· web viewthe autonomous region of bougainville (arb) (former north solomons province) is an...

United Nations Evaluation of Weapons Disposal on Bougainville

November-December 2012


Table of Contents

LIST OF ACRONYMS IV

MAP OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA V

MAP OF BOUGAINVILLE VI

I INTRODUCTION 1

1 TERMS OF REFERENCE 2

2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 2

2.1 PURPOSE 22.2 SCOPE 32.3 KEY INTERLOCUTORS 52.4 HUMAN RESOURCES 62.5 TIMEFRAME 6

3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6

4 CONSTRAINTS 6

III FINDINGS 7

5 INITIAL OBSERVATIONS 7

5.1 PUBLIC AWARENESS 75.2 ATTITUDE OF BRA AND BRF EX-COMBATANTS 85.3 WEAPONS CONTROL AS A LAW-AND-ORDER ISSUE 85.4 MONETIZATION OF RECONCILIATION AND WEAPONS DISPOSAL 85.5 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS 8

6 DISTRIBUTION OF WEAPONS 9

6.1 PRESENCE OF WEAPONS IN BOUGAINVILLE 96.1.1 RESIDUAL CRISIS WEAPONS 96.1.2 WORLD WAR II WEAPONS 106.1.3 TRAFFICKED WEAPONS 116.1.4 POLICE WEAPONS 136.2 HOLDERS OF WEAPONS AND THEIR MOTIVATIONS FOR HOLDING THEM 146.2.1 WEAPONS HOLDERS 146.2.2 MOTIVATIONS 14

7 IMPACT OF WEAPONS 15

7.1 COMMUNITY PEACE AND SECURITY 157.1.1 ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE 15

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7.1.2 DOMESTIC AND COMMUNITY-LEVEL DISPUTES 157.2 LAW ENFORCEMENT 167.3 STATUS AND ROLE OF WOMEN 177.4 SORCERY-RELATED KILLINGS 18

8 PERCEPTION OF WEAPONS 19

9 CAPACITY TO ADDRESS WEAPONS DISPOSAL 19

9.1 WEAPONS DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES SINCE 2005 209.2 PEACEBUILDING 209.3 ENGAGEMENT WITH MEKAMUI FACTIONS 219.4 ENGAGEMENT WITH EX-COMBATANTS 229.5 POLICY DEVELOPMENT 23

IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24

RAISE AWARENESS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT 25SUSTAINABLY ADVANCE POST-CRISIS RECONCILIATION 26BRING ALL FACTIONS UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT 27RE-EMPOWER WOMEN AS AGENTS OF PEACEMAKING 27STRENGTHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT 28STRENGTHEN BORDER CONTROLS WITH THE SOLOMON ISLANDS 29DISRUPT ARMS TRAFFICKING GROUPS OPERATING IN BOUGAINVILLE 30SEEK AND FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO “CLEAN UP” TOROKINA 30INSTIGATE AN INTENSIVE, COORDINATED SECOND ROUND OF WEAPONS DISPOSAL 31

PRINCIPAL REFERENCE MATERIALS 33

ANNEX 1: PROGRAMME OF EVALUATION MEETINGS 37

ANNEX 2: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE 45

ANNEX 3: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 48

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List of AcronymsABG Autonomous Bougainville GovernmentARB Autonomous Region of BougainvilleAXO Abandoned Explosive Ordnance BETA Bougainville Ex-combatants’ Trust AccountBFF Bougainville Freedom FightersBPA Bougainville Peace AgreementBPS Bougainville Police ServiceBRA Bougainville Revolutionary ArmyBRF Bougainville Resistance ForceCAP Civilian Auxiliary PoliceERW Explosive Remnants of WarGoPNG Government of Papua New GuineaISACS International Small Arms Control StandardsJJ Jungle Juice (Homebrew)JSB Joint Supervisory BodyLLG Local Level GovernmentLNG Liquefied Natural GasMDF Mekamui Defense ForceMGU Mekamui Government of UnityNCOBA National Coordinating Office for Bougainville AffairsOPM Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka)PMG Peace Monitoring GroupPNG Papua New GuineaPNGDF Papua New Guinea Defense Force RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon IslandsUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDPA United Nations Department of Political Affairs UNOMB United Nations Observer Mission in BougainvilleUNPOB United Nations Political Office in BougainvilleUXO Unexploded OrdnanceWILMO Wisai Liberation Movement

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Map of Papua New Guinea

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Map of Bougainville

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I IntroductionThe Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB) (former North Solomons Province) is an autonomous region in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Following years of conflict, the Government of PNG (GoPNG) and Bougainville actors signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) in 2001. In addition to providing a legal base for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), the Agreement addressed issues of political significance, including weapons disposal, autonomy, and a referendum on the political status of Bougainville.

According to the Agreement, a referendum on Bougainville’s political future will include the option of a separate independence for Bougainville; with the final outcome subject to ratification by the Parliament of PNG (BPA, 2001: 58). The referendum is subject to compliance with good governance and weapons disposal (as per the weapons disposal plan developed with ex-combatants and contained in the Resolution on Weapons Disposal of May 2001 (BPA, 2001: 63-66).

The United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB), established in August 1998 to monitor the implementation of the Lincoln and Arawa Agreements1, was entrusted with supervising the implementation of the weapons disposal plan to be executed in three stages: (1) collection and secure storage of weapons in containers by unit commanders, (2) delivery of weapons to company commanders and storage in containers under UNPOB supervision with the latter holding one of the two keys of the containers, and (3) decision on the final fate of the weapons and certification by UNPOB on whether the security of weapons is conducive to holding elections.

On 30 July 2003, UNPOB certified the completion of Stage II of weapons disposal, paving the way for the PNG government to make fully operational the constitutional amendments on elections, the establishment of an autonomous Bougainville government and on the holding of a referendum on the future political status of the autonomous region. In December 2003, the parties agreed to destroy all contained weapons. With the completion of UNPOB’s mandate, the UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) was established in December 2003 to finish the outstanding tasks of UNPOB. In May 2005, UNOMB determined that a substantial level of compliance by the parties with the implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan had been achieved, and that, consequently, elections could be held as planned. Subsequently, on 20 May – 2 June 2005 the first Bougainville general elections were held.

Despite these achievements, it was agreed that a major obstacle to the full achievement of weapons disposal in Bougainville under the Weapons Disposal Plan was the non-involvement of the Mekamui Defense Force (MDF) in the peace process. According to a United Nations report, “the Bougainville parties believe that ex-combatants associated with the MDF have played a role in the de-containment of collected weapons” (UNPOB, 2003: 2). While attempts were made to ensure the MDF’s commitment to the peace process, these efforts ultimately failed and to this day the MDF remains outside the peace framework.

1 The Lincoln and Arawa Ceasefire Agreements were signed in January and May 1998 respectively, as a result of negotiations between the Government of Papua New Guinea and Bougainvillean factions. The agreements provided the framework for UNPOB’s mandate. Its establishment was the result of a request by the Government of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations Security Council. UNPOB’s mandate. Its establishment was the result of a request by the Government of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations Security Council.

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1 Terms of ReferenceIn October 2012, on behalf of the Bougainville Referendum Committee, (a joint Working Committee between the Government of PNG and the ABG) the Government of PNG requested the UN to conduct a thorough assessment of the state of weapons disposal on Bougainville. The requested scope included looking at the areas of security, historical perspective, geography and government. The Key focus areas included: arms presence and movement, arms collection, threats of WW II relics, cross-border issues, current law and order situation, enforcement, parliament’s capacity to enact relevant laws on enforcement, traditional power systems and community peace and order enforcement mechanisms and the nature of political space for involving factions in decision-making.

The Government of PNG also requested the UN to provide clarity in terms of public perceptions on arms and security in general, as well as, evidence-based data on arms distribution. Based on the findings, the UN assessment mission was requested to write a report and provide recommendations on the way forward, including what needs to be done in order to strengthen community capacity for trust/confidence-building and government capacity for security enforcement mechanisms. The Terms of Reference prepared by the Bougainville Referendum Committee are contained in Annex 2.

2 Evaluation Methodology

2.1 Purpose

As specified in the Terms of Reference prepared by the Bougainville Referendum Committee (see Annex 2), the purpose of the evaluation was to “evaluate the state of weapons disposal on Bougainville and provide recommendations on next steps.” Prior to deployment, the evaluators drafted an outline methodology (see Annex 3) for the conduct of the evaluation, which was endorsed by the Chief Secretary of the Government of PNG (GoPNG) and by the Chief Administrator of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) at the commencement of the evaluation mission (on 20 and 23 November 2012, respectively).

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2.2 Scope

The technical scope of the evaluation encompassed small arms, light weapons and their ammunition in Bougainville, regardless of their time or method of manufacture, by whom they are held or for what purposes they are used.

Table 1 – Technical Scope of the Evaluation

Small Arms any man-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive

NOTE Includes, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

Light Weapons any man-portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive

NOTE includes, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti- tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres, as well as their parts, components and ammunition.

Ammunition the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, that are used in small arms or light weapons

NOTE Includes• cartridges (rounds) for small arms and light weapons;• explosive shells, grenades and missiles for light weapons; and• mobile containers with missiles or shells for anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems.

Source of definitions: International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), Module 01.20 – Glossary of terms, definitions and abbreviations – www.smallarmsstandards.org

The geographical scope of the evaluation encompassed the islands of Buka and Bougainville. The evaluators visited 10 of the 11 Local Level Government (LLG) areas on these islands and collected data from the remaining District (Kunua) by interviewing a delegation of Council of Elders Chairmen from Kunua at a consultation held in Talena (Buka District). Due to time constraints, the evaluators were not able to visit the island Districts of Nissan and Atolls.

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http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/


Table 2 – Geographic Scope of the Evaluation2

District Local Level Government

Town/Constituency

Community Consultations

Focus Group Discussions

Key Informant Interviews

North Atolls

Buka Buka √ √

Haku √ √

Halia √ √

Gogohe √ √

Kunua (1)3

Nissan (1)4

Selau/Suir Siarra √ √ √

Talena √ √

Tinputz Tinputz √ √

Central Arawa-Kieta Arawa √ √ √

Rorovana √

Koromira √

Morotana √

Panguna Panguna √ √

Wakunai Wakunai √ √

South Bana Bolawe √ √

Lato √ √

Buin Buin √ √ √

Tabago √ √

Siwai Panakei √ √ √

Tonu √ √

Torokina Koiari √ √

Torokina √ √ √

2 Geographic designations of Bougainville differ between the PNG Government (GoPNG) and the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). What for ABG is a “Region” is a “District” for GoPNG and what for ABG is a “District” is a “Local Level Government” (LLG) area for GoPNG. The geographical designations used in this table, and in this report more generally, correspond to those used by the Government of PNG. 3 Focus group discussion conducted in Talena (Selau/Suir District) with Council of Elders Chairmen from Kunua.4 Interview of one resident of Nissan in Buka.

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2.3 Key interlocutors

At the outset of their mission, the evaluators consulted in Port Moresby with high-level officials of the PNG Government, including the Chief Secretary, Ministers, the Department of the Prime Minister, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Electoral Commissioner and the National Coordinating Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA).

On their arrival in Buka, Bougainville, the evaluators consulted with high-level officials of the Autonomous Bougainville Government, including the President, Ministers, members of the Bougainville House of Representatives, the Chief Administrator and Deputy Chief Administrators, Chief Executive Officers of ABG Divisions and Departments and District-level Executive Managers.

During the course of their mission, the evaluators collected information, data and documentation from the following key interlocutors (the full evaluation programme is contained in Annex 1):

Regional, district and local-level ABG government officials;

The Head of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), BPS officers, the Head of the New Zealand Police Bougainville Programme and Civilian Auxiliary Police (CAP) officers;

Healthcare providers (local and international);

Traditional authorities, including Chiefs, Elders and their Councils;

Community leaders;

Ex-commanders and ex-combatants of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF), the Mekamui Defense Force (MDF) and other factions, including Bougainville Freedom Fighters (BFF), Struggling for Peace and the Wisai Liberation Movement (WILMO);

Civil society organizations (including women’s organizations, faith-based organizations and youth organizations);

the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in PNG and the UNDP Bougainville Programme; and

PNG development partners Australia and New Zealand.

In each District visited, the evaluators conducted one or more community consultations with gatherings of between 50 and 250 people, representing a cross-section of the community; separate focus-group discussions with chiefs, women, ex-combatants, youth, church groups, health workers, police and local government officials; and key informant interviews with community leaders and organizers. In total, the evaluators interacted with more than 1,000 Bougainvilleans during the course of the evaluation. The full programme of community consultations, focus group discussions and key informant interviews conducted by the evaluators is contained in Annex 1.

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2.4 Human resources

The evaluation was carried out jointly by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDPA deployed a former staff member with extensive knowledge and experience of Bougainville affairs, especially as they relate to weapons disposal. UNDP deployed a staff member with expertise on political and technical aspects of small arms and light weapons control.

2.5 Timeframe

The evaluation was carried out between 17 November and 16 December 2012, following which the evaluators presented their preliminary findings to the ABG and GoPNG before departing PNG.

3 AcknowledgementsThe evaluators received invaluable support from the Government of PNG, the ABG, the Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in PNG, the UNDP Bougainville Programme and the people of Bougainville. The community consultations, focus group discussions and key informant interviews carried out by the evaluators, as well as logistical arrangements, were organized by the ABG with the support of UNDP.

4 ConstraintsAlthough the evaluation team received excellent support from the partners and interlocutors set out above, the following constraints may have limited the reliability of the data collected during the course of the evaluation mission, as well as the ability of the evaluation team to present its findings in the most effective way possible:

The evaluation team did not manage to conduct a community consultation in the Panguna Local Level Government (LLG) area and thus did not have the opportunity of conduct focus group discussions with Chiefs, women and youth in this strategically important area.

The findings on arms trafficking into, within and out of Bougainville are largely based on a small number of anonymous sources with limited, albeit direct, access to Bougainville-based arms trafficking groups. Given the opaque nature of illicit trade, information related to arms trafficking presented in this report should be considered as indicative only.

The evaluation team did not manage, despite the best efforts and good will of all concerned, to meet with Vice President Patrick Nisira. Given the leading role being played by Vice President Nisira in developing a strategy to advance weapons disposal in Bougainville, this was an unfortunate shortcoming of the mission.

Due to Parliament being in session, the evaluators were not able to have working level meetings with the Clerk of Parliament who could have provided a briefing on the capacity of the ABG legislature to draft and pass laws related to law and order in Bougainville.

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During the course of the 5-week mission, the evaluators collected a significant amount of primary source documentation, as well as a large volume of data from community consultations, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Very little time was available during the mission itself to process any of this information, due to the intensity of the evaluation team’s meeting schedule. The tight deadline for presenting the evaluation report to the Government of PNG and the ABG may have constrained the evaluation team’s ability to present its finding and recommendations in the most coherent and structured manner possible. The evaluation team nevertheless hopes that the current report and recommendations will make a contribution to both governments’ efforts in moving forward together in support of advancing weapons disposal and building community security in Bougainville.

II FindingsThe Government of PNG and the ABG stand together at a critical political juncture. According to the Peace Agreement – as enacted through the 2002 PNG Organic Law and the 2004 Bougainville Constitution – a referendum on Bougainville’s political future, including the option of independence from PNG, will take place sometime between 2015 and 2020. The exact date of the referendum will be agreed by both governments after taking into consideration progress made in Bougainville in two areas: weapons disposal and good governance. The Peace Agreement provides some guidance on benchmarks that can be used to determine whether certain standards of good governance have been met (BPA, 2001: Section 313.a). It is silent, however, on what would constitute adequate progress on weapons disposal.

When withdrawing from Bougainville in 2005, the UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) was aware that the Weapons Disposal Plan it had helped to implement under the Peace Agreement had not been fully complied with and that weapons remained in the hands of ex-combatants and others (Turk, 2005). This report finds that not much progress has been made since 2005 in disposing of these remaining weapons and that there is scope to make further progress in this area.

5 Initial observations

5.1 Public awareness

One of the most significant findings made by the evaluators during the course of their broad-ranging consultations with Bougainvillean communities was the fundamental lack of awareness and understanding of the Peace Agreement that exists among the people of Bougainville. There is a high level of misunderstanding and confusion among ordinary people regarding the basic provisions of the Agreement and, in particular, regarding the role that weapons disposal plays in clearing a path to a referendum on their political future. Widespread illiteracy, especially among those whose education was disrupted by the crisis, and the absence of a local language version of the Peace Agreement seem to have deepened this lack of awareness. The evaluators found that although Bougainvilleans are keen to acquire information that would allow them to have a better understanding of how to shape their political future, the mechanisms are currently not in place to make this possible.

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5.2 Attitude of BRA and BRF ex-combatants

A significant number of BRA and BRF ex-combatants believe that weapons disposal has been complied with in accordance with the provisions of the Weapons Disposal Plan mandated by the Peace Agreement. At the same time, they acknowledge that some high-powered weapons were not handed in under the Plan and expressed their readiness to look into ways of resolving this issue. As signatories of the Peace Agreement, they feel obliged to implement it in full, something that could make them reliable partners of the ABG in achieving the goal of disarmament. Initiating informal consultations with them on the issue could be a step in the right direction. Having reached a consensus with BRA and BRF ex-combatants on the way forward, the ABG would be in a much stronger position to address the same issue with other Bougainville factions that are not party to the Peace Agreement.

5.3 Weapons control as a law-and-order issue

A significant number of people in Bougainville consider weapons control in the current climate to be a law-and-order issue, since most weapons are being kept silent. It would seem to be the case that a significant proportion of weapons (perhaps even the majority) now held in Bougainville are in the hands of businesses, arms traffickers and civilians who are not ex-combatants. These weapons holders, and the weapons they hold, would indeed seem to fall under the purview of law enforcement rather than under the political umbrella of the Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, these weapons will need to be taken into consideration when developing a comprehensive plan to address the continued presence of weapons.

5.4 Monetization of reconciliation and weapons disposal

The evaluators heard strong complaints in many parts of Bougainville that implementation of the Peace Agreement had turned into a money-making scheme, in particular its components related to reconciliation and weapons disposal, and that this was undermining not only Peace agreement itself but also some important Bougainville values and traditions. On numerous occasions, the evaluators heard passionate statements to the effect that the only incentive Bougainvilleans should need to comply with all provisions of the Peace Agreement, including those on weapons disposal, was the incentive provided by the opportunity to decide of their own political future in a referendum.

5.5 Attitudes towards the United Nations

Throughout Bougainville, the evaluators heard a consistent message that an independent outside body would be needed to facilitate and support any serious new initiative on weapons disposal, due to the high levels of popular mistrust that exist both within Bougainville and towards the Government of PNG. Many Bougainvilleans, including those from Mekamui factions, called on the UN to play such a role. In their view, an independent UN political presence could facilitate confidence building and ensure transparency in the run-up to and during a referendum. This positive disposition towards the UN would seem to stem from a positive evaluation by Bougainvilleans of the role played by the UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) in helping to implement the Weapons Disposal Plan completed in 2005.

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6 Distribution of weapons

6.1 Presence of weapons in Bougainville

The weapons present in Bougainville may be divided into 4 main categories; residual crisis weapons, World War II weapons, trafficked weapons and police weapons.

6.1.1 Residual crisis weapons

The term ‘residual crisis weapons’ is used to denote those weapons present in Bougainville during the crisis that were not disposed of during implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan mandated by the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The Weapons Disposal Plan was a formalized and tightly sequenced 3-stage process that involved (1) the storage in sealed containers of BRA and BRF weapons at the unit commander level, (2) the transfer of these weapons to the company command level for storage in double-locked containers (with one key held by company commanders and the other by UNOMB), and (3) a decision on the ultimate fate of the weapons, which was decided would be destruction.

In 2005, the United Nations informed the Parties to the Bougainville Peace Agreement that the Weapons Disposal Plan incorporated in the Agreement had been implemented. The Plan succeeded in destroying 2,051 weapons. Of the weapons that the UN certified as having been destroyed as part of the Plan, most (56 percent) were homemade, with the remainder roughly equally divided between World War II rifles and machine guns recovered from Torokina (12 percent), high-powered weapons (15 percent) and sporting/hunting weapons (16 percent) (UNOMB, 2005).

There is no reliable estimate of the number of weapons present in Bougainville prior to the implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan. It is clear, however, that the plan did not succeed in destroying all weapons in Bougainville. For example, one hundred and twenty weapons were stolen from containers before they could be destroyed (Türk, 2005). Moreover, the BRA and BRF undoubtedly withheld some weapons from the containerization and disposal process, although this was likely a small proportion of their overall holdings.

Of all the weapons destroyed under the Weapons Disposal Plan, almost all (97.5 percent) belonged BRA and BRF fighters. Only 2.5 percent of the total were relinquished by MDF elements. These were mostly homemade and none were modern, high-powered weapons (UNOMB, 2005). A more significant source of residual crisis weapons, therefore, is likely to be those retained by the MDF, which neither signed the Peace Agreement nor participated significantly in the Weapons Disposal Plan. Senior BRA figures estimated in 2003 that the MDF held about 400-500 weapons (Regan, 2010: 95). MDF elements destroyed 48 weapons as part of the Weapons Disposal Plan (UNOMB, 2005).

On the basis of an estimate that, between them, the BRA and BRF destroyed 90 percent of their weapons and the MDF retained 90 percent of theirs, the total number of weapons remaining in Bougainville immediately following the completion of the Weapons Disposal Plan – residual crisis weapons – would have been around 600 (around 200 BRA/BRF and around 400 MDF based on the mid-range of the estimate given above). This estimate is intended as no more than a rough guide. The absence of reliable baseline data on BRA, BRF and MDF weapons holdings

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immediately prior to the implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan means that it is not possible to offer anything more than a rough guide on the number of residual crisis weapons.

On the completion of the Weapons Disposal Plan in 2005, UNOMB determined that there had been a “substantial level of compliance” with the Plan but recognized that not all weapons had been disposed of. The parties to the Peace Agreement agreed that it would be up to the ABG to address the issue of the remaining weapons (Türk, 2005).

6.1.2 World War II weapons

The area around Torokina on the west coast of Bougainville was the site of major hostilities during World War II. In 1942, the area was occupied by about 65,000 Japanese troops. The following year, it was bombarded and taken by the United States, who established a base with a similar number of troops and three airfields from which to fly bombing missions. Australia took over from the U.S. in 1944 and used Torokina as their base to recapture the rest of Bougainville from the Japanese, who had dispersed into the island after the U.S. took Torokina (Regan, 2010).

As a result, the area was seriously contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW) – i.e. unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – as well as by abandoned small arms, light weapons, heavy weapons and their ammunition.

The consequences of this contamination are significant and are sorely felt even today. The development of communities in the Torokina area – which is relatively thinly populated, remote and inaccessible – has been severely hampered by the widespread presence of explosive remnants of war, which prevent residents from exploiting the full productive potential of their land.

During the crisis, the BRA recovered hundreds of weapons from around Torokina, including rifles, sub-machine guns, heavy machine guns and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Parts recovered from otherwise unusable weapons were used to manufacture reconditioned or homemade guns. Explosives harvested from explosive remnants of war were used to make improvised explosive devices. (Regan, 2010: 25-26).

Torokina remains an important source of weapons, ammunition and explosives, which are nowadays recovered for financial gain rather than for use in active hostilities. A World War II-era .308 bolt-action rifle can reportedly fetch about $1,500 (K3,000) on the domestic black market in Bougainville. Rounds of ammunition for such rifles are being offered for $5 each. An M1 semi-automatic rifle in good condition can reportedly sell for about $5,000 (K10,000) in Bougainville and can reportedly fetch up to $25,000 in the Highlands of PNG.

Explosive material harvested from explosive remnants of war has been used by fishermen in the area, which has resulted in some injuries being sustained, at least one involving the loss of limbs (Lemieux, 2012). The evaluators did not uncover evidence of illicit trade in explosive material originating in Torokina, but this cannot be ruled out given the existence of informal mining activities on the Panguna tailings and potentially other sources of demand outside of Bougainville.

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The high prices quoted for weapons and ammunition, if accurate, suggest that demand is strong, particularly outside of Bougainville, and that their supply is relatively limited. Even if quoted prices are significantly inflated, there would remain a strong financial incentive for residents of Torokina (and indeed other parts of Bougainville) to seek caches of abandoned weapons and ammunition with a view to selling them on the black market. This incentive has even led high-school boys to seek out and sell weapons and ammunition in the hills around Torokina.

As long as weapons and ammunition remain buried and abandoned around Torokina, this area will continue to be a source of illicit trade for decades to come. Perversely, the more successful weapons disposal in Bougainville is, the stronger will become the financial incentive to recover weapons and ammunition from Torokina, since any reduction in the supply of readily available weapons and ammunition in Bougainville will lead to an increase in their black market value, resulting in more people engaging in recovery and trafficking around Torokina. It is a vicious cycle that must be broken if weapons disposal in Bougainville is to be ultimately successful.

It is almost certainly impossible to estimate with any confidence the quantities of World War II era weapons, ammunition and explosives that remain hidden around Torokina. Given the number of troops that were based there and the scale of hostilities that took place there during World War II, the numbers are likely to be significant.

In 2010, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the U.S. Department of State deployed an explosive ordnance disposal team to clear explosive remnants of war around Torokina. Over a 3-month period, the team succeeded in destroying more than 1,400 individual pieces of abandoned and unexploded ordnance. The mission’s terms of reference did not, however, encompass destruction of weapons or ammunition. The Australian Government is considering deploying a similar mission in 2013 and is further considering whether to include in its scope the destruction of weapons and ammunition, in addition to explosive remnants of war.

6.1.3 Trafficked weapons

Given that illicit trade is opaque by nature, it is difficult to paint a precise picture of it. This is certainly the case when it comes to arms trafficking into, within and out of Bougainville. The assessment made in this section is primarily based on first-hand information about arms trafficking in Bougainville collected during a one-month period in 2011 and supplemented throughout 2012. While the evaluators consider this information to be reliable, it represents only one perspective on the illicit trade. Further research is needed to verify elements of the assessment made below. Nevertheless, the information is provided here in an attempt to begin to paint a picture of the dynamics of arms trafficking in Bougainville.

Bougainville is at the centre of a low-level “ant trade” in small arms, i.e. numerous illicit shipments of small numbers of weapons that, over time, result in the accumulation of large numbers of illicit weapons by unauthorized end users. This illicit trade is carried out by about 10-20 small, loosely organized trafficking groups based in Bougainville.

These groups buy residual crisis weapons (see above) from ex-combatants (and others who possess them) and also illegally import weapons from the Solomon Islands. Weapons so acquired are mainly sold out of Bougainville for a large profit, the main destinations being

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liquefied natural gas (LNG) project landowners in the Southern Highlands of PNG; businesses and private security companies in Port Moresby, Lae and Rabaul; and the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) in Jayapura, Papua province, Indonesia. Only a small fraction of trafficked weapons would seem to be re-sold within Bougainville and then mainly to businesses.

Bougainvillean arms traffickers travel to Honiara in the Solomon Islands to buy weapons from Solomon Islands-based middlemen who source the guns mainly in Malaita Province. The traffickers travel by boat either on the twice-monthly business trips that allow Bougainvilleans to shop for store merchandise in Honiara, or on specially contracted boats that cater to arms traffickers about once per month, most of which operate from around Sirowai in Koromira district. Due to the widespread and longstanding practice of “traditional border crossing” between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, such shipments are not subject to inspection.

Once brought back to Bougainville, weapons are stored in the private residences or business premises of traffickers, who are mostly based in or around Arawa, which is the focal point of arms trafficking transactions in Bougainville. At one point during 2012, one such group reportedly had 35 weapons in storage, 28 sourced in the Solomon Islands and 7 in Bougainville. In total, arms trafficking groups in Bougainville may control around 400-500 weapons at any one time.

Outside buyers, mainly from the areas mentioned above, travel to Arawa to buy weapons from Bougainville trafficking groups. Weapons are smuggled out of Arawa from nearby Kieta wharf on ships destined for Port Moresby, Lei and Rabaul. Weapons are sometimes hidden in the ship’s engine-room by the ship’s crew, which can be implicated in the smuggling. While Arawa is the focal point for the trafficking of weapons out of Bougainville, some transaction do take place elsewhere, including in Kokopau and Buka town.

Trafficked weapons include automatic assault rifles (M16, SR-88A, and possibly the L1A1 Self Loading Rifle), semi-automatic rifles (AR15), light machine guns (L4A4 Bren, Ultimax) grenade launchers (M79) and pump-action shotguns (Mossberg). World War II weapons from Torokina do not seem to be implicated to a significant degree in the illicit sale of weapons to buyers outside of Bougainville. Also, the evaluators did not uncover evidence of a significant illicit trade in ammunition beyond the relatively small amounts needed to fill the magazines of trafficked weapons.

Arms trafficking in Bougainville is a lucrative business due to price differentials that exist between the Solomon Islands, Bougainville and the final destinations of trafficked weapons. For example, an automatic assault rifle can reportedly be sourced in the Solomon Islands for around $750-1,000 (K1,500-2,000); in Bougainville, the going price for a similar weapon is reportedly around $3,500-5,000 (K7,000-10,000); while buyers outside of Bougainville are reportedly willing pay up to $10,000-15,000 (K20,000-30,000) for the same gun.

If these figures are accurate, this represents a mark-up or around 500 percent between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville; around 300 percent between Bougainville at outside trafficking destinations; and around 1,300-1,500 percent for an assault rifle sourced in the

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Solomon Islands and eventually sold on to buyers outside of Bougainville. The staggering nature of these figures demands that further research be carried out to test their accuracy.

While cash would seem to be the predominant medium of transaction in this illicit trade, there have also been reports of weapons being exchanged for a vehicle or for gold mined from the Panguna tailings.

Since the majority of trafficked weapons, including those sourced in Bougainville, would seem to be making their way to outside buyers, this illicit trade may be contributing to reducing the overall number of weapons in Bougainville, while at the same time fuelling armed violence at their destinations outside of Bougainville. One source familiar with the trade estimated that, in June 2012 alone, 26 automatic assault rifles were sold out of Bougainville, about half of which had been sourced in Bougainville.

6.1.4 Police weapons

Officially, the Bougainville Police Service (BPS) is unarmed.5 In actuality, it has access to a range of weapons. According to a BPS inventory list dated May 2009 – the latest available – these include 20 pump-action shotguns (Mossberg), 17 high-powered automatic and semi automatic rifles (M16, SR-88, AR15, SIG), 9 revolvers (Smith and Wesson), 6 single shot shotguns (Baikal), 2 anti-riot gas guns (38mm), 1 self-loading pistol (Baretta) and 1 under-barrel grenade-launcher (M203); for a total of 56 weapons.

According to the inventory, these weapons are distributed among BPS stations and officers in Buka, Buin, Arawa, Bana, Oria, Torokina and Nissan. The BPS weapons inventory made available to the evaluators contains information on the identity of weapons held by the BPS, including weapon make, model, calibre and serial number, as well as the location of the weapon and an indication of its operational status. However, the inventory list is outdated by more than 3 years and the evaluators were not able to verify its accuracy.

BPS officers sometimes seize or confiscate weapons during the course of their duties. These are stored in the police armoury in Buka pending the completion of judicial procedures. The evaluators received conflicting reports as to whether seized and confiscated weapons are subsequently used by BPS officers. It is the case, however, that some BPS officers carry weapons in their vehicles and take them home to their residences at night for reasons of personal security.

The ABG Vice President has proposed setting up an armed rapid-response police unit. Members would be drawn from the BPS, mobilized and armed when needed, and then re-deployed back into the regular police force following an operation. The requirement that BPS should be unarmed would reportedly be more strictly enforced once such a response force is established.

5 Paragraph 223 of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, as well as Section 21(5) of the PNG Organic Law (2002) state that “The Bougainville Police shall not develop the equivalent of an armed Police Mobile Unit.”

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6.2 Holders of weapons and their motivations for holding them

6.2.1 Weapons holders

In addition to the BPS, the following categories of people are believed to hold weapons in Bougainville;

Arms traffickers;

Ex-combatants who did not relinquish their weapons during the Weapons Disposal Plan mandated by the Bougainville Peace Agreement, especially (1) the MDF, who did not participate significantly in the Plan, and (2) factions involved in recent localized conflict in South Bougainville, such as the Freedom Fighters;

Businesses who use weapons to provide security for their premises and operations;

Non-ex-combatant civilians who acquired weapons during or after the crisis, particularly young men; and

A small number of private security companies that possess, or at least have easy access to, weapons.

6.2.2 Motivations

The principal motivations for holding weapons appear to include the following, arranged in rough order of importance:

Political: The political motivation for holding weapons stems from uncertainty about the political future of Bougainville, in particular uncertainty about (1) whether a referendum on the status of Bougainville will be held; (2) what will be the outcome of such a referendum; (3) whether the PNG Parliament would endorse the outcome of the referendum; and (4) whether the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) would be redeployed to Bougainville in the event that the PNG Parliament does not endorse the outcome of the referendum. Under this motivation, weapons are essentially considered to provide insurance against Bougainville not being allowed to gain its independence from PNG.

Security: The security motivation for holding on to weapons may be divided into three main elements: (1) concern for personal security grounded in fear of retaliation for acts committed during the crisis; (2) concern for clan/faction security grounded in inter-clan / inter-faction differences or conflicts (which can be localized and unrelated to the crisis); and (3) concern for the security of businesses and business activities grounded in a lack of confidence in the BPS to provide such security.

Monetary: Weapons are widely considered to be valuable objects that can fetch high prices on the illicit market (see above) or be purchased as part of an official gun buy-back scheme that some people still suspect or hope will happen. This motivation causes people to hold on to weapons until they can be relinquished in exchange for their monetary value.

Criminal: Some guns are retained for criminal purposes, including for purposes of trafficking in arms, illegally acquiring land or protecting illicit scrap metal recovery or gold mining activities.

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Display of masculinity: Some young Bougainvillean males acquire weapons not necessarily for criminal purposes but to enhance their status, power and respect among their friends.

Sentimental: Some ex-combatants have a very close personal relationship with the weapon they used during the crisis and want to retain it for sentimental reasons and as an heirloom to show to their grandchildren in years to come.

7 Impact of weaponsFor the most part, the weapons that remain in Bougainville are not being used. Rather, they are being held in storage; retained for the reasons outlined above. However, some guns continue are being misused, with significant negative consequences for peace, security and development. The main impacts that these weapons have on Bougainville society are outlined below.

7.1 Community peace and security

7.1.1 Alcohol and drug abuse

A common message delivered by communities all over Bougainville is that the misuse of guns (as well as bladed weapons) goes hand-in-hand with the abuse of alcohol and drugs. The production, distribution and sale of homebrew and, increasingly, marijuana provide an opportunity to generate income for poor people with few other livelihood opportunities.

Homebrew – also known as “Jungle Juice” or “JJ” – is a strong alcoholic spirit that is widely produced by women and men throughout Bougainville and widely consumed, mainly my men and in particular by young men. In almost every community visited during the course of the evaluation, women in particular complained that abuse of homebrew by men (especially young men) frequently led to arguments or to aggressive behaviour, which sometimes resulted in weapons being discharged with a view to letting off steam or to intimidate. Such misuse of weapons reportedly rarely results in firearms-related injuries, however. Injuries inflicted by bladed weapons such as bush knives or machetes, which are ubiquitous in Bougainville as they are used as everyday tools for gathering food, are much more common.

No health centre visited during the course of the evaluation reported having treated a gunshot wound during the previous 1-2 years. It was common, on the other hand, for health centres to report treating wounds inflicted by bladed weapons. One health centre also reported treating young people for alcohol poisoning as a result of over consumption of homebrew.

Social problems related to the consumption of marijuana are also growing in Bougainville. Like homebrew, the cultivation, distribution and sale of the drug generate income for people with few other economic opportunities. Although the cannabis plant grows natively in Bougainville, its larger-scale cultivation for the purpose of producing drugs would seem to be concentrated around Tinputz and Wakunai, on the northeast coast of Bougainville island.

7.1.2 Domestic and community-level disputes

The continued availability of weapons in communities also leads to their misuse in the resolution of domestic and community-level disputes. The evaluators witnessed one such incident in

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Arawa: In the context of a domestic dispute involving infidelity, relatives of the wronged husband fired three rounds from an M16 rifle in the course of looting the shop owned by his wife. No one was injured in the incident (two of the shots were fired in the air and one was used to help break open a lock). The incident is indicative of a broader trend of using guns to intimidate and spread fear in the context of domestic and family-related disputes.

7.2 Law enforcement

Law enforcement in Bougainville is the responsibility of the Bougainville Police Service (BPS), a largely autonomous branch of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, and the community-based Civilian Auxiliary Police (CAP), which is supported by the Government of New Zealand. During much of the crisis, there was a complete absence of policing infrastructure and presence in Bougainville. Both the BPS and the CAP thus face the significant challenge of re-establishing a functioning law enforcement system.

There are currently about 180 BPS officers in all of Bougainville, located mainly at police stations in Buka, Arawa and Buin. They are poorly equipped, especially in the area of transportation, and have difficulty making their presence felt in the Districts in which they are based, especially in the Central and Southern Districts and on the west coast. To boost their effectiveness, BPS officers often cooperate with ex-combatants in the maintenance of law and order, in particular related to curbing the production and abuse of homebrew. This cooperation is widely supported by the General Population.

There are about 350 CAP officers, more than 20 percent of whom are female, who serve in the villages where they live. A central goal of the CAP programme is that a female CAP officer should be within reasonable walking distance of every village in Bougainville. The CAP programme is supported by the Government of New Zealand but is approaching sustainability. 2012 was the first year that the ABG paid for 100 percent of CAP allowances. The level of integration between the CAP and the BPS is improving but has some ways to go before the two services fully support one another.

Reporting of and data collection on crime, armed violence and homicide is very underdeveloped, with perhaps only 20 percent of crime being reported to police, mainly out of a lack of confidence that the police will be able to take any effective action. The BPS has 3 intelligence units – one each in Buka, Arawa and Buin, trained and set up by New Zealand Police, but these remain largely ineffective with very limited capacity, for example, to collect intelligence on arms trafficking.

An independent baseline performance assessment of the BPS commissioned in 2010 found significant deficiencies in the areas of staffing and structure, intelligence and case management, general competence of BPS and CAP officers, I.T. and communications, policy development, ethics and integrity and community engagement. The assessment noted, however, the low level from which the BPS and CAP are beginning and pointed to some positive developments as well, including the overall growth in police numbers; the continued integration of BPS and CAP; progress in training, competency development and performance management; and the development of community policing practice.

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The BPS Strategic Plan 2010-2014, which encompasses the BPS and CAP, acknowledges these deficiencies and sets out a number of key objectives, including improved relations with and responsiveness to the community, improved knowledge and skills of police officers, higher levels of ethics, honesty and trustworthiness among police officers, improved management, leadership and supervision of police officers and improved human resource management. The Strategic Plan also includes a number of objectives with direct relevance to weapons, including assisting the ABG in the collection and disposal of weapons and the development and implementation of sound logistical and armoury management policies and practices (BPS, 2010).

The already limited capacity of the BPS and the CAP to enforce laws and to maintain order is severely inhibited by the continuing presence of weapons in communities. BPS officers, especially those without access to weapons themselves, feel powerless to take action against suspected law breakers who are known to possess or have access to guns.

The evaluators received reports of weapons being discharged in the presence of police officers with a view to intimidating them, saw for themselves police vehicles that had been hit by bullets, and interviewed police officers who had come under fire and had sustained gunshot injuries as a result. BPS officers informed evaluators that if they were to go after guns in the community, the affected clan would cease all cooperation with the police, making their work in the community even more difficult.

Police stations have come under attack by armed mobs intent on extracting prisoners from jail. In 2011, for example, an armed mob attacked Arawa police station, extracted a suspected sorcerer from the jail and took him to nearby Aropa where they killed him (for more on sorcery-related killings, see below). An armed mob comprising relatives of a deceased woman reportedly attacked Buin police station, extracted the man arrested on suspicion of her murder and killed him.

Although staff numbers have been growing in recent years, the BPS is still severely under-staffed, under-resourced and inadequately trained. Its already limited capacity is undermined even further by the presence of weapons in communities, which inhibits the capacity of the police to enforce law and order and undermines community confidence in the police.

A similar trend can be seen in the Bougainville Customs Service. There are only 3 Customs officers in all of Bougainville; 1 based in Buka and 2 in Arawa. They reportedly face intimidation from traffickers in all kinds of commodities, which severely undermines their effectiveness.

7.3 Status and role of women

Most of Bougainville’s language and cultural groups are matrilineal,6 which means that descent from the female line is a central principle of social organization and, in particular, that land rights pass through women and their daughters. As a result, women in Bougainville have traditionally enjoyed a relatively high status compared to women elsewhere in the region, even though men still tend to dominate Bougainville’s public and political life (Regan, 2010: 11).

6 The Local Level Government areas of Buin in the south and Nissan in the north are the only exceptions.

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The Bougainville crisis changed many things, including gender relations. The crisis caused increased levels of violence against women, which have persisted following the Peace Agreement. This has sparked fears that, “high levels of violence [against women] may be a long-term consequence of the conflict” (CEDAW, 2009: 103).

Despite this, however, Bougainville women played an important and courageous role in bringing the crisis to an end. They used their traditional status and influence to act as go-betweens with the warring factions; mothers went into the jungle attempting to bring their sons home; and women lobbied and pleaded with men to lay down their arms and return to a normal life. Likewise, during the Peace Agreement negotiation process, women were active agents for peace. Women were involved in setting up, and participated in, a process of negotiation between Bougainville leaders and the Government of PNG to bring an end to the conflict and were recognized by all actors – combatants, the UN, donor agencies and NGOs – as having been instrumental in setting up the peace process (CEDAW, 2009: 104).

The role of women in implementing the peace agreement has been much weaker, however. The strong emphasis put on weapons disposal in the period 2001-2005 put ex-combatants and their weapons in the centre of the picture and largely excluded women from playing a meaningful role. The continued presence of weapons in communities following the completion of the Weapons Disposal Plan in 2005, along with the high levels of violence against women that have persisted following the crisis, have resulted in Bougainville women not reclaiming their traditional roles as prominent and outspoken peacemakers. Women are intimidated and frightened by the continued presence of weapons in their communities and are traumatized when they hear gunshots, since they associate the sound with the crisis, which they are fearful might return.

The continued presence of weapons in Bougainville society is also hampering the freedom of expression of women. Women across Bougainville who spoke with the evaluators broadly held the opinion that all weapons should be removed from communities without preconditions. Women’s ability to express this opinion in their own communities is severely inhibited, however. There have been cases of women being physically assaulted as a result of expressing their opinions on this matter, including one woman interviewed by the evaluators who sustained a head injury as a result of speaking out against the continued availability of weapons during a public meeting.

7.4 Sorcery-related killings

The continuing presence of weapons in communities in Bougainville is facilitating the extra-judicial killing of suspected sorcerers, a phenomenon that Bougainville’s weak law enforcement apparatus has been unable to prevent. Although traditional procedures exist to determine whether someone is a sorcerer or not, with restorative remedies short of death for those found “guilty,” people are taking the law into their own hands more frequently and are bypassing such traditional investigations. Firearms have become the preferred tool for executing suspected sorcerers and incidents are reportedly on the rise (according to police reports, there were 10 incidents of violence against suspected sorcerers during 2011 in the Central District of Bougainville alone).

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8 Perception of weaponsDespite the presence of a significant number of weapons in Bougainville – including high-powered, military-style weapons – the misuse of guns was not cited among the top three problems being faced by communities in any of the community consultations conducted during the course of the evaluation. The most important challenges being faced today by communities all over Bougainville are poverty, lack of economic opportunity, lack of social and cultural outlets for young people, illiteracy and under-education (especially of the “lost generation” whose formative education was disrupted by the crisis) and drug abuse (homebrew and marijuana), particularly by young people.

Nevertheless, the presence and misuse of guns do have significant negative impacts on Bougainville society, which are most strongly felt in the south. For example, in Buin District, women reported that they are fearful of the misuse of guns by young men under the influence of alcohol and that they do not report this behaviour to the police for fear of retaliation by the person being reported. In Siwai District, women reported that they do not feel safe moving about during the weekend, when is usually when men drink, and that there had bee some cases of rape. In Bana District, women reported that they have been traumatized by the use of weapons during the crisis and that their continued presence in communities continues to cause them anxiety. In Torokina District, on the west coast, women reported that they have lost their freedom of speech due to the fear caused by the presence of arms in communities, which is forcing them to keep a low profile and not speak out. One women interviewed in Araya reported being struck on the head by a iron bar while speaking out during a public meeting against the presence of weapons in her community.

The traditional authority of Chiefs in Bougainville was undermined by the crisis and continues to be undermined by the presence of weapons in communities. In Siwai District, in South Bougainville, Chiefs reported that their authority had been eroded to the point where they do not have the freedom to move around their communities as they would like. In Bana District, also in the south, Chiefs estimated that, since the crisis, their authority had had been restored to about 40% of where it was before the crisis. This problem has been recognized in some areas and is beginning to be addressed. For example, one of the main outcomes of the Siwai Arms Summit in 2012 was a strategy to empower Chiefs with a view to restoring their traditional authority. The ABG organized a first Chiefs’ Empowerment Workshop in Siwai in October/November 2012.

9 Capacity to address weapons disposalSince the withdrawal of the UNOMB in 2005, not much progress has been made in the physical destruction of weapons in Bougainville – either those left over at the completion of the Weapons Disposal Plan (i.e. residual crisis weapons) nor those that have found their into circulation in Bougainville since 2005 (e.g. recovered in Torokina or smuggled from the Solomon Islands). Since no formal ABG-led Bougainville-wide weapons disposal process succeeded the Weapons Disposal Plan completed in 2005, momentum was lost and has proven difficult to recover.

One reason for this relates to the presence (or absence) of political deadlines that are both strict and looming. The Weapons Disposal Plan embedded in the Bougainville Peace Agreement succeeded in disposing of a significant number of weapons in large part because it was closely

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linked to the election of the first ABG; a political outcome strongly desired by the BRA and BRF ex-combatants holding the weapons. With the election of the first ABG in 2005, that significant deadline was met and replaced only by a much more distant one – the holding of a referendum on the political future of Bougainville sometime between 2015 and 2020, the exact date of which would depend, inter alia, on satisfactory progress on weapons disposal. With the opening of this significant window now only 2 years away, the opportunity presents itself again for the ABG to bring strong political pressure to bear on those still retaining weapons in Bougainville.

9.1 Weapons disposal activities since 2005

Since 2005, a relatively small number of weapons, many if not all of them homemade, have reportedly been handed in to police and destroyed, mainly as a result of successful, ad-hoc, local-level reconciliations, which are broadly supported by the ABG (the evaluators saw two such homemade weapons, handed in as a result of a reconciliation, at the police station in Siwai). A small number of weapons have also been seized by the BPS, sometimes in cooperation with ex-combatants, in connection with their use in crime, but it would seem that these continue to be stored in the police armoury in Buka, as well as at police stations in Arawa and Buin, and have not been destroyed. Between about 2005 to early 2007, a small unofficial weapons disposal programme was run under the patronage of the New Zealand High Commissioner, which resulted in an estimated 12 weapons being handed in in return for technical training (Regan, 2008: 27-28). Between 2008 and 2010, reconciliation and weapons disposal activities carried out by UNDP succeed in collecting less than 10 weapons (Cardno, 2011: 2). Finally, as a result of the resolution of localized conflicts in the south of Bougainville in 2011 (see below), more significant numbers of weapons, including high-powered weapons, have been contained under the authority of factional commanders and chiefs but, at the time of writing, the parties have not taken a decision as to the ultimate fate of these weapons. In short, the developments in weapons disposal since 2005, as outlined above, have had little impact on the overall availability of weapons in Bougainville.

Notwithstanding this, the ABG, with support from UNDP, has made important progress in related areas that prepare the ground for further progress on addressing the availability of weapons, including in the areas of engagement with Mekamui factions, peacebuilding and policy development

9.2 Peacebuilding

Localized conflicts that broke out in the south of Bougainville between 2004 and 2011 have seriously set back the process of weapons disposal by attracting arms into the region, both from within Bougainville (residual crisis weapons and those recovered from Torokina) and from the Solomon Islands. Significant setbacks in this regard have been the conflict in Siwai (2004-2007); the arrival of Noah Musingku (a.k.a. King Peii II) in Tonu in 2004, his establishment of an armed unit to provide security to his self-proclaimed Kingdom of Papala, and the 2006 attack on his compound by the BPS in cooperation with the Bougainville Freedom Fighters; and the localized conflict around Konnou (2006-2011) between, on the one hand, the Mekamui Defence Force on Konnou Constituency and, on the other, 6 local splinter groups also based in Konnou Constituency.7

7 The Kerugotomei faction, the Moikui Freedom Fighters, the Mongai Home Guards, the Mongai Freedom Fighters, the Nomororai Freedom Fighters and the Wisai Liberation Movement (WILMO).

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The Konnou ceasefire agreement of 2011 put an end to the last ongoing localized armed conflict in Bougainville. Under the terms of the ceasefire agreement, all weapons used in the conflict are to be “brought under the authority and control of respective traditional leaders and commanders until [a] decision on the final fate of the weapons under each respective command is decided for their removal from our communities” (Konnou Cease Fire, 2011). Weapons are reportedly so contained but no date has been set for a decision to be taken on the final fate of the weapons. Their continued presence in the region heightens the risk that they could be used to fuel future localized conflicts. Currently, however, no localized armed conflicts are ongoing in Bougainville, which creates space to further advance the process of weapons disposal.

The ABG, with support from UNDP, played an important role in helping to bring such localized conflicts to an end. In attempting to mediate the Konnou conflict, for example, the ABG declared 2008 to be a “year of reconciliation and weapons disposal” and sought the assistance of UNDP to develop proposals for a new weapons disposal process. While the 2008 initiative did not result in the handing in of a significant number of weapons, it did lay the foundation for intensified mediation and community-based peacebuilding efforts, in which UNDP played a important role.

9.3 Engagement with Mekamui Factions

Mekamui factions, which did not participate in the Weapons Disposal Plan, are cooperating more closely with the ABG and have developed a weapons disposal plan of their own. The Panguna Communiqué, singed by the ABG and the Mekamui Government of Unity (MGU) in 2007, renounces violence in all its forms and announces that the MGU has contingency plans for weapons disposal that it intends to implement under the auspices of the Panguna District Administration.

The 9 November 2009 resolution of the Weapons Steering Committee of the Panguna District Reconciliation Steering Committee sets out a 7-stage weapons disposal plan culminating with the disposal of all MDF and remaining ex-combatant arms. The 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the ABG, MGU and the Original Mekamui brought the latter group into the fold of cooperation with the ABG. Among the points covered, the MoU stresses the importance of an amnesty and pardon arrangement to support new weapons disposal programmes.

While these developments are encouraging and indicate a level of commitment on the part of the Mekamui factions to engage with the ABG on weapons disposal, the implementation of such plans would seem to be dependent on financial support being forthcoming from the ABG and, more significantly, on progress being made on resolving issues surrounding the re-opening of the Panguna Mine in the context of the Panguna Peace Building Strategy (PPBS, 2012).

9.4 Engagement with ex-combatants

Ex-combatants in Bougainville are becoming more organized and politically more active and, as such, will likely be an important factor in determining the success or failure of future weapons disposal efforts. Ex-combatants of the BRA, BRF and MDF have recently organized themselves into 3 Ex-Combatant Associations, one each for the North, Central and South Districts of Bougainville. In September 2012, the Associations came together to present a petition to ABG

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President John Momis and the 4 Bougainvillean members of the PNG Parliament. In it, they complained of their dissatisfaction with the leadership being displayed on the implementation of the Peace Agreement and made a number of specific demands, including that the Parties review the Agreement and remove reference to weapons disposal as a condition for the holding of a referendum. The petition called for the resignation of those it addressed if its demands were not met within 3 months. The Ex-Combatant Associations have organized a number of peaceful protests in Buka to follow up on the petition and have sent delegations to meet with the ABG President to discuss their demands.

The Ex-Combatants’ demand to remove weapons disposal as a condition for holding a referendum would seem to be motivated mainly by uncertainty as to whether the PNG Parliament would ratify a vote for independence by Bougainville in a referendum (the petition also includes the demand that reference to such ratification be removed from the Peace Agreement). As mentioned above, they are also largely of the view that they have already complied with the terms of the Weapons Disposal Plan under the Peace Agreement.

The political organization of ex-combatants in Bougainville would seem to stem from frustration that the peace process is not advancing quickly enough and from a perception that they as a group have been largely left out of the decision making process around its implementation. So far, the political activism of the Ex-Combatant Associations has been peaceful, expressed through street marches, petitions and open letters in the press (Ex-Combatant Letter, 2012). Also, the Ex-Combatant Associations informed the evaluators that they are engaged in a process of registering ex-combatants and collecting data on weapons still held by them, something that could be of great value to a future weapons disposal process. Nevertheless, the continued retention of weapons by ex-combatants – especially ex-combatants who are becoming more politically organized and who are beginning to make strong demands of the ABG – is a risk factor that, if left unaddressed, could be destabilizing.

Given the supportive role that ex-combatants have been playing in helping police to maintain law and order – and the broad popular support there is for this – there is further scope for the ABG to engage constructively with ex-combatants as political actors, in order to advance the debate on implementation of the Peace Agreement. Although the Ex-Combatant Associations have been critical of the ABG leadership, they nonetheless consider the ABG to be the legitimate government of Bougainville – their “mandated leaders” (Ex-Combatant Petition, 2012) – and are strongly supportive of the full implementation of the Peace Agreement.

A next step could be the holding by the ABG of informal Pan-Bougainville consultations with the original Parties to the Peace Agreement, as well as with those factions who are not party to it. Such consultations could generate valuable ideas and options for moving forward. In the view of some ex-combatant leaders, the inclusion in this process of Bougainvillean legal advisors who worked originally on drafting and negotiating the Peace Agreement would ensure that a deep knowledge of the nuances of the agreement could be brought to bear on the debate.

9.5 Policy development

The experiences in peacebuilding gained in South Bougainville are leading to a gradual movement by the ABG away from a tight focus on weapons disposal and ex-combatants to a more holistic approach centered on community development and security. The most visible

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manifestation of this has been the establishment of Peace and Security Committees at the district and local levels in Siwai and Buin and their planned replication across all districts in the south and eventually to the rest of Bougainville. By broadening the focus of peacebuilding efforts to encompass community security and development, the ABG hopes to create broader-based, bottom-up support for addressing the wider range of issues that impede the achievement of sustainable human development in Bougainville, one of which is the continued presence of weapons in communities.

A commitment to revisit the institutional mechanisms for the implementation of the ABG’s peacebuilding and security priorities has emerged during the last 1-2 years from the ABG political and administrative leadership. The Office of the Vice President – ABG’s focal point for peace and security – convened the Tsiroge Summit in early 2012 to address broad coordination challenges in light of the stalemate over the issues of weapons, community security, and general law and order problems. The leadership also recognized that a secure and safe environment is a precondition for economic revitalization as a peace dividend (UNDP, 2012A). The Tsiroge Summit produced a number of positive results, including:

The ABG, in consultation with all stakeholders resolved to review and establish a strong Peace and Security Implementation Framework;

The lack of coordination was considered a limitation to better accountability, targeting and achievement of tangible results on peace, weapons collection and reintegration of combatants and youth;

Timelines were reached on immediate demonstration by the leadership to fast track the collection of weapons; and

A community-driven security implementation modality was recommended.

The most recent and strongest manifestations of this more holistic approach is reflected in two policy documents emanating from the highest levels of the ABG: President Momis’ “Ten Principles for Weapons Disposal Plans and Programs” and Vice President Nisira’s “Framework For Peace And Security Coordination Mechanism.”8

The Momis Principles stipulate that disposal plans should be based on facts about weapons in Bougainville; incentives, pressures and processes should correspond to the different reasons why groups and individuals hold weapons; political incentives may still be important; weapons plans must involve the whole community; there should be no “buy back” or “economic projects in exchange for weapons;” there should be realistic thinking about economic development projects in support of weapons disposal; there should be an accountable and transparent process for the actual disposal of collected weapons; actual disposal should be supervised by an independent authority; reconciliation programs should support weapons disposal; and the security concerns of those holding weapons should be addressed (Momis, 2012).

The Vice President’s “Framework For Peace And Security Coordination Mechanism” sets out an integrated, community driven (as opposed to a stand-alone, individually focused) strategy that

8 Full titile: Framework For Peace And Security Coordination Mechanism With Strategic Options For Weapons Disposal And Ex Combatants Intergration Programme: To create an enabling environment that will accelerate social and economic development, good governance and the rule of law towards securing Bougainville’s political future.

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includes weapons disposal incentive options that communities can choose from based on their specific needs (ABG, 2012).

III Conclusions and recommendationsBougainville has entered a highly important period of its political development in light of the upcoming referendum scheduled for sometime between 2015 and 2020. Time is short to make the required preparations in accordance with the Peace Agreement.

Since the completion of the Weapons Disposal Plan, certified by the UN in 2005, and the withdrawal of the UNOMB in the same year, not much progress has been made in disposing of the weapons of war left over from the Bougainville crisis. Given the likely inflow of weapons to fuel only recently concluded localized conflicts in the south, and the outflow of guns on the black market, the number of weapons present in Bougainville today may be largely the same as it was in 2005.

However, the ABG has made significant progress in areas closely related to weapons disposal, with support from UNDP and development partners. In particular, the ABG has made important advances in the area of policymaking, culminating in the most recent Policy Paper from the Office of the Vice President (ABG, 2012), which presents mostly sound strategic options for advancing weapons disposal. The ABG and the GoPNG have revitalized their cooperation on this issue, in particular during the most recent (October 2012) meeting of the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB), which noted that a weapons disposal strategy and plan should be jointly supported and implemented by the GoPNG and the ABG (JSB, 2012). Moreover, the ABG has made important breakthroughs in peacebuilding, most recently by helping to bring to a close in 2011 the last remaining localized conflict around Konnou in the south of Bougainville. Also, the social mobilization that the ABG has helped to encourage around the issue of weapons disposal, most prominently displayed in the outcomes of the Tsiroge and Siwai Arms Summits of 2012, is to be commended.

The fact remains, however, that since 2005 the number of actual weapons actually destroyed remains very low in comparison with the overall number of weapons estimated to remain in Bougainville. It is the assessment of the evaluators that while the guns remaining in Bougainville remain largely silent and are not being overtly used for political purposes, their continued presence (1) does have significant negative impacts on society and (2) is potentially destabilizing insofar as they could be used in the future to fuel further localized conflict or even to bring political pressure to bear on the ABG.

Based on the findings presented in this report, the evaluation team presents the following conclusions and recommendations to the PNG Government and to the ABG for their consideration. The purpose of these recommendation is to provide ideas and guidance to both governments that could inform their common work of preparing the ground for and implementing effective action to address the continued presence of weapons in Bougainville. Recommendations are arranged thematically and are subdivided into recommended immediate actions and actions that could be taken over the medium and longer-term.

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Raise awareness of the provisions of the Peace Agreement

One of the main obstacles to completing the process of weapons disposal on Bougainville is the low level of understanding of the Peace Agreement that exists among the general population. Lack of awareness, in particular, of the link between weapons disposal, on the one hand, and the conduct of a referendum on the political future of Bougainville, on the other, is a major obstacle to completing the weapons disposal process. A broader understanding of this linkage could lead to greater popular support for completing the weapons disposal process in order to clear a path to a referendum. Intensified awareness-raising on the Peace Agreement should be led by the ABG and should be driven at the District and Local Level Government levels. The following key actions could facilitate this process:

Recommended immediate actions:

Translate the BPA, as well as a summary of its main provisions, into Tok Pisin and disseminate widely.

Initiate an intensive, ABG-led, Bougainville-wide campaign of awareness-raising focusing on community-level education on the provisions of the Peace Agreement.

Encourage Members of the Bougainville House of Representatives to make regular visits to their constituencies in order to provide political leadership to the awareness-raising process.

Further research the potential of using the information centres to be set up this year at the Local Level Government level to provide feedback to the ABG on the peoples’ perceptions regarding progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, including weapons disposal.

Enhance confidence building among the parties by informing the people of Bougainville through the available mass media outlets, with the help of the MPs and ABG officials about the outcomes of JSB and other high-level meetings of the GoPNG and the ABG.

Recommended medium- and longer-term actions:

Expand the coverage of radio broadcasts to encompass all of Bougainville (or at least Buka and Bougainville islands) and use the medium of radio to disseminate information on the Peace Agreement, including its provisions on weapons disposal.

Include a module on the Peace Agreement in the high-school curriculum so that teachers and high-school students can act as agents of awareness raising in their communities.

Support the provision, at the community level, of basic education (especially reading, writing and basis life skills) for those men and women whose formation was disrupted by the crisis (the so-called “Lost Generation”).

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Sustainably advance post-crisis reconciliation

Reconciliation is a central, formalized and highly developed characteristic of Bougainville society. Traditional reconciliation provides a means for both parties to a dispute to put their conflict behind them and to move forward in a spirit of mutual respect. Reconciliation is a prerequisite for widespread weapons disposal since it can reduce the feelings of insecurity (e.g. fear of retaliation for acts committed during the crisis) that cause many people to hold guns. However, traditional processes of reconciliation have been undermined to some extent in Bougainville by the expectation, now widely held, that reconciliation ceremonies should be supported financially by the ABG – by paying for not only such things as mediation services and logistics (transport, meals, etc.), but also for the pigs, shell money and other items of value that are traditionally exchanged during such ceremonies. This practice is not sustainable and threatens to undermine the effectiveness of traditional reconciliation. When advancing the post-crisis reconciliation process, therefore, the ABG should try to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, providing support to stimulate the process and, on the other, demanding that parties to a dispute themselves invest significantly in the reconciliation. In order to be effective, formal reconciliation should take place at the highest political levels down to the grassroots level of society.


Priority should be given to sustainably reconciling ex-commanders of the BRA, BRF and MDF, who continue to exert influence on rank-and-file ex-combatants, including in relation to their continued retention of weapons. Reconciliation at this high level would facilitate further reconciliations among rank-and-file ex-combatants who continue to hold weapons out of fear of retaliation for acts committed during the crisis.

An integral part of the reconciliation process should be the location and return to their home towns and villages of the remains of those killed during the crisis.


Explore the possibility of holding a high-level, meeting between the Government of PNG, the ABG and the people of Bougainville, preferably in Bougainville, on the way forward in resolving the remaining outstanding issues under the Agreement. This would go a long way towards reassuring the people of Bougainville that both parties are moving ahead together on the basis of the Peace Agreement and would assuage the fears of some concerning the holding of a referendum.

Bring all factions under the umbrella of the Peace Agreement

A lot of progress has been made over the last number of years to bring Mekamui factions under the umbrella of the Peace Agreement. In 2007, the Panguna Communiqué brought the Mekamui Government of Unity (MGU) into cooperation with the ABG, which led to the creation of the ABG Panguna District Administration. In 2009, the MDF drafted a seven-stage weapons disposal plan (the plan has not been implemented but indicates a willingness by the MDF to engage in the process). Noah Musingku in Tonu also indicated to the evaluators that he is

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willing to enter into dialogue with the ABG. It is vital that all political factions in Bougainville engage in the process of implementing the provisions of the Peace Agreement, under the overall leadership of the ABG. To achieve this:


The ABG should reach out to all Bougainville factions that were not original parties to the Peace Agreement with a view to addressing and resolving outstanding issues that prevent such groups from fully engaging in the implementation of the Agreement, including its provisions on weapons disposal.

Examine the option of holding informal consultations for convening an internal Pan-Bougainville meeting aimed at mobilizing the people of Bougainville – including signatories and non-signatories of the Agreement, representatives of traditional authority, civil society, women’s organizations, churches and others – to resolve their differences and discuss ways of expediting the full implementation of the Agreement.


The GoPNG and the ABG should together consider the feasibility and modalities of extending the amnesty that applies under the Peace Agreement to encompass factions that were not original parties to the agreement but that subsequently agree to be bound by it.

Re-empower women as agents of peacemaking

The traditional status of women in Bougainville’s matrilineal society, evident in the prominent role women played in the peace process, has been undermined by high levels of violence against women (sparked by the crisis but persisting thereafter) and by the continued presence of weapons in their communities. The ABG should take steps to re-empower women as agents of peacemaking in Bougainville, since their active engagement will increase the chances that further efforts to address weapons disposal will be successful.


Intensify actions to address violence against women, including though awareness-raising and outreach to men and boys.

Encourage women’s organizations to intensify their community-based peacebuilding efforts by providing direct support to their work.

Ensure that women’s organizations and voices are fully integrated into ABG efforts to (1) raise awareness of the provisions of the peace agreement and (2) sustainably advance post-crisis reconciliation.

Ensure that women’s organizations and voices are adequately represented in the peace and security committees being established at district and local levels that will address, inter alia, the continued presence of weapons in communities.


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Encourage women to contest more seats in the Bougainville Parliament: There is a widespread, and incorrect, belief among women in Bougainville that the three seats reserved for women in Parliament (one each from North, Central and South Bougainville) represent the totality of seats that women are entitled to hold. This belief is reinforced by the fact that there are currently only three female Members of Parliament in Bougainville.

Strengthen law enforcement

Although some progress has been made, the BPS remains under-staffed, under-resourced and inadequately trained and supervised. The level of public confidence in the BPS is low, which leads some people – and in particular businesses – to hold weapons in order to provide for their own security. The performance of the community-based CAP has been encouraging, but their performance, as reported to the evaluators, would seem to be varied. In some communities, their work was praised, while in others CAP officers were criticized for their lack of impact in addressing domestic violence. The CAP has twice as many personnel as the BPS and is present in most communities, but its work has not always been closely integrated with that of the BPS. Strengthening the performance of the BPS and the CAP is vital to creating the conditions necessary for people to feel confident that relinquishing weapons will not adversely affect their personal, family or business security. The following actions should be considered:


As an interim measure until the BPS has been adequately strengthened, ex-combatants could be encouraged and supported in cooperating actively with the BPS and the CAP in the maintenance of community-level law and order (e.g. collection of gas bottles used in the production of homebrew, prevention of the carrying and discharge of weapons, disruption of the production and distribution of marijuana, etc.).

Routine cooperation between BPS officers and traditional authorities (Chiefs, Elders and their Councils) at the community level should be ensured.


The BPS should be numerically and logistically strengthened and provided with improved training and tighter supervision. Given that ex-combatants have been cooperating with police in many parts of Bougainville in the maintenance of community law and order – with broad community support – ex-combatants should be encouraged to apply for positions in the BPS.

The intelligence capacity of the BPS in particular should be boosted, in order to improve information gathering on illicit arms trafficking and the groups that engage in it.

The CAP programme should be further expanded and its integration into the work of the BPS continued.

The GoPNG and the ABG should consult on the utility and feasibility of the ABG adopting firearms legislation to reflect the specific local conditions and requirements of Bougainville. This could be based on the provisions of the PNG Firearms Act and the

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PNG War Surplus Material Act and could include within its scope an explicit prohibition on recovering World War II weapons, ammunition and explosives.

Strengthen border controls with the Solomon Islands

The customs component of law enforcement in Bougainville is also severely underdeveloped. With only 3 Customs Officers, who face recurring threats and intimidation from traffickers, the capacity to control Bougainville’s sea border with the Solomon Islands is very weak. Traditional border crossers travel between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville without restriction. This facilitates a low-level but persistent illicit trade in weapons between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, with Bougainville being used as a transit point to move weapons from the Solomon Islands, as well as those sourced domestically in Bougainville, to other provinces of PNG and beyond. Although this trade is motivated by financial gain and not politics, it contributes to an accumulation of significant numbers of high-powered weapons in Bougainville that could potentially be destabilizing. The following actions are recommended:


The GoPNG and the ABG could jointly open a dialogue with the Government of the Solomon Islands and the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI) with a view to shedding further light on the nature and extent of illicit arms trafficking between the Solomon Islands and Bougainville, with a view to stopping it. The three governments could also encourage further investigation and research into this issue.

Traditional border crossers (from Bougainville and the Solomon Islands) should be encouraged to engage in self-regulation to prevent arms smuggling and to cooperate with the Bougainville police and customs services in reporting suspicious activities that could be related to trafficking in arms and ammunition.


The ABG should strengthen its customs enforcement capacity. In particular, plans to establish a border surveillance point around Koromira/Sirowai should be accelerated. Given that the south-eastern coast of Bougainville offers continuous landing opportunities for small vessels, all of which in are close proximity to the main road running north to Arawa and Buka, border surveillance should be carried out on both land and sea; by day and at night;

Disrupt arms trafficking groups operating in Bougainville

Trafficking in arms through Bougainville is a law-and-order issue that is not connected with the political process surrounding the Peace Agreement. However, the presence of significant numbers of high powered weapons in Bougainville awaiting shipment on to other destinations is potentially destabilizing since such weapons have likely been, and could again be sold to fuel localized conflicts in Bougainville. The following actions may assist with disrupting this illicit trade:

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Focus attention on disrupting the onward smuggling of weapons from Bougainville by ship, mainly from Kieta wharf but also from Buka and Kokopau, by intensifying intelligence-led customs inspections, including of crew’s quarters and ships’ engine-rooms, which reportedly are preferred places of concealment for smuggled weapons.

Investigate the storage of trafficked weapons in and around Arawa with a view to arresting traffickers and seizing and destroying illicit weapons.


Boost the police and customs services’ intelligence-gathering capacity and encourage community-based intelligence gathering from coastal communities in the south-east, traditional border crossers to the Solomon Islands and communities in and around Arawa.

Seek and facilitate international assistance to “clean up” Torokina

The presence of significant numbers of serviceable World War II era weapons, ammunition and explosives around Torokina on Bougainville’s west coast will continue to be a stumbling block for weapons disposal efforts unless it is addressed in an intensive and sustained manner. Given the likely high volume of such World War II remnants and their location in dense jungle and swampland, there can be no quick solution to this problem. Addressing it effectively will require years of sustained joint efforts. The following actions could assist in this process:


The GoPNG and the ABG could request the government of Australia, which is currently considering sending an explosive ordnance disposal team to Torokina (following a similar mission by the U.S. in 2010) to also include weapons and ammunition within the scope of the mission.

The ABG could explore the possibility of using various incentives for local people to provide information to the police and local authorities on arms retrieval activities


Both governments could formally request the governments of Australia, Japan and the United States to assist them, possibly as part of a joint longer-term programme, to dispose of weapons, ammunition and explosives that their armed forces left behind in Torokina after World War II.

Torokina could be declared a zone of special attention by the ABG.

Instigate an intensive, coordinated second round of weapons disposal

Given (1) the progress that the ABG has made in the areas of policy development and peacebuilding; (2) the progress that the GoPNG and the ABG have together made in the context

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of the Joint Supervisory Body (JSB); and (3) the impending opening of the referendum “window” in 2015, the time may be opportune to initiate an intensive and coordinated second round of weapons disposal in Bougainville (a Weapons Disposal Plan: Part II) as long as the ABG; with the support of the National Government, the UN and development partners; can adequately prepare the ground along the lines of the recommendations presented above.

Two core documents – the “Ten Principles for Weapons Disposal Plans and Programs” elaborated by ABG President John Momis and the October 2012 Policy Paper developed by the Office of ABG Vice President Patrick Nisira9 – provide a solid foundation upon which to base this work. Taken together, these documents set out an integrated, community driven (as opposed to a stand-alone, individually focused) strategy that includes weapons disposal incentive options that communities can choose from based on their specific needs.


Fine-tune the principal ABG policy documents: While the strategy presented in the 2012 ABG policy paper is broadly sound, it does have room for improvement in order to be fully in line with International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), particularly as they relate to weapons collection and disposal. For example:

While some of the disposal incentives set out in the Policy Paper have proven to be effective in certain circumstances (e.g. weapons in exchange for development, education or employment/livelihoods), others require further consideration and refinement. For example, the option of “arms amnesty” is presented as a stand-alone option but is actually one that should accompany any weapons collection process, regardless of other incentive options used.

Given the overall negative experience of the Bougainville Ex-combatants’ Trust Account (BETA) programme during implementation of the Weapons Disposal Plan under the BPA, and the fact that is in opposition to the sound Momis Principles, the option of “cash for weapons” should be reconsidered.

Rather than making the delivery of community-based incentives dependent on the relinquishment of weapons (which would provide an incentive for weapons-free communities to acquire weapons), linking the delivery of such incentives to the achievement of a weapons-free end state at the community level could be a more effective option.

The ABG could use the findings of this evaluation report, especially regarding the holders of weapons and their motivation for doing so, to fine-tune the types of incentives to be used in the context of a renewed Bougainville weapons disposal process. In this context, the potency of the political incentive – i.e. relinquishment of weapons as a means of helping to clear a path towards a referendum – should not be underestimated.

It is the assessment of the evaluators that the continued presence in Bougainville of a relatively small but potentially destabilizing number of weapons should be of concern to the ABG, the 9 Framework for Peace and Security Coordination Mechanism with Strategic Options for Weapons Disposal and Ex Combatants Integration Programme, Office of the ABG Vice President, 10 October 2012.

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GoPNG and the international community. With the opening of the referendum window just 2 years away, an opportunity presents itself to complete the work begun by the BPA’s Weapons Disposal Plan and to clear a path to a referendum on the political future of Bougainville.

It is the evaluation team’s fervent hope that the findings and recommendations of this report will contribute to the sound design and successful implementation of a new round of weapons disposal in Bougainville, based on the principles of community security and development and building on the solid foundation already laid by JSB decisions, the Momis Principles and the ABG Vice President’s Policy Paper. The United Nations stands ready to support the Government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government in this important effort.

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Principal reference materials

ABG & MGU, 2007. The Panguna Communiqué: Memorandum of Understanding between Mekamui Government of Unity, the People of Ioro & the Autonomous Bougainville Government. Signed at Panguna, 30 August.

ABG & UNDP, 2012. Outcomes of the Siwai District Arms Summit. Panakei Cocoa Shed, Siwai District, South Bougainville. May 23-25.

ABG & UNDP, 2012A. Recommendations of the Tsiroge Summit on Peace-Building and Weapons Disposal. February 15-17.

ABG, 2009. Reconciliation, Weapon Collection & Disposal Program: A way forward to peace consolidation and sustainable development.

ABG, 2010. Bougainville Peace Building Project Report. (Bougainville Peace Audit). ABG Division of Veterans Affairs in Collaboration with the AusAID Democratic Governance program Transition Phase.

ABG, 2012. Framework For Peace And Security Coordination Mechanism With Strategic Options For Weapons Disposal And Ex Combatants Integration Programme. Policy Paper, Office of the Vice President.

ABG, 2012A. Siwai District Perspective in Drive: District Planning and Development Coordination Management Technical Meeting. Siwai District Administration. 24-26 October.

ABG, 2012B. Chiefs Empowerment Workshop: Strengthening of Traditional Authority. Siwai District Administration. 31 October – 1 November.

ABG, 2012C. Revitalized Peacebuilding in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville: Empowering communities through open dialogue to achieve a culture of peace. Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation.

ABG, 2012D. The Peace and Security Mechanism. Office of the Vice President, 20 August.

ABG, 2012E. Government must work; and be seen to be working: A Capacity Development Strategy for the Autonomous Government of Bougainville. July 31.

ABG, 2012F. Report On Bolave Peace & Governance Workshop. Boleuko Catholic Mission Station, 17-18 July.

ABG, 2012G. Joint ABG and National Government Weapons Disposal Strategy. Joint Technical Meeting, July 2012. Division of Veterans Affairs and Weapons Disposal.

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ABG, 2012H. Weapons Disposal: American World War II (WWII) Arms War Relics Stored at Torokina. Joint Technical Team Meeting, March 2012. Division of Veterans Affairs and Weapons Disposal

ABG, 2012I. Recommendations of the Tsiroge Summit on Peace-Building and Weapons Disposal. February 15-17.

ABG, MGU & Original Mekamui, 2010. Memorandum of Understanding on Continued Dialogue Between Autonomous Bougainville Government, Me’ekamui Government of Unity, and Chamber of Clans Paramount Council (Original Me’ekamui). 17 March 2010.

ACCORD, 2002. Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville peace process. London: Conciliation Resources.

ALPERS, Philip & TWYFORD, Conor, 2003. Small Arms in the Pacific. Occasional Paper No. 8. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

ALPERS, Philip, 2005. Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern Highlands. Special Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

ARB CONSTITUTION, 2004. Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

BPA, 2001. Bougainville Peace Agreement.

BPS, 2012. Central Crime Statistics: 1 January – 31 August 2012. Bougainville Police Service, Central District.

CARDNO, 2011. UNDP – Third Party Cost Sharing Arrangement for Bougainville Programme: Independent Completion Report. Carndo-Emerging Markets.

CEDAW, 2009. Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Combined initial, second and third periodic report of States parties - Papua New Guinea. CEDAW/C/PNG/3, 22 May.

COWLEY, Daniell, 2009. Developing a Culture of Disarmament: Building Community Level Support for Small Arms Reduction in Papua New Guinea. Report for UNDP.

EMENONI, Agatha, 2012. Issues Faced by the Women in Torokina District: Implications of Existence of Weapons and other Unexploded Ordnance in Torokina. Unpublished manuscript.

EX-COMBATANT LETTER, 2012. Open Letter from the Central Bougainville Ex-Combatant Association to Dr. John Momis, ABG President. Post-Courier, 18 December 2012, p. 10.

EX-COMBATANT PETITION, 2012. Petition by the Ex-Combatant Associations of Bougainville directed to the President of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville and the 4 Bougainville National Parliamentarians. September 12.

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GHAI, Yash & and REGAN, Anthony, 2000. Dialects of autonomy in Bougainville.

GoPNG & ABG, 2012. Government of Papua New Guinea and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. Joint Technical Officers Meeting. Kokopo 14-16 October.

GoPNG, 2002. Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville, Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum. Government of Papua New Guinea.

HAHELA UNDERSTANDING, 2011. Panguna Stakeholders Hahela Understanding. July 8.

JSB, 2012. Joint Supervisory Body Meeting Between PNG National Government and the Autonomous Bougainville Government. Kokopo, East New Britain Province, 17th October 2012.

JSB, 2012A. Official Joint Statement on the Conclusions and Records of The Joint Supervisory Body by the Co-Chairs Hon. Peter O’Neill, CMG, MP, the Prime Minister for Papua New Guinea and Hon. Chief Dr. John Momis, GCL, MHR, the President of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

KONNOU CEASEFIRE, 2011. Konnou Ceasefire Agreement.

LEMIEUX, Jason, 2012. Torokina Scoping Meeting. PowerPoint presentation. July 7.

MOMIS, John, 2012. Ten Principles for Weapons Disposal Plans and Programmes. Chief Dr. John Momis, President of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

NEW ZEALAND POLICE, 2011. Bougainville Police Service Baseline Performance Assessment.

PANGUNA RESOLUTION, 2009. Panguna District Reconciliation Steering Committee. Weapons Steering Committee Meeting. Resolution # Nov 09 2009 (Weapons Disposal Plan).

PANGUNA RESOLUTION, 2009A. February 5.

POST COURIER, 18 December 2012. Open Letter from the Central Bougainville Ex-Combatants Association to Dr. John Momis, President of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. Page 10.

PPBS, 2012. A Coordinated Panguna Peace Building Strategy: Design Document. AusAID Programme “Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen” on behalf of the ABG and Panguna Joint Supervisory Committee.

REGAN, Anthony J., 2008. Weapons Disposal and Peace-Building in Bougainville – Issues and Options in 2008-09. Draft Discussion Paper.

REGAN, Anthony J., 2009. Bougainville’s Bernie Madoff: Noah Musingku, U-Vistract, and the Kingdom Of Papala, 1996-2009. Draft manuscript, 29 July.

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REGAN, Anthony J., 2010. Light Intervention: Lessons from Bougainville. New York: US Institute of Peace.

REGAN, Anthony J., 2010A. Mining World War Two in Bougainville, 2005-2010. PowerPoint Presentation.

SIWAI CHIEFS, 2010. Petition Priorities. Siwai District Chiefs Meeting.

TURK, Danilo, 2005. Briefing on Bougainville to the Security Council. 6 July.

UN, 2011. Four Year Strategic Plan: Bougainville. United Nations Country Programme, 2012-2015.

UNDP, 2008. Bougainville Programme End of Year Report. United Nations Development Programme.

UNDP, 2012. Outcomes of the 10th Peace Anniversary Reflection Meetings. United Nations Development Programme.

UNDP, 2012A. Supporting Community Security and Peacebuilding in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea.

UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS & UNICEF, 2011. Draft common country programme document for Papua New Guinea, 2012-2015. DP/FPA/OPS-ICEF/DCCP/2011/PNG/1. July 12.

UNIFEM, 2004. Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Chapter 4: Case Study: Bougainville—Papua New Guinea. United Nations Development Fund for Women.

UNOMB, 2003. Implementation of The Bougainville Peace Agreement: Completion of Stage II of Weapons Disposal – UNOMB’s Verification Report.

UNOMB, 2004. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea). S/2004/771, 29 September.

UNOMB, 2005. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea). S/2005/204, 28 March

UNPOB, 2003. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville. S/2003/345, 20 March.

WOLFERS, Edward P., 2008. Authority, Community and Autonomy: The New Political Community in Bougainville. Revised Edition.

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Annex 1: Programme of Evaluation Meetings

Place Date Time Meeting Venue

PORT MORSEBY

18 Nov 2012

05:00

Evaluators arrive in Port Morseby

19:00

Mr. David Mc Lachlan-Karr - UN Resident CoordinatorMs. Carol Flore-Smereczniak - UNDP Deputy Resident RepresentativeMr. Jorg Schimmel - UNDP Assistant Resident Representative

Port Morseby Yacht Club

19 Nov 2012

09:30

Mr. Trevor Meauri - Dept. of the Prime Minister & National Executive Council, PNG GovernmentAccompanied by:Ms. Carol Flore-Smereczniak - UNDP Deputy Resident Representative

Dept. of the Prime Minister

20 Nov 2012

08:30

Mr. Manasupe Zurenuoc - Chief Secretary, PNG GovernmentMr. Andrew Trawen - PNG Electoral CommissionerMr. Dominic Sengi - Advisor to the PNG Secretary for Foreign AffairsAccompanied by:Mr. Trevor Meauri - Dept. of the Prime Minister & National Executive Council, PNG Government

Dept. of the Prime Minister

21 Nov 2012

10:00

Mr. Jimmy Miringtoro - Minister for Communications, PNG Government, and Member of PNG Parliament for Central BougainvilleMr. Kora Nou - Deputy Secretary for Communication, PNG Government

Office of the Minister for Communications

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13:00

Ms. Marion Crawshaw - New Zealand High CommissionerMs. Rebecca Lineham - Manager, New Zealand Aid ProgrammeAccompanied by:Mr. Trevor Meauri - Dept. of the Prime Minister & National Executive Council, PNG Government

New Zealand High Commission

14:30

Mr. Ellison Towallom - Director, National Coordinating Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA), PNG GovernmentMr. Wemen Boi - Legal Officer, NCOBA, PNG Government

NCOBA

22 Nov 2012

07:30

Mr. Ellison Towallom - Director, National Coordinating Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA), PNG GovernmentMr. Trevor Meauri - Dept. of the Prime Minister & National Executive Council, PNG Government

Lamana Hotel

14:30

Ms. Margaret Adamson - Deputy Australian High CommissionerMs. Lisa Clutterham - Second Secretary, Australian High CommissionAccompanied by:Mr. Manasupe Zurenuoc - Chief Secretary, PNG GovernmentMr. Ellison Towallom - Director, National Coordinating Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA), PNG GovernmentMr. Trevor Meauri - Dept. of the Prime Minister & National Executive Council, PNG GovernmentMr. David Mc Lachlan-Karr - UN Resident CoordinatorMs. Carol Flore-Smereczniak - UNDP Deputy Resident Representative

Office of the Prime Minister

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18:30

Dr. John Momis - President of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG)Mr. Steven Karma Pirika - Minister for Bougainville Affairs, PNG GovernmentAccompanied by:Mr. Ellison Towallom - Director, National Coordinating Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA), PNG GovernmentMr. Trevor Meauri - Dept. of the Prime Minister & National Executive Council, PNG Government

Golden Bowl restaurant, Port

Morseby

BOUGAINVILLE

23 Nov 2012

06:00

[Flight to Bougainville]

BUKA 10:00

Mr. Lawrence Disin - ABG Chief AdministratorMr. Paul Kebori - Deputy ABG Chief Administrator (Operations)Mr. Anthony Agienta - Head of UNDP Office, Bougainville

Buka Airport

11:30

Mr. Anthony Agienta - Head of UNDP Office, Bougainvilleand UNDP Bougainville staff Edward and Peter.

UN House Buka

14:00

Mr. Chris Siriosi - Deputy ABG Chief Administrator (Policy), ChairMr. Lawrence Disin - ABG Chief AdministratorMr. Paul Kebori - Deputy ABG Chief Administrator (Operations)Mr. Tom Eluh - Assistant Commissioner for Police and Head of Bougainville Police Service

ABG Administration Building

15:30

Dr. John Momis - President of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG)

Office of the President,

Bougainville Parliament

16:30

District-level ABG Managers (Southern, Central and Northern Regions)


18:00

Ms. Tracy Tann - Team Leader, AusAID Office, BukaMs. Roselyn Kenneth - Programme Manager, AusAID Office, Buka

UN House Buka

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24 Nov

2012

11:00

ABG Minister for Public Works and Transport & local Tinpuz Chief

Tinpuz

12:00

Reconciliation ceremony between President John Momis and ex-combatants of Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)

Tinpuz

25 Nov 2012

16:00

Mr. Tom Eluh - Assistant Commissioner for Police and Head of Bougainville Police Service

Buka Police Station

26 Nov 2012

10:00

ABG Senior Management Team - i.e. CEOs of all ABG Departments (14, of which 2 women)Mr. Chris Siriosi - Deputy ABG Chief Administrator (Policy), ChairMr. Paul Kebori - Deputy ABG Chief Administrator (Operations)


15:00

Hon. Rose Pihei - ABG Minister for Culture and Tourism; Female Member of Parliament for South Bougainville; former ABG Minister for Women’s Affairs

Ms. Pihei’s office

16:30

Port Manager - Buka wharf (included tour of wharf facilities)

Buka Wharf

27 Nov 2012

08:00

South Bougainville Veteran’s Association - 5 Executive Members: Mr. Paul Sampai, Mr. Thomas Tarii, Mr. Philip Marape, Mr. Michael Komoiki and Mr. David Kongkori.Mr. Michael Laita - ABG Member of Parliament representing veterans of South BougainvilleAccompanied by:Mr. Anthony Agyenta - Head of UNDP Office, Bougainville

UN House Buka

11:00

Mr. Dennis Kuiai - First Secretary, ABG Ministry of Peace & Reconciliation (based in Arawa)

UN House Buka

12:00

Ms. Joan Jerome - ABG Female Member of Parliament for Central Bougainville

UN House Buka

13:00

Mr. Francisco Hoping - ABG Member of Parliament representing veterans from North Bougainville

UN House Buka

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16:15

Council of Elders Chairmen - North Bougainville (Selau Suir District and Kunua District) and South Bougainville (Torokina District) - approx. 160 people

Talena

18:30

Sr. Lorraine - Director, Nazareth Centre for Rehabilitation

Nazareth Centre, Chabai

28 Nov 2012

08:00

Mr. Clyde Paris - AusAID Adviser to ABG on weapons disposal

Kuri Hotel, Buka

10:00

Ms. Agnes Titus - Sub-National Coordinator for Gender Equality and Political Governance Programme, UN Women.

UN House Buka

11:00

Ms. Helen Hakena - Director, Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency (LNWDA)

LNWDA Office, Buka

14:00

Mr. Murray Lewis - Head, New Zealand Police Bougainville Programme

Buka Police Station

ARAWA 29 Nov 2012

07:30

Mr. James Koimo - ABG Regional Commissioner, Central Bougainville

Regional Commissioner’s

Office

09:00

Mr. Ismael Toroama - Former BRA Commander; now Director of a private security company - Island Cops - based in Arawa.

UN Office, Arawa

10:00

Mr. Rubin Sierra - Former BRA Commander; now with Me’ekamui faction

UN Office, Arawa

10:30

Shooting incident Close to UN Office, Arawa

11:00

Patricia Tapakau - Pineinari (Pakia) Women’s Group Coordinator, Panguna Landowners Association

UN Office, Arawa

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TABAGO 17:00

Commemoration of the one year anniversary of the Konnou ceasefire agreement - Approximately 65 people present when Evaluators arrived (commemoration had been going on all day): Chiefs, Church leaders, some women and youth, and ex-combatants from the U-Vistract Me’ekamui and from Freedom Fighters, includingMr. Chris Motta - U-Vistract Me’ekamui and Chairman of the Konnou Peace ProcessMr. Martin Kongke - Ex-Commander, Freedom Fighters

Tabago

30 Nov 2012

09:00

Mr. Damien Fresnel - Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF)

Buin Hospital

10:00

Buin District Community Consultation - Town-hall meeting (approx 250 people) followed by focus-group discussions with women, church leaders, Chiefs, Council of Elders Chairs and ex-combatants.

Buin market

SIWAI 15:00

Siwai District Community Consultation - Town-hall meeting (approx 200 people) followed by focus-group discussion with women (Siwai District Women’s Federation), church leaders, Chiefs, ex-combatants, police and District Administrators.

Siwai community centre, police

station and District Administration

Office

1 Dec 2012

14:30

Siwai Catholic service Siwai youth centre

TONU 2 Dec 2012

08:00

Preliminary meeting with Col. Moloni (Fiji) - Protocol Officer and Head of Security; Kingdom of Papala Chief Administrator, Bank Governer, and other members of the Papala government administration.

Musingku compount, Tonu

10:00

Tonu Health Centre Tonu

10:30

Noah Musingku (a.k.a. King Peii II) Musingku compount, Tonu

BANA 12:00

Visit to the grave of President Joseph Kabui Bana

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12:30

Bana District Community Consultation 1 - Town-hall meeting (approx. 150 people) followed by separate focus-group discussions with Chiefs, women, ex-combatants, police, public servants and health workers.

Lato Constituency

16:00

Bana District Community Consultation 2 - Town-hall meeting (approx. 200 people) followed by separate focus-group discussions with women and ex-combatants.

Bolawe Constituency

19:30

Students & Teachers Bana High School

TOROKINA 3 Dec 2012

10:00

Torokina District Community Consultation 1 - Town-hall meeting (approx. 75 people) followed by separate focus-group discussions with women, Chiefs and ex-combattants.

Koiari Village

12:30

Torokina District Community Consultation 2 - Town-hall meeting (approx. 150 people) followed by separate focus-group discussions with women, Chiefs, ex-combatants

Torokina

15:00

Tour of villages and jungle around Torokina to inspect recovered World War II weapons and ammunition, as well as unexploded and abandoned ordnance.

Surroundings of Torokina

4 Dec 2012

09:00

Buin Police Officer (BPS) Torokina beach

11:30

Morotana Health Centre Morotana

ARAWA 16:00

Mr. Herman Birengka - Bougainville Police Service Commander, Central Region.

Arawa Police Station

17:00

Mr. Sam Kauona - BRA Ex-CommanderMr. George Fahey - BRA ex-combatant

UN Office, Arawa

ROROVANA 5 Dec 2012

09:00

Paramount Chief Andrew Baka - Rorovana 1 and 2, Loloho and Takopunibua Villages

Rorovana

PANGUNA 11:00

Mr. Otto Noruka - Panguna District Executive Manager

Panguna

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12:30

Town-hall meeting with Me’ekamui Leadership, including:Mr. Philip Miriori - President, Mekamui Government of UnityMr. Phillip Takoung - Vice President, Mekamui Government of UnityMr. Blaise Iruinu - Chairman, Panguna Peacebuilding StrategyAccompanied by:Mr. Otto Noruka - Panguna District Executive ManagerMr. Robin Tekapu - Panguna District Deputy Executive Manager

Panguna District Administration

Office

ARAWA 18:30

Mr. Laurance Matau - BRA ex-combatant; cousin of Chris Uma

UN Office, Arawa

20:30

Mr. Michael Pai - Close confident of the late Francis Ona

21:30

Mr. Michael Otoroa - Former BRA Commander (Buin); Minister for Education in Kabui Cabinet

UN Office, Arawa

6 Dec 2012

09:00

Ms. Theresa Jaintong - Deputy Chair, Panguna Landowners Association; Minister for Health in the Bougainville Interim Government

UN Office, Arawa

10:00

Ms. Marcelline Kokiai - Bougainville Women’s Federation

UN Office, Arawa

11:00

Mr. Philip Rali - Ex-PNG Defence Forces Commander, Arawa

UN Office, Arawa

12:00

Council of Elders Chairs and Chiefs Arawa Mari Mari House

17:30

Ms. Elisabeth Pilo & Ms. Patricia Wlea - Torau Women’s Association

UN Office, Arawa

18:00

Geoffrey and Nelson - Former Resistence combatants, Kieta District

UN Office, Arawa

18:30

Peter - Torau Council of Elders ChairStephan - Subsistence farmer, Torau

UN Office, Arawa

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19:00

Thomas - ABG Tax Officer; Former Member of Parliament during the Kabui Administration representing BanaJoseph - Executive Officer, Eivo Council of EldersPatrick - Eivo Council of Elders Chair

UN Office, Arawa

KOROMIRA 7 Dec 2012

07:00

Mr. Sam Kaona - Ex-BRA CommanderMs. Josephine Kaona - Director, Tunaniya Open Learning Centre & Rehabilitation Centre for Suspected SorcerersMr. Robert Ereva - Ex-BRA combatant

Koromira

10:00

CoE Chair, Koromira Kekere Passage, Koromira

WAKUNAI 15:00

Wakunai District Community Consultation - Town-hall meeting followed by separate focus-group discussions with Chiefs, women and ex-combatants.

Wakunai

SELAU SUIR 9 Dec 2012

14:00

Mr. Peter Barik - Chair, Veterans Association of North BougainvilleMr. Daniel Tsunno - Chair, Siarra Village AssemblySelau Suir District Community Consultation - Town-hall meeting followed by separate focus-group discussions with women, Chiefs, ex-combatants

Siarra

BUKA 18:00

Mr. Aaron Pita - CEO, Division of Veterans’ Affairs, ABG.

UN House Buka

10 Dec 2012

09:30

Buka District Community Consultation 1 - Town-hall meeting followed by separate focus-group discussions with women, Chiefs, ex-combatants and young men.

Mangoana, Haku Constituency

13:00

Buka District Community Consultation 2 - Town-hall meeting followed by separate focus-group discussions with Chief, women and young men.

Hahalis, Halia Constituency

15:00

Buka District Community Consultation 3 - Town-hall meeting followed by separate focus-group discussions with women and the Chief.

Hoko, Gogohe Constituency

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TINPUZ 11 Dec 2012

10:30

Tinpuz District Community Consultation - Town-hall meeting followed by separate focus-group discussions with Chiefs, women, young men and ex-combatants

Tinpuz

BUKA 16:00

Mr. Oni - ABG Minister for Mining; MP for Ioro 1 Constituency, Panguna Distruct

UN House Buka

12 Dec 2012

08:30

Ms. Marion Jacka - Regional Project Manager, Care International

Care International Office, Buka

11:00

Anonymous interview on arms trafficking

15:00

Mr. Andrew Cooper, Mr. Clyde Paris and Ms. Roselyn Kennth - AUSAIDMr. Eric Berman - Small Arms SurveyMr. Anthony Agyenta - UNDP, Buka

UN House Buka

14 Dec 2012

10:00

Hon. Andrew Miriki - Speaker, ABG House of Representatives

Parliament building

15 Dec 2012

10:00

Anonymous interview on Private Security Companies

14:00

Sir Michael Ogio - Governor-General of PNG Guesthouse

16 Dec 2012

07:00

Mr. Tony Regan - AusAID Adviser to the ABG Guesthouse

17 Dec 2012

13:00

Debrief of the ABG Administration ABG Administration Building

15:00

Debrief of the ABG President and Cabinet ABG Parliament building

PORT MORSEBY

19 Dec 2012

14:00

Debrief of the PNG Government Office of the Prime Minister

15:30

Consultation with the UN Resident Coordinator

UN Office

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20-21

Dec 2012

Evaluators leave PNG

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Annex 2: Evaluation Terms of Reference

BOUGAINVILLE REFERENDUM COMMITTEE

Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Weapons Disposal on BougainvilleIntroductionUnder the National Constitution of Papua New Guinea, a Referendum to determine the political future of Bougainville is guaranteed and will be held no sooner than ten (10) and no later than fifteen (15) years after the election of the Autonomous Bougainville Government.

At the December 2009 Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) meeting in Buka, it was agreed that a joint Working Committee (the so-called ‘Bougainville Referendum Committee’; hereafter the Committee) between National Government and ABG be established to investigate constitutional, legal, administrative and financial matters that may need to be considered in preparing for the conduct of the referendum on the political future of Bougainville.

In addition, it was recognised that the work of the Committee will overlap in many respects with the review of the Autonomous Arrangement. Thus it was important that the review become a function of the Committee.

Referendum and Weapons DisposalThe determination of the date for the conduct of the referendum will be subject to the outcome of the investigation by the Committee into the implementation of the weapons disposal and the Autonomous Bougainville Government's compliance with appropriate standard of 'good governance 10' (taking account of internationally accepted standards of democracy, transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights) and the rule of law as agreed to with the National Government, as agreed in the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA). These are conditions clearly set-out in the BPA and are essentially the key focus of the Committee.

With respect to Weapons Disposal, the Committee agreed in its third meeting in Buka in September 2012 that an independent weapons disposal expert is engaged to review and evaluate the state of weapons disposal on Bougainville and advise the Committee. The Committee further resolved that the independent expert be sought from the United Nations pool of experts and that the expert will commence his or her engagement as soon as practicable.

10 See Section C., paragraph 314 of the Bougainville Peace Agreement.

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Job Summary and Terms of ReferenceThe Committee recognises that UNDP and ABG has been working on a project on Peace and Security and also the ongoing work by ABG in initiating reconciliation among Bougainvilleans throughout Bougainville, with the full support of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations. These initiatives in many ways addresses the issue of continued presence of arms or arms proliferation at its very core and this is fundamental to establishing the foundations for long lasting peace and security in Bougainville Communities.

In this context, the independent expert to be provided by the United Nations will undertake a thorough assessment to evaluate the state of weapons disposal on Bougainville and provide recommendations on next steps. The independent expert will enjoy all the required support and assistance from the PNG Government and the ABG, as well as others concerned, in the discharge of his/her mandate.

The terms of reference for this assessment are as follows:Area Key FocusSecurity Identifying extent of presence of arms or arms proliferation in

Bougainville (who owns, where, how and why)

Arms movement (inflow-outflow; identifying origin and destinations; motivation behind the arms movement (trade? Conflict? Self-protection? Status?etc.)

Arms Collection (types of arms collected? how successful? etc.)

Historical Perspective Arms culture in Bougainville; resistance groups; the threats of WW II

Unexploded Ordinances (UXOs)

Geography The Solomon Islands factor; cross-border arms manufacture; drugs, youths, etc.

Government Current law and order situation; enforcement

Legislation: evaluation of parliament’s capacity to enact relevant laws for enforcement

Traditional power systems and community peace and order enforcement mechanisms

Nature of political space for involvement of factions in decision making

Other Outcome of other previous reviews of weapons disposal exercises, and other relevant information and analysis

Key ResponsibilityEnsure the Bougainville Referendum Committee is kept informed of progress of work in each focus areas as specified in the ToR.

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Expected Outcome Provide clarity on the State of Weapons Disposal on Bougainville in terms of public

perceptions on arms and security in general as well as evidenced-based data on arms distribution; and,

Based on the findings, provide options in terms of next steps. This should include identifying areas to strengthen community capacity for Trust/Confidence-Building and Government capacity for security enforcement mechanisms

Duration of AssignmentThis assessment will take two months from November to December 2012

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Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology

Outline Methodology for an Evaluation of Weapons Disposal on Bougainville

Endorsed by the Chief Secretary of the PNG Government (20 November 2012) and by the Chief Administrator of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (23 November 2012)

PART 1BACKGROUND

Reference points

This outline methodology is based on

the Bougainville Peace Agreement, signed at Arawa on 30 August 2001;

the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville – Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum, certified on 25 June 2002;

the Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB), adopted by the Bougainville Constituent Assembly on 12 November 2004;

the latest version of the “Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of Weapons Disposal on Bougainville” (henceforth ‘Terms of Reference’) that has been shared with the United Nations by the Bougainville Referendum Committee;11 and

The International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) launched by the United Nations on 29 June 2012.12

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to outline a methodology for an evaluation of weapons disposal on Bougainville, to be carried out by the United Nations (UNDPA and UNDP) over a period of approximately 4 weeks in November and December 2012, with the possibility of follow-up evaluation missions should these be deemed necessary by the Bougainville Referendum Committee.

11 This outline methodology may need to be updated in light of the final version of the Terms of Reference prepared by the Bougainville Referendum Committee. 12 www.smallarmsstandards.org

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http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/


As specified in the Terms of Reference, the purpose of the evaluation is to “evaluate the state of weapons disposal on Bougainville and provide recommendations on next steps” (p. 2)13.

As specified in the Terms of Reference, the evaluation and recommendations should assist the Government of PNG (GPNG) and the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) in jointly determining the date for the conduct of a referendum to determine the political future of Bougainville.

Bougainville Peace Agreement

The Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed in Arawa on 30 August 2001. It provides for a referendum among Bougainvilleans on Bougainville’s future political status, which will include the choice of independence for Bougainville. The timeframe for holding the referendum is 2015 – 2020 (between 10 and 15 years after the election of the first ABG, which happened in 2005). The actual date of the referendum will be set taking account of, inter alia, the state of weapons disposal on Bougainville.

PART 2OUTLINE METHODOLOGY

Key questions

The evaluation will attempt to answer the following key questions:

What initiatives has the ABG – at provincial, district and local levels – undertaken to advance weapons disposal since 2005, how successful have these initiatives been and what is the capacity of the ABG to undertake such initiatives in the future?

What initiatives have Bougainvillean civil society organizations (e.g. women’s groups, youth groups, faith-based groups, etc.) undertaken to advance weapons disposal since 2005, how successful have these initiatives been and what is the capacity of civil society organisations to undertake such initiatives in the future?

What initiatives have the United Nations and other key international actors undertaken on weapons disposal, how successful have these initiatives been and what is the capacity of these actors to support and/or undertake such initiatives in the future?

What are the direct and indirect impacts of small arms and light weapons misuse on different segments of Bougainvillean society (gender, age and socio-economic differences)?

How secure do Bougainvilleans perceive themselves to be from violence perpetrated with small arms or light weapons (disaggregated by gender, age and socio-economic group).

Have ex-combatants remained armed or re-armed and, if so, to what extent?

13 By “weapons disposal,” the evaluation team understands collection, destruction (or other means of disposal) of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition.

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What are the main demand factors underpinning the possession of small arms and light weapons on Bougainville and who mostly holds these weapons?

What types and estimated quantities of small arms and light weapons are present on Bougainville; how are they distributed and where are they concentrated?

What is the situation regarding official ABG holdings of small arms, light weapons and ammunition and what are the practices, current and planned, for safely and securely managing such holdings?

Are small arms, light weapons and their ammunition moving into or out of Bougainville in significant numbers and, if so, what are the sources and/or destinations?

How prevalent is craft production of small arms, light weapons and ammunition (i.e. homemade weapons and ammunition)?

What is the legislative framework governing the legal access of civilians to small arms, light weapons and ammunition and how effectively is this enforced by the Bougainville Police Service and prosecuted by the judicial arm of the ABG?

Scope

Technical

The evaluation will focus on small arms, light weapons and their ammunition on Bougainville, regardless of their time or method of manufacture, by whom they are held or for what purposes they are used.

The scope of the evaluation does not extend to the question of ABG’s compliance with appropriate standards of good governance.

Geographical

The geographical coverage of the evaluation will be the islands of Buka and Bougainville. Given the short time available, it will not be possible to include other islands in the ARB.

Subject to access being possible, the evaluation will encompass the

North Bougainville District (including Buka, Kunua, and Selau Suir Local Level Governments (LLGs));

Central Bougainville District (including Arawa and Wakunai LLGs); and

South Bougainville District (including Buin, Bana, Siwai and Torokina LLGs).

Core components

The evaluation of weapons disposal on Bougainville will undertake the following:

Contextual Analysis : A contextual analysis of relevant conflict/security, political, economic, social, environmental and cultural factors.

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Disposal Assessment : Assessment of weapons disposal efforts undertaken by the ABG, civil society, the United Nations and other international actors since 2005.

Distribution Assessment : An assessment of the types, quantities, possession, distribution and movement of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition on Bougainville.

Impact Assessment : An assessment of the impact of small arms and light weapons on communities, including differential impacts on men, boys, women, girls, marginalized and vulnerable groups, etc. and on overall social and economic development.

Perception Survey : Survey of the differential attitudes of men, boys, women, girls, marginalized and vulnerable groups, etc. towards small arms and light weapons, armed violence and related issues such as security, development and governance.

Capacity Assessment : Assessment of community, local, national and regional resources, capacities and positive coping mechanisms available to respond to problems associated with small arms and light weapons, as well as relevant challenges, including legislative controls and their enforcement.

Key interlocutors

The assessment will be inclusive, participatory and conflict sensitive. It will gather information and data from among the following key interlocutors:

the Government of PNG, including

o the office of the Prime Minister,

o the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

o the National Coordinating Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA), and

o other relevant GPNG ministries;

the Autonomous Bougainville Government, including

o provincial, district and local-level government,

o law enforcement,

o health services, and

o other relevant ABG ministries;

traditional authorities on Bougainville (e.g. Chiefs, Elders and their Councils; village assemblies, etc.);

ex-combatants (including BRA, BRF, MDF, etc.); and

Bougainville civil society (including women’s groups, faith-based groups and youth goups).

In addition to the above PNG and ABG sources, the assessment will also gather information and data from

the office of the UN Resident Coordinator in PNG;

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UNDP presences on Bougainville; and

other relevant international partners with activities on Bougainville.

Human resources

The evaluation will be carried out using the following human resources:

A consultant with extensive experience of PNG and Bougainville deployed by UNDPA;

a staff member with extensive experience of small arms and light weapons control deployed by UNDP; and

UN/UNDP personnel on the ground in PNG and in the ARB.

Methodology

The evaluation methodology will include the following core components:

Desk review of available relevant materials;

High-level consultations with GPNG and ABG in order to secure consensus on the outline methodology to be used;

Key informant interviews with

o District and Local-Level ABG Officials,

o ABG law enforcement officers,

o Traditional Bougainville authorities (Chiefs, Elders, etc.),

o Ex-combatants,

o Health service workers, and

o Civil society organizations (women’s groups, faith-based groups, youth groups); and

Focus group discussions: Focus group discussions will be organized in each district visited and, if possible, in each LLG area. Priority will be given to two types of focus groups; one composed of females (all ages) and the other of young males (between the ages of about 15-25). Focus group discussion can include the creation of security maps, security timelines and actor maps.

Key informant interviews and focus group discussions will be conducted in a semi-structured manner using questionnaires.

Outputs

The outputs of the evaluation will include

an independent technical assessment of the current state of weapons disposal on Bougainville, along with an indication of further assessment work that main need to be undertaken; and

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a set of recommendations on how to further advance weapons disposal before a referendum on the political future of Bougainville to be held between 2015 and 2020.

report interim findings to GPNG and ABG on or around 3 December 2012

During the course of the evaluation, the Evaluation Team can discuss its interim findings with the Autonomous Arrangements Committee, upon request.

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