01425690123902.pdf

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

1/15

This article was downloaded by: [University of the West of Scotland]On: 08 November 2014, At: 07:28Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

British Journal of Sociology

of EducationPublication details, including instructions for

authors and subscription information:

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbse20

Taking Sides in SocialResearch: Essays on

partisanship and biasSara Delamont , Mike Oliver & Paul Connolly

Published online: 28 Jun 2010.

To cite this article:Sara Delamont , Mike Oliver & Paul Connolly (2001) Taking

Sides in Social Research: Essays on partisanship and bias, British Journal of

Sociology of Education, 22:1, 157-169

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01425690123902

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the Content) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbse20http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01425690123902http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbse20

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

2/15

form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Downloadedby[UniversityoftheWestofSco

tland]at07:2808Novem

ber2014
http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

3/15

British Journal of Sociology of Education, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2001

REVIEW SYMPOSIUM

Taking Sides in Social Research: essays on partisanship and bias

MARTYNHAMMERSLEY, 2000

London, Routledge196 pp, ISBN 0-415-20287-6

Reviewed by Sara Delamont, Mike Oliver & Paul Connolly

Imagine it is the 2000 BERA Conference. In one of Cardiffs fashionable cafe bars, two

women are relaxing over mocha lattes. Eowyn, an educational ethnographer is down

from Glasgow[1]. Zenobia, who was her Ph.D. student, is now working on a project in

Kent. They have caught up on the personal news, and fall to discussing academic

matters.

Zenobia: Have you seen Martyn Hammersleys new book? Fenella is a great fan

and says I must read it.

Eowyn: Im reviewing itin a symposium with three men.

Zenobia: Oh dearyou cant win that battle. If you raise any feminist issues

you look like a single minded bore with a one track mind.

Eowyn: And if I dont, they dont get raised at all, because I know none of

the men will deal with them.

Zenobia: But by asking you the review editor must want a feminist angle onthe book.

Eowyn: I hope so. Im going to make some feminist points, but there are

other important things about the book.

Zenobia: Whats the book about?

Eowyn: Revisiting some classic sociologists to explore partisanship and bias in

social research. He starts with The Enlightenment and comes up to

current debates.

Zenobia: OhSusan Haack versus Patti Lather and Sandra Harding. Really

exciting. I need a good secondary source to help me deal with them.

Eowyn: NoMarx, Weber, Mills, Gramsci, Althusser, Becker and Gouldner.

Haacks and Lathers major books arent cited.

Zenobia: What! When Haacks (1995) Evidence and Inquiry is the big defence of

objectivity in a modern context and is a mega best seller?

Eowyn: Yes: and I think Haacks position is very similar to Hammersleys so

it is a real pity he doesnt engage with her. And he doesnt deal with

ISSN 0142-569 2 (print)/ISSN 1465-334 6 (online)/01/01015713 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/0142569002003084 6



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

4/15

158 Review Symposium

Lathers (1991) Getting Smart or any of her work since 1993, or

Hardings since 1992, or Liz Stanleys since 1983. It is very out of

date in its coverage of any women who support Hammersleys

position, and even more so in its discussions of any feminists who

disagree with him. Stanley (2000) has shown how Hammersley fails

to keep up to date with the publications of women on partisanship inher major discussion of Mills and Gouldner. But Hammersley doesnt

engage with any feminists. Just Marx, Weber, Mills, Gramsci,

Althusser, Becker and Gouldner.

Zenobia: Whos Gouldner? I dont think Ive ever heard of him. Should I have

read him?

Eowyn: Hes dead. He was a big name in the USA in the 70spointed out

the many limitations of Parsonian sociology. Stanley (2000) deals

with his ideas too. He isnt taught or read very much these days. HefoundedTheory and Society, because he wanted a journal fully engaged

with the social world. Hammersley is interested in his debate with

Becker about Whose side are we on? Hammersley gives Becker and

Gouldner a chapter each.

Zenobia: So a dead white male book. No wonder Fenella insists I read it, her

version of sociology of education is based on re-thinking Weber.

Eowyn: Well the book raises important questions. Hammersley is bothered

that scholars are not articulating the case for value neutrality, ordefending value neutrality; rather its obsolence is being taken for

granted. So he has revisited what he sees as the classic texts

advocating partisanship, to see what they actually say, as opposed to

what they are believed to say.

Zenobia: Does it deal with the disputes over qualitative research on race in

UK schools?

Eowyn: Yeah. Chapters 5 and 6 are about that. Chapter 6 is written with

Gomm, and the book is dedicated to Fosters memory.Zenobia: I never understood that debate. If you read Beckers Whose side are

we on?, and grasp his concept of the Hierarchy of Credibility, that

whole debate just melts away. Foster was reporting the rational,

objective, facts about a school from the top of the hierarchy of

credibility, while Gillborn, Wright, Sewell, and Mac an Ghaill were

collecting the perspectives of the group at the very, very, bottom of

the hierarchy of credibility.

Eowyn: You mean Afro-Caribbean boys are the lowest group in that hier-archy?

Zenobia: Yes. That debate illustrated Beckers point perfectly. Should I read

the book?

Eowyn: Yesbut I dont think you will enjoy it. It is dense, and not easy to

read. The topics are important, but they do not really come to life.

I would have liked more examplesmore discussion of how these

classic theorists are directly relevant to current research problems: to

things we are all currently gathering data on.



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

5/15

Review Symposium 159

Zenobia: Like the collapse of B.Ed. recruitment, or the impact of loans on HE

[higher education] access, or the expansion of medical student

numbers, or the governments failure to get rid of Clause 28 in

England?

Eowyn: Yesany empirical topic really. I would rather read a book of new

research than another exegesis of famous gures who wrote inanother country a long time ago. In the end its the empirical work

that really matters to me: Gouldners study of industrial bureaucracy,

Beckers ethnography of medical students. I wish Hammersley him-

self would do more empirical work and write it up, rather than keep

revisiting dead white males.

Zenobia: Empirical work on schools?

Eowyn: Ideally on something outside education: elder abuse, or CJD or why

people like Alton Towers or why visitors go to Althorpe: anythingempirical to get away from the library, anything away from edu-

cation to help challenge the familiarity of schooling. (Delamont &

Atkinson, 1995)

Zenobia: You sound jaded.

Eowyn: Sorrythe issue of research bias is important. I just wish I had

enjoyed the book more. It is hard to stay engaged with books that

just ignore womens work as if it never existed even when it bears

directly on their argument.

Zenobia: Such as?

Eowyn: Well, Hammersley gives a potted history of the Chicago School (pp.

7577) from 1890 to 1970. It is taken from classic male authors, and

is all about men [2]. He ignores Mary Jo Deegans (1988) account of

how the separation of pure research from reform and politics was

accomplished by driving out all the women from the sociology

department, and expunging them from the historical record, like

Stalin wiping opponents out of the Soviet photographs. Then heignores all the discussion in Fine (1995) about the same exclusion of

women happening in Beckers era. He discusses The Fantastic Lodge

(Hughes, 1961) without mentioning Helen McGill Hughes.

Zenobia: Whats The Fantastic Lodge? Ive never heard of it.

Eowyn: A life history of a woman who is a heroin addict. Becker did the data

collection, but Helen Hughess name is on the book. Well worth

reading.

Zenobia: Maybe Hammersley disputes Deegans (1988, 1995) accounts?

Eowyn: Well then, he should say so. By ignoring it he disses Deegan, leaves

out an important issue (can there be high status, objective sociology

if there are women researchers involved?) and perpetuates the male

chauvinist history of Chicago so his readers will never know there is

a feminist alternative to that orthodoxy.

Zenobia: OK, he has neglected feminist re-readings of intellectual history.

Where does he stand on critical ethnography?



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

6/15


Eowyn: He does not engage with Wexler or Carspecken so Im not sure.

Zenobia: And he must hate postmodernism?

Eowyn: It is a very muted presence in the book. There is no Denzin as sole

author after 1990, no Judith Butler, only one citation to Flax and no

Lather since 1993. Stronach & MacLure (1997) is not cited.

Zenobia: So Hammersley isnt living in the seventh moment? (Denzin &

Lincoln, 2000).

Eowyn: Denitely not. But then who is except Denzin himself?

Zenobia: Well we are. This is a seventh moment book review, isnt it?

Eowyn: No. Its only a fourth moment review of a second moment bookwe

should get back to the conference.

Correspondence: Sara Delamont, Cardiff School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University,Glamorgan Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WT, UK.

NOTES

[1] Eowyn is named after the woman warrior in The Lord of the Rings, and appeared in Delamont (2000).

Zenobia is named after the third-century warrior queen of Palmyra, and is a new character.

[2] There are two basic stories about what happened to Chicago sociology after 1920. In the dominant, male

versions of the story, three men of perspicacityFaris, Park and Burgessinherited the department,

puried it, and created modern sociology there. That is, they separated academic sociology as an objective

scientic discipline from social administration, social policy, social work, home economics and politicalactivism of all kinds. The minority feminist version of the story casts Park as a villain who could not work

with women and was not prepared to recognise their scholarship in his history of the department. Deegan

(1988) shows in considerable detail how Mead, Dewey, Thomas and Small were all able to work with

women, and shared some of the social and political concerns of Abbott, A ddams, Breckinridge and Talbot.

Two organisational changes, an ideological division, and the malign inuence of one man (Park) explain

for Deegan why these women were excluded from the historical record of sociology (Delamont, 1992).

REFERENCES

DEEGAN, M.J. (1988) Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Press).DEEGAN, M.J. (1995) The second sex and the Chicago School, in: G.A. FINE (Ed.) A Second Chicago School?

(Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press).

DELAMONT, S. (1992) Old fogies and intellectual women, Womens History Review, 1, pp. 3961.

DELAMONT, S. (2000) Confessions of a ragpicker, in: H. HODKINSON (ed.) Feminism and Educational Research

Methodologies(Manchester, Manchester Metropolitan University).

DELAMONT, S. & ATKINSON, P. (1995) Fighting Familiarity (Cresskill, NJ, Hampton Press).

DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (Eds) (2000) Handbook of Qualitative Research, (2nd edn) (London, Sage).

FINE, G.A. (Ed.) (1995) A Second Chicago School? (Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press).

HAAC K, S. (1995) Evidence and Inquiry (Oxford, Blackwell).

HUGHES, H.M. (1961) The Fantastic Lodge (Greenwich, CT, Fawcett).LATHE R, P. (1991) Getting Smart(London, Routledge).

STANLEY, L. (2000) Children of our time, in: H. HODKINSON(Ed.) Feminism and Educational Research Methodologies

(Manchester, Manchester Metropolitan University).

STRONACH, I. & MACL URE, M. (1997) Educational Research Undone (Buckingham, Open University Press).

It is not until the nal paragraph in this book that Hammersley comes clean and rmly

states that the purpose of the book is to defend the proper operation of research



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

7/15


communities on which the pursuit of social scientic knowledge necessarily depends (p.

166). These research communities, he believes, are under attack from those like me who

seek to redene the goals of enquiry as the promotion of some practical or political

cause and that the only defence is to develop a proper understanding of the nature of

error and bias in social enquiry.

It does not, of course, come as a surprise to anyone familiar with Hammersleysprevious work to nd that he is continuing to promote the idea of value-free, objective

social research and the university as the key institution to carry out such work. However,

this book is less convincing as well as less interesting than his previous attempt

(Hammersley, 1995). In The Politics of Social Research, he at least attempted to provide a

critique of many of the ideas and issues that underpin participatory and emancipatory

research, and while ultimately I found his arguments to be unconvincing, they were

arguments that had to be dealt with rather than ignored. Unfortunately, his arguments

in the book are irrelevant to the development of participatory and emancipatory

research.There are a number of stages to Hammersleys argument in Taking Sides in Social

Research. Initially, he quite rightly points out that one of the goals of social research since

its beginnings has been to improve social conditions and hence bring about social

change. Thus, in one sense, he suggests that research has always been partisan and value

based, and that some of the difculties this raises have been resolved by Weber (1949)

through his advocacy of the position of value neutrality in the pursuit of objective

knowledge about the social world we are seeking to change. He then goes on to provide

a critique of the work of three sociologists on whom, he assumes, most emancipatory

researchers rely as justication for their political activities.

Wright Mills, he argues, does not provide a convincing case for the committed political

sociologist. Beckers work can be read in a number of different ways including, in

Hammersleys own reading, as a defence of value neutral research. Gouldners critique

of Becker, he suggests, is ambiguous because it fails to distinguish between value

neutrality as an occupational ideology or as a methodological principle. Finally, he

suggests that emancipatory researchers fail to deal with critiques of their work advanced

by those he calls methodological purists, simply refusing to get involved in the tediousness

of having to reply to criticisms from this quarter.He is, of course, right to suggest that much social research since its inception has been

about attempting to bring about social change and to improve the conditions of peoples

lives. What he does not point out, however, is that, by and large, it has been unsuccessful

in this enterprise. As a consequence, there has been growing disillusionment with social

scientic social research and, in the past 30 years, we have seen attempts by academics,

supported and often led by disempowered and excluded groups, to reconstruct the whole

social research enterprise in an entirely new way. What he fails to understand, however,

is that this new participatory and emancipatory research has not emerged by building

upon the past history of social research, but by actively rejecting it.As a consequence, yet more discussions about whether Wright Mills reputation really

does outweigh his intellectual contribution, whether Becker really was on anyones side

except his own, or if Gouldner had applied his critique of others to his own work would

he have been equally scathing about it, seem rather irrelevant. Issues such as these may

well be fascinating to those of us who are paid merely to think or teach about social

research, but they do not have much much practical relevance to attempts to build a

genuinely participatory or emancipatory research paradigm in the here and now. Some

years ago (Oliver, 1992a), I accused certain academics who endlessly revisited theoretical



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

8/15


debates about labelling theory while the education system continued to label thousands

of kids, inappropriately, of being intellectual masturbators: I had a similar reaction after

reading Hammersleys book. Masturbation is a pleasurable but ultimately pointless

activity and thats how I felt after reading this book.

The reason why the kind of research Hammersley advocates is ultimately pointless, I

would suggest, is precisely because he wants to keep separate the pursuit of objectiveknowledge through social research and other activities whether they be what he refers to

as propagandising or advocacy. While he argues that this separation is fundamental to

the preservation of social research, I would argue that it is for this reason that social

research has failed those communities it was supposed to serve. But, more importantly,

this is not just an argument between academics; those failed communities themselves

have begun to express a view on the failures of research and researchers.

In the area in which I work, disabled people have become increasingly vocal about the

kind of work that Hammersley advocates, arguing that it distorts the experience of

disability, its ndings are often irrelevant to the lives of disabled people, and its practicesare often exclusionary and oppressive. Such criticisms cannot be properly addressed by

re-reading dead, non-disabled sociologists, but only by a proper engagement with the

worlds of people coming to hold such views. This engagement can only be opera-

tionalised in my experience, by dispensing with objectivity and the commitment to

science on which it is based.

Hammersley goes on to argue that it is perfectly reasonable to be both a researcher

and a political animal but that we should not be both at the same time. What I

personally nd hard to understand is how it is possible to maintain that distinction, both

in light of my own experiences as a social researcher and as a disabled person. I am both

at all times and, while contexts may effect the importance of each, I nd it impossible

to be an objective social researcher one minute and a political disabled person the next.

It is simply not a cognitive split that I can maintain.

I would not deny that, when I began my career in the 1970s, this was a distinction

I tried to maintain. I was socialised by my teachers and constrained by my funders to

operate as if the undertaking of objective social research was a feasible goal. It did not

take me long, however, to realise that while the pursuit of such a goal was essential to

building my career as a researcher, it was the road to nowhere as far as improving mylife as a disabled person. It was only after some early encounters with feminism and its

nascent attempts to build a different kind of research enterprise that I came to realise that

there was another way.

I suppose that one of the functions of objectivity in social research is that it enables

researchers to remain aloof from exploitation that is often involved in researching other

peoples lives and detached from the feelings of outrage when confronted with the

conditions under which some people are forced to live out their lives. I see no evidence

in this recent book, or in any of his other works, that Hammersley is aware of any of this

or that it has effected the way he works as a researcher.If I reect on my own intellectual journey as a researcher, I started out believing that

objective social research was both desirable and possible before moving on to believe that

all that was necessary was to render an accurate and faithful account of peoples lives in

order for the world to change. From there I stalled for a while before moving on to

believe that it is possible to create a genuinely emancipatory social research enterprise.

Through this intellectual journey, my own practices as a researcher also changed as

I moved farther away from the academy and closer to my research subjects before nally

attempting to turn my practice on its head by changing the social relations of research



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

9/15


production (Oliver, 1992b). For me, this has meant nothing less than attempting to put

my skills, knowledge and experience under the control of disabled people, and has led

me to withdraw from funded research because, despite recent rhetoric to the contrary,

funding bodies are not willing to take risks and support user-controlled research.

From discussions with and through the reading of other researchers accounts of their

experiences, I know that they have been on similar journeys, and I simply nd itincredible that Hammersley seems unaffected by any of his own experiences as a

researcher, at least to the point of writing about them or changing his practices. It is a

pity that he chose to re-engage with the past work of the dead rather than the current

work of the living. In his own area, exciting progress has been made in articulating,

debating and actioning participatory and emancipatory approaches to educational

research (Clough & Barton, 1995, 1999). What is more, perhaps, the cloak of objectivity

with which he surrounds himself is better protection against the reality of our own

failures as researchers than I thought, and that I discarded it too quickly.

Hammersley also expresses concern that partisan or biased researchers are unwillingto engage in discussions of their work with their academic critics, or methodological

purists, as he calls them. What he fails to understand is that emancipatory researchers

are much more concerned to orient their work to the needs of the groups and

communities they are seeking to serve than they are to the academic community,

whatever that may be. If I have to choose between doing practical and politically useful

research and that which is methodologically pure, give me practical and useful every

time.

But there is more to it than rational choice; struggling to work in emancipatory ways

is such a difcult, demanding and energy-sapping task that usually there is little left for

engaging in mastabatory debates with fellow academics. Furthermore, such work is far

less likely to attract large-scale funding so the emancipatory researcher does not have the

luxury of engaging research assistants and Ph.D. students to do the hard graft of eld

work and analysis while the methodologically pure researcher endlessly debates the

epistemological basis for their work.

Ultimately, what is disappointing about this book is that, while Hammersley recognises

the collapse of what he calls foundationalism under a welter of attacks from feminists,

constructionists and postmodernists, he fails to adopt their solution and to opt for radicalepistemological alternatives. Instead, he reverts to the past and tries to resurrect

foundationalism by re-reading if not rewriting the history of social research. It is a shame

that he did not engage with the present and grasp the future by reading some of the

exciting new work that is beginning to emerge from participatory and emancipatory

approaches. Had he done so, the book might have made a genuine contribution to the

potential development of social research rather than become a bystander at its possible

demise.

Correspondence: Mike Oliver, Professor of Disability Studies, University of Greenwich, UK.

REFERENCES

CLOUGH, P . & BARTO N, L. (Eds) (1995) Making Difculties: research and the construction of SEN (London, Paul

Chapman Publishing).

CLOUGH, P. & BARTO N, L. (Eds) (1999) Articulating with Difculty: research voices in inclusive education (London, Paul

Chapman Publishing).



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

10/15


HAMM ER SLEY, M. (1995) The Politics of Social Research (London, Sage).

OLIVER, M. (1992a) Intellectual masturbation: a rejoinder to Soder and Booth, European Journal of Special Needs

Education, 7.

OLIVER, M. (1992b) Changing the social relations of research production, Disability and Society, 7, pp. 101114.

WEBER, M. (1949) The Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York, Free Press).

Since the early 1990s, a debate has taken place in the UK over the issue of evidence in

educational research. At one level, the debate has centred around what constitutes

sufcient evidence to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of discriminatory

processes within schools to account for the educational inequalities that exist in relation

to race, gender and social class. It has been a debate stimulated by the late Peter Foster

through his systematic critique of many of the key ethnographic studies on racism and

education in the UK conducted over the previous decade (see, for instance, Foster, 1990,1992, 1993). Without exception, he concluded that each study did not offer sufcient

proof of teacher racism as a factor inuencing the schooling experiences of minority

ethnic students. By the mid-1990s, Martyn Hammersley and Roger Gomm joined this

methodological project of Peter Fosters, and the project itself was extended to en-

compass research on gender and social-class inequalities in education as well as race. In

1996, it culminated in the publication of a book jointly authored by Peter Foster, Roger

Gomm and Martyn Hammersley (Foster et al., 1996), in which they challenged much of

the research that currently existed on educational inequalities.

Inevitably, the debate soon became polarised. While Peter Foster and his colleagues

were keen to focus narrowly on debates about research evidence, many of their critics

drew attention to the political nature and implications of their methodologically purist

project (Gillborn & Drew, 1993; Troyna, 1993, 1995). Indeed, some argued that their

approach was racist in consequence by its tendency to bolster the status quo and to

frustrate attempts to address racism in schools (see Gillborn, 1995). This debate over the

relationship between politics and social research was one that Martyn Hammersley

appeared to be particularly interested in at the time (see Hammersley, 1993a,b 1995,

1998) and one that, subsequently, has led to the production and publication of thispresent volume.

Taking Sides in Social Research itself represents an outline and critique of the arguments

forwarded in favour of what Hammersley terms partisan research. It provides a detailed

review of some of the classic sociological texts that are often used in support of

politicising the research processincluding those of Mills, Becker and Gouldnerand

also an assessment of the arguments and claims made by contemporary anti-racist and

feminist researchers. Throughout the book, Hammersley maintains that the politicisation

of social research is not only misguided, but inherently dangerous, and that an intelligent

and sceptical commitment to the principles of objectivity and value neutrality mustremain an essential feature of social research (back cover).

In reviewing this volume, it needs to be stated from the outset that I have also been

implicated in these debates (see Connolly, 1992, 1996; Connolly & Troyna, 1998) and

would be characterised as one of those who has been extremely critical of the work of

Foster, Hammersley and Gomm. It should therefore not be surprising to note that I do

not nd Hammersleys arguments particularly convincing. However, I do feel that the

present book makes an important contribution, especially in offering a clear and

accessible consideration of many of the key arguments involved. It certainly provides an



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

11/15


opportunity for both sides of the debate to think through and clarify the basic premises

of their positions and, it is hoped, for a more fruitful dialogue to begin to take place. With

this in mind, I would like to use the remaining space in this review to respond to some

of the key points raised by Hammersley and to attempt to clarify my own position in

relation to these.

Before doing this, however, it is important to make a more general point about thenature of the debate. This can be illustrated by Hammersley arguing in the present book

for a constructive debate between the two sides but resigning himself to the fact that the

prospects of productive debate actually taking place do not seem good (p. 149, original

emphasis). This is because, as he goes onto explain:

the critical approach is structured in such a way as to treat those who do not

accept its fundamental assumptions as not just mistaken, and therefore in need

of persuasion, but rather as witting or unwitting agents of an unjust social

system that must be resisted or overthrown. This is encouraged by its emphasison the unity of theory and practice, which blurs or even erases the distinction

between political struggle and academic discussion. This perhaps explains the

fact that for the most part the critics of methodological purism have refused to

engage with its arguments in any detail, preferring to denounce it as ideologi-

cal, immoral, etc. For instance, one of the early responses to methodological

purist criticism begins by complaining about the tediousness of having to reply

to criticism from this quarter and explicitly refuses to respond to each of

the criticisms, on the grounds that this would allow the methodological purists

to dene what is important in relation to research on race and ethnicity(Gillborn & Drew, 1993, pp. 354355). This refusal to engage with the

arguments of the other side undercuts the possibility of fruitful discussion. In

this way, it seems to me, the critical approach disqualies itself as a form of

academic research: it turns sociology into a political morality play

This quote is certainly indicative of how the debate has become polarised. However, it

also highlights one of the root problems underlying that debate. It is a problem

characterised by the difculty each side has in appreciating the epistemological perspec-

tive of the other. For my own part, it is certainly the case that I have given littleconsideration to the detail of Foster, Hammersleys and Gomm position, tending to

believe, as does Gillborn in the earlier quote, that to engage with it point by point is to

accept and be bound by their epistemological agenda. However, Hammersleys criticism

cuts both ways. The methodological purists have also failed to accept or be particularly

drawn upon our criticisms of their work, particularly in relation to its political implica-

tions. For the most part, they simply refuse to accept that politics has any inuence over

what they do and, as in the presented quotation from Hammersley, often tend to

caricature our position and/or simply dismiss it out of hand.

For a fruitful debate to take place, therefore, both sides need to engage seriously withthe perspectives of the other. To avoid and/or denigrate the legitimate concerns of

critical researchers simply is not good enough. With this in mind, and in an attempt to

help move the debate on, I would like to try to respond constructively to Hammersleys

arguments. In particular, Hammersley identies a number of issues that each side in the

debate need to address. The core one he raises for critical researchers is to respond to

the claim that critical research is likely to involve systematic error because it is concerned

not just with producing knowledge but also with pursuing political goals (p. 146). Given

the limited space available, all that can be offered below is a brief outline of the three



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

12/15


key principles underlying my own position, offered with the aim of demonstrating that

bias need not be a feature of critical research [1].

The rst principle relates to the need to accept that all research is political in its

inception. Simply by choosing a research problem, a political decision has been made.

This is a point recognised by Weber when he wrote of the need for research to be value

relevant in ensuring that it addresses the questions and problems that matter withinsociety. It is also a point accepted by Hammersley. Interestingly, however, Hammersley

is at pains to distance this rst principle from the more radical and caricatured partisan

research that he attempts to construct in his book. As he explains:

research can be partisan in the limited respect that problems must be

selected for investigationand explanations, theoretical evaluations and pre-

scriptions constructedso as to be of direct relevance to particular practical

values, and thereby perhaps to the interests of specic groups or categories of

actor. Despite this, the term partisan is probably better reserved for views thatallow a larger and non-conditional role for practical values within research. (p.

19).

This dispute over words may seem rather trivial yet it is extremely important. As seen

earlier, much of Hammersleys critique of partisan research is judgemental in tone

attempting to contrast his own reasonable, objective and neutral approach with the

unreasonable, irrational and politically-rabid one of his opponents. However, here is a

case where one of the core principles underpinning the critical research perspective is

denied it, and a much more caricatured and untenable position imposed upon it instead.

The sense of creating straw dolls to then knock down is certainly evident here.

In practical terms, this rst principle requires critical researchers to be acutely aware

of the decisions they make when selecting topics for research. In relation to anti-racist

research, for example, this commonly means choosing research problems that aim to

address issues of racism and racial inequalities.

The second principle underpinning my own position is the need to take responsibility,

as far as possible, for the political implications of research that is published. This is

certainly a point that Hammersley would appear to disagree with and yet it is something

that may not be incompatible with his own position. To explain, there are at least twoways in which researchers need to take responsibility for the work that they publish. The

rst is in relation to how it is likely to be interpreted by others (whether the media,

politicians, civil servants and so on). At one level, most researchers seem to accept

responsibility for this as witnessed by the care usually taken in discussing their research

ndings, clarifying what can be legitimately concluded from these, and the many

different caveats and numerous provisos added to the claims that they do make.

However, what is needed is to extend such efforts to include not only a concern for the

internal conherency of a research report, but also to attempting to limit the ways in

which that research may be misinterpreted and/or misused by others once it has beenpublished. Of course, if someone is intent on misrepresenting what has been written then

there is little that can be done to address this. Rather, I am thinking of cases where it

can be reasonably anticipated that either there is likely to be a genuine misinterpretation

of what has been published or where the political climate is such that it can be

anticipated that the research ndings are likely to be intentionally used and misrepre-

sented by others. What is at stake in both cases, then, is no more than a legitimate

concern that research ndings are correctly and accurately interpreted and understood.

In relation to anti-racist researchers, for example, this commonly means being aware of



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

13/15


and attempting to avoid the possible ways in which their research may unwittingly

reproduce racist stereotypes or assumptions and/or be mis-used in order to bolster

support for existing policies or practices that tend to reinforce racial inequalities.

The second way in which researchers need to take responsibility for the work that they

publish relates to more ethical considerations. It is interesting, for example, that most

researchersincluding Hammersley and his colleagueswould accept that ethical con-siderations should have a legitimate role in inuencing what is and/or is not acceptable

in terms of research. In this sense, there is an acceptance more generally that there is a

limit to the pursuit of truth in relation to when it may adversely effect the wellbeing of

others. However, such ethical considerations are usually limited to individual concerns

(i.e. the individuals right to privacy, condentiality, etc.) and are much less likely to be

broadened to consider the concerns of particular groups of people who may be effected

by the research. And yet, if the consequence of research being published is that it is likely

to have an adverse effect on a particular group (whether that group be women, minority

ethnic people, people with disabilities, etc.), then this must surely be an ethical matterthat the researcher needs to consider. Moreover, as with the case of more individualistic

ethical concerns, it is also a matter that could legitimately lead to certain research not

being pursued and/or published because of its likely effects on a particular group. It is

accepted that this is a very difcult issue to resolve, especially in terms of what would

constitute research that has a detrimental effect on certain groups. However, the fact that

it raises extremely difcult and demanding questions does not provide an excuse for

simply ignoring the issue. There is certainly a need for such ethical issues to be open to

scrutiny and debate. It is something that is expected within critical social research, for

example. To take the case of anti-racist research again, it means being acutely aware of

and attempting to avoid situations where the research process itself may adversely impact

upon those minority ethnic groups being researched, as well as how the publication of

the ndings may negatively impact upon them.

The third and nal principle underlying my own position is a commitment to the

rigorous and systematic use of methods within social research. While there are many

different goals that can underpin critical social research, one that has increasingly come

to dominate is the use of research ndings to challenge social inequalities by inuencing

and applying pressure on those in positions of power and responsibility. In relation toanti-racist research, for example, one of its aims has been to document and highlight the

nature and extent of racism, and to assess and evaluate differing strategies employed to

counter racial inequalities. In this sense, there is little point producing research reports

that are clearly regarded as biased and/or partisan. If the effectiveness of such research

is in its ability to convince others of the signicance of the issues raised, then there is a

need to provide research evidence that is generally acceptable among academics,

policy-makers and practitioners. This, in turn, requires careful and rigorous use of the

fundamental methods of social research. In this sense, while political and ethical

considerations play a central role in the choice of research topic and in how the ndingsare later to be presented and used, the methods employed to actually collect and analyse

the data need to follow the generally accepted principles of social research. In other

words, the evidence presented should be convincing whatever the political position of the

reader.

As with ethical considerations, this is not to deny that there is considerable controversy

over what counts as sufcient evidence to support a particular claim. Indeed, this is

where we began in the debate with Peter Foster and others. While such a debate suggests

that there may never be complete agreement over the issue of evidence, a general



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

14/15


consensus is necessary in order to allow meaningful dialogue to take place. In attempting

to reach and maintain a consensus, however, the focus of the debate needs to include

more than the very narrow, technical emphasis pursued by Hammersley and others. In

particular, there is a need to also review research evidence in relation to broader

considerations, including the possible effects of the political/value position of the

researcher, the impact of their own identity and experience on relations with those theyhave researched and on how they have consequently interpreted and written-up their

data. These are issues that should be of concern to all social researchers. And yet there

is a sense in which those researchers committed to the notion of objective and value-free

research feel that their approach effectively absolves them from having to consider the

inuence of their own value-base on the research they conduct.

One nal consequence of this adherence to rigorous methods worth mentioning is that

it requires critical researchers to be reexive. While political considerations may play a

signicant role in inuencing the research agenda, that agenda cannot be maintained in

the light of conicting research evidence. For example, during much of the 1980s,anti-racist researchers and activists were keen to promote the concept of Black as a

political identity representing the shared experiences of racism of all non-white people.

While this was an important strategy at the time in raising the issue of racism onto the

research and political agenda, research began to emerge towards the end of the 1980s

that challenged this political construct and highlighted the great diversity that exists both

within and between different minority ethnic groups. Initially, such research was met

with signicant resistance and criticism for being divisive and undermining attempts to

stress the importance and signicance of racism. However, the fact that most anti-racist

researchers and activists now accept the issue of diversity is testament to their ability to

remain critically reexive and to allow research evidence to inform their work.

Overall, it has been difcult to adequately provide an account of my own position in

relation to critical research in the space available. What I have tried to do is to sketch

out a response to Hammersleys concern that partisan research will inevitably lead to

systematic error and, thus, bias. While there is a commitment to ensuring that research

engages political goals, I have tried to show that this does not mean that the research

evidence that is produced will necessarily be biased. Indeed, I have argued that, for

critical research to be effective, it must produce evidence that is regarded as valid andacceptable more generally and this, in turn, means applying the same standard tests of

validity and reliability as other social researchers. Ultimately, however, this review has

raised more questions than provided answers. There is currently little consensus over

many of the political and ethical issues raised or those surrounding what counts as

sufcient evidence in social research. This is where Hammersleys book is to be

welcomed as an important contribution to some of these debates. While we, as critical

researchers, need to begin to address the issues he raises seriously and constructively,

there is also an onus on him and those within the methodological purist camp to do the

same in relation to the concerns of critical researchers.

Correspondence: Paul Connolly, University of Ulster, UK.

NOTES

[1] It is important to stress that I am not attempting to present myself as a spokesperson for critical social

research. While many of my own arguments draw heavily upon and reect those within the critical

research tradition, I can only present my own position here.



ber2014

8/10/2019 01425690123902.pdf

15/15


REFERENCES

CONNOLLY, P. (1992) Playing it by the rules: the politics of research in race and education, British Educational

Research Journal, 18, pp. 133148.

CONNOLLY, P. (1996) Doing what comes naturally? Standpoint epistemology, critical social research and the

politics of identity, in: E.S. LYON & J. BUSFIELD (Eds) Methodological Imaginations(London, Macmillan).

CONNOLLY, P. & TROYNA, B. (Eds) (1998) Researching Racism in Education (Buckingham, Open University Press).

FOSTER, P. (1990) Cases not proven: an evaluation of two studies of teacher racism, British Educational Research

Journal, 16, pp. 335349.

FOSTER, P. (1992) Equal treatment and cultural difference in multi-ethnic schools: a critique of the teacher

ethnocentrism theory, International Studies in Sociology of Education, 2, pp. 89103.

FOSTER, P. (1993) Some problems in establishing equality of treatment in multi-ethnic schools, British Journal

of Sociology, 44, pp. 519535.

FOSTER, P., GOMM , R. & HAMMER SLEY, M. (1996) Constructing Educational Inequality (London, Falmer Press).

GILLBORN, D. (1995) Racism and Antiracism in Real Schools (Buckingham, Open University Press).

GILLBORN, D. & DREW, D. (1993) The politics of research: some observations on methodological purity, New

Community, 19, pp. 354360.

HAMM ER SLEY, M. (1993a) On methodological purism, British Educational Research Journal, 19, pp. 339341.HAMM ER SLEY, M. (1993b) Research and anti-racism: the case of Peter Foster and his critics, British Journal of

Sociology, 44, pp. 429448.

HAMM ER SLEY, M. (1995) The Politics of Social Research (London, Routledge).

HAMM ER SLEY, M. (1998) Partisanship and credibility: the case of anti-racist educational research, in: P.

CONNOLLY & B. TROYNA (Eds) Researching Racism in Education (Buckingham, Open University Press).

TROYNA, B. (1993) Underachiever or misunderstood? A reply to Roger Gomm, British Educational Research

Journal, 19, pp. 167174.

TROYNA, B. (1995) Beyond reasonable doubt? Researching race in educational settings, Oxford Review of

Education, 21, pp. 395408.



ber2014

01425690123902.pdf

Documents