01. can_business_effectively_regulate_employee_conduct

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CAN BUSINESSES EFFECTIVELY REGULATE EMPLOYEECONDUCT? THE ANTECEDENTS OF RULE FOLLOWING

IN WORK SETTINGS

TOM R. TYLER

STEVEN L. BLADERNew York University

Achieving employee adherence to organizational rules and policies is critical forsuccessful coordination and functioning within organizations. In this article, we ex-plore the antecedents of such rule-following behavior and present two studies ofemployees that compare two strategies for achieving rule and policy adherence: (1) anextrinsically oriented command-and-control model and (2) an intrinsically orientedself-regulatory model. The findings of both studies suggest that the influence of theself-regulatory strategy exceeds that of the command-and-control approach. Overall,these studies highlight the potential value of fostering employee rule following viaintrinsically oriented self-regulatory mechanisms and suggest strategies for imple-menting such mechanisms.

Organizations rely on their employees to followthe formal rules and procedures the organizationsestablish. Such rule following is critical for organ-izations to function effectively, a reality that isapparent in the significant time and resourcesdevoted to controlling employee behavior (OReilly,1989). While there is little question that gaining ad-herence to organizational policies is critical for suc-cessful organizational functioning (Bell, McLaugh-lin, & Sequeira, 2002; Laufer & Robertson, 1997;

Vardi & Weitz, 2004), the strategies organizations

should use to best achieve that objective is moredebatable. This is the issue we explore in this article.

The importance of identifying optimal strategiesto engender rule following is linked to the signifi-cant challenge that is presented by trying to achieveemployee adherence to organizational rules andpolicies. Indeed, there has long been extensive ev-idence that noncompliance in organizations iswidespread (e.g., Frederick, 1995; Healy & Iles,2002; Mintz, 2001; Rice, 1992; Simon & Eitzen,1990; Spence, 2001). This extensive noncompli-ance leads to a concern among business and gov-ernment officials over successfully regulating theconduct of employees. Recent corporate scandals,as well as the more mundane and common rule

breaking in organizations that occurs daily, make itclear why organizational researchers should beconcerned with identifying optimal strategies forachieving employee rule and policy adherence.

Two Approaches to Fostering EmployeeRule Adherence

The studies reported here compare the utility oftwo approaches to achieving such adherence, whatwe will refer to as the command-and-control ap-proach and the self-regulatory approach. The dis-tinction between these approaches has deep rootswithin both the organizational and the psycholog-ical research literatures. The command-and-controlapproach is linked to extrinsic motivational modelsof human behavior, in which people primarily re-spond to external contingencies in their environ-ment. The self-regulatory approach, on the other

The collection of the data used in Study 2 was sup-ported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Program inBusiness Organizations. Gail Pesyna is the program di-rector, and we thank her for her support and encourage-ment. Earlier versions of this article benefited from feed-

back made during presentations at the Conference on theRole of the Corporation in Modern Society, sponsored bythe Sloan Program for the Study of Business in Society(George Washington University Law School, October

1999); a conference at the Jurisprudence and Social Pol-icy Program (Law School, University of California, Berke-ley, April 2000); the Research School of the Social Sci-ences (Australian National University, December 2000);the Georgetown University Law Center (January 2001);New York Law School (February 2001); The University ofPennsylvania Law School (March 2001); the ethics pro-gram of the Kellogg Graduate School of Management(May 2001); the conference on the social and psycholog-ical foundations of economic life (Steyr, Austria, July2001); and the conference on research methods in corpo-rate law, Sloan Program for the Study of Business inSociety (November 2001).

Academy of Management Journal

2005, Vol. 48, No. 6, 11431158.

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hand, is linked to intrinsic motivational models ofhuman behavior, which emphasize individuals in-nate preferences and desires as the fundamentaldrivers of behavior. These innate preferences areconceptualized as operating independent of contin-gencies in the environment for the performance ornonperformance of particular behaviors. We elabo-

rate on the fundamental theoretical distinction be-tween these two approaches below.The command-and-control approach. The com-

mand-and-control model represents a traditionalapproach to encouraging rule following, insofar asit operates via extrinsic forces and draws uponemployees instrumental concerns and utility max-imization goals. It is based on the view that rulefollowing is a function of the costs and benefitspeople associate with noncompliance to thoserules. It is rooted in traditional economic theory,insofar as it rests on the assumption that employeesare rational actors who are primarily concernedabout maximizing their own outcomes in work set-tings (Blair & Stout, 2001), and it embodies theprinciples of approaches, such as agency theory,that emphasize the influence of self-interested out-come maximization on employee behavior (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Jones & Butler, 1992). Thecommand-and-control argument is that employeesare instrumentally motivated and are thus primar-ily interested in the resources and outcomes theyreceive from their organizations. Therefore, organ-izations need to take an active role in enforcingrules by providing incentives (to encourage desired

behavior) and sanctions (to discourage undesirable behavior). Interestingly, although there is muchdiscourse in the organizational literature over in-centives (Kohn, 1999), there has not been a parallellevel of discussion regarding the potential strengthsand pitfalls of punishments as motivational tools(cf. Arvey & Jones, 1985; Trevino & Youngblood,1990).

It would be difficult to overestimate the preva-lence of command-and-control mechanisms in theU.S. workplace. For example, the extensive use ofsurveillanceby managers, cameras, the monitor-

ing of telephone calls and computer use, and soforthis an artifact of the implementation of com-mand-and-control techniques. Drug testing, search-ing employees cars and lockers, and the use of timeclocks and other performance-tracking devices sim-ilarly reflect the view that rule following developsfrom a credible fear of detection and punishment.

Do such techniques work? Studies generally in-dicate that instrumental strategies do, as expected,shape peoples behavior (Nagin, 1998; Nagin & Pa-ternoster, 1991; Paternoster, 1987, 1989), withsome studies supporting this argument in work set-

tings (Huselid, 1995; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, &Shaw, 1998). But such strategies come with signif-icant costs. For sanctions and deterrence systems towork, organizations must be able (and willing) todevote considerable resources to the surveillanceneeded to make detection of rule breaking suffi-ciently likely that people are deterred. In addition

to their financial costs to the organization, there arealso social costs associated with control-and-com-mand systems. These systems have the potential tocommunicate a sense to employees that the organ-ization is their adversary (and vice versa). Further-more, interpersonal dynamics may often be af-fected, as employees that maintain surveillancesystems are pitted against those being scrutinized,creating a culture of distrust among employees.

The efficacy of command-and-control strategieshas likewise been questioned (Katyal, 1997; Mal-loy, 2002; Markell, 2000; Sutinen & Kuperan,1999), particularly in the arena of legal regulation(Tyler & Huo, 2002). In legal settings sanction-

based deterrence strategies have consistently beenfound to have only a minor influence on rule-break-ing behavior (MacCoun, 1993; Tyler, 1990). Skep-ticism about this approach is less common amongorganizational scholars, and thus the managerialrelevance of these critiques remains an open issue.

We therefore empirically examined the influenceof the command-and-control approach on em-ployee rule following in the two employee studiesreported here. We did so by examining employeeperceptions of the likelihood that their behavior

would be detected, as well as their perceptionsregarding the sanctions or incentives presented tothem for engaging in undesirable or desirable be-havior. By considering both sanctions and incen-tives, we covered the breadth of instrumental orextrinsic motivations that shape employee behav-ior. That is, we covered the range of cost/benefitanalyses that may underlie employees decisionswhether to follow organizational rules or not.

The self-regulatory approach. The self-regula-tory model represents an alternate approach to en-couraging rule following, because it focuses on em-

ployees intrinsic motivations. It identifies rulefollowing as originating with an individuals intrin-sic desire to follow organizational rules, and notwith external contingencies in the environmentthat are linked to rule following. The theoreticaldistinction between this approach and the com-mand-and control approach has its roots in priorsocial psychological research, in particular thework of Kelman (1958), which distinguished be-tween compliance based on external contingenciesand self-regulation linked to identification and in-ternalization. This distinction was previously ex-

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tended to organizational arenas by Kelman andHamilton (1989) and to work settings by OReillyand Chatman (1986). The utility of such a self-regulatory model has long been advocated withindiscussions of legal regulation of business (Sel-znick, 1969), and it has been advanced with partic-ular frequency in recent years (Aalders & Wiltha-

gan, 1997; Darley, Tyler, & Bilz, 2003; Gunningham& Rees, 1997; King & Lenox, 2000; Rechtschaffen,1998; Suchman, 1995; Tyler, 2001).

An intrinsic desire to follow organizational rulesand policies may have a variety of origins. On theone hand, individual differences in the propensityto follow rules may lead some individuals to have astronger desire than others to follow rules. For ex-ample, people high in conscientiousness may havea stronger desire to follow rules than others. Alter-natively, an intrinsic desire to follow organization-al policies may be linked to employees judgmentsregarding their employer, such as judgments em-ployees develop through interactions with theirwork organizations. Perceived congruence of moralvalues between an organization and a person is onelikely judgment that can instigate an intrinsic de-sire to follow organizational rules. Organizationalpractices that lead employees to view managementas legitimate is another judgment that will alsoencourage rule following.

In the two studies presented here, we focused onan intrinsic desire to follow organizational rulesthat is rooted in social value judgments regarding awork organization, or those judgments of the organ-

ization that are related to employees value sys-tems. Our focus on social value judgments reflectsour interest in determining the characteristics ofwork environmentsas opposed to individualsthat may shape employee rule following. This em-phasis has the potential to be of particular utility toleaders and managers in their attempts to designworkplaces that foster rule following among em-ployees. Furthermore, the influence of value judg-ments on behavior has garnered empirical support(Aalders & Wilthagen, 1997; Gunningham & Rees,1997; King & Lenox, 2000; Rechtschaffen, 1998),

such as that found in work focused on the role oflegitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz,2002) and morality (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996)in shaping social behavior.

Drawing on this work linking legitimacy and mo-rality to social behavior, we considered two spe-cific judgments employees make regarding theirwork organizations: (1) the perceived legitimacy ofthe organizations rules and authorities and (2) thecongruence of those rules with an employeesmoral values. Legitimacy refers to the view thatthe actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or

appropriate within some socially constructed sys-tem of norms, values, beliefs and definitions(Suchman, 1995: 574), and thus feelings of legiti-macy are expected to be related to adherence torules and policies. Congruence between rules andan individuals moral values should also motivateadherence, as people strive to follow their inclina-

tions to do what they feel is morally right. Forexample, in legal settings an important motivationthat encourages people to bring their behavior intoline with the law is their belief that many behaviorsthat are illegal are also immoral (Carlsmith, Darley,& Robinson, 2002; Robinson & Darley, 1995, 1997;Tyler, 1990). Conversely, in situations in which

behaviors are contrary to official policy but viewedby people as not being immoral, such as employeetheft performed in an effort to restore equity, it ismore difficult to bring peoples behavior into con-formity with the rules.

The self-regulatory argument is that the concernsembodied in these two judgments can intrinsicallymotivate employees to feel a personal responsibil-ity and desire to bring their behavior into line withcorporate rules and policies. Although other factorsand judgments may likewise intrinsically motivateindividuals to follow rules, in these studies weoperationalized the self-regulatory perspective byexamining the impact of judgments that an employ-ees organization (1) is led by legitimate authoritiesand structured around legitimate rules, and (2) hasvalues consistent with that of the employee.

Forms of Rule Following

Two aspects of employee rule-following behaviorwere considered in these studies: policy adherenceand rule breaking. On the one hand, organizationswant employees to adhere to organizational poli-cies. Organizational rules and policies stipulate de-sired employee behavior, and organizations benefitwhen those policies are followed. For example,organizational rules often specify how work should

be carried out and when people are to arrive atwork. Such rules facilitate coordination between

employees and ensure the smooth functioning ofthe organization. This aspect of rule following in-volves conformity to organizational policies, sinceit involves actions that bring employee behaviorinto line with organizational rules. Organizationsoften develop incentives that stipulate rewards forfollowing rules and sanctions that stipulate punish-ments for breaking rules.

We further distinguish between two forms ofpolicy adherence: compliance or conformity withorganizational policies and voluntary deferenceto organizational policies. The roots of the dis-

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tinction between compliance and deference lie inthe literature on obeying the law, which distin-guishes between compliance with the law andvoluntary, willing acceptance of the law (seeKelman, 1958; Tyler, 1990). The same distinctionis important in work settings (OReilly & Chat-man, 1986).

The distinction between these two forms of be-havior lies in the conditions under which employ-ees indicate that they follow rules. With compli-ance, employees indicate how often they generallyfollow rules, thereby showing their willingness toabide by or tolerate rules. But voluntary deferencerefers to more discretionary acceptance of rules,tapping into whether employees follow rules evenwhen no one is around and when their behavior isnot being monitored. It therefore includes that sub-set of situations in which issues of detection arelargely or completely irrelevant.

On the flip side of compliance and deference toorganizational policies lies deviant behavior byemployees, or behaviors that are damaging andprohibited by organizational rules. For example,employees may take office supplies for personaluse or use sick leave when they are not sick. Moreseriously, employees may steal or break organi-zational rules by lying and cheating. We refer tothis deviant behavior as rule breaking because itinvolves a decision to ignore or violate organiza-tional rules.

The Current Research

The goal of the studies reported here was to com-pare the relative efficacy of the two distinct strate-gies for promoting the three forms of rule followingoutlined above (compliance, deference, and rule

breaking). Although the use of command-and-con-trol strategies is a traditional management ap-proach to achieving policy adherence, in thesestudies we considered whether employee socialvalue judgments may provide a more viable approachto encouraging rule following via self-regulatorymechanisms. In particular, we tested the following:

Hypothesis 1. The social value judgments thatembody the self-regulatory approach are amore potent influence on employee rule fol-lowing than command-and-control-relatedconcerns.

The first study was based on questionnaires dis-tributed to the employees of one division of a mul-tinational banking firm. The second study was

based on an Internet-based survey conducted on anational panel of employees, with supervisor rat-ings of respondents rule-following behavior for a

subset of these employees. The studies comple-ment one another, since one was conducted withinthe division of a single organization and the otherrepresents a broader cross-section of occupations,industries, and organizations.

STUDY 1

Methods

Study 1 was conducted within a U.S. division ofa large multinational financial services company.Employees within that division (n 1,350) re-ceived a questionnaire via interoffice mail that as-sessed various aspects of their organizational atti-tudes and behaviors. Surveys were returneddirectly to the authors in enclosed business replyenvelopes. Employees were permitted to completethe survey while at work and were assured confi-

dentiality by both the investigators and the organ-izations management. The total of 540 surveys re-turned represented a 40 percent response rate.Sample. Of the 540 respondents, 44 percent were

male, and 50 percent had pursued some postbach-elors education. The mean tenure with the firmwas 13 years, and the mean age was 42 years. Thesample was somewhat heterogeneous with respectto race, with 69 percent being Caucasian; 10 per-cent, Latino; 5 percent, African American; and 6percent, Asian. The demographic characteristics ofthe respondent sample closely resembled that of

the overall sample, with the overall sample con-taining 41 percent males, having an average tenureof 13 years, an average age of 43 years, and a fairlysimilar distribution with respect to race (63% Cau-casian, 17% Latino, 11% African American, and8% Asian). The average salary of the overall samplewas $84,000; for privacy purposes, salary informa-tion was not collected from respondents on thesurvey, so a comparison figure is not available forthat group. The type of job ranged from clerical tomanagerial, with the bulk of the employees in-volved in directly providing banking services to

customers.Measures. The survey included scales assessingemployee judgments of legitimacy, value congru-ence, and rule-following behavior (compliance,deference, and rule breaking). These scales, whichwere based on those we used in previous research(Tyler & Blader, 2000), are presented in the Appen-dix. Also presented in the Appendix are the mea-sures used to assess the use of the command-and-control approach, which asked respondents toindicate (1) the perceived likelihood of behavior

being detected (expectancy) and (2) the sanctions



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and incentives associated with employee behavior,or the perceived reaction to their behavior (value).

According to theories of deterrence, it may be theinteraction of expectancy and value that shapes

behavior, since utility reflects the joint result ofthese two issues (Nagin, 1998). In order to captureany interactive effects that may exist between the

expectancy and value judgments, we also com-puted an interaction term from the two judgments.The influence of this interaction effect was consid-ered in addition to the influence of the main effectsof expectancy and value.

Results

Means, standard deviations, and the correlationmatrix for all measures are presented in Table 1.Table 1 also includes three control variables thatwere entered into the analyses: age, tenure with theorganization, and gender.

We conducted confirmatory factor analysis toverify that the three rule-following behaviors actu-ally represented three distinct forms of behavior.As expected, the hypothesized three-factor modelfitted the data well (2 897, df 74; CFI .97;NFI .97, IFI .97), and had incrementally betterfit than a one-factor model (2 2,338, df 77;2 1,354, p .001) or a two-factor model thatcombined compliance and deference to organiza-tional policy (2 2,172.5, df 76; 2 1,275,p .001).

Command-and-control versus self-regulatory

strategies. Regression analysis was used to test therelative efficacy of the command-and-control andself-regulatory approaches to promoting employeeadherence to organizational rules, and in particularto determine whether the self-regulatory approach

represents a viable or even superior strategy forgaining such adherence. In the analysis, the com-mand-and-control variables (detection of behavior,reaction to behavior, and their interaction) wereentered, as were the two self-regulatory variables(legitimacy and moral value congruence). Thesevariables were regressed on each of the three types

of employee rule following (compliance with or-ganizational policies, deference to organizationalpolicies, and rule breaking). Table 2 presents theresults of those regression analyses.

The results presented in Table 2 indicate no sig-nificant effect for age, tenure, or gender. Confirm-ing the hypothesized pattern of results, they indi-cate that self-regulatory variables such as employeeviews about legitimacy and value congruence bothsignificantly shape all three types of employee rulefollowing. Judgments about the legitimacy of organ-izational authorities significantly impacted bothforms of policy adherence (compliance, .29, p .001; deference, .29, p .001) and employeerule breaking ( .10, p .05). Moral valuecongruence was also significantly related to bothforms of policy adherence (compliance .14, p .001; deference .19, p .001) as well as em-ployee rule breaking ( .31, p .001). Theresults further indicate no significant impact of thecommand-and-control variables on these forms ofemployee rule following. The results therefore pro-vide strong support for the hypothesized impor-tance of the self-regulatory variables.

Structural equation modeling was used to more

formally determine whether there are significantdifferences between these two classes of variablesin their influence on employee rule following. La-tent factors were constructed for both the self-reg-ulatory and command-and-control constructs; the

TABLE 1Study 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa

Scales Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. Compliance 5.58 0.48 (.89)

2. Deference 5.01 0.68 .40 (.82)3. Rule breaking 1.99 0.72 .30 .19 (.60)4. Legitimacy 4.23 0.75 .32 .31 .18 (.80)5. Value congruence 4.03 1.00 .20 .27 .35 .27 (.81)6. Detection of behavior

(expectancy)4.40 0.94 .11 .15 .20 .20 .21 (.84)

7. Reaction to behavior (value) 4.04 0.97 .12 .12 .26 .21 .32 .41 (.69)8. Expectancy value interaction 18.16 6.56 .15 .16 .28 .24 .32 .81 .859. Age 42.91 8.96 .09# .06# .09 .08# .13 .07# .09# .02#

10. Tenure 13.68 9.19 .04# .02# .09 .02# .03# .01# .02# .01# .6211. Gender .07# .03# .01# .03# .03# .04# .05# .00# .05# .03#

a n 540. Higher numbers indicate greater endorsement of the construct (higher positive ratings of fairness or outcomes). Diagonalentries in parentheses are the coefficient alphas for each scale. All correlations are significant at p .05 unless marked #.



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measures of employee rule following were treatedas observed variables. The results of these struc-tural equation models, also reported in Table 2,further confirm the findings of the regression anal-

yses. Overall, the structural equation model hadgood fit to the data (2 373.33, df 35; CFI .98;NFI .98; IFI .98). The self-regulatory factor wassignificantly related to compliance ( .60, p .001), deference ( .58, p .001), and employeerule breaking ( .45, p .001). There were nosignificant effects of the command-and-control fac-tor on any of these variables.

To determine whether the relative influence ofthe self-regulatory factor was significantly greaterthan that of the command-and-control factor, weconducted three separate analyses (one for each of

the three dependent variables) in which the pathsbetween these factors and the dependent variablewere constrained to be equal. If the effects of thesevariables were not equal in magnitude, constrain-ing them to equality should have produced a sig-nificant increase in chi-square. The results con-firmed that the influence of the self-regulatoryfactor was greater than that of the command-and-control factor, with significant increases in chi-square for compliance (2 36.6, df 1, p .001), for deference (2 37.4, df 1, p .001),and for rule breaking (2 64.8, df 1, p .001).

Discussion

Study 1 confirms our central prediction that re-liance on a self-regulatory approach more effec-

tively fosters employee rule following than doesreliance on a command-and-control approach. Em-ployees social value judgments regarding theirwork organization, embodied in their perceptionsof the legitimacy of organizational authorities andthe perceived congruence of their personal valueswith those of the organization, were the primaryfactors shaping their rule adherence. This was trueacross the three types of rule-following behaviorexamined. These results confirm that the self-regu-latory strategy on employee rule following is a vi-able approach to attaining policy adherence andrule following.

Although confirmatory, the results of Study 1were in need of additional exploration. One limit ofthe study was that it focused on employees withinone branch of one multinational firm. A secondlimitation was that Study 1 did not contain inde-pendent ratings of rule-following behavior, andthus raised issues related to self-reports of behaviorand common method variance. Although it is notclear that these results supporting the self-regula-tory approach could be attributed to commonmethod variance (particularly given that command-

TABLE 2Study 1: Antecedents of Employee Adherence to Organizational Policya

Variables

Compliance withOrganizational Policy

Deference toOrganizational Policy Rule Breaking

RegressionAnalysis SEMb



ControlAge .05 .05 .04 .06 .02 .02Tenure .00 .00 .05 .07 .10 .07Gender .06 .07 .02 .03 .01 .02

Self-regulatory .60*** .58*** .45***Legitimacy .29*** .29*** .10*Moral value congruence .14** .19*** .31***

Command-and-control .03 .01 .02Detection of behavior (expectancy) .08 .00 .05Reaction to behavior (value) .16 .11 .03Expectancy value .14 .14 .18

Total adjusted R2

.14 .15 .16

a n 540.b Two latent variables reflecting: (1) the two self-regulatory variables and (2) the three command-and-control variables were created.

2 373.33, df 35, CFI 0.98, NFI .98, IFI .98. p .10* p .05

** p .01*** p .001



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and-control, and not self-regulatory, approachesrepresent the more traditional understanding ofhow to elicit rule following), conclusions regardingthese results would be strengthened by validatingthem against independent ratings of behavior.

Study 2 addressed these limitations and further-more was an attempt to replicate the general find-

ings from Study 1. Study 2 is based on a largesample of employees from around the United Stateswho worked in a wide variety of companies andindustries. Furthermore, manager ratings of em-ployee rule following were attained for a significantsubset of respondents in Study 2.

STUDY 2

In designing Study 2, our goal was to build off ofthe results of Study 1 by replicating the key find-ings from that study, but in a sample of employeeswho worked for a wide variety of organizationsinstead of a single organization. In addition, an-other goal of Study 2 was to collect supervisorratings of employee rule-following behavior. Wepursued these objectives by surveying a sample ofemployee respondents from throughout the UnitedStates via the Internet.

Methods

Sample and procedure. Study 2 was based onresponses to a questionnaire presented to a nationalpanel of respondents via WebTV. Potential respon-

dents were screened to ensure that they worked atleast 20 hours a week, had a primary supervisor,and had worked at their current employer for atleast three months. Respondents meeting these cri-teria completed the survey in two parts, one weekapart. Those who completed both portions of thesurvey received a small cash incentive.

The final sample included 4,430 employees.These employees came from a variety of organiza-tions. The following statistics indicate the hetero-geneity of the sample: 24 percent worked for small

businesses; 20 percent, for large companies in one

location; 36 percent, for large, multicity Americancompanies; and 20 percent, in multinational com-panies. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents weremen; 83 percent were white, 41 percent had collegedegrees or more; and 48 percent had householdincomes of over $50,000. The mean age of the re-spondents was 43 years.

All 4,430 employees in the sample were asked ifthey would be willing to have their supervisorscomplete and return a confidential questionnaire.Incentives were offered to both employee and su-pervisor if a completed questionnaire was received.

Of the employees, 2,020 volunteered informationabout their supervisors, and 831 of those 2,020supervisors eventually completed and returned aquestionnaire (41%).

Measures. As in Study 1, the employee surveyincluded measures assessing the three rule-follow-ing behaviors (compliance, deference, and rule

breaking), the likelihood of detection of behavior,perceived responses to detected behavior (assess-ing sanctions and incentives), and the two socialvalues (legitimacy and value congruence). In addi-tion, the supervisor questionnaire included mea-sures of employee rule-following behavior. Allscales were based on those described in Study 1and on those presented in Tyler and Blader (2000).The Appendix lists all the items comprising eachscale.

Results

Table 3 presents means, standard deviations, andthe correlation matrix for all measures. As in Study1, we used confirmatory factor analysis to deter-mine whether the three-factor characterization ofthe dependent variables fitted the data. The resultsof this analysis confirmed that the three-factormodel had moderately good fit with the data (2 3,594, df 116; CFI .82; NFI .82; IFI .82) andhad incrementally better fit than a one-factor model(2 19,573, df 119; 2 15,979, p .001); ora two-factor model combining policy adherenceand deference (2 7,554, df 118; 2 3,960, p

.001).Confirmatory factor analysis was also used in

verifying that the three rule-following behaviors asreported by supervisors actually represented threedistinct forms of behavior. As expected, the hy-pothesized three-factor model fitted the data well(

2

1,145, df 149; CFI .90; NFI .89, IFI .90) and had incrementally better fit than a one-factor model (2 2,636, df 152; 2 1,491,p .001) or a two-factor model that combinedcompliance and deference to organizational policy(2 1,598, df 151; 2 453, p .001).

Command-and-control versus self-regulatorystrategies. Regression analyses were again used asour means of comparing the two strategies for gain-ing employee adherence to organizational rules. Asin Study 1, variables representing the self-regula-tory (legitimacy and value congruence) and com-mand-and-control (detection of behavior, reactionto behavior, and their interaction) strategies wereregressed on each of the three types of rule follow-ing. Table 4 presents the results of those regressionanalyses.

The results presented in Table 4 indicate an in-



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fluence of legitimacy and value congruence on allthree forms of rule following, with evidence sug-gesting that legitimacy had somewhat stronger ef-fects (compliance, .27, p .001; deference, .46, p .001; rule breaking, .26, p .001)than value congruence (compliance, .07, p

.001; deference, .17, p .001; rule breaking, .12, p .001). The influence of the com-mand-and-control variables exceeded that found inStudy 1. In particular, detection of behavior (ex-pectancy) was significantly related to all threeforms of rule following (compliance, .32, p

TABLE 4Study 2: Antecedents of Employee Adherence to Organizational Policya

Variables






ControlAge .10** .13*** .06*** .06*** .15*** .14***Tenure .00 .00 .02 .02 .03* .04*Gender .15*** .08*** .05*** .05*** .00 .01Education .02 .06 .01 .01 .01 .05*

Self-regulatory .37*** .66*** .40***Legitimacy .32*** .46*** .26***Moral value congruence .07*** .17*** .12***

Command-and-control .69*** .38*** .32***Detection of behavior

(expectancy).32*** .15*** .11***

Reaction to behavior (value) .03*** .02 .02*Expectancy value .00 .01 .01

Total adjusted R2 .26 .36 .15

a n 4,430.b Two latent variables reflecting: (1) the two self-regulatory variables and (2) the three command-and-control variables were created.

2 1,288, df 41, CFI .82, NFI .82, IFI .82.* p .05

** p .01*** p .001

TABLE 3Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Employee Scalesa

Scalesb Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1. Compliance 6.02 0.78 (.79)2. Rule breaking 1.84 0.84 .46 (.76)3. Deference 5.46 1.00 .64 .44 (.87)4. Legitimacy 3.72 0.80 .45 .33 .55 (.86)5. Value congruence 3.60 0.93 .22 .21 .31 .28 (.88)6. Detection of behavior

(expectancy)3.53 0.91 .42 .16 .27 .20 .01# (.69)

7. Reaction to behavior (value) 2.61 1.14 .16 .09 .14 .14 .16 .22 (.71)8. Expectancy value 9.43 5.27 .31 .14 .23 .20 .12 .61 .889. Tenure 4.46 0.72 .02# .01# .04# .02# .01# .08 .19 .11

10. Gender 1.41 0.49 .14 .05 .10 .06 .09 .09 .03# .02# .0511. Age 3.34 1.12 .12 .17 .10 .07 .12 .02 .06 .06 .26 .0412. Education 2.99 0.96 .09 .06 .06 .13 .11 .17 .02# .10 .06 .03# .03#

a n 4,430. Higher numbers indicate greater endorsement of the construct. All correlations are significant at p .05, unless marked #.The diagonal entries in parentheses are the coefficient alpha reliabilities for each scale.

b See the Appendix for variable codings.



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.001; deference, .15, p .001; rule breaking, .11, p .001), and there were also small butsignificant effects of perceived strength of negativereactions to behavior (value) on compliance ( .03, p .05) and rule breaking ( .02, p .05).There were no significant effects for the interaction

between expectancy and value.

As in Study 1, we used structural equation mod-eling to explore the relative impact of self-regula-tory and command-and-control variables and to de-termine whether there were significant differences

between these two classes of variables in their in-fluence on employee rule following. Table 4 alsopresents these results. They indicate that the self-regulatory factor was significantly related to allthree forms of rule following. As the finding of asignificant influence of command-and-control vari-ables on the three forms of rule following wouldsuggest, the command-and-control factor likewisemattered, also influencing all three forms of rulefollowing.

These findings provide support for our hypothe-sis regarding the potential of a self-regulatory ap-proach to employee rule following. However, thekey question is whether or not the magnitude of theinfluence of a self-regulatory approach signifi-cantly differs from that of a command-and-controlapproach. As in Study 1, we conducted analyses inwhich we constrained the paths between the latentfactors reflecting the self-regulatory and command-and-control approaches and each dependent vari-able to be equal in magnitude. If these variables

were, in fact, not equal in magnitude, the overallchi-square should significantly increase.

For each dependent variable, there was a highly

significant increase in chi-square, suggesting thatfor each of the three forms of rule following therewas a significantly different effect between the twolatent factors. That is, the baseline model was sig-nificantly better fitting than models with equalityconstraints for compliance (2 85.9, df 1, p .001), deference (2 258, df 1, p .001), or rule

following (

2

611, df

1, p

.001). An inspec-tion of the magnitude of the coefficients indicatesthat, as hypothesized, in the case of deference andrule breaking it is the self-regulatory factor that is thestronger predictor. Contrary to predictions, however,in the case of compliance the command-and-con-trol factor was the stronger predictor.

Supervisor ratings of employee behavior. To ex-amine independent ratings of employee rule-fol-lowing behavior, we obtained and analyzed super-visor ratings for a subset of 831 of the respondentsin Study 2. Table 5 shows the means and correla-tions among these scales.

Before conducting the analysis, we examined thesubsample of employees for whom supervisor rat-ings were successfully obtained. One concern wasthat those employees who agreed to have their su-pervisor contacted might differ in some way fromthose who were not willing to allow their supervi-sor to be contacted. A comparison of the two groupsfound that there was no difference in their self-reported compliance behavior (x 5.85 for theno group [n 831) and x 5.84 for the yesgroup [n 3,599]; t[4,850] 0.50, n.s.). Similarly,

there was no difference in their self-reported rulebreaking (x 1.83 for the no group; and x 1.83for the yes group; t[4,847] 0.33, n.s.). Finally,

TABLE 5Study 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Supervisor Behavior Ratingsa

Scalesb Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

1. Compliance 6.06 0.81 (.90)2. Rule breaking 6.02 0.90 .56 (.87)3. Deference 5.66 0.99 .75 .61 (.91)4. Legitimacy 3.76 0.76 .11 .05 .13 (.86)

5. Value congruence 3.71 0 .93 .10 .17 .14 .27 (.88)6. Detection of behavior

(expectancy)c3.50 0.90 .04# .02# .06 .17 .02# (.69)

7. Reaction to behavior (value)c 2.58 1.13 .03# .04# .08 .15 .11 .26 (.71)8. Expectancy value 9.27 5.27 .04# .01# .08 .18 .08 .63 .899. Tenure 4.49 0.70 .04# .05 .05 .03 .06 .07 .11 .11

10. Gender 1.48 0.50 .16 .09 .11 .09 .13 .08 .03# .02# .03#

11. Age 3.43 1.07 .09 .09 .10 .07 .19 .03# .04 .04 .19 .0912. Education 3.01 0.84 .03# .06 .05 .12 .05 .15 .08 .14 .03# .03# .01#

a n 831. Higher numbers indicate greater endorsement of the construct. All correlations are significant at p .05, unless marked #.Diagonal entries in parentheses are the coefficient alphas for each scale.

b For variable codings, see the Appendix.c Scales range from 1 to 5, with high scores indicating high risk.



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no difference was found in sanction evaluations(x 3.76 for the no group; x 3.64 for the yesgroup; t[4,835] 0.26, n.s.). Slight differences werefound in the case of three variables: deference (x 5.43 for the no group, and x 5.54 for the yesgroup; t [4,847] 2.69, p .01); legitimacy (x 3.71 for the no group, and x 3.76 for the yes

group; t[4,841]

2.04, p

.05); and moral congru-ence (x 3.57 for the no group, and x 3.71 forthe yes group; t[4,435] 3.99, p .01). Thesedifferences indicate that those whose supervisorsparticipated were slightly more likely to indicatethat they voluntarily deferred to rules, that theyviewed the rules as legitimate, and that they feltcorporate practices were congruent with their ownmoral values. On the other hand, they were nomore likely to indicate that they complied with therules, broke the rules, or felt that those who brokethe rules were sanctioned.

Regression analyses and structural equationmodels similar to those conducted on the self-re-ported data were replicated with these supervisorratings of behavior as the dependent variables. Ta-

ble 6 presents the results of these analyses. Theregression analyses indicated significant effects oflegitimacy on compliance and deference (compli-ance, .08, p .05; deference, .08, p .05)and effects of value congruence on deference and

rule breaking (deference, .08, p .05; rulebreaking, .13, p .001). The only significanteffect among the command-and-control variableswas for the influence of perceived reactions to be-havior (value) on rule breaking ( .34, p .05).Results of the structural equation models likewiseindicated that, as hypothesized, the self-regulatory

approach was the primary influence on supervisor-reported compliance ( .81, p .001); on super-visor-rated deference to organizational policies( .90, p .001) and on supervisor ratings of rule

breaking ( .67, p .001). The SEM analysisshowed no significant effects of the command-and-control factor on any of these dependent variables.

Once again, we conducted analyses to furtherdetermine whether the influence of the self-regula-tory factor was significantly greater than that of thecommand-and-control factor. Three separate anal-yses were conducted, one for each of the threedependent variables, in which the path betweenthe dependent variable and each of the two factorswas constrained to be equal. If the effects of thevariables were not equal in magnitude, constrain-ing them to equality should produce a significantincrease in the chi-square. The results confirmedthat the influence of the self-regulatory factor wasgreater than that of the command-and-control fac-tor, with significant increases in chi-square for

TABLE 6Study 2: Antecedents of Supervisor Ratings of Employee Adherence to Organizational Policya

Variables






ControlAge .06 .04 .06 .06 .05 .06Tenure .04 .04 .05 .04 .03 .03Gender .15*** .13*** .09* .07* .08* .07*Education .05 .05 .05 .06 .05 .07

Self-regulatory .81*** .90*** .67***Legitimacy .08* .08* .01

Moral value congruence .04 .08* .13***

Command-and-control .04 .09 .02Detection of behavior (expectancy) .10 .12 .11Reaction to behavior (value) .19 .22 .34*Expectancy value .19 .19 .31

Total adjusted R2 .40*** .40*** .40***

a n 831.b Two latent variables reflecting (1) the two self-regulatory variables and (2) the three command-and-control variables were created. 2

251.27, df 40, CFI .95, NFI .94, IFI .95.* p .05

*** p .001



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compliance (2 52.3, df 1, p .001), fordeference (2 52.1, df 1, p .001), and forrule breaking (2 49.6, df 1, p .001).

Discussion

The findings largely confirm the hypothesized

influence of a self-regulatory approach to employeerule following. They indicate that employees fol-low organizational rules, and are perceived by theirsupervisors as following those rules, when theyhold favorable social values that promote rule fol-lowing. Command-and-control concerns, such asdetection of behavior and incentives and sanctionsassociated with behavior, were important predic-tors of whether employees reported following or-ganizational rules, but they had little predictivevalue with regards to supervisor ratings of em-ployee rule following, nor were they even the pri-

mary predictors of employee reports of deferenceand rule following. These results provide addi-tional support for the premise that self-regulatorystrategies, and the variables associated with them,are particularly useful for gaining employee adher-ence to organizational rules.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Social Values and Workplace Rule Adherence

These studies support the argument that employ-ees social value judgments shape their behavior,

and in particular their rule-following behavior. So-cial value judgments are a major motivation leadingto employee adherence to company policies andrules, and they also lead to lower levels of rule-

breaking behavior on the part of employees. Theseresults suggest that one promising way to bring the

behavior of employees into line with corporatecodes of conduct is to tap into their social values.To gain acceptance for corporate rules and policies,companies should encourage employees to act ontheir values. These values are central to the self-regulatory strategy for achieving employee policy

adherence.Of course, encouraging employees to act on theirvalues is not the only way to influence rule-related

behavior. Such organizational practices as monitor-ing employees and sanctioning or rewarding their

behavior may likewise motivate employees to fol-low organizational policies, in keeping with thecommand-and-control approach. However, in thetwo studies reported here, the utility of that ap-proach overall appeared to be weaker than that of aself-regulatory approach. There was only one ex-ception to this. In Study 2, command-and-control

concerns had a stronger influence on compliancethan did the self-regulatory approach. By and large,however, although the command-and-control ap-proach had significant influences in some instances,these influences were typically lower in magnitudethan those of the self-regulatory approach.

These findings suggest that companies have a

great deal to gain by going beyond instrumentalstrategies of social control and focusing attentionon the activation of employee values that are con-sistent with a self-regulatory strategy. Overall, thetwo studies presented here indicate the viability ofsuch a strategy and, furthermore, the potential su-periority of that strategy over the more traditionalcommand-and-control approach. This alternativestrategy leads to employee cooperation much moreefficiently and effectively, since employees becomeself-regulating and take the responsibility of follow-ing rules onto themselves. Further, they do so with-out reference to the likelihood of being punished forwrongdoing or rewarded for acting appropriately.

Earlier studies in the area of everyday law-relatedbehavior highlight the important role of social val-ues in encouraging citizen compliance with the law(Tyler, 1990). It has been shown that people aremore likely to comply with laws when they feelthat legal authorities are legitimate and ought to beobeyed. The findings outlined here support thisargument and extend it to a different arenaem-ployees and their relationship to the corporationsin which they work. This extension is especiallystriking since the work arena is one in which the

influence of values has traditionally been down-played in favor of alternative instrumental or ra-tional approaches.

The current findings also extend previous workby considering not only the social value of legiti-macy but also that of moral value congruence (thematch between an employees moral values andthose of her or his organization). When employeesfeel that the values of their work organization arecongruent with their own, their own motivation to

behave morally leads them to follow organizationalrules out of their intrinsic motivation to behave

appropriately. Moral values and legitimacy differin that psychologists do not view moral values asparticularly malleable, so congruity is the key is-sue. Legitimacy, in contrast, can be more readilycreated or destroyed by the actions of organizationsand their authorities.

Although our findings point to the importance ofemployee social values, the organizational implica-tions of the various values are not identical. In thecase of moral congruence, the issue is creating con-gruence between employee values and organization-al practices. One way for organizations to do so is



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by selecting employees with congruent values. It isalso possible to bring organizational practices intoline with employee moral values. Although it istheoretically possible to change employee values,research suggests that changing moral values is dif-ficult among adults. One possibility is for manage-ment to create the perception of moral value con-

gruence by using fair procedures within anorganization, and research has supported this ap-proach (Tyler & Blader, 2000).

On the other hand, in the case of legitimacy, alarge body of research suggests that this value iscreated or destroyed by the practices of manage-ment (Tyler & Blader, 2000). In particular, the fair-ness of organizational procedures shapes legiti-macy, suggesting that organizations can shapelegitimacy by the way they structure and exercisemanagerial authority.

In addition to the empirically supported utility ofthe self-regulatory strategy reported here, such anapproach has additional benefits over a command-and-control strategy. For instance, it prevents or-ganizations from expending resources on creatingand maintaining credible systems of surveillance toenforce rules. This expense is typical of efforts toregulate conduct using incentive- or sanction-basedstrategies. Exacerbating this problem, such strate-gies actually encourage people to hide their behav-ior and thus make it necessary to have especiallycomprehensive and costly surveillance systems.

Besides their actual costs, these strategies havethe additional problem that they undermine em-

ployees commitment to their companies and en-joyment of their jobs. Employees who focus onavoiding sanctions have their intrinsic motivationand commitment to their company undermined(Frey, 1997). They then contribute less to theirworkplaces. Hence, there is a downside to sanc-tions and incentives and the surveillance necessar-ily associated with them. They hurt company pro-ductivity by undermining the values thatencourage commitment to work (Tyler & Blader,2000, 2003).

Importantly, one might consider a managerial ap-

proach in which the influence of both the com-mand-and-control and self-regulatory strategies arepursued concurrently. The two studies presentedhere did not directly address this option, but rather,they treated the two approaches as distinct fromone another. This perspective is consistent withresearch showing that extrinsic rewards and pun-ishments undermine intrinsic motivation. Thiswork indicates that the two strategies cannot beused at the same time because extrinsic strategiesundermine intrinsic strategies (Deci & Ryan, 1985;Frey, 1997).

Of course, it is important to note the limits ofthese studies. The data were cross-sectional, so weneed to be tentative in inferring causal relations.Further, much of the behavioral data examined inthese studies was self-reported, and of course theusual limitations of such data apply here as well.Finally, the scales used were not previously vali-

dated (they were drawn from Tyler and Blader[2000]), and, further, their reliabilities vary. There-fore, these findings should be regarded as an im-portant step in the process of further exploring thefactors that shape rule adherence in work settingsand, in particular, the role of self-regulatory factorsin that process.

IMPLICATIONS

The findings outlined above are not only impor-tant in terms of organizational governance, but alsoaddress theoretical questions about human motiva-tion in work settings. In particular, they providestrong support for the relational perspective on co-operation presented in the group engagementmodel (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). According tothis model, social values, such as the self-regula-tory variables examined in these studies, are a keyantecedent of voluntary cooperative behaviors. Afurther hypothesis contained in the model is thatthe procedural justice of an organization will be akey antecedent of these social values. Empiricalwork on the group engagement model supports

both of these hypotheses (Blader & Tyler, 2006;Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2006), indicating that the keyantecedent to the self-regulatory factors examinedin the current research is the procedural justicepeople experience in their organizations. Thisstudy does not speak to the issue of proceduraljustice, but the findings reinforce the argument thatinternal values shape voluntary cooperation.

The group engagement models insights suggestthat employees connections to their work organi-zations should be considered within an identity-

based framework, which emphasizes that people

cooperate with their work organizations in an effortto develop and support a positive identity and fa-vorable views about the self. To the degree thatemployees identify with their organization, theirsocial values are engaged and they are motivated tovoluntarily cooperate with that organization. This ar-gument suggests that resources and resource acquisi-tion are not the primary factors linking people togroups. Rather, voluntary cooperation flows fromstimulating peoples internal motivations, which arelinked to the ethical values central to peoples senseof who they are and what they represent.



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CONCLUSION

The argument advanced here is for a broaderview of employees and of the antecedents of rule-following behavior among employees. We looked atthe influence of both instrumental and value-basedmotivations in shaping rule-following behavior.The results presented suggest that considering both

models together better explains such behavior thandoes considering either model alone.

The view presented here includes not only themotivations traditionally studiedmotivationslinked to sanctions and incentivesbut also socialmotivations for following group rules (Tyler & Dar-ley, 1999). These social motivations are linked toconcerns about social values in work settings. Thecase for this broader model rests on the findingthat, in two different studies, corporate actors so-cial values concerning legitimacy and moralitywere found to motivate their rule following. These

findings suggest that scholars would be better ableto understand rule-following behavior in work or-ganizations, as well as in other settings, if theyadopted a broader model of human motivation thatadded an account of social motivations to modelsof employee behavior.

Of course, companies are hierarchical, with rulesand policies flowing down from top levels of man-agement. If upper management does not itself sup-port conformity to ethical codes of conduct, as ap-pears to have been the case in several recentcorporate scandals, then the motivation to create asupportive corporate culture may not exist amongmanagers. In that case, employees are likely to be-come aware that company policies are not in ac-cord with their own values, and they will becomeless intrinsically motivated to follow them.

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APPENDIX

Study 1 Measures

Rule-Following Behavior

Compliance with organizational policy( .89). Re-spondents were asked to indicate how often they com-plied with corporate policy using the following items,with a scale ranging from never (1) to very often(6):How often do you: Do as your supervisor requests,Follow the policies established by your supervisor,Carefully try to carry out the instructions of your super-visor, and Comply with work-related rules andregulations.



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Deference to organizational policy( .82). Respon-dents were asked how willingly they accepted policies,using the same scale as for the policy compliance scale.Respondents were asked how often they: Willingly fol-low company policies, Follow organizational policieseven when you do not need to do so because no one willknow whether you did or not, Voluntarily follow or-ganizational rules and policies concerning how to do

your job, Willingly defer to your supervisors judg-ments about your work load, Willingly defer to yoursupervisors judgments about your job responsibilities,and Willingly defer to your supervisors decisions aboutwork deadlines.

Rule breaking ( .60). Respondents were askedhow often (on a scale of 1, never, to 6 very often)they: Try to find ways to hinder or undermine yoursupervisor, Do work that is not the best you can do

because you are angry at your employer, Find faultwith what the company is doing, and Slack off towardsthe end of the day.

Self-Regulatory Variables

Legitimacy ( .80). Legitimacy was assessed usingan eight-item scale using a strongly disagree (1) tostrongly agree (6) response range. The items were: Anemployee should accept the decisions made by theirsupervisor, even when they think the supervisor iswrong, Disobeying ones supervisor is seldom justi-fied, Someone who disregards their supervisors deci-sions hurts their work group, Work organizations aremost effective when people follow the directives of theirsupervisors, Respect for the organizations rules is animportant value for employees to have, In the long run,

the organization is better off if workers willingly followthe rules, It is difficult to break the rules and keep onesself-respect, and People should support the policies oftheir work organization.

Value congruence ( .81). Respondents were askedto respond to five items tapping their sense of whetherthe corporation reflected their personal values, using asix-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) tostrongly agree (6). The organizations name appeared where we have substituted brackets [ ]. The items were: Ifind that my values and the values at [ ] are very similar,What [ ] stands for is important to me, I agree with thevalues that define the goals of [ ], I agree with the thingsmy work group stands for, and My values and the

values of others in my work group are very similar.

Command-and-Control Variables

Detection of behavior (expectancy) ( .84). Judg-ments about expectancies of behavior being observedwere assessed using a four-item measure. Items included:How much attention does your supervisor pay towhether or not you follow work rules (very little, 1, toa lot 6), How easy is it for your supervisor to observewhether you follow work rules? (very hard, 1, to veryeasy, 6), How much does your supervisor care whether

you do your job well? (very little, 1, to a lot, 6) andHow closely is your work behavior supervised? (not atall, 1, to very much, 6).

Reaction to behavior (value) ( .69). Judgmentsabout perceived punishments and rewards for detected

behavior were also assessed using a four-item measure,asking respondents the following: If you were caught

breaking a work rule, how much would it hurt you, If

you were caught breaking a work rule, how much wouldyour supervisor care, If you do your job well, howmuch does that improve your pay and benefits? and Ifyou do your job poorly, how much does that hurt yourpay and benefits? All items responses ranged fromvery little (1) to a lot (6).

Study 2 Measures

Rule-Following Behavior

Compliance with organizational policy. A five-itemscale was used ( .79). Respondents were asked how

often they: Comply with organizational rules and regu-lations, Use company rules to guide what you do onthe job, Seek information about appropriate companypolicies before acting, Come to work on time, andFollow organizational rules about how you shouldspend your time.

Deference to organizational policy. A six-item scalewas created ( .87). Respondents were asked how oftenthey: Follow company policies even when you do notneed to do so because no one will know whether you didor not, Follow company policies and rules about howto do your job, Follow organizational rules and policieswithout questioning them, Implement your supervi-sors decisions even when he/she will not know whether

you did, Do what your supervisor expects of you, evenwhen you do not really think it is important, and Hap-pily accept the decisions made by your supervisor.

Rule breaking. A six-item scale was used ( .76).Respondents were asked how often they would: Not doyour best work because you are angry at your supervi-sor, Find ways to undermine your supervisor, Slackoff towards the end of the day, Take supplies fromwork without permission, Come in late to work with-out permission, and Neglect to follow work rules or theinstructions of your supervisor.

Self-Regulatory Variables

Legitimacy. Legitimacy was assessed using an six-item scale ( .86). The items were: An employeeshould accept the decisions made by their supervisor,even when they think that their supervisor is wrong,Disobeying ones supervisor is seldom justified,Someone who disregards their supervisor hurts theirwork group, People should follow organizational pol-icies, even when they think that those policies arewrong, It is wrong to break company rules, even if youcan get away with it, and Companies are most success-ful when employees follow company policies.



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Value congruence. Respondents were asked to re-spond to five items tapping their sense of whether thecorporation reflected their personal values ( .88). Theitems were: I find that my values and the values whereI work are very similar, What my company stands for isimportant to me, I agree with the values that define thegoals of my company, I think that my employer actsvery ethically, and I am seldom asked at work to do

anything that goes against my personal moral values.

Command-and-Control Variables

Respondents were asked questions related to their ex-pectations about the likelihood of their behavior beingdetected (expectancy), and the likely reaction to that

behavior (value). Each measure included assessments forboth positive and negative behaviors, to capture effectsfor both sanctions for undesirable behavior and incen-tives for desired behavior. Furthermore, we combinedthese two sets of judgments multiplicatively to create aninteraction term.

Detection of behavior (expectancy) (

.69). Threeitems reflected expectations about whether rule breakingor rule following would be detected. The items were:How easy is it for your supervisor to observe whetheryou follow work rules, How often is your supervisorpaying attention to whether or not you follow the rules,and How closely is your work monitored by your super-visor? The scale ranged from 1 to 5, with high scoresindicating a high likelihood of punishment.

Reaction to behavior (value) ( .71). Three itemsmeasured anticipated reactions (sanctions and incentives)to detected behavior. The items were: If you are caught

breaking a work rule, how much does it hurt you pay oryour chances for promotion? If you do your job poorly,how much does that hurt your pay or benefits? and If youdo your job well, how much does that improve your pay or

benefits? The scale ranged from 1 to 5, with high scoresindicating expecting more severe punishments.

Supervisor Ratings of Employee Behavior

Supervisor ratings used a seven-point response formatranging from never to always.

Compliance with organizational policy. ( .90).Five-items asked supervisors how often often the em-ployees being rated: Comply with work-related rulesand regulations, Use company rules to guide what theydo on the job, Carefully carry out supervisor instruc-tions, Follow established policies, Seek informationabout appropriate company policies before acting,Come to work on time, and Follow work rules abouthow they should spend their time.

Deference to organizational policies. ( .91). Sixitems asked supervisors how often often the employees

being rated willingly and voluntarily:Follow companypolicies even when they do not need to do so because noone will know whether they did or not, Voluntarilyfollow company rules and policies concerning how to dotheir job, Follow organizational rules and policieswithout questioning them, Voluntarily accept the de-cisions made by their supervisor, Willingly implementdecisions even when their behavior is not being moni-

tored, and Willingly defer to supervisors decisions. Rule breaking. ( .87). Eight items asked supervi-

sors how often the employees being rated: Do work thatis not their best because they are angry, Find ways toundermine their supervisor, Find fault with what thecompany is doing, Slack off towards the end of theday, Take property from work without permission,Come in late to work without permission, Neglect tofollow work rules or instructions of their supervisor,and Do personal tasks on work time.

Background Factors

Job tenure. Respondents indicated the number of

years they had worked at their current jobs. Responsecategories were: 1, 03 months, 2, 36 months, 3,612 months, 4, 1260 months, and 5, 60 or moremonths.

Gender. Respondents self-reported their gender as 1,male or 2, female.

Age. Respondents self-reported their age. Responsecategories were 1, 1824, 2, 2534, 3, 3544, 4,4554, 5, 5564, 6, 6574, and 7, 75 or older.

Education. Respondents self-reported their educationusing a four-category scale ranging from 1, less thanhigh school, to 4, college degree.

Tom R. Tyler ([email protected]) is a professor at NewYork University. He teaches in the psychology departmentand the law school. His research explores the dynamics ofauthority in groups, organizations, and societies. In partic-ular, he examines the role of judgments about the justice orinjustice of group procedures in shaping legitimacy, com-pliance, and cooperative behavior. He received his Ph.D.from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Steven L. Blader ([email protected]) is an assistantprofessor of management and organizations at the SternSchool of Business, New York University. His researchfocuses on employees social and relational concerns inthe workplace, leading him to examine how employeesassess their social and relational standing at work and theinfluence of those judgments on how they relate to theirwork organizations. His Ph.D. (social psychology) is fromNew York University.



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