GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC.,petitioners, vs.BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National Telecommunications,respondents.[G. R. No. 126526.April 30, 1997]COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,petitioner, vs.BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.,respondent.D E C I S I O NHERMOSISIMA, JR.,J.:Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the decision[1]of the respondent Court of Appeals[2]declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546[3]and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.Established by evidence are the following facts:On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority.This application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481.At the time of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service.Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service[4].Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994.On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority tocarry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-added services such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio and video, information service bureau, and all other telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be made available through technical advances or innovations in the future, or construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting and receiving stations and switching stations, both for local and international services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently carry out the purposes of this franchise.[5]On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application[6]praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system.This second application was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229.In this second application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10) years using the most modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network.Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481.In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice.The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTels evidence.Written opposition and other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors.Other oppositors to private respondent BellTels application were Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief.In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the aforementioned oppositors.On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application.Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy CommissionerFidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995[7]manifesting his findings and recommending that based on technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically feasible.[8]Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of private respondent BellTel.On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years.Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval thereto by making the following notation on the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6, 1995:With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application merits due/favorable consideration.[9]Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez affixed their signatures and the date, 4/6/95.In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft[10]of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel.The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11].Reference was explicitly made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez that were all favorable to private respondent BellTel.Mention was also made of the aforementioned working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel, which draft was made by the Legal Department of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy commissioners.No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion.Thus, on May 12, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion[12]reiterating its earlier prayer.Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition[13]to the aforestated two motions of private respondent BellTel.In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on May 29, 1995.On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on June 13, 1995.On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve)[14]In said motion, private respondent prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC.To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial body and that as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes by the members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition[15]to the aforecited motion.On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment[16]in whichthe Solicitor General took a legal position adverse to that of the NTC.The Solicitor General, after a close examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:(a)declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as a collegial body;(b)restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating unto himself alone the powers of the said agency;(c)order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecoms application under NTC-94-229;(d)declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void;[and](e)uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.[17]On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1.Petitioners petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby granted.Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93,Annex J of the Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93,Annex K of the Petitionand the Order of Kintanar,Annex L of the Petition, are herebySET ASIDEfor being contrary to law.The Respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined and prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same; [and]2.Petitioners petition for mandamus is herebyGRANTEDin that the Respondent NTC, composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby directed to meet en banc and to consider and act on the draft Order,Annex B of the Petition, within fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision.Without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[18]The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for review.Commissioner Kintanars petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, ascribes to the respondent appellate court the following assignment of errors:1.The Court of Appeals, in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC 3-1-93 and the Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995, made a collateral attack on a law which was nowhere called for in the pleadings of the parties nor is authorized by the Rules of Court.2.The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that the Commission is a collegial body simply by reason of the fact that other bodies which were a spin off from the defunct Public Service Commission were created as a collegial body.The law that created EO 546 erased the collegial character of the proceedings before the NTC.3.The Court of Appeals decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it considered evidence not formally offered or incorporated into the records of the case; yet failed to consider evidence submitted by petitioner-appellant nor on the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties-3.1CA erred in assuming that the NTC is collegial by the fact that Charters of other regulatory agencies expressly made them collegial while this express provision was absent in NTCs charter.3.2CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614 prevails and [requires] collegiality.3.3The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco signed by her and her 2 deputies are in no way indicative of collegiality and should not be considered as having any persuasive effect xxx.3.4The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of Communications Rules of Practice and Procedures.4.The Court of Appeals erred when it granted mandamus, directing and in effect controlling Commissioner Kintanar and deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez, to meeten bancto consider and act on a draft Order only which the Court itself recognized no longer had the approval of two (2) Commissioners while in the same token the Court of Appeals had set aside a duly promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 allegedly because it did not carry the approval of 2 commissioners.[19]On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R. No. 126496, assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the following grounds:1.The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the instant Petition outright for its failure to implead indispensable parties, in violation of Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court;2.The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of and passing upon BellTels Petition, which on its face is premature since the Order of July 4, 1996 assailed was not a final decision of the Commission;3.Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of the Petition, the disposition in Decision therein which nullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 itself constitutes a collateral attack on the said laws, the validity of which were never put in issue by any of the parties, contrary to the clear legal requirement that the validity of laws can be attacked only in direct proceedings instituted for that purpose;4.It was in fact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 and Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 since the same was absolutely unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;5.Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the prime issues as being that of collegiality, nonetheless the Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in declaring the NTC as a collegial body despite the clear intent of E.O. No. 546 and the provisions of DOTC MC 95-640, and the obvious implications of pending bills in Congress on the reorganization of the NTC;6.The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners sit to consider the draft-and only the draft-in rendering its Decision in BellTels application constitutes an unwarranted, unauthorized and unlawful interference in and canalization of the discretionary functions of the Commission as a quasi-judicial entity; and7.The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel of surreptitiously securing a draft decision, and encourages and places premium on future similar illegal acts-all in violation of the ruling and the mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado:Adm. Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12, 1990).[20]On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filed an Omnibus Motion[21]praying for, among others, the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment.[22]On the same day, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion[23]echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation/Motion[24]reiterating that its legal stance in this case is adverse to that of the NTC and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC.In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse the Solicitor General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC, require the NTC to file its own comment in G.R. No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion[25]praying that the latters petition in G.R. No. 126526 be adopted as their comment in the consolidated cases.Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive the fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial agency.We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.First.We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein.Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission.He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC.The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion:the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of the respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC:In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service Commission (PSC).While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner.As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners.The amendment provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the Commission en banc.On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into law, Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the PSC.This time, the new regulatory board was composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:x x xThe Board of Communications shall be composed of a full time Chairman who shall be of unquestioned integrity and recognized prominence in previous public and/or private employment; two full-time members who shall be competent on all aspects of communications, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and the other an economist x x xOn January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure and Practice in connection with applications and proceedings before it.On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546, creating the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers.Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that --x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist. x x xThe aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 x x x.However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice.Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC.In the meantime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman aloneof the NTC which rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners non-participative in the task of decision-making.This prompted the then Minister of Transportation and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinion of the then Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC was a collegial body or not.On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno sent a letter-opinion x x x to the effect that the NTC was not a collegial body but a single entity and thus the then practice of only the Chairman of the NTC signing the Decisions of the NTC was authorized by law. x x xAdmittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight x x x.However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x.We find and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not correct.Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a collegialbody.Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings.Under [Rule 15] of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc:x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion.Any member dissenting from the order, ruling, decision or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to him.Copy of the decision on the merit of the case so assigned shall be furnished the Chairman of the Board.x x xInscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is necessary for a valid Decision x x x.While it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order No. 546.This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200 when it declared that:The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC. x x xIn the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717, the Supreme Court applied and cited Rule 15of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC x x x.Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.Respondents Kintanars and NTCs pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order No. 546.It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:[a] body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform some public service.(City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286).A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service x x x (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246).There is persuasive authority that a commission is synonymous with board (State Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash County, 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596).Indeed, as can be easily discerned from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a Commissionerandtwo (2) deputy commissioners x x x not the commissioner,alone, as pontificated by Kintanar.The conjunctive word and is not without any legal significance.It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the law.It means in addition to (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332).The word and, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another x x x.In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions.As the aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed x x x.If it was the intention of President Marcos to constitute merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, instead of a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the two (2) deputy commissioners.Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably with the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC and applicable to the NTC.The barefaced fact that x x x of Executive Order 546 used the word deputy to designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC. x x xThe collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof.Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x xIn hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the NTC when he promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x x.Even then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia and opted to seek refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno x x x.It was only when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Kintanar was designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flip-flapped [sic], and suddenly found it expedient to recall his Department Order No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by himself, all cases pending with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of Procedure and Practice before the NTC, more specifically Rule 15 thereof x x x.x x xThe Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their argumentx x x because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed into a collegial body.Indeed, We find Respondents pose tenuous.For, it can likewise be argued, with justification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming the same.x x xIn sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 x x x Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to law and thus null and void and should be, as they are hereby, set aside.[26]Second.Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that respondent appellate courts act of nullifying NTC Memorandum CircularNo. 1-1-93 issued by then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then Commissioner Benedicto on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited circulars and an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the courts power to nullify administrative regulations.It must be remembered bypetitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement.Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and voidab initiofor being unabashedly contrary to law.They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect.The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice.At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws.At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations.Third.In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the formersadherence and defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter.Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties.After all, it is they whom private respondent BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman of NTCbecause the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General.Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors cause could not be significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits ofa case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the commission.The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises to be the most technologically advanced telephone service in the country.This court is not in any way concerned with whether or not private respondent BellTels project proposal is technically feasible or financially viable, and this court should not, in fact, delve into these matters which are patently outside of its review jurisdiction.All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so we must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this score, and this score alone.Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of indispensable parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229, is untenable.Fourth.Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent appellate court has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meeten bancand forthwith grant private respondent BellTels application for a provisional authority.Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered by respondent Court of Appeals.There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety ofmandamusin causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition.As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office of the special civil action of mandamus.It is elementary legal knowledge, after all,thatmandamusdoes not lie to control discretion.When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Kintanar, Dumlao and Perez to meeten bancand to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meeten bancas a collegial body, and the subject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on private respondent BellTels application for a provisional authority.The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application.This is understandable since every commissioner of the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of private respondent BellTels application and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the commission of their individual discretion in private respondent BellTels case.Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the consideration of private respondent BellTels application for provisional authority, for the same has been ripe for decision since December, 1994.With the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to delay action on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals order for the NTC to sit and meeten bancto consider private respondent BellTels application for a provisional authority, attains deep significance.Fifth.The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the latter through illegal means, is a serious charge.However, not asingle piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this charge.Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working draft.In private respondent BellTels Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and For Issuance of Provisional Authority, it is alleged that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal Department of the NTC.[27]Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez.[28]The working draft is attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by any person for any stated purpose.[29]Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or declared it to be spurious.More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of any illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft.The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be diverted from the principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality of the NTC.In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is moreaproposfor a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 110526 February 10, 1998ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS,petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY,respondent.MENDOZA,J.:At issue in this case is the validity of a resolution, dated March 24, 1993, of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business.Petitioner Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (hereafter referred to as APCD) brought this suit forcertiorariandmandamusagainst respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to invalidate the latter's Board Resolution No. 018-93 and the certificates of registration issued under it on the ground that the resolution in question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and to compel said administrative agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the desiccated coconut industry, in particular, and the coconut industry, in general.As disclosed by the parties' pleadings, the facts are as follows:On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order.1On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.2Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The full text of the resolution reads:RESOLUTION NO. 018-93POLICY DECLARATION DEREGULATINGTHE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW COCONUTPROCESSING PLANTSWHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes;WHEREAS, the deregulation of certain sectors of the coconut industry, such as marketing of coconut oils pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1960, the lifting of export and commodity clearances under Executive Order No. 1016, and relaxation of regulated capacity for the desiccated coconut sector pursuant to Presidential Memorandum of February 11, 1988, has become a centerpiece of the present dispensation;WHEREAS, the issuance of permits or licenses prior to business operation is a form of regulation which is not provided in the charter of nor included among the powers of the PCA;WHEREAS, the Governing Board of PCA has determined to follow and further support the deregulation policy and effort of the government to promote free enterprise;NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that, henceforth, PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants;RESOLVED, FURTHER, that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards with the corresponding service fees/charges.ADOPTED this 24th day of March 1993, at Quezon City.3The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. Hence this petition.Petitioner alleges:IRESPONDENT PCA'S BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 018-93 IS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING AN UNDUE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY.IIASIDE FROM BEING ULTRA-VIRES, BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 018-93 IS WITHOUT ANY BASIS, ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE IN VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.IIIIN PASSING BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 018-93, RESPONDENT PCA VIOLATED THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF CONSULTATION PROVIDED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1644, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 826 AND PCA ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 002, SERIES OF 1991.On the other hand, in addition to answering petitioner's arguments, respondent PCA alleges that this petition should be denied on the ground that petitioner has a pending appeal before the Office of the President. Respondent accuses petitioner of forum-shopping in filing this petition and of failing to exhaust available administrative remedies before coming to this Court. Respondent anchors its argument on the general rule that one who brings an action under Rule 65 must show that one has no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.I.The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of theirquasi-judicialfunction is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete4and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective.In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the Office of the President, considering the fact that two months after they had sent their first letter on April 26, 1993 they still had to hear from the President's office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately to new coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was justified in filing this case on June 25, 1993.5Indeed, after writing the Office of the President on April 26, 19936petitioner sent inquiries to that office not once, but twice, on May 26, 19937and on June 2, 1993,8but petitioner did not receive any reply.II.We now turn to the merit of the present petition. The Philippine Coconut Authority was originally created by P.D. 232 on June 30, 1973, to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Philippine Coconut Administration and the Philippine Coconut Research Institute. On June 11, 1978, by P.D. No. 1468, it was made "an independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines,"9and charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth."10through a regulatory scheme set up by law.11Through this scheme, the government, on August 28, 1982, temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut processing plants and, four months later, phased out some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality products and ultimately in the decline of the export performance of coconut-based commodities. The establishment of new plants could be authorized only upon determination by the PCA of the existence of certain economic conditions and the approval of the President of the Philippines. Thus, Executive Order No. 826, dated August 28, 1982, provided:Sec. 1. Prohibition. Except as herein provided, no government agency or instrumentality shall hereafter authorize, approve or grant any permit or license for the establishment or operation of new desiccated coconut processing plants, including the importation of machinery or equipment for the purpose. In the event of a need to establish a new plant, or expand the capacity, relocate or upgrade the efficiencies of any existing desiccated plant, the Philippine Coconut Authority may, upon proper determination of such need and evaluation of the condition relating to:a. the existing market demand;b. the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality;c. the level and flow of raw materials; andd. other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned,authorize or grant the application for, the establishment or expansion of capacity, relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut processing plant, subject to the approval of the President.On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing plants."12Accordingly, it was ordered:13Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival of the remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants for the above purpose.It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA adopted Resolution No. 058-87, authorizing the establishment and operation of additional DCN plants, in view of the increased demand for desiccated coconut products in the world's markets, particularly in Germany, the Netherlands and Australia. Even then, the opening of new plants was made subject to "such implementing guidelines to be set forth by the Authority" and "subject to the final approval of the President."The guidelines promulgated by the PCA, as embodied in Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991,inter aliaauthorized the opening of new plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all procedures and requirements for registration under Administrative Order No. 003, series of 1981 and this Order." In addition, as the opening of new plants was premised on the increased global demand for desiccated coconut products, the new entrants were required to submit sworn statements of the names and addresses of prospective foreign buyers.This form of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino in her memorandum, dated February 11, 1988, to the PCA. Affirming the regulatory scheme, the President stated in her memorandum:It appears that pursuant to Executive Order No. 826 providing measures for the protection of the Desiccated Coconut Industry, the Philippine Coconut Authority evaluated the conditions relating to: (a) the existing market demands; (b) the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality; (c) the level and flow of raw materials; and (d) other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned and that the result of such evaluation favored the expansion of production and market of desiccated coconut products.In view hereof and the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture, the deregulation of the Desiccated Coconut Industry as recommended in Resolution No. 058-87 adopted by the PCA Governing Board on October 28, 1987 (sic) is hereby approved.14These measures the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field, the reduction the same year of the number of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the restrictions in 1987 were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth."15Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, the power given to the Philippine Coconut Authority and before it to the Philippine Coconut Administration "to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oils industry"16is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the development of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of this regulatory structure.In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. The field would be left without an umpire who would retire to the bleachers to become a mere spectator. As the PCA provided in its Resolution No. 018-93:NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that, henceforth, PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants;RESOLVED, FURTHER, that the PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards with the corresponding service fees/charges.The issue is not whether the PCA has the power to adopt this resolution to carry out its mandate under the law "to promote the accelerated growth and development of the coconut and other palm oil industry."17The issue rather is whether it can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.Under Art. II, 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468), the role of the PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects." By limiting the purpose of registration to merely "monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop.Art. II, 3 of P.D. No. 1468 further requires the PCA:(h) To regulate the marketing and the exportation of copra and its by-products by establishing standards for domestic trade and export and, thereafter, to conduct an inspection of all copra and its by-products proposed for export to determine if they conform to the standards established;Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely on competition with all its wastefulness and inefficiency to do the weeding out, in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry.Indeed, by repudiating its role in the regulatory scheme, the PCA has put at risk other statutory provisions, particularly those of P.D. No. 1644, to wit:Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the marketing and export of copra, coconut oil and their by-products, in furtherance of the steps being taken to rationalize the coconut oil milling industry.Sec. 2. In the exercise of its powers under Section 1 hereof, the Philippine Coconut Authority may initiate and implement such measures as may be necessary to attain the rationalization of the coconut oil milling industry, including, but not limited to, the following measures:(a) Imposition of floor and/or ceiling prices for all exports of copra, coconut oil and their by-products;(b) Prescription of quality standards;(c) Establishment of maximum quantities for particular periods and particular markets;(d) Inspection and survey of export shipments through an independent international superintendent or surveyor.In the exercise of its powers hereunder, the Philippine Coconut Authority shall consult with, and be guided by, the recommendation of the coconut farmers, through corporations owned or controlled by them through the Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the private corporation authorized to be organized under Letter of Instructions No. 926.and the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468), Art. II, 3, to wit:(m) Except in respect of entities owned or controlled by the Government or by the coconut farmers under Sections 9 and 10, Article III hereof, the Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the production, distribution and utilization of all subsidized coconut-based products, and to require the submission of such reports or documents as may be deemed necessary by the Authority to ascertain whether the levy payments and/or subsidy claims are due and correct and whether the subsidized products are distributed among, and utilized by, the consumers authorized by the Authority.The dissent seems to be saying that in the same way that restrictions on entry into the field were imposed in 1982 and then relaxed in 1987, they can be totally lifted now without prejudice to reimposing them in the future should it become necessary to do so. There is really no renunciation of the power to regulate, it is claimed. Trimming down of PCA's function to registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself. But how can this be done when, under Resolution No. 018-93, the PCA no longer requires a license as condition for the establishment or operation of a plant? If a number of processing firms go to areas which are already congested, the PCA cannot stop them from doing so. If there is overproduction, the PCA cannot order a cut back in their production. This is because the licensing system is the mechanism for regulation. Without it the PCA will not be able to regulate coconut plants or mills.In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as justification for abolishing the licensing system. There can be no quarrel with the elimination of "unnecessary red tape." That is within the power of the PCA to do and indeed it should eliminate red tape. Its success in doing so will be applauded. But free enterprise does not call for removal of "protective regulations."Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiatedlaissez-faireas an economic principle.18Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy,19it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. This is clear from the following provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution which, so far as pertinent, state:Sec. 6. . . . Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises,subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolieswhen the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Emphasis added).At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Indeed, petitioner charges the PCA of seeking to render moot a case filed by some of its members questioning the grant of licenses to certain parties by adopting the resolution in question. It is alleged that members of petitioner complained to the court that the PCA had authorized the establishment and operation of new plants in areas which were already crowded, in violation of its Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991. In response, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from issuing licenses to the private respondent in that case.These allegations of petitioner have not been denied here. It would thus seem that instead of defending its decision to allow new entrants into the field against petitioner's claim that the PCA decision violated the guidelines in Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991, the PCA adopted the resolution in question to render the case moot. In so doing, the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left the field to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry.The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. As already stated, what President Aquino approved in 1988 was the establishment and operation of new DCN plantssubject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA.20In the first place, she could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she was no longer vested with legislative authority.21WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsROMERO,J.,dissenting;The past decade, a distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation has been evident. Both developed and developing countries have seriously considered, and extensively adopted, various measures for this purpose. The Philippines has been no exception.To this end, the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 (PCA-BR No 018-93) dated March 24, 1993, deregulating the coconut processing plant industry.1The Association of Philippine Desiccators (APCD) has filed this instant petition for prohibition andmandamusunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of said resolution.APCD questions the validity of PCA-BR No. 018-93 for being violative of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power. It contends that in issuing the resolution deregulating the coconut industry, the PCA exercised legislative discretion, which has not been delegated to it by Congress. It adds that when PCA deregulated the coconut industry, it ran counter to the very laws2which mandated it to regulate and rationalize the industry.We see no merit in this contention. PCA's authority to issue PCA-BR No. 018-93 is clearly provided in Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 232, reading as follows:. . . To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry.Similar grants of authority were made in subsequent amendatory laws.3In this regard, we have ruled that legislative discretion, as to the substantive contents of a law, cannot be delegated. What may be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law is to be enforced, not what the law should be, a prerogative of the legislature which it can neither abdicate nor surrender to the delegate.4The principle is based on the separation and allocation of powers among the three departments of government.5Thus, there are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, namely, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running amiss.6We have accepted as sufficient standards "interest of law and order,"7"adequate and efficient instruction,"8"public interest,"9"justice and equity,"10"public convenience and welfare,"11"simplicity, economy and efficiency,"12"standardization and regulation of medical education,"13and "fair and equitable employment practices."14Consequently, the standard may be expressed or implied. In the former, the non delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out but need only be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.15It may also be found in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.16In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this guideline is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment.17In the instant case, we believe that the PCA did not overstep the limits of its power in issuing the assailed resolution. We need not belabor the point that one of the economic goals of our country is the increased productivity of goods and services provided by the nation for the benefit of the people,18since from a purely economic standpoint, the increase in agricultural productivity is of fundamental importance.19Considering the responsibilities and powers assigned to the PCA, as well as its underlying policy, namely, that "the economic well-being of a major part of the population depends to a large extent on the viability of the industry and its improvement in the areas of production, processing and marketing," the irresistible conclusion is that PCA-BR No. 018-93 is a valid exercise of delegated legislation by the PCA. Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sought to be achieved by the laws regarding the coconut industry, particularly "to promote accelerated growth and development of the coconut and other palm oil industry,"20and "rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry."21These are sufficient standards to guide the PCA. Thus, measures to achieve these policies are better left to the administrative agencies tasked with implementing them.It must be stressed that with increasing global trade and business and major upheavals in technology and communications, the time has come for administrative policies and regulations to adapt to ever-changing business needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the legislature.22Even the 1987 Constitution was designed to meet, not only contemporary events, but also future and unknown circumstances.23It is worth mentioning that the PCA, after conducting its studies, adopted the policy of deregulation to further enhance the coconut industry competition, since any continuation of the restrictive regulation in the industry would have detrimental effects.24This is in consonance with the constitutional mandate that the State must "adopt measures that help make them (locally produced goods) competitive."25Undoubtedly, an "agency, in light of changing circumstances, is free to alter interpretative and policy views reflected in regulations construing an underlying statute, so long as any changed construction of the statute is consistent with express congressional intent or embodies a permissible reading of the statute."26Furthermore, the Constitution is cognizant of the realities of global interdependency, as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchanges on the basis of equality and reciprocity."27In sum, the policy of deregulation must be determined by the circumstances prevailing in a certain situation.28As we have stressed in the past, this Court is only concerned with the question of authority, not the wisdom of the measure involved which falls within the province of the Legislature.Theponenciapresents the issue: whether it is within the power of the PCA to renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it (P.D. No. 232). (It is to be pointed out that this issue was not included in the Assignment of Errors of Petitioner).Underlying this formulation is the assumption/admission that PCA has the power to regulate the coconut industry, as in fact the power is bestowed upon it by its organic act, P.D. No. 232,viz. "to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oils in industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth." Its broad mandate is "to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oils industry."It avers that this "legislative scheme" was disregarded when the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the assailed Resolution which is effect liberalized the registration and licensing requirements for the granting of permits to operate new coconut plants. But this was effected pursuant to the October 23, 1987 PCA Board Resolution laying down the policy of deregulating the industry and authorizing the creation of additional desiccated coconut plants.As with any administrative agency established to promote the growth and development of any industry, the PCA has considerable latitude to adopt policies designed to accelerate the attainment of this objective and corollarily, to lay down rules and regulations to implement the same. We can take judicial notice of the fact that during its 25 years of existence, the PCA has achieved enough experience and expertise to introduce measures which shall ensure the dominant role of the crop as a major dollar-producing industry, including the manipulation of market forces to our comparative advantage, certainly an area beyond the Court's ken.Hence, guided by guidelines already laid down, it responded to regional developments by:(1) taking cognizance of the overproduction in the industry and curtailing the expansion of coconut processing plants in 1982, within reasonable limits and with safeguards (hence the issuance of Executive Order Nos. 826 on August 28, 1982 and No. 854 on December 6, 1982);(2) five years later, responding to the demand for desiccated coconut products in the world market, liberalized its former policy by deregulating the industry and authorizing the creation of additional desiccated coconut plants in 1987;(3) complementing and supplementing (2), by easing registration and licensing requirements in 1993.It bears repeating that the above measures were not taken arbitrarily but in careful compliance with guidelines incorporated in the Executive Orders and subject to the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and the approval of the President.The crux of theponenciais that, in the process of opening doors to foreign markets, the PCA "limited itself to merely monitoring their volumes of production and administration of quality standards, in effect abdicating its role and leaving it almost totally to market forces to define how the industry will develop."Actually, the relevant provisions in the disputed resolution reads:Resolved further, that the PCAshall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards with the corresponding service fees/charges.For the sake of clarity and accuracy, it is to be stressed that the PCA did not limit itself "merely to monitoring . . ." as theponenciastates, but to "registering the . . . processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. . . ."In the actual words of the Resolution, the PCA recognizes its principal function of registration so as to be able to monitor the production and administer quality standards, both objectives of which are not merely nominal or minimal, but substantial, even vital, aspects of the power to regulate. Put differently, there is no renunciation of the power to regulate, for the regulation is essentially recognized and accomplished through the registration function which enables the PCA to keep track of the volume of production and the observance of quality standards by new entrants into the industry. In sum, trimming down its functions to registration is not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself.If the PCA, in light of the crucial developments in the regional and domestic coconut industry decides to open wide its doors, allow the free entry of other players and the interplay of competitive forces to shape the configuration of the industry, who are we to declare such policy as one characterized by "wastefulness and inefficiency . . . based on its naive faith in survival of the fittest." Is not this a blatant incursion by the Court into the economic arena which is better left to the administrative agency precisely tasked to promote the growth of the industry, through the exercise of its studied discretion? To be sure, those operators already in the field, such as the petitioner members of the Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators, are expected to vigorously protest and work for the nullity of what they perceive as an obnoxious, life threatening policy. But instead of opposing what the PCA views as a timely, well-considered move, the healthy competition should spur them to improving their product and elevating the standards they have imposed on themselves.If, in the course of its monitoring which is a piece of the regulatory function, the PCA should detect a violation of its guidelines that would result in a lowering of the quality of the product, or unfairness to other players, surely, it is not powerless to impose sanctions, as categorically provided in P.D. 1469, P.D. 1644, Adm. Order No. 003, Series of 1981 and Adm. Order No. 002, Series of 1991. Any administrative agency is empowered to establish its implementing rules, together with sanctions guaranteed to ensure the observance of such rules, else it would be a mere "toothless" entity.Theponenciaprognosticates, "The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a 'free-for-all,' resulting in cutthroat competition, underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of our coconut industry." Are we not encroaching on legislative domain in questioning the wisdom of the action taken by the PCA which was accorded a broad mandate by the Congress? Moreover, let us bear in mind that during those "abnormal times," forces other than merely economic, e.g. political, dominated the economy effectively supporting, even favoring, destructive capitalistic monopolies and, in the process suppressing healthy competition.Not to forget, too, that we cannot close our eyes and ignore the world-wide trend towards globalization in the economy, as in other fields, as in fact the Court recognized this economic reality in its decision in the Oil Deregulation Case.With the unrelenting march of globalization in our economy, the Philippines must find its market niches and be able to adapt to these inevitable changes, for the Asia-Pacific rim is bound to become a truly dynamic region in the economic, political and cultural arenas in the coming millennium.ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998BLAS F. OPLE,petitioner,vs.RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.PUNO,J.:The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."1Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos On December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZEDIDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEMWHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:Sec. 1. Establishment of a National Compoterized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.Sec. 2. Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members:Head, Presidential Management StaffSecretary, National Economic Development AuthoritySecretary, Department of the Interior and Local GovernmentSecretary, Department of HealthAdministrator, Government Service Insurance System,Administrator, Social Security System,Administrator, National Statistics OfficeManaging Director, National Computer Center.Sec. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.Sec. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.Sec. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.Sec. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.Sec. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the President through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.Sec. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOSA.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.Petitioner contends:A. THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION.2Respondents counter-argue:A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.3We now resolve.IAs is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.4As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.5The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper seand as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.6Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.7All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.IIWe now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."8The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.9The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.10The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.11Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.12In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.13While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.14The executive power is vested in the Presidents.15It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.16It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.17As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.18He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the discretion of its officials.19Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.20Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.21It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.22To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.23An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.24We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance."25and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve thepeople."26The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guideline for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration of government,i.e,internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government.27It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the extent of pr