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Given the rising tide of violence and the mounting evidence of drug-related cor-ruption at all levels of government, it is probably fair to say that, so far, the cartelshave managed to take the lead in a psychological war against the Mexican state.

Mexicos Drug Wars Get BrutalfranciSco e. Gonzlez

Narco-violence has intensifed in Mexicosince the early 2000s as a consequenceo the Mexican governments crackdown

on drug cartels. The spiral o violence has includ-ed shootouts on the public squares o big cities

in broad daylight. A grenade attack on Septem-ber 15, 2008, let eight dead and more than onehundred injured on the central square in Morelia(the capital o the state o Michoacn), on a nightMexicans were celebrating the 198th anniversa-ry o their countrys independence. The mayhemhas included a prolieration o mass executionsdiscovered on isolated ranches in remote areas,as well as in homes in crowded neighborhoodso cities as dierent and distant as Tijuana, onthe border with Caliornia, and Mrida, on the

Yucatn peninsula.For most Mexicans, rich and poor, a psycho-

logical leap into a state o generalized ear and aperception o acute vulnerability coincided withan increase in gruesome displays o barbarismsince the spring o 2006. These acts have includ-ed public displays o battered human heads, somethrown into plazas or placed on car rootops,some thrown outside schools; mutilated torsoshanging rom meat hooks; threats and taunts torival cartels written on walls with the blood o

butchered adversaries; and video-postings o tor-ture and beheadings on YouTube.

How did Mexico spiral into this horrifc waveo violence? The export o illegal substances tothe United States became big business during theProhibition years (19171933), but the seeds or

the long-term growth and astounding proftabil-ity o the Mexico-US illegal drug trade were sownmuch earlier. Opiates (morphine and heroin) be-came a growing business in the United States inthe wake o the American Civil War (18611865)

and the two world wars (19141918 and 19391945). Since the nineteenth century, armers innorthwest Mexico had grown the opium poppiesthat satisfed part o this demand.

Mexico also became one o the ports o entry orcocaine. It was sold commercially and developed amass market in the United States in the 1880s asa cure-all or everything rom discolored teeth tofatulence. Smugglers rom the Andean countriesand their US networks used Mexico and the Carib-bean as gateways to supply the illegal market that

served Hollywoods and New Yorks glamoroussets in the 1950s and 1960s. Cocaine remained aluxury item that only the well-to-do could aorduntil the early 1980s, when crack cocaine invad-ed the streets o Americas large cities, wreakinghavoc particularly in poor Arican-American andHispanic neighborhoods.

Mexican seasonal migrant workers in the 1920sintroduced to Americans the smoking o canna-bis leaves. A mass market or cannabis consump-tion did not develop, however, until the rise o the

counterculture o the 1960s and 1970s. Lastly, amass market or synthetic drugs such as metham-phetamines developed in the 1990s in the UnitedStates, and Mexican drug cartels became domi-nant suppliers o these too.

For decades Mexico and the United Stateshave pursued very dierent antidrug strategies.The United States launched the original war ondrugs under President Richard Nixon in the ear-ly 1970s. This policy contained both domestic andvery prominent international components, explic-

itly targeting Mexico as a key site or the eradi-cation o opium crops and marijuana, as well as

franciSco e. Gonzlez is an associate professor of politicsand Latin American studies at Johns Hopkins UniversitysSchool of Advanced International Studies. He is the author ofDual Transitions rom Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized

Regimes in Chile and Mexico, 1970-2000 (Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2008).

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Mexicos Drug Wars Get Brutal 73

the Andean countries or the eradication o coca.Successive Mexican governments, on the otherhand, pursued what analysts have dubbed a liveand let live approach. This system, characterizedby a working relationship between some Mexicanauthorities and drug lords, prevailed between the1940s and the 1990s.

This does not mean that Mexican presidents ormost high-ranking bureaucrats, governors, andmilitary high commanders were involved in the il-legal drug trade. It does mean, however, that givenMexicos complex and ragmented territorial poli-tics, the countrys governors, mayors, military o-cers, and police chies retained some autonomyto advance their interests and those o their allies,including drug trackers.

The kingpins bought access to the Mexico-USborder, and this access allowed them to expand

their production and smuggling activities. The au-thorities in turn stued their pockets with cashbut also, crucially, kept relative public peace and asemblance o law and order through the contain-ment (rather than the destruction) o drug syn-dicates. Direct conronta-tion meant risking publicdisorder and violence, andindeed whenever authori-ties went ater trackers,bloody shootouts ensued.

But such conrontationswere the exceptions ratherthan the rule. For those involved on both sides othe game, mutually understood rules and practic-es prevailed. Authorities did not tolerate open turwars among competing cartels, and they prohibit-ed them rom harming innocent civilians throughextortion, kidnappings, or assassinations.

risinGviolenCeMexican authorities came under increased

pressure rom the United States to clamp down ondrug cartels ater the 1985 murder o an AmericanDrug Enorcement Administration (DEA) ocer.Enrique Camarena, a DEA agent working under-cover in Mexico, had exposed big ranches in thestate o Chihuahua where trackers cultivatedcannabis with the ull knowledge o some ederalauthorities, military ocers, and state and localocials. The trackers captured and killed Ca-marena, and the discovery o his tortured, decom-posing body created a uror in US public opinion.

Footdragging by the authorities investigating thecase convinced Americans that highly placed in-

dividuals in the government o President Miguelde la Madrid were involved with the trackers.

By the time a new president, Carlos Salinas,expressed eagerness to join the United Statesin a ree trade agreement in 1989, the Mexicangovernment had to show that it was doing all itcould to clean house. Salinas allowed DEA agents

to return to work in Mexico and his governmentspent resources strengthening military and policeoperations against trackers. In parallel, changesenacted under the administration o George H.W.Bush altered the long-standing equilibrium o theMexico-US illegal drug trade. In 198990, Wash-ington committed large-scale material resources,military training, and intelligence to try to bustthe Andean cocaine trade. Ater years o engage-ment, the United States contributed to the demiseo Colombias main syndicates, the Medelln and

Cali cartels, and to largely shutting down theCaribbeanGul o Mexico cocaine route. By thelate 1990s, the battle lines had been redrawn andMexico had ended up in the eye o the storm.

The demise o the Colombian cartels allowedthe Mexican syndicates,which ormerly had workedor the Colombians, to takeover. The virtual closureo the Caribbean routestrengthened the Central

AmericaMexico route byland and the Pacic Ocean

route toward Mexicos western coast. Despite o-cial eorts by Salinass successor, President Er-nesto Zedillo, drug trac increased in the late1990s and some Mexican authorities continued tobe on the drug lords payroll. The most embarrass-ing instance was revealed in 1997, when Zedillosdrug czar, General Jess Gutirrez Rebollo, wasexposed as a beneciary o the top leader o theJurez cartel. The confuence o higher spending

by Mexican governments to combat drug track-ing and higher illegal drug fows through the coun-trys territory set the stage or a serious increase innarco-violence in the late 1990s.

This increase in drug-related violence coin-cided in 2000 with the loss o the presidency bythe Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) or therst time in Mexicos history. Vicente Fox, o thecenter-right National Action Party (PAN), assumedthe presidency promising many changes, amongthem the deeat o the drug cartels. Some analysts

think that even beore Fox became president, PANgovernments at the state and local levels in the

Only now are we realizing the extent

to which top Mexican authorities

are in the pay of the drug lords.

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74 CURRENT HISTORY February 2009

early 1990s had pursued a more principled ap-proach to combating drug tracking, which hadresulted in higher levels o drug-related violencein border states such as Baja Caliornia and Chi-huahua. Fox purged and reorganized the ederalpolice orces and tried to extradite captured druglords to the United States.

This policy, though eective at raising the num-ber o individuals arrested and drug shipmentsconfscated, ell ar short o the governmentsobjective o deeating the cartels. Moreover, thecapture o some cartel leaders was tantamount tokicking hornets nests without having the meansto spray the rattled insects. The capture o Ben-jamn Arellano Flix, head o the Tijuana cartel,in 2002, and o Osil Crdenas Guilln, head othe Gul cartel, in 2003, led to a vicious war with-in and among the criminal organizations, as up-

coming drug leaders battled to assert or reassertcontrol over territory, resources, and manpower.The change in the balance o power among thecartels led to new alliances. The Gul, Tijuana,and Jurez cartels struckdeals to take on anotherbloc made up o the Si-naloa, Milenio, Jalisco,and Colima cartels.

Likewise, the reorga-nized police orces soon

succumbed to the bribes and threats o the crimi-nal syndicates. Government inltration contin-ued to such an extent that a spy or a drug cartelwas discovered working in the presidents ocein 2005. Violence had gotten so out o controlby 200405 that Fox implemented an operationinvolving 1,500 army and ederal police ocersin Mexico-US border cities. In this context, theconfict intensied and started mutating into thebloody spectacle that Mexicans witness today.

CaldernswarFelipe Caldern, also rom the PAN, took overthe presidency rom Fox on December 1, 2006.Caldern won a fercely contested and extremelyclose election against the candidate o the center-let Party o the Democratic Revolution (PRD),Andrs Manuel Lpez Obrador. Throughout thecampaign, public opinion surveys had shownthat Mexican citizens top concerns were lack oeconomic opportunities, and crime and generalinsecurity. Shortly ater assuming ofce, Calde-

rn declared a war on drugs by deploying theMexican military in a series o large-scale opera-

tions that by the end o 2008 had involved closeto 40,000 troops and 5,000 ederal police.

The decision to bring the armed orces into theray was controversial, and observers disagreedabout the reasons the president raised the stakesin this way, investing his political capital in thewar on drugs. During the presidential campaign

Caldern had not hinted that this policy wouldcome to dene his government.

Some analysts highlighted a political explana-tion, according to which weak incoming presi-dents in contemporary Mexico have to carryout spectacular acts early on to establish theirauthority, boost their standing with the public,and help gain some autonomy over groups withinthe Mexican political class that try to limit theirscope o action. From this perspective, Calde-rn may have ordered the military surge against

the drug cartels to turn the page on the then-raging postelectoral confict with the PRD candi-date. Given the contentious electoral results, L-pez Obrador had declared himsel the legitimate

president. Calderns de-cisive action showed ineect who was the realcommander-in-chie.

Other analysts haveargued that the politicalexplanation sounds like

a conspiracy theory. The main reason behind themilitary surge, they suggest, was the incomingadminstrations realization that the cartels weredominating more territory and public spaces andthat i this process were let unchecked, it couldlead to a situation o state ailure similar to theone that Colombia had to endure. Also, accord-ing to this view, a war on drugs had existed in allbut name during Foxs term. Given the ineective-ness o police orces in combating the syndicates,Caldern was let without any option but to in-

volve the military.In act these two explanations are not mutually

exclusive. Caldern might have decided to pursuea war on drugs given, rst, genuine concern re-garding the uncontrolled violence in parts o thecountry, including his home state o Michoacn;and, second, his wish to make the armed orceskey allies in the context o the postelectoral con-fict with Lpez Obrador and the PRD. Regardlesso the mix o motivations or launching the surgeagainst trackers, in the short term Caldern has

reaped higher political than operational benets.Opinion polls show that a majority o the Mexican

Caldern has managed to bring the

United States into the eye of the storm.

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public supports the presidents stance against thecartels. By mid-2007, the postelectoral confict andLpez Obradors continuing maneuvers to discred-it Caldern had disappeared rom the headlines.But dominating the news instead has been a brutalintensication o drug-related violence.

theCorruptionConundrumOperationally, Calderns war against drugshas already resulted in the arrests o more thana dozen top drug lords and record seizures oarms, cash, and drugs. Yet the campaign startedas, and it remains, a steep uphill battle. The mainconundrum is still the ineectiveness o law en-orcement in Mexico. Aside rom questions o ju-risdiction (Mexicos ederal structure means thatapproximately 3,800 law enorcement institutionsexist throughout the country), the root cause o

the problem is the drug cartels extensive penetra-tion o government agencies and co-optation ogovernment ocials. This is a hurdle that is al-most impossible to overcome without somehowdepriving the drug lords o the astounding protsthey currently make.

Indeed, the paradox o tougher enorcement isthat, as the cost o doing business in the illegaldrug trade rises, the street price o drugs goes uptoo, thereby raising prot margins. The result isthat some drug trackers and would-be track-

ers may decide that pursuing this line o businessis becoming prohibitively risky, but as long asprots rom the trade remain so out o line com-pared with any other economic activity, there willalways be individuals ready to risk their lives.

Studies o drug gang members in cities likeChicago have shown that only the top dogsmake stratospheric prots, while most o the rankand le make so little that they have second andthird jobs, while still living with their mothers!Yet, no matter how low the probability o making

it to the top, individuals will take a chance on thedangers o the drug trade i their social conditionsare precarious enough and their opportunities oradvancement are negligible. And it goes withoutsaying that conditions o hopelessness and ex-treme lie choices abound in developing coun-tries such as Mexico. As long as these conditionspersist, and as long as the system put in place tocounter the narcotics trade leads to the generationo exceptional prots, there will continue to be in-dividuals willing to play this lottery.

The generation o exceptional prots, more-over, also provides the plentiul cash that drug

lords use to buy into the system. Only now arewe realizing the extent to which top Mexican au-thorities are in the pay o the drug lords. Since atleast the Camarena aair, and probably or muchlonger, Mexicans had assumed that the cartels hadbought o some among the political elite. But nev-er beore have so many top ranking law enorcers

been exposed as under Caldern. They have beenexposed at the local, state, and ederal levels, andhave ranged rom the lowliest privates among theranks to the head o Mexicos Interpol oce andthe ederal governments drug czar.

Even though many ocials might reuse to col-laborate with the drug cartels irrespective o thepecuniary gains on oer, the criminal syndicatesalso compel cooperation by issuing threats andsometimes carrying them out. The assassinationin May 2008 o Edgar Milln Gmez, the acting

chie o Mexicos ederal police, allegedly in retri-bution or the arrest in January o one o the topleaders o the Sinaloa cartel, increased the senseo vulnerability even or those who go about theirdaily lives surrounded by bodyguards.

Fate did not help the governments cause whena small jet carrying Mexicos top law enorce-ment ocialsincluding the interior secretaryand Calderns closest political ally, Juan CamiloMourio, as well as the countrys antidrug pros-ecutor, Jos Luis Santiago Vasconceloscrashed

in downtown Mexico City on November 4, 2008,killing all on board. Even though ocial evi-dence has suggested that turbulence caused theaccident, conspiracy theories have spread aroundMexico, ueling the sense that the government hassuered another blow, this time at its core.

In the two years since the start o Caldernswar on drugs, the government has raised thestakes or the cartels by hitting them with ullmilitary orce. The cartels have responded withan intensication o both their tur wars and their

war against the Mexican state. As a result, drug-related violence has spread rom states where ithas been endemic or years into states that hadnot seen drug-related violence beore. The num-ber o dead almost doubled in just one yearrom2,700 in 2007 to more than 5,300 in 2008. Giventhe rising tide o violence and the mounting evi-dence o drug-related corruption at all levels ogovernment, it is probably air to say that, so ar,the cartels have managed to take the lead in a psy-chological war against the Mexican state.

I noted earlier that Calderns drug war hasyielded higher short-term political than operation-

Mexicos Drug Wars Get Brutal 75

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76 CURRENT HISTORY February 2009

al benets. However, some political implicationso the war could have a big impact on the opera-tional capacity or waging it. The most importanto these political implications has been Caldernsability to get the US government to accept that thewar on drugs is a matter o co-responsibility. Ineect, Caldern has managed to bring the United

States into the eye o the storm.

washinGtonlendsahandColombia receives the lions share o US anti-

narcotics aid in Latin Americathis has been thecase or several decades. But Calderns declara-tion o a war on drugs in Mexico got the attentiono President George W. Bush and the US Congressin 2007. As a result, a $1.4 billion, three-year pro-gram, the Mrida Initiative, started operating inDecember 2008. The aim is to assist the Mexican

government wage the war against drugs by help-ing it with technology and training.

There is no doubt that, in the case o Colombia,the agreement between Presidents Andrs Pastra-na and Bill Clinton, which led to the creation oPlan Colombia in 2000, has proved a game chang-er. In the late 1990s, analysts and policy makerstalked about Colombia as a potential ailed state.Although the US Government Accountability O-ce has shown that Plan Colombia has not been agreat success in terms o curbing the production o

coca and the transportation o cocaine, it has un-doubtedly strengthened the Colombian state andits capacity to strike against non-state actors, no-tably guerrillas and paramilitary groups. Colom-bia, which until recently possessed an underdevel-oped military, has come a long way in eight years,and the central governments presence around thecountrys territory is stronger than ever.

These benets have been very costly in someregards. Aerial umigation to eradicate coca plantshas damaged legal crops and produced adverse

health eects in those exposed to the herbicides.The number o dead and displaced as a result othe intensication o the confict since the early2000s has grown enormously. News o exten-sive human rights violations has made headlinesaround the world. And yet, the plans contributionto strengthening the stateand thereby to rees-tablishing a still precarious but nonetheless basicsense o security or many Colombians, particu-

larly in big citieshas meant that a substantialmajority o that countrys public avors the con-tinuation o President Alvaro Uribes policies, ando Colombias cooperation with the United States.

What then or Mexico? There is danger in car-rying the Colombia-Mexico analogy too ar. Aterall, the United States does not share a border with

Colombia, let alone a 2,000-mile one as it doeswith Mexico. For Mexico, the danger o an esca-lating war on drugs, with the United States help-ing to strengthen Mexican authorities repower,is that some o the extreme conditions created inColombia since 2000 could be repeated. For theUnited States, the danger rom such an escala-tion is potentially ar greater than in its engage-ment with Colombia. An escalation o the war ondrugs in Mexico could spill over into US territory.Indeed, an April 2008 report by the US National

Drug Intelligence Center, part o the Departmento Justice, ound evidence o Mexican smugglingoperations in all but two states (Vermont and WestVirginia) o the union. Drug-related violence con-nected with the Mexican cartels has been increas-ingly reported in cities o the American south-west, rom San Diego to Phoenix, Las Vegas, andDallas.

Some analysts have gone so ar as to start call-ing this a borderless war. This is no doubt an exag-geration. But there is also no doubt that unless US

authorities can control the massive tracking oweapons, cash, and chemical precursors o drugsthat originate in the United States and are shippedinto Mexico, America risks exposing its sot un-derbelly, a term now oten used to describe itssouthern border. As it is, some 90 percent o ar-maments conscated rom the cartels comes romthe more than 7,000 gun outlets situated on USsoil within 50 miles o the Mexican border.

The stakes or the United States in Mexico,thus, are much higher than they could ever be in

Colombia. Supplying the Mexican governmentwith technology and training to help prop up itsghting capabilities is an important rst step, butit is not enough. Without seriously denting the de-mand or illegal drugs and preventing the south-bound fow o weapons, cash, and drug-makingchemicals, the United States will keep eeding thefames that threaten to consume the basis or civi-lized lie in Mexico.