we do have a soul, how does this decide actions for our material bodies that are trapped within this rigid ordering of events in history? Can our ’free will… intervene in the world to violate Newton…s laws? These were big Philosophical questions that were hot topics in the Modern age (in the 1600…s and 1700…s with people like Descartes, Leibniz, Kant) and still today (when Determinism is more linked to genes and their expression). In this sense we can understand that ’everything happens by necessity…. Leucippus insists that all happens ’out of reason…. We cannot understand this in the sense that there is some intelligent supreme being guiding it all. There is no place for a God here– the universe is but a machine, and it works because one thing causes another. For the Atomists, it has been so since ever, and will continue forever. There is no intelligence that controls this movement according to some end or purpose. It all just happens according to the laws of Physics. So where is the ’reason…? The reason � the LOGOS � is the law, the physical law that accounts for the intelligibility of the whole system. In other words, we can UNDERSTAND how everything is if we know the positions and other mechanical properties of the atoms and we know Newton…s laws. It is understandable (intelligible) because it is predictable, indeed it is all utterly predictable. So it all happens ’out of reason….

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Lee You mentioned ’mechanical properties…. What are you referring to exactly?



Tank I think that is obvious. Things like size, position, velocity, direction of movement, shape– things that would fit in Newton…s equations. Am I right?

Sap. Yes. You…ve just mentioned some properties (or ’qualities…) that belong to the atoms and things themselves, independent of the observer (hence ’objective…). The Atomists would call these properties ’Properties by Nature…. All other properties (such as taste, colour, ’feel… and so on) are called ’Properties by Convention…. This is because, say, a cup of tea with a teaspoon of sugar inside may taste bitter to some people, sweet to others. So part of the property ’sweet… or ’bitter… depends on the observer, and is hence subjective. If the cup of tea were to have 20 teaspoons of sugar inside we would all agree that it would be sweet– we would CONVENE on this upon tasting it, hence it is a property ’by convention…. But whether or not something qualifies as ’sweet… to everyone is not something you could measure. Better example: beauty. A beautiful painting is one that most people would convene is beautiful. Hence beauty is not a mechanical property of the atoms of which the painting is made up. It results from the interaction between us and the me-chanical properties of the atoms of the painting, say, from the way these atoms reflect light, due to their surface properties and relative positions. But there is more to beauty that a mixture of coloured light hitting our retina! Beautiful paintings evoke past experi-ences, arouse emotions– but that does not come from the atoms, but rather from within us the beholders (’beauty is (partially) in the eye of the beholder– …).

Men…s So the properties of things ’by Convention… result from our experiences of their proper-ties ’by Nature….

Sap. Exactly. Modern philosophers (namely John Locke) have coined the term Primary Quali-ties for the ’Properties by Nature… (Mechanical, Objective properties), and Secondary Qualities for the ’Properties by Convention… (Non-mechanical, Subjective properties).

By the way, we have unwittingly gone into fragments D9 and D11 which deal with knowledge. The properties ’by Nature… give us a proper knowledge of things, those ’by Convention… give us an ’imperfect… knowledge (actually, the Greek reads ’bastard…, be-cause this knowledge results from a cross between the objectivity of fact and the subjec-tivity of our perception). Sometimes, our senses give us a good representation of the world, and do not disturb our acquaintance with the facts of the world. At other times, our senses do interfere and we get illusions, e.g. optical illusions. Interesting to note here is that atoms are theoretical entities: nobody ever saw them. For the ancient Atom-ists, they result from argumentation, rather than from experimentation. So, once again, as in Parmenides, our mind is superior: it is the source of pure knowledge, our senses the sources of ’bastard… knowledge. Yet ’bastard knowledge… is knowledge all the same – unlike what the Eleatics claimed.

Atoms are theoretical in many senses. They are indivisible (that…s a property arrived at theoretically, because all the things we perceive can be broken up into smaller bits, somehow). They come in different kinds, but each kind has a particular shape and size. All atoms of the same kind are perfectly identical (they can be distinguished only be-cause of their respective positions in 3-dimensional space). Clearly, we have no experi-ence of anything of the sort in our lives: there is no perfect circle, no square that is per-fectly identical to another square. The atoms are material versions of the perfect forms we construe in Mathematics. Interesting to note, a major difference between material be-ing and void is that void is infinitely divisible while atoms (material entities) are not. They cannot be split further. So our distinction between Atoms and Void has also solved Anaxagoras… problem regarding divisibility.

Whiz What do you mean? Sap. Anaxagoras was aware of the existence of irrational numbers, which for the Pythago-

reans constituted a scandal in Mathematics. For instance, the relationship between the



diameter an the circumference of a circle involves an irrational number, pi. Pi is ’irra-tional… since it has an indefinite number of digits following the decimal point. Similarly, if you have an isosceles right-angled triangle with sides of 1cm and are asked to deter-mine the length of the hypotenuse you would say it is the square root of 2 (Pythagoras… theorem, no wonder). But when you try to work that out, you get an irrational number. Anaxagoras wanted to have infinite divisibility in his system so that these funny propor-tions (circumference/diameter, sides/hypotenuse, etc.) could be accounted for in nature: such mathematical problems were probably the reason for his idea of indefinitely divisi-ble seeds. In the Atomists, matter is not infinitely divisible. But space is. As long as your geometrical figures remain theoretical structures in space they can have all sorts of weird proportions between their sides. When the become real figures made of atoms, the lose their mathematical perfection. Yet the atoms themselves are mathematically perfect figures. But the things resulting from their clumping are not: no cannonball is a perfect sphere, for instance, even though its constituent atoms may be perfect spheres. This means that we cannot ever encounter perfect mathematical entities with our senses. We can only imagine them with our minds– again the difference in knowledge. So we distinguish here between physical and mathematical divisibility. Space has mathematical divisibility (infinite), atoms (and being) have physical divisibility (finite).

Tank One clarification, given your mention of infinity: does the universe have a beginning or end in time for the Atomists? Does it have an end in space?

Sap It is infinitely extended in time and space. This is why we can say that there are infinite atoms because the space containing them is infinitely large, and there are atoms hang-ing around all the way. They keep moving and hitting and clumping and breaking up from one another forever. Clearly, in this universe, a God would feel very impotent in front of the laws of motion. We do not even need someone to kick-start the process: it has gone on since ever and will go on forever. Atheism is the result of this ’materialist… and ’determinist… Cosmology. Clearly, the movement of the atoms (and so the history of the universe) is not random, but fixed. However, one notes that the fact that this particu-lar possible universe (which we live in) is such and such (i.e. the atoms within in have certain mechanical properties at a certain point in time) is a random fact. You could have an infinite number universes with different structures and histories, though once you es-tablish for each such universe what the global situation is at time t, you know all the rest. How…s that for stable knowledge such as that sought by Heraclitus?

Lee Wait a moment– are we still talking about the Atomists… theory of knowledge here? Sap. Not exactly. We…ve gone back a bit to his cosmology, but we have seen how knowledge

of the atoms and their mechanical properties constitutes stable knowledge using which we can explain every event in the universe at any time. That is what the Greeks were af-ter in their search for the arche . That is ’pure… knowledge. Remember, we were saying that there are 2 types of knowledge and that knowing how things look and feel is the bastard type of knowledge. Knowing the atoms and their mechanical properties is the pure kind of knowledge. So far, so good. Now, remember, for the Atomists, persons are atoms aggregates, full stop. So how do explain perception? How do we explain thinking? Perception is understood to result from collisions between atoms/clumps coming from the subject and others coming from the object. Our sense organs emit atoms that hit the atoms of the object and turn back con-veying mechanical data regarding the object to our sense organs. The hitting and re-bounding process observes the mechanical laws, and so the results of such collisions can be used to determine certain characteristics of the object being perceived. The ’sampling… of the object is incomplete and so we may be deceived. Such theory may sound strange, but contemporary physics too says that we get information about objects because they reflect light, which is made of photons, energy particles that rebound or



are absorbed. Compared with other naturalist theories we have seen, the Atomists… the-ory has the added benefit of trying to explain why sometimes we get optical (and other) illusions. Within the framework of a very predictable and rigid universe, we have the possibility of sense deception neatly accounted for. I must say, it is hard to accuse the atomists of incoherence, even I am not too keen on their determinism.

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Sap. I…ll just add a word on the Ethics. You may say: hey, this is where the incoherence lies! How can you speak about Ethics and be a determinist? How can you seek to modify your behaviour if you have no freedom to do so? I don…t know what Democritus would say to that, but he did write a lot about Ethics and it is not as schizophrenic as it looks. It is clearly the same person who recommends certain type of actions and decisions and the person who says we don…t really choose anything, since his picture of society is analogous to his picture of the universe. In any case, if you told him to shut up and stop telling people what they should choose when they cannot choose anything, he may an-swer you that he cannot do that– he cannot choose to stop speaking and writing about Ethics even if it may have no effect whatsoever on the behaviour of people. I chose two big bits out of many ethical fragments extant. We see the emphasis on euthymia, ’cheerfulness…. I think it is better translated here with ’tranquillity…, or ’serenity…. The idea is that of achieving an equilibrium of our internal being with the outside word where we are not troubled by excess or want, where we are not troubled by cravings for more material possessions. There is an individualist tendency in such a conception of the good life. I…m O.K. as long as I am at peace with myself– the others come into the picture only if they bother me or if they help me achieve this. I have no concern about their welfare unless it is somehow linked to mine. As I said, some authors have com-mented that the vision of the world made up of atoms surrounded by void that move un-disturbed till they bump into each other appears here once more. People are social at-oms, societies are chance aggregates of individuals. Societies and groups of people have an inferior kind of existence to that of individuals, and so should be put at the ser-vice of individuals, and not vice versa. That…s a view of politics that would nowadays be considered very liberal, or better ’libertarian…, akin to Reaganomics, Thatcherism and Pi-nochetismo. It goes against leftist ideologies that see the individual as subject to the dic-tates of the group (for Marx it is the class that survives through the lives of generations of individuals, and the social class has true existence, while the individuals composing it are ephemeral embodiments of the group which is eternal).

07 saving the phenomena

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