READINGS and QUESTIONS- Imperialism and Teddy Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy

AMSCO- US Foreign Policy, 1865-1914Ever since the 1790s, US foreign policy had been centered on expanding westward, protecting US interests abroad, and limiting

foreign influences in the Americas. The period after the Civil War saw the development of a booming industrial economy, which created the basis for a major shift in US relations with the rest of the world. Instead of a nation that- at least since the War of 1812- had been relatively isolated from European politics, the United States became a world power with territories extending across the Pacific to the Philippines. How and why did the United States acquire an overseas empire and intervene in the affairs of Cuba, Mexico, and other Latin American nations? For the origins of these developments, we must return briefly to the years just after the Civil War.

SEWARD, ALASKA, AND THE FRENCH IN MEXICOA leading Republican of the 1850s and 1860s, William H. Seward of New York served under both Abraham Lincoln and Andrew

Johnson as their secretary of state (1861-69). Seward achieved more as secretary of state than anyone since the time of John Quincy Adams (who had helped formulate the Monroe Doctrine in 1823). During the Civil War, Seward helped Lincoln prevent Great Britain and France from entering the war on the side of the South. A strong expansionist, he was unsuccessful in his efforts to convince Congress to annex Hawaii and purchase the Danish West Indies, but he achieved the annexation of Midway Island in the Pacific and gained rights to build a canal in Nicaragua.

The French in Mexico:Napoleon III (nephew of the first Napoleon) had taken advantage of US involvement in the Civil War by sending French troops to

occupy Mexico. With the conclusion of the Civil War in 1865, Seward immediately invoked the Monroe Doctrine and threatened US military action unless the French withdrew. Napoleon III backed down, and the French troops left Mexico.

The Purchase of Alaska:For decades, the vast territory of Alaska had been the subject of dispute between two European powers that claimed it: Russia and

Great Britain. Russia assumed control and established a small colony for seal hunting, but the territory soon became an economic burden always subject to the threat of a British takeover. Seeking buyers, Russia found Seward to be an enthusiastic champion of the idea of the United States acquiring Alaska by purchase. Due to Seward’s lobbying, and also in appreciation of Russian support during the Civil War, Congress in 1867 agreed to purchase Alaska for $7.2 million. It would take many years, however, for Americans to see the value in Alaska and stop referring to it derisively as “Seward’s Folly” and “Seward’s Icebox.”

THE “NEW IMPERIALISM”As the United States industrialized in the late 19 th century, it also intensified its foreign involvement partly because it needed (1)

worldwide markets for its growing industrial and agricultural surpluses and (2) sources of raw materials for manufacturing. In addition, many conservatives hoped that overseas territories and adventures might offer an outlet and safety valve for unhappiness at home. They were concerned about the growing violence of labor-management disputes and the unrest of farmers. For the most part, advocates of an expansionist policy hoped to achieve their ends by economic and diplomatic means, not by military action.

International Darwinism:Darwin’s concept of the survival of the fittest was applied not only to competition in the business world but also to competition

among nations. According to this theory, only the strongest survived, and, depending on the interests of various groups, this meant that the US had to be strong religiously, militarily, and politically. Therefore, in the international arena, the United States had to demonstrate its strength by acquiring territories overseas. Expansionists of the late 19 th century extended the idea of manifest destiny so that the potential for US territorial expansion applied not just to North America but to all parts of the world.

IMPERIALISM- Americans were not alone in pursuing a policy of imperialism, which meant either acquiring territory or gaining control over the political or economic life of other countries. Many nations in Europe, led by Britain, France, Germany, and Russia, as well as Japan, were involved in gaining possessions and influence in weaker countries, especially in Africa and the Pacific Ocean. Some in the United States believed that the nation had to compete with the imperialistic nations for new territory or it would grow weak and fail to survive. In the United States, advocates of American expansion included missionaries, politicians, naval strategists, and journalists.

MISSIONARIES- In his book, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Present Crisis (1885), the Reverend Josiah Strong wrote that people of Anglo-Saxon stock were “the fittest to survive” and that Protestant Americans had a Christian duty to colonize other lands for the purpose of spreading Christianity and Western civilization. Strong’s book expressed the thinking of many Protestant congregations, which believed that westerners of the Christian faith had a duty to bring the benefits of their “superior” civilization (medicine, science, and technology) to less fortunate peoples of the world. Many of the missionaries who traveled to Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Islands also believed in the racial superiority and supremacy of whites. Mission activities of their churches encouraged many Americans to support active US government involvement in foreign affairs.

POLITICIANS- Many in the Republican Party were closely allied with the business leaders, Republican politicians therefore generally endorsed the use of foreign affairs to search for new markets. Congressional leaders such as Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and the Republican governor of New York, Theodore Roosevelt, were eager to build US power through global expansion.

NAVAL POWER- US Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote an important book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890), in which he argued that a strong navy was crucial to a country’s ambitions of securing foreign markets and becoming a world power. Mahan’s book was widely read by prominent American citizens, and also by political leaders in Europe and Japan. Using arguments in Mahan’s book, US naval strategists persuaded Congress to finance the construction of modern steel ships and encouraged the acquisition of overseas islands, such as

Samoa, to be used as coaling and supply stations so that the new fleet would be a world power. By 1900, the United States had the third largest navy in the world.

POPULAR PRESS- Newspaper and magazine editors found that they could increase circulation by printing adventure stories about distant and exotic places. Stories in the popular press increased public interest and stimulated demands for a larger US role in world affairs.

Latin America:Beginning with the Monroe Doctrine in the 1820s, the United States had taken a special interest in problems of the Western

Hemisphere and had assumed the role of protector of Latin America from European ambitions. Benjamin Harrison’s Secretary of State James G. Blaine of Maine played a principal role in extending this tradition.

BLAINE & THE PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCE 1889- Blaine’s repeated efforts to establish closer ties between the United States and its southern neighbors bore fruit in 1889 with the meeting of the first Pan-American Conference in Washington. Representatives from various nations of the Western Hemisphere decided to create a permanent organization for international cooperation on trade and other issues. Blaine had hoped to bring about reductions in tariff rates. Although this goal was not achieved, the foundation was established for the larger goal of hemispheric cooperation on both economic and political issues. The Pan-American Union continues today as part of the Organization of American States, which was established in 1948.

CLEVELAND, OLNEY, & THE MONROE DOCTRINE- One of the most important uses of the Monroe Doctrine in the 19 th century concerned a boundary dispute between Venezuela and a neighboring territory- the British colony of Guiana. In 1895 and 1896, President Cleveland and Secretary of State Richard Olney insisted that Great Britain agree to arbitrate the dispute. At first, the British said the matter was not the business of the United States. Cleveland and Olney, however, argued that the Monroe Doctrine applied to the situation, and if the British did not arbitrate, the United States stood ready to back up its argument with military force. Deciding that US friendship was more important to its long-term interests than winning a boundary dispute in South America, the British finally agreed to US demands. As it turned out, the arbitrators ruled mainly in favor of Britain, not Venezuela. Even so, Latin American nations appreciated US efforts to protect them from European domination. Most important, the Venezuela boundary dispute marked a turning point in US-British relations. From 1895 on, Britain would cultivate US friendship rather than continuing its former hostility. The friendship would prove vital for both nations throughout the coming century.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR A principal target of American imperialism was the nearby Caribbean area. Expansionists from the South had coveted Cuba as early as

the 1850s. Now, in the 1890s, large American investments in Cuban sugar, Spanish misrule of Cuba, and the Monroe Doctrine all provided justification for US intervention in the Caribbean’s largest island.

Causes of War:In the 1890s, American public opinion was being swept by a growing wave of JINGOISM- an intense form of nationalism calling for an

aggressive foreign policy. Expansionists demanded that the United States take its place with the imperialist nations of Europe as a world power. Not everyone favored such a policy. Presidents Cleveland and McKinley were among many who thought military action abroad was both morally wrong and economically unsound. Nevertheless, specific events combined with background pressure led to overwhelming popular demand for war against Spain.

CUBAN REVOLT- Bands of Cuban nationalists had been fighting for ten years to overthrow Spanish colonial rule. In 1895, they adopted the strategy of sabotaging and laying waste Cuban plantations in order either to force Spain’s withdrawal or involve the United States in their revolution. Spain responded by sending the autocratic General Valeriano Weyler and over 100,000 troops to suppress the revolt.

YELLOW PRESS- Actively promoting war fever in the United States were sensationalistic city newspapers with their bold and lurid headlines of crime, disaster, and scandal. “Yellow journalism,” as this type of newspaper reporting was called, went to new extremes as two New York newspapers- Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal- printed exaggerated and false accounts of Spanish atrocities in Cuba. Believing what they read daily in their newspapers many, Americans urged Congress and the president to intervene in Cuba to put a stop to the atrocities and suffering.

DE LOME LETTER 1898- One story that caused a storm of outrage was a Spanish diplomat’s letter that was leaked to the press and printed on the front page of Hearst’s New York Journal. Written by the Spanish minister to the United States, Dupuy de Lôme, the letter was highly critical of President McKinley. Many considered it an official Spanish insult against the US national honor.

SINKING OF THE MAINE- Less than one week after the de Lôme letter made headlines, a far more shocking event occurred. On February 15, 1898, the US battleship Maine was at anchor in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, when it suddenly exploded, killing 260 Americans on board. The yellow press accused Spain of deliberately blowing up the ship, even though experts later concluded that the explosion was probably an accident.

MCKINLEY’S WAR MESSAGE- Following the sinking of the Maine, President McKinley issued an ultimatum to Spain demanding that it agree to a ceasefire in Cuba. Spain agreed to this demand, but US newspapers and a majority in Congress kept clamoring for war. McKinley yielded to the public pressure in April by sending a war message to Congress. He offered four reasons for the United States to intervene in the Cuban revolution on behalf of the rebels:

(1) “Put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries” in Cuba.(2) Protect the lives and property of US citizens living in Cuba.(3) End “the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people”. (4) End “the constant menace to our peace” arising from the disorders in Cuba.

TELLER AMENDMENT- Responding to the president’s message, Congress passed a joint resolution on April 20 authorizing war. Part of the resolution, the Teller Amendment, declared that the United States had no intention of taking political control of Cuba and that, once peace was restored to the island, the Cuban people would control their own government. Fighting the War:

The first shots of the Spanish-American War were fired in Manila Bay in the Philippines, thousands of miles from Cuba. The last shots were fired only a few months later in August. So swift was the US victory that Secretary of State John Hay called it “a splendid little war.”

THE PHILIPPINES- Theodore Roosevelt, McKinley’s assistant secretary of the navy, was an expansionist who was eager to show off the power of his country’s new, all-steel navy. Anticipating war and recognizing the strategic value of Spain’s territories in the Pacific, Roosevelt had ordered a fleet commanded by Commodore George Dewey to the Philippines. This large group of islands had been under Spanish control ever since the 1500s. On May 1, shortly after war was declared, Commodore Dewey’s fleet opened fire on Spanish ships in Manila Bay. The Spanish fleet was soon pounded into submission by US naval guns. The fight on land took longer. Allied with Filipino rebels, US troops captured Manila on Aug 13.

INVASION OF CUBA- More troublesome than the Philippines was the US effort in Cuba. An ill-prepared, largely volunteer force landed in Cuba by the end of June. Here the most lethal enemy proved to be not Spanish bullets but tropical diseases. More than 5,000 American soldiers died of malaria, typhoid, and dysentery, while less than 500 died in battle. Attacks by both American and Cuban forces succeeded in defeating the much larger but poorly led Spanish army. Next to Dewey’s victory in Manila Bay, the most celebrated event of the war was a cavalry charge up San Juan Hill in Cuba by the Rough Riders, a regiment of volunteers led by Teddy Roosevelt, who had resigned his Navy post to take part in the war. Roosevelt’s volunteers were aided in victory by veteran regiments of African Americans. Less heroic but more important than the taking of San Juan Hill was the success of the US Navy in destroying the Spanish fleet at Santiago Bay on July 3. Without a navy, Spain realized that it could not continue fighting, and in early August asked for US terms of peace.

Annexation of Hawaii:For decades before the war, the Pacific Islands of Hawaii had been settled by American missionaries and entrepreneurs. US

expansionists had long coveted the islands and, in 1893, American settlers had aided in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarch. Queen Liliuokalani. President Cleveland, however, had opposed republican efforts to annex Hawaii. Then the outbreak of war and fight for the Philippines gave Congress and President McKinley the pretext to complete annexation in July 1898. The Hawaiian Islands became a territory of the United States in 1900. Hawaii became the 50th state in the Union in August 1959.

Controversy Over the Treaty of Peace:Far more controversial than the war itself were the terms of the treaty of peace signed in Paris on December 10, 1898. It provided for

(1) recognition of Cuban independence, (2) US acquisition of two Spanish islands- Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and Guam in the Pacific, and (3) US acquisition of the Philippines in return for payment to Spain of $20 million. Since the avowed purpose of the US war effort was to liberate Cuba, Americans accepted this provision of the treaty. They were not prepared, however, for the idea of taking over a large Pacific island nation, the Philippines.

THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION- Controversy over the Philippine question took many months longer to resolve than the brief war with Spain. Opinion both in Congress and the public at large became sharply divided between imperialists who favored annexing the Philippines and anti-imperialists who opposed it. In the Senate, where a two-thirds vote was required to ratify the Treaty of Paris, anti-imperialists were determined to defeat the treaty because of its provision for taking over the Philippines. They argued that, for the first time, the United States would be taking possession of a heavily populated area whose people were of a different race and culture. Such action, they thought, violated the principles of the Declaration of Independence by depriving Filipinos of the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and also would entangle the United States in the political conflicts in Asia. On February 6, 1899, the imperialists prevailed and the Treaty of Paris (and Philippine annexation) was ratified by an extremely close vote of 57 to 27. The anti-imperialists fell just two votes short of defeating the treaty. The people of the Philippines were outraged that their hopes for national independence from Spain were not being denied by the United States. Filipino nationalist leader Emilio Aguinaldo had fought alongside US troops during the Spanish-American War. Now he led bands of guerilla fighters in a war against US control. It took US troops three years and cost thousands of lives on both side before the insurrection finally ended in 1902.

Other Results of the War:Imperialism remained a major issue in the United States even after ratification of the Treaty of Paris. An Anti-Imperialist League, led

by William Jennings Bryan, rallied opposition to further acts of expansion in the Pacific.

INSULAR CASES- One question concerned the constitutional rights of the Philippine people: Did the Constitution follow the flag? In other words, did the provisions of the US Constitution apply to whatever territories fell under US control, including the Philippines and Puerto Rico? Bryan and other anti-imperialists argued in the affirmative, while leading imperialists argued in the negative. The issue was resolved in favor of the imperialists in a series of Supreme Court cases (1901-03) known as the insular (island) cases. The Court ruled that constitutional rights were not automatically extended to territorial possessions and that the power to decide whether or not to grant such rights belonged to Congress.

CUBA AND THE PLATT AMENDMENT 1901- Previously, the Teller Amendment to the war resolution of 1898 had more or less guaranteed US respect for Cuba’s sovereignty as an independent nation. Nevertheless, US troops remained in Cuba from 1898 until 1901. In the latter years, Congress made the withdrawal of troops conditional upon Cuba’s acceptance of certain terms. These terms were included in an amendment to an army appropriations bill- the Platt amendment of 1901. Bitterly resented by Cuban nationalists, the Platt amendment required Cuba to agree:

(1) Never to sign a treaty with a foreign power that impaired its independence(2) Never to build up an excessive public debt(3) To permit the United States to intervene in Cuba’s affairs to preserve its independence and maintain law and order

(4) To allow the US to maintain naval bases in Cuba, including one at Guantanamo Bay

A Cuban convention reluctantly accepted these terms, adding them to its country’s new constitution. In effect, the Platt Amendment made Cuba a US protectorate; in other words, its foreign policy would be, for many years, subject to US oversight and control.

ELECTION OF 1900- The Republicans renominated President McKinley, along with war hero and New York Governor Theodore Roosevelt for vice president. The Democrats, as they had in 1896, nominated William Jennings Bryan, who again argued for free silver. With most Americans accepting the recently enacted gold standard, Bryan vigorously attacked the growth of American imperialism. While many Americans questioned imperialism, they saw the new territory, including the Philippines, acquired during the war as an accomplished fact. The deciding issue was the growing national economic prosperity, which convinced the majority to give McKinley a larger margin of victory than in 1896.

RECOGNITION OF US POWER- One positive consequence of the Spanish-American War was its effect on the way both Americans and Europeans thought about US power. The decisive US victory in the war filled Americans with national pride. Southerners shared in this pride and became more attached to the Union after their bitter experience in the 1860s. At the same time, France, Great Britain, and other European nations came to recognize that the United States was a first-class power with a strong navy and a new willingness to take an active role in international affairs.

OPEN-DOOR POLICY IN CHINAEuropeans were further impressed by US involvement in global politics as a result of John Hay’s policies toward China. As McKinley’s

secretary of state, Hay was alarmed that the Chinese empire, weakened by political corruption and failure to modernize, was falling under the control of various outside powers. In the 1890s, Russia, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Germany had all established SPHERES OF INFLUENCE in China, meaning that they could dominate trade and investment within their sphere (a particular port or region of China) and shut out competitors. To prevent the United State from losing access to the lucrative China trade, Hay dispatched a diplomatic note in 1899 to nations holding spheres of influence. He asked them to accept the concept of an Open Door, by which all nations would have equal trading privileges in China. The replies to Hay’s note were evasive, but because no nation rejected the concept, Hay declared that all had accepted the Open Door Policy. The press hailed Hay’s initiative as a diplomatic triumph.

Boxer Rebellion 1900:As the 19th century ended, nationalism and XENOPHOBIA (hatred and fear of foreigners) were on the rise in China. In 1900, a secret

society of Chinese nationalists- the Society of Harmonious Fists, or Boxers- attacked foreign settlements and murdered dozens of Christian missionaries. To protect American lives and property, US troops participated in an international force that marched into Peking (Beijing) and quickly succeeded in crushing the rebellion of the rebellion of the Boxers. China was forced to pay a huge sum in indemnities, which further weakened the imperial regime.

Hay’s Second Round of Notes:Hay feared that the expeditionary force in China might attempt to occupy the country and destroy its independence. In 1900,

therefore, he wrote a second note to the imperialistic powers stating US commitment to (1) preserve China’s territorial integrity as well as (2) safeguard “equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire.” Hay’s first and second notes set US policy on China not only for the administrations of McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt but also for future presidents. In the 1930s, this Open Door policy for China would strongly influence US relations with Japan. Hay’s notes in themselves did not deter other nations from exploiting the situation in China. For the moment, European powers were kept from grabbing larger pieces of China by the political rivalries among themselves.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S “BIG-STICK” POLICYThe Panama Canal:

As a result of the Spanish-American War, the new American empire stretched from Puerto Rico in the Caribbean to the Philippines in the Pacific. As a strategic necessity for holding on to these far-flung islands, the United States needed a canal through Central America to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

REVOLUTION IN PANAMA- Roosevelt was eager to begin the construction of a canal through the narrow but rugged terrain of the Isthmus of Panama. He was frustrated, however, by the fact that Colombia controlled this isthmus and refused to agree to US terms for digging the canal through its territory. Losing patience with Colombia, Roosevelt supported a revolt in Panama in 1903. With US backing, the rebellion succeeded immediately and almost without bloodshed. The first act of the new government of independent Panama was to sign a treaty (the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903) granting the United States long-term control of a canal zone.

HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY 1901- One other obstacle to a canal built and operated by the United States had been removed earlier by the signing in 1901 of a treaty with Great Britain. The British had agreed to abrogate (cancel) an earlier treaty of 1850 in which any canal in Central America was to be under joint British-US control. Now, as a result of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the United States could begin to dig the canal without British involvement.

BUILDING THE CANAL- Started in 1904, the Panama Canal was completed in 1914. Hundreds of laborers lost their lives in the effort. The work was completed thanks in great measure to the skills of two Army colonels- George Goethals, the chief engineer of the canal, and Dr. William Gorgas, whose efforts eliminated the mosquitoes that spread deadly yellow fever. Most Americans approved of Roosevelt’s determination to build the canal. Many, however, were unhappy with the high-handed tactics employed to secure the Canal Zone. Latin Americans were especially resentful. To compensate, Congress finally voted in 1921 to pay Colombia an indemnity of $25 million for its loss of Panama.

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine:Another application of Roosevelt’s big-stick diplomacy involved Latin American nations that were in deep financial trouble and could

not pay their debts to European creditors. In 1902, for example, the British dispatched warships to Venezuela to force that country to pay its

debts. In 1904, it appeared that European powers stood ready to intervene in Santo Domingo (the Dominican Republic) for the same reason. Rather than let Europeans intervene in Latin America- a blatant violation of the Monroe Doctrine- Roosevelt declared in December 1904 that the United States would intervene instead, whenever necessary. This policy became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. It meant that the United States would send gunboats to a Latin American country that was delinquent in paying its debts. US sailors and marines would then occupy the country’s major ports to manage the collection of customs taxes until European debts were satisfied. Over the next 20 years, US presidents used the Roosevelt Corollary to justify sending US forces into Haiti, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. The long-term result of such interventions was poor US relations with the entire region of Latin America.

East Asia:As the 20th century began, Japan and the United States were both relatively new imperialist powers in East Asia. Their relationship

during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, though at first friendly, grew increasingly competitive.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR- Imperialist rivalry between Russia and Japan led to a war between these nations (1904-05), which Japan was winning. To end the war, Theodore Roosevelt arranged for a diplomatic conference between representatives of the two foes at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1905. Although both Japan and Russia agreed to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japanese nationalists blamed the United States for not fiving their country all that they wanted from Russia.

“GENTLEMEN’S AGREEMENT”- A major cause of friction between Japan and the United States concerned the laws of California, which discriminated against Japanese Americans. San Francisco’s practice of requiring Japanese American children to attend segregated schools was considered a national insult in Japan. In 1908, President Roosevelt arranged a compromise by means of an informal understanding, or “gentlemen’s agreement.” The Japanese government secretly agreed to restrict the emigration of Japanese workers to the United States in return for Roosevelt persuading California to repeal its discriminatory laws.

GREAT WHITE FLEET- To demonstrate US naval power to Japan and other nations, Roosevelt sent a fleet of battleships on an around-the-world cruise (1907-09). The great white ships made an impressive sight, and the Japanese government warmly welcomed their arrival in Tokyo Bay.

ROOT-TAKAHIRA AGREEMENT 1908- An important executive agreement was concluded between the United States and Japan in 1908. Secretary of State Elihu Root and Japanese Ambassador Takahira exchanged notes pledging the following: (1) mutual respect for each nation’s Pacific possessions and (2) support for the Open Door policy in China.

Peace Efforts:The purpose of the great white fleet and all other applications of Roosevelt’s big-stick policy was to maintain the peace between rival

nations. The president consistently promoted peaceful solutions to international disputes. For his work in settling the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906. In the same year, he helped arrange and direct the Algeciras Conference in Spain, which succeeded in settling a conflict between France and Germany over claims to Morocco. The president also directed US participation at the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, which discussed rules for limiting warfare.

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT AND “DOLLAR DIPLOMACY”Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft (1909-13), did not carry a big stick. He adopted a foreign policy that was mildly

expansionist but depended on investors’ dollars than on the navy’s battleships. His policy of trying to promote US trade by supporting American enterprises abroad was given the name “dollar diplomacy.”

Dollar Diplomacy in East Asia and Latin America:Taft believed that private American financial investment in China and the nations of Central America would lead to greater stability

there, while at the same time promoting US business interests. His policy, however, was thwarted by one major obstacle: growing anti-imperialism both in the United States and overseas.

RAILROADS IN CHINA- Taft first tested his policy in China. Wanting US bankers to be included in a British, French, and German plan to invest in railroads in China, Taft succeeded in securing American participation in an agreement signed in 1911. In the northern province of Manchuria, however, the United States was excluded from an agreement between Russia and Japan to build railroads there. In direct defiance of the US Open Door policy, Russia and Japan agreed to treat Manchuria as a jointly held sphere of influence.

INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA- To protect American investments, the United States intervened in Nicaragua’s financial affairs in 1911, and sent in marines when a civil war broke out in 1912. The marines remained, except for a short period, until 1933.

The Lodge Corollary:Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican senator from Massachusetts, was responsible for another action that alienated both Latin America

and Japan. A group of Japanese investors wanted to buy a large part of Mexico’s Baja Peninsula, extending south of California. Fearing that Japan’s government might be secretly scheming to acquire the land, Lodge introduced and the Senate in 1912 passed a resolution known as the Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The resolution stated that non-European powers (such as Japan) would be excluded from owning territory in the Western Hemisphere. President Taft opposed the corollary, which also offended Japan and angered Latin American countries.

WOODROW WILSON AND MORAL DIPLOMACYIn his campaign for president in 1912, the Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson called for a NEW FREEDOM in government and

promised a moral approach to foreign affairs. Wilson said he opposed imperialism and the big-stick and dollar-diplomacy policies of his Republican predecessors.

Moral Diplomacy:

In his first term as president (1913-17), Wilson had limited success applying a high moral standard to foreign relations. He and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan hoped to demonstrate that the United States respected other nations’ rights and would support the spread of democracy.

RIGHTING PAST WRONGS- Hoping to demonstrate that his presidency was opposed to self-interested imperialism, Wilson took steps to correct what he viewed as wrongful policies of the past.

(1) The Philippines- Wilson won passage of the Jones Act of 1916, which (1) granted full territorial status to that country, (2) guaranteed a bill of rights and universal male suffrage to Filipino citizens, and (3) promised Philippine independence as soon as a stable government was established.

(2) Puerto Rico- An act of Congress in 1917 granted US citizenship to all the inhabitants and also provided for limited self-government. (3) Panama Canal- Wilson persuaded Congress in 1914 to repeal an act that had granted US ships an exemption from paying the standard

canal tolls charged other nations. Wilson’s policy on Panama Canal tolls angered American nationalists like Roosevelt and Lodge but pleased the British, who had strongly objected to the US exemption.

CONCILIATION TREATIES- Wilson’s commitment to the ideals of democracy and peace was fully shared by his famous secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan. Bryan’s pet project was to negotiate treaties in which nations pledged to (1) submit disputes to international commissions and (2) observe a one-year cooling-off period before taking military action. Bryan arranged with Wilson’s approval, 30 such conciliation treaties.

Military Intervention in Latin America:Wilson’s commitment to democracy and anti-colonialism had a blind spot with respect to the countries of Central America and the

Caribbean. He went far beyond both Roosevelt and Taft in his use of US marines to straighten out financial and political troubles in the region. Throughout his presidency, he kept marines in Nicaragua and ordered US troops into Haiti in 1915 and the Dominican Republic in 1916. He argued that such intervention was necessary to maintain stability in the region and protect the Panama Canal.

Conflict in Mexico:Wilson’s moral approach to foreign affairs was severely tested by a revolution and civil war in Mexico. Wanting democracy to triumph

there, he refused to recognize the military dictatorship of General Victoriano Huerta, who had seized power in Mexico in 1913 by arranging to assassinate the democratically elected president.

TAMPICO INCIDENT- To aid a revolutionary faction that was fighting Huerta, Wilson asked for an arms embargo against the Mexican government and sent a fleet to blockade the port of Vera Cruz. In 1914, several American seamen went ashore in Tampico where they were arrested by Mexican authorities and soon released. Huerta refused to apologize, as demanded by a US naval officer, and Wilson in retaliation ordered the US Navy to occupy Vera Cruz. War between Mexico and the United States seemed imminent. It was averted, however, when South America’s ABC powers- Argentina, Brazil, and Chile- offered to mediate the dispute. This was the first dispute in the Americas to be settled through joint mediation.

PANCHO VILLA AND THE US EXPEDITIONARY FORCE- Huerta fell from power in late 1914 and was replaced by a more democratic regime led by Venustiano Carranza. Almost immediately, the new government was challenged by a band of revolutionaries loyal to Pancho Villa. Hoping to destabilize his opponent’s government, Villa led raids across the US- Mexican border and murdered a number of people in Texas and New Mexico. In March 1916, President Wilson ordered General John J. Pershing to pursue Villa into Mexico. This expeditionary force, as it was called, was in northern Mexico for months without being able to capture Villa. President Carranza eventually protested the American presence in Mexico. In January 1917, the growing possibility of US entry into World War I caused Wilson to withdraw Pershing’s troops.

Debate Over the Annexation of HawaiiThe 1897 Petition Against the Annexation of Hawaii

When the Hawaiian Islands were formally annexed by the US in 1898, the event marked the end of a lengthy internal struggle between native Hawaiians and white American businessmen for control of the Hawaiian government. In 1893 the last monarch of Hawaii, Queen Liliuokalani, was overthrown by a party of businessmen, who then imposed a provisional government. Soon after, President Benjamin Harrison submitted a treaty to annex the Hawaiian Islands to the U.S. Senate for ratification. In 1897, the treaty effort was blocked when the newly-formed Hawaiian Patriotic League, composed of native Hawaiians, successfully petitioned the U.S. Congress in opposition of the treaty. The League's lobbying efforts left only 46 Senators in favor of the resolution, less than the 2/3 majority needed for approval of a treaty. The League's victory was short-lived; however as unfolding world events soon forced the annexation issue to the foreground again. With the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine in February of 1898 signaling the start of the Spanish American War, establishing a mid-Pacific fueling station and naval base became a strategic imperative for the United States. The Hawaiian Islands were the clear choice, and this time Congress moved to annex the Hawaiian Islands by Joint Resolution, a process requiring only a simple majority in both houses of Congress. On July 12, 1898, the Joint Resolution passed and the Hawaiian Islands were officially annexed by the United States. Once annexed by the United States, the Hawaiian Islands remained a U.S. territory until 1959, when they were admitted to statehood as the 50th state. The story of the annexation is a story of conflicting goals as the white businessmen struggled to obtain favorable trade conditions and native Hawaiians sought to protect their cultural heritage and maintain a national identity. The 1897 Petition by the Hawaiian Patriotic League stands as evidence that the native Hawaiian people objected to annexation, but because the interests of the businessmen won out, over the coming decades most historians who wrote the history of Hawaii emphasized events as told by the Provisional Government and largely neglected the struggle of the Native Hawaiians. Today, there is a growing movement on the Islands to revive interest in the native Hawaiian language and culture.

December 19, 1898 Letter of Protest from Queen Liliuokalani of Hawaii to the House of Representatives: I, Liliuokalani of Hawaii, named heir apparent on the 10th day of April, 1877, and proclaimed Queen of the Hawaiian Islands on the 29th day of January, 1891, do hereby earnestly and respectfully protest against the assertion of ownership by the United States of America of the so-called Hawaiian Crown Islands amounting to about one million acres and which are my property, and I especially protest against such assertion of ownership as a taking of property without due process of law and without just or other compensation.

Therefore, supplementing my protest of June 17, 1897, I call upon the President and the National Legislature and the People of the United States to do justice in this matter and to restore to me this property, the enjoyment of which is being withheld from me by your Government under what must be a misapprehension of my right and title.Done at Washington, DC, USA, December 19, 1898PRESIDENT GROVER CLEVELAND'S MESSAGE: December 18, 1893To the Senate and House of Representatives:

In my recent annual message to the Congress I briefly referred to our relations with Hawaii and expressed the intention of transmitting further information on the subject when additional advices permitted… I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject. If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial extension, or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own, ought to regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our Government and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of their public servants. When the present Administration entered upon its duties the Senate had under consideration a treaty providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the United States. Surely under our Constitution and laws the enlargement of our limits is a manifestation of the highest attribute of sovereignty, and if entered upon as an Executive act, all things relating to the transaction should be clear and free from suspicion. Additional importance attached to this particular treaty of annexation, because it contemplated a departure from unbroken American tradition in providing for the addition to our territory of islands of the sea more than two thousand miles removed from our nearest coast. These considerations might not of themselves call for interference with the completion of a treaty entered upon by a previous Administration. but it appeared from the documents accompanying the treaty when submitted to the Senate, that the ownership of Hawaii was tendered to us by a provisional government set up to succeed the constitutional ruler of the islands, who had been dethroned, and it did not appear that such provisional government had the sanction of either popular revolution or suffrage.. In the next place, upon the face of the papers submitted with the treaty, it clearly appeared that there was open and undetermined an issue of fact of the most vital importance. The message of the President accompanying the treaty declared that "the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government," and in a letter to the President from the Secretary of State also submitted to the Senate with the treaty, the following message occurs: "At the time the provisional government took possession of the Government buildings no troops or officers of the United States were present or took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was accorded to the provisional government by the United States Minister until after the Queen's abdication and when they were in effective possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, the barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the Government." But a protest also accompanied said treaty, signed by the Queen and her ministers at the time she made way for the provisional government, which explicitly stated that she yielded to the superior force of the United States, whose Minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support such provisional government. The truth or falsity of this protest was surely of the first importance… I conceived it to be my duty therefore to withdraw the treaty from the Senate for examination, and meanwhile to cause an accurate, full, and impartial investigation to be made of the facts attending the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii and the installment in its place of the provisional government. I selected for the work of investigation the Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia, whose service of eighteen years as a member of the House of Georgia, and whose experience as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in that body, and his consequent familiarity with international topics, joined with his high character and honorable reputation, seemed to render him peculiarly fitted for the duties entrusted to him. His report detailing his action under the instructions given to him and the conclusions derived from his investigation accompany this message… The report with its accompanying proofs, and such other evidence as is now before the Congress or is herewith submitted, justifies in my opinion the statement that when the President was led to submit the treaty to the Senate with the declaration that "the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government", and when the Senate was induced to receive and discuss it on that basis, both President and Senate were misled… It is unnecessary to set forth the reasons which in January, 1893, led a considerable proportion of American and other foreign merchants and traders residing at Honolulu to favor the annexation of Hawaii to the United States. It is sufficient to note the fact and to observe that the project was one which was zealously promoted by the Minister representing the United States in that country. He evidently had an ardent desire that it should become a fact accomplished by his agency and during his ministry, and was not inconveniently scrupulous as to the means employed to that end. On the 19th day of November, 1892, nearly two months before the first overt act tending towards the subversion of the Hawaiian Government and the attempted transfer of Hawaiian territory to the United States, he addressed a long letter to the Secretary of State in which the case for annexation was elaborately argued, on moral, political, and economical grounds. He refers to the loss of the Hawaiian sugar interests from the operation of the McKinley bill, and the tendency to still further depreciation of sugar property unless some positive measure of relief is granted. He strongly inveighs against the existing Hawaiian Government and emphatically declares for annexation. He says: "In truth the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it once stood no longer existing, the monarchy now is only an impediment to good government - an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the islands." He further says: "As a crown colony of Great Britain or a Territory of the United States the government modifications could be made readily and good administration of the law secured. Destiny and the vast future interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who at no distant day must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the existing Territories of the United States." * * * "Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia, or the other which outlets her in America, gives her an American civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny." He also declares: "One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be followed, either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not expressly stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more advantageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end to the United States. If it was wise for the United States through Secretary Marcy thirty-eight years ago to offer to expend $100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly cannot be chimerical or unwise to expend $100,000 to secure annexation in the near future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger than they were then. I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand."

These declarations certainly show a disposition and condition of mind, which may be usefully recalled when interpreting the significance of the Minister's conceded acts or when considering the probabilities of such conduct on his part as may not be admitted. In this view it seems proper to also quote from a letter written by the Minister to the Secretary of State on the 8th day of March, 1892, nearly a year prior to the first step taken toward annexation. After stating the possibility that the existing Government of Hawaii might be overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolution, Minister Stevens writes as follows: "Ordinarily in like circumstances, the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement of United States forces in foreign waters and dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation and of the lives and property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present Minister and naval commander may deviate from established international rules and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this dispatch”… As a further illustration of the activity of this diplomatic representative, attention is called to the fact that on the day the above letter was written, apparently unable longer to restrain his ardor, he issued a proclamation whereby "in the name of the United States" he assumed the protection of the Hawaiian Islands and declared that said action was "taken pending and subject to negotiations at Washington." Of course this assumption of a protectorate was promptly disavowed by our Government, but the American flag remained over the Government building at Honolulu and the forces remained on guard until April, and after Mr. Blount's arrival on the scene, when both were removed. A brief statement of the occurrences that led to the subversion of the constitutional Government of Hawaii in the interests of annexation to the United States will exhibit the true complexion of that transaction. On Saturday, January 14, 1893, the Queen of Hawaii, who had been contemplating the proclamation of a new constitution, had, in deference to the wishes and remonstrances of her cabinet, renounced the project for the present at least. Taking this relinquished purpose as a basis of action, citizens of Honolulu numbering from fifty to one hundred, mostly resident aliens, met in a private office and selected a so-called Committee of Safety, composed of thirteen persons, seven of whom were foreign subjects, and consisted of five Americans, one Englishman, and one German. This committee, though its designs were not revealed, had in view nothing less than annexation to the United States, and between Saturday, the 14th, and the following Monday, the 16th of January - though exactly what action was taken may not be clearly disclosed -they were certainly in communication with the United States Minister. On Monday morning the Queen and her cabinet made public proclamation, with a notice which was specially served upon the representatives of all foreign governments, that any changes in the constitution would be sought only in the methods provided by that instrument. Nevertheless, at the call and under the auspices of the Committee of Safety, a mass meeting of citizens was held on that day to protest against the Queen's alleged illegal and unlawful proceedings and purposes. Even at this meeting the Committee of Safety continued to disguise their real purpose and contented themselves with procuring the passage of a resolution denouncing the Queen and empowering the committee to devise ways and means "to secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii." This meeting adjourned between three and four o'clock in the afternoon. On the same day, and immediately after such adjournment, the committee, unwilling to take further steps without the cooperation of the United States Minister, addressed him a note representing that the public safety was menaced and that lives and property were in danger, and concluded as follows: "We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the United States forces." Whatever may be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute truth of this latter statement is incontestable. When the note was written and delivered, the committee, so far as it appears, had neither a man or a gun at their command, and after its delivery they became so panic-stricken at their stricken position that they sent some of their number to interview the Minister and request him not to land the United States forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been ordered, and whether the committee was ready or not the landing should take place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893, between four and five o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from the United States Steamer Boston, with two pieces of artillery, landed at Honolulu. The men, upwards of 160 in all, were supplied with double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and medical supplies. This military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an act of war, unless made either with the consent of the Government of Hawaii or for the bona fide purpose of protecting the imperiled lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen, which at that time was undisputed and was both the de facto and the de jure government. In point of fact the existing government instead of requesting the presence of an armed force protested against it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such forces were landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they would have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to protect it, instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian Government building and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command of our naval force on the Pacific station, has frankly stated that in his opinion the location of the troops was inadvisable if they were landed for the protection of American citizens whose residences and places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a distant part of the city, but the location selected was a wise one if the forces were landed for the purpose of supporting the provisional government. If any peril to life and property calling for any such martial array had existed, Great Britain and other foreign powers interested would not have been behind the United States in activity to protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When these armed men were landed, the city of Honolulu was in its customary orderly and peaceful condition. There was no symptom of riot or disturbance in any quarter. Men, women, and children were about the streets as usual, and nothing varied the ordinary routine or disturbed the ordinary tranquility, except the landing of the Boston's marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them. Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United States forces on the plea of danger to life and property the Committee of Safety themselves requested the Minister to postpone action, exposed the untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and property. The peril they saw was an anticipation growing out of guilty intentions on their part and something which, though not then existing, they knew would certainly follow their attempt to overthrow the Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States forces. Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States forces without the consent or wish of the government of the islands, or of anybody else so far as shown, except the United States Minister. Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States on the day mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers threatening American life and property. It must be accounted for in some other way and on some other ground, and its real motive and purpose are neither obscure nor far to seek. The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably stationed, the committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme. They met the next morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of temporary government, and fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom were drawn from the thirteen members of the Committee of Safety. Between one and two o'clock, by squads and by different routes to avoid notice, and having first taken the precaution of ascertaining whether there was any one there to oppose them, they proceeded to the Government building to proclaim the new government. No sign of opposition was manifest, and thereupon an American citizen began to read

the proclamation from the steps of the Government building almost entirely without auditors. It is said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of persons, variously estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some unarmed, gathered about the committee to give them aid and confidence. This statement is not important, since the one controlling factor in the whole affair was unquestionably the United States marines, who, drawn up under arms and with artillery in readiness only seventy-six yards distant, dominated the situation. The provisional government thus proclaimed was by the terms of the proclamation "to exist until terms of union with the United States had been negotiated and agreed upon". The United States Minister, pursuant to prior agreement, recognized this government within an hour after the reading of the proclamation, and before five o'clock, in answer to an inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced that he had done so. When our Minister recognized the provisional government the only basis upon which it rested was the fact that the Committee of Safety had in the manner above stated declared it to exist. It was neither a government de facto nor de jure… But the United States had allied itself with her enemies, had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice... Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the provisional government by the United States Minister she yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss of life and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands… Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in its possession. The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing how scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the people of Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved that on the acknowledgment of their independence by the United States they would seek admission into the Union. Several months after the battle of San Jacinto, by which Texan independence was practically assured and established, President Jackson declined to recognize it, alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it became us "to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves". This is in marked contrast with the hasty recognition of a government openly and concededly set up for the purpose of tendering to us territorial annexation. I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States. Fair-minded people with the evidence before them will hardly claim that the Hawaiian Government was overthrown by the people of the islands or that the provisional government had ever existed with their consent. I do not understand that any member of this government claims that the people would uphold it by their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question. While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican form of government, it has been the settled policy of the United States to concede to people of foreign countries the same freedom and independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we have always claimed for ourselves; and it has been our practice to recognize revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were supported by the people… As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the following conditions: The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may be safely asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives. But for the notorious predilections of the United States Minister for annexation, the Committee of Safety, which should be called the Committee of Annexation, would never have existed. But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by undertaking the subversion of the Queen's Government. But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the committee would not have proclaimed the provisional government from the steps of the Government building. And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens' recognition of the provisional government when the United States forces were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the provisional government, even for a time and for the sole purpose of submitting her case to the enlightened justice of the United States. Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for its consideration, and in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of which accompanies this message, I have directed him to so inform the provisional government… By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress, the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair. The provisional government has not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has remained a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support and has given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the representatives of that government assert that the people of Hawaii are unfit for popular government and frankly avow that they can be best ruled by arbitrary or despotic power. The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a civilized state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations. The considerations that international law is without a court for its enforcement, and that obedience to its commands practically depends upon good faith, instead of upon the mandate of a superior tribunal, only give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any deliberate infraction of it not merely as a wrong but as a disgrace. A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which subjects him to legal liabilities; and the United States in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of nations would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United States cannot properly be put in the position of countenancing a wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it cannot allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States, the United States cannot fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.

These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special conditions of the Queen's surrender of her sovereignty are recalled. She surrendered not to the provisional government, but to the United States. She surrendered not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts could be considered by the United States. Furthermore, the provisional government acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of that government who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the justice of the United States, and that the whole subject would be finally considered at Washington… Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of January last, if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show, contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the provisional government and a recognition of all its bona fide acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be buried, and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that they will be insisted upon, and that, unless acceded to, the efforts of the President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence. The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their presentation to the members of the provisional government, while unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the prospects of successful Executive mediation… In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of the Congress, I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much gratified to cooperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.

GROVER CLEVELANDExecutive MansionWashington, December 18, 1893

Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, 1898

Queen Liliuokalani, of the Hawaiian Islands, attempted, in 1893, to introduce a new constitution, which would place the government of the Islands much more completely in her power than it had previously been. The attempt did not succeed; the Queen was forced to abdicate; and the foreigners in Honolulu set up a provisional government with a view to negotiating for annexation to the United States. President Harrison sent an annexation treaty to the Senate, but President Cleveland, on his coming into power, withdrew it. President McKinley, in 1897, sent in a second treaty, which was passed by Congress in June and July, 1898, and the sovereignty was transferred to the United States on Aug. 12, 1898.

Whereas, the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in due form, signified its consent, in the manner provided by its constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America, all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, and also to cede and transfer to the United States, the absolute fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be, and they are hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and are subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United States of America.

The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands; but the Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their management and disposition: Provided, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public purposes.

Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United states shall direct; and the President shall have power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so occasioned.The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, between the United States and such foreign nations. The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine.

Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States and other countries shall remain unchanged.

The public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at the date of the passage of this joint resolution, including the amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Savings Bank, is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States; but the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case exceed four million dollars. So long, however, as the existing Government and the present commercial relations of the Hawaiian Islands are continued as hereinbefore, provided said Government shall continue to pay the interest on said debt.

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States; and no Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.

Sec. 1. The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem necessary or proper.

Sec. 2. That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Sec. 3. That the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and to be immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the President of the United States of America, for the purpose of carrying this joint resolution into effect.

Joint Resolution on the 100 th Anniversary of the Overthrow of Hawaii- Public Law 103-150 103rd Congress of the United States of America- January 1993

To acknowledge the 100th anniversary of the January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, and to offer an apology to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. Whereas, prior to the arrival of the first Europeans in 1778, the Native Hawaiian people lived in a highly organized, self-sufficient, subsistent social system based on communal land tenure with a sophisticated language, culture, and religion;

Whereas a unified monarchical government of the Hawaiian Islands was established in 1810 under Kamehameha I, the first King of Hawaii; Whereas, from 1826 until 1893, the United States recognized the independence of the Kingdom of Hawaii, extended full and complete diplomatic recognition to the Hawaiian Government, and entered into treaties and conventions with the Hawaiian monarchs to govern commerce and navigation in 1826, 1842, 1849, 1875, and 1887;

Whereas the Congregational Church (now known as the United Church of Christ), through its American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, sponsored and sent more than 100 missionaries to the Kingdom of Hawaii between 1820 and 1850;

Whereas, on January 14, 1893, John L. Stevens (hereafter referred to in this Resolution as the "United States Minister"), the United States Minister assigned to the sovereign and independent Kingdom of Hawaii conspired with a small group of non-Hawaiian residents of the Kingdom of Hawaii including citizens of the United States, to overthrow the indigenous and lawful Government of Hawaii;

Whereas, in pursuance of the conspiracy to overthrow the Government of Hawaii, the United States Minister and the naval representatives of the United States caused armed naval forces of the United States to invade the sovereign Hawaiian nation on January 16, 1893, and to position themselves near the Hawaiian Government buildings and the Iolani Palace to intimidate Queen Liliuokalani and her Government;

Whereas, on the afternoon of January 17, 1893, a Committee of Safety that represented the American and European sugar planters, descendants of missionaries, and financiers deposed the Hawaiian monarchy and proclaimed the establishment of a Provisional Government;

Whereas the United States Minister thereupon extended diplomatic recognition to the Provisional Government that was formed by the conspirators without the consent of the Native Hawaiian people or the lawful Government of Hawaii and in violation of treaties between the two nations and of international law;Whereas, soon thereafter, when informed of the risk of bloodshed with resistance, Queen Liliuokalani issued the following statement yielding her authority to the United States Government rather than to the Provisional Government:

"I Liliuokalani, by the Grace of God and under the Constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

"That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America whose Minister Plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and declared that he would support the Provisional Government.

"Now to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss of life, I do this under protest and impelled by said force yield my authority until such time as the Government of the United States shall, upon facts being presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands."

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A.D. 1893.

Whereas, without the active support and intervention by the United States diplomatic and military representatives, the insurrection against the Government of Queen Liliuokalani would have failed for lack of popular support and insufficient arms;

Whereas, on February 1, 1893, the United States Minister raised the American flag and proclaimed Hawaii to be a protectorate of the United States;

Whereas the report of a Presidentially established investigation conducted by former Congressman James Blount into the events surrounding the insurrection and overthrow of January 17, 1893, concluded that the United States diplomatic and military representatives had abused their authority and were responsible for the change in government;

Whereas, as a result of this investigation, the United States Minister to Hawaii was recalled from his diplomatic post and the military commander of the United States armed forces stationed in Hawaii was disciplined and forced to resign his commission;

Whereas, in a message to Congress on December 18, 1893, President Grover Cleveland reported fully and accurately on the illegal acts of the conspirators, described such acts as an "act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of Congress", and acknowledged that by such acts the government of a peaceful and friendly people was overthrown;Whereas President Cleveland further concluded that a "substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people requires we should endeavor to repair" and called for the restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy;

Whereas the Provisional Government protested President Cleveland's call for the restoration of the monarchy and continued to hold state power and pursue annexation to the United States;

Whereas the Provisional Government successfully lobbied the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (hereafter referred to in this Resolution as the "Committee") to conduct a new investigation into the events surrounding the overthrow of the monarchy;

Whereas the Committee and its chairman, Senator John Morgan, conducted hearings in Washington, D.C., from December 27, 1893, through February 26, 1894, in which members of the Provisional Government justified and condoned the actions of the United States Minister and recommended annexation of Hawaii;Whereas, although the Provisional Government was able to obscure the role of the United States in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, it was unable to rally the support front two-thirds of the Senate needed to ratify a treaty of annexation;

Whereas, on July 4, 1894, the Provisional Government declared itself to be the Republic of Hawaii;Whereas, on January 24, 1895, while imprisoned in Iolani Palace, Queen Liliuokalani was forced by representatives of the Republic of

Hawaii to officially abdicate her throne;Whereas, in the 1896 United States Presidential election, William McKinley replaced Grover Cleveland;Whereas, on July 7, 1898, as a consequence of the Spanish-American War, President McKinley signed the Newlands Joint Resolution

that provided for the annexation of Hawaii;Whereas, through the Newlands Resolution, the self-declared Republic of Hawaii ceded sovereignty over the Hawaiian Islands to the

United States;Whereas the Republic of Hawaii also ceded 1,800,000 acres of crown, government and public lands of the Kingdom of Hawaii,

without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian people of Hawaii or their sovereign government;Whereas the Congress, through the Newlands Resolution, ratified the cession, annexed Hawaii as part of the United States, and

vested title to the lands in Hawaii in the United States;Whereas the Newlands Resolution also specified that treaties existing between Hawaii and- foreign nations were to immediately

cease and be replaced by United States treaties with such nations;Whereas the Newlands Resolution effected the transaction between the Republic of Hawaii and the United States Government;

Whereas the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States, either through their monarchy or through a plebiscite or referendum;

Whereas, on April 30, 1900, President McKinley signed the Organic Act that provided a government for the territory of Hawaii and defined the political structure and powers of the newly established Territorial Government and its relationship to the United States;

Whereas, on August 21, 1959, Hawaii became the 50th State of the United States;Whereas the health and well-being of the Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and attachment to the

land;Whereas the long-range economic and social changes in Hawaii over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been

devastating to the population and to the health and well-being of the Hawaiian people;Whereas the Native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural identity in accordance with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs, customs, practices, language, and social institutions;

Whereas, in order to promote racial harmony and cultural understanding, the legislature of the State of Hawaii has determined that the year 1993 should serve Hawaii as a year of special reflection on the rights and dignities of the Native Hawaiians in the Hawaiian and the American societies;Whereas the Eighteenth General Synod of the United Church of Christ in recognition of the denomination’s historical complicity in the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893 directed the Office of the President of the United Church of Christ to offer a public apology to the Native Hawaiian people and to initiate the process of reconciliation between the United Church of Christ and the Native Hawaiians; and

Whereas it is proper and timely for the Congress on the occasion of the impending one hundredth anniversary of the event, to acknowledge the historic significance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, to express its deep regret to the Native Hawaiian people, and to support the reconciliation efforts of the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians: Now, therefore, be itResolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION I. ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND APOLOGY.The Congress –

(1) on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893, acknowledges the historical significance of this event which resulted in the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people;

(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconciliation initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians;

(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination;

(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and

(5) urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.

Teddy Roosevelt and Foreign Policy

The United States and World Affairs: 1880-1916The 1890s ushered in a world-wide imperialistic scramble for new colonies, new naval bases, and new prestige. At first the US seemed

immune to the new imperialistic fervor. A few voices were raised in support of the “manifest destiny” of the US to expand into the Pacific and the Caribbean or in support of the responsibility of the US to take up the “white man’s burden” and spread the fruits of Anglo-Saxon civilization to “unenlightened” peoples. But imperialistic thinking did not seem to have a great deal of influence on American minds until the Spanish-American War, in 1898. Then, the excitement generated over Commodore Dewey’s naval victory over the Spanish fleet in the Philippines led, some weeks later, to the annexation of the Hawaiian islands; and, by the Treaty of Paris ending the war, the US became the possessor of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands.

When the Treaty of Paris was placed before the Senate for ratification, controversy arose immediately over the annexation of the Philippine Islands. Most Republicans, under the leadership of President McKinley and Senator Lodge, supported the annexation of the Philippines, while most Democrats opposed it. After two months of debate, the Senate ratified the treaty in February of 1899. This action touched off a two-year Filipino revolution- a fight for independence- led by Emilio Aguinaldo. The Filipinos had worked with the Americans to throw off Spanish rule, only to find themselves ruled by another foreign power. The methods used by the US to put down the revolution resulted in the growth, within the nation, of a strong anti-imperialist crusade against the annexation of the Philippines because, among other reasons, annexation was a denial of the basic American principles of consent of the governed. Eventually, however, the US did grant the Philippines self-government in 1916, and complete independence in 1946.

President TR’s use of the forceful “big stick” policy in negotiating with Colombia for the rights to build the Panama Canal was also an example of American imperialism. In January, 1903, the US concluded the Hay-Herran Treaty, leasing a strip of the Colombian-owned Isthmus of Panama. When the Colombian government delayed in ratifying the treaty, Roosevelt looked for a chance to take forceful action, learned of a projected Panamanian revolution against Colombia, and used US forces to prevent Colombia from putting down the revolution. The US then quickly recognized the new Panamanian government and, in November, 1903, signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama for rights to the Canal Zone. In 1904 President TR further expanded American power in the Caribbean by issuing a statement now known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, claiming the right to intervene in any Latin American country whose “wrongdoing” might result in foreign intervention. Under this policy, the US took charge of the custom houses of the debt-ridden Dominican Republic and within 2 years righted the country’s financial situation. This action, however, set a dangerous precedent, and the US later repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary.

Controversy Over US Involvement in the Philippine Islands

I. Carl Schurz Opposes American Imperialism in the Philippines: After the Spanish-American War, Carl Schurz, leader of the liberal reform wing of the Republican Party, became one of the leading

opponents of American expansionism. In this except from his book The Policy of Imperialism, published in 1899, Schurz attacks the arguments for taking over the Philippine Islands and putting down the Filipino struggle for independence.

… I will assume that the true spirit of American imperialism is represented not by the extremists who want to subjugate the Philippine Islanders at any cost and then exploit the islands to the best advantage of the conquerors, but by the more humane persons who say that we must establish our sovereignty over them to make them happy, to prepare them for self-government, and even recognize their right to complete independence as soon as they show themselves fit for it.

Let me ask these well-meaning citizens a simple question. If you think that the American people may ultimately consent to the independence off those islanders as a matter of right and good policy, why do you insist upon killing them now? You answer: Because they refuse to recognize our sovereignty. Why do they so refuse? Because they think themselves entitled to independence, and are willing to fight and die for it. But if you insist upon continuing to shoot them down for this reason, does not that mean that you want to kill them for demanding the identical thing which you yourself think that you may ultimately find it just and proper to grant them?...

Those who talk so much about “fitting a people for self-government” often forget that no people were ever made “fit” for self-government by being kept in the leading strings [under the control] of a foreign Power. You learn to walk by doing your own crawling and stumbling. Self-government is learned only by exercising it upon one’s own responsibility…

There are some American citizens who take of this question a purely commercial view… I will, for argument’s sake, adopt even their point of view for a moment and ask: Will it pay? … Taking a general view of the Philippines as a commercial market for us, I need not again argue against the barbarous notion that in order to have a profitable trade with a country we must own it… it is equally needless to show to any well-informed person that the profits of the trade with the islands themselves can never amount to the cost of making and maintaining the conquest of the Philippines.

But there is another point of real importance. Many imperialists admit that our trade with the Philippines themselves will not nearly be worth its cost; but they say that we must have the Philippines as a foothold, a sort of power station, for the expansion of our trade on the Asiatic continent, especially in China. Admitting this, for argument’s sake, I ask what kind of a foothold we should really need. Coaling stations and docks for our fleet, and facilities for the establishment of commercial houses and depots. That is all. And now I ask further, whether we could not easily have had these things if we had, instead of making war upon the Filipinos, favored the independence of the islands. Everybody knows that we could we might have those things now for the mere asking, if we stopped the war and came to a friendly understanding with the Filipinos tomorrow…

I ask you, therefore… whether the killing policy of subjugation is not a colossal, stupid blunder… Here are our “manifest destiny” men who tell is that whether it be right or not, we must take and keep the Philippines because “destiny” so wills it. We have heard this cry of manifest destiny before, especially when, a half century ago, the slave power demanded the annexation of Cuba and Central America to strengthen the slave power. The cry of destiny is most vociferously put forward by those who want to do a wicked thing and to shift the responsibility…

Here are our “burden” men [advocates of the “white man’s burden”], who piously turn up their eyes and tell us with a melancholy sigh, that all this conquest business may be very irksome, but that a mysterious Providence has put it as a “burden” upon us which, however sorrowfully, we must bear; that his burden consists in our duty to take care of the poor people of the Philippines; and that in order to take proper care of them we must exercise sovereignty over them; and that if they refuse to accept our sovereignty, we must- alas! alas!- kill them, which makes the burden very solemn and sad…

I know the imperialists will say that I have been pleading here for Aguinaldo [the leader of the Filipino revolution] and his Filipinos against our republic. No- not for the Filipinos merely… I am pleading the cause of American honor and self-respect, American interests, American democracy- aye, for the cause of the American people against an administration of our public affairs which has wantonly plunged this country into an iniquitous war; which has disgraced the republic by a scandalous breach of faith to a people struggling for their freedom whom we had used as allies…

I confidently trust that the American people will prove themselves too clearheaded not to appreciate the vital difference between the expansion of the republic and its free institutions over contiguous territory and kindred populations, which we all gladly welcome if accomplished peaceably and honorably- and imperialism which reached out for distant lands to be ruled as subject provinces; too intelligent not to perceive that our very first step on the road to imperialism has been a betrayal of the fundamental principles of democracy, followed by disaster and disgrace; … too wise not to detect the false pride or the dangerous ambitions, or the selfish schemes which so often hide themselves under that deceptive cry of mock patriotism: “Our country, right or wrong!” They will not fail to recognize that our dignity, our free institutions, and the peace and welfare of this and coming generations of Americans will be secure only as we cling to the watchword of true patriotism: “Our country-when right to be kept right; when wrong to be put right.”

II. Henry Cabot Lodge Favors American Imperialism in the Philippines: Henry Cabot Lodge was a Republican senator from Massachusetts who supported America’s imperialistic ventures and was a close

adviser to President Roosevelt on international affairs. In this except from his speech to the Senate on March 7, 1900, Lodge explains the imperialist’s concept of America’s duty to and need for the Philippines, and attacks the arguments leveled against the government.

The policy we offer… is simple and straightforward… [T]he Philippine Islands are ours today and that we are responsible for them before the world… [T]here is a war in those islands… Our immediate duty, therefore, is to suppress this disorder, put an end to fighting, and restore peace and order. That is what we are doing… I hope and believe that… we shall and should reestablish civil government… where the inhabitants are able to manage their own affairs. We should give them [the Filipinos] honest administration, and prompt and efficient courts. We should see to it that there is entire protection to persons and property; in order to encourage the development of the islands by the assurance of safety to investors of capital. All men should be protected in the free exercise of their religion, and the doors thrown open to missionaries of all Christian sects. The land, which belongs to the people, and of which they have been robbed in the past, should be returned to them and their titles made secure. We should inaugurate and carry forward, in the most earnest and liberal way, a comprehensive system of popular education. Finally, while we bring prosperity to the islands by developing their resources, we should, as rapidly as conditions permit, bestow upon them self-government and home rule…

Our opponents put forward as their chief objection that we have robbed these people of their liberty and have taken them and held them in defiance of the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence in regard to the consent of the governed. As to liberty, they have never had it, and have none now, except when we give it to them protected by the flag and armies of the United States…

The next argument of the opponents of the Republican policy is that we are denying self-government to the Filipinos. Our reply is that to give independent self-government at once, as we understand it, to a people who have no just conception of it and no fitness for it, is to dower [endow] them with a curse instead of a blessing…

… Of self-government… there has never been the faintest conception in the Philippine Islands, and there never will be unless we give them the opportunity, and by slow process teach them what it is. Geographically and ethically- because they are scattered islands and because the people are divided among 84 tribes in all stages of development from savagery to civilization, speaking 50 or 60 different dialects or languages, with every form of religion- they are today not only unfit for self-government, but from the physical facts alone self-government is impossible to the Philippines as a whole. There must be one central, strong, civilized power which shall control all the islands and thus give them in the only possible way the opportunity of rising to freedom and home rule…

I come now to a consideration of the advantages to the US involved in our acquisition and retention of the Philippine Islands… … [T]he islands… are over a hundred thousand square miles in extent, and are of the greatest richness and fertility. From these islands comes not the best hemp in the world, and there is no tropical product which cannot be raised there in abundance. Their forests are untouched, of great extent and with a variety of hard woods of almost unexampled value… There are regions in Luzon containing great and valuable deposits of copper which have never been developed. But the chief mineral value of the islands is in their undeveloped coal beds… to a naval and commercial power the coal measures of the Philippines will be a source of great strength and of equally great value. It is sufficient for me to indicate these few elements of natural wealth in the islands which only await development.

A much more important point is to be found in the markets which they furnish… With the development of the islands and the increase of commerce and of business activity the consumption of foreign imports would rapidly advance, and of this increase we should reap the chief benefit. We shall also find great profit in the work of developing the islands. They require railroads everywhere. Those railroads would

be planned by American engineers, the rails and the bridges would come from American mills, the locomotives and cars from American workshops. The same would hold true in regard to electric railways, electric lighting, telegraphs telephones, and steamships for the local business…

But the value of the Philippine Islands… great as it undoubtedly is, and great as it unquestionably will be, is trifling compared to the indirect results which will flow from our possession of them… the struggle for the world’s trade which has for many years been shaping ever more strongly the politics and history of mankind, has its richest prize set before it in the vast markets of China… That Hawaii was necessary as the first and essential step toward our obtaining that share to which we were entitled in the trade of the Pacific, the ocean of the future, was obvious enough, but beyond that all was doubt and darkness. Then came the Spanish war, and the smoke of Dewey’s guns had hardly cleared away when it was seen by those who were watching that he had not only destroyed the Spanish fleet, but had given to his countrymen the means of solving their problem in the far East. He had made us an Eastern power…

… It was neither chance nor accident which brought us to the Pacific and which has now carried us across the great ocean even to the shore of Asia… I do not believe that this nation was raised up for nothing. I do not believe that it is the creation of blind chance. I have faith that it has a great mission in the world- a mission of good, a mission of freedom. I believe that it can live up to that mission; therefore I want to see it step forward boldly and take its place at the head of the nations. I wish to see it mater of the Pacific. I would have it fulfill what I think is its manifest destiny if it is not false to the laws which govern it.

Controversy Over US Involvement in Panama:

I. TR Defends the “Big Stick” Policy in Panama: The following excerpt from TR’s autobiography gives his interpretation of the conflict which occurred with Colombia over the building

of an inter-oceanic canal through the Colombian-owned Isthmus of Panama. TR claims no part in the Panamanian revolution and defends his actions which have since been labeled the “big stick” policy.

President Maroquin (of Colombia), through his Minister, had agreed to the Hay-Herran Treaty in January 1903. He had the absolute power of an unconstitutional dictator to keep his promise or break it. He determined to break it. To furnish himself an excuse for breaking it he devised the plan of summoning a Congress especially called to reject the canal treaty. This the Congress- a Congress of mere puppets- did, without a dissenting vote; and the puppets adjourned forthwith without legislating on any other subject…

When in August 1903, I became convinced that Colombia intended to repudiate the treaty made the preceding January, under cover of securing its rejection by the Colombian Legislature, I began carefully to consider what should be done. By my direction Secretary Hay, personally and through the Minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow her rejection of the treaty. The possibility of ratification did not wholly pass away until the close of the session of the Colombian Congress on the last day of October. There would then be two possibilities. One was that Panama would remain quiet. In that case I was prepared to recommend to Congress that we should at once occupy the Isthmus anyhow, and proceed to dig the canal; and I had drawn out a draft of my message to this effect. But from the information I received, I deemed it likely that there would be a revolution in Panama as soon as the Colombian Congress adjourned without ratifying the treaty… [O]n October 16… two army officers who had returned from the Isthmus, saw me and told me that there would unquestionably be a revolution on the Isthmus, that the people were unanimous in their criticism of the Bogota Government and their disgust over the failure of that Government to ratify the treaty; and that the revolution would probably take place immediately after the adjournment of the Colombian Congress.

… Accordingly I directed the Navy Department to station various ships within easy reach of the Isthmus, to be ready to act in the event of need arising. These ships were barely in time. On November 3 the revolution occurred. Practically everybody on the Isthmus, including all the Colombian troops that were already stationed there, joined in the revolution, and there was no bloodshed. But on that same day 400 new Colombian troops were landed at Colon. Fortunately, the gunboat Nashville, under Commander Hubbard, reached Colon almost immediately afterwards, and when the commander of the Colombian forces threatened the lives and property of the American citizens, including women and children, in Colon, Commander Hubbard landed a few score sailors and marines to protect them. By a mixture of firmness and tact he not only prevented any assault on our citizens, but persuaded the Colombian commander to re-embark his troops for Cartagena… Every consideration of international morality and expediency, of duty to the Panama people, and of satisfaction of our own national interests and honor, bade us take immediate action. I recognized Panama forthwith on behalf of the United States, and practically all the countries of the world immediately followed suit. The State Department immediately negotiated a canal treaty with the new Republic…

From the beginning to the end our course was straightforward and in absolute accord with the highest standards of international morality. Criticism of it can come only from misinformation, or else from a sentimentality which represents both mental weakness and a moral twist. To have acted otherwise than I did would have been on my part betrayal of the interests of the United States, indifference to the interests of Panama, and recreancy [cowardliness] to the interests of the world at large. Colombia had forfeited every claim to consideration… she eagerly pressed us to enter into an agreement with her, as long as there as any chance of our going to the alternative route through Nicaragua. When she thought we were committed, she refused to fulfill the agreement with her, with the avowed hope of seizing the French company’s property for nothing and thereby holding us up… I did not lift my finger to incite the revolutionists. The right simile to use is totally different. I simply ceased to stamp out the different revolutionary fuses that were already burning… Colombia was solely responsible for her own humiliation; and she had not then, and has not now, one shadow of claim upon us, moral or legal; all the wrong that was done was done by her. If, as representing the American people, I had not acted precisely as I did, I would have been an unfaithful or incompetent representative; and inaction at that crisis would have meant not only indefinite delay in building the canal, but also practical admission on our part that we were not fit to play the part on the Isthmus which we had arrogated to ourselves…

…. [T]he canal would not have been built at all save for the action I took. If men choose to say that it would have been better not to build it, than to build it as the result of such action, their position, although foolish, is compatible with belief in their wrongheaded sincerity. But it is hypocrisy, alike odious and contemptible, for any man to say both that we ought to have built the canal and that we ought not to have acted in the way we did act.

II. Rafael Reyes Opposes the “Big Stick” Policy in Panama:

Rafael Reyes was a Colombian general/statesman who headed the Colombian diplomatic mission to the US in 1903 to “save whatever he could from the wreck,”; 1904 he was elected President of Colombia. The following excerpted letter is a “statement of grievances” to US Secretary of State, John Hay, (12-23- 1903) and gives the Colombian interpretation of events.

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: The Government and people of Colombia consider themselves aggrieved by that of the United States in that they are convinced that the course followed by its administration, in relation to the events that have developed and recently been accomplished at Panama, have worked deep injury to their interests… It is proper to observe that under our constitution the Congress is the principal guardian, defender, and interpreter of our laws. And it cannot be denied by anyone, I take it, that the Hays-Herran convention provides for the execution of public works on a vast scale and for the occupancy in perpetuity of a portion of the territory of Colombia… all of which would have given occasion for frequent conflicts, since there would have been a coexistence in Panama of two public powers, the one national, the other foreign.

Hence the earnest efforts evinced by the Senate [of Colombia] in ascertaining whether the American Government would agree to accept certain amendments tending especially to avoid as far as practicable any restriction in the treaty of the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory… I firmly believe that it [the Senate] would have approved the convention with amendments that would probably have been acceptable to the United States had not the American minister at Bogota [the capital of Colombia] repeatedly declared in the most positive manner that his Government would reject any amendment that might be offered…

It will be well to say that before the news was divulged that a revolution was about to break out on the Isthmus, American cruisers which reached their destination precisely on the eve of the movement were plowing the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Cablegrams that are given public circulation in an official document show that two days before the movement the Secretary of the Navy issued orders to those cruisers not to permit the landing of troops of the Government of Colombia on Panama’s territory. A military officer of the Government of the United States stopped the railway from carrying to Panama, as it was under obligations to do, a battalion that had just arrived at Colon [a city in Panama] from Bogota at the very time when its arrival in that city would have impeded or suppressed any revolutionary attempt…

… Because of this circumstance… certain citizens of Panama, without taking into account the consent of the other towns of the department, proclaimed the independence of the Isthmus and organized a government. Two days after effecting that movement they were recognized by the American Government as a sovereign and independent Republic, and fourteen days later the American Government signed a treaty with the Republic of Panama with not only recognized and guaranteed its independence, but agreed to open a canal for the purpose of uniting the waters of the Atlantic with those of the Pacific…

… Panama has become independent, has organized a Government, has induced a few powers prematurely to recognize her sovereignty, has usurped rights which do not belong to her in any case, and has ignored the debts, which weigh upon Colombia… because the Government of the United States has desired it; because, with its incomparably superior force, the US has prevented the landing of Colombian troops destined to reestablish order after our having exhausted every possible means of friendly understanding; because the US, even before the separatist movement was known in Bogota, had its powerful war vessels at the entrance of our ports, preventing the departure of our battalions; because, without regarding the precedents established by statesmen who have dealt with this matter, the US has not respected our rights as a divine bequest for the innocent use of the American family of States; and, finally, because the Government of the United States, invoking and putting into practice the right of might, has taken from us by bloodless conquest- but by conquest, nevertheless- the most important part of the national territory…

It might be said to me that exaggerated demands or obstacles which are intentionally raised are equivalent to a refusal. But this is not our case. Colombia has made diverse treaties and contracts with foreign countries for the construction of a Panama Canal, and if they have not been carried into effect, as was the case with the treaty with the United States in 1870 and the contract with the French company later, it was not the fault of Colombia… The fact that the US demands from us, in order to carry out the enterprise, a part of our sovereignty, which, under our laws, we cannot legally concede… does not mean that we have been opposed nor that we are opposed to the realization of our greatest undertaking of the kind which the past and future centuries have seen or will see.

III. John Hay Defends the “Big Stick” Policy in Panama: On January 5, 1904, Secretary of State John Hay, in the letter excerpted below, replied to the “statement of grievances” from Rafael

Reyes. Hay defended TR’s policy in Panama but was not responsible for initiating it.

SIR: The Government of the US has carefully considered the grave complaints so ably set forth in the “statement of grievances” presented on behalf of the Government and people of Colombia…

On June 28, 1902, the President of the United States gave his approval to the act now commonly referred to as the Spooner Act, to provide for the construction of the inter-oceanic canal…

After the Spooner Act was approved, negotiations were duly initiated by Colombia. They resulted on January 22, 1903, in the conclusion of the Hay-Herran convention. By this convention every reasonable desire of the Colombian Government was believed to be gratified… The limited control desired by the United States of the canal strip for purposes of sanitation and police, not only in its own interest but also in that of Colombia and all other governments, was duly acquired. But in order that neither this, nor any other right or privilege, granted to the US, might give rise to misconception as to the purposes of the Government, there was inserted in the convention this explicit declaration: “The United States freely acknowledges and recognizes the sovereignty [of Colombia] and disavows any intention to impair it in any way whatever or to increase its territory at the expense of Colombia or of any of the sister Republics in Central or South America…”

Sometime after the convention was signed the Government of the United States learned, to its utter surprise, that the Government of Colombia was taking with the canal company the position that a further permission, in addition to that contained in the convention, was necessary to the transfer of its concessions and those of the Panama Railroad Company, respectively, to the US… To this proposal this department answered that “the US considers this suggestion wholly inadmissible.” The proposition was then abandoned by Colombia, and the convention was nearly three months later signed without any modification of the absolute authorization to sell…

… The explanation put forward in Colombia’s “statement of grievances” merely repeat the pleas devised at the Colombian capital. The sudden discovery that the terms of the convention, as proposed and signed by the Colombian Government, involved a violation of the Colombian constitution, because it required a cession to the United States of “sovereignty” which is expressly recognized and confirmed, cold be received by this Government only with the utmost surprise. Nevertheless, the Colombian Senate unanimously rejected the convention…

… The people of Panama rose against an act of the Government at Bogota that threatened their most vital interests with destruction and the interests of the whole world with grave injury. The movement assumed the form of a declaration of independence. The avowed object of this momentous step was to secure the construction of an inter-oceanic canal…

By the declaration of independence of the Republic of Panama a new situation was created. On the one hand stood the Government of Colombia invoking in the name of the treaty of 1846 the aid of this Government in its efforts to suppress the revolution; on the other hand stood the Republic of Panama that had come into being in order that the great design of that treaty might not be forever frustrated, but might be fulfilled. The Isthmus was threatened with desolation by another civil war, nor were the rights and interests of the United States alone at stake, the interests of the whole civilized world were involved. The Republic of Panama stood for those interests; the Government of Colombia opposed them. Compelled to choose between these two alternatives, the Government of the US, in no wise responsible for the situation that had arisen, did not hesitate. It recognized the independence of the Republic of Panama, and upon its judgment and action in the emergency the powers of the world have set the seal of their approval.

In recognizing the independence of the Republic of Panama the United States necessarily assumed toward that Republic the obligations of the treaty of 1846. Intended, as the treaty was, to assure the protection of the sovereign of the Isthmus, whether the government of that sovereign ruled from Bogota or from Panama, the Republic of Panama, as the successor of sovereignty of Colombia, became entitled to the rights and subject to the obligations of the treaty…

Under all the circumstances the department is unable to regard the complaints of Colombia against this Government, set forth in the “Statement of Grievances” as having any valid foundation. The responsibility lies at Colombia’s own door rather than at that of the United States. This Government, however, recognizes the fact that Colombia has, as she affirms, suffered an appreciable loss. This Government has no desire to increase or accentuate her misfortunes, but is willing to do all that lies in its power to ameliorate [improve] her lot…

Entertaining these feelings, the Government of the United States would gladly exercise its good offices with the Republic of Panama, on a fair and equitable basis.

IV. William Stone Opposes the “Big Stick” Policy in Panama: In January 1904, the Senate debates were held over the ratification of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with the newly independent

country of Panama for US rights to the building of the canal. Senator William Stone of Missouri, a Democrat, was one of the senators who spoke out against Roosevelt’s use of the “big stick” policy in Panama. His speech was delivered to the Senate on January 26, 1904… the treaty… was ratified by the Senate.

Mr. President, unless our ideals have fallen to a lower plane, there is something dearer to our hearts and of infinitely greater consequence to the American people than mere commercial considerations of profit and loss. I want to see this inter-oceanic canal constructed… But above all, I would place the honor and good name of the Republic…

… I do not charge misconduct on the part of the Administration; I do not charge complicity of an American official in the Panama insurrection; but I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that the situation is surrounded by circumstances that cast upon it the shadow of grave suspicions…

Mr. President, what are the things, or some of them, that give to our part in the Panama revolution a sinister aspect? Let us see. To begin with, while the Hay-Herran treaty was pending for ratification before the Colombian senate Secretary Hay sent some remarkable communications to Bogota… He was directed to warn the Colombian Government, which he did, that to reject the treaty or unduly delay its ratification would seriously compromise the friendly relations between the two countries, and might result in consequences which every friend of Colombia would regret.

This is strange language, Mr. President, for one sovereign to address to another. It is not the language of diplomacy or amity or courtesy, but of threat and menace… I will… say that I can take no pride in seeing my country strut before the world like a swaggering bully on the stage. Colombia was “warned,” says the President, that grave consequences might result from a rejection of the treaty. What consequences? What did he mean? If he meant anything, necessarily he might if the treaty should be rejected we would forcibly seize the Isthmus of Panama and settle with Colombia on our own terms, or he meant that Panama would secede from Colombia and set up an independent government under the protection of the United States. That was the undoubted meaning of his threat. The President himself admits it…

As to the first of these two schemes- that of the forcible acquisition of the Isthmus- he said in the message alluded to: “My intention was (if the treaty should be rejected) to consult the Congress as to whether under such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the canal would be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms we had offered and no others, and that if such terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct or take what other steps were needful in order to begin the enterprise.”

There you have it- the declared purpose of the President to seize… the territory of a neighboring, friendly nation for a purely commercial purpose, openly proclaimed in the blustering diction of the buccaneer without disguisement and without shame. Here is an American President preaching the morality of force and the doctrine that might makes right, a monstrous doctrine… which our nation was born in a bloody protest against…

In his message the President says that he thought it possible, if the Hay-Herran treaty should be possible, if the Hay-Herran Treaty should be rejected, that the people of Panama- “might take the protection of their own vital interests in their own hands… declare their independence upon just grounds, and establish a government competent and willing to do its share in this great work of civilization.” And, as the President naively put it, “this is what actually occurred;”…

Whatever the President may or may not have had to do with that actually eventuated in Panama, one this is sure, and that is that he contemplated entering into direct arrangement with Panama if Colombia rejected the treaty… But Panama could not have made any arrangement with the President without seceding from Colombia and establishing a government of her own. Without independence Panama would have had no power to make a treaty. Without independence Panama could not have interfered with the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and right of Colombia. Thus the President admits his willingness, if he had found it necessary to his purposes, to have inspired revolt- to have incited rebellion in Panama…

… The uprising was belated, but it came. And after it came, what happened?... It is sufficient to say that the captains of our warships and marines were promptly and peremptorily ordered to prevent the landing of Colombian troops in Panama, and to use whatever force might be necessary to prevent any conflict on the Isthmus. These orders were obeyed, as they should have been, Colombia sought to convey troops in sufficient numbers to suppress the insurrection, maintain order, and restore her authority, but was denied the right to land them and the troops she had there were so hedged about, restrained, and coerced by our authority that they were practically driven from the Isthmus.

In consequence of this intervention on our part, preconcerted and prearranged, the revolution, otherwise hopeless, became a shining success in its way. In a sense, almost literal sense, we booted Colombia from the Isthmus and lined the coast with our guns to prevent invasion. Whatever the motive or excuse for this, the effect was to protect the conspirators and assure the success of their enterprise. There was nothing the Panama insurgents could have desired this Government to do that it did not do…

…The revolt occurred on November 3. Before three suns had set, before a Government worthy of the name had been established, the President recognized what he called, or miscalled, the Republic of Panama, and entered into diplomatic relations with it… This quick recognition could not have been more unwarily adjusted to time and circumstances. To the world it is bound to look as if it were part of a program- an act in a play.

But there was method in the madness. Recognition was the one necessary thing left to be done before the final step. After recognition came… the making of a canal treaty with Panama. The belief is inevitable that to this end everything done had been directed. Without this the whole business would be aimless and meaningless. If the situation created was not created to furnish the President an opportunity to “enter into an arrangement direct” with Panama, then what was it created for? The opportunity was created, and the President embraced it…

… I profoundly regret that I can find nothing in the grounds put forward to justify the President’s course which is satisfactory to my mind…

… [W]e may secure an isthmian canal as the result of these embroilments, which we could have better obtained without them. But what a pitiful chapter will our connection with this insurrection be in the history of our country!

APUSH Unit 3Name: _________________________________________________________________ Date: ___________________

QUESTIONS- Imperialism and Teddy Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy Readings

1. By the end of the 19th century, jingoism in the US was encouraged by all of the following EXCEPT:a. European imperialismb. International Darwinismc. Yellow Journalismd. New Immigrants

2. Which of the following statements best defines the Open Door policy?a. The US would encourage greater immigration from Europe and Asiab. The US would seek spheres of influence in Chinac. All nations should have equal trading rights in Chinad. All nations should have equal trading rights in all parts of the world

3. Which of the following DOES NOT correctly describe how a territory was added to the US?a. Hawaii was annexed by Congressb. Alaska was purchased from Russiac. The Philippines was annexed by treatyd. Cuba was annexed by Congress

4. All of the following concerned US-Japanese relations EXCEPT the:a. Teller Amendmentb. Gentlemen’s Agreementc. Treaty of Portsmouthd. Great White fleet

5. Which of the following was an IMMEDIATE cause of the Spanish-American War?a. Cuban nationalismb. US expansionismc. Yellow journalismd. The sinking of the USS Maine

6. Which of the following best explains the influence of yellow journalism on US foreign policy in the 1890s?a. Sensational news stories stirred the anger of the American publicb. Newspapers failed to report news about Congressc. Most editorials favored China and criticized Japand. Publishers of New York Dailies suppressed news that favored Cuban revolutionaries

7. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine called for:

a. Prohibiting foreign nations from purchasing land in the Western Hemisphereb. Investing in the development of Latin Americac. Intervening in Latin American nations that could not pay their debts to European creditorsd. Pledging never to interfere in another nation’s foreign affairs

8. Which statement accurately summarizes Teddy Roosevelt’s policy on the Panama Canal?a. Roosevelt waited for Colombia to agree to a fair price for the Canal Zoneb. Roosevelt gave military support to Panama’s revolt against Colombiac. Panama’s government persuaded Roosevelt to give US assistance for building a canald. Roosevelt signed a treaty in which Colombia agreed to create Panama as a separate nation

9. Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy differed from that of Teddy Roosevelt and William Howard Taft by its emphasis on:a. US involvement in Latin Americab. The application of moral principles to foreign affairsc. Sending troops to intervene in a neighboring company’s politicsd. An open-door policy

10. In 1917, the nations of Panama, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti were:a. Subject to US military interventionb. The only nations that attended the Pan-American Conferencec. Territories annexed by the US after the Spanish-American Ward. Recipients of economic aid under dollar diplomacy

11. Since, from the US point of view, there were no negative consequences from the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War, John Hay was right to call it “a splendid little war.” Assess the validity of this statement with respect to the opinions of each of the following:

William Jennings Bryan

Teddy Roosevelt

Alfred T. Mahan

Emilio Aguinaldo

Cuban Revolutionaries

12. Discuss whether or not US foreign policy from 1890-1914 was principally guided by economic motives.

13. Compare and contrast the foreign policies of Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson toward Latin America.

14. Was the United States justified in annexing the Hawaiian Islands? Why or why not? (NO first person POV)

15. “As the United States became more involved in East Asia after 1900, its relationship with Japan became more competitive.” Assess the validity of this statement. (NO first person POV)