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© 2009 The Australian National University

S D S C Strategic & Defence Studies Centre

‘Simple Solutions to Complex Matters’: Identifying fundamental principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the multinational effort to broker a resolution to the Bougainville ‘Crisis’

Reuben R.E. Bowd

May 2009

Plate 1 ’No-one can Stop Peace’—a sticker produced to advance the Bougainville Peace Process

Published by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, Canberra

Strategic and Defence Studies C

entre Working Paper

Working

PaperN

o. 414


National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Author: Reuben R.E. Bowd, 1977–

Title: ‘Simple Solutions to Complex Matters’: Identifying fundamental principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the multinational effort to broker a resolution to the Bougainville ‘Crisis’

Edition: 1st ed.

ISBN: 9780731554904 (pbk.)

Series: Working Paper (The Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre); no. 414

Notes: Bibliography

Subjects: Bougainville Crisis, Papua New Guinea, 1988–. Dispute resolution (Law)—Papua New Guinea—Bougainville Island. Bougainville Island (Papua New Guinea)—History. Bougainville Island (Papua New Guinea)—Politics and government.

Dewey Number: 327.17099592.

Copyright

This book is copyrighted to The Australian National University. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre’s Publication Program

Established in 1966, the SDSC is located within the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. It specialises in the study of strategic issues—predominantly in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence series is a collection of monograph publications arising principally from research undertaken at the SDSC. Recent previous Canberra Papers have focused on major aspects of Australian defence policy, disease security in Northeast Asia, ballistic missile defence, cyber-warfare, the complexities of dealing with radical Islam, and aspects of transnational crime.

As at 2006, all papers in the Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence series are peer reviewed.

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Advisory Review Panel Editorial Board

Emeritus Professor Paul Dibb Professor Desmond Ball Professor David Horner Professor Hugh White Professor Anthony Milner Professor Virginia Hooker Professor William Tow Dr Coral Bell Dr Pauline Kerr

Professor Hugh White Dr Brendan Taylor Dr Christian Enemark Miss Meredith Thatcher (Series Editor)

Publisher

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

Tel: +61 2 6125 9921 Fax: +61 2 6125 9926 Email: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/sdsc


About the Author Reuben Bowd is a Major in the Australian Regular Army and is the son of a career army officer. He was educated at Waverley College and Saint Ignatius College, Riverview in Sydney and is a graduate of both the Australian Defence Force Academy (1998) and the Royal Military College of Australia (Duntroon) (1999). In 2001 he graduated Bachelor of Arts with First Class Honours in History from University College, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and shared the L.C.F. Turner prize for ‘outstanding performance in History’. He has held a variety of positions within the Australian Army and saw service with the Peace Monitoring Group while deployed in Bougainville on Operation Bel Isi II and as part of Operation Anode in the Solomon Islands.

Major Bowd has published several articles in professional journals and has made contributions in the Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2008). He is the author of two books: A Basis For Victory: The Allied Geographical Section, 1942-1946 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2005); and Doves Over the Pacific: In Pursuit of Peace and Stability in Bougainville (Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 2007).

In mid-2008 Major Bowd completed a Bachelor of Laws (Honours) at the University of New South Wales and is employed as a Construction and Major Projects Lawyer in a major Australian firm (Clayton Utz) whilst undertaking a period of long service leave from the Army.

Disclaimer

This paper represents the author’s views alone. It has been drawn entirely from open sources, and has no official status or endorsement.

© 2009 The Australian National University v

Contents About the Author iiiAcronyms and Abbreviations viiList of Maps, Plates and Tables ix Introduction 1Overview: The Bougainville Crisis 2Problem-Solving and Breakthrough Negotiation 3Bougainville: The Parties and their Interests 5The Negotiation Process 8The Final Analysis: Applying the Harvard Seven Elements 15Conclusion 19 Notes 19 Appendix: In Search of a Comprehensive Negotiated Agreement to the Bougainville ‘Crisis’: 1988–2001

23

Bibliography 39


Acronyms and Abbreviations ADF Australian Defence Force

ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution

BAG Bougainville Autonomous Government

BATNA Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement

BIG Bougainville Interim Government

BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army

BRF Bougainville Resistance Forces

IOG International Observer Group

NSP North Solomons Province (Bougainville)

PMG Peace Monitoring Group

PNG Papua New Guinea

PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Force

PPCC Peace Process Consultative Committee

SPPKF South Pacific Peacekeeping Force

TMG Truce Monitoring Group

TPI Third Party Intermediary

UNOMB United Nations Observer Mission Bougainville

UNPOB United Nations Political Office Bougainville


List of Maps, Plates and Tables Maps

Page Nos.

Map 1 North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea (Bougainville) x

Map 2 Location of the main islands of Bougainville and Buka in a regional context

xi

Plates Cover ‘No-one can Stop Peace’—a sticker produced to advance the

Bougainville Peace Process

Plate 1 The Panguna Mine, Bougainville 2

Tables Table 1 Parties to the Bougainville Conflict 6

Table 2 Third Party Roles for Coping with Conflict 9

Table 3 Evaluating the Final Negotiated Outcome 16

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 414


x

Map 1: North Solomons Province of Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)

(Source: ANU Cartography, Australian National University, Canberra, 2006)

‘Simple Solution to Complex Matters’: Identifying fundamental principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the multinational effort to broker a resolution to the Bougainville ‘Crisis’ Reuben R.E. Bowd


xi

Map 2: Location of the main islands of Bougainville and Buka in a regional context

(Source: ANU Cartography, Australian National University, Canberra, 2006)


‘Simple Solutions to Complex Matters’: Identifying fundamental principles of Alternative Dispute

Resolution in the multinational effort to broker a resolution to the Bougainville ‘Crisis’

Reuben R.E. Bowd

Paddy Palin once said that he was never truly lost. I can only surmise he has never participated in a Peace Awareness Meeting in a remote Bougainville mountain village.

Civilian Peace Monitor at Team Site Wakanai, Central Bougainville, 1999

INTRODUCTION

This paper analyses the multi-national effort to resolve the Bougainville ‘Crisis’ within an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) framework founded on universal principles applicable to all disputes. Firstly, the dispute will be defined, the parties and their interests identified, and the negotiation process described. The paper will then analyse the two-phase negotiation process that took place in Bougainville by assessing its successes and failures against a variety of factors that are common to all disputes. The problem-solving approach and breakthrough negotiation will be applied to the dispute, and the seven element theory for a successful negotiated agreement (alternatives, interests, options, legitimacy, commitments, communication, and relationship) advanced by the Harvard Negotiation Project will be utilised as a means of evaluating the overall outcome within a conceptual framework. A central theme of this paper is that the universal principles of ADR are just that—they are relevant and transferable to all negotiations, domestic or international.

The Bougainville experience clearly advances ADR as a viable alternative to the employment of combat forces to resolve longstanding international conflicts. In Bougainville, ADR techniques proved to be an unexpectedly powerful primary ‘weapon’ of conflict resolution that succeeded in the face of conventional military failure. However, the use of ADR on Bougainville was a learned experience accompanied by various challenges that were overcome through gradual refinement and experimentation over a period of almost 20 years.



2

OVERVIEW: THE BOUGAINVILLE CRISIS1

Although geographically and anthropologically part of the Solomon Islands, Bougainville is politically part of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Bougainville and Buka, along with numerous smaller islands and atolls, constitute the North Solomons Province (NSP) of PNG (Bougainville), with a combined land area of about 10 600 square kilometres (roughly one sixth the size of Tasmania).

There are approximately 157 000 people living in the NSP. They are nominally Christian and speak 16 Astronesian and nine Papuan languages that are localised and not commonly understood. Melanesian Pidgin, a product of colonial times, is the primary means of communication.

Plate 1 The Panguna Mine, Bougainville

Until 1989, the NSP exported large quantities of copper, copra, cocoa and timber; an independence move-ment accompanied by guerrilla fighting has badly affected the economy since then. The catalyst for violence was growing landowner jealousies and dissatisfaction over the environmental impact, compen-sation and distribution of profits from the colossal Panguna open-cut copper mine and processing facility located high in the mountainous Crown Prince Range of central Bougainville. The mine’s importance to the economy of PNG (during its 17 years of operation) cannot be overstated given that its operations constituted approximately 44 per cent of the nation’s exports and generated 17 per cent of the government’s internal revenue. Foreign investment also saw Bougainville become one of the wealthiest, best educated and infrastructure developed areas in the South Pacific.

The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) commenced militant activities in November 1988, targeting local plantations and businesses. The BRA initially stated that its main objective was to obtain increased compensation for landowners who were affected by mining operations. When the Panguna Mine was forced to close in May 1989, the PNG Government declared a State of Emergency and deployed riot police and Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) personnel to Bougainville in an ill-disciplined and poorly organised effort to



3

restore order. The BRA subsequently amended its objectives to include secession from PNG. This was entirely unacceptable to the PNG Government: such a precedent could not be allowed in an already fragmented nation.

In March 1990 an Agreement to end hostilities on Bougainville was signed between the BRA and the PNGDF that set the conditions for negotiations to commence between the PNG Government and the BRA. It incorporated arrangements for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of PNG Security Forces and the simultaneous disarming of the BRA. This was to be overseen by an International Observer Group (IOG) led by the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. Although both sides initially complied, the BRA reneged on the agreement and took up its surrendered weapons. It also established a political arm, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG), and proclaimed it to be the legitimate civil authority.

In May 1990 the PNG Government declared ‘war’ on the BRA and commenced a series of major military operations to recapture BRA/BIG controlled areas. It also imposed a total blockade on government services and supplies to the province. The BRA/BIG responded by issuing a unilateral declaration of independence from PNG on 17 May 1990.

In the total absence of PNG Government authority, the BRA/BIG leadership proved incapable of maintaining law and order and lost control of its factions; these soon became embroiled in local disputes, formed criminal gangs and undertook a campaign of settling age-old scores and the wanton destruction of private and provincial infrastructure. Lawlessness, coupled with hardship caused by the blockade, fostered considerable anti-BRA sentiment and resulted in the formation of the PNG Government-backed Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF). Some areas of the province, like Buka, even invited a return of the PNGDF. The conflict soon escalated into a protracted civil war with atrocities committed by all parties. An estimated 8000 people (or 5 per cent of the population) would lose their lives in the violence, and the widespread displacement of the civilian population threatened a major humanitarian disaster.

Resolving the ‘Crisis’ on Bougainville, a trouble-spot on Australia’s doorstep, has been at the forefront of Australia’s foreign and defence policy since 1988. Furthermore, it constitutes a matter of broader international importance, not least in terms of regional security, but also given the unacceptable cost in human life, and the economic, social and internal security impact on PNG. It was acknowledged quite early that there could be no military solution to the conflict, making a successful negotiated outcome, acceptable to all parties, the only viable option.2 PROBLEM-SOLVING AND BREAKTHROUGH NEGOTIATION

The terms ‘dispute’ and ‘conflict’ are distinct and distinguishable concepts. A ‘dispute’ is an argument, debate or quarrel, whereas a ‘conflict’ involves a struggle or clash over opposing principles that may include resources, ideas, values and inherent human needs.3 John Burton suggests that although dictionaries may distinguish the two terms, in practice they are incorrectly treated as synonymous in a dispute resolution context. He attributes this to a failure by many to acknowledge ‘why and in what respects disputes and conflicts differ in intensity’ and he argues that, as a consequence, conventional dispute settlement processes (including adjudication, arbitration, mediation, negotiation and a combination of these) have



4

been inappropriately applied to all situations, whether minor differences (disputes) or major confrontations (conflicts).4

To Burton, disputes can be ‘settled’ by negotiation and compromise, whereas conflicts involve issues that are non-negotiable and cannot accommodate compromise: they must be ‘resolved’.5 Burton objects to the use of conventional methods to ‘resolve’ conflicts on the basis that they lack the analytical processes necessary to reveal the underlying issues at the source of the conflict. He also believes that ‘the treatment of conflicts as though all issues in human relationships are negotiable and subject to compromise, lead to attempts at forced “settlement” within existing institutional and social norms’ and therefore temporary solutions.6

I am unconvinced by Burton’s position on the basis that there exist numerous examples of these so-called ‘dispute settlement processes’ (like negotiation) being effectively applied to achieve legitimate and lasting outcomes (the conflict on Bougainville is one example). What Burton appears to be advancing is the problem-solving approach to negotiation practised by negotiators like Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project.

Problem-solving negotiators seek to present disputes as problems that the parties should attempt to resolve to their mutual benefit.7 Not unlike Burton, ‘problem-solving negotiators see compromise as an unattractive solution, not as a goal to be pursued’8 and warn against overlooking basic human needs (like security) that, if met, can turn an opponent around, or otherwise can block agreement.9 The objective is to look past personalities10 and apparently uncompromising and irreconcilable positions (what a party asserts, demands or offers during negotiations) to address underlying interests (the needs, desires and fears that drive negotiations).11 Such action then encourages parties to generate legitimate options (solutions) that address all of the issues to the mutual satisfaction of the parties—the aim is not to win positions or to gain victories for people.12 A party should not commit to an option unless it is better than their Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).13 Effective communication, an essential ingredient in all negotiations, is central to the success of the problem-solving approach (a party is more likely to have their interests met if these are communicated to the other side),14 which concurrently seeks to enhance the relationship between the parties into the future.

To get past ‘no’ in the most difficult circumstances, negotiators like William Ury employ a five-step strategy (breakthrough negotiation) ‘to change the game from face-to-face confrontation to side-by-side problem-solving’:

1. don’t react to an opponent’s barriers to cooperation and stay focused on achieving the objective (your interests);

2. disarm your opponent of their fear, suspicion, defensiveness and hostility so that they listen to you;

3. change the game to one whereby interests, rather than positions, are being bargained; engage an opponent in problem-solving negotiation and guide them to a mutually satisfactory agreement;

4. make it easy to say yes by bridging the gap between their interests and yours; help them save face through legitimate options and by making the outcome appear a victory; and



5

5. make it difficult to say no by educating an opponent (perhaps about your BATNA) and make it clear, in a non-threatening manner, what the consequences of a failure to agree will be (third-parties can be effectively employed toward this aim). One should keep in mind the need for an ongoing and constructive relationship by bringing an opponent to their senses, not to their knees.15

The problem-solving approach, and its subset, ‘breakthrough negotiation’ are ‘all-purpose’ strategies that anyone can use with any opponent.16 They are directly applicable to negotiations conducted to resolve the Bougainville conflict. BOUGAINVILLE: THE PARTIES AND THEIR INTERESTS

The primary negotiations aimed at resolving the Bougainville ‘Crisis’ spanned a period of almost 13 years between 1988 and 2001 (negotiations are still ongoing). During that period, some 46 major agreements were negotiated between, and among, the parties (see Appendix). These, along with countless other meetings and exchanges, collectively comprise what I will refer to as the ‘Bougainville Peace Process’.

The parties did not remain constant during the Bougainville peace process. As is the nature of protracted conflict, the number of affected or otherwise interested parties increased with time (Table 1 demonstrates this by identifying the various parties involved in negotiations from time to time). However, the parties can be broadly categorised into pro-PNG Government or pro-Rebel political, combatant and other disputants, and interested Third Party Intermediaries (TPIs).

Tabl

e 1:

Par

ties

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle C

onfli

ct

Dis

puta

nts:

Pol

itica

l D

ispu

tant

s: C

omba

tant

Third

Par

ty In

term

edia

ries

(TPI

)—Fa

cilit

atin

g th

e B

ouga

invi

lle P

eace

Pro

cess

Pro-

Gov

ernm

ent

Pro-

rebe

l

Pro-

Gov

ernm

ent

Pro-

Reb

el

Dis

puta

nts:

Oth

er

Agr

eem

ent/T

ruce

/Pea

ce

Mon

itorin

g an

d/or

O

bser

ving

Key

Fac

ilita

ting

Nat

ions

Inte

rnat

iona

l B

odie

s

N

GO

PN

G N

atio

nal

Gov

ernm

ent

(incl

udin

g th

e S

peci

al

Sta

te N

egot

iato

r) (S

epte

mbe

r 197

5–pr

esen

t)

New

Pan

guna

La

ndow

ners

A

ssoc

iatio

n (N

PLA

) (A

ugus

t 198

7–N

ovem

ber 1

988)

Pap

ua N

ew G

uine

a D

efen

ce F

orce

(P

NG

DF)

(1

988–

2003

)

Bou

gain

ville

R

evol

utio

nary

Arm

y (B

RA

) (N

ovem

ber

1988

–pre

sent

)

Bou

gain

ville

Cop

per

Lim

ited

(BC

L) (A

pril

1972

–May

198

9)

(Not

e: s

till a

list

ed

Pub

lic C

ompa

ny w

ith

an in

tere

st)

Inte

rnat

iona

l Obs

erve

r G

roup

(IO

G) (

Gha

na,

Trin

idad

, Nig

eria

, Brit

ain,

C

anad

a, S

wed

en

and

the

Net

herla

nds)

(1

2–16

Mar

ch 1

990)

Sol

omon

Isla

nds

(198

8–pr

esen

t)

Com

mon

wea

lth

Sec

reta

riat,

Lond

on

(199

0–97

)

Inte

rnat

iona

l C

omm

issi

on o

f Jur

ists

(1

995)

Nor

th S

olom

ons

Pro

vinc

ial

Gov

ernm

ent (

NS

PG)

(197

6–A

ugus

t 199

0)

Bou

gain

ville

Inte

rim

Gov

ernm

ent (

BIG

) (A

pril

1990

– M

ay 1

999)

Roy

al P

apua

New

G

uine

a C

onst

abul

ary

(RPN

GC

) (1

988–

2003

)

Me’

ekam

ui D

efen

ce

Forc

e (M

DF)

(and

B

RA

‘A’ C

ompa

ny)

(199

7–pr

esen

t)

Loca

l Chi

efs

and

‘Big

M

en’ (

1988

–pre

sent

)

Ope

ratio

n BI

G T

ALK

and

In

tern

atio

nal O

bser

vers

(N

ew Z

eala

nd, C

anad

a an

d V

anua

tu) (

27 J

uly–

6 A

ugus

t 199

0)

New

Zea

land

(198

8–pr

esen

t)

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

(in

clud

ing

UN

POB/

UN

OM

B)

(199

4–20

05)

Mor

al R

earm

amen

t (1

995)

Bou

gain

ville

P

rovi

ncia

l A

dmin

istra

tion

in E

xile

(A

ugus

t 199

0–

Apr

il 19

95)

Bou

gain

ville

R

esis

tanc

e Fo

rces

(B

RF)

(199

0–pr

esen

t)

Chu

rch

Gro

ups

(esp

ecia

lly th

e C

atho

lic C

hurc

h)

(198

8–pr

esen

t)

Ope

ratio

n LA

GO

ON

, Sou

th

Pac

ific

Pea

ceke

epin

g Fo

rce

(SP

PK

F)

Aus

tralia

, New

Zea

land

, To

nga,

Fiji,

Van

uatu

) (4

–20

Oct

ober

199

4)

Aus

tralia

(198

8–pr

esen

t)

Sec

reta

ry G

ener

al o

f U

nrep

rese

nted

N

atio

ns P

eopl

es

Org

aniz

atio

n (1

995)

Inte

rim L

egal

A

utho

ritie

s (D

ecem

ber

1991

–Apr

il 19

95)

Wom

en’s

A

ssoc

iatio

ns

(198

8–pr

esen

t)

Truc

e M

onito

ring

Gro

up

(TM

G) (

Aus

tralia

, New

Ze

alan

d, F

iji, V

anua

tu)

(6 D

ecem

ber 1

997–

30

Apr

il 19

98)

Bou

gain

ville

Tr

ansi

tiona

l G

over

nmen

t (B

TG)

(Apr

il 19

95–

Janu

ary

1999

)

Pea

ce M

onito

ring

Gro

up

(PM

G) (

Aust

ralia

, New

Ze

alan

d, F

iji, V

anua

tu) (

30

Apr

il 19

98–2

3 Ju

ly 2

003

(man

date

end

ed

30 J

une

2003

)

Leita

na C

ounc

il of

E

lder

s (1

998–

pres

ent)

Bou

gain

ville

Tra

nsiti

on

Team

(BTT

) (1

July

– 31

Dec

embe

r 200

3)

Pea

ce P

roce

ss C

onsu

ltativ

e C

omm

ittee

(PP

CC

) (O

ctob

er 1

998–

June

200

5)

Bou

gain

ville

Con

stitu

ent A

ssem

bly

(BC

A)

(Jan

uary

–May

199

9)

Bou

gain

ville

Inte

rim

Pro

vinc

ial

Gov

ernm

ent (

BIP

G)

(Mar

ch 2

000–

Ju

ne 2

005)

Bou

gain

ville

Peo

ple’

s C

ongr

ess

(BP

C) (

May

19

99–J

une

2005

)

Bou

gain

ville

Aut

onom

ous

Gov

ernm

ent (

BA

G)

(Jun

e 20

05–p

rese

nt)



7

The disputants

For the purposes of this analysis, attention will be focused on the two major disputants in the ‘Crisis’: the PNG Government, and the BRA/BIG. Anthony Regan reminds us that no party to the Bougainville conflict was ‘monolithic’.17 Instead, complexity is added through the existence of various factions and stakeholders within each camp, possessing vastly different positions (and underlying interests) and perspectives on the major issues. Importantly, the parties commence the negotiation process from fundamentally opposed and seemingly irreconcilable positions. To demonstrate, Sean Dorney (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Correspondent at the Endeavour Peace Talks (August 1990)) observed that the BIG/BRA position

was more like a demand for surrender … it obliged PNG to recognise Bougainville’s independence, to fund its independent bank, to stock its reserves, and even pay all the future wages of the Republic’s public servants. In other words, a nation-sized cargo.18

The underlying issues behind each position are discussed later in this paper. However, the BIG/BRA position commences as unconditional secession from PNG and the total withdrawal of PNGDF elements. The PNG Government, on the other hand, regards Bougainville as its sovereign territory; secession is an entirely non-negotiable issue.

Third Party Intermediaries

By 1990, it had become obvious that ‘outsiders’ could play a vital and constructive role in providing momentum to the peace process and in encouraging the parties to proceed ‘in the direction they had already committed themselves to’.19 Generally, when TPIs are injected into negotiations, the two contending parties will have to give up control over one or both aspects of the negotiation: the process (how the negotiation is conducted) and the outcome (the result of the negotiation).20 However, this was not the case in the Bougainville Peace Process—the parties always maintained entire control and ownership of the process and outcome of negotiations. TPIs proved particularly useful on Bougainville: they helped to resolve the dispute by assisting the parties to explore options, helped repair and improve the relationship between the parties and, on occasion, separated the parties to avoid further conflict.21 However, involving TPIs in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation can be problematic and must be handled as a matter of considerable sensitivity; it was a particularly difficult and embarrassing decision for the PNG Government, which was forced to accept the harsh reality that there was ‘no other practical alternative’: The PNG Government felt it had lost face by having to involve TPIs in its domestic affairs.22

The three best placed TPIs to assist were nation states: the Solomon Islands, Australia and New Zealand. The Solomon Islands played a vital role in facilitating early contact and dialogue between the disputants, although its Government was often criticised by the PNG Government as being overly sympathetic to the Bougainville cause. Because of its historical, political and defence ties to the PNG Government, and the fact that an Australian company owned and operated the Panguna Mine, Australia was at first treated with considerable suspicion by the BIG/BRA. For this reason, Australia’s initial involvement in the peace process was low-key, yet instrumental in terms of financial and logistical support. On the other hand, New Zealand was regarded as largely neutral by all of the parties because it was sufficiently detached from the conflict and its origins. New Zealand became a mutually acceptable TPI to all parties and therefore played a critical role as host and facilitator in numerous early interventions.



8

Other TPIs also played a critical role in the Bougainville Peace Process. The involvement of experts in the field of conflict resolution, negotiation coaches, international observers, peace monitors, and agencies like the United Nations and Commonwealth Secretariat were instrumental in providing legitimacy, security, flexibility and much needed momentum to the negotiations. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Being an intractable conflict posing a serious threat to international peace and security, the Bougainville ‘Crisis’ falls at an extreme end of the negotiation spectrum. At first, monadic (one party)23 attempts were made to resolve or otherwise avoid the conflict. An example was the Bika Report (1988) commissioned by the PNG Government in the hope of appeasing the disputants and thereby avoiding an escalation of the conflict. Additionally, until 1997, both the BRA and PNG Government attempted coercive unilateral resolution through a series of military actions aimed at breaking the stalemate or jockeying to improve their respective bargaining positions, in advance of major negotiations.

However, the Bougainville peace process was overwhelmingly dominated by triadic (involving third parties) attempts at conflict resolution.24 The process closely resembled facilitated negotiation:

a process in which the parties to a dispute, who have identified the issues to be negotiated, utilise the assistance of a neutral third party (the facilitator), to negotiate the outcome. The facilitator has no advisory or determinative role on the content of the matters discussed or the outcome of the process, but may advise on or determine the process of facilitation.25

Facilitation is therefore a process that ‘requires the presence of a third party whose role it is to inject some degree of lateral thinking into multi-party disputes. This has the purpose of helping the parties to agree on a common course of action to resolve the problem’.26 Third party involvement can be minimal (limited to the provision of logistical support to the process) or extensive (offering advice to the parties).27 The Bougainville Peace Process is useful because it demonstrates both extremes of the facilitated negotiation spectrum. It also provides examples of the variety of roles that third parties can play in a dispute resolution process. Three (of many supporting) examples are offered in table 2 on page 9:



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Table 2: Third Party Roles for Coping with Conflict

Range of Third Party Roles

Example Who Played the Third Party Role?

Primarily process orientated roles (such as hosting a diplomatic conference)

The Endeavour Peace Talks hosted by the Royal New Zealand Navy aboard military vessels (1990) with civilian International Observers—New Zealand support was limited to hosting the peace talks.

New Zealand Government International Observers: Canada, New Zealand and Vanuatu

Mixed process and substantive roles

The SPPKF deployed following the Honiara Ceasefire Agreement. The SPPKF facilitated logistic support and security to enable the conduct of the Arawa Peace Conference (1994).

Governments of Australia, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga (Note: the Solomon Islands Government facilitated and chaired the talks that resulted in the Ceasefire Agreement and Chaired the Arawa Peace Conference).

Primarily substance orientated roles (monitoring compliance after agreement)

Compliance with the Burnham Truce (1997) was monitored by a regional Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). Monitoring compliance with the Lincoln Agreement (1998) was the responsibility of a PMG and the United Nations through its Political Office/Observer Mission on Bougainville.

Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Vanuatu and Fiji. United Nations

(Source: R. Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, Penguin Books, New York, 1996, p. 124)

Neutrality and conflict resolution

Conflict resolvers have traditionally placed considerable importance on the ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ of TPIs. To Bernard Mayer, this emphasis is misplaced because it denies the fact that ‘the commitment of third parties is to help people work through a conflict in a wise way and in keeping with a certain set of values or standards, but not necessarily without taking sides or having one’s interests at stake as well’.28 I also disagree with the definition of the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council that emphasises the requirement for facilitator neutrality—to me, third party neutrality is not essential; it is a myth.29 Likewise, Laurie Nathan suggests that, in international mediation, an emphasis on third-party impartiality reflects ‘an ideal that is not fully attainable’.30 Although mediators must be non-partisan and treat all sides fairly, William Smith31 argues that third party interventions in international disputes differ from their domestic counterparts, because,

whereas the impartiality of mediators in domestic settings stems from the fact that they have no extended relationship with the parties and no interest in the dispute beyond its peaceful resolution, states have little motivation to mediate in international conflicts other than because they have a relationship with the adversaries and an interest in the details of a settlement. International mediators are thus probably always biased to some degree.32

Not unlike conventional dispute resolution, the issue of third party neutrality becomes less important in situations where neither party raises an objection to the intervention and therefore willingly enters into the process.33 The Challenges Project identified that gaining the consent of the parties to a conflict was ‘the ultimate factor in determining the success of a peace operation’ (a third party intervention).34

In Bougainville, the issue of third party neutrality was particularly important to both parties in the early stages. However, neutrality was viewed in the sense that an acceptable third party



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was ‘omnipartial’ (on both peoples side at the same time).35 As the parties developed trust and confidence in the process, the issue became less prevalent; thereby allowing states like Australia, that were previously viewed with considerable suspicion by the Bougainville side, to take an increasingly active role in facilitating a resolution to the conflict.

Phases in the Bougainville Peace Process

A detailed analysis of the Appendix reveals the existence of two distinct phases in the Bougainville negotiation process: (1) preliminary efforts to reach a negotiated settlement (1988–June 1997); and, (2) the development of a comprehensive negotiation process, reconciling issues and generating a ‘yesable’ proposal that is sufficient, realistic and operational (July 1997–2001).36

Phase 1: Preliminary

This phase is often unfairly judged a failure because it was characterised by successive unsuccessful attempts at resolution over a nine-year period. In most conflicts, some form of resolution is required before there can be effective negotiation—‘participants who are in conflict, who oppose and distrust each other, do not have a good basis for negotiation. Until there is at least a minimum level of resolution of the relationship between them, negotiating may be frustrating and ineffectual.’37 For this reason, phase 1 was anything but a failure. It ‘built vital experience, contributing to relationships between key actors on all sides’ and developed much needed confidence in the negotiation process.38

The following observations assist in explaining why a resolution to the conflict proved unattainable during phase 1; it should be noted that most, if not all, of these reasons regularly affect the outcome of conventional negotiations:

• No ‘ripe’ moment: The predominant explanation for a failure to achieve an early resolution was the non-existence of an optimal (or ‘ripe’) moment for negotiations to take place—in serious conflicts, negotiation will only succeed if it can capture a particular moment ‘when the adversaries, for a variety of reasons, appear most amenable to change’.39 A ‘ripe’ moment typically presents at a point when the parties reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ which brings them together in the hope of achieving a lasting settlement.40 Before 1997, such a ‘ripe’ moment had not yet materialised. The parties had not exhausted the hope of resolving the conflict through force of arms.

• Perception gap: A dangerous perception gap existed between the parties whereby each believed they had ‘won’ violent exchanges outside of the negotiation process, without acknowledging that the other side held the same perception.41 Therefore, there was an unwillingness to negotiate on the main issues, including the future political status of Bougainville, because both sides perceived that they held the strategic high ground whereby they could ‘take all’ without negotiation. This gap was eventually bridged with the passage of time.

• Failure to involve all parties: Before 1997 not all interested groups and major stakeholders were recognised or represented as equal partners in the peace process.42 With the passage of time, new parties like the BRF emerged but were incorporated into negotiations relatively late in the process.43 Hence, not all of the parties were signatories to the early agreements, and were therefore not bound to their commitments.



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• Lack of authority to settle: The parties to agreements often lacked any authority to settle. For example, BIG/BRA leader Francis Ona refused to personally participate in any negotiations or genuinely delegate authority to his representatives who did participate.44 Likewise, the PNG Government delegations could not settle without the approval of parliament. This situation did not improve until 1997, when BIG/BRA ‘moderates’ moved to disassociate themselves from ‘hardliners’ like Francis Ona. Likewise, the National Government adopted a bi-partisan approach (that incorporated the creation of a Special State Negotiator) toward the negotiation process. This approach provided greater certainty to commitments. The importance of ‘moderate’ leadership cannot be overstated: ‘peaceful outcomes are more likely when the leaders of the parties to the dispute are moderate in their words, actions, and policies, make conciliatory gestures, and seek bilateral or multilateral negotiations and bargaining to resolve their issues of dispute.’45

• Spoilers: Resolution is more likely to be effective if no factions (within each community) remain committed to the continuation of violence.46 This was not the case in the early years of the Bougainville conflict. Genuine and honest efforts by the PNG Government to resolve the conflict were often undermined by its own agencies—particularly the security forces that feared losing face if others succeeded where the military could not. Sometimes these agencies deliberately violated agreements through unilateral and unauthorised activities aimed at ensuring agreements did not succeed. Likewise, the BIG/BRA refused to participate in significant peace efforts such as the Arawa Peace Conference (1994), and therefore undermined the process.

• Motivation not to negotiate: In the early years of the dispute there were hidden agendas and undisclosed motivations on all sides that worked against achieving a lasting agreement. On the PNG Government side, there was strong opposition to negotiations and a military solution to the ‘Crisis’ was preferred. Furthermore, some of the negotiations may be criticised as mere grandstanding. For example, the Endeavour Accord (1990) came at a particularly important time for the PNG Government because the leader of its delegation, Sir Michael Somare, was a candidate for President of the UN General Assembly. It was hoped that securing a negotiated settlement on Bougainville would advance his election to that post. When it became apparent that Somare would not be elected, key PNG Government figures lost enthusiasm for the agreement and those in favour of a military solution regained ascendancy.

• Misuse of process:47 The negotiation process was initially misused by both parties. It was inappropriately utilised as an opportunity to test resolve and as a ‘fishing expedition’ to gain information that might strengthen respective positions. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the early negotiations on Bougainville demonstrates that BRA/BIG and PNG hardliners did not approach the process with a spirit of goodwill and often had little, if any, intention of implementing agreed outcomes or commitments. This further fuelled distrust between the parties and proved an obstacle to future negotiations.

The Challenges Project identifies misuse of process as a major reason for failed attempts at achieving the peaceful political settlement of disputes. For success to be achieved the parties must genuinely want to resolve their differences peacefully. However, Dennis Jett observes that:

Many parties in civil wars sign peace agreements for tactical reasons without intending to live up to their obligations. Movements and leaders may define the stakes in all or nothing terms.



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They may be willing to sign and implement an agreement if it suits their immediate interests, but will defect if the agreement will not bring them complete power.48

This observation certainly holds true for the early experiences of negotiations conducted between disputants in the Bougainville conflict.

• Focusing on positions rather than interests: Roger Fisher remarks that ‘in a conflict situation, particularly if it has involved violence, feelings are likely to be more important than thoughts. Participants ... are more apt to be ready for battle than for cooperatively working together on a common problem.’49 This was the case on Bougainville where the parties proved incapable of reaching an early resolution because they were focused on entrenched positions rather than underlying, and often reconcilable, interests. Furthermore, for negotiations to succeed parties must genuinely be ‘willing to communicate’ and there must be at least some matters that are negotiable.50 The presence of non-negotiable issues (such as secession) further entrenched the parties in their respective positions.

• Inappropriate reliance on both ‘sticks and carrots’: ‘Sticks’ are used to ‘make the present course more unpleasant’ while ‘carrots’ are designed to make a ‘future alternative more attractive’.51 The PNG Government used a ‘stick’ (the Bougainville blockade) at a time when ‘engaging in dialogue’ could arguably have been more productive. Likewise, ‘carrots’ aimed at avoiding the conflict (like the Bika Report that promised economic incentives to the rebels) proved ineffective because they did not address the root causes of the conflict.

• Inadequate documented outcomes: Agreements need to be adequately documented.52 The early agreements reached between the parties were open-ended and not comprehensive, clear, well planned or durable.53 This made them difficult to enforce, and ambiguous when it came to confirming commitments made by each party. For example, the BRA/BIG and the PNG Government both insisted that the first ceasefire agreement (1990) was to be produced as a one-page document. Later in the Bougainville Peace Process this ceased to be a problem. For example, the Bougainville Peace Agreement was a 75-page document that was comprehensive and enforceable.

• Well poisoning:54 To add pressure to the negotiating environment, both the PNG Government and the BRA/BIG regularly used the media quite ruthlessly to accuse each side of atrocities or insincerity, in the hope of enhancing their respective positions. The parties eventually developed a level of trust, confidentiality and negotiating maturity that saw the media excluded from sensitive talks. Later in the process, the parties enhanced their relationship by issuing Joint Press Statements following negotiations.

The first phase of the negotiating process (1988–97) effectively satisfied the first two challenges of Breakthrough Negotiation: (1) both sides learned to overcome barriers to cooperation, and to control their reactions in the face of adversity, and (2) a favourable negotiating climate had slowly emerged whereby both parties were sufficiently disarmed of their initial fear, suspicion, defensiveness and hostility to effectively participate in problem-solving negotiations.



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Phase 2: Developing a viable process, reconciling issues and generating a ‘yesable’ proposition

Phase 2 of the Bougainville peace process (1997–2001) is characterised by a number of significant breakthroughs that culminated in a binding agreement between the parties. The negotiations demonstrate the flexibility of ADR processes and their universal application to all manner of disputes. The successes achieved can be attributed to the following:

• An initial focus on establishing a process rather than on outcomes: Between July 1997 and April 1998 the focus of negotiations was on the establishment of a robust negotiation process that would serve the parties into the future. The critical issues, including the political future of Bougainville, were set aside and it was mutually agreed that they would be addressed once the process was securely established.55 A truce and ceasefire were negotiated (to be supervised by third-party monitors) that created a secure environment conducive to problem-based negotiation.

• Joint Negotiating Position: In December 1999, the Bougainville Delegation presented a Joint Negotiating Position to the PNG Government reflecting the common view of all interested parties on the Bougainville side. This clarified for the PNG Government what the Delegation hoped to accomplish, and for what purpose.56

• Importance of neutral venues: The availability of neutral venues, where negotiations could be conducted in a secure environment, was enormously important. For example, in 1997 the New Zealand Government offered the parties Burnham Military Camp, near Christchurch, as a venue. To the Bougainvilleans tight security and the military atmosphere of the camp helped to reduce fear and mistrust that had haunted them over decades. This enabled the parties to speak freely about the pain and frustration of the war. In Bougainville in 1997 this type of session would have led to more violence, but in Burnham Bougainvilleans could take advantage of neutral ground.57 By April 1999 the relationship between the parties had developed to a point where a neutral venue was no longer an important issue. All parties felt secure enough to agree that future negotiations should take place in Bougainville or PNG.

• Reconciliation:58 The Bougainville side conducted a series of group negotiations aimed at reconciling its own factions and internal divisions. This was critical because it was essential that all Bougainvilleans acknowledge that ‘the war had divided them, and without a commitment to each other and the entering into a process of reconciliation and unity at all levels of the community; there could be no possible hope of ever achieving peace with Papua New Guinea’.59 As a significant symbolic step toward reconciliation, two prominent Bougainville leaders co-chaired the July 1997 all-Bougainville talks.

• Development of trust: Trust and understanding gradually fostered between the belligerents and materialised in actions that included apologies and unconditionally constructive acts of good faith.60 For example, following the all-Bougainvillean talks at Burnham in July 1997, the BRA agreed to release five PNGDF soldiers who had been captured in September 1996. This was a gesture of gratitude to the PNG Government for agreeing to allow the parties to meet in New Zealand. In response, the PNGDF guaranteed safe passage for Bougainville leaders returning after the talks.



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• Venting: Alan Limbury advances two essential phases to a successful negotiated settlement: the ‘who did what to whom’ (venting) phase; and the ‘what’s it going to take to fix it?’ (solution) phase.61 He suggests that the chances of reaching a successful settlement are compromised when the first phase is rushed, or otherwise ignored. This is because ‘people are frequently unable to focus on possible solutions until they have finished telling the story of how they got to where they are now’.62 Early attempts at resolving the Bougainville Crisis suffered as a result of neglecting Limbury’s first phase. Sufficient emphasis was not placed on allowing the parties to tell their story, thereby preventing effective communication and the exploration of viable solutions. The Bougainville Delegation, in particular, required an opportunity to be heard, and to vent their anger, before they could proceed to explore possible solutions that would meet the interests of all parties. The different factions needed to be assured that the PNG Government, and their own side, understood their concerns and the difficulties they had faced.63 Taking into account cultural considerations, the talks conducted at Burnham in July and October 1997 incorporated a two-day open session known as a ‘Taraoting’ (literally translated as ‘vomiting session’) wherein all representatives freely expressed their views and concerns and had a genuine opportunity to tell their story before proceeding to negotiate.64

• Dispute resolution training: Significant progress can be attributed to ‘capacity-building’ individuals who assisted the peace process by training the parties to more effectively participate as negotiators.65 For example, in June and July 1997, two Australian lawyers ran a negotiating skills workshop for the BIG/BRA in Honiara and for the Bougainville Transitional Government in Buka to enhance their participation and communication skills in preparation for the Burnham talks.

• Timely intervention of TPIs: Consultation at some meetings was only achieved through third-party facilitation. For example, at times ‘shuttle-diplomacy’ was required by Australian and New Zealand diplomats in order to bring the parties together. On some occasions (like the Lincoln talks of January 1988) participants refused to talk and it took the intervention of trusted TPIs (including individuals like the former New Zealand High Commissioner to PNG, John Hayes) to get the parties talking.66

• Creation of a Dispute Resolution Procedure: William Ury states that ‘guarantees offer you a final resort if your opponent breaks the agreement—but they don’t give you a first resort. For that you need to establish in advance a dispute resolution procedure.’67 The establishment of a Peace Process Consultative Committee (PPCC), comprising representatives of all affected parties and chaired by the United Nations, was such a procedure that all parties agreed would be a first resort to resolve issues concerning compliance with the various peace agreements.

• Presence of non-warring parties (civil society): The increased presence of affected non-warring parties, including church and women’s organisations was critical to the negotiation process. In particular, women ‘mediated between all sides of the conflict and contributed to bringing the parties together’.68 The voice of Bougainville’s women was incredibly influential (Bougainville is a largely matriarchal society). The presence of women’s groups at critical negotiation sessions brought home the full impact of the conflict and its cost to civil society. It became increasingly difficult to justify continued violence and failed negotiations when mothers, sisters, daughters and wives of



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combatants, who had experienced considerable hardship throughout the conflict, actively petitioned their men for peace.69

Phase 2 of the Bougainville peace process, that ended with the Bougainville Peace Agreement, met the final three challenges facing breakthrough negotiators: (3) The game had been changed to be conducive to problem-solving (focusing on interests, rather than positions) and a mutually satisfactory agreement was achieved; (4) The interests of the parties were bridged by legitimate options that made it easy for both parties to say yes (win/win) and to save face with their respective constituencies; and, (5) It became difficult to say no because of the unfavourable BATNA of both parties, the expectations and encouragement of third-parties and the involvement of affected non-warring elements of civil society that were weary of the conflict and desired peace.70 THE FINAL ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE HARVARD SEVEN ELEMENTS

In October 1997, the Burnham Truce was signed by the parties to declare an end to hostilities, a commitment to establishing a clear negotiation process to determine Bougainville’s political future, and a ceasefire to be supervised by a neutral TMG. By January 1998, the TMG had been deployed and the parties reached another significant milestone, the Lincoln Agreement that was subsequently implemented through the Arawa Agreement (April 1998). The Arawa Agreement provided for a permanent and irrevocable ceasefire and for a transition of the TMG into a PMG. It also established the PPCC, with a sub-committee on weapons disposal, to resolve disputes concerning compliance with the agreement. The PPCC comprised representatives of all parties, and was chaired by the Director of the United Nations Political Office Bougainville (later the United Nations Observer Mission Bougainville or UNOMB). Most importantly, the Arawa Agreement triggered the commencement of the negotiation process on the central issue in dispute—the future political status of Bougainville—an issue that was finally resolved through a comprehensive Bougainville Peace Agreement in August 2001. Table 3 demonstrates the final negotiated outcome agreed upon as a settlement to the Bougainville ‘Crisis’ by showing the mutually acceptable options adopted as legitimate solutions to the underlying issues behind each parties’ position.



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Table 3: Evaluating the Final Negotiated Outcome

Issue Party Starting Position (1988) Agreement reached to settle the dispute: Bougainville Peace Agreement (30 August 2001)

• Bougainville will be granted a high level of autonomy within PNG via amendments to the PNG Constitution to establish a Bougainville Autonomous Government (BAG).

Bougainville

Immediate Secession from PNG

• Bougainville will establish its own Constitution, courts, police and public service. The PNG Government will remain responsible for taxation and the provision of essential services (ie telecommunications, defence, post, foreign affairs and taxation until self-dependence is achieved).

Issue 1 (Bougainville’s secession/greater autonomy)

PNG Government

Secession is not, and never will be, negotiable

• The BAG will be elected and established once the UNOMB confirms that the security situation on Bougainville is stable enough for the conduct of elections.

• The people of Bougainville will freely decide the matter of secession from PNG via a referendum on independence to be held within 15 years (and not less than 10 years) of the election of a BAG (unless the BAG decides not to conduct such a referendum).

• Amnesty and pardon for those involved in the conflict.

• Until the BAG is established, the parties will consult to resolve any disputes that may arise and agree to engage a mutually acceptable third-part if required.

PNG Government

Bougainville is PNG sovereign territory and

the Security Forces must remain. The BRA must

disarm.

• Phased withdrawal of PNG Security Forces to coincide with an improving security environment on Bougainville (under the supervision of the UNOMB and the PMG).

• PNG Government to establish a Bougainville-specific Police Force to maintain law and order.

Issue 2 (Security situation on Bougainville)

Bougainville

Total withdrawal of PNGDF and Security

Forces from Bougainville and a right to bear arms

• The BRA and other factions will disarm in accordance with a three phase Weapons Disposal Plan formulated by the PPCC (surrender of arms, containment of weapons and verification by the UNOMB). The final phase will be a decision on the final fate of the weapons by the PPCC following UNOMB verification.

• Until the BAG is established, the parties will consult to resolve any disputes that may arise and agree to engage a mutually acceptable third-part if required.

• The PPCC reaffirms commitment to the permanent and irrevocable ceasefire.

(Source: Reuben R.E. Bowd)



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The Harvard Negotiation Project’s seven-element diagnostic checklist can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the final negotiated outcome of the Bougainville Peace Process:

• Interests: A negotiated outcome should satisfy the interests of both parties, at least better than if there were no agreement.71 The underlying interests behind the respective positions of the disputants in the Bougainville ‘Crisis’, although initially opposed, did not prove irreconcilable. To the Bougainville side, it was important that the issue of secession be addressed, and that concessions be gained toward the achievement of greater autonomy for the NSP. It was also in its interest to remove PNG Security Forces from the province. For the PNG Government, the fundamental issue was ensuring that Bougainville did not achieve independence by force of arms. To allow such a precedent to occur would serve as an incentive to various secessionist movements in other parts of PNG and would undermine the authority of the National Government. It was also critical to the Government’s security interest that the militants be disbanded and disarmed and to strike a compromise that would allow all sides to part with dignity, and their interests sufficiently satisfied. The shared interest of both parties was the achievement of a lasting peace which was being demanded by their war-weary constituent base upon whom all of the leaders themselves relied to maintain power.

• Options: The best negotiations are those in which a number of possible options (solutions to issues being negotiated) have been explored.72 Over the course of the peace process, numerous options were explored to resolve the issue of secession and the security situation in Bougainville. The option adopted constitutes a ‘yesable proposition’ that is realistically achievable, sufficiently meets the interests of all parties and has an operational effect in that it tells the parties who will do what and when.73

• Alternatives: Alternatives are other ways of accomplishing interests. Interests can be satisfied through either a negotiated agreement (adopting an option as a solution to interests) or through a BATNA that is independent of the negotiation process. Parties should walk away if they cannot adopt an option that is better than their BATNA.74 The PNG Government and the Bougainville leaders had no viable BATNA available as an alternative to a negotiated outcome. Even the option of returning to military action was no longer viable to either side. Both sides acknowledged that they were unilaterally incapable of breaking the stalemate through force of arms, and that their constituent base longed for peace.

• Legitimacy: Negotiations invariably involve reconciling competing interests. Legitimacy involves criteria of fairness measured by some external objective principle or standard. These principles and standards assist the parties to choose between their options. They also assist both parties to justify to their constituents why they accepted a negotiated agreement.75 The agreement negotiated invariably meets several objective criteria for legitimacy. The PNG Government departed the process satisfied that its withdrawal of forces, and the granting of increased autonomy, was not an unreciprocated concession but was directly linked to the compliance and disarmament of the Bougainville militants and to achieving a state of security determined by the UNOMB—an independent third party.76 The use of the PPCC (which comprised representatives of all disputants and was chaired by the UNOMB) and the PMG to oversee compliance with the peace agreements also gave the process legitimacy. Providing the PNG Government a minimum of 10 years ‘breathing space’ prior to a Bougainville referendum on



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independence was also justified to the Bougainville side using legitimate external criteria. This element of the agreement guaranteed the Bougainville people a future opportunity to exercise their collective rights within a lawful and democratic framework, whilst also providing time for the NSP to gain a sufficient level of reconciliation, political and financial self-reliance to legitimise its claim to independence.

• Communication: With good communication, negotiation makes it easier for parties to deal with each other in the future.77 During over a decade of conflict, and numerous negotiations, the parties had clearly articulated their perceptions and interests to the opposite side. They also developed sufficient confidence to communicate directly with each other. The PPCC, TMG and UNOMB were all mechanisms through which the parties could check whether what was understood to have been agreed is in fact what eventually happened.

• Relationship: A successful negotiated agreement will improve the relationship that exists between the parties. ‘Unconditionally constructive’ steps should be taken to improve the relationship, whether or not the other party reciprocates.78 The peace process undoubtedly climaxed having enhanced the pre-existing relationship between the parties. The PPCC and other consultative bodies ensured that constructive dialogue would be maintained.

• Commitments: At the conclusion of a negotiation, unless the parties walk away without reaching an agreement, the parties make commitments. Commitments about what each party undertakes to do should be clear, well planned and durable.79 Unlike early peace agreements, like the one page Ceasefire Agreement (1990), the Bougainville Peace Agreement was comprehensive and structured to ensure that all parties were clear on their agreed undertakings. Furthermore, compliance with the agreement was not dependent on the cooperation of any absent parties. All of the key players (with the exception of Francis Ona who refused to participate in the peace process), including third parties, were signatories. The commitment was also durable enough to accommodate the resolution of unforseen disputes through mutually acceptable avenues including the PPCC, UNOMB or other peaceful ADR processes.

Through an application of the seven-element problem-solving analysis, the Bougainville Peace Agreement can be regarded as a win/win outcome for all concerned. As a testament to its worth, in the almost eight years that have passed since it was signed in August 2001, the agreement has attracted substantial compliance by all parties:

• The last elements of the PNGDF departed Bougainville in April 2003;

• In July 2003 UNOMB verified that Stage II (weapon containment) was complete;

• In December 2003 the PPCC decided that all contained weapons would be destroyed and Stage III (weapon destruction) commenced;

• By May 2004 the UNOMB had verified that Stage III (weapon destruction) was complete and that Bougainville was now stable enough for elections to take place for a BAG; and

• Elections for the BAG were conducted from 20 May to 2 June 2005, resulting in the democratic election of a 39-member BAG on 15 June 2005.80



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CONCLUSION

It will take the greater part of the coming decade to conclusively determine the success, or otherwise, of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The agreement took almost 13 years to materialise, demonstrating the complexity of intractable violent conflicts, and the significant period required by belligerents to effectively re-establish relationships, communication and to heal deep-seated differences. Notwithstanding initial setbacks, an application of the Harvard Negotiation Project’s seven elements indicates that a lasting comprehensive political settlement has been negotiated.

The final negotiated outcome represented a win/win for all sides. Whether the parties knew it or not, this result was gained through the employment of problem-solving negotiation, and its subset, breakthrough negotiation (Ury’s ‘eighteenth camel’)81 to resolve what at first appeared to be intractable differences. By learning to focus on interests rather than positions, both sides invented a new way to divide the ‘orange’82 and left the negotiating table with grace and, most importantly, their relationship enhanced. The Bougainville experience also reinforces that the many traps and pitfalls, tools and aids commonly identified in conventional negotiations are equally transferable to international dispute resolution scenarios.

The Bougainville Peace Process heralded a revolution in military-political affairs whereby a previously unexplored application for ADR processes was discovered, far removed from a conventional context. To the Australian Defence Force (ADF), at least, ADR demonstrated itself to be a viable alternative to armed intervention in regional disputes. Accordingly, ADF members and their coalition partners, and the negotiations they are facilitating, would stand to benefit from enhanced and comprehensive training in negotiation techniques when confronted by conflict situations comparable to Bougainville. To the Challenges Project:

negotiation techniques … should be at the core of all peace operations training. Lower ranks should have a rudimentary understanding, while more senior mission personnel should be proficient. Negotiation techniques improve both civil-military interaction and liaison competencies, and promote cross-culture communication, active listening and conflict management skills.83

With Australian and coalition forces currently deployed across the globe on nation-building operations within states torn apart by complex and longstanding internal civil and political unrest, there remains considerable lessons to be learnt from the Bougainville experience and the use of ADR techniques as a viable means of resolving such conflict. Notes

1 Background information obtained from: R.R.E. Bowd, Doves Over the Pacific: In Pursuit of Peace and Stability in Bougainville, Australian Military History Publications, Sydney, 1997, pp. 21–35.

2 Report of the Visit of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Bougainville 18–22 April 1994, Bougainville: A Pacific Solution, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

3 J.W. Burton, Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes Scarecrow Press, Lanham, MD, 1996, pp. 7–8.

4 Burton, Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes, p. 7. 5 Burton, Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes, p. 8. 6 Burton, Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes, pp. 8–12. 7 H. Astor and C. Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd ed.), LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2002,

p. 166. 8 C. Menkel-Meadow, ‘Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What we Learn from Mediation’ Modern

Law Review, vol. 56, no. 3, May 1993, p. 367.



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9 W. Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People ,Random House, London, 1991, pp. 98–99; and R. Fisher and W. Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In, Random House, London, 1992, pp. 49–51.

10 Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In, pp. 38–40. 11 R. Fisher and D. Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook,: Penguin Books, New

York, 1995, p. 21. 12 R. Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, Penguin Books, New York, 1996, p. 76; and

G. Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1999), p. 71.

13 Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In, pp. 104–111. 14 Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In, p. 51. 15 Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, pp. 7–9. 16 Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, p.10. Note that William Ury states that the strategy is

so applicable to all disputes that it can even be employed by ‘diplomats trying to stave off a war’. 17 A. Regan, Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond, Submission to the Foreign Affairs Sub- Committee

of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry, Canberra, June 1999, p. 23, available at <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/bougainville/BVrepindx.htm>, accessed 31 March 2009.

18 D. Oliver, Black Islanders: A Personal Perspective of Bougainville 1937–1991 ,Hyland House, Melbourne, 1991, p. 251.

19 Regan, Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond, p. 21. 20 R.J. Lewicki, D.M. Saunders, J.M. Minton and B. Barry, Negotiation: Readings. Exercises and Cases (4th

ed.), McGraw-Hill, New York, 2003, p. 439. 21 Lewicki, Saunders, Minton and Barry, Negotiation: Readings. Exercises and Cases (4th ed.), p. 437. 22 E.P. Wolfers, International Peace Missions In Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, 1990–2005: Host State

Perceptions, Regional Forum on Reinventing Government Exchange and Transfer of Innovations for Transparent Governance and State Capacity, Nadi, 20–22 February 2006, p. 10.

23 Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (2nd ed.), pp. 45–46. 24 Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (2nd ed.), pp. 45–51. 25 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Alternative Dispute Resolution Definitions,

NADRAC, Canberra, 1997, p. 8. 26 Astor and Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, 2nd ed., p. 88. 27 Astor and Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, 2nd ed., p. 88. 28 B.S. Mayer, Beyond Neutrality: Confronting the Crisis in Conflict Resolution, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco,

2004, p. 84. 29 M. Brandon and L. Robertson, Conflict and Dispute Resolution: A Guide for Practice, Oxford University

Press, Melbourne, 2007, p. 195. 30 L. Nathan, ‘Undue Pressure: International Mediation in Africa Civil Wars’, in L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz,

Peace Building: A Field Guide, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2001, p. 185. 31 W.P. Smith, ‘Effectiveness of the Biased Mediator’, Negotiation Journal, vol. 1, no. 4, 2 July 2007, pp. 363. 32 Nathan, ‘Undue Pressure: International Mediation in Africa Civil Wars’, p. 185. 33 Nathan, ‘Undue Pressure: International Mediation in Africa Civil Wars’, pp. 185–86. 34 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century—Concluding Report: 1997–

2002, Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002, pp. 269–70. 35 Brandon and Robertson, Conflict and Dispute Resolution: A Guide for Practice, p. 195. 36 Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 96–98. 37 Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (2nd ed.), p. 68. 38 A.J. Regan, ‘Phases in the Negotiation Process’, in A. Carl and L. Garasu (eds), Weaving Consensus: The

Papua New Guinea—Bougainville peace process (Accord issue 12, 2002), available at <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/pngbougainville/phases.php>, accessed 31 March 2009.

39 J. Bercovitch, ‘International Mediation and Intractable Conflict’, January 2004, available at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/med_intractable_conflict/>, accessed 25 March 2009

40 G. Hassall, ‘Peace Agreements in the Pacific Islands’, in Regional Workshop on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the Pacific, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Nadi, 25–27 April 2005, p. 3.

41 Regan, Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond, p. 22. 42 M. Miriori, ‘A Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) Perspective on Early Peace Efforts’, in Carl and Garasu

(eds), Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea—Bougainville peace process, (Accord issue 12, 2002), available at <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/big-perspective.php>, accessed 31 March 2009.



21

43 P. Sohia, ‘Early Interventions’, in. Carl and Garasu (eds), Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea—Bougainville peace process. (Accord issue 12, 2002), available at <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/early-interventions.php>, accessed 31 March 2009,

44 Miriori, ‘A Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) Perspective on Early Peace Efforts’. 45 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations, p. 115. 46 Bercovitch, ‘International Mediation and Intractable Conflict’. 47 Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (2nd ed.), p. 77. 48 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations, p. 270. 49 Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 23–24. 50 Astor and Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia (2nd ed.), p. 114. 51 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations, p. 119. 52 J. Emmerig, ‘Advanced Negotiation for Lawyers: Tricks and Traps in Negotiation’ August 2005

(unpublished), p. 11; and Hassall, ‘Peace Agreements in the Pacific Islands’, p. 14. 53 Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook, p. 96. 54 Emmerig, ‘Advanced Negotiation for Lawyers: Tricks and Traps in Negotiation’, p. 7. 55 Regan, ‘Phases in the Negotiation Process’. 56 Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, p. 76. 57 R. Tapi, ‘From Burnham to Buin: Sowing the Seeds of Peace in the Land of the Snow Capped Mountains’, in

Carl and Garasu (eds), Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea—Bougainville peace process (Accord issue 12, 2002),available at <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/burnham-buin.php>, accessed 25 March 2009.

58 Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (2nd ed.), p. 52. 59 Tapi, ‘From Burnham to Buin: Sowing the Seeds of Peace in the Land of the Snow Capped Mountains’. 60 Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, p. 42; Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate:

the Getting to Yes Workbook, pp. 86–88; and Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 78–79.

61 A. Limbury, ‘Principled Negotiation and Constructive Mediation’, Seminar Paper: ‘Negotiation Skills for Lawyers’, Centre for Continuing Education, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, 4 August 2005, p. 9.

62 Limbury, ‘Principled Negotiation and Constructive Mediation’, pp. 9–10. 63 Interestingly, in traditional islander culture, emotions are acknowledged as key to the successful resolution of

disputes. Negotiations are traditionally followed by a ‘sing sing’ (also known as a reconciliation ceremony), whereby opposing parties publically acknowledge the agreement reached and forgive past wrongs.

64 Tapi, ‘From Burnham to Buin: Sowing the Seeds of Peace in the Land of the Snow Capped Mountains’; and Burnham II Preparatory Talks, Burnham Military Camp, New Zealand, 1–10 October 1997, Record of Understanding (dated 10 October 1997).

65 J. Eagles, ‘Aid as an Instrument for Peace: A Civil Society Perspective’, in Carl and Garasu (eds), Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea—Bougainville peace process (Accord issue 12, 2002), available at <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/aid.php>, accessed 31 March 2009; Regan, Bougainville: The Peace Process and Beyond, p. 21; and Hassall, ‘Peace Agreements in the Pacific Islands’, p. 13.

66 Hassall, ‘Peace Agreements in the Pacific Islands’, p. 14. 67 Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, pp. 113–14. 68 K. Patterson, ‘Australia Promotes Gender Equality and Peace-Building’ in Focus, Canberra, March 2001,

available at , a <http://www.womenwarpeace.org/webfm_send/92>, accessed 31 March 2009. 69 See also R. Saovana-Spriggs, ‘Bougainville Women’s Role in Conflict Resolution in the Bougainville Peace

Process’, in S. Dinnen, A. Jowitt and T. Newton (eds), A Kind of Mending: Restorative Justice in the Pacific Islands, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 2003, pp. 195–214.

70 Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, pp. 7–9. 71 Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook, p. 21; and Fisher, Beyond

Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 74–76. 72 Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook, p. 33; and R. Fisher, Beyond

Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 76–77. 73 Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 96–98. 74 Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook, pp. 45–48; and Fisher, Beyond

Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 77–78. 75 Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook, pp. 61–64; and Fisher, Beyond

Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, p. 77. 76 UN support for various cease-fire agreements on Bougainville also carried a great deal of legitimacy. Refer

also R. Fisher, Basic Negotiating Strategy: International Conflict for Beginners, Penguin Press, London, 1971, p. 142.



22

77 Fisher and Ertel, Getting Ready To Negotiate: the Getting to Yes Workbook, pp. 76–78; and Fisher, Beyond Machiavelli: Tools for Coping with Conflict, pp. 80–81.



80 Historical information sourced from R.R.E. Bowd, Doves Over the Pacific: In Pursuit of Peace and Stability in Bougainville, pp. 134–48.

81 A parable used by William Ury whereby the only way to equally divide an inheritance of 17 camels by two, three and nine (one half to the eldest son, one third to the middle son, and one ninth to the youngest son) was through an outsider providing an ‘eighteenth’ camel. Eighteen could be divided equally between the three sons (nine camels to the eldest son, six to the middle son and two to the youngest son) (making 17 camels equally divisible). The one camel remaining was returned to the third-party. Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating With Difficult People, pp. 137–38.

82 Roger Fisher and William Ury tell the story of two sisters quarrelling over an orange to typify how many people negotiate. The two sisters arrive at the natural decision to cut the orange in two. Following this, one sister ate the fruit and threw away the peel and the other threw away the fruit and used the peel from her half to bake a cake. ‘Too many negotiations end up with half an orange for each side instead of the whole fruit for one and the whole peel for the other’. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In, p. 59.

83 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations, p. 239.

App

endi

x

In S

earc

h o

f a

Com

preh

ensi

ve N

egot

iate

d A

gree

men

t to

th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risi

s’:

19

88

–2

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1

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r. Pe

riod

of

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atio

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Dat

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Title

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The

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Lead

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gain

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n

Cha

irper

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edia

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litat

or

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Part

y In

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emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

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rs)

Post

Agr

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vent

s

1 D

ec 1

988

8 D

ec 1

988

Aro

vo Is

land

, B

ouga

invi

lle

Mem

oran

dum

of

Und

erst

andi

ng

(MO

U)

• N

atio

nal G

over

nmen

t to

addr

ess

the

issu

e of

impr

ovin

g co

mm

unity

ser

vice

s

Ako

ka D

oi (D

eput

y P

rime

Min

iste

r and

le

ader

of t

he

Spe

cial

Com

mitt

ee

on B

ouga

invi

lle)

Fran

cis

Ona

(le

ader

of t

he

New

Pan

guna

La

ndow

ners

A

ssoc

iatio

n an

d B

RA

)

• 1

Apr

il 19

72: P

angu

na M

ine

com

men

ces

oper

atio

ns

• 1

Sep

tem

ber 1

975:

Bou

gain

ville

(unl

awfu

lly) d

ecla

res

inde

pend

ence

as

the

Rep

ublic

of N

orth

Sol

omon

s (fa

ils to

attr

act i

nter

natio

nal

supp

ort).

PN

G le

gisl

atio

n pa

sses

giv

ing

Bou

gain

ville

gre

ater

au

tono

my

as a

com

prom

ise

• 16

Sep

tem

ber 1

975:

PN

G b

ecom

es a

n in

depe

nden

t sta

te

• 19

76: N

orth

Sol

omon

s P

rovi

ncia

l Gov

ernm

ent e

stab

lishe

d •

1979

: Pan

guna

Lan

dow

ners

Ass

ocia

tion

(PLA

) is

form

ed to

repr

esen

t la

ndow

ner i

nter

ests

•

Aug

ust 1

987:

New

Pan

guna

Lan

dow

ners

Ass

ocia

tion

(NP

LA)

appe

ars

and

chal

leng

es le

gitim

acy

of th

e PL

A (F

ranc

is O

na, a

n em

ploy

ee o

f the

Pan

guna

Min

e, is

its

Sec

reta

ry)

• 4

July

199

8: R

abbi

e N

amal

iu re

plac

es P

aias

Win

gti a

s P

M o

f PN

G

• N

ovem

ber 1

988:

Com

men

cem

ent o

f hig

hly

orga

nise

d ar

son

atta

cks

by N

PLA

lead

er F

ranc

is O

na in

Pan

guna

are

a. M

ilitan

ts b

ecom

e kn

own

as th

e Bo

ugai

nvill

e R

evol

utio

nary

Arm

y (B

RA

) •

18 A

pril

1989

: Fra

ncis

Ona

con

tact

s th

e N

SPG

and

adv

ises

that

se

cess

ion,

as

oppo

sed

to c

ompe

nsat

ion,

is th

e m

ain

issu

e •

8 D

ecem

ber 1

989:

On

the

nigh

t the

MO

U is

sig

ned

polic

e ar

rest

key

la

ndow

ners

lead

ing

to th

e ag

reem

ent b

eing

reno

unce

d by

the

BR

A

lead

ersh

ip

• A

pril

1989

: Fra

ncis

Ona

dec

lare

s th

at s

eces

sion

is th

e or

gani

satio

n’s

mai

n ob

ject

ive

2 2

May

–Oct

19

89

12 S

ept

1989

(in

tend

ed

date

of

mee

ting)

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Bik

a R

epor

t •

Pro

pose

d pa

ckag

e be

twee

n th

e N

orth

Sol

omon

s P

rovi

ncia

l G

over

nmen

t (N

SP

G) a

nd

Nat

iona

l Gov

ernm

ent

• M

ajor

pub

lic w

orks

favo

ring

land

owne

rs a

ffect

ed b

y th

e m

ine

• E

quity

in B

CL

and

gene

rous

fin

anci

al c

once

ssio

ns

• (N

ote:

Mee

ting

neve

r too

k pl

ace,

Ona

dem

ande

d th

at

sece

ssio

n m

ust b

e di

scus

sed

and

John

Bik

a w

as

assa

ssin

ated

on

10 S

epte

mbe

r 19

89)

Nat

iona

l G

over

nmen

t

NS

PG

(a

ttem

ptin

g to

faci

litat

e be

twee

n th

e B

RA

and

Nat

iona

l G

over

nmen

t)

•

15 M

ay 1

989:

Pan

guna

Min

e is

forc

ed to

clo

se

• M

id-1

989:

Aus

tralia

don

ates

four

Iroq

uois

hel

icop

ters

to th

e P

NG

DF

(sub

sequ

ently

em

ploy

ed in

Bou

gain

ville

for o

ffens

ive

oper

atio

ns (a

s gu

nshi

ps) i

n co

ntra

vent

ion

of a

gree

d co

nditi

ons

(the

helic

opte

rs w

ere

only

to b

e us

ed fo

r tra

nspo

rtatio

n, s

urve

illanc

e an

d m

edic

al

evac

uatio

n ac

tiviti

es).

A 1

991

Par

liam

enta

ry C

omm

ittee

con

clud

ed

that

the

dona

tion

was

the

mos

t pub

licis

ed a

nd c

ontro

vers

ial a

ctio

n of

th

e A

ustra

lian

gove

rnm

ent a

t a c

ruci

al s

tage

in th

e Bo

ugai

nville

cris

is

• 26

Jun

e 19

89: S

tate

of E

mer

genc

y de

clar

ed

• 12

Sep

tem

ber 1

989:

Ass

assi

natio

n of

Pro

vinc

ial M

inis

ter J

ohn

Bik

a pr

ompt

s th

e P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent t

o in

tens

ify e

fforts

to fi

nd a

mili

tary

so

lutio

n to

the

Cris

is

• 19

89: P

NG

DF

Ope

ratio

n FO

OTL

OO

SE in

the

Kon

gara

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

24

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

3 O

ct 1

989

27 O

ct

1989

A

raw

a,

Bou

gain

ville

N

amal

iu

Agr

eem

ent a

nd

Pea

ce

Cer

emon

y

• A

ll pa

rties

(exc

ept F

ranc

is O

na)

(exc

ept F

ranc

is O

na a

nd th

e B

RA

) com

mit

to c

ease

hos

tiliti

es

and

rest

ore

law

and

ord

er

• R

abbi

e N

amal

iu

(Prim

e M

inis

ter o

f P

NG

) •

Jose

ph K

abui

(P

rem

ier o

f the

N

orth

Sol

omon

s P

rovi

ncia

l G

over

nmen

t) •

Cha

irman

and

M

anag

er o

f BC

L •

Chu

rch

Lead

ers

• Tr

aditi

onal

Le

ader

s

BR

A re

fuse

s to

par

ticip

ate

and

milit

ant a

ctiv

ities

inte

nsif y

4 Ja

n–M

ar

1990

1

Mar

199

0 A

raw

a,

Bou

gain

ville

A

gree

men

t to

End

Hos

tiliti

es

on B

ouga

invi

lle

(Bou

gain

ville

C

ease

fire

Agr

eem

ent)

• C

ease

fire

from

2 M

arch

199

0 •

Tota

l with

draw

al o

f PN

G

Sec

urity

For

ces

by 1

6 M

arch

19

90

• B

RA

dis

arm

amen

t und

er

supe

rvis

ion

of In

tern

atio

nal

Obs

erve

r Gro

up (I

OG

) •

Cre

ate

cond

ition

s fo

r fac

e-to

-fa

ce d

ialo

gue

betw

een

the

disp

utan

ts

Col

onel

Neo

Nui

a (D

eput

y C

ontro

ller

of th

e St

ate

of

Em

erge

ncy)

Sam

Kau

ona

(BR

A M

ilitar

y C

omm

ande

r)

Pro

fess

or

Pet

er

Wal

lens

teen

(U

ppsa

la

Uni

vers

ity,

Sw

eden

) (F

acili

tato

r)

Faci

litat

ed b

y th

e C

omm

onw

ealth

S

ecre

taria

t, Lo

ndon

: IO

G

of 1

1 m

embe

rs fr

om

Gha

na, T

rinid

ad, N

iger

ia,

Brit

ain,

Can

ada,

Sw

eden

an

d th

e N

ethe

rland

s

• 14

Feb

ruar

y 19

90: V

alen

tine’

s D

ay M

assa

cre.

The

PN

GD

F to

rture

s,

kills

and

thro

ws

susp

ecte

d re

bels

from

Aus

tralia

n do

nate

d he

licop

ters

. Hou

ses

are

burn

ed in

the

Kie

ta d

istri

ct (N

ote:

this

was

ju

st o

ne o

f num

erou

s at

roci

ties

on b

oth

side

s of

the

conf

lict)

• 12

Mar

ch 1

990:

All

PN

G S

ecur

ity F

orce

s ar

e w

ithdr

awn

from

B

ouga

invi

lle

• 12

–16

Mar

ch 1

990:

IOG

led

by th

e C

omm

onw

ealth

Sec

reta

riat

(Gha

na, T

rinid

ad, N

iger

ia, B

ritai

n, C

anad

a, S

wed

en a

nd th

e N

ethe

rland

s) d

eplo

ys to

Bou

gain

ville

and

repo

rts th

at a

ll pa

rties

hav

e co

mpl

ied

with

thei

r und

erta

king

s •

Mar

ch 1

990:

BR

A re

pudi

ates

agr

eem

ent a

nd ta

kes

cont

rol o

f the

is

land

•

Mar

ch 1

990

(onw

ards

): B

RA

/BIG

pro

ves

inca

pabl

e of

mai

ntai

ning

la

w a

nd o

rder

and

crim

inal

gan

gs a

nd fa

ctio

ns fo

rm

• A

pril

1990

: BR

A e

stab

lishe

s a

polit

ical

arm

, the

Bou

gain

ville

Inte

rim

Gov

ernm

ent (

BIG

) and

dec

lare

s it

the

legi

timat

e au

thor

ity o

n B

ouga

invi

lle

• 2

May

199

0: P

NG

dec

lare

s a

tota

l blo

ckad

e on

Bou

gain

ville

•

17 M

ay 1

990:

Fra

ncis

Ona

mak

es a

uni

late

ral d

ecla

ratio

n of

B

ouga

invi

lle in

depe

nden

ce

• M

ay 1

990:

Lea

ders

of N

issa

n (G

reen

) Isl

and

invi

te a

retu

rn o

f the

P

NG

DF

and

pro-

PN

GD

F an

ti-B

RA

Bou

gain

ville

Res

ista

nce

Forc

es

(BR

F) e

mer

ge to

pro

tect

villa

ges

from

the

BR

A a

nd in

crea

sing

ly

law

less

ness

5

29 J

ul–

5 A

ug 1

990

5 A

ug 1

990

HM

NZS

E

ndea

vour

, K

ieta

, B

ouga

invi

lle

End

eavo

ur

Acc

ord

• Lo

ng te

rm p

oliti

cal s

tatu

s of

B

ouga

invi

lle w

ould

be

addr

esse

d as

par

t of f

utur

e ta

lks

• E

nd th

e B

lock

ade

on s

ervi

ces

and

supp

lies

to B

ouga

invi

lle

• C

ondu

ct fu

rther

talk

s w

ithin

ei

ght w

eeks

Mic

hael

Som

are

(PN

G F

orei

gn

Min

iste

r, ‘F

athe

r of

the

Nat

ion’

and

fo

rmer

Prim

e M

inis

ter)

Jose

ph K

abui

(B

IG M

inis

ter

for P

eace

, Ju

stic

e an

d P

olic

e an

d fo

rmer

P

rem

ier o

f the

N

orth

S

olom

ons

Pro

vinc

ial

Gov

ernm

ent

(NS

PG

)

•

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d •

Inte

rnat

iona

l Obs

erve

rs

(New

Zea

land

, Can

ada

and

Van

uatu

) •

Roy

al N

ew Z

eala

nd

Nav

y (R

NZN

)(Tas

k G

roup

com

pris

ing

the

nava

l sup

ply

vess

el

HM

NZS

End

eavo

ur a

nd

the

friga

tes

HM

NZS

W

aika

to a

nd H

MN

ZS

Wel

lingt

on)

• 27

Jul

y–6

Augu

st 1

990:

New

Zea

land

Nav

y Ta

sk G

roup

dep

loys

to

Bou

gain

ville

in s

uppo

rt of

pea

ce ta

lks

• A

ugus

t 199

0–Fe

brua

ry 1

991:

PN

G G

over

nmen

t los

es in

tere

st in

ag

reem

ent a

nd B

RA

refu

ses

to a

llow

aid

to a

rrive

—B

lock

ade

cont

inue

s •

29 A

ugus

t 199

0: N

SPG

sus

pend

ed a

nd a

n pr

ovin

cial

adm

inis

tratio

n in

exi

le is

est

ablis

hed

at R

abau

l •

Sep

tem

ber 1

990:

Fig

htin

g br

eaks

out

on

Buka

bet

wee

n lo

cal B

RA

and

BR

A fa

ctio

ns—

the

PN

GD

F is

invi

ted

to re

turn

to th

e is

land

to re

-es

tabl

ish

law

and

ord

er

6 5

Oct

199

0 5

Oct

199

0 B

uka,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Mal

agan

Acc

ord

(Kav

ieng

A

gree

men

t)

• R

etur

n of

gov

ernm

ent s

ervi

ces

to B

uka

• R

etur

n of

the

PN

GD

F to

Buk

a

Gov

ernm

ent

Offi

cial

s

Lead

ers

of

Buk

a Is

land

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

25

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

7 22

–23

Jan

1991

23

Jan

19

91

Hon

iara

, S

olom

on

Isla

nds

Hon

iara

D

ecla

ratio

n on

P

eace

, R

econ

cilia

tion

and

Reh

abili

tatio

n on

B

ouga

invi

lle

• A

nnul

the

unila

tera

l dec

lara

tion

of in

depe

nden

ce m

ade

by

Fran

cis

Ona

on

17 M

ay 1

990

• R

esto

ratio

n of

ess

entia

l ser

vice

s •

Pro

mis

e of

am

nest

y fo

r the

BR

A

• In

trodu

ctio

n of

a M

ultin

atio

nal

Sup

ervi

sory

Tea

m (M

ST) t

o ov

erse

e di

sarm

amen

t •

Rev

iew

the

agre

emen

t eve

ry s

ix

mon

ths

Mic

hael

Som

are

(PN

G F

orei

gn

Min

iste

r, ‘F

athe

r of

the

Nat

ion’

and

fo

rmer

Prim

e M

inis

ter)

Jose

ph K

abui

(B

IG M

inis

ter

for P

eace

, Ju

stic

e an

d P

olic

e an

d fo

rmer

P

rem

ier o

f the

N

orth

S

olom

ons

Pro

vinc

ial

Gov

ernm

ent

(NS

PG

))

Bis

hop

Lesl

ey

Bes

eto

(Cha

irman

of

SIC

A)

(Med

iato

r)

• S

olom

on Is

land

s G

over

nmen

t •

Sol

omon

Isla

nds

Chr

istia

n A

ssoc

iatio

n (S

ICA

)

• U

nila

tera

l dec

lara

tion

is a

nnul

led

• B

RA

har

dlin

ers

imm

edia

tely

repu

diat

e th

e H

onia

ra D

ecla

ratio

n an

d re

fuse

to d

isar

m

• P

NG

DF

fails

to d

eplo

y a

MST

and

onl

y se

lect

ivel

y re

stor

es s

ervi

ces

to P

NG

DF

cont

rolle

d ar

eas

8 7–

8 S

ept

1991

N

o ag

reem

ent

MV

Kris

A

gend

a se

tting

ta

lks

for

revi

ewin

g th

e H

onia

ra

Dec

lara

tion

• Fi

nalis

e ag

enda

for r

evie

w o

f the

H

onia

ra

• D

ecla

ratio

n (N

ote:

no

subs

eque

nt ta

lks

ever

took

pl

ace)

Bro

wn

Bai

(C

hairm

an o

f the

P

NG

Nat

iona

l S

ecur

ity A

dvis

ory

Com

mitt

ee)

Mar

tin M

irior

i (B

IG

Sec

reta

ry)

• D

ecem

ber 1

991:

PN

G N

atio

nal G

over

nmen

t ins

talls

Inte

rim L

egal

A

utho

ritie

s in

PN

GD

F co

ntro

lled

area

s •

1992

: BIG

est

ablis

hes

a B

ouga

invi

lle In

terim

Pea

ce O

ffice

in

Hon

iara

, Sol

omon

Isla

nds

unde

r Mar

tin M

irior

i •

17 J

uly

1992

: Pai

as W

ingt

i rep

lace

s R

abbi

e N

amal

iu a

s P

M o

f PN

G

• 19

91-1

994:

Lar

ge s

cale

PN

GD

F m

ilitar

y op

erat

ions

on

Bou

gain

ville

to

rega

in c

ontro

l of a

reas

nor

th o

f Wak

unai

and

larg

e pa

rts o

f so

uthw

est B

ouga

invi

lle in

clud

ing

Bui

n an

d A

raw

a •

Apr

il 19

93: W

eek

long

pan

-Bou

gain

ville

Lea

ders

' For

um h

eld

in B

uka

(BIG

/BR

A, l

ocal

lead

ers

and

othe

r loc

ally

affe

cted

par

ties)

. R

esol

utio

ns in

clud

ed a

band

onin

g se

cess

ion,

rein

stat

emen

t of t

he

NS

PG

and

pea

ce ta

lks

with

the

BR

A in

the

abse

nce

of th

e P

NG

G

over

nmen

t 9

4–5

June

19

94;

10–1

1 Ju

ne

1994

11 J

une

1994

H

onia

ra,

Sol

omon

Is

land

s

Tam

bea

Talk

s •

Initi

al a

gend

a se

tting

for

Min

iste

rial l

evel

dia

logu

e •

Rea

ffirm

com

mitm

ent t

o th

e pe

ace

proc

ess

Sen

ior G

over

nmen

t O

ffici

als

Sam

Kau

ona

(BR

A M

ilitar

y C

omm

ande

r –

repr

esen

ting

BIG

/BR

A)

Fa

cilit

ated

by

the

Sol

omon

Isla

nds

Gov

ernm

ent

Aug

ust 1

994:

PN

GD

F in

itiat

es O

pera

tion

HIG

H S

PE

ED

I, a

cos

tly

mili

tary

effo

rt to

reta

ke th

e P

angu

na M

ine

10

26–2

7 Au

g 19

94

27 A

ug

1994

Ta

mbe

a,

Sol

omon

Is

land

s

Tam

bea

Rec

ord

• S

et a

gend

a fo

r Hon

iara

Tal

ks

• C

ontin

uing

con

sulta

tive

proc

ess

(four

sta

ges)

: -

Sta

ge I:

Con

sulta

tive

mee

ting

betw

een

the

Dep

uty

Prim

e M

inis

ter a

nd S

am K

auon

a on

23

Aug

ust 1

994

- S

tage

II: H

igh

Leve

l C

onsu

ltativ

e m

eetin

g be

twee

n P

NG

Sen

ior o

ffici

als

and

the

Com

man

der o

f the

BR

A a

nd th

e re

pres

enta

tives

of t

he

orga

nisa

tion

know

n as

the

Bou

gain

ville

Inte

rim

Gov

ernm

ent

- S

tage

III:

Min

iste

rial m

eetin

g to

be

hel

d on

2nd

Sep

tem

ber i

n S

olom

on Is

land

s -

Sta

ge IV

: The

Bou

gain

ville

P

eace

Con

fere

nce

to b

e he

ld in

B

ouga

invi

lle

Bro

wn

Bai

(S

ecre

tary

to th

e D

epar

tmen

t of

Prim

e M

inis

ter a

nd

Cab

inet

, Prim

e M

inis

ter's

Offi

ce)

Sam

Kau

ona

(BR

A M

ilitar

y C

omm

ande

r— re

pres

entin

g B

IG/B

RA

)

Fran

cis

Sae

mal

a (D

eput

y P

rime

Min

iste

r and

M

inis

ter f

or

Fore

ign

Affa

irs o

f S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

(C

onve

ner

and

Cha

ir-pe

rson

)

Faci

litat

ed b

y th

e S

olom

on Is

land

s G

over

nmen

t

30 A

ugus

t 199

4: J

uliu

s C

han

repl

aces

Pai

as W

ingt

i as

PN

G P

M a

nd

plac

es B

ouga

invi

lle a

t the

top

of h

is p

riorit

ies

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

26

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

11

2–3

Sep

t 19

94

3 S

ept

1994

H

onia

ra,

Sol

omon

Is

land

s

Hon

iara

C

omm

itmen

ts to

P

eace

on

Bou

gain

ville

• Im

med

iate

dec

lara

tion

of P

eace

•

Forc

es to

rem

ain

in s

tatic

po

sitio

ns

• D

eplo

ymen

t of S

outh

Pac

ific

Pea

ce-K

eepi

ng F

orce

(SP

PK

F)

as s

oon

as p

ract

icab

ly p

ossi

ble

afte

r a c

ease

fire

decl

arat

ion

• A

raw

a P

eace

Con

fere

nce

conv

ened

no

late

r tha

n 10

O

ctob

er 1

994

Juliu

s C

han

(Prim

e M

inis

ter o

f PN

G)

Sam

Kau

ona

(BR

A M

ilitar

y C

omm

ande

r— re

pres

entin

g B

IG/B

RA

)

Fran

cis

Billy

H

illy

(Prim

e M

inis

ter o

f S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

(C

onve

ner

and

Cha

irper

son)

Faci

litat

ed b

y th

e S

olom

on Is

land

s G

over

nmen

t

Unf

ortu

nate

ly, S

am K

auon

a (B

RA

) did

not

retu

rn to

Bou

gain

ville

to

brie

f the

BR

A on

the

agre

emen

t and

this

was

to h

ave

unfo

rtuna

te

cons

eque

nces

12

4–8

Sep

t 19

94

8 S

ept

1994

H

onia

ra,

Sol

omon

Is

land

s

Cea

sefir

e A

gree

men

t (an

d Im

plem

enta

tion

Inst

rum

ent)

• C

ease

fire

to ta

ke e

ffect

mid

nigh

t 9

Sep

tem

ber 1

994

• S

PP

KF

invi

ted

to B

ouga

invi

lle to

m

onito

r cea

sefir

e an

d fa

cilit

ate

Ara

wa

Pea

ce C

onfe

renc

e •

Est

ablis

hmen

t of N

eutra

l Zon

es

durin

g A

raw

a P

eace

Con

fere

nce

• S

PP

KF

will

ent

er B

ouga

invi

lle a

t le

ast 7

day

s pr

ior t

o th

e C

onfe

renc

e an

d ca

rry o

ut it

s fu

nctio

ns fo

r at l

east

14

days

•

Sec

urity

of n

eutra

l SPP

KF

is

guar

ante

ed

• LT

CO

L D

avey

U

gul (

Dire

ctor

La

nd O

pera

tions

, P

NG

DF)

•

Gab

riel D

usav

a (S

ecre

tary

, D

epar

tmen

t of

Fore

ign

Affa

irs a

nd

Trad

e, P

NG

)

• S

am K

auon

a (B

RA

Milit

ary

Com

man

der)

• M

artin

Miri

ori

(Rep

rese

n-tin

g th

e or

gani

satio

n kn

own

as

BIG

)

Fa

cilit

ated

by:

•

Sol

omon

Isla

nds

Gov

ernm

ent

Witn

esse

d by

: •

Fred

eric

k S

oaki

(Pol

ice

Com

mis

sion

er, S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

•

Thom

as A

nis

(Cha

irman

, Bou

gain

ville

In

terim

Aut

horit

ies,

P

NG

)

• 23

Sep

tem

ber 1

994:

Jul

ius

Cha

n co

nced

es to

BR

A in

sist

ence

that

th

e U

N e

ndor

se th

e SP

PK

F de

ploy

men

t and

see

ks fo

rmal

UN

re

cogn

ition

•

27 S

epte

mbe

r 199

4: U

N S

ecre

tary

-Gen

eral

Bou

tros

Bou

tros-

Gal

i is

brie

fed

on th

e B

ouga

invi

lle s

ituat

ion

• 6

Oct

ober

199

4: B

outro

s B

outro

s-G

ali w

rites

to J

uliu

s C

han

and

form

ally

end

orse

s th

e pe

ace

proc

ess.

The

UN

indi

cate

s its

w

illin

gnes

s to

ass

ist b

y pr

ovid

ing

join

t sec

reta

rial s

ervi

ces

and

a Ja

pane

se P

oliti

cal O

bser

ver,

Hik

o M

iram

ura

to th

e B

PC

•

4–20

Oct

ober

199

4: S

PP

KF

and

supp

ortin

g lo

gist

ical

ass

ets

incl

udin

g H

MA

S T

obru

k an

d H

MA

S M

anoo

ra d

eplo

y to

Bou

gain

ville

vi

a H

onia

ra to

sup

port

BP

C

• 7

Oct

ober

199

4: C

han

tem

pora

rily

lifts

blo

ckad

e on

Bou

gain

ville

to

allo

w fo

r SPP

KF

depl

oym

ent

13

10–1

4 O

ct

1994

14

Oct

19

94

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Bou

gain

ville

P

eace

C

onfe

renc

e (n

o fo

rmal

ag

reem

ent

reac

hed)

It w

as a

gree

d th

at, d

espi

te th

e fa

ilure

of t

he C

onfe

renc

e, ta

lks

wou

ld c

ontin

ue to

see

k to

re

solv

e th

e co

nflic

t. Th

e of

ficia

l ag

enda

was

to d

iscu

ss:

• C

ontin

uatio

n of

pea

ce

• P

ardo

n, a

mne

sty

and

tem

pora

ry

refu

ge

• R

esto

ratio

n an

d re

cons

truct

ion

of e

ssen

tial s

ervi

ces

• R

econ

cilia

tion

and

com

pens

atio

n •

Dis

cuss

ions

on

polit

ical

futu

re o

f B

ouga

invi

lle w

ould

be

defe

rred

(sec

essi

on w

as n

ot o

n th

e ag

enda

alth

ough

PN

G O

ffici

als

conc

eded

that

this

sho

uld

be th

e fo

cus

of s

ubse

quen

t tal

ks in

the

pres

ence

of t

he B

IG/B

RA

) The

B

RA

/BIG

Hija

cked

talk

s by

ta

blin

g th

ree

dem

ands

: •

An

inde

finite

man

date

for t

he

SP

PK

F •

Tota

l with

draw

al o

f the

PN

GD

F •

Inde

finite

dur

atio

n fo

r the

BP

C

Juliu

s C

han

(Prim

e M

inis

ter o

f PN

G

open

ed th

e C

onfe

renc

e). I

n pe

rman

ent

atte

ndan

ce w

ere

high

leve

l Offi

cial

s

Tem

pora

ry

repr

esen

tatio

n by

Is

hmae

l To

roam

a (B

RA

Act

ing

Com

man

der

and

Chi

ef o

f S

taff,

lead

er

Kon

gara

R

egio

n)

Geo

rge

Lepp

ing

(form

er

Gov

erno

r-G

ener

al o

f the

S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

(C

hairp

erso

n)

• S

olom

on Is

land

s G

over

nmen

t •

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Aus

tralia

•

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d •

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Fiji

• G

over

nmen

t of T

onga

•

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Van

uatu

•

UN

Pol

itica

l Obs

erve

r

• B

IG/B

RA

lead

ersh

ip re

fuse

d to

atte

nd b

ut w

ere

repr

esen

ted

on

occa

sion

by

Ishm

ael T

oroa

ma

• 13

Oct

ober

199

4: T

oroa

ma

brin

gs th

e B

PC

to a

n en

d w

hen

he

anno

unce

s B

RA

dem

ands

of t

otal

with

draw

al o

f the

PN

GD

F,

sece

ssio

n fro

m P

NG

and

an

inde

finite

man

date

for t

he S

PPK

F an

d B

PC

. PM

Jul

ius

Cha

n ca

ncel

’s th

e ‘s

ing

sing

’ cer

emon

y sc

hedu

led

to

be c

ondu

cted

at t

he c

oncl

usio

n of

the

BP

C w

ith fo

reig

n di

gnita

ries

and

offic

ials

invi

ted

�O

ctob

er 1

994:

Sev

eral

reas

ons,

man

y qu

ite

valid

, wer

e gi

ven

for t

he B

RA

non

-atte

ndan

ce a

t the

BP

C

14

17–1

8 O

ct

1994

18

Oct

19

94

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Nor

th N

asoi

A

gree

men

t •

Ack

now

ledg

ed th

e pr

inci

ples

an

d m

atte

rs o

f con

cern

s re

cogn

ised

by

the

parti

es

• C

ontin

uatio

n of

the

Cea

sefir

e A

gree

men

t and

pea

ce p

roce

ss

• S

hare

d bl

ame

betw

een

the

parti

es

PN

G N

atio

nal

Gov

ernm

ent

Offi

cial

s an

d C

omm

ande

r P

NG

DF,

Brig

adie

r-G

ener

al T

ony

Hua

i

BIG

/BR

A sp

linte

r fa

ctio

ns

(incl

udin

g B

RA

C

omm

ande

rs

of th

e N

orth

N

asio

i Are

a

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

27

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

• Th

e V

illage

Cou

ncil

of C

hief

s an

d B

RA

Com

man

ders

who

si

gned

the

agre

emen

t acc

epte

d Th

eodo

re M

iriun

g as

Inte

rim

Cha

irman

of t

he N

orth

Nas

ioi

Vill

age

Cou

ncil

of C

hief

s

who

wer

e fru

stra

ted

with

ha

rdlin

ers)

(1

3 pa

ges

of

sign

ator

ies)

15

25 N

ov

1994

25

Nov

19

94

Wai

gani

, B

ouga

invi

lle

Cha

rter o

f M

irigi

ni

• C

omm

itmen

t to

peac

e pr

oces

s •

Ste

p up

the

pace

and

m

omen

tum

of b

ringi

ng

norm

alcy

, ser

vice

s an

d le

gal

auth

ority

to B

ouga

invi

lle

• B

y M

arch

199

5 th

e N

atio

nal

Gov

ernm

ent w

ould

est

ablis

h a

Bou

gain

ville

Tra

nsiti

onal

G

over

nmen

t (BT

G) t

o re

plac

e th

e N

SPG

•

Com

mitm

ent t

o an

act

ive

prog

ram

of c

onsu

ltatio

ns a

nd

nego

tiatio

ns o

n a

polit

ical

se

ttlem

ent

• M

aint

ain

dial

ogue

on

othe

r is

sues

per

tinen

t to

reso

lutio

n of

th

e cr

isis

incl

udin

g re

conc

iliatio

n, re

cons

truct

ion

and

rest

orat

ion

of s

ervi

ces

• Ju

lius

Cha

n (P

rime

Min

iste

r of P

NG

) •

Cha

irman

of

resp

ectiv

e In

terim

A

utho

ritie

s

10

Apr

il 19

95: B

ouga

invi

lle T

rans

ition

al G

over

nmen

t (BT

G) i

s es

tabl

ishe

d at

Buk

a. T

heod

ore

Miri

ung

is e

lect

ed P

rem

ier

16

18 M

ay–3

A

ug 1

995

18 M

ay

1995

P

ort M

ores

by,

PN

G

Wai

gani

C

omm

uniq

ué

• B

TG e

stab

lishe

d •

Com

mitm

ent t

o on

goin

g pr

ogra

ms

for c

onsu

ltatio

ns a

nd

nego

tiatio

ns o

n al

l iss

ues

perti

nent

to th

e re

solu

tion

of th

e B

ouga

invi

lle s

ituat

ion

(Par

don

Am

nest

y an

d Te

mpo

rary

R

efug

e; R

econ

cilia

tion

and

Com

pens

atio

n; R

esto

ratio

n of

S

ervi

ces

and

Rec

onst

ruct

ion

of

Bou

gain

ville

; and

oth

ers)

• Ju

lius

Cha

n (P

rime

Min

iste

r of P

NG

) •

Theo

dore

Miri

ung

(Pre

mie

r of t

he

BTG

)

17

29

Jul

y 19

95

Por

t Mor

esby

, P

NG

Jo

int S

tate

men

t on

Am

nest

y

18

3

Aug

199

5 P

ort M

ores

by,

PN

G

Are

as o

f C

omm

on

Und

erst

andi

ng

• A

mne

sty

for t

hose

who

hav

e co

mm

itted

crim

es d

urin

g th

e B

ouga

invi

lle c

onfli

ct

• A

rms

amne

sty

• C

omm

itmen

t to

a "n

ew p

roje

cts"

ap

proa

ch fo

r all

new

de

velo

pmen

tal p

roje

cts

in th

e pr

ovin

ce

• P

ropo

sed

polic

y on

the

futu

re o

f ar

med

you

th, t

heir

disa

rmam

ent

and

reha

bilit

atio

n •

Futu

re p

oliti

cal s

tatu

s of

B

ouga

invi

lle

• P

aral

lel n

egot

iatio

ns s

houl

d co

mm

ence

bet

wee

n th

e BT

G

and

the

BIG

/BR

A

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

28

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

19

9–12

Sep

t 19

95

12 S

ept

1995

C

airn

s,

Aus

tralia

Jo

int P

ress

S

tate

men

t (P

relim

inar

y Ta

lks—

C

AIR

NS

I)

• Id

entif

y pr

oble

ms

• A

ddre

ss a

reas

of c

omm

on

unde

rsta

ndin

g •

Lay

grou

ndw

ork

for a

n al

l-in

clus

ive

mee

ting

of B

ouga

invi

lle

lead

ers

Theo

dore

Miri

ung

(Pre

mie

r of t

he

BTG

)

Mar

tin M

irior

i (B

IG

Sec

reta

ry)

Fa

cilit

ated

by

the

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Aus

tralia

20

14–1

8 D

ec

1995

18

Dec

19

95

Cai

rns,

A

ustra

lia

Join

t C

omm

uniq

ué

(CA

IRN

S II

—A

ll B

ouga

invi

lle

Lead

ers

Talk

s)

• C

essa

tion

of v

iole

nce

and

secu

rity

issu

es

• Fu

ture

sta

tus

of B

ouga

invi

lle

• C

onfid

ence

Bui

ldin

g •

Hum

an ri

ghts

mat

ters

•

Ren

ewal

and

soc

io-e

cono

mic

de

velo

pmen

t •

Pro

cedu

ral i

ssue

s an

d ca

lend

ar

• Th

eodo

re M

iriun

g (P

rem

ier o

f the

B

TG)

• M

icha

el L

aim

o, M

P

(Mem

ber f

or S

outh

B

ouga

invi

lle w

as

also

a s

igna

tory

on

the

Com

mun

iqué

• Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(BIG

Min

iste

r fo

r Pea

ce,

Just

ice

and

Pol

ice

and

form

er

Pre

mie

r of

the

Nor

th

Sol

omon

s P

rovi

ncia

l G

over

nmen

t (N

SP

G))

• S

am K

auon

a (B

RA

Milit

ary

Com

man

der)

• P

rofe

ssor

Fr

anci

sco

Ven

drel

l (U

N

Dire

ctor

of

the

Asi

a P

acifi

c P

oliti

cal

Div

isio

n)

• D

r Kris

S

riniv

asan

(D

eput

y S

ecre

tary

-G

ener

al o

f th

e C

omm

on-

wea

lth

Sec

reta

riat)

(Co-

Cha

ir-pe

rson

s )

• G

over

nmen

t of A

ustra

lia

Obs

erve

rs:

• In

tern

atio

nal

Com

mis

sion

of J

uris

ts

(NG

O)

• M

oral

Rea

rmam

ent

(NG

O)

• S

ecre

tary

Gen

eral

of

Unr

epre

sent

ed N

atio

ns

Peo

ples

Org

aniz

atio

n (N

GO

)

• 3

Janu

ary

1996

: BR

A/B

IG D

eleg

atio

n le

d by

Jos

eph

Kab

ui w

as

atta

cked

by

the

PN

GD

F at

the

sea

bord

er b

etw

een

Bou

gain

ville

and

th

e S

olom

on Is

land

s •

11 M

arch

199

6: J

ohn

How

ard

beco

mes

PM

of A

ustra

lia a

nd h

is n

ew

Gov

ernm

ent c

alls

for a

cha

nge

of p

olic

y to

war

d th

e m

anag

emen

t of

the

Bou

gain

ville

Cris

is. A

lexa

nder

Dow

ner b

ecom

es A

ustra

lia’s

Fo

reig

n Af

fairs

Min

iste

r •

21 M

arch

199

6: F

ollo

win

g a

spat

e of

vio

lenc

e on

Bou

gain

ville

, PN

G

PM

Jul

ius

Cha

n lif

ts th

e ‘te

ntat

ive’

cea

sefir

e th

at h

ad b

een

in p

lace

si

nce

Sep

tem

ber 1

994

and

bans

offi

cial

con

tact

bet

wee

n th

e P

NG

G

over

nmen

t and

BIG

/BR

A

• 30

Apr

il 19

96: U

NH

CR

eva

cuat

es M

artin

Miri

ori (

BIG

Sec

reta

ry) a

nd

his

fam

ily fr

om th

e So

lom

on Is

land

s to

Am

ster

dam

. Rel

atio

ns

betw

een

PN

G a

nd S

olom

on Is

land

s im

prov

e

21

4 Ju

ne

1996

4

June

19

96

Por

t Mor

esby

, P

NG

M

emor

andu

m o

f U

nder

stan

ding

•

Mai

ntai

n th

e pr

oces

s of

pea

ce,

reco

ncilia

tion

and

reco

nstru

ctio

n on

Bou

gain

ville

, inc

ludi

ng th

e im

petu

s cr

eate

d to

dat

e •

Cur

rent

term

of t

he B

TG b

e ex

tend

ed b

eyon

d th

e 19

97

Nat

iona

l Ele

ctio

ns

• D

elib

erat

e fu

rther

on

the

leve

l an

d sc

ope

of a

uton

omy

for

Bou

gain

ville

•

Est

ablis

h a

syst

em o

f loc

al le

vel

gove

rnm

ent

• Ju

lius

Cha

n (P

rime

Min

iste

r of P

NG

) •

Theo

dore

Miri

ung

(Pre

mie

r of t

he

BTG

)

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d •

May

–Jun

e 19

96: P

NG

DF

com

men

ces

Ope

ratio

n H

IGH

SP

EE

D II

ag

ains

t the

rebe

ls

• S

epte

mbe

r 199

6: K

angu

Bea

ch M

assa

cre.

BR

A a

ttack

s P

NG

DF

stro

ngho

ld a

t Kan

gu a

nd ta

kes

5 P

NG

DF

pris

oner

s •

12 O

ctob

er 1

996:

The

odor

e M

iriun

g (B

TG P

rem

ier a

nd s

enio

r ne

gotia

tor i

s as

sass

inat

ed a

t his

hom

e in

Sou

ther

n B

ouga

invi

lle. T

he

BR

F an

d P

NG

DF

are

impl

icat

ed

• 31

Jan

uary

199

7: T

he P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent s

igns

the

‘San

dlin

e A

gree

men

t' w

ith in

tern

atio

nal m

erce

narie

s •

22 F

ebru

ary

1997

: ‘Sa

ndlin

e A

gree

men

t’ be

com

es p

ublic

•

27 M

arch

199

7: A

ustra

lian

Def

ence

For

ce in

terc

epts

and

con

fisca

tes

arm

s an

d eq

uipm

ent b

ound

for P

NG

on

an A

ntin

ov c

harte

red

airc

raft

• M

arch

199

7: P

NG

DF

Com

man

der,

Brig

adie

r-Gen

eral

Jer

ry S

ingi

rok

calls

for t

he P

NG

PM

Jul

ius

Cha

n to

sta

nd d

own

Sin

giro

k is

su

bseq

uent

ly s

acke

d by

Jul

ius

Cha

n •

26 M

arch

199

7: J

uliu

s C

han

stan

ds d

own

as P

NG

PM

pen

ding

Jul

y 19

97 e

lect

ions

•

Apr

il–M

ay 1

997:

Con

fiden

tial d

iscu

ssio

ns b

etw

een

BTG

and

B

IG/B

RA.

Don

McK

inno

n co

ntac

ts M

artin

Miri

ori a

nd c

onve

ys N

ew

Zeal

and’

s pr

opos

als

for r

enew

ed p

eace

effo

rts in

Bou

gain

ville

•

10–2

0 Ju

ne 1

997:

Sol

omon

Isla

nds

Gov

ernm

ent h

olds

con

fiden

tial

talk

s w

ith B

IG/B

RA

lead

ers

incl

udin

g Jo

seph

Kab

ui a

nd S

am

Kau

ona

in H

onia

ra, S

olom

on Is

land

s w

hich

furth

ered

the

agre

emen

t w

ith th

e BT

G to

hol

d ta

lks

in B

urnh

am in

Jul

y 19

97

• Ju

ne 1

997:

PN

G N

atio

nals

arri

ve u

nexp

ecte

dly

in H

onia

ra, S

olom

on

Isla

nds

prom

ptin

g fe

ars

that

the

men

(cla

imin

g to

be

bric

klay

ers)

had

be

en s

ent a

s a

hit-s

quad

to a

ssas

sina

te th

e B

RA

lead

ersh

ip. I

t lat

er

turn

ed o

ut th

at th

e m

en w

ere

in H

onia

ra fo

r ‘bo

na fi

de p

urpo

ses’

•

June

–Jul

y 19

97: A

ustra

lian

law

yers

, Leo

Whi

te a

nd M

ark

Plu

nket

t, ru

n a

nego

tiatio

n co

urse

on

nego

tiatin

g sk

ills (a

nd c

onfli

ct re

solu

tion)

fo

r par

ties

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle C

onfli

ct (

BTG

in B

uka

and

BIG

/BR

A in

H

onia

ra)

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

29

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

22

15–1

8 Ju

ne

1997

18

Jun

e 19

97

Nov

otel

Hot

el,

Auc

klan

d,

New

Zea

land

Con

fiden

tial t

alks

be

twee

n B

IG/B

RA

and

BTG

Buk

a le

ader

s

Agr

eem

ent t

o w

ork

tow

ard

a B

urnh

am p

eace

pro

cess

. Bef

ore

that

cou

ld o

ccur

Bou

gain

ville

ans

mus

t mee

t and

atte

mpt

to

reso

lve

thei

r pro

blem

s. T

he n

ext

stag

e w

ould

invo

lve

nego

tiatio

ns

with

the

PN

G G

over

nmen

t

BTG

Buk

a le

ader

s B

IG/B

RA

Lead

ers

incl

udin

g M

artin

Miri

ori

(BIG

S

ecre

tary

)

• D

on

McK

inno

n (N

Z Fo

reig

n M

inis

ter)

• Jo

hn H

ayes

, B

ede

Cor

ry

and

Nei

l W

alte

r (S

enio

r NZ

Fore

ign

Min

istry

O

ffici

als)

(P

arty

to

the

talk

s)

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d Ju

ne 1

988:

Bip

artis

an/N

atio

nal A

ppro

ach

to th

e cr

isis

sho

wn

thro

ugh

the

appo

intm

ent o

f a S

peci

al S

tate

Neg

otia

tor (

Sir

John

Kap

utin

) and

la

ter t

he B

ipar

tisan

N

atio

nal C

omm

ittee

on

Bou

gain

ville

23

5–18

Jul

y 19

97

18 J

uly

1997

B

urnh

am

Milit

ary

Cam

p,

New

Zea

land

Bur

nham

D

ecla

ratio

n (B

UR

NH

AM

I)

• E

stab

lishm

ent o

f a c

lear

pro

cess

fo

r the

ach

ieve

men

t of a

pol

itica

l se

ttlem

ent t

o th

e w

ar o

n B

ouga

invi

lle

• C

omm

itmen

t to

unity

and

re

conc

iliatio

n at

all

leve

ls

• E

stab

lishm

ent o

f a p

roce

ss fo

r ne

gotia

tions

bet

wee

n B

ouga

invi

lle L

eade

rs a

nd th

e G

over

nmen

t of P

apua

New

G

uine

a •

End

to th

e w

ar a

nd D

ecla

ratio

n of

Cea

sefir

e to

take

effe

ct

sim

ulta

neou

sly

with

the

arriv

al o

f th

e fir

st c

ontin

gent

of t

he

peac

ekee

ping

forc

e on

B

ouga

invi

lle

• N

eutra

l Pea

ceke

epin

g Fo

rce

is

invi

ted

to B

ouga

invi

lle a

t the

be

ginn

ing

of th

e pr

oces

s fo

r a

perio

d of

not

mor

e th

an th

ree

year

s, u

nder

the

ausp

ices

of t

he

UN

•

Any

'Sta

tus

of F

orce

s'

Agr

eem

ent i

s ag

reed

to b

y th

e S

tate

of P

apua

New

Gui

nea

and

coun

tries

con

tribu

ting

to th

e P

eace

keep

ing

Forc

e, th

at th

e B

ouga

invi

lle In

terim

G

over

nmen

t and

the

Bou

gain

ville

Tra

nsiti

onal

G

over

nmen

t be

fully

con

sulte

d an

d be

par

ty to

it

• D

emilit

aris

atio

n of

B

ouga

invi

lle—

com

plet

e w

ithdr

awal

of t

he P

NG

DF

with

in

a tim

e fra

me

to b

e ag

reed

to

betw

een

Boug

ainv

ille

Lead

ers

and

the

PN

G G

over

nmen

t •

Layi

ng d

own

of a

rms

by a

ll B

ouga

invi

llean

s un

der

supe

rvis

ion

of th

e P

eace

keep

ing

Forc

e

Ger

ard

Sin

ato

(Pre

mie

r BTG

) Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(lead

er o

f B

IG/B

RA

dele

gatio

n)

• M

artin

Miri

ori

(BIG

S

ecre

tary

) •

Com

mis

s-io

ner S

imon

P

enta

nu

(PN

G C

hief

O

mbu

dsm

an)

—al

so a

B

ouga

in-

ville

an (C

o-

Cha

irper

sons

)

Faci

litat

ed a

nd o

bser

ved

by:

• G

over

nmen

t of N

ew

Zeal

and

Obs

erve

d by

: •

Don

McK

inno

n (N

Z Fo

reig

n M

inis

ter)

• Jo

hn H

ayes

, Bed

e C

orry

an

d N

eil W

alte

r (S

enio

r N

Z Fo

reig

n M

inis

try

Offi

cial

s)

• 19

97: F

ranc

is O

na o

bjec

ts to

the

dire

ctio

n of

the

Pea

ce P

roce

ss a

nd

inst

ead

form

s a

self-

proc

laim

ed M

e'ek

amui

Gov

ernm

ent a

nd

Me'

ekam

ui D

efen

ce F

orce

(MD

F) (t

he d

omin

ant f

orce

in th

e M

DF

is

the

BR

A ‘A

’ Com

pany

). O

na c

ontin

ues

to re

fuse

to p

artic

ipat

e in

the

peac

e pr

oces

s an

d de

clar

es a

15k

m ‘N

o G

o Zo

ne’ a

roun

d M

DF

stro

ngho

lds

vici

nity

Pan

guna

and

Ton

u. T

he d

ispu

tant

s, a

nd th

e TM

G/P

MG

resp

ect t

he ‘N

o G

o Zo

ne’

• 22

Jul

y 19

97: B

ill S

kate

repl

aces

Jul

ius

Cha

n as

PM

of P

NG

fo

llow

ing

his

defe

at a

t the

pol

ls

• Ju

ly 1

997:

As

a go

odw

ill g

estu

re p

ost-B

urnh

am 1

, the

BR

A ag

reed

to

rele

ase

five

PN

GD

F so

ldie

rs c

aptu

red

durin

g a

BR

A a

ttach

on

the

PN

GD

F ou

tpos

t at K

angu

Bea

ch, S

outh

ern

Boug

ainv

ille in

S

epte

mbe

r 199

6. In

retu

rn, t

he P

NG

DF

guar

ante

ed th

e de

lega

tion

safe

pas

sage

bac

k to

Bou

gain

ville

•

Aug

ust 1

997:

Aus

tralia

n Fo

reig

n M

inis

ter,

Ale

xand

er D

owne

r, re

vers

es A

ustra

lia’s

long

sta

ndin

g po

licy

of n

o m

inis

teria

l or o

ffici

al

cont

act w

ith th

e B

RA

by

mee

ting

with

Mos

es H

avin

i (B

IG) i

n S

ydne

y.

Ale

xand

er D

owne

r sub

sequ

ently

ann

ounc

ed in

crea

sed

Aust

ralia

n ai

d fo

r Bou

gain

ville

reco

nstru

ctio

n (A

$100

milli

on o

ver f

ive

year

s)

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

30 Se

r. Pe

riod

of

Neg

otia

-tio

n

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

• Li

fting

of B

lock

ade

and

Rem

oval

of

Res

trict

ions

—ne

ed fo

r acc

ess

thro

ugho

ut B

ouga

invi

lle to

re

leva

nt d

onor

org

anis

atio

ns

and

othe

r hum

anita

rian

agen

cies

, inc

ludi

ng IC

RC

and

U

NIC

EF,

for t

he im

plem

enta

tion

of h

ealth

and

edu

catio

n pr

ogra

ms,

and

for t

he

rest

orat

ion

of b

asic

nee

ds

• P

oliti

cal P

roce

ss—

peop

le o

f B

ouga

invi

lle, a

s a

peop

le, f

reel

y an

d de

moc

ratic

ally

exe

rcis

e th

eir r

ight

to d

eter

min

e th

eir

polit

ical

futu

re

• C

omm

ence

men

t of P

roce

ss a

nd

Ven

ue fo

r Firs

t Mee

ting—

first

m

eetin

g of

Bou

gain

ville

Lea

ders

w

ith th

e G

over

nmen

t of P

apua

N

ew G

uine

a no

late

r tha

n S

epte

mbe

r 199

7 in

a n

eutra

l pl

ace

outs

ide

Papu

a N

ew

Gui

nea

or B

ouga

invi

lle

24

1–10

Oct

19

97

10 O

ct

1997

B

urnh

am

Milit

ary

Cam

p,

New

Zea

land

Bur

nham

Tru

ce

(BU

RN

HA

M II

) •

Lead

ers

affir

med

obj

ectiv

es o

f B

UR

NH

AM

I •

Lead

ers

agre

ed to

mee

t on

a re

gula

r bas

is to

mon

itor t

he

impl

emen

tatio

n of

the

com

mitm

ent

• Le

ader

s ag

reed

to in

vite

a

neut

ral r

egio

nal T

ruce

M

onito

ring

Gro

up (T

MG

) to

mon

itor t

he te

rms

of th

e tru

ce

• R

ober

t Iga

ra

(Sec

reta

ry fo

r P

rime

Min

iste

r) •

Kap

eatu

Pua

ria

(BTG

Leg

al

Adv

isor

) W

itnes

sed

by:

• B

RF

Lead

ers,

P

NG

DF

Rep

rese

ntat

ives

, P

NG

D le

ader

s,

PN

G S

ecur

ity

Forc

e le

ader

s

• M

artin

Miri

ori

(BIG

/BR

A

dele

gatio

n le

ader

) W

itnes

sed

by:

• B

RA

C

omm

ande

rs

Lesl

ie B

oset

o (M

inis

ter f

or

Hom

e A

ffairs

, S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

(C

hairp

erso

n)

• H

oste

d by

Gov

ernm

ent

of N

ew Z

eala

nd

• Fi

nanc

ed b

y G

over

nmen

t of A

ustra

lia

• O

bser

vers

from

G

over

nmen

t of S

olom

on

Isla

nds

Oct

ober

199

7: T

he B

urnh

am T

ruce

mar

ks th

e en

d of

the

‘War

’ on

Bou

gain

ville

. Fol

low

ing

Bur

nham

the

BIG

/BR

A le

ader

ship

mov

ed to

di

sass

ocia

te it

self

and

oper

ate

inde

pend

ently

from

Fra

ncis

Ona

(who

re

fuse

s to

par

ticip

ate

at B

urnh

am o

r sig

n th

e Tr

uce)

und

er th

e le

ader

ship

of J

osep

h Ka

bui a

nd S

am K

auon

a

25

19–2

4 N

ov

1997

24

Nov

19

97

Cai

rns,

A

ustra

lia

The

Cai

rns

Com

mitm

ent

(incl

udin

g a

Join

t P

ress

S

tate

men

t)

• A

gree

men

t to

esta

blis

h an

d de

ploy

a n

eutra

l TM

G

• E

stab

lishm

ent o

f a P

eace

C

onsu

ltativ

e C

omm

ittee

(PC

C)

with

cor

e m

embe

rs fr

om th

e N

atio

nal G

over

nmen

t (3)

, B

TG(2

), B

IG(2

), B

RA

(2),

BR

F(2)

•

PC

C is

to re

view

and

ass

ess

impl

emen

tatio

n an

d ad

here

nce

by th

e si

gnat

orie

s to

the

Bur

nham

Tru

ce

• R

evie

w c

omm

itmen

t in

Janu

ary

1998

•

Age

nda

set f

or n

ext l

eade

rs

mee

ting

• K

apea

tu P

uaria

(B

TG L

egal

A

dvis

or)

• R

ober

t Iga

ra

(Sec

reta

ry fo

r P

rime

Min

iste

r)

Mar

tin M

irior

i (B

IG/B

RA

de

lega

tion

lead

er)

Lesl

ie B

oset

o (M

inis

ter f

or

Hom

e A

ffairs

, S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

(C

hairp

erso

n)

Faci

litat

ed b

y:

• G

over

nmen

t of A

ustra

lia

Witn

esse

d by

: •

The

Hon

. Rev

. Les

lie

BO

SET

O (M

inis

ter f

or

Hom

e A

ffairs

, G

over

nmen

t of S

olom

on

Isla

nds)

•

Dav

id R

ITC

HIE

(R

epre

sent

ativ

e,

Gov

ernm

ent o

f A

ustra

lia)

• B

ede

CO

RR

Y (R

epre

sent

ativ

e,

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d)

5 D

ecem

ber 1

997:

Agr

eem

ent s

igne

d in

Por

t Mor

esby

bet

wee

n th

e G

over

nmen

ts o

f PN

G, A

ustra

lia, F

iji, V

anua

tu a

nd N

ew Z

eala

nd fo

r th

e de

ploy

men

t of a

TM

G c

omm

enci

ng 6

Dec

embe

r 199

7

26

19–2

3 Ja

n 19

98

23 J

an

1998

Li

ncol

n U

nive

rsity

, C

hris

tchu

rch,

N

ew Z

eala

nd

Linc

oln

Agr

eem

ent

• R

enou

nce

viol

ence

and

com

mit

to a

chie

ving

pea

ce b

y pe

acef

ul

mea

ns

• E

xten

sion

of t

he B

urnh

am T

ruce

to

30

April

199

8

• Jo

hn K

aput

in

(Chi

ef N

egot

iato

r, P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent)

• S

am A

koita

i (M

inis

ter f

or

Bou

gain

ville

• Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(BIG

Vic

e P

resi

dent

) •

Sam

Kau

ona

(BR

A M

ilitar

y C

omm

ande

r)

Bar

thol

omew

U

lufa

'alu

(P

rime

Min

iste

r, S

olom

on

Faci

litat

ed b

y:

• G

over

nmen

t of N

ew

Zeal

and

In a

ttend

ance

: •

Gov

ernm

ent l

eade

rs

from

Fiji

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

31

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

• P

erm

anen

t and

irre

voca

ble

ceas

efire

to ta

ke e

ffect

from

24

00H

on

30 A

pril

1998

•

Pha

sed

with

draw

al o

f PN

GD

F an

d re

stor

atio

n of

civ

il au

thor

ity

• A

rrang

emen

ts fo

r dep

loym

ent o

f a

succ

esso

r to

the

TMG

(the

P

eace

Mon

itorin

g G

roup

(PM

G))

to b

e fin

alis

ed b

y 30

Apr

il 19

98

• P

NG

to a

ppro

ach

UN

to re

ques

t O

bser

ver M

issi

on to

ove

rsee

ar

rang

emen

ts

• A

mne

sty

and

Par

don

for

parti

cipa

nts

in th

e C

risis

and

a

rem

oval

of ‘

boun

ties’

on

indi

vidu

als

• P

rom

ote

reco

ncilia

tion

• Tr

ansi

tion

to c

ivilia

n po

licin

g •

Res

tora

tion

of s

ervi

ces

on

Bou

gain

ville

•

Pro

mot

e pu

blic

aw

aren

ess

and

resp

ect f

or th

e A

gree

men

t •

Mee

t to

disc

uss

the

polit

ical

fu

ture

of B

ouga

invi

lle b

efor

e th

e en

d of

Jun

e 19

98

Affa

irs, P

NG

G

over

nmen

t) •

Ger

ard

Sin

ato(

BTG

P

rem

ier)

Oth

er B

ouga

invi

lle

Par

liam

enta

ry

Rep

rese

ntat

ives

fro

m th

e P

NG

G

over

nmen

t •

Hila

ry M

asiri

a (R

esis

tanc

e C

omm

ande

r)

Isla

nds)

(C

hairp

erso

n)

• G

over

nmen

t lea

ders

fro

m V

anua

tu

• G

over

nmen

t lea

ders

fro

m N

ew Z

eala

nd

• G

over

nmen

t lea

ders

fro

m A

ustra

lia

Obs

erve

rs:

• V

aler

y M

arus

in (S

peci

al

Env

oy o

f the

Sec

reta

ry-

Gen

eral

of t

he U

N)I

27

27 M

ar

1998

M

arch

199

8 C

anbe

rra,

Aus

tralia

Te

chni

cal

Mee

ting

(Sup

plem

en-

tatio

n of

the

Cea

sefir

e A

gree

men

t)

• Fu

rther

talk

s pr

ior t

o A

raw

a an

d im

plem

enta

tion

of th

e Li

ncol

n A

gree

men

t •

Opp

ortu

nity

for a

ll th

e pa

rties

to

disc

uss

deta

ils o

f the

per

man

ent

ceas

efire

•

Exp

lore

opt

ions

for t

he le

vel o

f ex

tern

al in

volv

emen

t in

mon

itorin

g th

e pe

ace

proc

ess

• P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent

• B

RF

BR

A/B

IG

Fa

cilit

ated

by

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Aus

tralia

•

22 A

pril

1998

: UN

Sec

urity

Cou

ncil

Ann

ounc

es S

uppo

rt fo

r the

Li

ncol

n A

gree

men

t and

cal

ls o

n th

e U

N S

ecre

tary

-Gen

eral

to

cons

ider

a U

N O

bser

ver M

issi

on o

n B

ouga

invi

lle

• 29

Apr

il 19

98: P

roto

col s

igne

d fo

r est

ablis

hmen

t of P

MG

(a

succ

esso

r to

the

TMG

) bet

wee

n P

NG

, Van

uatu

, Fiji,

New

Zea

land

an

d A

ustra

lia

28

30 A

pril

1998

30

Apr

il 19

98

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Ara

wa

Agr

eem

ent

(ann

ex 1

to th

e Li

ncol

n A

gree

men

t)

• Im

plem

ente

d th

e Li

ncol

n A

gree

men

t and

per

man

ent

ceas

efire

•

Est

ablis

hed

a Pe

ace

Proc

ess

Con

sulta

tive

Com

mitt

ee (P

PC

C)

that

will

be c

haire

d by

the

lead

er

of th

e U

N O

bser

ver M

issi

on o

r an

othe

r per

son

agre

eabl

e to

the

parti

es

• Jo

hn K

aput

in

(Chi

ef N

egot

iato

r, P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent)

• S

am A

KO

ITA

I (M

inis

ter f

or

Bou

gain

ville

Af

fairs

, PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent)

• G

erar

d S

inat

o (B

TG P

rem

ier)

• O

ther

Bou

gain

ville

P

arlia

men

tary

R

epre

sent

ativ

es

from

the

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent

• H

ilary

Mas

iria

(BR

F C

hairm

an)

• Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(BIG

Vic

e P

resi

dent

) •

Sam

Kau

ona

(BR

A M

ilitar

y C

omm

ande

r)

Fa

cilit

ated

by:

•

TMG

W

itnes

sed

by:

• B

arth

olom

ew U

lufa

'alu

(P

rime

Min

iste

r, S

olom

on Is

land

s)

• D

on M

cKin

non

(NZ

Min

iste

r for

For

eign

Af

fairs

and

Tra

de)

• A

lexa

nder

Dow

ner

(Aus

tralia

n M

inis

ter f

or

Fore

ign

Affa

irs)

• B

erna

rdo

Vuni

bobo

(Fiji

Min

iste

r for

For

eign

Af

fairs

) •

Cle

men

t Leo

n (A

ctin

g V

anua

tu M

inis

ter f

or

Fore

ign

Affa

irs)

• D

r Fra

ncis

Ven

drel

l (R

epre

sent

ativ

e of

the

UN

Sec

reta

ry-G

ener

al)

• 30

Apr

il 19

98: T

MG

bec

omes

Aus

tralia

n-le

d P

MG

•

2 Ju

ne 1

988:

Let

ter f

rom

the

UN

Sec

reta

ry-G

ener

al to

the

Pre

side

nt

of th

e Se

curit

y C

ounc

il en

dors

ing

the

depl

oym

ent o

f a U

nite

d N

atio

ns O

bser

ver M

issi

on o

n B

ouga

invi

lle (U

NO

MB

) •

June

199

8: W

ithdr

awal

of P

NG

DF

from

Ara

wa,

Bou

gain

ville

•

June

199

8: B

ouga

invi

lle L

eade

rs M

eetin

g to

dis

cuss

arra

ngem

ents

fo

r fre

e an

d de

moc

ratic

ele

ctio

ns fo

r a B

ouga

invi

lle R

econ

cilia

tion

Gov

ernm

ent (

BR

G) t

o be

est

ablis

hed

befo

re th

e en

d of

199

8. It

als

o di

scus

sed

auto

nom

y an

d th

e de

ploy

men

t of a

UN

Obs

erve

r Mis

sion

•

1 A

ugus

t 199

8: U

nite

d N

atio

ns P

oliti

cal O

ffice

in B

ouga

invi

lle

beco

mes

ope

ratio

nal

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

32

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

29

20–2

2 Au

g 19

98

22 A

ug

1998

B

uin,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Bui

n D

ecla

ratio

n (P

an-

Bou

gain

ville

Le

ader

s C

onfe

renc

e)

• C

onfir

mat

ion

that

inde

pend

ence

is

the

com

mon

goa

l for

B

ouga

invi

lle to

be

achi

eved

th

roug

h pe

acef

ul m

eans

•

Cal

ls fo

r est

ablis

hmen

t of B

RG

•

Oth

er is

sues

incl

udin

g de

velo

pmen

t and

the

disp

osal

of

arm

s to

be

rais

ed a

t PP

CC

•

Wom

en o

f B

ouga

invi

lle

• C

hief

s of

C

entra

l, S

outh

and

N

orth

B

ouga

invi

lle

Rev

eren

d Le

slie

Bes

eto

(Min

iste

r for

H

ome

Affa

irs

& C

hairm

an o

f S

olom

on

Isla

nds

Bou

gain

ville

P

eace

C

omm

ittee

, G

over

nmen

t of

Sol

omon

Is

land

s)

(Cha

irper

son)

7–

8 O

ctob

er 1

998:

Firs

t mee

ting

of th

e PP

CC

cha

ired

by V

aler

y M

arus

in (U

N R

epre

sent

ativ

e). O

bser

vers

at t

he P

PC

C m

eetin

g in

clud

e th

e C

omm

ande

r PM

G a

nd re

pres

enta

tives

from

Aus

tralia

, N

ew Z

eala

nd, F

iji an

d V

anua

tu

30

24 D

ec

1998

24

Dec

19

98

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Dra

ft B

asic

A

gree

men

t C

once

rnin

g th

e B

ouga

invi

lle

Rec

onci

liatio

n G

over

nmen

t

• D

etai

l a p

ropo

sed

cons

titut

ion

for t

he B

RG

•

Det

ail e

stab

lishm

ent,

prin

cipl

es

and

stru

ctur

e of

BR

G

• P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent

• B

TG le

ader

s •

BR

F le

ader

s

BIG

/BR

A Le

ader

s

•

1998

: MP

Joh

n M

omis

cre

ates

a n

ew g

roup

ing

(the

Leita

na C

ounc

il of

Eld

ers)

whi

ch in

clud

ed th

e lo

cal-l

evel

gov

ernm

ent f

or th

e is

land

of

Buk

a an

d se

nior

lead

ers

of th

e B

RF

• D

ecem

ber 1

998:

Leg

isla

tion

to e

stab

lish

the

BR

G fa

ils to

pas

s se

cond

read

ing.

It is

pro

pose

d th

at th

e ne

w In

terim

Gov

ernm

ent d

ue

to b

e es

tabl

ishe

d in

Jan

uary

199

9 w

ill b

e su

spen

ded

to m

ake

way

for

an In

terim

BR

G

• 31

Dec

embe

r 199

8: B

TG C

harte

r exp

ires

and

in th

e ab

senc

e of

en

ablin

g le

gisl

atio

n (to

est

ablis

hmen

t a B

RG

), th

e de

faul

t pos

ition

is

the

re-in

stat

emen

t of t

he B

ouga

invi

lle P

rovi

ncia

l Gov

ernm

ent o

n th

e sa

me

stat

us a

s al

l oth

er P

NG

pro

vinc

es (J

ohn

Mom

is w

ould

bec

ome

Gov

erno

r of B

ouga

invi

lle a

s M

embe

r for

Bou

gain

ville

Reg

iona

l in

the

natio

nal p

arlia

men

t) •

Janu

ary

1999

: Int

erim

Pro

vinc

ial G

over

nmen

t arra

ngem

ents

co

mm

ence

and

the

PN

G G

over

nmen

t sus

pend

s th

e BT

G a

nd p

lace

s th

e pr

ovin

ce u

nder

Nat

iona

l Exe

cutiv

e C

ounc

il co

ntro

l (Jo

hn M

omis

m

ount

s a

cons

titut

iona

l cha

lleng

e to

the

susp

ensi

on)

• 15

Jan

uary

199

9: B

ouga

invi

lle C

onst

ituen

t Ass

embl

y (B

CA

) ele

cted

(J

osep

h K

abui

(BIG

vic

e-ch

airm

an) a

nd G

erar

d S

inat

o (fo

rmer

BTG

P

rem

ier)

elec

ted

as C

o-C

hairm

en).

The

BC

A is

resp

onsi

ble

for

draw

ing

up a

con

stitu

tion

for t

he in

terim

form

of B

RG

to b

e ca

lled

the

Bou

gain

ville

Peo

ple'

s C

ongr

ess

(BP

C) a

nd fo

r an

advi

sory

role

to

the

NE

C u

ntil

the

body

is e

lect

ed

31

14–2

2 Ap

ril

1999

22

Apr

il 19

99

Lake

O

kata

ina,

N

ew Z

eala

nd

Mat

akan

a an

d O

kata

ina

Und

erst

andi

ng

(to re

solv

e di

ffere

nces

st

emm

ing

from

th

e D

ecem

ber

1998

inte

rim

polit

ical

ar

rang

emen

ts fo

r B

ouga

invi

lle)

• P

ledg

e to

mai

ntai

n th

e pe

rman

ent a

nd ir

revo

cabl

e ce

asef

ire a

nd p

eace

ful

nego

tiatio

n on

the

polit

ical

futu

re

of B

ouga

invi

lle

• Th

e fo

ur B

ouga

invi

lle M

Ps

mus

t w

ork

toge

ther

(uni

ted

polit

ical

le

ader

ship

) •

Spe

cial

Sta

te N

egot

iato

r will

prep

are

a pa

ckag

e of

pro

posa

ls

on th

e po

wer

s, fu

nctio

ns,

stru

ctur

e an

d st

atus

of

Bou

gain

ville

's g

over

nmen

t, ge

ared

to B

ouga

invi

lle's

nee

ds.

All

indi

vidu

als

and

grou

ps in

B

ouga

invi

lle w

ill b

e gi

ven

the

oppo

rtuni

ty to

mak

e w

ritte

n su

bmis

sion

s to

the

Spec

ial S

tate

N

egot

iato

r

The

Gov

ernm

ent o

f P

NG

Fo

ur M

embe

rs o

f th

e N

atio

nal

Par

liam

ent

The

Bou

gain

ville

C

onst

ituen

t A

ssem

bly

(BC

A)

Leita

na

Cou

ncil

of

Eld

ers

Fa

cilit

ated

by:

•

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d W

itnes

sed

by:

• P

aul R

eeve

s,

(Arc

hbis

hop

and

Prim

ate

of N

ew Z

eala

nd

(198

0–85

) and

form

er

Gov

erno

r-Gen

eral

of

New

Zea

land

(198

5-90

))

28 M

ay 1

999:

Bou

gain

ville

Peo

ple'

s C

ongr

ess

(BP

C) I

naug

urat

ion

Cer

emon

y in

Ara

wa

unde

r Jos

eph

Kab

ui (p

rimar

ily c

ompr

isin

g m

embe

rs o

f the

BIG

)

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

33

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

•

Req

uest

that

the

tech

nica

l of

ficer

s of

the

Boug

ainv

illea

n pa

rties

mee

t as

soon

as

poss

ible

to p

repa

re fo

r di

scus

sion

s on

futu

re

arra

ngem

ents

for g

over

nmen

t on

Bou

gain

ville

, inc

ludi

ng

disc

ussi

ons

on o

ther

rela

ted

mat

ters

rais

ed in

this

doc

umen

t •

Pol

itica

l lea

ders

will

mee

t to

disc

uss

the

pack

age

as s

oon

as

poss

ible

, and

no

late

r tha

n 30

Ju

ne 1

999

• W

eapo

ns d

ispo

sal s

houl

d be

gin

imm

edia

tely

und

er U

NO

MB

and

N

ew Z

eala

nd s

uper

visi

on

• W

ork

tow

ard

esta

blis

hmen

t of a

P

rovi

ncia

l Gov

ernm

ent

• Fo

r the

pur

pose

s of

tra

nspa

renc

y an

d ac

coun

tabi

lity,

al

l fut

ure

nego

tiatio

ns s

houl

d ta

ke p

lace

in B

ouga

invi

lle o

r P

NG

32

30 J

une

1999

30

Jun

e 19

99

Rab

aul,

New

B

ritai

n Fu

ndam

enta

l P

rinci

ples

for t

he

Futu

re o

f B

ouga

invi

lle

• A

ddre

ssed

the

issu

e of

the

futu

re p

oliti

cal s

tatu

s of

B

ouga

invi

lle

• P

rime

Min

iste

r und

erto

ok to

su

bmit

the

‘Fun

dam

enta

l pr

inci

ples

’ pre

pare

d by

the

BP

C

to th

e N

atio

nal E

xecu

tive

Cou

ncil

for i

ts c

onsi

dera

tion

• Th

e P

rime

Min

iste

r of P

NG

ad

vise

d th

at th

e G

over

nmen

t w

ould

be

prep

ared

to c

onsi

der

the

prop

osal

for a

refe

rend

um

for i

ndep

ende

nce

• Th

e m

eetin

g ac

cept

ed th

at

Bou

gain

ville

sho

uld

be g

iven

a

stat

us u

nder

whi

ch B

ouga

invi

lle

will

exe

rcis

e th

e po

wer

s of

go

vern

men

t with

the

exce

ptio

n of

cer

tain

pow

ers

to b

e ne

gotia

ted

that

sha

ll be

reta

ined

by

the

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Pap

ua

New

Gui

nea

• A

gree

men

t tha

t eve

ry e

ffort

shou

ld b

e m

ade

to b

uild

bi

parti

san

supp

ort f

or th

e ag

reem

ents

to b

e re

ache

d be

twee

n th

e pa

rties

•

The

parti

es s

hall

mee

t as

soon

as

pra

ctic

able

to fu

rther

thes

e di

scus

sion

s

Bill

Ska

te (P

NG

P

rime

Min

iste

r) M

r Jos

eph

Kab

ui

(Pre

side

nt

BP

C)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• D

avid

Irvi

ne (H

igh

Com

mis

sion

er fo

r A

ustra

lia)

• M

aria

Mat

aeva

(Dep

uty

Hig

h C

omm

issi

oner

for

Fiji)

•

Nig

el M

oore

(Hig

h C

omm

issi

oner

for N

ew

Zeal

and)

•

LTC

OL

Cly

de P

arris

(U

N O

bser

ver M

issi

on in

B

ouga

invi

lle)

• B

rigad

ier S

imon

Willi

s (A

ustra

lian

Com

man

der,

PM

G, B

ouga

invi

lle)

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

34

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

33

10 J

uly

1999

10

Jul

y 19

99

Por

t Mor

esby

, N

ew G

uine

a H

utje

na M

inut

e S

ubm

issi

on o

f the

‘Fun

dam

enta

l P

rinci

ples

’ doc

umen

t sig

ned

on

30 J

une

1999

to th

e N

atio

nal

Exe

cutiv

e C

ounc

il fo

r co

nsid

erat

ion

Bill

Ska

te (P

NG

P

rime

Min

iste

r) M

r Jos

eph

Kab

ui

(Pre

side

nt

BP

C)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• N

oel S

incl

air (

UN

O

bser

ver M

issi

on)

• B

rigad

ier F

rank

Rob

erts

(C

omm

ande

r PM

G)

14 J

uly

1999

: Mek

ere

Mor

auta

repl

aces

Bill

Ska

te a

s P

M o

f PN

G

34

14–1

5 D

ec

1999

15

Dec

19

99

Buk

a,

Bou

gain

ville

H

utje

na R

ecor

d •

Bou

gain

ville

Del

egat

ion

pres

ente

d a

docu

men

t rec

ordi

ng

Bou

gain

ville

's c

omm

on v

iew

as

to th

e fu

ture

of B

ouga

invi

lle, a

nd

note

d th

at th

e pe

ople

of

Bou

gain

ville

are

of t

he fi

rm

conv

ictio

n th

at th

e is

sues

of

Aut

onom

y an

d R

efer

endu

m a

re

inse

para

bly

linke

d an

d m

ust b

e co

nsid

ered

toge

ther

•

The

PN

G M

inis

ter u

nder

took

to

mak

e a

subm

issi

on o

n th

e is

sue

of R

efer

endu

m a

s ou

tline

d in

the

Bou

gain

ville

Par

ties

‘Joi

nt

Bou

gain

ville

Neg

otia

ting

• P

ositi

on' t

o th

e N

atio

nal

Exe

cutiv

e C

ounc

il fo

r its

co

nsid

erat

ion

• G

over

nmen

t of P

apua

New

G

uine

a ag

rees

that

the

high

est

poss

ible

Aut

onom

y fo

r B

ouga

invi

lle, s

ubje

ct to

ne

gotia

tion

• G

over

nmen

t sha

ll at

the

sam

e tim

e pr

ovid

e its

resp

onse

to th

e pr

inci

ple

of R

efer

endu

m a

s ou

tline

d in

the

Bou

gain

ville

pr

opos

al

• Th

e Pa

rties

sha

ll m

eet b

efor

e th

e en

d of

Jan

uary

200

0 to

co

nsid

er th

e re

spon

ses

of th

e

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Pap

ua N

ew

Gui

nea

Mic

hael

Som

are

(On

beha

lf of

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent

Del

egat

ion—

Min

iste

r for

B

ouga

invi

lle A

ffairs

an

d C

hairm

an o

f th

e N

atio

nal

Com

mitt

ee o

n B

ouga

invi

lle)

• Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(BP

C

Pre

side

nt, o

n be

half

of

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n)

• Jo

hn M

omis

(G

over

nor,

on

beha

lf of

B

ouga

invi

lle

Del

egat

ion)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• N

oel S

incl

air (

UN

O

bser

vers

Mis

sion

) •

Brig

adie

r Fra

nk

RO

BE

RTS

(Aus

tralia

n C

omm

ande

r PM

G)

• N

ovem

ber 1

999:

Joh

n M

omis

win

s hi

s C

onst

itutio

nal c

halle

nge

in th

e H

igh

Cou

rt an

d be

com

es G

over

nor o

f the

BIP

G

• 9

Dec

embe

r 199

9: J

ohn

Mom

is is

rein

stat

ed a

s G

over

nor o

f B

ouga

invi

lle

35

23 D

ec

1999

23

Dec

19

99

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Gre

enho

use

Mem

oran

dum

Fi

nalis

e th

e re

latio

nshi

p an

d ar

rang

emen

ts b

etw

een

the

BP

C, t

he B

ouga

invi

lle In

terim

P

rovi

ncia

l Gov

ernm

ent a

nd th

e Le

itana

Cou

ncil

of E

lder

s

BP

C, B

IPG

and

Le

itana

Cou

ncil

of

Eld

ers

Witn

esse

d by

: •

Am

bass

ador

Noe

l S

incl

air (

UN

Obs

erve

rs

Mis

sion

) •

BR

IG F

rank

Rob

erts

(A

ustra

lian

Com

man

der

PM

G)

29 D

ecem

ber 1

999:

A lo

cal c

erem

ony

is h

eld

at B

uka,

initi

ated

by

the

Leita

na C

ounc

il of

Eld

ers,

to re

inst

all J

ohn

Mom

is a

s G

over

nor.

Jose

ph K

abui

atte

nded

as

BP

C P

resi

dent

36

17–2

3 M

arch

200

0 23

Mar

ch

2000

Lo

loat

a Is

land

, Cen

tral

Pro

vinc

e an

d Is

land

er H

otel

, P

ort M

ores

by,

PN

G

Lolo

ata

Und

erst

andi

ng

• R

eaffi

rmed

com

mitm

ent t

o th

e pe

ace

proc

ess,

and

to

cons

ulta

tion

and

coop

erat

ion

with

in th

e fra

mew

ork

and

spiri

t of

the

Linc

oln

Agr

eem

ent

• Th

e pa

rties

dis

cuss

ed th

e B

ouga

invi

lle p

aper

, 'B

ouga

invi

lle

Com

mon

Neg

otia

ting

Pos

ition

: E

xpan

ded

Det

ails

' dat

ed 8

M

arch

200

0, a

nd th

e Pa

pua

New

Gui

nea

Gov

ernm

ent p

aper

,

Mic

hael

Som

are

(Min

iste

r for

B

ouga

invi

lle A

ffairs

an

d C

hairm

an o

f th

e N

atio

nal

Com

mitt

ee o

n B

ouga

invi

lle)

• Jo

hn M

omis

(G

over

nor,

Co-

Lead

er o

f th

e B

ouga

invi

lle

Del

egat

ion)

•

Joel

Ban

am

(Cha

irman

, Le

itana

C

ounc

il of

E

lder

s)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• N

oel S

incl

air (

Dire

ctor

of

the

UN

Obs

erve

r M

issi

on)

• E

wan

McM

illan

(Chi

ef

Neg

otia

tor,

PM

G)

30 M

arch

200

0: B

ouga

invi

lle In

terim

Pro

vinc

ial G

over

nmen

t (B

IPG

) sw

orn

in b

y th

e P

NG

Gov

erno

r-Gen

eral

at B

uka

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

35

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

'The

Nat

iona

l Del

egat

ion'

s P

ositi

on o

n th

e B

ouga

invi

lle

Del

egat

ion'

s Au

tono

my

Pro

posa

ls' d

ated

19

Mar

ch

2000

, and

oth

er p

aper

s, a

nd

agre

ed th

at th

ese

docu

men

ts

prov

ide

for f

utur

e ne

gotia

tions

be

twee

n th

e pa

rties

•

Est

ablis

hmen

t of a

Bou

gain

ville

In

terim

Pro

vinc

ial G

over

nmen

t (B

IPG

) •

Mov

emen

t tow

ard

auto

nom

ous

gove

rnm

ent

• R

efer

endu

m o

n in

depe

nden

ce

follo

win

g au

tono

my

• Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(BP

C

Pre

side

nt,

Co-

Lead

er o

f th

e B

ouga

invi

lle

Del

egat

ion)

37

23 M

ay–

9 Ju

ne

2000

9 Ju

ne

2000

G

atew

ay

Hot

el, P

ort

Mor

esby

, P

NG

Gat

eway

C

omm

uniq

ué

• B

ouga

invi

lle D

eleg

atio

n pr

esen

ted

the

Nat

iona

l G

over

nmen

t Del

egat

ion

with

a

deta

iled

wor

king

pap

er c

alle

d 'P

ropo

sals

for a

Spe

cial

Sta

tus

Agr

eem

ent',

out

linin

g th

e pr

opos

ed d

raft

of a

n ag

reem

ent

betw

een

the

parti

es o

n a

polit

ical

set

tlem

ent (

base

d on

a

docu

men

t ent

itled

'Aut

onom

y an

d R

efer

endu

m',

whi

ch th

e N

atio

nal G

over

nmen

t D

eleg

atio

n ha

s ac

cept

ed a

s th

e ba

sis

for f

urth

er n

egot

iatio

ns

• Th

e pa

rties

agr

eed

that

thes

e do

cum

ents

wou

ld p

rovi

de th

e ba

sis

for f

utur

e ne

gotia

tions

•

Dis

cuss

ed is

sues

suc

h as

ca

paci

ty b

uild

ing,

inst

itutio

nal

stre

ngth

enin

g, w

eapo

ns

disp

osal

, am

nest

y an

d pa

rdon

, w

ithdr

awal

of s

ecur

ity fo

rces

an

d re

cons

truct

ion

of

infra

stru

ctur

e, re

stor

atio

n of

se

rvic

es a

nd d

evel

opm

ent

• It

was

agr

eed

that

the

PP

CC

sh

all m

eet a

s so

on a

s po

ssib

le

to d

evel

op p

ropo

sals

for

wea

pons

dis

posa

l and

the

phas

ed w

ithdr

awal

of t

he P

NG

se

curit

y fo

rces

•

The

parti

es a

gree

d on

add

ition

al

time

to n

egot

iate

det

ails

of t

he

agre

emen

t •

Agr

eem

ent t

o be

gin

furth

er

exch

ange

s co

ncer

ning

all

the

abov

e is

sues

no

late

r tha

n th

e fir

st w

eek

of J

uly

2000

(a fi

nal

agre

emen

t is

to b

e co

nclu

ded

no la

ter t

han

mid

-Sep

tem

ber

2000

)

Mic

hael

Som

are

(Min

iste

r for

B

ouga

invi

lle A

ffairs

an

d C

hairm

an o

f th

e N

atio

nal

Com

mitt

ee o

n B

ouga

invi

lle)

• Jo

hn M

omis

(G

over

nor

BIP

G a

nd

Co-

Lead

er o

f th

e B

ouga

invi

lle

Del

egat

ion)

•

Jose

ph K

abui

(B

PC

P

resi

dent

and

C

o-Le

ader

of

the

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• B

rigad

ier M

. Silv

erst

one

(Com

man

der,

PM

G)

• S

cott

Sm

ith (U

N

Obs

erve

r Mis

sion

)

• Fe

brua

ry 2

001:

Wea

pons

Dis

posa

l Tal

ks c

ondu

cted

bet

wee

n B

ouga

invi

lle le

ader

s an

d th

e P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent i

n To

wns

ville

•

26 J

anua

ry 2

001:

Agr

eed

prin

cipl

es o

n de

ferre

d co

nditi

onal

re

fere

ndum

on

inde

pend

ence

, ini

tiale

d at

Kok

opo,

PN

G

• M

arch

200

1: A

uton

omy

talk

s co

nduc

ted

betw

een

Bou

gain

ville

le

ader

s an

d th

e P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent i

n P

ort M

ores

by

• 4–

6 Ju

ly 2

000:

Nat

iona

l Gov

ernm

ent B

ouga

invi

lle p

olic

y w

orks

hop

in

Por

t Mor

esby

Stra

tegi

c an

d D

efen

ce S

tudi

es C

entre

Wor

king

Pap

er N

o. 4

14

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

36

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

38

7–19

Jul

y 20

00

No

agre

emen

t G

atew

ay

Hot

el, P

ort

Mor

esby

, P

NG

Bou

gain

ville

and

N

atio

nal

Gov

ernm

ent

tech

nica

l tal

ks

Talk

s in

acc

orda

nce

with

the

Gat

eway

Com

mun

iqué

P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent

Bou

gain

ville

Le

ader

s

Ju

ly 2

000–

May

200

1: T

alks

sta

ll ov

er d

etai

ls o

f aut

onom

y

39

Aug

–Sep

t 20

00

11 S

ept

2000

R

abau

l, N

ew

Brit

ain,

PN

G

Rec

ord

of

Out

com

e of

P

oliti

cal T

alks

be

twee

n B

ouga

invi

lle

Lead

ers

and

Nat

iona

l G

over

nmen

t

• A

uton

omy

• R

efer

endu

m

• A

rms

disp

osal

PN

G G

over

nmen

t B

ouga

invi

lle

Lead

ers

Dec

embe

r 200

0: M

oi A

vei r

epla

ces

Mic

hael

Som

are

as M

inis

ter f

or

Bou

gain

ville

Affa

irs

40

Oct

200

0–Ja

n 20

01

26 J

an

2001

K

opok

o, N

ew

Brit

ain,

PN

G

Kop

oko

Agr

eem

ent

(Agr

eed

Prin

cipl

es o

n R

efer

endu

m)

Agr

eed

prin

cipl

es o

n a

refe

rend

um fo

r Bou

gain

ville

in

depe

nden

ce w

ithin

15

year

s (a

nd n

o ea

rlier

than

10

year

s) o

f th

e el

ectio

n of

a B

ouga

invi

lle

Aut

onom

ous

Gov

ernm

ent (

BAG

) un

less

that

gov

ernm

ent d

ecid

es

not t

o co

nduc

t suc

h a

refe

rend

um

Moi

Ave

i (M

inis

ter

for B

ouga

invi

lle

Affa

irs)

Bou

gain

ville

Le

ader

s N

oel S

incl

air

(Dire

ctor

U

NO

MB

) (C

hairp

erso

n)

Witn

esse

d by

: •

Dr S

teph

en

Hen

ning

ham

(Chi

ef

Neg

otia

tor,

PM

G)

41

Feb–

April

20

01

19–2

6 Fe

b 20

01

(Tal

ks

brok

e do

wn)

Tow

nsvi

lle,

Aus

tralia

R

ecor

d of

O

ffici

al

Dis

cuss

ions

on

Aut

onom

y A

rrang

emen

ts

for B

ouga

invi

lle

Aut

onom

y ar

rang

emen

ts fo

r B

ouga

invi

lle

Moi

Ave

i (M

inis

ter

for B

ouga

invi

lle

Affa

irs)

Bou

gain

ville

Le

ader

s N

ick

War

ner

(Aus

tralia

n H

igh

Com

mis

sion

er

to P

NG

) (F

acili

tato

r)

Faci

litat

ed b

y:

• G

over

nmen

t of

Aus

tralia

: •

PM

G)

42

M

arch

–A

pril

2001

G

atew

ay

Hot

el a

nd P

ort

Mor

esby

, P

NG

Join

t Wor

k in

P

rogr

ess

on

Aut

onom

y—In

clud

ing

reco

mm

ende

d Te

xt to

be

Inco

rpor

ated

in

Tow

nsvi

lle

Rec

ord

43

1–3

May

20

01

3 M

ay 2

001

Toga

rau,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Rot

okas

Rec

ord

• B

RA

and

BR

F co

mm

it to

the

deve

lopm

ent o

f pea

ce,

dem

ocra

cy a

nd th

e re

stor

atio

n of

fund

amen

tal h

uman

righ

ts

with

out t

he th

reat

or t

he u

se o

f w

eapo

ns

• To

a th

ree

phas

e W

eapo

ns

Dis

posa

l Pla

n (S

urre

nder

, co

ntai

nmen

t and

ver

ifica

tion,

an

d de

cisi

on o

n fin

al fa

te o

f w

eapo

ns)

Hila

ry M

asiri

a (B

RF

Cha

irman

) Is

hmae

l To

roam

a (B

RA

Chi

ef o

f D

efen

ce)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• N

oel S

incl

air (

UN

O

bser

ver M

issi

on)

• M

att A

nder

son

(Neg

otia

tor,

PM

G)

44

7–9

May

20

01

9 M

ay 2

001

Buk

a,

Bou

gain

ville

P

PC

C

Res

olut

ion

on

Wea

pons

D

ispo

sal

• P

PC

C m

eetin

g on

dis

posa

l of

wea

pons

•

PP

CC

wel

com

es th

e ar

rang

emen

ts in

the

Rot

okas

R

ecor

d •

Rea

ffirm

com

mitm

ent t

o Li

ncol

n A

gree

men

t •

Dev

elop

PP

CC

sub

-com

mitt

ee

to o

vers

ee w

eapo

ns d

ispo

sal

arra

ngem

ents

: Cha

irman

—D

irect

or U

NO

MB

or

• P

NG

Gov

ernm

ent

PP

CC

mem

bers

le

d by

Willi

am

Dih

m

• H

ilary

Mas

iria

(BR

F C

hairm

an)

• B

ouga

invi

lle J

oint

Te

chni

cal T

eam

Ishm

ael

Toro

ama

(BR

A C

hief

of

Def

ence

)

W

itnes

sed

by:

• N

oel S

incl

air (

UN

O

bser

ver M

issi

on)

• B

rigad

ier M

icha

el

SWAN

(Com

man

der

PM

G)

29 A

ugus

t 200

1: J

oint

Bou

gain

ville

Neg

otia

ting

Team

rele

ases

a

stat

emen

t titl

ed 'B

ouga

invi

lle P

eace

Agr

eem

ent—

Sum

mar

y of

Aim

s an

d C

onte

nts'

‘Sim

ple

Sol

utio

n to

Com

plex

Mat

ters

’: Id

entif

ying

fund

amen

tal p

rinci

ples

of A

ltern

ativ

e

Dis

pute

Res

olut

ion

in th

e m

ultin

atio

nal e

ffort

to b

roke

r a re

solu

tion

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle ‘C

risis

’ R

eube

n R

.E. B

owd

© 2

009

The

Aust

ralia

n N

atio

nal U

nive

rsity

37

Ser.

Perio

d of

N

egot

ia-

tion

Dat

e of

A

gree

men

t Pl

ace

of

Agr

eem

ent

Title

of

Agr

eem

ent

Agr

eem

ent

The

Part

ies

Key

PN

G

Gov

ernm

ent/

Pro-

PNG

G

over

nmen

t re

pres

enta

tives

Lead

er—

Bou

gain

ville

D

eleg

atio

n

Cha

irper

son/

M

edia

tor/

Faci

litat

or

3rd

Part

y In

volv

emen

t (W

itnes

ses

and

Obs

erve

rs)

Post

Agr

eem

ent E

vent

s

repr

esen

tativ

e; D

eput

y C

hairm

an—

Com

man

der P

MG

or

repr

esen

tativ

e 45

22

–25

June

20

01

25 J

une

2001

G

atew

ay

Hot

el, P

ort

Mor

esby

, P

NG

Agr

eed

Bas

is fo

r a C

ompr

ehen

sive

P

oliti

cal

Set

tlem

ent

betw

een

the

Par

ties

to th

e B

ouga

invi

lle

peac

e pr

oces

s

The

docu

men

t out

lines

the

arra

ngem

ents

for t

he

esta

blis

hmen

t of a

n au

tono

mou

s B

ouga

invi

lle g

over

nmen

t, in

clud

ing

prov

isio

ns fo

r a

Bou

gain

ville

-spe

cific

pol

ice

forc

e an

d co

nditi

ons

for t

he

rede

ploy

men

t of t

he P

NG

DF

PN

G G

over

nmen

t A

ll pa

rties

(e

xcep

t Fr

anci

s O

na)

46

30 A

ug

2001

30

Aug

20

01

Ara

wa,

B

ouga

invi

lle

Bou

gain

ville

P

eace

A

gree

men

t

• H

igh

leve

l of a

uton

omy

for

Bou

gain

ville

•

Ref

eren

dum

to b

e he

ld o

n in

depe

nden

ce w

ithin

15

year

s of

th

e el

ectio

n of

the

Bou

gain

ville

A

uton

omou

s G

over

nmen

t •

Am

endm

ents

to b

e m

ade

to th

e P

NG

Con

stitu

tion

to

acco

mm

odat

e ag

reem

ent

• W

eapo

ns d

ispo

sal a

nd a

dopt

ion

of th

e ‘P

PC

C R

esol

utio

n on

W

eapo

ns D

ispo

sal’

of 9

May

20

01

• W

ithdr

awal

of S

ecur

ity F

orce

s •

Arra

ngem

ents

for p

eace

m

onito

ring

• M

eker

e M

OR

AU

TA (P

rime

Min

iste

r of P

NG

) •

Hila

ry M

asiri

a (B

RF

Cha

irman

)

• Jo

hn M

omis

(B

IPG

G

over

nor)

• Jo

seph

Kab

ui

(BP

C

Pre

side

nt)

• Is

hmae

l To

roam

a (B

RA

Chi

ef o

f D

efen

ce)

W

itnes

sed

by:

repr

esen

tativ

es o

f: •

Gov

ernm

ent o

f New

Ze

alan

d •

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Aus

tralia

•

Gov

ernm

ent o

f Fiji

• G

over

nmen

t of V

anua

tu

• G

over

nmen

t of S

olom

on

Isla

nds

• U

N O

bser

ver M

issi

on

• P

MG

• 31

Aug

ust 2

001:

Joi

nt B

ouga

invi

lle N

egot

iatin

g Te

am re

leas

es a

st

atem

ent t

itled

Bou

gain

ville

Inte

rim P

rovi

ncia

l Gov

ernm

ent a

nd

Bou

gain

ville

Peo

ple'

s C

ongr

ess

'Impl

emen

ting

the

Boug

ainv

ille

Pea

ce A

gree

men

t’ •

31 O

ctob

er 2

001:

UN

Man

date

for U

NP

OB

ext

ende

d to

cha

iring

the

wea

pons

dis

posa

l sub

-com

mitt

ee

• 6

Dec

embe

r 200

1: F

irst o

f man

y w

eapo

ns s

urre

nder

and

co

ntai

nmen

t cer

emon

ies

take

s pl

ace

on B

ouga

invi

lle

• 27

Mar

ch 2

002:

PN

G P

arlia

men

t app

rove

s C

onst

itutio

nal

amen

dmen

ts to

giv

e ef

fect

to P

eace

Agr

eem

ent

• 20

03–2

004:

BR

A ‘A

’ Com

pany

(but

not

rem

aind

er o

f Fra

ncis

Ona

’s

MD

F) jo

ins

the

peac

e pr

oces

s an

d di

sarm

s by

6 M

ay 2

004

• 1

Febr

uary

200

3: F

irst d

raft

Bou

gain

ville

Con

stitu

tion

rele

ased

for

cons

ulta

tion

• 25

Mar

ch 2

003:

Sec

ond

draf

t Bou

gain

ville

Con

stitu

tion

rele

ased

for

cons

ulta

tion

• 17

Apr

il 20

03: L

ast P

NG

DF

elem

ents

dep

art B

ouga

invi

lle

• 23

Jul

y 20

03: P

MG

dep

arts

Bou

gain

ville

and

is re

plac

ed b

y a

smal

l ci

vilia

n B

ouga

invi

lle T

rans

ition

al T

eam

(BTT

) •

25 J

uly

2003

: UN

PO

B c

onfir

ms

wea

pon

cont

ainm

ent i

s co

mpl

ete

• 7

Aug

ust 2

003:

PN

G C

onst

itutio

nal a

men

dmen

ts a

llow

ing

for

Bou

gain

ville

aut

onom

y ta

ke e

ffect

•

17 D

ecem

ber 2

003:

PP

CC

dec

ided

that

all

cont

aine

d w

eapo

ns

wou

ld b

e de

stro

yed

• 31

Dec

embe

r 200

3: B

TT d

epar

ts B

ouga

invi

lle

• 1

Janu

ary

2004

: UN

POB

is re

plac

ed b

y a

smal

ler U

N O

bser

ver

Mis

sion

Bou

gain

ville

(UN

OM

B)

• 20

Apr

il 20

05: J

ohn

Mom

is re

sign

s as

Gov

erno

r (G

erar

d S

inat

o is

A

ctin

g G

over

nor u

ntil

15 J

une

2005

) •

6 M

ay 2

005:

UN

OM

B re

ports

that

des

truct

ion

is n

earin

g co

mpl

etio

n an

d th

at th

e co

nditi

ons

wer

e no

w s

tabl

e en

ough

for B

AG

ele

ctio

ns to

oc

cur

• 20

May

–2 J

une

2005

: BA

G e

lect

ions

are

con

duct

ed s

uper

vise

d by

an

Inte

rnat

iona

l ele

ctio

n O

bser

ver M

issi

on

• 15

Jun

e 20

05: 3

9 m

embe

r BAG

is e

lect

ed to

be

led

by P

resi

dent

Jo

seph

Kab

ui

• 30

Jun

e 20

05: M

anda

te fo

r UN

OM

B e

nds

• 24

Jul

y 20

05: F

ranc

is O

na D

ies

• 5

Aug

ust 2

002:

Mic

hael

Som

are

repl

aces

Mek

ere

Mor

auta

as

PM

of

PN

G


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