US v. DAVIS June 29, 1973 | Browning, J. | Search & Seizure (Airport Searches)

PETITIONER: United States

RESPONDENT: Charles Davis

SUMMARY: Appellant was convicted of attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon. The conviction was

based upon the discovery of a loaded revolver in appellant's briefcase by a Trans World Airlines employee during a sea rch of the

carry-on luggage of boarding passengers. Appellant's motion to suppress was denied on the grounds that he "impliedly consented"

to the search and that, in any event, "there was no governmental involvement."

DOCTRINE: Searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as

part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment tho ugh not supported

by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place or person to be searched.

FACTS:

1. Mar. 16, 1971: Davis and a friend checked in a few minutes

before 6:50pm flight from San Francisco Int’l Airport bound

for Bangkok, Thailand, with a stopover at Los Angeles.He had

a ticket for LA.

2. As he reached the loading gate, Malcolm Read, a TWA

employee conducted a routine security check. The latter

reached into the briefcase of Davis and found a gun. He gave

it to a customs security agent. They then conducted a search of

Davis’ person.

3. Davis filed a motion to suppress, but was denied because of

a finding of implied consent, and was sentenced to pay $250.

4. The Court then went on to discuss that since 1961, and

moreso in 1968, hijacking of American aircrafts have been on

the rise. The Government then undertook security measures

such as profiling of passengers, use of magnetometers,

weapon searches. By July 1972, US President ordered the

screening of all passengers and inspection of all carry-on

baggage.

5. Basically, the government’s participation in implementation

of airport search program has been significant, such that any

search conducted pursuant to that program is within the reach

of the Fourth Amendment.

6. GOVERNMENT ARGUMENT: Search was consistent

with Fourth Amendment because (1) because appellant did not

have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his

carry-on luggage, citing Katz v. United States, (Harlan, J.,

concurring), and (2) because "a police officer is not required

to have probable cause for arrest before he can seize a person

and subject him to a limited search for weapons," citing Terry

v. Ohio.

ISSUE/S:

W/N the search conducted on the luggage was valid. NO

RULING: Reversed and remanded for further consideration

of the consent issue

RATIO:

1. Katz threshold test: If the complaining individual did not

have a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the

intrusion, the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable; if he did

have a reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the

government must demonstrate that the intrusion was justified

under Fourth Amendment standards.

2. In Katz, J. Harlan’s concurring opinion imposes "a twofold

requirement [for Fourth Amendment protection], first that a

person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of

privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is

prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'

3. In this case, Davis relied on the privacy of his briefcase to

conceal his gun. The second requirement was also satisfied,

but this does not mean that any kind of governmental intrusion

is allowed just because it has happened often enough.

4. Terry v. Ohio also inapplicable because the search

conducted was against the general introduction of weapons or

explosive into a restricted area. “The search was

indiscriminate, and, in view of its object, necessarily so,

absent a foolproof means of isolating in advance those few

individuals who were genuine hijack risks .”

5. In addition the Court said that, “Mr. Read had no particular

interest in appellant as an individual. He had no individualized

basis for the search at all, much less specific and articulable

facts that would justify a reasonably prudent man in believing

that appellant was about to commit a crime or that he was

carrying a weapon.”

6. There is no reason to believe that the incidence of concealed

weapons is greater in airline passengers than in the general

public. Terry does not justify the “wholesale frisking” of the

general public in order to locate weapons to prevent future

crimes.

7. However, the search conducted in this case is in

furtherance of an administrative purpose and not as part

of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of a crime.

This is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. It seeks to

deter persons carrying weapons/explosives from boarding the

plane, though without showing of probable cause.

8. Reasonableness may only be determined by balancing the

need to seach against the invasion which the search entails. In

this case, the need to prevent airline hijacking is

unquestionably grave and urgent.

9. A pre-boarding screening of all passengers and carry-on

articles sufficient in scope to detect presence of weapons or

explosives is reasonably necessary to meet the need. Right

now, there is no foolproof method of confining the search to

the few who are potential hijackers.

10. It is not fatal that the search was conducted without a

warrant because requiring one would frustrate the

governmental purpose behind the search.

11. Also, the search is indistinguishable from searches for

plant pests and diseases.

12. THIS IS WHERE THE COURT ULTIMATELY

DECIDED THE MATTER: CONSENT

The court said that based on current screening program, a

prospective passenger may choose to leave if s/he doesn ’t

want to accede to the search. If he chooses to proceed, then it

means his consent is given. However, at the time Davis

boarded, the nature and scope of airport searched was not yet

widely known. There might have been signs around that

alerted him to such procedures, but these were not presented

as evidence.

13. The burden of proving whether consent was given rests on

the Government. “The government and TWA could insist

upon a preboarding search; they could deny appellant the right

to fly if he refused to consent, or if his late arrival deprived

them of sufficient time to obtain his consent or to conduct the

search. But the government may not justify a search on the

basis of "consent" unless it first establishes that such consent

was given, expressly or by implication.”