02 buddhist philosophy-er

8/9/2019 02 Buddhist Philosophy-ER

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Buddhist Philosophy Encyclopedia of Religion

1. Buddhist Philosophy - Malcolm David Eckel,2. Four Noble Truths - John Ross Carter, 3. Eightfold Path - Bhikkhu Thanissaro 4. Prat ! tya-Samutp!da - David J. Kalupahana 5. Nirv!!a

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Thomas P. Kasulis 6. Buddhist Concept of Karma - Dennis Hirota

Buddhist Philosophy

Source Citation (MLA 7th Edition)Malcolm David Eckel. "Buddhist Philosophy." Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. 2nd ed. Vol.2. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 1295-1303. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 7 Aug.2012.

When Buddhism first became known in the West, many historians of philosophy were reluctant to call it"philosophy." Philosophy in the strict sense was viewed as a legacy of the Greeks, who learned tocultivate a critical and theoretical attitude that was free from the limitations of tradition, mythology, anddogma. By the end of the twentieth century, this restrictive approach has begun to change. We now knowmuch more about the critical precision of Buddhist philosophy, and Western philosophers are morefavorably inclined toward the practical concerns that inspired Greek philosophy. As theoretical as Greekspeculation may have been, it was never far from the practical challenge of living a good or happy life.The same is true of Buddhist philosophy. Even the most rarefied and theoretical analysis is related to a process of moral discipline and liberation from suffering.

In India the word most often translated as "philosophy" is dar !ana, whose root meaning is simply "to

see." As a metaphor, dar !

ana is close to the Greek word theoria, which is the source of our wordtheoretical and also means "to see." Dar !ana can be used to name a system or school of Indian philosophy, as in the title of M!dhava's famous Sarva-dar !anasamuccaya (Compendium of all systems),or it can be used to name philosophy itself. Some Indian philosophers play on the metaphoricalassociations of the word to picture philosophy as way of ascending a mountain to get a clear vision of theworld. Bh!vaviveka (also known as Bhavya or Bh!viveka) described the practitioner of philosophy assomeone "who climbs the mountain peak of wisdom and is free from grief, but looks with compassion on people who are burned by grief." This verse echoes an earlier Buddhist verse about a wise person whoascends the "palace of wisdom" and, (Page 1296) without grief or sorrow, sees the suffering of life spreadout below. Hans Jonas has pointed out that the metaphor of vision plays a crucial role in Western philosophy, because it suggests distance, detachment, and the ability to perceive all of reality in a single,inclusive act of understanding. Jonas's point applies equally well to Buddhist philosophy. Whether itinvolves an Indian scholar climbing a mountain, a Chinese master polishing the mirror of the mind, or aJapanese philosopher gazing at the moon reflected in a dewdrop, Buddhist philosophy functionsmetaphorically as a form of vision.

The idea of vision suggests another important metaphor for the practice of Buddhist philosophy. To get tothe top of the mountain, a philosopher has to follow a path. At a crucial moment in his life, Siddh!rthaGautama, the man who became the Buddha, realized that fasting and self-denial were not leading himwhere he wanted to go. He accepted a gift of food and took up a mode of discipline that is known inBuddhist tradition as a Middle Way, avoiding the extremes of self-denial and self-indulgence. Once he


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had found the Middle Way, he began to make progress toward the awakening (bodhi) that made him a buddha. For Buddhist philosophers, the Middle Way is more an intellectual discipline than a discipline ofdesire, but it is equally fundamental to their practice: their philosophical practice charts a Middle Way between the extremes of affirmation (in which things are treated as permanent entities) and negation (inwhich they are treated as utterly nonexistent).

The most fundamental way of understanding Buddhist philosophy, however, is simply as a pursuit of

knowledge. From the earliest stages of Buddhist tradition, wisdom ( prajñ") played a central role inBuddhist practice. Wisdom involved an ability to see through appearances of things and understand themcorrectly. By a grammatical accident that had enormous influence on the development of Buddhistthought, it also involved a certain way of "going." The word way ( pratipad ), in one of its forms, functionsas a verbal noun that means "to go." For the philosophers of classical India, "to go" can always mean "toknow." This means that the philosophy of the Middle Way is a way of knowing the world without illusion,grief, or suffering. While the metaphors of vision and the path have become attenuated in the long historyof Western philosophy, the Buddhist view of the philosopher's path is not far from Plato's parable of thecave, where the challenge is to ascend from the dark world of mere appearances to the bright light of truth.

EARLY BUDDHIST THOUGHT

It is difficult to separate the teachings of the historical Buddha from the complex layers of oral traditionabout his life, but several fundamental themes seem to have been established early in Buddhist historyand have given decisive shape to the rest of Buddhist thought.

Early canonical literature tells a story about an encounter between the Buddha and a man namedM!lunkyaputta. According to the story, M!lunkyaputta asked the Buddha a series of questions: Is theuniverse eternal or not? Is it finite or infinite? Is the soul identical to the body or not? Does the Buddhaexist after death or not? Does he both exist and not exist after death? Does he neither exist nor not exist?M!lunkyaputta said that, if he did not get answers to these questions, he would leave the order. TheBuddha responded with a story about a man who was wounded by a poisoned arrow. When someone tried

to take out the arrow, the man said: "Wait! Until you tell me who shot the arrow, what kind of person hewas, what the bow and arrow were made of, and so forth, I will not let you remove the arrow." TheBuddha said that M!lunkyaputta was like the man shot by the arrow. His speculative questions did nothave anything to do with the practical challenge of removing suffering. Buddhists interpret this story asmeaning that the Buddha's teaching has a practical goal. Buddhist philosophy is not averse to questionsabout the nature of reality, even questions that are quite abstruse, but in the end their purpose is to removesuffering.

Another story compares the Buddha's teaching to a raft. The Buddha explains that his teaching shouldhelp people cross the river of suffering and should not be treated as a source of attachment. Someone who becomes attached to the words of the teaching is like a man who builds a raft to cross a river, gets to the

other side, and is so fond of the raft that he puts it on his back and carries it wherever he goes. The rightattitude toward the raft is to use it to cross a river then let it go. Once again, the teaching has a practicalfunction, but out if its practicality grows a critical principle. This story challenges anyone who reverestradition for its own sake, even when that tradition is the teaching of the Buddha. When the Buddha'steaching is no longer useful, or when it is not effective in removing suffering, it should be left behind. If"philosophy," in the strict sense of term, requires a critical spirit toward dogma, myth, and other forms oftradition, as it often does in the Western tradition, then a distinguishable Buddhist "philosophy" is beginning to stir in these early stories.


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One of the most important systematic accounts of early Buddhist thought is found in the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (Discourse on the turning of the wheel of the teaching). According toBuddhist tradition, this discourse contains the Buddha's first sermon and summarizes the content of hisawakening. It begins with the Middle Path, then presents a teaching about four noble truths: the truths ofsuffering (Skt., du#kha; Pali, dukkha), the arising of suffering ( samudaya), the cessation of suffering(nirodha), and the path to the cessation of suffering (Skt. m"rga; Pali, magga). Although these truthsneed to be elaborated before their significance can become clear, they contain an outline of the major

topics of Buddhist thought.

The truth of suffering is related to two other important aspects of Buddhist thought: the doctrines ofimpermanence (Skt., anitya; Pali, anicca) and no-self (Skt., nair "tmyam; Pali, anatt "). Buddhists arguethat, while some things are painful in an obvious sense, other things become painful (Page 1297) whenthey change and pass away, and eventually everything changes and passes away. Someone who holdsonto changeable things will eventually experience them as suffering. Buddhists carry this point furtherand argue that, because things change, they lack the permanent identity or "self" that we normallyattribute to them. They are nothing but a series of "aggregates" (Skt., skandha; Pali, khandha) ormomentary phenomena that give the illusion of continuity, like momentary flickers in a flame ormoments in the flow of a river. The doctrine of impermanence became a major point of controversy

between Buddhist and Hindu philosophers, and the doctrine of no-self produced some of the mostimportant debates within the Buddhist tradition itself.

According to the second noble truth, suffering comes from desire, and desire comes from ignorancethrough a causal sequence known as "dependent co-arising" (Skt., prat $ tya-samutp"da; Pali, pa% icca- samupp"da). The most fundamental form of ignorance is the misconception that there is a self. Whensomeone realizes that nothing has any permanent identity, the chain of dependent co-arising unravels, andsuffering begins to cease. The third noble truth, the cessation of suffering, is also known as nirv"&a (Pali,nibb"na), a word that means simply to "blow out" the fire of ignorance and craving. In its traditional form,the concept of nirv"&a has a negative flavor that sometimes puzzles Western interpreters, but it is notdifficult to understand if it is read against the background of Indian views of reincarnation. Like their

Hindu and Jain counterparts, Buddhists assume that a person's life follows a cycle of death and rebirth,known in Indian tradition as sa' s"ra (literally, "wandering"). The goal of the Buddhist path is to bringthis cycle to an end. Nirv"&a is not merely the cessation of desire and ignorance; it is liberation from thecycle of reincarnation.

Traditional outlines of the path to nirv"&a, the fourth noble truth, divide it into eight parts, beginning with"right understanding" and ending with "right concentration." In a formula attributed to the nunDhammadinn!, the eight parts of the eightfold path can be grouped into three: moral conduct (Skt., !$ la;Pali, s$ la), concentration ( sam"dhi), and wisdom (Skt., prajñ"; Pali, paññ"). Moral precepts for laypeopleinclude no killing, no stealing, no lying, no abusing sex, and no taking of intoxicants. The practice ofconcentration involves a variety of disciplines that often are referred to in the general category of

"meditation." Of these the most basic is to sit in a stable posture and concentrate on the movement of the breath. This practice is meant to let the negative tendencies of the mind pass away so that the mind can beclearly aware of the flow of experience. Finally this clear mind should be infused with the wisdom, or theunderstanding of no-self, that unravels the chain of suffering. It is here, in the cultivation and practice ofwisdom, that philosophy finds its place in the path to nirv"&a.


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BUDDHIST SECTARIANISM

According to Buddhist literature, the leaders of the early community convened a council about a hundredyears after the Buddha's death. While the sources do not agree about the exact nature of the disputes thatled to this council, they do show that the community began to divide into different sects or schools(nik " ya) at a relatively early date. A close study of the sources shows that these divisions initiallyinvolved questions of discipline in the Vinaya Pi"aka or "Basket of Discipline" in the Buddhist canon.

Later disputes focused on doctrinal questions found in the Sutta Pi"aka and the Abhidhamma Pi"aka.Eventually these disputes produced eighteen separate schools.

The disputes that separated the eighteen schools are too complex and often too obscure to summarize, butone particular dispute had wide influence in later Buddhist thought. This is the "Personalist Controversy."Some of the early schools, such as the V!ts # putr # yas and Sammit # yas, affirmed the existence of a "person"( pudgala) that continued from one moment to the next and gave continuity to the personality. Theseschools said that the "person" was neither identical to nor different from the "aggregates" ( skandha) thatconstitute the personality as it was understood by other Buddhist schools. The doctrine of the person( pudgala-v"da) was eventually rejected by the majority of Buddhist schools, but not without considerablecontroversy.

Judging from an account of the personalist doctrine in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako !a (Treasury of theabhidharma), there were two reasons for the personalists' position. One was a scriptural text (the BurdenS (tra) that spoke of a "person" who took up and laid down the burden of karma. The other was that the personalists felt that a "person" was necessary to guarantee moral accountability. They seem to haveunderstood the "person" as the shape or configuration ( sa' sth"na) of the aggregates. While the shape ofthe aggregates is not different from the aggregates themselves, it continues while the aggregatesthemselves come and go. Vasubandhu's criticism of this position takes the form of a dilemma. If the"person" is just a conventional way of speaking about the aggregates, then it is not ultimately real. If it isultimately real, then it cannot change and cannot be related to the aggregates. This dilemma is common inBuddhist philosophy and plays a crucial role in the Madhyamaka view of the two truths to be discussed

below.

THE ABHIDHARMA

The systematic elaboration of Buddhist thought took a major step forward with the development of theabhidharma (Pali, abidhamma). The abhidharma tradition began as lists, known as m"t ) k "s ("matrices"),of the fundamental constituents (dharmas) of reality. As Vasubandhu explained in his Abhidharmako !a,abhidharma has to do with cultivating pure wisdom through the discrimination of these fundamentalconstituents. Eventually these lists of fundamental constituents were developed into a third "basket" ofscripture. The abhidharma schools attributed these lists to the Buddha himself, although their attributionwas not universally shared. An important early school known as the Sautr !ntikas ("those who follow the

discourses") challenged the claim that the abhidharma could be traced to the Buddha. This school basedits doctrine solely on the Buddha's discourses ( s(tr "nta). (Page 1298)

A good way to become acquainted with the questions that occupied the abhidharma, without having todeal with the complexity of the matrices, is to read the Milindapañha (The questions of King Milinda).This text presents a discussion between the monk N!gasena and King Milinda, who is identified asMenander, an Indo-Greek king who ruled in northern India around 150–130 BCE. In one of its best knownchapters, Milinda asks N!gasena about the idea of "no-self." Does it mean that N!gasena himself does notexist? N!gasena responds by asking the king about his chariot. Does the word chariot refer to the wheel,


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the axle, the pole, or some other part of the chariot? The king says: No, the word chariot is just aconventional designation that depends for its meaning on these separate parts. N!gasena then says that theword N " gasena functions in the same way. It is just a conventional designation that depends on themomentary constituents of the personality. This comparison shows what Vasubandhu meant when he saidthat abhidharma is "the discrimination of fundamental constituents." The process of discriminationimplies not only a theory of language but an epistemology: the knowledge of reality has to penetrate beneath the level of conventional designations to the momentary constituents in the flow of experience.

The most influential of the abhidharma schools belonged to the Sarv!stiv!dins ("who hold the doctrinethat everything exists"), also known as the Vaibh!$ikas after the title of their greatest work, the Mah"vibh"*" (Great commentary). The school began in the central region of the Ganges basin andeventually migrated to Kashmir where it flourished for several centuries and had wide impact on thetransmission of Buddhism to Central and East Asia. Its influence was so great in China that the Mah"vibh"*" has been preserved in several different recensions in the Chinese canon, including atranslation made in 659 by the renowned Chinese scholar Xuanzang.

The most distinctive Sarv!stiv!din theory, and the one from which the school gets its name, is the ideathat "everything exists" not merely in the present, but in the past and future. This position was first

developed in the first century CE in a text known as the Vijñ"nak " ya (The body of consciousness) andseems to have responded to two problems associated with the concept of impermanence: How can an actof cognition "know" something in the past or future if that object does not exist, and how can past actionshave any effect in the present, if the actions have ceased to exist? In the Mah"vibh"*" there is anelaborate discussion of the mental factors that lead to awakening, along with the factors that hold a person back. As is often the case throughout Buddhist philosophy, epistemology plays a key part in the processof liberation.

THE MAH!Y!NA

The appearance of the Mah!y!na (Great Vehicle), near the beginning of the Common Era, led to a

reinterpretation of many of the basic values of Buddhist thought. Mah!y!na texts refer to the teachings ofearlier schools as H # nay!na (Lesser Vehicle) and claim that the Mah!y!na represents a transmission ofthe Buddha's most profound teaching. For modern scholars, the origins of the Mah!y!na are quite obscure.What is certain is that by the second century of the Common Era, when the first Buddhist translationsappeared in China, Mah!y!na texts were actively circulating through the Indian Buddhist community. Asthe Mah!y!na movement gathered momentum, it transformed the Buddhism of India and became thedominant tradition in China, Korea, Japan, Tibet, and Vietnam.

Early Mah!y!na literature, particularly the Prajñ" p"-ramit " (Perfection of Wisdom) S (tras, introducedtwo key new ideas into the tradition of Buddhist thought. The first of these, the doctrine of emptiness, presented a bold and radical application of the traditional doctrine of no-self. The second, the ideal of the

bodhisattva, placed this view of reality in a distinctive system of ethical practice and reflection. Neither ofthese two ideas was unprecedented in Buddhist tradition, but they were presented in such new ways thatthey precipitated a major reconsideration of the fundamental concepts of Buddhist thought.

According to the bodhisattva ideal, the goal of Buddhist life is not to achieve nirv"&a in this life, as it had been in earlier tradition; it is to return in the cycle of reincarnation to help others on the path. While thebodhisattva ideal does not exclude monks and nuns, Mah!y!na texts like the Vimalak $ rtinirde !a (Theteaching of Vimalak # rti) S (tra speak positively about the lay life and draw lay people into the center ofthe teaching. Bodhisattvas are encouraged to practice the active virtue of compassion (karu&"), along


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with the traditional virtue of wisdom ( prajñ"). This practice involves the cultivation of six "perfections"( p"ramit ")—generosity, moral conduct, patience, fortitude, concentration, and wisdom (a list that waslater expanded to ten)—and proceeds through a process of ten stages (bh(mi). In the last stages of this process, bodhisattvas acquire such extraordinary powers from their practice of merit and wisdom thatthey function almost like the Hindu gods.

While the abhidharma focused on the discrimination of dharmas as the momentary but real constituents

of reality, the early Mah!y!na s%tras called the reality of these dharmas into question. In the first chapterof The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines, for example, &!riputra poses a question: "Whatdharma does the word bodhisattva refer to?" The answer is that he cannot "find, apprehend, or see" anydharma corresponding to the word bodhisattva. The s%tra extends the same analysis to all of thecategories of Buddhist thought: no matter what the word, no dharma can be "apprehended" thatcorresponds to it. This view of reality can be distilled into the claim that all dharmas are "empty" ofidentity. In other words, the nature of all things is their emptiness.

While the Mah!y!na doctrine of emptiness is easy to state, its implications are complex. One obviousconsequence is the concept of nonduality: no matter how different two things may seem, in the end thereis no distinction between them. There is no difference between one moment and the (Page 1299) next,

between one person and another, and between nirv"&a and sa' s"ra. To the critics of the Mah!y!na, thisview often seems to be a form of nihilism, but it has important positive implications. The bodhisattva ideal, for example, is not based merely on a sense of altruism or compassion. While the bodhisattva maywish to help others, and this desire may be an important motivation for starting out on the bodhisattva path, the bodhisattva also realizes that there is no way to separate his or her fate from the fate of others,and there is no way to escape into nirv"&a apart from sa' s"ra itself. The doctrine of emptiness leadsinevitably to the bodhisattva practice. Emptiness may seem negative, but it leads to an expansive andaffirmative philosophy of Buddhist practice.

THE MADHYAMAKA

The first systematic attempt to organize Mah!y!na thought is associated with the philosopher N!g!rjuna.Reliable historical information about Indian philosophers is rare, and the figure of N!g!rjuna is evenmore elusive than most. Scholars generally agree that he lived in south-central India sometime in thesecond or third century of the Common Era. Otherwise what we know of him comes only through hisworks. Of these, the most important is the M (lamadhyamaka-k "rik " (Root verses on the Middle Way),the text that served as the source of the Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") school. N!g!rjuna also was theauthor of a number of independent treatises on problems in logic and the philosophy of language,including the Vigrahavy"vartan$ (Avoidance of disputes), a work on the bodhisattva path (the Ratn"val $ [Jewel garland]), and several well-known hymns.

N!g!rjuna makes the direction of his argument clear in the first verse of the M (lamadhyamaka-k "rik ":

"Nothing ever arises anywhere from itself, from something else, from both, or from nothing at all." Tosay that nothing arises by any possible causal mechanism depends on a particular assumption about thenature of identity: if something has an "own-being" or "identity of its own" ( svabh"va), then it cannot be produced by anything else and cannot give rise to itself. The only way something can "arise" is to beempty of any identity. In other words, for N!g!rjuna, the Buddhist view of impermanence expressed inthe doctrine of dependent co-arising required that everything be empty of identity. N!g!rjuna expressedthis point in two key verses in the M (lamadhyamaka-k "rik ": "We call dependent co-arising emptiness; itis a metaphorical designation, and it is the Middle Path"; and "Everything is possible for someone forwhom emptiness is possible, and nothing is possible for someone for whom emptiness is not possible."


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How can something be possible, if it has no identity? Is the doctrine of emptiness any different fromsaying that nothing exists at all? The answer to these questions requires another key Madhyamakaconcept: the distinction between the two truths. N!g!rjuna said: "When buddhas teach the dharma, theydepend on two truths: ordinary relative truth and ultimate truth.… It is impossible to teach the ultimatewithout depending on the conventional, and it is impossible to understand nirv"&a without understandingthe ultimate." The distinction between the two truths begins with a particular truth about language: a person has to depend on the distinctions of ordinary language in order to show that ordinary language

does not apply. But the distinction has important metaphysical and epistemological implications: a personhas to depend on an ordinary understanding of things in order to seek nirv"&a. From the ultimate point ofview distinctions fall away, but any action or thought that is directed toward ultimate truth gains itsmeaning by its dependence on relative ( samv) ti) or conventional (vyavah"ra) truth. The combination ofthe two truths—a conventional affirmation and an ultimate negation—constitutes the "middle way" thatgives the school its name. It also allows N!g!rjuna to appropriate the basic categories of Buddhist life in a positive way without treating them as ultimately real.

The distinction between the two truths was fundamental to Madhyamaka thought, but it posed troubling philosophical problems for N!g!rjuna's followers. These problems emerged in a series of commentarieson the M (lamad-hyamaka-k "rik ", written two or three centuries after the time of N!g!rjuna and focused

on a disagreement about the logical form of N!g!rjuna's arguments. The commentator Buddhap!lita (c.470–540) interpreted N!g!rjuna's arguments as a prasa+ ga or reductio ad absurdum in which theopponent's position is shown to lead to absurd conclusions. Buddhap!lita formulated the argument againstarising from self and other as two separate claims: If someone says that things cannot arise fromthemselves, this is impossible, because their arising would be useless, and if someone says that thingscannot arise from something else, this too is impossible, because then anything could be produced byanything else. This interpretation of N!g!rjuna is known as Pr " sa+ gika from its style of reasoning.Bh!vaviveka (c. 500–570) argued that the rules of Indian logic require M!dhyamikas not merely to defeattheir opponent's position but to establish a position of their own. He restated the first part of N!g!rjuna'sargument as an "independent syllogism" ( svatantra anum"na) with his own independent assertion andreason: "Things do not arise from themselves, because they already exist." Because of his fondness for

independent ( svatantra) arguments, Bh!vaviveka's position is known as Sv"tantrika. Candrak # rti (c. 600– 650) came to Buddhap!lita's defense and provided the classic statement of the Pr !sa'gika approach. ForTibetan tradition and for modern scholars, Bh!vaviveka's Sv!tantrika and Candrak # rti's Pr !sa'gikarepresent the two major, competing options in the interpretation of Madhyamaka thought.

This dispute about logical procedure gives a glimpse of the problems that occupied Buddhist philosophersin what might be called the classical period of Buddhist philosophy in India. By the fourth and fifthcenturies Buddhist monasteries had become sophisticated centers of learning and were drawn into debatenot only with other Buddhists but with competing schools of Hindus and Jains. Bh!vaviveka himself(Page 1300) played a crucial role in this inter-traditional dialogue by producing the Tarkajv"l " (Flame ofreason), the first systematic chapter-by-chapter account of the doctrines of competing Indian schools. It

was natural for him to insist that Buddhists play by the accepted rules of debate and defend their own positions. It fell to Candrak # rti to reassert the austerity and simplicity of N!g!rjuna's vision of ultimatetruth. Behind the argument about the procedure for debate, however, lay an argument about the nature ofconventional truth. Bh!vaviveka felt that it was necessary to "accept" ( siddha) conventional things beforeanalyzing them from the ultimate perspective; Candrak # rti refused to attribute such independent reality tothe subject of his arguments.

In addition to commentaries on N!g!rjuna, Bh!vaviveka and Candrak # rti wrote major works on thebodhisattva path. Both works, Candrak # rti's Madhya-mak "vat "ra (Introduction to the Middle Way) and


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the first three chapters of Bh!vaviveka's Tarkajv"l ", present their analysis of Madhyamaka philosophy as part of the path to buddhahood. The same is true of the Bodhicary"vat "ra (Introduction to the practice ofawakening) by &!ntideva (eighth century). In a widely-quoted scriptural text, wisdom ( prajñ") is picturedas a way of giving sight to the other perfections and leading them to the city of nirv"&a. While the practice of Buddhist philosophy became more and more concerned with issues of logic and epistemology,it did not lose its intimate relationship to the discipline of Buddhist life.

Madhyamaka continued to develop after the dispute between Candrak # rti and Bh!vaviveka.Bh!vaviveka's Sv!tantrika approach was taken up and extended by the eighth-century scholarsJñ!nagarbha, &!ntarak $ita, and Kamala(# la, who shared the definition of conventional truth as "arisingdependently, capable of effective action, and satisfying only when it is not analyzed." The concept of"effective action" (artha-kriy") in this definition shows the influence of the Buddhist logicianDharmak # rti (seventh century). Both &!ntarak $ita and Kamala(# la played important roles in theintroduction of Buddhism to Tibet. On the Pr !sa'gika side, the philosopher At #(a (eleventh century)helped reestablish the Buddhist intellectual tradition in Tibet after a period of persecution. His Pr !sa'gikaconvictions, along with his well-known work on the bodhisattva path, Bodhipathaprad $ pa (Lamp for the path to awakening), had immense influence on the shape of philosophy in Tibet. One of the least knownareas of Madhyamaka thought in the last period of Indian Buddhist history has to do with the relationship

between Madhyamaka and Tantra. Two works by the Tantric saint Vimalamitra are included in theMadhyamaka section of the Tibetan canon, and it is clear from later Tibetan history, as well as from thelives of Tantric saints, that Madhyamaka played an important role in developing the radical concept ofnonduality on which Tantra was based.

THE YOG!C!RA

A century or two after the time of N!g!rjuna, a second school emerged to challenge its interpretation ofthe Mah!y!na. This school is known by the name Yog!c!ra or "Practice of Discipline." The origin of theYog!c!ra is obscured by an old tradition that attributes several of the school's fundamental texts to thecelestial bodhisattva Maitreya. The school's most important early exponents, if not its actual founders,

were Asa'ga and Vasubandhu (fourth or fifth century), two philosophers who were possibly brothers.Like the Madhyamaka, the Yog!c!ra grew from the interpretation of a distinctive body of Mah!y!nas%tras. These included not merely the Perfection of Wisdom S (tras, but s%tras that spoke of a "thirdturning of the wheel of the teaching" intended to interpret and move beyond the teaching of the Perfectionof Wisdom. The Sandhinirmocana (Releasing the hidden meaning) S (tra describes the Perfection ofWisdom S (tras as ney"rtha (requiring further interpretation) as opposed to the Sandhinirmocana itself,which is n$ t "rtha (its meaning is definitive and does not need further interpretation).

Instead of two truths, the Yog!c!ra tradition developed a doctrine of three natures ( svabh"va): imagined( parikalpita) nature, dependent ( paratantra) nature, and perfected ( parini * panna) nature. The first ofthese natures has to do with distinctions between subject and object and between one object and another.

When the mind distinguishes things and gives them names, the nature it attributes to them is "imagined":it is as unreal as a magic trick or a dream. The mind itself, in its imaginative capacity, constitutes"dependent nature." When it creates imaginative fantasies about the nature of the world, it is like the mindthat creates a dream: its concepts are not real, but the mind itself is real. Perfected nature is defined as theabsence of imagined nature in dependent nature. In this sense it is identical to emptiness itself, but it alsocan be equated with the mind when all its illusory concepts have been removed.

This Yog!c!ra picture of reality appears in different forms in different texts, including the Madhy"ntavibh" ga (Distinction between the middle and the extremes), the Vi'!atik " (Twenty verses)


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and the Tri'!ik " (Thirty verses), but the basic picture remains the same. In all these texts, the threenatures function not only as an ontology, to distinguish real from unreal, but as an epistemology and aroadmap for meditation. The first step in the meditative process is to grasp the concept of "mind-only"(citta-m"tra) in order to eliminate attachment to external objects. Once a person has understood that thereis nothing but mind, it is possible to free the mind from the idea that it is a separate subject, different fromits objects. The goal of this process is to develop the nondual awareness that constitutes the Buddha'sawakening. The concept of "mind-only" is widely understood to mean that the Yog!c!ra is a form of

Indian idealism. There is much in Yog!c!ra literature to support this view, particularly the sophisticatedYog!c!ra analysis of the transformations ( pari&"ma) of consciousness. But it is important to note that theconcept of "mind-only" is used to remove attachment not only to objects but also to the mind as aseparate subject. (Page 1301)

After the time of Asa'ga and Vasubandhu, the Yog!c!ra school developed a complex commentarialtradition like the tradition of the Madhyamaka. Philosophers like Sthiramati (510–570) and Dharmap!la(c. 530–561) developed distinctive and influential interpretations of the school in the monasteries of North India. This was the intellectual milieu that Xuanzang (c. 600–664) encountered when he traveledfrom China in the early decades of the seventh century. After studying in Yog!c!ra circles for severalyears, he returned to China and introduced the Yog!c!ra tradition to Chinese Buddhism. While the school

did not maintain a separate identity in China long after the death of Xuanzang, its influence was feltthroughout the history of Chinese Buddhist thought.

BUDDHIST LOGIC

One of the most important legacies of the Yog!c!ra in India was the epistemological tradition known asBuddhist logic. Beginning in the sixth century in the works of Dign!ga (c. 480–540), the tradition produced some of the greatest philosophers in the Indian tradition. There is a legend that the Hindulogician Udayana went to a temple one day and found the door locked. In frustration, he addressed God inthe following words: "Drunk with the wine of your own divinity, you ignore me; but when the Buddhistsare here, your existence depends on me." The Buddhists he was referring to were not the M!dhyamikas or

the early Yog!c!ras, but the philosophical heirs of Dign!ga who kept up their controversies with theirHindu opponents until the Buddhist monasteries were destroyed at the end of the twelfth century.

In his major work, the Pram"&asamuccaya (A compendium of the means of knowledge), Dign!ga arguedthat there are only two acceptable ways to know: perception ( pratyak *a) and inference (anum"na).Perception gives access to momentary particulars ( svalak *a&a), which are ultimately real, while inferencegives access to universals ( s"m"nya-lak *a&a), which are only conventionally real. Absent from this list isknowledge based on scripture or verbal testimony. Verbal testimony played a crucial epistemic role inHindu exegesis of the Vedas, but Dign!ga cast verbal testimony aside in favor of perception and thelogical analysis of experience based on perception. In this respect, he represented a more sophisticatedversion of the critical approach that animated the teaching of the Buddha himself.

With Dign!ga's austere two-part epistemology came not only a complex analysis of the types of perception but also a thorough study of the forms of inference and, with the theory of inference, a view oflanguage as any" poha ("exclusion of the other"). Dign!ga recognized that it was impossible for a wordlike cow to refer directly to the universal "cowness," since such an entity was nothing more than anintellectual construct. Instead, he argued that the word gained its meaning by excluding particulars thatdid not belong to a cow, such as the distinguishing characteristics of a horse.


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Whether the Chan ("Meditation") school (referred to in Japan as Zen) should be called "philosophical" inthe strict sense of the word might be debated. It could just as well be called "anti-philosophical," in thesense that it challenges discursive logic and favors direct experience over "words and letters," but it hadso much influence on the development of Buddhist thought that it cannot be excluded. One of the keydocuments in the history of Chan is The Platform S (tra of the Sixth Patriarch by Huineng (638–713). Inthis text the master Hongren (601–674) asks his disciples to write verses expressing the basic point of theBuddha's teaching. The master then uses the verses to decide who should carry on the mantle of his

authority. One student writes a verse saying that the body is the tree of wisdom and the mind is the standof a mirror: the purpose of meditation is to wipe the mirror and not allow it to become dusty. Huinengresponds with a strict application of the concept of emptiness: "The mirror of the mind is always clear and pure. How can it be defiled by dust?" Out of Huineng's teaching grew the Southern school of Chan, withan emphasis on sudden awakening. The Northern school, which traced its origin to Huineng's rival,Shenxiu (c. 606–706), stressed a view of gradual awakening.

The intellectual strength of the Chan tradition shows itself vividly in the work of the Japanese Zen masterand philosopher D)gen (1200–1253). D)gen was born in the family of an influential courtier but lost hisfamily at an early age and entered the Tendai monastery on Mount Hiei in Kyoto to become a monk. Notsatisfied with his studies, he traveled to China and received what he later called "the dharma-gate of face-

to-face transmission." Returning to Japan, he founded the S)t) school of Japanese Zen, a school that isknown for its practice of "just sitting." D)gen's major work, the Sh,b, genz , (Treasury of the true dharma eye), crosses the line between poetry and philosophy with its eloquent and paradoxical explorations of theconcept of emptiness. It is relentlessly analytical, while it constantly subverts the linear process of logicalanalysis; it also is intensely intellectual, while it dissolves the intellect in a quest for pure experience.

RECENT BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

The history of Buddhist philosophy since the mid-nineteenth century has been dominated in one form oranother by the encounter with the West. The Therav!da tradition felt Western influence as early as theend of the nineteenth century, when the Theosophists Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907) and H. P.

Blavatsky (1831–1891) arrived in Sri Lanka, converted to Buddhism, and attempted to create a modern,rational Buddhism. They criticized practices that they considered corrupt or superstitious, like theworship of local deities, and they argued that Buddhists should return to the tradition's pragmatic, down-to-earth, experiential roots. This interpretation of the Buddhist tradition continues to have enormousinfluence in contemporary accounts of the Buddha's teaching.

One of the most influential attempts to bring Buddhism into dialogue with Western philosophy took placein the Kyoto school in Japan. The Kyoto school began in the departments of philosophy and religion atKyoto State University under the influence of Nishida Kitar ) (1870–1945). Nishida attempted to be loyalto Japanese traditions, especially Buddhism, and to synthesize Japanese traditions with the philosophicaltradition of the West. Nishida's project was taken up by his successor in Kyoto, Tanabe Hajime (1885–

1962), and by his student Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990). Nishida felt a deep affinity between Japanesethought and certain currents of German idealism, especially its use of dialectical logic and its opennesstoward mysticism. His concept of absolute nothingness involved a dialectical relationship of being andnonbeing and yielded a view of the self in which the self is "made nothing" so that it can open up to itstrue identity. In Religion and Nothingness (English translation 1982), Nishitani related this process to thehistory of Western philosophy and argued that Western thought had to pass through a stage of nihility toachieve a state of absolute nothingness, where it could embrace both being and nothingness. After thedeath of Nishitani, the Kyoto school has been less of a force in Japanese philosophy, but it remains one of


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the boldest attempts to cross the boundaries between philosophy and religion and between Buddhism andthe tradition of Western philosophy.

SEE ALSO

Dharma, article on Buddhist Dharma and Dharmas ; Eightfold Path ; Four Noble Truths ; M!dhyamika ; Nirv!*a ;Prajña ; Prat # tya-samutp!da ; Soteriology ; Soul, article on Buddhist Concepts ; Tath!gata-garbha ; Yog!c!ra .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Wilhelm Halbfass gives a thorough and illuminating account of nineteenth- and twentieth-centuryEuropean responses to Indian philosophy in India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding (Albany, N.Y.,1988). Bimal Krishna Matilal makes the analytical and critical dimension of Indian thought clear in Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague, 1971) and Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (Oxford, 1986). On the relationship between theoryand practice in Indian literature, see Sheldon Pollock, "The Theory of Practice and the Practice(Page 1303) of Theory in Indian Intellectual History," Journal of the American Oriental Society 105(1985): 499–519. Studies of the same issue in Classical Greek and Roman philosophy include Pierre

Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford, 1995), and Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, U.K., 1986). On the role of vision as ametaphor for philosophy in the Western tradition, see Han Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight: A Study in thePhenomenology of the Senses," in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology (1966;reprint, Evanston, Ill., 2001).

There are many helpful introductions to Buddhist thought. Three of the best are Walpola Rahula, Whatthe Buddha Taught (New York, 1974); Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London, 2000); and Donald W. Mitchell, Buddhism: Introducing the Buddhist Experience (New York, 2002). Karl H. Potter's Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (EnglewoodCliffs, N.J., 1963) still provides one of the most useful ways of understanding the relationship of the

doctrine of reincarnation to Indian theories of causation and epistemology. Steven Collins wrote animportant study of the no-self doctrine in Selfless Person (Cambridge, U.K., 1982).

For a summary of scholarship on the Buddhist councils, see André Bareau, Les premiers concilesbouddhiques (Paris, 1955); Charles S. Prebish, "A Review of Scholarship on the Buddhist Councils," Journal of Asian Studies 33 (1974): 239–254; and Janice J. Nattier and Charles S. Prebish,"Mah!sa+ghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism," History of Religions 16 (1977). Onthe doctrines of the eighteen nik " yas, see André Bareau, "Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribuésà Vasumitra, Bhavya, et Vin # tadeva," Journal Asiatique 242 (1954): 229–265; 244 (1956): 167–199.Vasubandhu's discussion of the personalist doctrine ( pudgala-v"da) is available in Edward Conze's Buddhist Scriptures (London, 1959), pp. 192–97.

The most inclusive account of the abhidharma is Karl H. Potter's Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D., Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 7 (Delhi, 1996). Vasubandhu's Abidharmako !a has beentranslated into French by Louis de La Vallée Poussin in L'Abhidharmako !a de Vasubandhu (Brussels,1971).

For an account of the Perfection of Wisdom literature and its role in the development of the Mah !y!na,see Edward Conze's The Perfection of Wisdom Literature, 2d ed. (Tokyo, 1978). Conze's translation ofThe Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and Its Verse Summary (Bolinas, Calif., 1973) gives a


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clear picture of the scriptural sources of the Mah!y!na. Another important Mah!y!na s%tra in translationis Etienne Lamotte's The Teaching of Vimalak $ rti (Vimalak $ rtinirde !a) (London, 1976).

The best source for a history of Madhyamaka thought is David Seyfort Ruegg's The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India (Wiesbaden, Germany, 1981). No single translation of N!g!rjuna's M (lamadhyamaka-k "rik " is considered definitive, but Jay L. Garfield, trans., The Fundamental Wisdomof the Middle Way (New York, 1995) provides a useful orientation to this fundamental text. A translation

of the Vigrahavy"vartan$ , one of N!g!rjuna's most important works on logic and epistemology, can befound in Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, "The Dialectical Method of N!g!rjuna," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971): 217–261. To study the disputes that divided the Madhyamaka tradition in India andTibet, there is no better source than The Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? edited by Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston, 2003). The mostaccessible translation of a Madhyamaka work on the bodhisattva path is &!ntideva's Bodhicary"vat "ra,translated by Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton (Oxford, 1996).

The basic sources of the Yog!c!ra tradition are available in Thomas A. Kochmuttom's A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the

Yog "c"rin (Delhi, 1989) and Stefan Anacker's Seven Works of Vasubandhu (Delhi, 1998). For scholarly

accounts of Dign!ga's thought, see Masaaki Hattori's Dign!ga, On Perception (Cambridge, Mass., 1968),and Richard P. Hayes, Dign" ga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1988). Tom J. F.Tillemans gives a good example of the excellent scholarship being done today on Dharmak # rti'sepistemology in Scripture, Logic, and Language: Essays on Dharmak $ rti and His Tibetan Successors (Somerville, Mass., 1999). One of the most helpful surveys of the issues that dominated the later traditionof Buddhist logic is Yuichi Kajiyama's translation of Mok $!karagupta's Tarkabh"*", in An Introductionto Buddhist Philosophy (Vienna, 1998).

Georges Dreyfus has written an engaging account of the scholar's life in a Tibetan monastery in TheSound of One Hand Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Monk (Berkeley, Calif., 2003). There is nosingle source to turn to for an introduction to Chinese Buddhist philosophy. Wing-tsit Chan provides

excerpts from major texts with helpful commentary in A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, N.J., 1963). Brook Ziporyn has written two important studies of Tiantai philosophy: Evil and/or/as theGood: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought (Cambridge,Mass., 2000), and Being and Ambiguity: Philosophical Experiments with Tiantai Buddhism (Chicago,2004). For a philosophical reflection on Zen, see Dale S. Wright, Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism (Cambridge, U.K., 1998). Important selections from D)gen's writings are available in KazuakiTanahashi, ed., Moon in a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master D, gen (New York, 1985).

James W. Heissig has written a useful history of the Kyoto school in Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu, 2001). Keiji Nishitani's most important work in English translationis Religion and Nothingness, translated by Jan van Bragt (Berkeley, Calif., 1982).

MALCOLM DAVID ECKEL (2005)


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2. FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS

Source Citation (MLA 7th Edition) Carter, John Ross. "Four Noble Truths." Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. 2nd ed. Vol. 5.Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 3178-3180. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 7 Aug.2012.

All strands of the Buddhist tradition recognize in the four noble truths (Skt., catv"ry "ryasaty"n$ ; Pali,catt "ri ariyasacc"ni) one of the earliest formulations of the salvific insight gained by the Buddha on theoccasion of his enlightenment. For the Therav!da tradition, the discourse on the four truths constitutes part of the first sermon of the Buddha, the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, delivered in the Deer Parknear Banaras to his five original disciples. The standard formulaic enumeration of the four truths as foundin this discourse is as follows:

This, monks, is the noble truth of dukkha ["suffering"]: birth is dukkha, old age is dukkha, disease isdukkha, dying is dukkha, association with what is not dear is dukkha, separation from what is dear isdukkha, not getting that which is wished for is dukkha; in brief, the five groups of grasping [i. e., the fivekhandhas; Skt., skandhas] are dukkha. And this, monks, is the noble truth of the uprising [ samudaya] ofdukkha: this craving, which is characterized by repeated existence, accompanied by passion for joys,delighting in this and that; that is to say, craving for sensual desires, craving for existence, craving forcessation of existence. And this, monks, is the noble truth of the cessation [ nirodha] of dukkha: completedispassion and cessation of craving, abandonment, rejection, release of it, without attachment to it. Andthis, monks, is the noble truth of the path [magga] leading to the cessation of dukkha; just this NobleEightfold Way; that is to say, proper view, proper intention, proper speech, proper action, properlivelihood, proper effort, proper mindfulness, proper concentration. (Sa' yutta Nik " ya 5.420ff.)

These four noble truths (formulaically, dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, magga) constitute a "middle way" between rigorous asceticism and sensual indulgence. The twin foci of truths are craving (Skt., t )*&"; Pali,ta&h") and ignorance (avidy"), craving to hold that which is impermanent, grasping for substantiality

where there is no abiding substance, and not knowing that this orientation inevitably yieldsunsatisfactoriness (Pali, dukkha; Skt., du#kha). Hence the twin foci draw attention to the fundamentalcause ( samudaya) of dukkha, and meditation on dukkha leads to a discernment that craving and ignoranceare its matrix.

The eightfold path, the fourth of the four noble truths, provides a means especially adapted to lead oneinto salvific insight, a way conforming completely to the Buddha's own salvific realization. In this sense,the eightfold path is the proper mode of religious living, one that subsumes ethics into soteriology.

Although some uncertainty remains among scholars as to whether the passage quoted above indeedrepresents the earliest formulation of the Buddha's teaching, in the early phase of the Buddhist tradition in

India (the so-called H # nay!na phase) the four noble truths played a major role in shaping the fundamentalorientation to religious living on the part of Buddhists. Early Buddhist schools in India differed in theirinterpretations of the four noble truths, but uniformly regarded its underlying thematic structure as oneinformed by metaphors of healing: symptom-disease, diagnosis-cause, elimination of cause, treatment orremedy. With (Page 3179) the rise of the Mah!y!na tradition the four noble truths became less central asa fundamental statement of the life situation and one's mode of engagement in a soteriological process, but continued to be revered as a fundamental part of the Buddha's early teachings.

THERAV!DA INTERPRETATIONS


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The Therav!da Buddhist tradition is prevalent in contemporary Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand. For atleast two millennia it has regarded the four truths as constitutive of its central soteriological doctrine. As aresult, considerable effort has been expended in the tradition on its exegesis. In an extended discussion onthe four noble truths, Buddhaghosa, in his fifth century CE classic, Visuddhimagga (The path of purity),comments at one point on the meaning of the term sacca ("truth"):

For those who examine [truth] closely with the eye of salvific wisdom [ paññ"], it is not distorted, like an

illusion, equivocated, like a mirage, and of an undiscoverable inherent nature, like the self amongsectarians, but, rather, it is the pasture of noble gnosis [ñ"&a] by means of its actual, undistorted,authentic condition. Just like [the characteristics of] fire, like the nature of the world, the actualundistorted, authentic condition is to be understood as the meaning of truth. (Visuddhimagga 16.24)

Among the many interpretations offered by Buddhaghosa for the existence of four, and only four, truthsis the Buddha's realization that the evolution of suffering, its cause, the devolution of suffering, and its cause are fully comprehensive of an analysis of the human condition and the way to liberation through it.(See Visuddhimagga 16.27.) Other analyses of the four truths suggest that the first Truth relates to the basis of craving; the second, to craving itself; the third, to the cessation of craving; and the fourth, to themeans to the cessation of craving. Similarly, the truths may be viewed as pertaining, respectively, to the

sense of attachment, delight in attachment, removal of attachment, and the means to the removal ofattachment. (See Visuddhimagga 16.27–28.) According to the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, the practitioner is to cultivate a fourfold awareness of the four truths in which dukkha is to be fullyunderstood; the origin of dukkha, abandoned; nirodha, realized; and magga, cultivated. The Therav!dacommentarial tradition has maintained that the soteriological moment arises in the simultaneity of thisfourfold awareness. (See Visuddhimagga 22.92.)

Although the tradition continued to elaborate analyses of the four truths arranged according to variousnumerical configurations (most frequently with the number sixteen), it has held to the conviction thatwhen the truths are fully penetrated and soteriologically known it is by one knowledge, through a single penetration, and at one instant. This knowledge of the four truths, they aver, is in and of itself salvific.

The Therav!da has continued to interpret the Eightfold Path as comprising three basic elements deemedintegral to religious living at its fullest: s$ la (Skt., !$ la), or moral virtue; sam"dhi, or meditativeconcentration; and paññ" (Skt., praj&"), or salvific wisdom. Proper view and intention are classed assalvific wisdom; proper speech, action, and livelihood are classed as expressions of moral virtue; and proper effort, mindfulness, and concentration are classed as forms of meditative concentration.

Finally, the tradition has utilized the notion of "emptiness" (Pali, suññat "; Skt., !(nyat ") in the analysis ofthe four noble truths. Buddhaghosa wrote:

In the highest sense, all the truths are to be understood as empty because of the absence of an experiencer,

a doer, someone extinguished, and a goer. Hence this is said:

For there is only suffering, no one who suffers, No doer, only the doing is found,Extinction there is, no extinguished man,There is the path, no goer is found.

Or alternatively,


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The first pair are emptyOf stableness, beauty, pleasure, self;Empty of self is the deathless state.Without stableness, pleasure, self is the path.Such, regarding them, is emptiness.(Visuddhimagga 16.90)

MAH!Y!NA INTERPRETATIONS

Although the Therav!da tradition applied the notion of "emptiness" in negating permanence, abidinghappiness, and substantiality as legitimate descriptions of sentient life, it is within the Mah!y!na that onefinds emptiness as a designation of reality in the highest sense. As part of the general critique of"substantiality" carried out by the Praj*! p!ramit! literature, even the four truths are declared void of realexistence. In this analysis, suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path to thecessation of suffering are themselves "empty."

In the Saddharmapu&- arika S (tra (Lotus S (tra), the old standard formulas of the epithets of the Buddhaand characteristics of dharma are repeated for the Tath!gata Candras%ryaprad # pa and his preaching, butthe four noble truths are only mentioned by title—there is no elaboration. The Saddharmapu&- arika

proclaims that such teaching is taken up and absorbed into the one comprehensive and centralsoteriological message (i.e., the "single vehicle"; ekay"na) of the s%tra.

Although the four noble truths are not featured in their earlier formulation in many Mah !y!na texts, the basic theme nonetheless persists: Life is awry, craving and ignorance are the cause, one's life can bechanged, and a way or means that brings this about is available. For example, the verse text of &!ntideva's Bodhicary"vat "ra does not contain the complete formula of the four noble truths. Praj*!karamati, acommentator on this great text, even points to the one verse (chap. 9, verse 41) where he finds a contrastclearly presented between the four noble truths and the "teaching of emptiness." Yet even though afundamental shift in the understanding of the path to liberation has taken place in this and otherMah!y!na texts, the underlying assessment as to the cause of suffering, that is, the basic thematic

structure of the four truths, remains unchanged. (Page 3180)

In the Madhyamakak "rik ", N!g!rjuna provides an incisive, penetrating analysis of the four noble truths.He maintains that du#kha, which evolves from the interplay of the constituents of individuality and theobjects of perception, can no longer be seen as having any fundamental ontological status, even in sa' s"ra, the fleeting "whirl" of repeated existence. The same is true, for that matter, of sa' s"ra itself, oreven of nirv"&a: All is emptiness ( !(nyat ").

Thus, the older-formulated Eightfold Path, which provided the remedy for the disease (du#kha) ofundisciplined and uninformed human existence, yielded with this shift in worldview to anotherformulation of the soteriological process, to another religious orientation that is also to be cultivated—the

bodhisattva path. Although the ontological interpretation of the four noble truths underwent change in thecumulative development of the Buddhist tradition, as in the case of the great Chinese Buddhist thinkerZhiyi (538–597), the fundamental theme that the inadequacy of human life results from craving andignorance, which can be eradicated by following the path to enlightenment taught by the Buddha, hascontinued.

SEE ALSO


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Eightfold Path ; Soteriology .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The text of the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta is available in English translation in Sa' yutta Nik " ya:The Book of Kindred Sayings (1917–1930), translated by C. A. F. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward(London, 1950–1956). For the Visuddhimagga, see the reliable translation by Bhikku Ñy!*amoli, The Path of Purification, 2d ed. (Colombo, 1964). A related text, Upatissa's Vimuttimagga, has beentranslated from the Chinese as The Path of Freedom by N. R. M. Ehara, Soma Thera, and KhemindaThera (Kandy, 1977). For an overview and analysis of the four truths from a Therav!da perspective, seeWalpola Rahula's What the Buddha Taught , rev. ed. (New York, 1974).

!"# %&'()"*

Anderson, Carol S. Pain and Its Ending: The Four Noble Truths in the Therav"da Buddhist Canon.Richmond, Va., 1999.

Eckel, Malcolm David, and John Thatamanil. "Beginningless Ignorance: A Buddhist View of the Human

Condition." In Human Condition, edited by Robert Cummings Neville, pp. 50–71. Albany, 2001.

Norman, K. R. "Why are the Four Noble Truths called 'Noble'?" In Ananda: Papers on Buddhism and Indology: A Felicitation Volume Presented to Ananda Weihena Palliya Guruge on his Sixtieth Birthday,edited by Y. Karunadasa, pp. 11–13. Columbo, 1990.

Pereira, Jose. "The Four Noble Truths in Vasubandhu." Buddhist Heritage in India and Abroad , edited byG. Kuppuram and K. Kumudamani, pp. 129–142. Delhi, 1992.

Skilling, Peter. "A Buddhist Verse Inscription from Andhra Pradesh." Indo-Iranian Journal 34 (1991):239–246.

JOHN R OSS CARTER (1987)

Revised Bibliography


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3. EIGHTFOLD PATH

Source Citation (MLA 7th Edition)Bhikkhu, Thanissaro. "Eightfold Path." Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. 2nd ed. Vol. 4.Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 2737-2739. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 7 Aug.2012.

The noble eightfold path (Pali, ariyo a%% ha+ giko maggo) is among the earliest formulations of theBuddhist path of practice. The Dhammacakkhappavattana Sutta (Setting the wheel of dhamma in motion),traditionally regarded as the Buddha's first discourse, introduces the eightfold path as a middle way between two extremes: indulgence in sensual pleasure and self-mortification. Sensual indulgence iscondemned as "gross, domestic, common, ignoble, and not conducive to the goal." Self-mortification iscondemned as "painful, ignoble, and not conducive to the goal." The eightfold path, however, is praisedas productive of vision, productive of knowledge, and conducive to calm, direct knowing, self-awakening,and nirv"&a. These statements are best evaluated in light of the story of the Buddha's quest for awakening,which provides the path with both narrative and theoretical context.

Having enjoyed lavish sensual pleasures in his youth, the young bodhisattva (Buddha-to-be) realized thatthese pleasures—subject to aging, illness, and death—could provide no lasting happiness. So he left homeand took up the life of a wilderness mendicant to see if a deathless happiness could be attained throughhuman effort. After six years of exploring various dead-end paths, including extreme self-mortification,he happened upon a path whose central factor consisted of a focused mental absorption called jh"na (Skt.,dhy"na). Developing this absorption to a level of pure mindfulness and equanimity, he applied his mindto developing three knowledges: knowledge of previous lifetimes, knowledge of the passing away and re-arising of living beings, and knowledge of the ending of " savas ("effluents" or "fermentations" that defilethe mind). Through this third knowledge, the bodhisattva gained release from the " savas of sensuality,ignorance, and "becoming"—the process whereby craving and clinging lead to rebirth. With this release,he realized the deathless and was now a Buddha: an awakened one.

The Pali discourses state that the first two of the three knowledges contained elements in common withother religious teachings of the time, but that the second knowledge also contained an element distinctiveto the Buddha: his insight that the level of an individual's rebirth was due to the quality of his or herintentional actions, or kamma (Skt., karman). Actions performed under the influence of right views led toa happy rebirth on the higher levels of becoming; those performed under the influence of wrong views,led to a painful rebirth on the lower levels. Thus, action leading to rebirth was of three types: skillful,unskillful, and mixed. However, the impermanence characterizing all levels of becoming meant that theycaused suffering for anyone searching for lasting happiness. Seeing this, the bodhisattva then applied hisinsight to the role of views in shaping action to see what kind of views would condition a fourth type ofaction, leading to the end of action and thus to the end of becoming. (Page 2738)

This question was answered in the third knowledge: A path of action based on viewing experience interms of four categories—suffering, its cause, its cessation, and the path of action leading to itscessation—led to a realization of the deathless. Because this path could be perfected, he realized that itwas a matter of skill, rather than of grace, fate, or coincidence. Thus, to teach that skill to others, heformulated the four view-categories underlying it as the four noble truths; and the fourth truth—the pathof action leading to the deathless—he formulated as the eightfold path.

The Pali discourses repeatedly cite the Buddha's insights into the nature and scope of action as the primary teachings distinguishing Buddhism from other contemporary religions. The eightfold path, as the


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expression of these insights, is thus the quintessential Buddhist teaching. According to the Mah" parinibb"na Sutta, the Buddha on the night of his passing away taught the eightfold path to his lastconvert in response to the question of whether teachers of other religions were also awakened. Only in ateaching that promoted the eightfold path, he maintained, could awakened people be found.

The first discourse lists the path factors without explanation: right view, right resolve, right speech, rightaction, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. Other Pali discourses

classify these eight factors under three headings: the first two under discernment , the next three undervirtue, and the last three under concentration. Still others define the factors in detail. Because the path tothe deathless overlaps somewhat with the actions leading to happy results in present and future lifetimes,the path can be taken as a guide, not only to transcendent happiness, but also to mundane happiness. Thuseach factor of the path has a mundane and a transcendent level.

Right view on the mundane level encapsulates the bodhisattva's second knowledge: that there is value inthe act of giving; that skillful and unskillful actions bear, respectively, pleasant and unpleasant fruit; thatthere are other levels of being; and that there are people who, practicing rightly, have directly knownthese principles for themselves. Transcendent right view encapsulates the third knowledge: knowing interms of the four noble truths.

Mundane right resolve aims at renouncing sensual passion, at freedom from ill will, and at freedom fromharmfulness. Transcendent right resolve entails directed thought and evaluation as factors of rightconcentration.

Right speech abstains from lies, harsh speech, divisive speech, and idle chatter. This and the remainingfactors are mundane or transcendent depending on whether they are informed by mundane ortranscendent right view and right resolve.

Right action abstains from killing, from stealing, and from sexual misconduct (or from sexual intercourse,according to one of the discourses).

Right livelihood, for lay people, means not selling meat, poison, weapons, slaves, or intoxicants. Formonastics it means not trying to attract material support by means of scheming, persuading, hinting, belittling, or offering material incentives.

Right effort tries to prevent unskillful mental states from arising, to abandon unskillful mental states thathave already arisen, to give rise to skillful mental states, and to bring already-existing skillful mentalstates to the culmination of their development.

Right mindfulness entails four activities. The first is keeping track of the body in and of itself—ardent,alert, and mindful—putting aside grief and distress with regard to the world. The remaining three

activities follow the same formula, replacing "body" with feelings, mind states, and mental qualities.

Right concentration consists of four levels of jh"na. The first is composed of directed thought andevaluation focused on a single object—a classic object being the breath—accompanied by pleasure andrapture born of seclusion. The second jh"na consists of mental unification, devoid of directed thought andevaluation, accompanied by pleasure and rapture born of concentration. The third jh"na is a pleasantequanimous state, devoid of rapture. The fourth jh"na consists of purity of mindfulness and equanimity,free from pleasure or pain. One discourse, in defining noble right concentration, adds a fifth factor tothese four jh"nas: the ability to step back from any level of jh"na to observe it. Another discourse states


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that one may use jh"na as a basis for awakening by observing its factors in terms of the four noble truths,so as to develop dispassion for those factors, and then inclining the mind to the deathless.

According to the Bh(mija Sutta, the rightness of these factors is an objective quality, determined by theirability to issue in the deathless when put into practice, regardless of whether one expresses a wish for thataim. This principle is illustrated with similes: trying to attain the deathless by means of wrong view,wrong resolve, and so on, is like trying to squeeze sesame oil from gravel. Following the path of right

view, and so on, is like obtaining sesame oil by squeezing sesame seeds.

The Pali discourses depict the relationships among these eight factors in a variety of ways, in keepingwith the complexity of early Buddhist teachings on causality. Individuals at different points in the causal patterns leading to suffering will need differing explanations of how to dismantle those patterns to meettheir specific needs. Some discourses depict a linear relationship among the factors, but in two different patterns: one, following the order in which the eight factors are listed; and another beginning with thevirtue factors, followed by the concentration and then the discernment factors. Other discourses suggestthat specific factors—such as right effort or right mindfulness—when pursued in all their ramifications,incorporate all the other path factors as well.

The most complex treatment of the relationships among the factors is found in the Mah"catt "r $ saka Sutta (The great (Page 2739) forty), which places right concentration at the heart of the path, with the otherseven factors its "requisites." This discourse adds, however, that right view, right effort, and rightmindfulness underlie the development of all eight factors. This same discourse also maintains that theeightfold path leads only to a preliminary level of awakening. Full awakening requires two furtherfactors—right knowledge and right release—although these factors are nowhere defined in the Palidiscourses.

The eightfold path was central to the teachings of all the early schools of Buddhism, but succeedinggenerations developed it in new directions. Before the early canons were closed, the question arose as tohow a Buddha's path of practice might differ from that of his arahant (Skt., arhat ) disciples. The various

schools mined their j"taka stories (accounts of the Buddha's previous lives) to produce lists of perfections(Pali, p"ram$ ; Skt., p"ramit ") that constituted the Buddha's path. The Sarv!stiv!dins, whose list laterformed the framework for the Mah!y!na bodhisattva path, found six perfections embodied in their j"takas: giving, virtue, energy, endurance, dhy"na, and discernment. Five of these perfections corresponddirectly to factors of the eightfold path: virtue to right speech, action, and livelihood; energy andendurance to right effort; dhy"na to right concentration; and discernment to right view and resolve. As forgiving, it derives from mundane right view.

Over time, however, Mah!y!na discourses redefined the individual perfections. The bodhisattva's perfection of discernment, for instance, consisted of insight into the lack of essential nature in all phenomena. His perfection of virtue allowed him to kill, for example, if his larger motivation was

compassionate. In this way, the bodhisattva path, while retaining some of the structure of the eightfold path, filled that structure with new elements. The Therav!din school, in its commentaries, made its ownde facto changes in the eightfold path, redefining the practice of jh"na and treating it as an optional factor.

In modern times, two developments—the rise of Pali studies in Japan and the rise of lay meditationmovements, based on Therav!da techniques, in Asia and the West—have prompted interest in using thestructure of the eightfold path to provide a guide for lay daily life.


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In these ways, succeeding generations of Buddhists, lay and monastic, have continued to mine theeightfold path for guidance in their quest for happiness.

SEE ALSO

Four Noble Truths .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A modern Western introduction to the eightfold path is Bhikkhu Bodhi, The Noble Eightfold Path (Seattle,1994). A modern Asian treatment is Ajaan Lee Dhammadharo, The Path to Peace and Freedom for the Mind , available at: http://www.accesstoinsight.org . The Dhammacakkappavatana Sutta is translated inBhikkhu Bodhi, trans., The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Sa. yutta Nik " ya (Boston, 2000), pp. 1843–1847. A translation of the Maggavibha+ ga Sutta, which analyzes theindividual factors of the path, is included in the same work, pp. 1528–1529. A translation of the Mah" parinibb"na Sutta is included in Maurice Walsh, trans., The Long Discourses of the Buddha: ATranslation of the D$ gha Nik " ya (Boston, 1995), pp. 231–277. Bhikkhu Ñ!*amoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi,trans., The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nik " ya (Boston,

1995), contains translations of the Mah"catt "r $ saka Sutta (pp. 934–940) and the Bh(mija Sutta (pp. 997– 1001). Alternative translations for all of these discourses are available from Access to Insight at:http://www.accesstoinsight.org .

THANISSARO BHIKKHU (2005)


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'Everything does not exist'—this, Kacc!yana, is the second extreme. Kacc!yana, without approachingeither extreme, the Tath!gata teaches you a doctrine in the middle.

Dependent upon ignorance [avidy"] arise dispositions [ sa' sk "ra]; dependent upon dispositions arisesconsciousness [vijñ"na]; dependent upon consciousness arises the psychophysical personality [n"ma-r ( pa]; dependent upon the psychophysical personality arise the six senses [ *a-" yatana]; dependent uponthe six senses arises contact [ spar !a]; dependent upon contact arises feeling [vedan"]; dependent upon

feeling arises craving [t )*&" ]; dependent upon craving arises grasping [up"d "na]; dependent upongrasping arises becoming [bhava]; dependent upon becoming arises birth [ j"ti]; dependent upon birtharises old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and despair. Thus arises this entire massof suffering. However, from the utter fading away and ceasing of ignorance, there is cessation ofdispositions … from the ceasing of birth, there is ceasing of old age and death, grief, lamentation,suffering, dejection and despair." (Sa' yutta Nik " ya 2.16–17)

Existence (atthit "; Skt., astitva) and nonexistence (n/atthit "; Skt., n" stitva) referred to here are not simplenotions of empirical existence or nonexistence. In the Indian context, existence implies permanence;hence the Buddha's appeal to the empirical fact of cessation of phenomena to reject the notion ofexistence. Nonexistence refers to complete annihilation without any form of continuity, hence the

Buddha's appeal to the empirical fact of arising of phenomena. Thus, the fundamental philosophical problem involved here is how to account for continuity in human experience without either having to posit permanence of some sort or accept absolute discontinuity.

Linguistic conventions of his day did not provide the Buddha with a term to express his ideas, hence itwas necessary to coin an entirely different compound term: prat $ tya-samutp"da. Samutp"da literallymeans "arising in combination," or "co-arising." But when compounded with the term prat $ tya (a gerundfrom the root i, "to move," with prefix prati meaning "toward"), implying "moving" or "leaning toward,"the term means "dependence." Prat $ tya-samutp"da may, therefore, be translated as "dependent arising."Formulating his experience in this way, the Buddha was able to avoid several metaphysical issues thathave plagued most discussions of the principle of causation in the East as well as in the West.

Attempts to understand how a cause produces an effect have led philosophers to adopt a reductionist perspective and look for an "essence," or "substance" in the cause that gives rise to the effect. Such a perspective is also motivated by a desire to predict with absolute certainty the manner of the emergenceof the effect from the cause. By speaking of the dependence of the effect on the cause, which is what theterm prat $ tya-samutp"da is intended to express, both the reductionist or essentialist perspective and theimpossible task of predicting an event with absolute certainty are avoided.

Thus, the Buddha spoke not of self-sufficient things or substances but of "dependently arisen phenomena"( prat $ tyasamutpanna-dharma). These refer to phenomena that have already occurred. There is noimplication here that individual and discrete phenomena (dharma) are experienced and that their

"dependence" upon one another is imagined (as was understood by the Humeans) or is the result oftranscendental categories of understanding (as the Kantians believed). On the contrary, both phenomenaand the manner of their dependence are part of human experience. However, this "dependence" is thenstretched out, by means of an inductive inference, to explain the events of the dim past as well as of thefuture. This is the manner in which the Buddha arrived at the uniformity of the principle of dependence.When he claimed that this "dependent arising" has remained as such despite either the arising of theTath!gatas or the nonarising of the Tath!gatas he was hinting at the universality of that experience. Theuniform and universal principle of dependence is expressed in a most abstract way in the oft-recurring


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statement: "When that exists, this comes to be; on the arising of that, this arises. When that does not exist,this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this ceases" ( Majjhima Nik " ya 1.262–264).

In the Discourse to K "ty" yana this principle of dependence is utilized to explain the processes of human bondage as well as of freedom. The positive statement of the twelvefold formula, beginning with thestatement "Depending upon ignorance arise dispositions," explains the human personality in bondage,avoiding both eternalistic and nihilistic views. The human person is here referred to as n"ma-r ( pa (the

psychophysical personality). The nature of that person is conditioned mostly by his or her consciousness(vijñ"na), which, in its turn, is determined by the person's understanding (and in the case of the person in bondage, by his or her lack of understanding— avidy") and the dispositions ( sa' sk "ra) formed on the basis of that understanding. Conditioned by such understanding and dispositions, a person comes toexperience ( spar !a, vedan") the world through the six sense faculties ( *a-" yatana) and to respond by being attracted to it (t )*&"). Thus, the person's behavior (karman) comes to be dominated not only by theworld he or she experiences but also by the way in which the person experiences it. If one is attracted bythat world one tends to cling to it (up"d "na). One's whole personality, what he or she wants to be orachieve, will be determined by that craving and grasping. Such would be this person's becoming ( bhava),not only in this life, but also in a future life ( j"ti). Involved in such a process of becoming (bhava), the person will be pleased and satisfied when obtaining what is craved and unhappy and frustrated when he

or she does not. Yet even these satisfactions, which are temporary at best, turn out to be dissatisfactionsas the craving and grasping continue to increase. Such (Page 7365) is the mass of suffering the personwill experience through successive stages of life and in subsequent births.

A proper understanding of phenomena as impermanent (anitya) and nonsubstantial (an"tman) wouldenable a person to pacify his or her dispositional tendencies ( sa' sk "ropasama). Pacification ofdispositions leads to a better understanding of one's own personality as well as the world of experience.Perceiving phenomena as being nonsubstantial, one will neither assume the existence of an inexorablelaw nor believe in complete lawlessness. When one responds to that world of experience with anunderstanding of conditionality one's responses will not be rigidly predetermined (asamsk ) ta).Abandoning passion or craving (t )*&"), one's actions will be dominated by dispassion (vair " gya), and

more positively, by compassion (karu&") for one's self as well as others. Thirsting for nothing, with fewwants, the person will be freed from most of the "constraints" and lead a happy and contented life untildeath. With no grasping, there will be no more becoming (bhava) and hence the cessation of any possiblefuture births ( j"tik *aya). The recognition of the possibility of replacing ignorance (avidy") with wisdom( jñ"na, vidy") and craving and grasping with dispassion and compassion leaves the individual with thecapacity to attain freedom. Thus, the principle of dependent arising avoids both strict determinism andabsolute indeterminism; it is neither an absolutely inviolable law nor a chaotic lawlessness.

The explanation of the human personality, both in bondage and in freedom, was of paramount importancefor the Buddha. Hence the discussion of the principle of dependence is confined to these two aspects inthe Discourse to K "ty" yana. Elsewhere, however, he applies this principle to explain most other aspects

of human existence. For example, without positing a first cause or any primordial substance he appliedthe principle of dependence to explain the evolution and dissolution of the world process. This principleis also utilized in the explanation of the process by which one comes to have knowledge of the worldthrough sensory as well as extrasensory means. Moral behavior, social life, and religious and spiritual phenomena are given causal explanations as well. For this reason, the Buddha did not hesitate to declare,"He who sees dependent arising sees the doctrine (dharma)" ( Majjhima Nik " ya 1.190–191).

The Abhidharma period was the most active and highly vibrant epoch of scholastic activity in Buddhisthistory. During this period the contents of the discourses were carefully analyzed and presented in


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nondiscursive form. In the process, the "dependently arisen phenomena" referred to by the Buddha cameto be listed and classified, together with an analysis of the various types of causal relations ( pratyaya) thatobtain among them. However, a few centuries later, metaphysical speculations began to emerge in theBuddhist tradition. Two schools of Buddhism, the Sarv!stiv!da and Sautr !ntika, speculating on theconcepts of time and space, produced theories of momentariness and atomism, thereby engenderinginsoluble problems such as the metaphysical notions of absolute identity and absolute difference.Contradicting the Buddha's notion of nonsubstantiality, the Sarv!stiv!dins accepted an underlying

"substance" ( svabh"va) in phenomena, while the Sautr !ntikas surreptitiously introduced a metaphysicalnotion of a transmigrating personality ( pudgala).

The Pali Abhidharma work Kath"vatthu criticized and rejected these views. In spite of this criticism,these views continued to survive. The early Mah!y!na s(tras represent another attempt to get rid of thesubstantialist metaphysics of these two schools by emphasizing a negative approach to the problem ofreality, one based upon the notion of "emptiness" ( !(nyat "). For example, one of the early Mah!y!na s(tras—the K "! yapaparivarta —continued to describe the "middle path" in negative terms, while at thesame time retaining the positive version discussed in the Discourse to K "ty" yana.

N!g!rjuna's famous treatise, the M (lamadhyama-kak "rik ", considered by many as the most sophisticated

philosophical justification of Mah!y!na, is a determined attempt to return to the original message of theBuddha by criticizing the substantialist views of the Sarv!stiv!dins and the Sautr !ntikas. Restatement ofthe principle of "dependent arising" without having to posit a substantial connection ( svabh"va) betweena cause and an effect (as the Sarv!stiv!dins did), or to emphasize their difference (as the Sautr !ntikas did),seems to be the foremost concern of N!g!rjuna. "Emptiness" here becomes a synonym for"nonsubstantiality" (an"tman).

The Buddha's conception of karmic continuity and moral responsibility also had to be rescued from thesubstantialist interpretations of the Buddhist metaphysicians. N!g!rjuna seems to have been aware of astatement popular among the Buddhists relating to the doctrine of karman that read: " Karmas do not perish (na pra&a ! yanti) even after a hundred myriads of aeons. Having attained the harmony of

conditions (s"magr $ ) and the proper time (k "la), they bear fruit for the human beings" (La Vallée Poussin,1903, p. 324). Inspired probably by this verse, N!g!rjuna ( M (lamadhyamakak "rik " 17.14) upheld thenotion of a nonperishable (avipra&a !a) karman, comparing it with

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