This dissertation has been

microfilmed exactly as received 67-13,689

AYOOB, Mohammed, 1942-PAJ(ISTAN'S ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES,1954-1965: A STUDY IN LOADS, CAPABILITIES ANDRESPONSIVENESS.

University of Hawaii, Ph.D., 1966Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan,. -.:,

PAKISTAN'S ALLIANCE WITH TtiE UNITED STATES, 1954-1965:

A STUDY IN LOADS, CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIVENESS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THEUNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

SEPTEMBER 1966

By

Mohannned Ayoob

Dissertation Connnittee:

Werner Levi, ChairmanHarry J. FriedmanRobert B. StaufferMichael HaasEdmund F. Vella

\\

)

ABSTRACT

This study deals with an alliance relationship between two

countries, the United States and Pakistan, one of whom is a Great Power

and therefore the senior partner in the alliance. The dissertation

tries to analyze a situation in \~1ich two countries enter into a

bilateral alliance arrangement with different aims and objectives in

view. It is contended in the study, that as a result of the difference

in their aims and objectives, the senior partner (the United States) has

not been responsive to the junior partner's demands to an extent

adequate to satisfy the junior partner (Pakistan). The lack of

responsiveness on the part of the senior partner has led to a

deterioration in the relationship between the two allies ani to an

eventual disruption of the bilateral alliance arrangement.

Pakistan's demands on the United States' decision centeLs have been

classified into three major categories corresponding to the tnree

fundamental objectives of Pakistanis foreign policy. These objectives

are: (1) security, i.e., moral and material support against a presumed-.;. -

threat from India, (2) Pakistan's goals regarding Kashmir, (3) the

attraction of foreign economic assistance into Pakistan.

It is the contention of the study that while the United States has,

by and large, been adequately responsive to Pakistan's demands relating

to economic assistance, it has failed to be adequately responsive to the

other two Pakistani demands--those relating to security and Kashmir.

The primary reason for the lack of American responsiveness to Pakistanis

demands relating to security and Kashmir has been the contradictory

iv

nature of these demands to other demands made on American decision

centers as well as the contradictory nature of these demands to

America's own global interests.

It has also been illustrated in the study that the objectives of

security and Kashmir rank higher than the objective of economic

assistance in the order of priorities followed by Pakistan's foreign

policy-makers. Consequently, Pakistan has been willing to sacrifice

economic assistance in its search for security vis~~-vis India and

support for its goals regarding Kashmir.

The term "responsiveness" has been defined to mean the probability

that the demands of one party will be met with indulgence rather than

deprivation by the other party. Demanas have been codified as "loads,"

signifying the burdens that they put upon decision centers of the

responding party. "Capabilities" stand for the facilities possessed by

the responding party which help it to meet the demands made on its

decision centers with gratification rather than deprivation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .

LIST OF TABLES

CHl~TER I. LOADS, CAPABILITIES p~D RESPONSIVENESS •

CHAPTER II. GENESIS OF THE ALLIANCE

CHAPTER III. THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

CH~~TER IV. kASHMIR AND THE ALLIANCE

CHAPTER V. ECONOMIC AID AND THE ALLIANCE

CHAPTER VI. THE DISRUPTION OF THE ALLIANCE •

BIBLIOGRAPHY

iii

vi

1

10

40

103

160

200

214

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE I. ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTP~CE 163

TABLE II. FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN '. 166

TABLE III. CONSORTIUM PLEDGES FOR AID TO PAKISTAN 167,,',"

TABLE IV. PLEDGES FOR AID TO PAKISTAN BY NON-CONSORTI~l

COUNTRIES • 168"

TABLE V. CO~lITMENTS FOR ECONOMIC ASSIST~~CE TOPAKISTAN . 169

CHAPTER I

LOADS, CAPABILITIES p~ RESPONSIVENESS

It will be thE purpose of this dissertation to study an alliance

relationship between a Great Power~-the United States of America--and a

smaller power--Pakistan. The principal hypothesis which we will attempt

to test in this study is as follows: if two partners to an al1iance--

one of whom is a Great Power and therefore the senior partner in the

al1iance--enter into an alliance relationship with different aims and

objectives in view, the senior partner will fail to be 'responsive' (to

a degree adequate to satisfy the junior partner) to the demands made on

its decision centers by the junior partner. The demands made by the

junior partner on the senior partner's decision centers are generated by

the former's fundamental objectives of foreign policy. The lack of

'responsiveness' on the part of the senior partner will lead to a

deterioration in the relationship between the two countries and to an

eventual disruption of the bilateral alliance arrangement.

Loads, Capabilities and Responsiveness.

The study will use a few concepts borrowed and adapted from Bruce

M. Russett's study of Anglo-American relations entitled Community and

Contention (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963). Russett defines

'responsiveness' as the "probability that demands of one party will be'.

met with' indulgence rather than deprivation by the other party."l

lBruce M. Russett, Community and Contention, (Cambridge, Mass.,1963), p. 30.

2

Responsiveness, according to Russett, involves the variables of

'attention' and 'indulgence'. Lack of responsiveness may be the result

either of inattention, that is, a failure to be aware that the demand

was made, or of a deliberate decision not to meet the demand made by

the partner country.

Russett terms :the_demands made by one party upon another as

'loads'. He uses this term to denote that the demands made by one

country upon another are in the nature of burdens on the decision

2centers of the second country. The responding country, to cope with

these loads, must possess certain capabilities which Russett calls

"capabilities for responsiveness." According to Russett, capabilities

for responsiveness include "attention to other units and corrununication

with them to perceive their vital interests" and the transmission of

"these perceptions to the points in the unit's decision-making centers

where they will be given quick and adequate treatment.,,3 Mere

attention, unless it is accompanied by the gratification of demands,

does not lead to responsiveness. However, attention is a pre~ondition

to the gratification of demands. Country 'A,' for example, cannot

gratify the demands made upon its decision centers by country 'B' unless

it is aware of, that is, has paid attention to, those demands.

It will be the major purpose of this study to see how far and with

what success the United States has been able to gratify Pakistani

demands and whether it has been able to give adequate attention to

2Ibid ., p. 26.

3Ibid ., p. 26.

3

demands made by Pakistan. Russett has dist~nguished demands or loads in

three dimensions: their number, their weight, i.e., the importance

attached to them by the party making the request, and their direction,

which he defines as "the degree to which they are complementary or

contradictory to other demands being made on the decision center.,,4 In

this study of Pakistani demands made on the United States' decision

centers and American responsiveness to Pakistani demands,' the number of

demands will be classified into various categories to be spelled out

later in this chapter. We hope to be able to assign 'weight' to these

categories of demands at the conclusion of our study when we will be in

a better position to judge which of these categories of demands in the

eyes of the Pakistani p6~tcy-makers is most important. We also plan to

deal with the question whether particular sets of Pakistani demands are

complementary or contradictory to demands from other sources being made

on the United States' decision centers. We will seek to ascertain how

the complementary or contradictory nature of demands affects the degree

of American responsiveness towards Pakistani demands. We hope to make a

clear statement on this question in the concluding chapter of this

study.

Fundamental Objectives of Pakistan;s Foreign Policy.

We will treat the fundamental objectives of Pakistan's foreign

policy under three headings in this study: (1) Pakistan's first

objective can be termed the preservation of the territorial integrity

4Ibid., p. 29.

4

and political independence of Pakistan. For the sake of brevity this

objective will be termed "security". An important objective of

practically every country's foreign policy, security has come to attain

a much greater importance in the case of Pakistan because of its

pecul~ar geographical division and the events and circumstances that led

to its creation. For Pakistan, the search for security has become for

all practical purposes a search for moral and material assistance

against India. (2) Pakistan's second objective is the achievement of

its goals regarding Kashmir. These include a plebiscite under

international auspices in the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir,

with the eventual aim of bringing about the accession of the State of

Jammu an~ Kashmir to Pakistan. (3) The third fundamental objective of

Pakistan's foreign policy is the attraction of foreign aid into Pakistan.... .

for economic development. Pakistan shares this aim with most other

developing nations and is heavily dependent upon foreign capital,

technical skill and equipment.

Pakistan "s demands on the United States' decision centers will.. -

follow a similar classification since these demands are generated by the

fundamental objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's demands

can be categorized under the following three categories: (1) demands

relatin~ to the security of Pakistan, (2) demands relating to Pakistan's

goals concerning Kashmir, (3) demands relating to Pakistan's need for

foreign aid for purposes of economic development.

Since Islamic ideology (in the form of the struggle to establish a

separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent) had played

a very important role in the creation of Pakistan, some writers, such as

- ;

5

Latif Ahmed Sherwani, tend· to consider Islamic ideology as one of the

fundamental objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy.5 Contrary to what

Sherwani believes, ideology, as distinct from the spreading of an

ideology, c~nnot form an obJective of a country's foreign policy.

Ideology may, however, be considered to be one of the sources that

influence the fundamental objectives of a country's foreign policy.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, Islam has influenced the thinking

of its policy-makers in matters of foreign policy just as it has in

matters of domestic policy. Pakistani foreign policy-makers have tried

to reconcile, as far as possible, the ideological bonds of Islam with

the objectives they have set for themselves and the policies they have

- -pursued in an effort to fulfill these objectives. A major concrete

effeet of Pakistan's Islamic ideology on its foreign policy has been the

conscious effort on the part of Pakistan to forge closer ties with the

Muslim countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia and lend full

support;to their causes, e.g., on Palestine and Algeria. But whenever

such ties have not been compatible with Pakistan's fundamental

objectives of foreign policy, the objectives of security, Kashmir and

foreign aid have been. given priority over closer relations with the

Muslim countries. For example, Pakistan's entry into the Western

alliance systems in 1954-55, which we shall demonstrate was prompted by

the fundamental ob~ectives of its foreign policy, led to a strain in

relations between Pakistan and the major Arab countries which considered

5Latif A~ed Sherwani, "The Objectives of Pakistan's ForeignPolicy," in Karachi University, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi,1964).

6

Pakistan a Western stooge. But since the Pakistani leadership was

convinced that the interests of the country in the realm of foreign

policy could be served better by such an alliance, Pakistan went ahead

with the alliance arrangement in spite of the criticism, thus

illustrating that bonds of Islamic community were not stronger than the

other objectives"of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's strained

relations with Afghanistan, a neighboring Muslim country, demonstrate

the same point. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have remained

strained due to territorial disputes on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border,

and the bonds,of Islamic community have not been able to overcome this

breach.

Pakistan's Islamic ideological base has become important in

Pakistan's dealings with India because of the circumstances which led to

the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 and to the creation of

Pakistan. Pakistan was established as the homeland for the Muslims of

the subcontinent and was carved out of the Muslim majority areas of the

former British Indian Empire. Because of these circumstances all major

Indo-Pakistani issues have religious or communal overtones to some

extent. In its relations with India, whether on matters of security or

Kashmir, Pakistan seems to be still struggling to make India accept the

validity of M. A. Jinnah's "two nation" theory--that the Hindus and

Muslims of the Indiqn subcontinent comprise two nations and not merely a

majority and a minority community.

Testing the HyPothesis.

To test-bur hypothesis concerning Pakistan's dem~nds and the United

7

States' responsiveness to these demands, we have chosen a method which

will be mainly historical. 6 The three major categories of Pakistani

demands and the degree of American responsiveness to these demands will

be discussed in three separate chapters. Incidents depicting the

demand-responsiveness mechanism will be treated chronologically.

Chapters concerning Pakistani demands will be prefaced by a chapter

entitled 'Genesis of the Alliance', which will deal with the reasons

that motivated~he United States to negotiate the Mutual Defense

Assistance Pact with Pakistan in 1954, and the reasons for Pakistan's

entry into an alliance relationship with the United States. This

chapter, it is hoped, will set the stage for the discussion of the three

categories of Pakistani demands and the United States responsiveness to

these demands in the following chapters. In the last chapter an effort

will be made to consolidate the findings emerging from Chapters Ill, IV

and V as to the degree of American responsiveness to Pakistan's demands.

An effort will also be made in the concluding chapter to discuss

American capabilities for responsiveness to Pakistan's demands. The

reasons why the growth of these capabilities has been helped or

hampered, and the effect of the complementary or contradictory nature of

Pakistani demands on American capabilities for responsiveness will also

be discussed. Having completed our study of the Pakistan-American case,

we may also find ourselves in a position in the concluding chapter to

make some remarks about such alliances in general in which one Great and

6By 'historical' we mean primarily the use of case study materialarranged, as far as possible, in chronological order.

8

one smaller power are involved.

Statements by Heads of State, Heads of Government, Foreign

Ministers, Secretaries of State, other Cabinet members, ambassadors and

other responsible officials of the two countries will be taken into

account in establishing the attitudes and policies of the two partners

to the alliance on particular issues and incidents. For these statements

and for the reconstruction of incidents which are now a matter of

history we will rely on Pakistani and American newspapers. Among these,

for purposes of documentation; we will draw primarily on the New York

Times and the leading Pakistani newspaper, Dawn of Karachi•. Other

Pakistani newspapers, such as the Pakistan Times and the Civil and

Military Gazette of Lahore, the Pakistan Observer of Dacca and the Times

of Karachi, will also be quoted. Editorial comments by Dawn will be

taken to reflect official thinking and opinion in Pakistan, especially

on matters of foreign policy, since Dawn has been closely connected with

the ruling circles of Pakistan, first as the organ of the Muslim League,

the ruling party, and then in its capacity as the elite newspaper of the

country. The Editor-in-Chief of ~, Altaf Hussain, is the Minister of

Industries in the present Cabinet of President Mohammed Ayub Khan of

Pakistan. Material from the editorials of other Pakistani newspapers

will be quoted to demonstrate the state of opinion in Pakistan

concerning incidents depicting various degrees of American responsive­

ness to the three categories of Pakistani demands. We will judge the

extent of the United States' responsiveness, to Pakistani demands by

studying the reactions in Pakistan as reflected in the statements of its

leaders and in opinions expressed in the editorial sections of the

leading newspapers in the country.

9

CHAPTER II

GENESIS OF THE ALLIANCE

In this chapter we will" discuss the reasons that prompted the

United States and Pakistan to enter into an alliance relationship and

the events that led to the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance

Pact. We will conclude the chapter by making some observations on

certain significant aspects of the negotiations that led to the

conclusion of the pact, and the reactions in Pakistan and the United

States to the signing of this pact. This chapter will set the stage for

the discussion of the three important categories of Pakistani demands in

the next three chapters of this study.

We will deal first with the reasons and the motives that prompted

the United States to sign the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact with

Pakistan in 1954 and extend military aid to that country. The decision

on the part of the United States to extend military aid to Pakistan was

a result of American global strategy aimed primarily at the encirclement

and containment of the Communist land-mass in Eurasia. To the United

States, its alliance with Pakistan formed a part of Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles' policy of forming a ring around the Communist

countries by means of bilateral alliances and regional pacts. While an

anti-Communist regional defense system, the North Atlantic Alliance, had

been created to contain the Soviet Union in the western sector, and a

similar arrangement to contain the Communist world was emerging in the

East as a result of treaties signed by the United States with Japan,

Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines and ~uth Korea, the strategically

11

important southern sector, comprising the countries of the Middle East

and South Asia, was still, from the American point of view, undefended.

There was a wide gap from Eastern Turkey to Western Thailand which had

to be filled if the policy of containment was to succeed.

Because India was 'positively neutral' and the leading Arab states

were in no mood to listen to Western reasoning as a result of their

preoccupation with Israel, this gap could be closed only with the help

of the three non-Arab Muslim countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and

the only Arab country willing to side with the West, Nuri-es-Said's

Iraq, which, with Afghanistan, formed the_'northern tier' of the Middle

East immediately bordering or a few miles away from Soviet territory.

It was in order to bolster the defenses of the southern sector that the

United States actively encouraged an alliance among these four countries

of the Middle East.

In addition to Pakistan's strategic importance in relation to the

defense_of the Middle East, Pakistan's eastern wing forms the western

boundary of Southeast Asia. Pakistan is therefore in a commanding

position to act as a link between the Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern

defense systems--just as Turkey does between NATO and the Middle East.

Lord Birdwood, writing shortly after the signing of the Mutual Defense

Assistance Pact (MDAP) , said: "The two wings of Pakistan supply the

missing link in the southern sector, which until recently lay open all

the way from Eastern Turkey across to the China seas. Pakistan thus

assumes a role of strategic importance in the defence of the free world

12

out of proportion to her resources."l

C. L. Sulzberger, writing in the~ York Times issue of

February 5, 1955, called Pakistan a "geo~raphical absurdity" but of

immense strategic and geopolitical value. Looking at Pakistan from the

American point of view, he assigned to it a three-fold diplomatic value:

(1) In the Middle East we hope its prestige as the world'slargest Islamic power will help Turkey break the Arab Leaguelogjam and induce other countries to join a defenseorganization extending from India to Greece. (2) Secondly,Pakistan blocks potential Soviet expansion southward throughAfghao istan. (3) Finally, it [United States] hopes to usethis country to strengthen Southeast Asian defense. 2

To do all this it was essential to bolster Pakistani defenses and put

its economy on a sound basis. It was expected that the former would be

accomplished by means of the MDAP and the latter by large doses of

economic aid.

Another strategic reason for American interest in Pakistan was the

proximity of northern West Pakistan and 'Azad' Kashmir (that part of

Kashmir which is under Pakistani control) to Soviet Central Asia, and of

East Pakistan to Tibet and the Sino-Burmese frontier. American

airplanes based in Peshawar--and the Gilgit region of 'Azad' Kashmir

could carry out crippling attacks on the industrial power concentrated

in Soviet Central Asia, a few hundred miles from the Pakistani border.

The strategic importance of this geographic proximity was much greater

in 1954, before the invention of the ICBM, than it is today.

The British-trained Pakistani Armed Forces, with the martial

lLord Birdwood, "Reflections on Pakistan in InternationalRelations," Pakistan Quarterly, V (Spring, 1955), p. 6.

2New York Times, February 5, 1955.

13

traditions of the Pathans, the Ba1uchis and the Muslim Punjabis, were

considered a definite asset by the United States and its Western allies

to the defensive forces of the free world.

In contrast to the American preoccupation with the Communist

threat, Pakistan's reasons for entering into an alliance with the United

States were not concerned primarily with any fear of Communist expansion.

In fact, Pakistan did not feel itself threatened either ideologically or

territorially by any Communist power.

As far as the ideological rift between the West and Communism was

concerned, "Pakistan had no strong convictions about the balance of

righteousness.,,3 Moreover, there was very little fear of COill1Ilunist

subversion in this staunchly Muslim country, in spite of the fact that

many Pakistanis were sympathetic toward socialist iJeas because of

strong socialist and collectivist trends in Muslim thought. As in other

developing countries, the rapid modernization of the Soviet Union was

greatly admired, but its Godless ideology was rejected in no uncertain

terms ....

This does not mean that the Pakistani leadership had no

apprehensions from Communist quarters. But most of these fears were

indirect rather than direct inasmuch as they were due to the Soviet

Union's support of Afghanistan and India in their disputes with Pakistan.

However, the Soviet Union, though always sympathetic toward India and

Afghanistan, did not throw its full weight behind them until after

Pakistan had signed the MDAP with the United States and openly joined

3Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policl : An Interpretation,(New York, 1957), p. 17.

14

the Western alliance. As far as Communist China was concerned, although

it "refused to take sides with India in the Indo-Pakistan disputes, the

slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are brothers)

sounded very ominous to Pakistani ears in the 1950's. But the

apprehensions that Pakistan had from Chinese and Soviet quarters were

not so much because of the nature of their Communist regimes as they

were the result of their close relations with two of Pakistan's

neighbors, India and Afghanistan, which had long-standing disputes with

that country.

Pakistan used American fears of Communist expansion and the United

States' policy of alliances for the containment of the Communist land­

mass for its own purposes of strengthening itself vis-~-vis India,

neutralizing Indian superiority on the subcontinent, and enlisting

American support for its case on Kashmir.

Pakistan, since its inception, has had many disputes with India,

the larger and stronger heir to the British Indian Empire. The two most

important of these have been the canal water dispute and the problem of

Kashmir. vfuile the former was settled through the good offices of the

World Bank, the latter continues to embitter relations between the two

nations. Moreover, the image of India held in Pakistan, both by the

leadership and the masses, is of a country and leadership unreconciled

to the establishment of Pakistan and ready to go to any extent, if

conditions permit, to undo the partition of 1947. Statements by

responsible Indian leaders and organizations, especially during the

initial stages of independence, have added to these Pakistani fears. To

quote just one instance, the All-India Congress Committee in the

15

resolution in which it reluctantly accepted the partition of the

subcontinent, said:

Geography and the mountains and the seas fashioned India asshe is, and no human agency can change that shape or come inthe way of that destiny. Economic circumstances and theinsistent demands of international affairs make the unity ofIndia still more necessary ••• The A.I.C.C. earnestlytrusts that when the present passions have subsided, India'sproblems will be viewed in the proper perspective and the.false doctrine of two nations in India will be discreditedand discarded by all. 4

The dispute over the question of the transfer of defense stores to

Pakistan following the partition of India in 1947 also generated great

resentment in Pakistan against India. Pakistan has continued to claim

that India has not transferred to it even a fraction of its share.

Pakistan looked upon this incident as a planned effort on the part of

Ind~a to keep Pakistan permanently weak and at India's mercy. As late

as February 22, 1957, H. S. Suhrawardy, the then Prime Minister of

Pakistan, declared, "Unfortunately, India did not abide by the agreement

arrived at concerning the transfer of defense stores to Pakistan and

did not send us these armaments, with the result that Partition found us

weak and feeble ,,5

Pakistan's search for security, therefore, has been aimed primarily

against India. As William S. Metz has pointed out:

Pakistan is an example of a nation having among her neighborsone other nation l~rger and more powerful than herself withwhich her relations have been constantly unfriendly. That

4Quoted in Ibid., p. 4.

5Quoted in J. B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955,(Amsterdam, 1958), p. 76, footnote 3.

16

neighboring nation, which in Pakistan's case is India, istherefore the most important constant, and the controllingfactor in Pakistan's foreign policy ••• Th~refore, themain problem of Pakistan's foreign policy has been: whereto turn for support in her disputes with her neighbor, andfor some redress of the power disparity between thatneighbor and herself. 6

: .A.s a result of the disparity in size and power between India and

Pakistan, the latter seems to be genuinely concerned about a threat to

its security from India. We are not making any judgment here as to the

existence of such a threat from this particular source. But the image

in the minds of the foreign policy-makers is much more important in the

shaping of a country's foreign policy than the reality itself which may

or may not coincide with the image. That the image of an aggressive

India exists in the minds of the Pakistani policy-makers will become

clear as we proceed with this study.

Turning next to the problem of Kashmir, we find that Pakistan's

security as well as the ideological basis of its creation are

fundamentally involved in this problem. Pakistan feels extremely

insecvre with India in, what it considers, forcible occupation of the

greater part of Kashmir, which includes the headwaters of most of the

important rivers that flow through and irrigate West Pakistan.

Moreover, for Pakistan, the Indian presence in·Kashmir symbolizes Indian

superiority in the subcontinent; in spite of several efforts Pakistan

has not been able to dislodge India from the strategically important and

predominantly Muslim Valley of Kashmir.

~li1liam S. Metz, Pakistan: Government and Politics, (New Haven,1956), p. 171.

17

The factor of Pakistan's Islamic character has attained great

importance in the case of Kashmir especially because the problem of

Kashmir is a legacy of the division of the Indian subcontinent into

India and Pakistan in 1947. The partition of the subcontinent was

performed on the basis of the Muslim majority areas, which were

separated from the rest of India and formed into an independent state--

Pakistan. Pakistan's ideological involvement in the question of Kashmir

should be studied in the context of the partition. of 1947 and the

ideological base on which Pakistan was established. For the Pakistanis,

an acceptance by India of the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan on the

c basis of its Muslim majority would constitute an acceptance on the part

of India of the validity of M. A. Jinnah's "two nation" theory, which

the Indian leadership has, in spite of the creation of Pakistan, refused

to accept.

In the initial stages of its existence as an independent state,

Pakistan turned to Great Britain and the Commonwealth machinery for

support in its disputes with India. However, it was soon disappointed

with Great Britain,as the latter refused to take sides in questions

involving two Commonwealth members. As one writer points out:

Pakistan hoped that the Commonwealth might be used as aninstrument of pressure against India. This hope was not tobe realised. Britain and other members of the Commonwealthhave traditionally avoided the discussion of matters indispute between member countries. No one wished to giveoffense to India, especially as the Commonwealth had nomachinery for enforcing its actions. 7

7Keith Ca11ard, ~. cit., p. 15.

IS

Moreover, Britain did not want to antagonize India, the larger and the

more important of the two dominions. The British had been sympathetic

to Muslim demands in the later stages of the British Raj in India and

the Pakistanis expected this attitude to continue even after

independence. But they were dismayed to find out that since Britain had

withdrawn from India it did not need the Muslims of the subcontinent any

longer as a counterweight against militant Hindu nationalism.

Pakistan was disappointed at the Commonwealth's impotence to do

anything about Indo-Pakistan disputes, especially Kashmir. On his

return from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1949, Prime

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan said: "Pakistan must not be taken

for granted. Pakistan is not a camp-follower of the Commonwealth."S

Liaquat Ali Khan at first refused to attend the Commonwealth Prime

Ministers' Conference in 1951 because of the non-inclusion of the

question of Kashmir in the agenda of the Conference. He was, however,

persuaded to go at the last minute by assurances that Kashmir would be

discussed in private talks among the Prime Ministers outside the

Conference. Though Pakistan has continued to remain a member of the

Commonwealth, and has derived some real benefits, mainly economic, from

its association with the Commonwealth, it has resigned itself to the

realization that neither Britain nor the Commonwealth machinery could

politically be of much help.

Pakistan was also disappointed in its bid to gain support from the

Muslim countries of the Middle East in the pursuit of its two main

SThe Round Table, YJeKIX, p. 365.

19

objectives. Most of these countries, newly independent, relatively

weak, and faced with too many internal problems to accept

responsibilities abroad, were in no position to give material help to.

Pakistan in case of an outbreak of hostilities with India or, for that

matter, with any other country. Moreover, most Muslim countries had

jus~ achieved independence after having struggled for it under the

banner of territorial and ethnic nationalism (e.g., Arab nationalism)

and were not interested in the concept of Pan-Islamism preached by the

Pakistanis. Some of these countries, especially the larger Arab states,

were even resentful of Pakistan's efforts toward Muslim unity. They saw

in these efforts a sinister plot on the part of Pakistan to take over

the leadership of the Muslim world in the name of Pan-Islamism. Since

some others, notably Egypt, had similar aspirations, their resentment ,.

was understandable. In addition, most of these countries did not want

to displease the largest 'nonaligned' nation in the world, India, by

taking sides in Indo-Pakistani disputes.

Pakistan's efforts to gain the support of Muslim countries for the

fundamental objectives of its foreign policy reached their climax with

Karachi's invitation to the other Muslim countries in 1952 to join

together in a consultative system. But the attempt failed, and, as a

correspondent of the Economist correctly predicted, this marked a

turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy.9 Pakistan now turned to the

United States in its search for security.

Pakistan's decision to enter into an alliance with the United

9The Economist, CLXIII (May 24, 1952), p. 522.

20

States was the result of Pakistan's desire to strengthen itself

vis-~-vis India and to be able to talk to India on the question of

Kashmir from a position of strength. That this was the case, rather

than any fear or hatred of Communism or any love for the United States

or the Western democracies, is borne out by the statements of a number

of responsible Pakistani leaders. Such statements became especially

frequent once Pakistan realized that the United States was unwilling to

do anything to further Pakistani objectives if such an act on its part

was likely to offend India. For most Pakistanis the alliance was

worthless if it did not strengthen Pakistan against India. The danger

of conquest by a Communist power, in a Pakistani writer's view, was very

remote "compared with the immediate and continuing danger of forcible

merger with India."l0

Pakistani leaders expressed the same sentiment repeatedly beginning

with Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon's speech during a debate on Kashmir

in the Pakistan National Assembly on March 8, 1958; berating Western

nations for supplying arms to India, he said that should Pakistan feel

her independence in jeopardy it "will break all pacts in the world, and

shake hands with those whom we have made our enemies for the sake of

others."n Speaking in the same vein, Pakistani Foreign Minister Z. A.

Bhutto said in the National Asse@bly on June 22, 1964, that because of

the United States' decision to give long-term military aid to India,

"time has come for Pakistan to undertake reappraisal of its foreign

10M• Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the United States," PakistanHorizon, IX (December, 1956), p. 200.

11New York Times, March 9, 1958.

21

policy and review her political and military commitments." Pakistan's

commitments, he said, had been made under a particular situation which

changed with Washington's decision to give massive military aid to

India. 12 The above statements have been quoted to prove that Pakistan's

main reason for entering into an alliance with the United States was its

preoccupation with a presumed threat from India.

In addition to Pakistan's search for security and support over the

question of Kashmir, the third main reason for Pakistan's alliance with

the United States was the need for aid for purposes of economic

development. Pakistan's leaders, beginning with the first Prime

Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, realized that the standard of living of the

poverty-stricken masses of the country could-be raised only by large

scale economic development, which could not be achieved without large

scale foreign aid. The capital, technical skill and equipment for this

massive effort towards economic development could come only from the

industrialized West, and especially from the United States. Liaquat Ali

Khan realized Pakistan's dependence upon the United States for economic

aid as early as 1949-50 and successfully maneuvered an invitation to

visit the United States. This visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister to

the United States was of tremendous publicity value to Pakistan. It was

the realization of economic dependence upon the United States that

prompted Liaquat to postpone, in effect to abandon, his projected visit

to the Soviet Union and go to the United States instead. 13 By 1965

l2Dawn, June 23, 1964.

13K• Sarwar Hasan, "The Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,"Pakistan Horizon, IV (December, 1951), p. 186.

22

Pakistan had received approximately $3 billion in economic aid in the

shape of loans, grants and commodity aid. 14

The above discussion should not lead the reader to believe that the

aims and objectives of the two countries were so incompatible with each

other that it was an act of folly on the part of Pakistan and the United

States to enter into an alliance relationship and expect the alliance to

help them achieve their separate goals. The United States, while

realizing Pakistan's preoccupation with India, tended to minimize Indo-

Pakistani conflicts as temporary and solvable. Moreover, the United

States also felt that the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in the subcontinent

. could be kept under control and would not interfere with the anti-

Communist aspects of the alliance.

American official thinking achieved support from statements made by

Pakistani leaders on the eve of the announcement of American military

aid to Pakistan. ~The Pakistani statements emphasized the belief that

Pakistan was not adverse to the extension of similar military aid to

India. The Pakistani leadership could afford to make such statements in

1954 because it had no imminent fear that India would accept arms aid

from the West for such mil~tary aid would have come into conflict with

India's policy of non-alignment. The foremost example of such a

statement was the one made by the then Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sir

Zafrulla Khan, in January 1954 that Pakistan would have no objection if

the United States gave military aid to India. On this occasion Sir

Zafrulla declared: "Why should we have any objection if India is in

l~orman D. Palmer, "India and Pakistan: The Major Recipients, II

Current History, XLIX (~ovember, 1965), p. 263.

23

need of any equipment and can obtain it from a friendly state like the

United States."l5 Statements, such as the one quoted above, may have

been made by the Pakistanis merely to convince the United States that it

did not oppose India's entry into an anti-Communist alliance; they were

apparently accepted at face value by the United States.

The United States was also led to believe that Pakistan looked upon

Communism as the major threat to itself and was therefore eager to join

the United States in organizing the defense of the free world against

this danger. An outstanding example of such a statement was the one

made by Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan at a National Press Club

luncheon during his visit to the United States in October 1954. On that

occasion the Pakistani Prime Minister contrasted his country's policy of

active defense against Communism in Asia with India's polic~ of

neutralism and declared: "Collective security is the. answer to

international Communism. It is weakness in defense that invites

aggression • • • We fear that in the conditions of today any attitude of

complacence or passive watching will place all that we value and hold

dear in extreme peril and jeopardy.lll6 The Pakistani Prime Minister

repeated the same theme in a speech in Karachi a few months later, when

he condemned the idea that democracy and Communism could co-exist.

Emphasizing Pakistan's ties with the West and particularly his support

of U. S. foreign policy, the Pakistani Prime Minister lauded the Western

democratic system and went on to remark that "posed on the other side is

l5New York Times, January 8, 1954.

l6New York Times, October 19, 1954.

24

communism, with an authoritarian and totalitarian system.,,17

Pakistan, fully aware of American reasons for the formation of such

an alliance, was bent upon using American fears of Communist expansion

to improve its power-position vis-~-vis India. To Pakistan the ftl1iance

was a marriage of 'convenience. Pakistan was willing to go along with

the American policy of military alliances in Asia for the purpose of

containing Communist power, thus risking the hostility of the Communist

Powers--the Soviet Union and China--as long as it saw a reasonable

chance of obtaining American support in its disputes with India.

Moreover, Pakistan expected to improve considerably its military

posture vis-~-vis India with the help of American military aid. The

American reason for the grant of military aid to Pakistan was the

building up of Pakistan's military strength so that it could cope with

any Communist military threat to its security as well as contribute to

the defense of the region (South Asia and the Middle East) in case of

such a threat. Pakistan, however, was primarily concerned with~

improving its military position so 'that it could negotiate with India on

matters in disputq from a position of strength. While the reasons for

the granting of military aid and its acceptance were not identical, the

objectives did not seem to corne into conflict in 1954. Pakistan was

willing to become:a part of the Western regional defense system in Asia

if this was the only way it could get American arms to build up its

military posture and neutralize Indian superiority in the subcontinent.

The United States was willing to arm Pakistan, even though such an act

l7 New York Times, January 3, 1955.

25'

was likely to upset the balance of power between India and Pakistan,

because of the latter's expressed readiness to join the West in

defending the region in the event of a Communist onslaught.

We can, therefore, reasonably project that the alliance would not

face serious trouble as long as the objectives and reasons which led the

two parties to enter into the alliance did not come into conflict with

each other. But if the objectives clashed the state of the alliance was

sure to be adversely affected.

The first public report that a Pakistan-United States defense pact

was in the offing came from a dispatch from the Karachi correspondent of

the New York Times dated November 2, 1953. The dispatch stated that

such a pact would be discussed between Pakistani Governor-General Ghulam

Mohammed and President Eisenhower during the former's forthcoming visit

to the United States. The reporter quoted "a high government official"

as saying that these discussions were about to begin. 18 Selig S.

Harrison, then Associated Press correspondent in India and Pakistan, was

convinced that the "high official" mentioned in the dispatch was Defense

secretary Iskander Mirza, who was later to become the Governor-General

and President of Pakistan. 19

On November 12, 1953, the New York Times published an Associated

Press report from London, dated November 11, stating that "Pakistani-informants" had confirmed that "the United States was negotiating with

l~ew York Times, November 2, 1953.-- ------19Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States: Case

History of a Mistake," New Reoublic, CXLI (August 10, 1959), p. 16.

26

Pakistan for permission to establish military bases there in exchange

for defense aid.,,20 These reports based on Pakistani sources were

followed by an admission by the American State Department that there had

been "general conversations" on the question of American mi1it~ry aid to

Pakistan. But at the same time the State Department denied that any

"negotiations" had been undertaken. 21

The reports that appeared in November, 1953, were the result of

certain events that had been taking place during the past few months,

and if Selig S. Harrison's version is to be accepted, had their roots in

the period as far back as the months immediately following the

assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October, 1951.

Harrison, as the A. P. correspondent in India and Pakistan, was in an

excellent position to follow the turn of events between 1951 and 1954.

He was of the opinion that Governor-General Ghu1am Mohammed, Defense

Secretary Iskander Mirza and Army Commander-in-Chief Ayub Khan had been

maneuvering adroitly to get a miI1tary aid commitment from the United

States since 1951-52. 22 The replacement in April, 1953 of Pakistan's

second Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, by Mohammed Ali Bogra; then

Ambassador to the United States, can also be regarded, in the light of

later developments, as an episode connected with this maneuver. It was

Ambassador Mohammed Ali who, addressing a meeting of the Eng1ish­

Speaking Union in San Francisco on June 12, 1952, had for the first time

20New York Times, November 12, 1953.

21New York Times, November 12, 1953.

22Se1ig S. Harrison, £E. cit., p. 14.

27

declared that Pakistan was against neutralism and definitely on° the side

of the West. To quote Ambassador Ali: "Do not count Pakistan as a

neutral nation of Asia. Our basic sympathies are strong1yo·with the

West. n23 However, no spectacular developments took place in Pakistan-

American relations until the inauguration of the Republican

administration in 1953, with John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State.

Dulles was impressed by the 'northern tier' scheme for the

containment of Soviet Russia in the southern sector. The scheme was in

line with his plans for regional alliances for the containment and

encirclement of the Communist land-mass. Events· moved quickly after

Dulles' visit to Pakistan in May, 1953, as a part of his tour of the

Middle East and South Asia. Dulles returned from Pakistan impressed by

what he saw. In a radio report regarding his trip he declared on

June 1, 1953, that "Pakistan occupies a high position in the Muslim

world. The strong spiritual faith of the people make them a dependable

bulwark against Communism.,,24 This was the first time that a

responsible American official had spoken of the possibility of making

Pakistan a bulwark against Communism.

secretary of State Dulles' visit to Pakistan was followed by the

visit of the Pakistan Army Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, to

military installations in the United States. His arrival in Washington

coincided with Governor-General ~hu1am Mohammed's visit to the American

capital for talks with President Eisenhower. It seemed the General was

23nawn, June 13, 1952.

240. S. Department of State, Bulletin, XXVIII (June 15, 1953),p. 833.

28

near at hand to advise his chief of state on matters pertaining to

military aid. Shortly after the visits of the Pakistani leaders to the

United States, American Vice-President Rictard H. Nixon visited Pakistan

on his Asian goodwill tour in early December 1953. Though Nixon denied

any knowledge of plans for military assistance to Pakistan during his

stop-over in Karachi, it is generally accepted that he recommended

military aid to Pakistan in his report to the President and to the

National Security Council after his return. 25

Heanwhi1:,., Prime Minister:-Nehru of India had become extremely vocal

in his criticism of the reports regarding the projected American

military aid to Pakistan. Nehru, in an 'effort to steal the thunder from

the Communists and the rightist Hindu parties,ordered his rulin&

Congress Party to take the lead in whipping up public criticism of and

demonstrations against the projected Pakistan-American defense pact.

Nehru denounced the proposed pact for bringing the Cold War to the

doorstep of India. Pakistan was told that negotiations begun in August

1953, and then underway, to solve the Kashmir dispute would be broken

off if Karachi decided to go through with the aid pact. Prime Minister

Nehru, addressing the Indian Parliament said' that "the whole con.text of

the August agreement on Kashmir will change if military aid comes to

Pakistan. ,,26

There was no official comment from the United States concerning thp.

25James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan," AmericanPolitical Science Review, XLVIII (September, 1954), p. 740.

26New York Times, December 24, 1953.

29

reports about projected American military aid to Pakistan except for a

statement on January 2, 1954, by Senator William F. Know1and, Republican

Senate Majority Leader, attacking India's opposition to the proposal for

military aid to Pakistan. In the same statement Senator Know1and called

Pakistan "one of the key, important countries in the entire world in

relation to the defense against Conununism.,,27 The only other indication

of the lines on which American policy was developing was contained in a

report in the New York Times' issue of January 6, 1954. The report,

quoting "authoritative" sources, stated that the United States was

actively encouraging a defense alliance among Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan.

On February 8, 1954, the New York Times reported that the National

Security Council had approved the military aid plan for Pakistan.

Though the report was unofficial, it was based once again on information

received from "authoritative" sources. On February 19 came the 'report

that Pakistan and Turkey were working on a defensive pact between

themselves, and on February 22 Pakistan formally requested military

assistance from the United States.

On February 25, 1954, President Eisenhower announced his decision

to give military aid to Pakistan in what he described as a move to

strengthen the "defensive capabilities" of the strategic Middle East.

Simultaneously, Eisenhower promised to give "most sympathetic

consideration" to any request by New Delhi for similar help. At the

same time, in an effort to allay Indian fears, he wrote a personal

letter to Prime Minister Nehru expla~ning his decision to extend

27New York Times, January 3, 1954.

30

military assistance to Pakistan. Both in his statement and in his

letter to the Indian Prime Minister, the President said that "If our aid.

to any country, including Pakistan, is misused or misdirected against

another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with

my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without

the United Nations to thwart such aggression.,,28

Welcoming President Eisenhower's decision to extend military aid to

Pakistan, Prime Minister Mohannned Ali said "Pakistan today enters a

glorious chapter in its history, and is now cast for a significant role

in world affairs." In the same statement he declared that "The United

States has not asked for any bases or any undertakings or concessions at

any time. Nor has Pakistan offered any.,,29

Several observations can be made on the events of the fo~ months,

November 1953 to February 1954, which culminated in President

Eisenhower's declaration granting military aid to Pakistan. One tactic

employed by the Pakistani officials in an attempt to force the hand of

the United States Government was that of the deliberate "leak." As

Selig S. Harrison points out, "The sequence of events leading up to the

announcement of the arms aid decision·on February 8, 1954, provides a

revealing example • • • of how U. S. foreign policy can fall into the

hands of interested parties in other governments.,,30

Secretary of State Dulles and Assistant Secretary of State Henry

28New York Times, February 26, 1954.

29Dawn, February 26, 1954.

30Se1ig S. Harrison, ££. cit., p. 16.

31

Byroade, though impressed by what they saw and heard in Pakistan during

their trip to that country in May, 1953, were in no particular hurry to

execute the 'northern tier' plan or finalize a defense assistance

agreement with Pakistan, especially in view of the fact that Pakistan

was not willing to give base rights to the United States in return for

military aid. They were also apprehensive of Indian reactions to such a

move and did not want to see India swing from its policy of non­

alignment to an even more pro-Communist posture as a result of an_

American decision to give military aid to P~kistan.

The Pakistani leaders, especially Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed,

Defense Secretary Iskander Mirsa and Commander-in-Chief General Ayub

Khan, were, however, in a big hurry to capitalize on the good

impressions that Dulles had carried away with him from Pakistan and

desired an immediate commitment from the United States, fearful of the

fact that if time was allowed to pass the "India Lobby" in Washington

might be able to thwart efforts toward a Pakistan-American defense pact.

The fear in Pakistani circles that a delay might kill all prospects

of American military aid to Pakistan prompted the deliberate leakage of

the news about negotiations concerning a defense pact to John Callahan,

New X2!k Times' correspondent in Karachi, on November 1, 1953, by a

"high official" of the Pakistan Government. Callahan I s report was

followed up, as has been mentioned above, by a November 11 A. P.

dispatch from London on the same lines. The November 11 dispatch, on

the eve of Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed's meeting with President

Eisenhower, was also attributed to Pakistan Government sources.

For the next few weeks there was no official confirmation on the

32

part of the United States of the news leaked by Pakistani sources.

However, there was an immediate and violent outcry against the proposed

defense pact and a denunciation of the United States in India. The

violent and well-publicized nature of the Indian reaction put the United

States Administration in an uncomfortable position. A United States

back-down on the military aid proposal would now be considered a result

of neutralist India's opposition and consequently American position

would suffer among United States' sympathizers in Asia. The vehemence

of Indian opposition led the Washington correspondent of the~ York

Times to comment that II As a matter of fact the opposition of Prime

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India was so pronounced that the State

Department felt the United States had to go through with the agreement

or face up to the consequences of turning the leadership of South Asia

over to neutralist India." 31 James W. Spain, expressing the same point

of view, has written:

The very violence of Indian opposition put the United Statesin a corner as far as international prestige was concerned.Prime Minister Nehru's unqualified denunciation, while quiteconsistent wi-Eh his ideology left the United States no "out."It had to bow to Indian pressure and drop all considerationof military aid to Pakistan or force it through in spite ofIndian objections. As was quickly pointed out, rejection ofPakistani overtures would mean a death blow to American hopesfor other Asian countries to join in defensive measures withthe West. 32

On his side, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan did a good job

of impressing upon the American Administration the sincere friendship

31New York Times, February 8, 1954.

32James W. Spain, £E. cit., p. 749.

33

that Pakistan harbored for the United States and its loyalty to the

projected alliance. In fact, he went out of his way to be flattering to

the United States. He rejected in very strongly worded notes Russian

and Chinese protests against the proposed pact, and, defending American

activities in Asia, declared: "The United States desires only peace and

its efforts should be appreciated; it is activated by a great good.,,33

At the same time Prime Minister Ali placated nationalist opinion in

Pakistan, which was averse to the grant of any bases or territorial

rights to any foreign power,' by stating categorically, "There never was

any question of giving one inch of Pakistan territory to any country,

however friendly • • • Pakistan would not shed one drop of blood to

fight the battles of others, except 'to safeguard her own freedom.,,34,

But though the proposal for the granting of air bases'to the United

States was dropped, there seemed to be a tacit understanding that in

case of a threat to the security of the region such rights might be

granted temporarily. This understanding could be read into a number of

statements made by Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, as well as into the

Pakistani note to the USSR rejecting Russian protests, in which Pakistan

stated that, though it was a hypothetical question, "yet in case of

emergency there was nothing to prevent Pakistan from inviting any

friendly power ••• to use such bases to defend the region.,,35

A comparison of how the announcement by the American President

33New York Times, December 18, 1953.

3~ew York Times, January 5, 1954.

35New York Times, May 5, 1954.

34

concerning the granting of military aid to Pakistan was received in

Pakistan and in the United States can be very illuminating. The

announcement was welcomed with great enthusiasm in Pakistan. After

years of virtual isolation, especially insofar as its disputes with

India were concerned, Pakistan's diplomacy had achieved its first major

breakthrough, and the Pakistanis looked upon it, rightly, as a major

achievement. "Later criticism of the pacts would develop, but in

1954-55, after seven years of humiliation and frustration they were

warmly welcomed. 1I36 The announcement also came at a very opportune

moment for the United States. A great fund of goodwill had been built

up for that country in Pakistan as a result of the prompt shipment of

610,000 tons of wheat in 1953-54, valued at ap~roximately $68 million in

current prices, by the United States to Pakistan, which was then

experiencing one of its worst food crises.

The Pakistani press, led by the semi-official ~, was extravagant

in its praise of the military aid announcement. Welcoming President

Eisenhower's declaration, Dawn wrote editorially that the news was "no

less stirring because it was not unexpected--that democracy's most

powerful defender in this cold-warring world, the United States of

America, has agreed to give military assistance to Pakistan under the

U. S. Mutual Security legislation.,,37 The only major newspaper which

opposed the acceptance of any such aid was the left-leaning Pakistan

Times of Lahore; but even it denounced Indian criticism of the pact as

36wayne A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan~ the~ of China, (New York,1964), p. 43.

37nawn, February 26, 1954.

35

an interference in Pakistan's sovereign rights to decide its own future.

The Pakistan Times wrote editorially:

Notwithstanding our opposition to U. S. military aid, whichWashington undoubtedly regards as a first step towardsPakistan's association with the network of military alliances,we feel that the Pakistan Government's protests against theIndian Government's attitude is fully justified, •••Surely, neither India nor any other country can be allowedto determine for other States, what they should not do tomaintain Asia's present "ba1ance of power." 38

While on the whole Pakistan reacted favorably to the news of the

proposed pact, there was some fairly vocal opposition on the part of a

motley group of East Pakistani politicians, dominated by leftist

elements and Communist sympathizers, and led by Mau1ana Abdul Hamid Khan

Bhashani, also known in Pakistani political circles as the 'Red Mullah.'

In February 1954 this group held an anti-American rally in Dacca, in

which an estimated 50,000 people took part, protesting the proposed

pact. 39 In West Pakistan the only voice other than that of the Pakistan

Times raised against the acceptance of American military aid was that of

Mian Iftikharuddin, a leftist member of the Pakistan Constituent

Assembly.

In contrast to the situation in Pakistan, where the government

officials took a leading part in welcoming, defending and praising the

proposed pact, there was an atmosphere of "public clamor and official

silence"40 in the United States. Most of the clamor was in criticism of

38pakistan Times, December 22, 1953.

39New York Times, February 21, 1954.

40James W. Spain, ~. cit., p. 738.

41rbid., p. 744.

42New York Times, February 27, 1954.

36

37

floor on March 2, 1954, Fulbright said: "I disappro~e of this move, and

I wish the Record to show very clearly my disapproval, because in the

future when the results of this policy are evident to all I want it to

be clear where the responsibility rests. ,,43

Among other important figures who opposed the proposed defense pact

was Chester Bowles, former Ambassador to India and later to become

ambassador in New Delhi once more; he had fought against the idea of

United States military aid to Pakistan until his resignation in early

1953 as a result of the Republican victory in the presidential elections

of 1952. After the decision to grant military aid to Pakistan was

taken, Bowles wrote in the~ Leader:

It is bad arithmetic to alienate 360 million Indians in orderto aid 80 million Pakistanis who are split in two sections,divided by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Instead of addingto the stability of the subcontinent, this will create newtensions and suspicions and thus further contribute to itsinsecurity. 44

However, the decision to give military aid to Pakistan was reached

by the "professionals" of the Pentagon and the State Department. A

military survey team under Brigadier General Henry F. Myers, who at one

time had served in the American Embassy in Karachi, arrived in Pakistan

in mid-March to study Pakistan's military requirements.

Pakistan and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Assistance

Pact in Karachi on May 19, 1954. The pact was signed by Foreign

Minister Zafrul1a Khan on behalf of Pakistan and the United States

43Congressional Record, Vol. 100, Part 2, p. 2481.

44Chester Bowles, "A U. S. Policy for Asia," New Leader, XXXVII(February 22, 1954), p. 3.

38

Charge d'affairs t John K. Emerson t deputising for Ambassador Horace

Hildreth t who was already in Washington discussing the amount and the

details of the aid to be given to Pakistan with Administration officials

and Congressional leaders.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Pact included the following important

provisions: (1) Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression.

(2) Pakistan will not t without prior agreement with the United States t

devote the aid to other purposes than those for which it was furnished.

(3) Pakistan will take appropriate measures consistent with its security

to keep the public informed of op~rations under the pact. (4) Pakistan

will join in promoting and maintaining world peace. (5) Pakistan will

furnish to the United States t or such other governments as she and the

United States agree upon t equipment and services to aid their defense

and to support collective security under the United Nations. (6) Paki­

stan will cooperate with the United States to control trade with nations

that threaten world peace, in the interest of general security.

(7) Administrative and operating costs of carrying ou~ the agreement

will be borne by Pakistan. 45

In this chapter we have tried to discuss the reasons that prompted

the United States and Pakistan to sign the MDAP and the events that

preceded the signing of the pact. In the next three chapters we propose

to deal with the three major categories of Pakistani demands on the

United States decision centers and see how the United States has

responded to these demands as well as what effect these demands and

45New York Times, May 20, 1954•

•

responses have had on the state of the alliance.

39

CHP~TER III

THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

It will be the purpose of this chapter to discuss Pakistan's

security demands and the degree of American responsiveness to these

demands. An effort will be made, as far as possible, to deal

chronologically with situations that illustrate Pakistan's security

demands and American responsiveness to these demands.

Pakistan, as has been pointed out in the last chapter, turned to

the United States in the early 1950's in its quest for se~urity. vlhile

the United States was also interested in preserving the security of

Pakistan, its interest in Pakistan's security was the outgrowth of its

global strategy of the containment of the Communist Powers. To the

United States, the major threat to Pakistan's security came from

Communist sources. In American eyes, the danger to Pakistan's security

was enhanced because of Pakistan's proximity to the Soviet Union and

Communist China. However, the sources of threat to Pakistan's security

that were considered primary by the United States, were considered, at

the most, secondary by Pakistan. As one Pakistani writer points out,

liThe idea underlying Pakistan's alliance with the West was the desire to

seek security which it clearly needed to deter the threat of attack by

India."l Therefore, while the United States signed the MDAP and

actively encouraged the formation of regional alliances with a view to

lMohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Foundations of Pakistan's ForeignPolicy," in Karachi Univers~ty, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, (Karachi,1964), p. 26.

41

contain and encircle the Communist land-mass, Pakistan's entry into

pacts and regional defense systems "was largely motivated, not by sheer

love of the West or mere hatred cf the Communists, but by her consuming

desire to neutralize, if possible counterpoise, the growing Indian

military strength. 1I2

The difference in how the two allies viewed Pakistan's problem of

security has been at the root of most of the important problems that

have arisen between them since the inception of the alliance. For

purposes of this chapter, however, we will accept that definition of

'security' which has been put forward by Pakistan, since we propose to

study the alliance from the point of view of the demands made by

Pakistan. Pakistani demands which fall in the category of 'security'

have been the outcome of how Pakistani policy-makers have viewed the

problem of 'security.' The American perception of this problem is

irrelevant to the image in the minds of the Pakistani decision-makers.

In the last chapter we have made an effort to show why such an image

regarding the source of threat to Pakistan's security has come to exist

in the minds of the Pakistanis. But, whatever the reasons, the

important thing is that the image does exist, and that it does play a

decisive role in the shaping of Pakistan's foreign policy. Khalid Bin

Sayeed sums up PakistanIs attitude towards the alliance with the United

States in the following words:

The fact remains that Pakistan joined the various defense pacts

2Sharif a1-Mujahid, "India-Pakistan Relations: An Analysis," inibid., p. 36.

42

with the United States largely to protect her interestsagainst the future aggression of India. According toPakistanis, Communism poses a threat to all and is notlikely to make Pakistan its exclusive target whereasIndians themselves have made it clear more than oncethat Pakistan is their number one enemy.3

A. M. Rosenthal expressed the same view, when he wrote in 1957:

This reporter • • • has yet to meet a Pakistani who infrank conversation would argue seriously that his countryentered the Western military alliance because of fear ofattack by Russia or China. pakistan wants arms, notagainst the Communist nations, but against India. Thisdoes not mean that the Pakistanis are arming for a swiftknockout attack against India. It does mean that thePakistanis think they can only be in a position to dealwith India diplomatically and politically if they aremilitarily strong. 4

The difference in how the two allies--pakistan and the United

States--view the question of Pakistan's security and the sources from

which aggression could be expected first came to light at the Manila

Conference convened to establish the South East Asia Treaty Organization.

The incident at Manila can also be considered the first major instance

in which the United States failed to be adequately responsive to

Pakistan's demands for security.

At the Conference convened in Manila on September 7, 1954, to

consider the establishment of a treaty organization to secure peace and

security in Southeast Asia and the South~yest Pacific, the pakistani

delegate, Sir Zafrulla Khan, clashed with the American delegate on the

3Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis ofPakistani Fears and Interests," Asian Survey, IV (Harch, 1964),pp. 746-L~7.

4A• H. Rosenthal, "Kashmir's Far Reaching Impact," Foreign PolicyBulletin, XXXVI (Harch 1, 1957), p. 93.

43

question of the definition of the word "aggression" in Article IV,

paragraph 1 of the draft treaty. The Article, in its final form,

provides that in case of aggression or armed attack against any

signatory to the Treaty, each member would act to meet the common danger

in accordance with its constitutional processes.

The United States wanted the treaty organization to be exclusively

a bulwark against Communist aggression, and, therefore, argued that it

be made explicit in Article IV that the treaty could be invoked only in

the case of Communist aggression. The United States wanted to do this

by expressly qualifying the term "aggression" by the prefix "Communist."

Pakistan, on the other hand, did not want to limit the definition of

aggression in such a way as to be exclusively interpreted as Communist

aggression and thus make the treaty uninvokable in the case of a threat

from any other source. Once again, it was Pakistan's objective of the

search for security against India and material assistance in case of a

conflict with its larger neighbor that led its delegate to take this

stand. The acceptance of the American definition of "aggression," as

Communist aggression only, would have ruled out any help against India.

And since Pakistan was much more concerned about an Indian threat,

rather than a remote and hypothetical Communist aggression, the defense

treaty would not have been adequate to serve Pakistani interests.

In putting forth the Pakistani point of view, Foreign Minister

Zafrulla Khan argued that the Conference should not discriminate between

various kinds of aggression. "Aggression is evil," he said. "There are

no varieties of evil, no varieties of aggression," and it was necessary

44

to resist it wherever it came fram. 5 U. S. Secretary of State Dulles

finally agreed to the omission of the word "Communist" from the main

body of the text, thus accepting the Pakistani point of view. But at

the same time he explained to the Conference that the United States was

not ready to assume any obligation in case of a quarrel between two non-

Connnunist states. The United States, therefore, appended an

"Understandingll to the treaty in which it stated that "The United States

of America in executing the present treaty does so with the

understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed

attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph

1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of

other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of

Article IV, paragraph 2. ,,6 Thus, while limiting the definition of

aggression, as far as it was concerned, the United States promised to

consult in the event of a non-Communist aggression.

Though the leading Pakistani newspaper, ~, hailed the dropping

of the word "Connnunist ll from Article IV, paragraph 1, as "a great

victory for the Pakistan delegation,,,7 there was great disappointment in

Pakistan at the American "Understanding" appended to the main body of

the treaty. The Pakistanis realized that the American refusal to accept

their definition of aggression had rendered SEATO useless as far as

5pakistan Times, September 7, 1954.

6United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. VI,Par t I, (1955), p. 85.

7Dawn, September 8, 1954.

45

their confrontation with India was concerned. They had agreed to join

the treaty organization, which was primarily aimed against the Communist

powers, with the hope that such an association with the Western Powers,

and especially the United States, would be helpful in their own disputes

with India and in achieving their fundamental objective of neutralizing

Indian superiority on the subcontinent. As a Pakistani writer points

out:

In Pakistan the Manila Treaty was received without enthusiasm.There was disappointment at the United States "Understanding"that the pact was directed against Communist aggression only.The United States and the other signatories to the treaty,Pakistan included, were all conscious of the Communist danger.

-- ~ut so far as Pakistan was concerned, it was primarilyperturbed about its trouble with India. Clearly it wasillogical and inconsistent with the principle of peace thatone kind of aggression should be considered less reprehensiblethan another kind. S

Popular disappointment in Pakistan with SEATO has led another Pakistani

student of international affairs to comment that "Pakistan's decision to

join the SEATO was in accordance 't'lith the dictates neither of her

ideology nor of her national interest. ,,9 pakistan came to feel that by

joining SEATO it had unnecessarily made enemies of the two great

Communist powers--the Soviet Union and China--with whom it had no

quarrel of its own. It also felt that in return for the sacrifices it

made by joining SEATO, i.e., gaining the hostility of the Communist

Powers, its allies in the treaty organization did not offer an adequate

8K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, (New York, 1960),p. 68.

9Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, "Foundations of Pakistan's ForeignPolicy," in Karachi University, .QQ.. cit., p. 2L,.

46

quid Q!£ quo in the shape of a guarantee of material assistance in case

of an outbreak of Indo-Pakistani hostilities. The lack of American

responsiveness to Pakistan's demand at the Manila Conference, so soon

after the signing of the MDAP, was an indication of the things to come.

Another major instance very early in the history of the Pakistan-

American alliance in which the United States failed to be responsive to

Pakistani demands arose out of the visit to India and Afghanistan in

December 1955 of Premier Bulganin of the Soviet Union and Nikita

Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Comnunist Party of the Soviet Union.

The two top Soviet leaders during their trip to India and Afghanistan

supported Indian and Afghan claims concerning Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan

against Pakistan. The Russian stand was considered by the. Pakistanis a

direct threat to their security, since it was an expression of support

by one of the two super-powers to the two neighbors of Pakistan, with

whom that country was engaged in territorial disputes.

Pakistan believed, and with good reason, that the anti-Pakistani

posture of the Soviet Union was the result of Pakistan's alliance with

the West. As such it expected the Western Powers, and especially the

United States, the leader of the Western alliance and the Western

country with whom Pakistan had the closest relationship, to come out

whole-heartedly and categorically in support of Pakistan's stand

vis-~-vis its two neighbors who were supported by the Soviet Union.

As the Times 2i Karachi put it:

The people of this country will of course fight for their sur­vival, but the obligation of our friends are clear, heavyand pressing. Dilly-dallying has done the worst harm to theobjective of galvanising the defence of the free area. Thatdilly-dallying must now stop at least as an earnest sicof recognising the imminent dangers. America must

47

dispel the impression that her friendship is half-heartedand her assistance is tardylO

~ Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, writing in the same vein,

said, "In this first-rate crisis created for Pakistan, the least America

. owes, both to this country, as a friend and an ally, and to free world

opinion as a champion of the democratic cause, is to naU this lie by

issuing a prompt categorical refutation."11

The Pakistanis were disappointed at the knerican reaction to what

they considered to be a threat of great magnitude to their territorial

integrity. The American Administration seemed to take no notice of the

Soviet statements regarding issues affecting the security of Pakistan.

The only statement made by a responsible American official in connection

with this episode was that. of Ambassador Horace Hildreth in Karachi, in

which he reiterated American support for U. N. resolutions on Kashmir.

Disappointment at American lack of responsiveness increased to such an

extent that a resolution was introduced in the policy-making Council of

the ruling Muslim League calling for the withdrawal of Pakistan from

Western-sponsored alliances unless the United States and Britain would

support pakistan in its territorial disputes with India and

Afghanistan. 12 The influential Davffi cOlnmented that while the United

States

neglected the disputes between the countries in the region,for fear of annoying the oppressor, these disputes were fully

10pakistan Ne\vs Digest, IV (December 15, 1955), p. 3.

11L . t-2..£ • .£L.

12New York Times, January 4, 1956.

48

exploited by the Communists in creating unbridgeable gulfs• • • The wooing of the neutralists in pursuance of thecompetitive economic co-existence policy was said to havemade the West lukewarm and hesitant in supporting its allieseven when they were on the right. The delay in thestrengthening of defence together with the reluctance inbeing emphatic and assertive of their friendship, made theposition of the allies of the West in the region extremelydifficu1t. 13

Other leading newspapers in the country echoed the same sentiments.

The Pakistan Times of Lahore wrote editorially:

Our alignment over the past few years with one of the twoPower-blocs has evidently failed to bring us all thepromised blessings, either in the political or the economicfield. On the other hand, it has isolated and estrangedus from some powerful n~ighbours, cut off the country fromsome valuable sources of economic aid and industrialsupplies, and severely restricted the markets for ourexportable raw materia1s. l4

~ civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, also commenting editorially,

wrote:

We cannot but regretfully remind ourselves of the luke-warmattitude our friends in the West have adoptea towards usdespite our sincere cooperation and studious adherence toour pledged word. The West has done little more than lip­service to our various causes. They have made gloriouspromises of assistance, military as well as economic. But,for reasons best known 4 to them, the promised aid has movedKarachi-ward at a snail's ·pace. 15

A meeting of the SEATO Council was scheduled to be held in Karachi

a few months after the episode connected with the visit of Bulganin and

Khrushchev to India and Afghanistan. A few days before the Council

13Dawn , January 23, 1956.

14pakistan~ Digest, IV (February 15, 1956).

15pakistan~ Digest, IV (February 15, 1956).

'-

49

meeting Davffi quoted a high level source in Karachi as saying that

Pakistan would tell the SEATO Council of lvlinisters "very frankly" that

public opinion in the country regards the attitude of Pakistan's allies

as "lukewarm and almost neutral" on problems in which Pakistanis are

deeply interested. The source went on to say that '~ile foes opposed

to Pakistan are mobilising their strength it appears our friends are

neutral.,,16

As a result of criticism in Pakistan against the stand taken by its

allies, especially by the United States, the SEATO Council in its

communique did support Pakistan's stand on its territorial disputes with

Afghanistan and also came out in favor of a settlement of the Kashmir

dispute on the basis of U. N. resolutions calling for a plebiscite in

the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Secretary of State Dulles was one of

the chief initiators of this move in tne Council meeting. The

Pakistanis were delighted, at least for the moment, at this affirmation

of support by its SEATO allies. As the Times of Karachi wrote, liThe

communique issued on the conclusion of the three day SEATO Conference

demonstrates that this compact of like-minded nations is no paper

organization. And particularly that Pakistan's confidence in this

ideological alliance has not been misplaced. IIl7 Foreign Minister

Hamidul Huq Choudhury said in the Pakistan National Assembly on March 26,

1956: "As far as pakistan is concerned the most notable achievement of

the SEATO is the joint affirmation by the members of our stand on

16~, February 25, 1956.

l7pakistan~ Digest, IV (March 15, 1956), p. 3.

50

Kashmir and the Durand Line. ,,18 But this declaration on the part of the

SEATO Council seemed to many intelligent observers as one forced upon

the Council, and especially upon the Great Powers of the West. The

declaration was a result of Pakistan's insistence that public opinion in

the country would not accept anything less than such an affirmation of

support for Pakistan and yet allow the Government to stay on as a member

of the Western-sponsored regional alliance system. As the New York-----Times correspondent covering the Council meeting wrote: "Support from

the members of the alliance, which is known as SEATO, was something

Pakistani leaders had been pleading for and then demanding. Without

that support, they insisted, the people of Pakistan would turn in

disillusionment from the South East Asian alliance.,,19

But Pakistan's confidence, which had been reestablished in her

allies of the SEATO and particularly in the United States, was

undermined when, immediately after the end of the Karachi Conference~

Un~ted States Secretary of State Dulles hurried to New Delhi to placate

the irate Indian leadership which had been irked by the United States'

support for Pakistan at the SEATO Conference. In New Delhi he assured

the Indians that the United States would support India in case of an

attack by Pakistan. This assurance was a part of the overall assurance

that Dulles gave to the Indian leaders that the weapons given to

Pakistan by the United States were only for defensive purposes. Dulles

also stated that though the United States did not believe that Pakistan

l~ational Assembly of Pakistan, P;rliamentary Debates, 1956,Vol. I, p. 96.

19New York Times, March 8, 1956.

51

had any aggressive designs against India, in case of such a hypothetical

attack Karachi's good relations with the United States would end and the

latter would support India in the United Nations. 20

Dulles' statement, which might have seemed harmless to an outside

observer, ~ounded ominous to Pakistani ears since the Pakistani

leadership had proclaimed time and again that Pakistan had no aggressive

designs against India, and that it needed American arms only to protect

itself from aggression. The term "aggression," to say the least, is

ambiguous. In case of an outbreak of Indo-Pakistani hostilities, the

Pakistanis expected that both sides would accuse each other of

aggression. Though the United States may not go to India's support in

such a case, assurances given by Dulles to the Indians seemed to rule

out the fact that the United States would come to the aid of its ally,

Pakistan. It could be presumed, that in such a case the United States

would stay neutral and let its ally fight its own battle.

The statement of the American Secretary of State led to another

outburst of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. Criticism of the

United States was extremely vocal in the Pakistan National Assembly

during the subsequent debate on foreign policy. Mian Jaffar Shah, a

member of the Assembly, said during the debate on March 26, 1956, that

"Hhen our allies visit us in connection with SEATO they first go to

India to whisper, conspire with, and console the Pandits of that country

which, mind you, is the only country with which we have our quarrels.,,2l

20New York Times, March 11, 1956.

21National Assembly of Pakistan, Parliamentary Debates, 1956,Vol. 1, p. 70.

52

On April 6, 1956, during a debate on Kashmir, Dulles once again ca~e in

for strong criticism for his New Delhi statement. One speaker during a

sharp condemnation of the American Secretary of State said:

Dulles supported us on Kashmir at the meeting of the SouthEast Asian Defense Treaty Organization, but as soon as hewas closeted with Nehru • • • he changed his attitude andsaid if Pakistan committed aggression the United Stateswould be on India's side. While making that statement Dulleswas aware of the fact that Pakistan has no intention ofattacking India. But he had the audacity to say he wouldside with India in time of war with Pakistan. 22

The tide of popular criticism had risen to such heights that no member

of the Government dared say a kind word about the United States. The

Foreign Minister, Hamidu1 Huq Ghoudhury, merely pointed out that there

were some direct benefits for Pakistan arising from the pacts with the

West. 23

Curiously, Pakistan's demands for security seemed to be met by the

United States more fully than was usually the case at the time of the

Suez crisis in late 1956 and early 1957. Pakistan, in spite of an

emotional attachment to the Muslim world, was not very favorably

disposed toward President Nasser of Egypt. Nasser's close ties with

Nehru and his lukewarm attitude towards Pakistan which he considered to

be a Western stooge, contributed to the lack of Pakistani enthusiasm

toward the President of Egypt. Moreover, Nasser antagonized both the

Pakistani leadership and the public by his insulting behavior toward

Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy of Pakistan at the height of the Suez

22New York Times, April 7, 1956.

2~ationa1 Assembly of Pakistan, Parliamentary Debates, 1956,Vol. 1, p. 96.

53

crisis. He not only refused to see Suhrawardy but refused also to

accept any Pakistani troops as part of the United Nations Emergency

Force set up to patrol the Egyptian-Israeli border. Nasser's behavior

was considered as insulting by the pakistanis especially since he

accepted a large contingent of Indian troops in the UNEF. ~,which

on November 1, 1956, immediately following the Anglo-French attack on

Egypt, had characterized Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister,

as "a new Hitler" who was engaged in a "new and unbelievable chapter of

perfidy and violence in the history of the human race ,,24 a montho • .,

later, follo~ring Nasser's refusal to accept pakistani troops as part of

the United Nations Emergency Force, declaimed with equal passion against

the Egyptian President. Criticizing Nasser's action in refusing the

Pakistani troop-offer, ~ wrote, "It is nevertheless a matter of deep

regret that in the veins of this turbulent egotist Nasser not the

blood of Islam should seem to flow but the turbid waters of the Nile.

Nasser will never be our friend; he will never think in terms of Islam

except when it suits his own interest.,,25 But while emotional reactions

may have counted a great deal in deciding the attitude of the masses

there ~~reimportant reasons for the attitude adopted by the handful of

leaders who ruled the country and formulated its foreign policy. These

men, as C. L. Sulzberger pointed out, were "exceedingly logical men.,,26

To them it was extremely important that 76 percent of Pakistan's trade

24Dawn, November 1, 1956.

25Dawn, December 1, 1956.

26New X£!k Times, February 4, 1957.

54

went through the Suez Cana1,27 and they wanted a more reliable landlord

than Nasser was expected to be, and--equa11y important--one not so

reliant upon Nehru's advice. Moreover, Pakistan was heavily dependent

upon American economic support, agricultural aurp1uses and military

assistance. It could not afford to see American influence completely

excluded from the Middle East, as Cairo seemed to prefer. The Soviet

Union, Nasser's great champion, was also India's champion as far as the

Indo-Pakistan disputes were concerned and Pakistan was none too happy to

see the Russian sphere of influence grow.

The stand taken by the United States on the issue of the Ang10­

French-Israeli aggression against Egypt made it much easier for the

Pakistani leadership to defend its ties with the United States before

the bar of public opinion. Prime Minister Suhrawardy neatly linked

Nehru, high prices (because of the closure of the Suez Canal) and a pro­

American foreign policy. He wanted to "trim Nasser to size, insure safe

passage at Suez and strengthen the Baghdad Pact." At the same time he

hoped "to smash his political opponents wIth a foreign policy hammer to

which any alternative offered would seem linked with Nehru.,,28

For once, American and Pakistani views on the question of security

coincided, so the United States was able to be responsive to a very

great extent to Pakistan's demands. Karachi welcomed an announcement

made by the State Department on November 29, 1956, that the United

States would view "with the utmost gravity" any threat to the

27 New York Times, February 4, 1957.

2~ew York Times, February 4, 1957.

55

territorial integrity or political independence of Turkey, Pakistan,

Iraq and Iran. The statement was issued to demonstrate U. S. support

for the four Muslim countries allied in the Baghdad Pact and was

intended to make clear American concern for the welfare of these four

countries at a time when the Baghdad Alliance was being assailed by the

Soviet Union and the neutralists for playing the game of 'imperialists'

in the Middle East.

In the foreign policy debate in the Pakistan National Assembly on

February 22, 1957, Prime Minister Suhrawardy defended Pakistan's

alliance with the United States in the following words:

It would be in order, Sir, if I were to begin by stating thatour~~lations with the United States of America are more thancordial. In her we have a friend and an ally. It is good tohave a country powerful enough at your back which can guaranteeyour territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Thereare not many who are prepared to take the risk and if I maysay so, Sir, I think that portion of the world that desirespeace stands indebted to this great nation for having socategorically placed itself on the side of maintaining thepeace of the various regions. 29

Soon after, on February 25, the National Assembly endorsed the

Government's foreign policy by an overwhelming majority. 3D

However, the continuation of massive economic aid to India, the

sale of arms to India on a large-scale, and lukewarm support for

Pakistan's case over Kashmir, again led to another outburst of criticism

against the lack of American responsiveness to Pakistan's security

demands. In the Baghdad Pact Council of Ministers meeting in Ankara in

29Nationa1 Assembly of Pakistan, Parliamentary Debates, 1957,Vol. 1, p. 924.

3D~ York Times, February 26, 1957.

56

the last week of January, 1958, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Malik Firoz

Khan Noon, vehemently attacked the policy of Western countries in giving

large scale aid to the so-called neutralist countries, mainly India, and

urged reappraisal of this trend. 31

During the foreign policy debate in the Pakistan National Assembly

on March 5, 1958, the Muslim League Opposition's foreign policy

spokesman and a veteran member of the National Assembly, Mian Mumtaz

Daultana, delivered a scathing attack on the Government's foreign policy

and especially its alliance with the West. Criticizing the policy of

alliances, he said that Pakistan

has lost the freedom of choice and has no capacity ofinitiative. We have arranged our affairs in the past manyyears in such a way that we have tied ourselves willy nillyto a series of alignments. That, Sir, is because ofinternal weakness, our economic poverty and the manner inwhich instead of improving our own lot through our ownefforts, we have come to depend exclusively on the helpdoled out by others. The economic dependence in our casehas led to political enslavement. 32

The strength of anti-American and anti-Western feeling was depicted

very clearly in Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon's statement during the

same debate in the National Assembly. While Dau1tana's statement could

be dismissed as irresponsible criticism of an Opposition spokesman, the

Prime Minister's statement could not be treated lightly. Noon said

during the debate on March 8, 1958, that the time was coming when

Pakistan might have to revise its policy toward the West. He sharply

3lDawn , January 28, 1958.

32National Assembly of Pakistan, Parliamentary Debates, 1958,Vol. 2, p. 855.

57

criticized the Western nations for supplying arms to India both directly

and indirectly through the medium of economic aid, which allowed India

to divert its own resources to armaments. He asserted that a military

buildup in India could only be for future use against Pakistan. As it

was, despite United States military aid to Pakistan, India had four or

five times the military strength of Pakistan, and the ratio was expected

to increase. Prime Minister Noon went on to say that should Pakistan

feel her independence in jeopardy "We will break all pacts in the world

and shake hands with those whom we have made our enemies for the sake of

others.,,33

The March 8 statement of Prime Minister Noon reflected the growth

in disenchantment of Pakistan with the United States. The New York

Times' correspondent in Karachi, commenting on Noon's speech, wrote:

"In Government buildings officials say the Prime Minister was too

emotional and violent. But they admit gloomily that anti-Westernism has

become politically attractive in Pakistan. The reason potiticians are

ganging up on the West is that they know there is widespread feeling

that the country has been let down by its friends." He went on to say

that politicians and editorial writers stated frankly that Pakistan

accepted pacts and obligations out of fear of India much more than the

fear of communism, and that since these pacts had not helped Pakistan

against India they were useless. Pakistanis charged that the United

States, by economic aid to India, was allowing New Delhi to spend

foreign exchange on jet bombers and tanks. They demanded that the U. s.

3~ew York Times, March 9, 1958.

58

halt aid to India unless New Delhi agreed to negotiate with Pakistan

over Kashmir and showed readiness to listen to the recommendations of

the U. N. 34

One of the main reasons for Pakistan's disillusionment with its

alliance with the United States was the refusal of the United States to

commit itself to come to the defense of Pakistan in case of "aggression"

from non-Communist sources. The United States had made it clear that as

far as it was concerned "aggression" was limited to Communist aggression

only. American hesitance in giving a blanket assurance of help in case

of any aggression was primarily due to the fact that it did not want to

be involved in an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan,

especially since the term "aggressionll could be defined in different

ways by the parties to the conflict.

It was in 1958-59 that Pakistan came as close as it ever had, or

ever would in the future, to extracting an assurance from the United

States that the latter would come to the aid of Pakistan in the event of

any aggression against Pakistan, whether Communist or non-Communist.

Circumstances arose in the Middle East that threatened to upset the

delicate balance of power in that area in favor of the Communists and

the neutralists. The formation of the United Arab Republic in February

by the merger of Egypt and Syria was a prelude to a series of anti­

Western movements that swept through the Arab Middle East. On July 14,

1958, a leftist military dictatorship was installed in Iraq, and King

Feisal and his Prime Minister, Nuri-es-Said, the staunchest friend of

3~ew York Times, April 7, 1958.

59

the West in the Arab world, were killed. At the same time a civil war

broke out in Lebanon as a result of a revolt against Chamoun, the pro-

Western President of that country. Another pro-Western ruler, King

Hussein of Jordan, the last of the Hashemites, was living in perpetual

fear of losing not only his crown but his life as well. It was the

landing of American Marines in Lebanon and of British troops in Jordan

that managed to avert the complete exclusion of Western influence from

the Arab Middle East.

American prestige in the Middle East as of 1958 had so declined

that pro-American regimes seemed to be doomed to the fate that befell

Nuri-es-Said's government. In this context, America's alliance with the

only three Middle Eastern countries which continued to be members of the

Western camp--Turkey, Iran and Pakistan--assumed greater importance in

the eyes of the United States Administration. In the last week of July

1958, American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, declared at the

London Conference of the Baghdad Pact countries, which the United States

as usual attended as an associate, that the United States would enter

into agreements of security and defense with the three remaining Muslim

nations of the Baghdad Pact. Iraq did not attend this meeting of the

Pact members and soon after announced its withdrawal from the alliance.

In what came to be known as the London Declaration, signed on

July 28, 1958, the five powers (United States, United Kingdom, Iran,

Turkey and Pakistan) said:

Article One of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdadon 24 February, 1955, provides that the parties will cooperatefor their security and defence and that such measures as theymay agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form

60

the subject of special agreements. Similarly, the UnitedStates, in the interest of world peace and pursuant toexisting congressional authorization, agrees to co-operatewith nations making this declaration for their securityand defence and will promptly enter into agreementsdesigned to give effect to this co-operation. 35

The American Secretary of State also promised to step up economic and

military aid to the three "northern tier" countries in private talks

with the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.36

Reaction in Pakistan to the London Declaration was very favorable

because after the Declaration the United States assumed the same

obligations that full-members of the Baghdad Pact did as far as

Pakistan's security was concerned. But, more than that, what appealed

to the Pakistanis was, according to ~, "the fact that the declaration

is not confined to merely Communist aggression." It went on to say that

this means that '~merica has now committed herself to the defence of

Turkey, Iran and Pakistan even against aggression which may not

necessarily be Communist in its origin.,,37

Such comments in pakistan reflected, once again, Pakistan's

preoccupation with its primary objective of seeking aid and material

assistance against the probability of an outbreak of hostilities with a

non-Communist state, namely, India. But there was a sharp reaction in

Pakistan when, immediately on his return to lVashington from the London

Conference, Dulles announced that while his diplomatic talks in London

35Quoted in Aslam Siddiqi, Pakistan Seeks Security (Lahore, 1960),pp. 133-34.

36Dawn , July 30, 1958.

37~, July 30, 1958.

61

had strengthened the confidence and morale of Turkey; Iran and Pakistan,

and while the United States had become more closely associated with the

Baghdad Pact countries, closer association, as he put it, involved only

Iltechnica1 agreements leading to supply of miL.t.s.ry equipment" rather

than any new defense commitment by the United States to aid them in the

event of outside attack. 38

Pakistan, after the initial feeling of exhilaration following the

London Declaration, once more felt let down by the United States. Once

again, the United States had raised high hopes in Pakistan and had then __

failed to be responsive to Pakistan's demands. The leading newspaper,

Dawn, writing editorially, attacked Dulles for saying one thing in

London and another in Washington. It went on to ·say that

The contradiction between what Mr. Dulles said in London andwhat he afterwards said in Washington is amazing, thoughcharacteristically American. If the proposed bilateraltreaties are to impose on the United States no greaterobligation than the supply of military equipment, then whatwould be new in them? ••• The London declaration of Mr.Dulles would have meaning only if, under a new series oftreaties, the U. S. stands committed to send its armedforces to the aid of any of these countries which may beattacked from outside. 39

The London Declaration did, however, lead to Bilateral Agreements

of Cooperation signed by the United States with the three Muslim members

of the Baghdad Pact on March 5, 1959, in Ankara. The Bilateral

Agreement with Pakistan, which was identical with those signed with Iran

and Turkey, was in effect a new defense pact. The first of the six

380awn , July 30, 1958.

39~, July 31, 1958.

62

articles of the Agreement provided that "In case of aggression against

Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance

with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such

appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be

mutually agreed upon and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote

Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the

Government of Pakistan at its request. 1140

The Agreement was hailed in Pakistan as giving "adequate" cover to

the country against aggression. M. S. A. Baig, Pakistan's Foreign

Secretary, when asked to comment on Article 1 of the Agreement

concerning "aggressionll said that although the occasion to interpret it

had not yet arisen, Pakistan was of the view that the Agreement can be

invoked lI and we shall certainly invoke it--in the event of aggression

from any quarter." He went on to say that the "use of armed forces,"

mentioned in this Agreement, was not specifically mentioned even in the

Baghdad Pact. He cited the case of American troop landings in. Lebanon

in 1958 at the request of the Lebanese Government to protect it from

aggression, even though the danger was not from Communist aggression.

He obviously implied that if the United States had acted in such a

manner in Lebanon it had no reason not to do likewise if Pakistan were

threatened from a non-Communist source. 41

Z. A. Bhutto, then the Commerce Minister of Pakistan and later to

become the Foreign Minister, expressed the same views about the

40nawn , March 6, 1959.

41nawn , March 6, 1959.

63

Agreement while addressing the Punjab University students on March 13,

1959. He expressed the view that the recently concluded Agreement

"assured American assistance against all types of aggression." The

terms of the Agreement, he said, were abundantly clear, and one need not

go beyond what had been provided in the Agreement itself. Bhutto went

on to say that SEATO and the Baghdad Pact provided American aid in the

event of Connnunist aggression. "It was with a view to providing

assistance in all sorts of aggression, that the new agreement was

arrived at.,,42

Once again statements by Pakistani leaders depicted their primary

concern with fears of aggression from India. Pakistan had finally

succeeded in getting the United States to commit itself, or at least so

the Pakistanis thought, to the use of force in the defense of Pakistan

in case of aggression from any quarter, Connnunist or non-Communist.

But, again, though the United States might have accepted the

responsibility to come to the aid of Pakistan in case of an aggression

against the latter, the United States might not accept Pakistan's

definition of "aggression," especially since the United States was wary

of getting involved in an Indo-Pakistan war.

Immediately following the publication of the Bilateral Agreement,

the UPI, quoting official sources, reported from Washington, that the

United States interpreted the Agreement as covering Communist aggression

only.43 While the UPI report could not be confirmed, the refusal of the

42Dawn, March 14, 1959.

43pawn, March 6, 1959.

64

American Administration to make a categorical statement that it

considered the Agreement to cover all forms of aggression, dampened

Pakistani enthusiasm for the new Bilateral Agreement. The Pakistanis

came to look upon the Agreement also as one of a series of maneuvers in

which they thought the United States was indulging to keep Pakistan in

the Western alliance without giving Pakistan any real benefits in

return. The United States had once again failed to be responsive to

Pakistan's demands for security. What was worse, in both instances-­

Dulles' statement in London and the Bilateral Agreement--the United

States had raised Pakistani hopes but had then failed to fulfill these

hopes. If Pakistani hopes had not been so raised the disappointment

would not have been so great and therefore the reaction to the lack of

responsiveness on the part of the United States would have been much

milder in degree.

Pakistan's disenchantment with the United States was increased also

because of the criticism in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of

the existing military strength of Pakistan; the Committee members, as

well as most members of the Administration testifying before the

Committee, were of the opinion that Pakistan's military strength

was more than necessary for the external defense of the country. In

testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 5, 6 and

13, 1959, a heavily censored report of which was released on June 20,

1959, Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy, testified that Pakistan had

military forces in excess of those regarded as militarily required by

the American chiefs of staff. However, he said that the U. S. program

supported only that "portion of their forces which are regarded as

65

militarily needed" for the defense strategy of the free world. The

other forces, he said, were supported by Pakistan from its own

resources. 44 Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

including Albert Gore of Tennessee, John Sparkman of Alabama, Frank

Church of Idaho and Theodore Green of Rhode Island, thought that by

giving arms aid to Pakistan the United States was not only keeping

Pakistan's armed forces at a level much above those required for defense

but encouraging Pakistan and India to engage in an arms race as well and

building up Pakistan's army against India. The Administration

spokesman, while admitting the fact that the strength of Pakistani

forces was at a higher level than those required by American world

strategy, defended the arms aid to Pakistan and the buildup of

Pakistanis armed strength as an essential bulwark against Communism. 45

The statements made in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were

challenged immediately by President Mohammed Ayub Khan of_Pakistan. The

Pakistani President said India's "aggressive intentions and massive

military build up" were forcing Pakistan to maintain a large military

deterrent at a high cost to the country. President Ayub criticized the

remarks made by the Senators about Pakistan's defense needs as "totally

erroneous and based on an incorrect appreciation of Pakistan's military

requirements. ,,46 In another statement made a few days later President

Ayub, again commenting on the Congressional hearings, said that "Some of

4~ew York Times, June 23, 1959.

45Dawn, June 21, 1959.

46New York Times, June 23, 1959.

66

our friends in the United States have misunderstood the defence

situation in this part of the world." He added: "We are taking care to

remove the confusion, but the difficulty is that sometimes our American

friends do not distinguish between a good friend and a doubtful

character. ,,47

While the statements made in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

were still fresh in the minds of the Pakistanis, remarks during the

debate on the foreign aid bill on the floor of the Senate added to the

Pakistanis' bitterness toward the United States. Senator Wayne Morse of

Oregon was the worst offender in Pakistani eyes. Senator Morse opposed

American "expenditures" in Pakistan because these were "causing a loss

J'of United States prestige in India • • • and forcing India to spend more

than is necessary on her military strength." Moreover, he opposed even

the giving of economic aid to Pakistan because he thought that much of

the U. S. assistance to Pakistan would "fall into Russian hands if the

Russian juggernaut decides to move.,,48

These incidents relating to the difference in the assessment of

Pakistan's defense needs and consequently the strength of its armed

forces were, once again, the result of the different views that Pakistan

and the United States held about Pakistan's objective of security and

the source or sources from which a threat to this security was expected.

While the American Senators and important members of the U. S.

Administration believed that five and a half divisions were enough to

47nawn , July 1, 1959.

48nawn, July 12, 1959.

67

defend Pakistan from the only source of aggression that they could see--

that is the Communist source--the Pakistanis were mainly concerned about

the threat to their security from India. The lack of responsiveness on

the part of the United States was, again, the result of the refusal on

the part of the United States to accept Pakistan's contention that a

genuine threat to Pakistan's security did exist from Indian sources and

that this, to the Pakistanis, was more imminent and important than a

remote and hypothetical threat from Communist sources. As the Pakistan

Times put it, the United States

seemed to imply that Pakistan's sole concern as an ally of theu. S. and as a beneficiary of its military and economic aidshould be to support U. S. strategic objectives and to judgeeverything from the standpoint of U. S. political expediency.If Pakistan still adheres to the view that the alliance servesobjectives which are dear to both Pakistan and America, itdoes not mean that Pakistan is willing--or can be persuaded-­to accept a totally one-sided definition of these objectives.Some Senators seem to have ignored the fact that an allianceis nothing if it is not a mutually beneficial arrangement. 49

President Ayub told a newspaper correspondent in an interview

published in the July 31, 1959, issue of Le Monde that, if the United

_States continued to underestimate his country's needs, Pakistan would

eventually be obliged to turn to "o ther Powers" for help. The pakistani

President went on to say that "In the end the people will oblige us to

do so. We hope we will not have to do so but it is a question of the

instinct of self-preservation. One cannot indefinitely resist the

people's will. Besides, the camp opposed to the Americans attaches a

great importance to our country both militarily and politically and

49pakistan News Digest, VII (July 1, 1959), p. 3.

68

persistently makes advances to uso fl President Ayub Khan said he

considered that the American Government paid more attention to non­

committed countries than to friendly countries. He was quoted by Le

Monde as adding, flOur people have already begun to murmur against the

American policy in South East Asia, which consists in giving in to

blackmail practised by the so-called neutralist states."sO

Another incident that enforced Pakistani doubts regarding the value

of an alliance with the United States, without a sufficient quid pro quo

for the risks involved, was the U-2 spy plane affair. An American U-2

spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory in May 1960. The Russians·

alleged that the plane had taken off from the airbase at Peshawar.

While Pakistan disclaimed any responsibility for the U-2 flight, this

incident made the dangers of an immediate Soviet threat to Pakistan's

security only too clear to Pakistan. Following the U-2 incident,

Pakistan informed the United States that the use in the future of

Pakistani airfields even by unarmed American aircraft would have to be

more firmly controlled. The United States was told that American

aircraft would be able to use Pakistani airfields from now on only after

firm assurances had been given as to their destination once they left

Pakistani soil. This was the gist of the representation made to the

U. S. State Department by Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington, Aziz

Ahmed. 51

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Ikramullah, also issued a statement

sODaWll, August 1, 1959.

5lDawn, May 15, 1960.

69

in London in which he said:

In case any American aircraft taking off from Peshawar hasbeen diverted in the direction of the Soviet Union in thecourse of its flight, and the Soviet allegation that theAmerican aircraft, which·~as been brought down in the SovietUnion took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause forbitter complaint ••• The American authorities must realisethe delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concernedrefrain from such activities in the future. 52

The U-2 incident reminded the Pakistanis with great force of a

number of factors. They realized that such incidents could touch off a

war and that Pakistan would be a prime target of the Soviet Union in

case of such a war. The incident also brought the awareness to the

Pakistanis that the Soviet Union nearly touched Pakistan's northern

border while her ally, the United States, was 9000 miles away.

Pakistani doubts about the value of an alliance with the United

States, as far as its own security was concerned, increased with the

election of John F. Kennedy to the office of the President of the United

States. Pakistani fears regarding the outcome of the American

Presidential elections were expressed with great candor in an editorial

in~ of Karachi, the elite newspaper of the country, on the occasion

of the Kennedy victory. Dawn wrote:

Rightly or wrongly, an impression has been created that Mr.Kennedy does not believe in the pacts and alliances intowhich the Eisenhower Administration successfully persuadeda number of underdeveloped countries of Asia, includingPakistan, to enter, thereby linking their own fate withAmerica's and incurring the illwill and even anger of theSoviet bloc. There is also an impression that America'sfuture President has greater respect for, and feels morefriendly towards the apostles of so-called neutralism who

52Dawn, May 15, 1960.

70

thrive by milking the American and the Russian cows at thesame time, than the more straightforward nations who havebecome the allies of the United States and are loyal to thattie. 53

This image of the American President-elect in the minds of the

Pakistanis was based on Kennedy's role as a Senator. As a member of the

Senate, Kennedy had belonged to, what the Pakistani press called, the

IIIndia Lobby." In February, 1959, Senator Kennedy had co-sponsored a

resolution in the Senate with Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-Kentucky),

a former Ambassador to New Delhi and one of the foremost Republican

spokesmen on foreign policy, that a high level mission be sent to India

to appraise its development needs and recommend ways in which all

interested free nations could effectively help meet India's loan and

food requirements. During the debate on the resolution Senator Kennedy

had described India as lithe hinge of fate in Asia. 1I54

Suspicion of the new American President's plans grew in Pakistan

when such Indophiles as Chester Bowles and John Kenneth Galbraith were

appointed to high posts. 55 Pakistan also feared the prospect that the

Kennedy Administration might take comfort in long-range missiles based

in the Uriited States and place less emphasis on military alliances. The

greatest fear, however, continued to be the Kennedy Administration's

soft policy toward the neutralists. Increasing talk in Washington about

making India a showcase for non-Communist development, with the help of

53nawn, November 10, 1960.

54nawn, February 21, 1959.

55The former was appointed Undersecretary of State and the latterwas sent to New Delhi as Ambassador to India.

71

massive economic aid, greatly disturbed Pakistan. 56

The first major incident under the new American Administration

depicting lack of American responsiveness to Pakistan's demands occurred

as a result of Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson's tour of South and

Southeast Asia during which he also visited Pakistan and India. In

addition to having disappointed Pakistanis by his refusal to say a word

of sympathy or support for Pakistan on the question of Kashmir, he

enraged the Pakistanis when at the conclusion of his tour he said, in a

Press Conference in Washington on May 24, 1961, that at President

Kennedy's request, he had Ilurged Mr. Nehru to extend his leadership to

other areas in South East Asia and to try to cooperate with the other

leaders of government to exchange viewpoints, to try to solicit the

peace-loving nations in that area."57 Johnson's statement, though it

might have sounded harmless to American ears, was considered in Pakistan

as a betrayal of Pakistan by its ally. Nehru and India were considered

the arch enemies of Pakistan and it was hard for the Pakistanis to

accept the fact that their American ally was offering the mantle of

leadership in South and Southeast Asia to neutralist India without any

consideration for Pakistan's fears or its vital national interests.

The Pakistan Observer of Dacca writing about the incident

commented editorially:

President Kennedy has certainly added a new flavour to Americanforeign policy. He has made it quite clear in his speechesthat he considers himself as the leader of the forces of peaceallover the world; it is also clear that in that capacity he

56New York Times, March 5, 1961.

57New York Times, June 20, 1961.

72

has started to appoint his deputies for the different areas.For South-East Asia his obvious choice is Mr. Nehru inappreciation of the contribution he [Mr. Nehru] has madeand "his willingness to be helpful whenever peace isinvolved." President Kennedy has the unquestionable rightto select anyone for the purpose of executing his peaceplan for South-East Asia or elsewhere. But the people onwhom he is going to be imposed as a guardian of peace mayvery weli ask how far has Mr. Nehru been helpful inrehabilitating peace in his own backyard, particularly inKashmir, an area where peace continues to occupy the topmostplace in the list of casualties?58

In the same vein~ commented that now "There is need for Pakistan to

beware not only of her enemies but also of her 'friends,."59

The criticism concerning Vice-President Johnson's statement had

hardly died down in Pakistan when President Ayub announced in an

interview with the ~ X2!k Times' correspondent on May 29, 1961, that

the United States "representatives had asked whether Pakistan had used

American equipment some time ago in ejecting hostile elements from her

territory. II The hostile elements referred to by the Pakistani President

were Afghans who, Pakistan claimed, had committed an incursion into

Pakistani territory. The pakistani President went on to say that

pakistan was "no t unarmed before American weapons came to US," and he

observed trenchantly that the United States "should be mindful ·of the

fact that, if our territory was violated, we would spend our time

dealing with the enemy rather than putting the American weapons in

cotton wool. 1I60

58pakistan News Digest, IX (June 15, 1961).

59~, May 29, 1961.

60Dawn , June 4, 1961.

73

The two incidents: concerning Vice-President Johnson's statement

and the case of American arms, so soon after Kennedy's inauguration,

once more depicted the lack of understanding on the part of the United

States of Pakistan's objective concerning the security of the country.

Moreover, they reinforced the belief held by many Pakistanis that "the

Kennedy Administration has betrayed the faith Pakistan showed in the

West through her membership in. anti-Communist military alliances which

incurred the wrath of the Soviet Union. They apparently think

Washington has become more interested in catering to nonaligned

countries than in helping its allies. Resentment about this is believed

to be especially deep because Pakistan considers two such nonaligned

countries--India and Afghanistan--to be her enemies.,,61

That the American Administration realized the strength of anti­

American sentiments in Pakistan is illustrated by the fact that the

United States decided to advance the date of President Ayub's state

visit to the United States, which was scheduled for November 1961, to

July of the same year. The date was advanced, in the words of a White

House statement, to enable Presidents Kennedy and Ayub "to exchange

views on matters of immediate concern in the light of the current world

situation.,,62

Meanwhile, rumors had been circulating that the United States

intended to amend the Mutual Security Act to enable neutrals such as

India to be entitled to American military aid. Pakistani officials

61New York Times, June 20, 1961.

62New York Times, June 20, 1961.

74

hoped that President Ayub would seek a clarification of these reports. 63

During his trip to the United States President Ayub spoke out

strongly against any U. S. military assistance to India at the National

Press Club meeting on July 13. IIIf arms aid is given to India naturally

we shall feel more insecure,1I he said. IIAnd naturally there will be a

tremendous groundswell of public opinion in Pakistan against that sort

of thing and it would put a tremendous strain on our relationship with

America. ,,64

In private sessions with President Kennedy, President Ayub made the

American President familiar with the major Pakistani complaints against

the attitude of the United States. I~ile American sources indicated

that President Kennedy declined to take an active role in settling

Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir,65 President Ayub l<han on his

return from his state visit to the United States said that he had

received assurances from the Pmerican Administration that Pakistan would

be consulted before large-scale arms assistance was given in that

region. "We have been assured that nothing will be done to make our

position more difficult,1l he said at a news conference. He added that

there would have to be "very good cause" before the U. S. gave massive

military aid to nonaligned countries of South Asia. 66

The assurance by President Kennedy set at rest for the time being

63New York Times, July 6, 1961.

64New York Times, July 14, 1961.-----65New York Times, July 15, 1961.-----66New York Times, July 20, 1961.

75

fears in Pakistani minds that the United States might decide to give

massive military aid to India, especially because many in the United

States felt that India was fighting the free world's battle against

Communism in Asia as a result of its confrontation with China across its

northern borders. However, increasing tension on the Sino-Indian border

reinforced Pakistani fears that American arms aid for India might have

. become a distinct possibility in spite of all the assurances given to

the Pakistani President by President Kennedy during the former's visit

to the United States in July 1961.

Expressing Pakistani fears regarding American military aid to

India, President Ayub Khan warned on May 10, 1962, that the present

trend of U. S. relations with India might force some of India's

neighbors to look for protection elsewhere. He said in an interview

that

Many people feel that the United States is very closelyidentified with India and therefore with aggressive Indiandesigns. If this goes on, I have no doubt, the smallercountries in this area will be forced to look for protectionelsewhere. The feeling is emerging in the minds of manycountries surrounding India that with American assistance,India is enlarging her military powers as a pretext ofopposition to China. And there is a feeling of uneasinessin many of the smaller countries around India that Indiamay engage in an aggressive and expansive program. 67

At the same time a reported move by the United States to compete

with the Soviet Union in supplying the latest military aircraft to India

caused great resentment in Pakistan. India had been negotiating with

the Soviet Union for the purchase of MIG jets. The United States, to

67New York Times, May 11, 1962.

76

forestall exclusive Indian dependence on the Soviet Union in matters of

military equipment, reportedly had declared its willingness to sell

modern military aircraft to India. Britain already had offered British

aircraft in lieu of the Soviet aircraft to India. A Pakistan Foreign

Office spokesman expressed concern over the competition to supply

aircraft to India, which, according to him, posed a threat to Pakistan's

security. However, the official view in Pakistan seemed to be .that the

stage for protesting to America had not yet arrived, as no official

commitment had been announced by the United States, though there were

many reports to the effect that the United States, to prevent the

Indo-Soviet MIG deal from materializing, was willing to assist India's

military buildup.68

Earlier instances of American lack of responsiveness to Pakistan's

demands relating to its security are minor compared to the events of

late 1962, when the United States rushed massive arms aid to India

following large-scale fighting on the Sino-Indian border, beginning

October 20, 1962. The Pakistanis looked upon this rush of arms to India

as a direct threat to their own security. They viewed the Sino-Indian

border war as a case of limited border conflict and did not think it was

a full-scale invasion of India. Pakistan argued that India was using

the border conflict, which Pakistan believed had, in the words of the

Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mohannned Ali, stennned "from India's

unrealistic and fallacious foreign policies,,,69 to acquire Western arms

680awn, May 22, 1962.

69New York Times, November 23, 1962.

77

and armament which would eventually be used against Pakistan. The

Pakistanis were not ready to put any faith in assurances given by India

to the United States and other Western powers supplying arms to that

country that these arms would be used exclusively against the Chinese.

Pakistan Gontinued to assert that the arms were acquired by India

primarily for the purpose of increasing its armed superiority over

Pakistan as a prelude to forcing that country to accept India's solution

of Indo-Pakistani problems. As Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali pointed

out, a 4-to-l military disparity between India and Pakistan had been

checked by Pakistan's excellent army but that "the present augmentation

in India's military strength and the warlike stores and assistance now

being extended by our friends to India are going to seriously aggravate

the, situation against us to our great disadvantage. ,,70

As the airlift of arms to India started, President Kennedy,

anticipating Pakistan's reaction, sent a letter to President Ayub Khan

of Pakistan in which he declared that the Chinese Communist attack

against India was a threat to the whole Indian subcontinent, including

Pakistan. The implication of the message to President Ayub appeared to

be that Pakistan should not resent American military aid to India. The

sole aim of this assistance, according to the United States, was to

support the fight against Chinese Communism. 71 President Ayub, in his

replies both to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan of Great

Britain, who had sent him a similar message, told the two Western

70New York Times, November 23, 1962.

71~ York Times, October 31, 1962.

78

leaders that large-scale supply of military equipment to India would not

further the cause of world peace and international understanding,

especially between the three neighboring countries of India, Pakistan

and China. 72

The Pakistan National Assembly was called into emergency session on

November 21, 1962, to discuss the situation arising from the shipment of

Western arms to India. In a closed session of the Assembly on November

21 President Ayub was reported to have outlined to the lawmakers an

increasingly neutral foreign policy for Pakistan. He reportedly told

the National Assembly that in the future Pakistan would have to seek

more friends even though they might not be fully satisfactory. Assembly

sources quoted him as saying that the main threat to Pakistan came from

international communism and "Hindu imperialism," but that the Indian

threat was more pressing. President Ayub was also quoted as having

asserted that the United States and British military aid to India would

do the aid-giving countries more harm than good in Southeast Asia,

because the modern equipment given to India would cause anxiety in

smaller countries of the area. He, however, cautioned the Assembly

members against extreme action. 73

Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali, considered the most pro-American of

Pakistan's top leaders, echoed the views of his President the next day

before the National Assembly in open session. The Foreign Minister

declared: "I speak in anguish and not in anger when I have to say that

72Dawn , November 8, 1962.

73New York Times, November 22, 1962.

79

one of our allies had promised us that we would be consulted before any

allnS assistance is given to India. I regret to have to observe that

this was not done.,,74 He went on to say that in international relations

arrangements are not permanent or static. "In international relations

there can be no eternal friends nor can there be eternal enemies. The

only thing eternal is the national interest•••• As situation changes,

enemies can become f~iends and friends can become enemies •••• If

friends let us down we shall not consider them as friends. Friends that

stand by us we will stand by them."75

The Leader of the Opposition in the Pakistan National Assembly,

Sardar Bahadur Khan, was even more outspoken in his criticism of the

United States. He called' for Pakistan to drop out of SEATO and CENTO,

adopt a policy of neutrality and promote friendship with all nations--

"Communist or capitalist." He accused the United States, through its

arms shipment to India, of having expanded the frontier hostilities

between India and China into a full-fledged war for America's own

benefit .76

The leading Pakistani newspapers as well as leading Pakistani

political figures mentioned a number of reasons to which they attributed

Pakistan's violent reaction against American military aid to India. The

first of these was the acute disappointment both among the Government

74National Assembly of Pakistan, Parliamentary Debates, 1962,Vol. II, p. 4.

75Ibid ., p. 10.

76New York Times, November 25, 1962.

80

leaders and the people that the United States had failed to put pressure

on India at this opportune moment to reach a settlement with Pakistan

over Kashmir. Secondly, the Pakistanis seemed to be genuinely afraid of

the fact that Western arms aid to India had increased the military

capability of India and consequently its threat to Pakistan. The phrase

most frequently used in Pakistan to describe this situation was that the

"balance of power in the subcontinent has been upset. II Thirdly,

Pakistan resented the assumption held to be implicit in the American

attitude that the United States had IIchosenll India over Pakistan, an old

and faithful ally, which was once described as IIAmerica's best friend on

the Asian mainland. lin A fourth reason also mentioned in this

connection was the feeling, especially among Government circles, that

President Kennedy had failed to keep the promise, made to President Ayub

during the latter's visit to the United States in July 1961, that no

military aid would be given to any neutral country in South Asia without

consultations with Pakistan.

American military aid to India was the most important example of

the lack of American responsiveness to Pakistan's demands concerning its

security. However, in spite of the fact that the Pakistanis protested

vehemently against American arms shipment to India, they might have

finally come to accept the American position that military aid to India

was given only because of the emergency situation created by China's

invasion of that country. The American position acceptable to the

Pakistanis would have, therefore, implied that such aid to India would

77~ York Times, November 19, 1962.

81

be discontinued once the immediate Chinese threat disappeared. The

Pakistanis were, however, not prepared to accept any expansion of the

emergency commitment by the Western Powers to India, since such an

expansion of military aid would have meant a continuous buildup of

Indian military strength, which they were not ready to tolerate.

By the spring of 1963 the pakistani leadership seemed prepared to

accept the $120 million military aid promised to India by the Americans

and the British following the Kennedy-Macmillan meeting at Nassau in

December, 1962. But, as Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto pointed out, "It

would be the greatest tragedy of the 20th century if the Western

countries expanded the quantum of arms supply to India beyond their

emergency commitment." He also declared that in spite of India's'

"consistent and best endeavours" it had not received any commitment of

further arms supply from the West. The quantity of armaments to be

supplied to India, decided upon at Nassau, had not been increased. He

went on to quote from recent statements of the United States Secretary

of State and Secretary of Defense that, pending the settlement of the

Kashmir dispute, no long-term military ass is tance to India was.. in

. 78Vl.ew.

Pakistan was, therefore, greatly shocked when President Kennedy and

Prime Minister Macmillan, in a comnlunique issued on June 30, 1963,

reaffirmed their "policy of continuing to help India by providing

further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of

renewed Chinese Communist attack." The term "further military aid" was

78~, April 12, 1963.

82

interpreted by Prime Minister Macmillan's Press Adviser, Harold Evans,

at a Press Conference, as indicating military assistance to India in

additio~ to the $120 million emergency assistance offered to India

jointly by the United States and Britain at the Nassau meeting. 79 The

Pakistanis interpreted the June 30 announcement as an "unwritten

alliance" between the Anglo-American bloc and "uncommitted" India. They

greatly resented the fact that "Without entering into a formal alliance

with the Nehru Administration, President Kennedy and Premier Macmillan

have now decided to bestow upon India many of the 'benefits' and

security normally accruing to members of a military alliance.,,80

Foreign Minister Bhutto of Pakistan, commenting on the Kennedy-Macmillan

communique, said on July 10, 1963, that it had "gravely disappointed"

Pakistan. Talking to newsmen at his residence, the Pakistani Foreign

Minister said that the Kennedy-Macmillan communique had magnified "the

tension and fears in the area." Describing the communique as "most

regrettable and disappointing" Z. A. Bhutto said the decision arrived at

by Kennedy and Macmillan carried considerable significance for the

people of Pakistan and the region. 8l American reaction to Pakistan's

fears about the supply of arms to India in addition to the emergency

commitment, was expressed in a statement made by Defense Secretary

Robert.McNamara before the House Armed Forces Committee in which he

stated that the United States will arm India despite Pakistani

79Dawn, July 1, 1963.

80Dawn , July 2, 1963.

8lDawn, July 11, 1963.

83

objections. McNamara stated that though United States' military

assistance ''has deeply troubled Pakistan" it is in the United States'

interest to "improve the quality of India's defences.,,82

Military aid to India from the United States continued despite

Pakistani protests. One writer estimated that in addition to the

emergency aid given to India immediately following the outbreak of

large-scale hostilities between China and India in the fall of 1962,

which he valued at $60 million, the United States military aid to India

"mainly in the form of light weapons and communications and other

equipment for Indian mountain divisions, engineering and road-building

equipment and cargo aircraft," probably ran to about $100 million a

83year.

Continuation of knerican military aid to India, which Pakistan

considered to be a major threat to its security, led to an important

declaration on June 22, 1964, by Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z. A.

Bhutto, in the Pakistan National Assembly. During a debate on an

adjournment motion relating to United States' decision to give long-term

military aid to India, Bhutto declared that the "Time has come for

Pakistan to undertake reappraisal of its foreign policy and review her

political and military commitments." He added that Pakistani

commitments were made under a particular situation which had now changed

with the Washington decision to give massive long-term aid to India. 84

82~, January 29, 1964.

83Norman D. Palmer, "India and Pakistan: The Major Recipients,"Current History, }~IX (November, 1965), p. 263.

84Dawn, June 23, 196L,.

84

The next day President Ayub of Pakistan in his most outspoken criticism

until that date of the Illavish U. S. aid to India,1I deplored the fact

that in contrast to the Dulles-Eisenhower era, "now the Americans do not

hesitate to let down their friends." In an exclusive interview to the

British newspaper, Daily Mail, the Pakistani President said, "Now

American, Soviet and British policy regarding India is virtually the

same--to build up that nation against Chinese or other penetration.

This is a fallacy. No nation in its senses would try to occupy India.

It just canlt be done. But the effect of giving arms to India will

enable her to threaten her neighbors, of whom Pakistan is top on the

1ist. 1I85

The Pakistani President expressed the same views six months later,

on the day after his reelection, in an exclusive interview with Daniel

Coggin of the APP. President Ayub said during the interview that IIU. S.

policy in this part of the world has changed in a fashion that has

imperilled our security • • • China is not going to attack India. India

will use these American weapons against smaller nations and continue

trying to intimidate us as she has for the past 17 year S.II He held out

little hope of improvement in American-Pakistani relations so long as

the United States continued to supply arms to India. He, however,

denied rumors that Pakistan might pullout of SEATO and CENTO. 86

Addressing a Press Conference in Karachi on March 28, 1965, Foreign

Minister Z. A. Bhutto of Pakistan declared that by rushing military

85~, June 24, 1964.

86nawn, January 4, 1965.

85

assistance to India, a country hostile to Pakistan, the United States

had not merely jeopardized the concept of alliances but had shattered it

completely. 87

The American lack of responsiveness to Pakistan's demands relating

to its security became very clear to the Pakistanis during the Indo­

Pakistan war of 1965. Not only did the United States, a formal ally of

Pakistan, fail to come to the latter's assistance, but immediately on

the outbreak of large-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan it

imposed an arms embargo on both belligerents. The 'stoppage of American

military supplies to both India and Pakistan resulted in greater

hardship for the Pakistanis than it did for the Indians because while

Pakistan relied almost exclusively on American equipment the Indians

received military hardware from a wide range of countries, such as

Britain and the Soviet Union. 88 The Pakistanis construed the American

decision concerning the arms embargo as unequal treatment and one

specifically designed to hurt their military posture. In addition to

the arms embargo the United States put pressure on its allies of NATO,

CENTO,and SEATO not to supply military aid to Pakistan. The Indian

Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, made an announcement in the Indian

Parliament that the United States had given India an assurance to this

effect. 89

Pakistani feelings regarding the United States during the Indo-

87nawn, March 29, 1965.

88nawn, September 12, 1965.

89New York Times, November 9, 1965.

86

Pakistan war of 1965 can be summed up in the statement by Foreign

Minister Bhutto of Pakistan made in the Pakistan National'Assembly,

winding up the debate on the emergency situation created by the Indo­

Pakistani war. In his statement the Pakistani Foreign Minister declared

that the responsibility for straining friendly relations between the

United States and Pakistan lay with the United States, which started

supplying arms to India despite repeated Pakistani protests. American

military aid, Bhutto said, ultimately enabled India to "invade"

Pakistan. 90

To Pakistan, the American attitude during the Indo-Pakistani war

represented the high point of American lack of responsiveness to

Pakistan's demands relating to its security. Disenchantment with the

American alliance was almost complete, and Pakistan continued to look

elsewhere for support in its quest for security, i.e., the improvement

of its power position vis-~-vis India.

Since lack of responsiveness on the part of the United States to

Pakistan's security demands was primarily responsible for Pakistan's

efforts to improve relations with Communist China, it will not be out of

place here to discuss briefly the efforts on the part of Pakistan to

"normalize" Sino-Pakistani relations. Pakistan's efforts to improve

relations with China were based, once again, on its desire to

counterpoise Indian superiority on the Indian subcontinent and improve

its power-position in relation to India. In addition, the Sino­

Pakistani d~tente has had important ramifications for Pakistan's

90Dawn , November 22, 1965.

87

alliance with the United States and thus deserves a place in this study.

The Chinese leaders deserve credit for the fact that they

understood clearly Pakistan's objectives in entering into defense pacts

with the United States. It was this clear realization of Pakistan's

aims that prevented the Chinese from being overly critical of Pakistan's

ties with the West and, therefore, in contrast to the ups and downs of

Soviet-Pakistan relations, Sino-Pakistan relations have remained

uniformly cordial. The attitude of Peking toward Pakistan was

symbolized in China's position toward Pakistan's decision to join the

South East Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO was more of a provocation to

Peking than it was to Moscow, but while the Soviet Union lodged a

strongly-worded protest with the Pakistan Government concerning its

decision to join SEATO, Communist China did not send a protest note to

Pakistan. Commenting on the Chinese attitude regarding Pakistan's

membership in the Western alliance system, a Pakistani author wrote

that, "Perhaps it was due to the ability of the Chinese leaders to see

beyond the heat and passion of the moment • [which) convinced them

that Pakistan had joined the Western defensive alliances for its very

survival and that it had no aggressive designs against China.,,91

Pakistan also made a sincere effort to convince the Chinese that

its membership in Western alliances was not aimed against them. The

Pakistani Ambassador to Peking during the early years of Pakistan's

membership in the Western alliance system, Major General Raza, was

91Qutbuddin Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and the People'sRepublic of China, n in Karachi University, Foreign Policy of Pakistan,(Karachi, 1964), p. 77.

88

instrumental in explaining Pakistan's intentions to the Chinese.

Communist China's understanding attitude toward Pakistan's membership in

the Western alliance system coupled with the efforts made by the

Pakistani diplomats in Peking, notably Major General Raza, paved the way

for the cordial meetings between Premier Chou En-lai of China and Prime

Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan at the Bandung Conference in April

1955. At the Bandung Conference the Pakistani Prime Minister was

apparently successful in setting at rest any doubts and suspicions that

might have lingered on in the minds of the Chinese leaders concerning

Pakistani objectives in joining SEATO.

The Sino-Pakistani cordiality at the Bandung Conference went so far

that the Chinese Premier accepted Prime Minister Mohammed Ali's

assurance that SEATO was a defensive alliance as far as Pakistan was

concerned, and that Pakistan had entered into the Pact to defend itself

from aggression and not because of any hostility toward China, the major

Communist Power in the region covered by the South East Asia Collective

Defense Treaty. P~emier Chou, apparently accepting the Pakistani

assurance at face value, told the Political Committee of the Bandung

Conference, in the presence of Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, that the

Pakistani Prime Minister had told him that

Although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistanwas not against China. Pakistan had no fear that China wouldpermit aggression against her. As a result of that we achieveda mutual understanding although we are still against militarytreaties. The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured thatif the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would notbe involved in it • • • I am grateful to him for this

89

explanation because through these explanations we achievemutual understanding. 92

Relations between China and Pakistan continued to be cordial during

the next few years. Madame Soong Ching-ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen, and

a Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's

Congress, arrived in Pakistan on January 24, 1956, for a nine-day visit

and was given a warm welcome. Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy of

Pakistan visited the People's Repub1i~ of China in october of the same

year. While in China the Pakistani Prime Minister declared: "I see

this country wants friendship with every other country. It wants to go

out to assure every country that it means well If China seeks the

friendship of the world, it is the duty of the world to seek the

friendship of China. ,,93 The Chinese Prime Minister, on his part, said

that although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, since its government and

people have expressed friendliness for China, "there is no reason why

China cannot be friends with Pakistan.,,94

The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-1ai, returned Suhrawardy's

visit in December, 1956, and in their joint statement issued in Karachi

they went on record as saying that "there is no real conflict of

interests between the two countries." The joint statement added that

lIThe difference between the political systems of Pakistan and China, and

the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the

92New York Times, April 25, 1955.

93nawn, October 21, 1956.

94nawn, October 24, 1956.

90

strengthening of friendship between their two countries.,,95

But relations between Pakistan and China did not begin to_warm up

significantly until after Indials border troubles with China had reached

significant proportions. It must be pointed out, however, that during

the initial stages of the Sino-Indian border troubles, following the

Tibetan revolt of 1959, President Ayub of Pakistan made an offer of

joint defense of the subcontinent to India on the condition that

outstanding disputes between the two countries, especially the dispute

over Kashmir, be settled. Prime Minister Nehru rejected the offer out

of hand, feigning ignorance as to against whom a common defense policy

would be directed. He asserted that the real motive behind Pakistanis

offer was not joint defe~se but Kashmir. 96 The offer of joint defense

by President Ayub to India seemed to run against the Pakistani policy

followed consistently by all Governments in that country of doing

nothing to provoke directly the ire of the Chinese. President Ayub,

however, seemed to feel that the Sino-Indian border troubles had

presented a good opportunity to settle Pakistanis disputes with India in

exchange for the offer of joint defense of the Indian subcontinent,

especially since he was under the impression that the Indian Government

and people were also ready to come to some sort of a settlement with

Pakistan. President Ayub's assumption apparently was based on the

premise that the Indians expected continuing conflict and tension

between their country and China, amounting even to the outbreak of

95~, December 25, 1956.

96Times of India, May 2 and May 6, 1960.

91

large-scale hostilities between the two countries, and therefore would

be amenable to settle their differences with Pakistan. Ayub apparently

decided that if an agreement could be reached with India, as a result of

which Pakistan would be free of any threat from India, such a settlement

was worth incurring the displeasure of China, especially since the

Western Powers would stand solidly behind pakistan. Moreover, in case

Ayub's offer of joint-defense was rejected by India, he would still have

demonstrated his sincere desire to his Western allies, especially the

United States, of an understanding with India by which Pakistan and

India could disengage their troops and take on the responsibility of

jointly defending. the subcontinent in case of external attack.

Since Pakistanis offer of joint defense of the Indian subcontinent

was rejected by India, and since the United States and Great Britain

came to look upon India as the king-pin in their strateg~ to contain

Communist China, the Pakistani leadership decided that it was time to

increase their effort to improve relations with China to such a point

that the dltente with China could be used as a counterweight to

neutralize India. At the same time, however, Pakistan was not ready to

cut its ties with the West, and especially with the United States. It

was, therefore, very careful about not allowing its newly-improved

relations with China to appear so intimate that the United States would

give up Pakistan as a lost cause and decide to cut its losses in that

country by bringing the alliance relationship to an end. This maneuver

on the part of Pakistan had led Werner Levi to write in the fall of

1962, before the outbreak of hostilities on the Sino-Indian border, that

the Pakistan Government IS "ability to make Pakistan an ally of the

92

United States and simultaneously a good friend of Communist China must

be considered a contemporary miracle of diplomacy.,,97

Conflict over the disputed territories on the Sino-Indian border

assumed significant proportions starting in 1959. After the rejection

of the joint defense offer by the Indian Prime Minister in mid-1960,

Pakistan turned seriously toward mending its fences with China so that a

situation similar to that which existed on the Sino-Indian border might

not develop on the border between the Sinkiang province of China and

'Azad' Kashmir (the part of Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the cease-

fire line). At the same time pakistan looked upon the tension on the

Sino-Indian border as a good opportunity to embarrass India by coming to

an agreement with China on their COmmon border, thereby proving that the

tension on the Sino-Indian border was a result of Indian intransigence.

As early as January 15, 1961, Manzur Qadir, then Pakistan's Foreign

Minister, announced that the people's Republic of China had agreed in

principle to the demarcation of its border with pakistan. 98 However, it

was not until May 1962 that it was announced that Pakistan and China had

agreed to open negotiations with a view to signing an agreement for the

demarcation of the as yet unsettled border between the Sinkiang province

of China and "the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the

control of Pakistan." According to the Press Note issued by the

Pakistan Foreign Ministry, the border demarcation agreement was to be of

"a provisional nature." The Press Note went on to explain that "After

97werner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," PacificAffairs, XXXV (Fall, 1962), p. 222.

98~, January 16, 1961.

93

the settlement of the dispute over Kashmir be~ween Pakistan and India,

the sovereign authorities concerned shall reopen negotiations with the

Chinese government regarding the boundary of Kashmir so as to sign a

formal boundary treaty to replace this provisional agreement.,,99 Talks

between Pakistani and Chinese representatives on the demarcation of the

border opened in Peking on October 12, 1962, a few days before the

outbreak of large-scale hostilities on the Sino-Indian border.

Western military aid to India during and after the Sino-Indian

border war of October-November 1962 accelerated the pace of the Sino­

Pakistani d(tente. The New York Times correspondent reported from

Rawalpindi that "Pakistan and Communist China are negotiating a formal

declaration renouncing war as a means of settling disputes between the

two countries."lDO Although Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali refused to

comment on the ~ York Times report, he did say that he had accepted an

invitation from Premier Chou En-1ai to visit China soon. However, a

Foreign Office spokesman, commenting on the reported Chinese offer of a

non-aggression pact said: "If such a proposal is placed before the

Minister (i1ohannned Ali] in Peking, it would be seriously examined." 10l

During the debate in the emergency session of the Pakistan National

Assembly, Industries' Minister Z. A. Bhutto, deputizing for the ailing

Foreign Minister, assured the House that Pakistan would not join India

in any action against China even if the Kashmir dispute were resolved

99Dawn , May 4, 1962.

lOO~ York Times, November 26, 1962.

lOlNew York Times, November 25, 1962.

94

amicably. Bhutto declared: "There are no conditions to our friendship

with China. Friendship with the Chinese people is fundamental." 102

Bhutto's statement represented a radical contrast to President Ayub's

offer to India in 1959-60 of joint defense of the Indian subcontinent,

presumably against China, if Kashmir and other outstanding Indo-Pakistan

disputes were settled amicably.

A little over a month after the cease-fire by the Chinese on the

Sino-Indian frontier, it was announced that China and Pakistan had

reached complete agreement, in principle, in regard to the demarcation

of the border between Sinkiang "and the contiguous areas, the defence of

which is the responsibility of Pakistan."103 The border agreement was

finally signed in Peking on March 2, 1963 by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on

behalf of China and Foreign Minister Bhutto representing Pakistan. Out

of the 3400 square miles of territory to which both sides had laid

claim, Pakistan received 1350 square miles and China received the

remaining 2050 square miles. However, as the Pakistani spokesman

pointed out immediately after the conclusion of the Agreement, Pakistan

profited from the arrangement since it received 750 square miles of

territory then under actual Chinese control without surrendering any

territory under the actual physical control of Pakistan. 104

While the main reason that prompted Pakistan to sign the border

agreement with China may have been the desire to embarrass India and to

102New York Times, November 27, 1962.

l03nawn, December 27, 1962.

l°4nawn March 3, 1963.--'

95

come to an understanding with China in an effort to strengthen its

military and diplomatic position vis-~-vis India, another reason that

weighed with the Pakistani policy-makers was the genuine apprehension

that an undemarcated border with China might lead to the same kind of

trouble for Pakistan as it had for India. As Foreign Minister Bhutto

pointed out in a speech in Dacca on April 8, 1963, "Surely as a

Government it is our responsibility to see that such a situation 'God

forbid' is not repeated for our people in which we are unnecessarily

involved in a misunderstanding with a neighbour and a great power.

Surely we would not like to see the tantrums and all the crisis that has

been created as a result of the misunderstanding over the boundary

between People's Republic of China and India.,,105 Moreover, the

Pakistanis expected to sign an agreement much more favorable to them at

this particular time because the Chinese, "since they had been branded

in the West as an aggressor in their border dispute with India, • • •

were interested in changing this image and presenting themselves as a

106reasonable and friendly power."

As American military aid to India continued in spite of vehement

Pakistani protests the Pakistanis turned more and more toward China in

their search for assistance and support against a possible threat to

their security on the part of India. On July 17, 1963, Pakistani

Foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto, declared, at the start oJ~ a,. two-day

105Quoted in Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: AnAnalysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests," Asian Survey, IV (March,1964), pp. 749-50.

106Ibid ., p. 749.

96

debate on foreign policy in the Pakistan National Assembly, that an

attack on Pakistan by India would involve the "largest state in Asia."

Bhutto's remark was interpreted as referring to China. 107

In another move to "normalize" relations with China, Pakistan

concluded an air transport agreement with its Communist neighbor. The

aviation agreement provided for the operation over each other's

territories, with landing and other necessary facilities, of the

airlines of the two countries--the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)

and the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC). The agreement

was signed in Karachi on August 29, 1963. 108 Even before the agreement

the State Department announced that the United States would view an air

agreement between Pakistan and China as "an unfortunate breach of free

w'or1d solidarity. ,,109 In a swift reaction to the Sino-Pakistan air

agreement, the United States announced that it had decided to defer a

$4,300,000 loan which it had promised Pakistan to help the latter build

a new airport at Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan. 110

The American Administration sent Undersecretary of State, George W.

Ball, to Pakistan in September 1963, in an effort to arrest the growing

friendliness of that country toward Communist China. The Ball mission

accomplished nothing concrete; the only decision was that talks between-the top leaders of the two countries would be continued when the

107New York Times, July 18, 1963.

108Dawn , August 30, 1963.

109Dawn , July 7, 1963.

110New York Times, August 31, 1963.

97

Pakistani Foreign Minister visited the United States later in the year

to attend the United Nations General Assembly. Meanwhile, continuing

its policy of "normalization" of relations with Connnunist China,

Pakistan signed a barter agreement with its neighbor on September 30,

1963, providing for the exchange of Pakistani jute for Chinese cement.

Foreign Minister Bhutto informed President Kennedy on October 4 in

Washington that Pakistan intended to continue the process of

"normalizing" its relations with China. l1l

In other moves to improve Sino-Pakistan relations, Pakistan backed

a joint Albanian-Cambodian resolution in the United Nations calling for

the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. Pakistan

initially had backed the seating of the Communist delegate in the U. N.

but, later, as a result of its pacts with the United States, it switched

to the position that the question of Chinese representation should be

postponed until the support for the seating of Communist China became

more near-unanimous. As a result it had voted for the American motions

calling for the postponement of the discussion of this question in the

General Assembly. However, Pakistan changed its stand once again in

1961 as a part of its efforts to "normalize" relations with China and

has voted since then for the seating of the Communist Chinese delegate

in the United Nations.

Pakistan played host to Premier Chou En-1ai of China in February,

1964, when the Chinese Prime Minister arrived in Pakistan on an eight­

day state visit. At a dinner in honor of the Chinese Premier, President

lllNew York Times, October 5, 1963.

98

Ayub of Pakistan indirectly criticized the United States for its

military aid to India and said, "Hassive military preparations have

never been the answer to international differences." He prefaced it by

saying that "We believe the Sino-Indian boundary dispute can also be

resolved through peaceful"negotiations. il112

President Ayub returned the Chinese Prime Minister's visit in

March, 1965, and was given a rousing welcome in Peking. During his

visit the Pakistani President declared: "Friendship with China is for

us a long-term policy and not a matter of expediency." He also

announced that Pakistan and China were united "by a conunon determination

to eradicate last vestiges of imperialism and colonialism in all their

forms.,,113 However, what irked the United States most was the statement

in the joint conununique at the end of President Ayub's visit to China

that Pakistan, in addition to China, opposed the introduction of nuclear

weapons into the Indian Ocean area. 114 The abrupt cancellation of

President Ayub's visit to the United States, originally scheduled for

April 1965, by President Johnson was based primarily on Pakistan's

increasingly friendly relations with China and its refusal to support

American policy in Viet Nam, or, for that matter, take any stand on an

Asian problem that would displease China.

Pakistan refused to endorse American policy on Viet Nam at the

SEATO Council meeting in London" on May 5, 1965. While the Council, with

ll2New York Times, February 21, 1964.

113Dawn, March 6, 1965.

ll~ew York Times, March 14, 1965.

99

France present only as an observer, expressed support for the Anglo­

American stand on Viet Nam and Malaysia, Pakistan entered reservations

in the final communique issued by the Council on both these issues.

Pakistan made a special reservation in the SEATO communique on all

passages dealing with Viet Nam. "It expressed to the Council its

special concern over the consequences of the continuance of armed

conflict in Viet Nam and voiced the hope that determined efforts would

also be made to restore peace in that area through negotiations on the

basis of existing Geneva agreements." The communique said that until

Communist aggression was brought to an end in Viet Nam resolute

defensive action must be continued. 115 Pakistan also refused to take

part in the SEATO naval exercise, "Sea Horse," in the South China Sea

from May 1 to May 14. Communist China had taken a very serious view of

the SEATO countries' decision to stage this exercise so close to the

Chinese mainland and looked upon it as a direct provocation to China. 116

Pakistan's continued "normalization" of relations with China

finally brought a sharp reaction from the United States in the shape of

an American request for the postponement of the World Bank Consortium

m~eting, scheduled for July 27, which was expected to pledge about $500

million in foreign aid to Pakistan. 117 Reaction in Pakistan to this

action of the United States was extremely critical and it was

interpreted as an effort to change Pakistan's foreign policy, especially

l15~, May 6, 1965.

l16nawn , April 24, 1965.

l17nawn , July 14, 1965.

100

in regard to China, by the use of economic pressure. President Ayub

Khan, denouncing the American action in a speech at a meeting of the

Council of the Pakistan Muslim League, the ruling party in Pakistan,

declared that Pakistan "is seeking friends and not masters." President

Ayub went on to say that

If the Americans want that we should incur the hostility ofChina and USSR without any rhyme or reason and also humiliateourselves before the Indians we cannot accept these conditions••• We also cannot endanger our honour, integrity and oursovereignty • • • If friendship impinges on the sovereigntyand independence of our country we no longer desire suchfriendship. We are prepared to undergo trials and tribulationsbut we will not allow our sovereignty to be eroded. 118

President Ayub's reaction to the American decision to postpone the

Consortium meeting symbolized the Pakistani stand on the question of its

relations with China. Pakistan was not ready to sacrifice its

increasingly improved relationship with China at the altar of economic

aid. China was the only nation on whom Pakistan could rely for

assistance in case of an outbreak of ~ostilities with India, since both

these countries considered India to be their common enemy. As far as

Pakistan was concerned, the United States could not be relied upon in

case of a confrontation with India and, therefore, it was all the more

imperative for Pakistan to continue to be on the best of terms with

China. Pakistani reasoning seemed to have been borne out during the

Indo-Pakistan war of September, 1965. During this war, while the United

States looked on as a neutral--an unsympathetic neutral in the eyes of

the Pakistanis--Communist China declar.ed its open support for Pakistan

118nawn, July 15, 1965.

101

and branded India as the aggressor. But even more important was the

increased Chinese activity on the Sino-Indian border during the Indo­

Pakistan war, which forced the Indians to keep a large part of their

army stationed on the Chinese borders, and actually helped the much

smaller Pakistani army to fight the Indians to a standstill.

The importance of Chinese friendship to Pakistan's objective of

security is of such immense importance to the Pakistanis, especially in

the light of the war of 1965, that Pakistan is unwilling to take a stand

on any international issue which may be unpalatable to the Chinese.

President Ayub, during his visit to the United States in December, 1965,

made it clear to President Johnson that Pakistan was not willing to

change its attitude regarding China and that the United States should

not expect any support on the part of Pakistan for its policy in Viet

Nam. President Ayub made it clear to the American President that

Pakistan's political independence and security were the country's

primary concern and in keeping with this objective it was rudimentary

that Pakistan establish and maintain the best of relations with

China. 119 The leading Pakistani newspaper, Dawn, summed up the whole

situation in an editorial on Ayub's visit to the United States in the

following words: "If the United States has its global concepts which

make American leadership unresponsive to Pakistani reactions to this

policy tQf arming India) ••. Pakistan's friendly relations and

economic collaboration with her great neighbor, the People's Republic

of China, have • • • to be accepted by Washington as an equally

l19Dawn, December 18, 1965.

unalterable reality.1I120

120Dawn, December 19, 1965.

102

CHAPTER IV

KASHMIR AND THE ALLIANCE

The present chapter will deal with the degree of American

responsiveness to Pakistan's demands emitting from its goals regarding

Kashmir. In this chapter we will try to show how the degree of American

responsiveness to Pakistan's demands relating to Kashmir has contributed

to the state of the Pakistan-P~erican alliance.

Although there is a great deal of truth in the opinion expressed by

'[']erner Levi that "There is an inclination (among pakistaniJ to overlook

the fact that however important Kashmir might be to P'akistan, it does

not have the same importance to many others, especially the most

powerful nations, ,,1 it does not detract from the importance accorded to

Kashmir by Pakistan's policy-makers, which in the context of their

world-view is entirely understandable. According to an American news

correspondent, "Contrary to what many Americans seem to think, the

Kashmir issue is not artificially whipped up by Pakistani politicians.

They certainly do their best to exploit a juicy issue but Kashmir would

still arouse violent passions in Pakistan if all the politicians dropped

dead tomorrow.,,2 Kashmir's importance in Pakistanis foreign policy is

also clearly depicted in the following quotation from the semi-official

Dawn:

l1i7erner Levi, "Pakistan, the Soviet Union and China," PacificAffairs, X]J~ (Fall, 1962), p. 222.

2H• Hangen, "Pakistan at Bay," Ne,v Republic, CXLVIII (March 30,1963), p. 15.

104

While those who have been on the side of truth and justicein Kashmir have forged a new and deeper comradeship withthe people of Pakistan, those that choose to stand on thefence in this vital issue may no longer be counted as ourfriends, however prepossessing their exterior or volubletheir peaceful professions. On this criterion of value wemust continue to reappraise our international relations.In this momentous fight between right and wrong those thatare not with us are in fact against us. 3

Here we would like to point out that Pakistan's official stand on

the problem of Kashmir is that it does not want the outright annexation

of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, but merely demands a

plebiscite in the territory under international auspices to allow the

inhabitants of Kashmir to decide whether they desire to join India or

Pakistan. However, Pakistan banks on the Muslim majority in Kashmir to

decide in favor of accession to Pakistan in case of such a plebiscite.

We would also like to point out, that the rights and wrongs of the

Kashmir case fall outside the scope of this study. In this chapter we

will confine ourselves exclusively to Pakistan's demands on the United

States arising from its goals regarding Kashmir and the degree of

American responsiveness to these demands. Only those aspects of the

Kashmir case will be mentioned in this chapter which are concerned

directly with Pakistani demands and American responsiveness to these

demands.

At the time when Pakistan entered into an alliance relationship

with the United States in 1954, a deadlock already had developed between

India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In contrast to the neutral stand taken

by the delegate of the Soviet Union on the Kashmir problem during the

3nawn, February 27, 1957.

105

initial stages of the dispute before the Security Council, the United

States "played an important role inside as well as outside the United

~ations in finding an amicable settlement of this problem. In fact, the

United States was one of the sponsors of all the important resolutions

passed by the Security Council, demanding a free and impartial

plebiscite in Kashmir.,,4

In the early stages of the debate in the Security Council on the

Kashmir problem a majority of the members of the Council, including the

United States, seemed to lean toward the Pakistani side. Although India

had come to the United Nations as the complainant in the dispute, the

Indian admission that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to

India was provisional and depended on the outcome of a plebiscite in the

State, coupled with Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan's

masterly presentation of his country's case, had won great sympathy for

the Pakistani stand on the question of Kashmir. Pakistan argued that

the problem of Kashmir was not merely a legal case concerning the

accession of a particular princely state to India or Pakistan, but a

manifestation of the problems faced by the two dominions as a result of

the communal massacres taking place in the subcontinent following

partition and independence. He was able to successfully convince the

delegates that the problem of Kashmir could be correctly viewed only in

the context of the post-independence disturbances in the Indian

subcontinent. 5 Zafrulla Khan's primary attempt was to present the case

4 M• Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the United States," PakistanHorizon, IX (December, 1956), p. 202.

5 Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir, (New York, 1953),p. 69.

106

in as broad a context as possible. He won his first victory when the

Council acquiesced in his approach by deciding on January 22, 1948, over

strong Indian objections, to alter the title of the case before it from

"The Jammu-Kashmir Question" to "The, India-Pakistan Question."

Commenting on Sir Zafru11a ' s presentation of the Pakistani case,

Michael Brecher characterizes it as "brilliant and unprecedented." He

goes on to say that "In contrast to the able presentation of Pakistan's

Foreign Minister, the Indian delegation failed to portray its case

effectively. Indeed, it has been suggested that this was a significant

factor causing India's initial severe defeat at the U. N.,,6 A.

Campbell-Johnson, criticizing the Indian presentation, comes to the same

conclusion: "Quite apart from its actual merits [the Indian ca~el has

been abominably presented, and • nearly every canon of Public

Relations procedure had either been violated or neglected ••• Moreover,

the Pakistani delegate was their Foreign Minister, Zafru1la Khan, an

experienced and popular practitioner in United Nations dialectic, who

was as suave and smooth as the Indian delegates were awkward and

angular.,,7

The members of the Security Council also seemed to be influenced by

the principle of self-determination, which Pakistan seemed to uphold and

to which India was also committed. A majority of the Council members

were so overwhelmed by the political and "human" aspects of the case

that they did not pay adequate attention to India's legal case regarding

6Ibid., p. 63.

7A. Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, (London, 1951),pp. 287, 290.

107

de facto aggression by Pakistan. The majority of the Security Council,

including the United States, threw their weight behind a solution by

means of a plebiscite under international auspices without going into

the intricacies of tribal and Pakistani invasion of Kashmir as alleged

by India, and without going through the motions of branding any

particular party as the aggressor in the case, which would have obliged

them to decide on the ways and means of ending aggression before a

plebiscite could be organized.

The American delegate expressed this view in his speech before the

Council on February 4, 1948, when he said: "How is it possible to

induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without warfare

and without driving them out? That is the only way it can be done

unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite

assured through an interim government that is in fact, and that has the

appearance of being, non-partisan.,,8 Thus he ~vent on record as implying

that the tribal invasion of Kashmir was not completely unjustified and

that nothing should be done to evict the tribesmen by force; he also

denied to the Government of Kashmir in Srinagar under Sheikh Abdullah

the right to stay in power while a plebiscite to decide the future of

the state was being held, since it was obviously not non-partisan. Only

a few days prior to his statement quoted above, the American delegate

had declared: "No one wants to see a superior force sent into the

Kashmir area to drive out the invaders of that area."9 .

Bunited Nations Security Council, Official Records, 240th Meeting,February 4, 1948, p. 369.

9United Nations Security Council, Official Records, 237th Meeting,January 29, 1948.

108

But despite the initial support given to the Pakistanis by the

United States, the latter did not find itself in a position to do

anything effective to bring about the promised plebis~ite in Kashmir.

The inaction on the part of the Security Council was the result of a

deadlock between India and Pakistan on the question of the degre~ and

stages of demilitarization in Kashmir as a prelude to the holding of a

plebiscite. As early as 1949, criticism of the United States and Great

Britain developed in Pakistan, because the Pakistanis laid the major

blame for United Nations' procrastination on the Kashmir issue at the

door of these two Western powers who, the Pakistanis believed, with· some

degree of justification, dominated the world body during the initial

years of the Kashmir dispute. The strength of anti-American feeling in

Pakistan was reflected in the country's press. The Civil and Military

Gazette of Lahore wrote on September 2, 1949: "In Pakistan recently

there has been grm'1ing a feeling that its interests are being thro,m to

the dogs by'both Britain and the U. S. owing to India's more strategic

position in the struggle between Western democracy and Russian

communism. 1I10 The left-leaning Pakistan Times ,,,rote in the same vein:

"He cannot fail to notice that the whole issue (Pf Kashmid seemed to

have been tagged on unnecessarily to the big power conflict and to

P~erica's struggle to contain the spread of Communism in South East

Asia. lIll

Pakistan's frustration with the inaction of the United Nations

lOCivi1 and Military Gazette, September 2, 1949.

llpakistan Times, September 2, 1949.

109

reached a much higher level a year later and the criticism of the United

States and Great Britain increased proportionately. The Civil and

Military Gazette had the following words to say about the policy of

\,o,Jestern democracies toward Kashmir: liThe democracies profess to stand

for human rights but in Kashmir they have shown little solicitude for

this great principle. In fact, they have, for reasons best known to

themselves, sacrificed those rights to the demands of expediency.lIl2

The Pakistan Times '\'las even harsher in its criticism: "\.-n1en we say that

principles are being sacrificed for expediency, it is obvious that the

principles thus sacrificed are principles of the United Nations, but the

expediency that is being served is the expediency of the British and the

Americans. Hhen '\ve s"!-y that Asia is losing faith in the United Nations,

what we really mean is that it is losing faith in the bona fides of the

British-American policies in the East.,,13 The semi-official organ of

the Pakistan Government, Dawn of Karachi, '\rriting editorially, made

reference to a parallel between the United Nations' handling of the

Korean and Kashmir questions. The editorial made the point that while

the U. N. acted in Korea with great speed because the interests of the

Great Powers of the West, especially the United States, were so

intimately involved, the United Nations had failed to take action

against India, whom Dffivu termed the aggressor in Kashmir, because the

vlestern Powers were not interested in ending aggression there since,

according to the Pakistani newspaper, action against India would be

12Civil and Military Gazette, December 15, 1950.

13pakistan Times, December 28, 1950.

110

involved. 14

Criticism of the Uni~ed States in Pakistan over the question of

Kashmir increased when the Graham Mission's failure became apparent in

1952. 15 The New York Times correspondent reported from Karachi that

"the United States is regarded here as the main villain. ,,16 A fe~v

months earlier, while Dr. Frank Graham was still pursuing his talks,

Dawn had written: "The U. N. has been playing into Bharat's (India's]

hands. The Powers dominating that Organization--the U. S. A. foremost

among them--are unashamedly sacrificing principles for expediency

The situation now is that America, more than Bharat, is the enemy of the

Kashmiris."17

However, in spite of the Pakistani resentment against the lukewarm

American attitude toward Pakistan's case on Kashmir, one of the main

reasons that prompted Pakistan to enter into an alliance with the United

States ~vas the hope that the latter would give Pakistan, "besides

economic and military aid, full moral and political support in finding

an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.,,18 The Pakistanis

expected that, as a part of the arrangement, the United States would

14Dawn, September 15, 1950.

l5 Dr • Frank Graham, a former member of the U. S. Senate from NorthCarolina, was appointed by the United Nations Security Council onApril 30, 1951, as the U. N. representative to effect demilitarizationin Kashmir on the basis of UNCIP resolutions.

l6New~ Times, October 15, 1952.

l7Dawn, June 6, 1952.

ll\i. Ahsen Chaudhri, "Pakistan and the United States," PakistanHorizon, Vol. IX (December, 1956), p. 20.

111

support Pakistan in its disputes with India, especially over Kashmir, in

return for Pakistan's support of the United States on 'cold war' issues.

The first major situation, after the signing of the MD~E in 1954,

involving the question of American responsiveness to Pakistani demands

concerning Kashmir, arose as a result of the December 1955 visit to

India of Soviet Prime Minister Bu1ganin and Communist Party First

Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. While in India, the Soviet leaders

announced that they recognized Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian.

Union and the problem of Kashmir as an internal matter of India.

The Pakistanis expected that the least the United States could do

in the situation was to issue promptly a statement from the highest

sources refuting the Soviet stand on Kashmir and calling for the

decision of the future of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir by an

internationally supervised plebiscite, thus supporting the Pakistani

stand on the question of Kashmir. Since the Russians, who had thus far

remained neutral on the question of Kashmir and whose representatives

had abstained from voting whenever this issue came up in the Security

Council, had changed their stand and decided to throw their complete

support behind India as a result of Pakistan's alliance with the United

States, Karachi felt that it was incumbent on the part of America to

stand by its ally. As the Times of Karachi put it, "The situation

~ulganin and Khrushchev's statements on Kashmir) has arisen directly

out of international causes and must therefore be met on that plane.,,19

Pakistan was bitterly disappointed when no such forthright

19pakistan News Digest, IV (December 15, 1955), p. 3.

112

statement categorically refuting the Russian stand was forthcoming from

high American sources. The only statement concerning the issue was made

by Horace A. Hildreth, American Ambassador in Karachi, who stated that

lIThe basis of the United States position is that the question of the

accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through a

free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United

Nations. This was stated by the United States' representative in the

Security Council on December 5, 1952. It still stands." 20 Pakistan,

however, was not satisfied with this lukewarm support for a plebiscite

ili Kashmir. Its disappointment was primarily the result of the

indifference on the part of the American Secretary of State and other­

high officials of the State Department toward the Soviet statement on

Kashmir. Pakistan was disappointed that the United States Secretary of

State had not--come out in favor of the Pakistani stand to offset the

effects of the Russian statement. In an editorial on December 16, 1955,

Dawn, while welcoming the American envoy's statement, stated,

lINeverthe1ess, one does hope that Secretary of State Dulles will himself

take an early opportunity of saying something more positive on this

issue.,,2l

Dawn reported on December 29, 1955, that the Government of Pakistan

was not fully satisfied with the statement made by the U. S. Ambassador

in Karachi on the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's demand, for a refutation of

the Soviet stand by the highest officials of the American State

20Dawn , December 15, 1955.

21Dawn , December 16, 1955.

113

Department and the British Foreign Office, was, according to informed

sources quoted by the newspaper, contained in a letter sent by the

Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hamidu1 Huq Choudhury, to his counterparts

in the United States and the United Kingdom. 22 However, no such

declarations were forthcoming from the United States or Great Britain.

Pakistani reactions to the American response to the statements of

the Soviet leaders were typified in a dispatch filed from San Francisco

by Dawn's special correspondent, Nasim Ahmed, in which he said:

~Vhat disturbs a Pakistani observer here is that • • • protestswere not voiced in th~s country against the extremelyunfriendly and provocative speech made by Khrushchev in Kashmir• • • Silence on the part of the United States State Departmentconcerning Khrushchev's statement supporting Bharati [Indian]occupation of Kashmir, in contrast to Secretary of StateDulles's denunciation of the Soviet interference in the Goanissue, can only be described as a fresh manifestation of thetimid policy vis-a-vis Kashmir pursued by the United States andother Western allies of Pakistan. 23

Lack of American support for the Pakistani case on Kashmir in the

face of the Soviet Union's declaration of complete support for the

Indian point of view was very disturbing to the Pakistanis who had

"looked to the United States for equally unequivocal support, but got

nothing more than the suggestion that the question be again referred to

the United Nations. They seemed to assume that because the Russian

leaders had openly supported India, the United States should as openly

side with its ally, Pakistan, and they were bitterly disappointed when

22Dawn , December 29, 1955.

23Dawn , December 29, 1955.

114

the United States failed to act as expected.,,24 Reaction to such a

manifestation of American indifference to Pakistanis objectives in

Kashmir took the form of a resolution introduced in the policy-making

Council of the ruling Muslim League calling for Pakistanis withdrawal

from Western-sponsored alliances. 25 The resolution, which was meant to

be a symbolic gesture, was voted down and nothing concrete came out of

the move.

Pakistani feelings were voiced as well at the meeting of the SEATO

Council of Ministers in Karachi in March 1956. The United States and

six other members of the treaty organization supported Pakistan's demand

that a United Nations-supervised plebiscite be held to determine whether

Kashmir should go to India or Pakistan. During the meeting Pakistan

also was supported in its territorial disputes with her other hostile

neighbor, Afghanistan. The SEATO communique was welcomed in Pakistan.

The Morning News of Karachi wrote editorially: "From Pakistan's point

of view and in the general interest of peace and stability in Asia, the

SEATO Council has acquitted itself remarkably well by vindicating

Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and by declaring the Durand Line to be the

international boundary of Pakistan, which the SEATO Powers are committed

to defend." 26 The SEATO communique, however, did not entirely satisfy

the Pakistanis. American lack of responsiveness to Pakistan's demands

concerning Kashmir following the statements of the Soviet leaders in

24Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and Pakistan," CurrentHistory, XXXIV (March, 1958), p. 145.

25New York Times, January 4, 1956.

26pakistan News Digest, IV (March 15, 1956), p. 3.

115

India had undermined Pakistan's confidence in the United States. Selig

Harrison, ~rriting a few months after the visit of Bulganin and

Khrushchev to India, summed up the situation in the following words:

"Pakistan cannot exact from the United States the unequivocal stand on

Kashmir that the Soviet Union, with its direct security interests in the

adjacent Himalayan state, can afford to lavish on India. Within

Pakistan the Soviets can thus evoke understandable doubts about the

~visdom of the commitment to the West." 27

Another incident connected with the episode concerning the

statement made by Khrushchev and Bu1ganin in India over Kashmir was the

statement made by the First Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union, A. I.

Mikoyan, in Karachi on March 25, 1956. Mikoyan was then in Karachi to

take part in the Pakistan Republic Day celebrations. Mikoyan, who was

the head of the Soviet delegation to the celebrations, told newsmen at a

reception given by the Soviet Embassy in Karachi that "The problem of

Kashmir should be decided by the people of Kashmir." He added, however,

that the Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev, had expressed their

views on Kashmir during their trip to India" after assessing public

opinion. ,,28 Mikoyan's statement was a clear attempt to placate public

opinion in Pakistan concerning the final disposition of Kashmir, without

at the same time saying anything which might be construed as a

refutation of the statement made a few months earlier by Bu1ganin and

Khrushchev in India.

27 Selig S. Harrison, "New Approach to South Asia," New Republic,CXXXIV (June 11,' 1956).

28Da\vn, March 26, 1956.

116

An important reason for the high level of resentment in Pakistan

against the United States' lack of support of the Pakistani case over

Kashmir was the result of the feeling in Pakistan that had it not been

for Pakistan's decision to sign the MDP~ with the United States in 1954,

Pakistan would have had a better chance of coming to a settlement of

the Kashmir issue with India on the basis of some sort of a plebiscite

in the territory. Prime Minister Nehru of India had broken off

negotiations on the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator in 1954 on

the pretext that the whole context of the dispute had changed as a

result of the American-Pakistan alliance, which he claimed had brought

the cold war to the doorstep of~ia. The Indian Prime Minister

reiterated the same stand a few months after the visit of the Soviet

leaders to India. Welcoming Soviet support for the Indian case, Nehru

said that the whole basis of the Kashmir dispute had IIcomp 1ete1y

changedll following a series of international developments, such as

American military aid to Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister said that

now it made little difference to what extent Pakistan agreed to

demilitarize on its side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir, since "There

is much more increased military potential sitting on the other side. It

makes a huge difference. Large bases surrounding India--not only

surrounding India but their existence on Pakistan-occupied territory of

Kashmir--have made a tremendous difference.,,29

The Pakistanis, as they saw it, were faced with an extremely unfair

situation. On the one hand, Indian intransigence over Kashmir, from

29New York Times, April 3, 1956.-- ---..::.==

117

their point of view, had grown as a result of Pakistan's alliance with

the United States. On the other hand, their American ally was not

willing to support their case on Kashmir, even though the other super-

power involved in the cold war, the Soviet Union, had expressed support

for the Indian case. Therefore, the alliance with the United States, as

one Pakistani writer put it, "far from bringing any advantage to

Pakistan in respect to its disputes with India, in particular, the all-

important dispute over Kashmir,

positi(;>n worse for Pakistan. ,,30

. (is] believed to have made the

Disappointment with the United States was reflected in the debate

on Kashmir in the Pakistan National Assembly on April 6, 1956. One

member questioned the "wisdom" of accepting U. S. aid if "such aid is

one reason why we have not been able to secure Kashmir • • • We should

refuse aid from the United States if such conditions preclude United

States help in obtaining Kashmir." Another speaker charged that the

United States was indirectly supporting India over the Kashmir issue. 3l

Pakistan decided to raise the question of Kashmir in the Security

Council in the latter part of 1956 as a result of the decision of the

Kashmir Constituent Assembly, on the Indian side of the cease-fire line,

on November 17, 1956, to amalgamate the State of Jammu and Kashmir

formally into the Indian Union. January 26, 1957, the anniversary of

India's Republic Day, was chosen as the date when the integration would

come into effect. As of that date the Kashmir Constituent Assembly was

30K• Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, (New York,1960), p. 75.

31New York Times, April 7, 1956.

118

to give up its constitution-making functions and act merely as a state

legislature. Pakistan requested a meeting of the Security Council to

discuss the situation arising from the decision of the Kashmir

Constituent Assembly. This decision, Pakistan claimed, was in direct

contravention of the Security Council resolutions which had clearly laid

down that the final disposition of the state could be decided only as a

result of a free and impartial plebiscite and that the Srinagar Assembly

had no right to take such a decision. A Security Council meeting to

discuss the Kashmir question was scheduled for January 16, 1957.

Pakistan, primarily because of the lack of an alternative but also

encouraged by America's strong stand supporting U. N. action during the

Suez crisis, seemed to be in a mood once more to put its trust in the

United States to support its case over Kashmir. It expected the United

States not only to uphold the principle of a plebiscite in the state,

but to bring about effective action on the part of the Security Council

to implement the holding of this plebiscite. The Pakistani mood was

reflected in Dawn of Karachi, which wrote editorially on January 6, 1957:

A great deal will no doubt depend on the attitude of theUnited States of America. It is under the leadership ofthe world's greatest democracy that the U. N. was able toacquit itself in the matter of the Anglo-French-Israeliaggression in Egypt so nobly and effectively • • • Notonly because we are an ally who believes in the Americanleadership of the free world, but because the Kashmirquestion, on its own merits, invokes the same principleswhich President Eisenhower upheld in the Egyptian crisis,it is inconceivable that he can give any other directiveto the United States representative on the Security Councilthan that he should fully support Pakistan's demand forpositive action to compel Bharat (India] to honour itscommitment for a free and fair plebiscite • • • If Americafollows any other course the conclusion will be irresistiblethat expediency and the desire to spread its influence in

119

the Middle East to the exclusion of that of Britain andFrance on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other,were at the root of recent American policy--and nothingnobler. If so, disillusionment will be rapid and theconsequences unpredictable. 32

Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy also sounded a note of warning

when) addressing a student rally on Kashmir Day in Karachi on January 16,

1957) coinciding with the start of the debate on Kashmir in the Security

Council) he said:

Many countries talked tall. Today they are on test. Thecountries which want to befriend us and cooperate with usare also on test. The countries which profess and claimto be our friends are also on test today. Now we will knowhow many of them speak the truth) and how many use us toachieve their ends by promising friendship to Pakistan. IfI find that these countries do not act justly and areinclined towards fraud) and do not do justice to our justcause, then Pakistan will determine another path for itself,come what may. 33

Pakistan won an initial victory in the Security Council) when bn

January 25) 1957) that body adopted a resolution calling for a

maintenance of the status guo in Kashmir until the fate of the territory

could be decided by a plebiscite. The Council, overriding strong Indian

objections, declared that any changes made in the status of Kashmir·

with out a plebiscite would not be in accordance with previous U. N.

decisions. The resolution, which was adopted by a vote of ten to zero,

with the Soviet Union abstaining) was sponsored by the United States and

four other nations--Britain, Australia, Colombia and Cuba.

The American delegate, Henry Cabot Lodge, speaking for the

32Dawn, January 6, 1957.

33Dawn, January 17, 1957.

120

resolution, recalled that on March 30, 1951, the Security Council had

taken note of the proposed convening of the Constituent Assembly in

Kashmir and had affirmed that no action of the Assembly could involve a

disposition of the state, which could be decided only under the agreed

principle of a free and impartial plebiscite. The resolution before the

Council, he said, was basically a reaffirmation of the earlier statement

by the Security Counci1. 34

The American position on the question was welcomed in Pakistan.

Dawn, applauding the American stand wrote: "Our people will be happy to

find that the trust they reposed in their Western allies has proved to

be well placed. The United States, lately subjected to much

blandishments at the highest level, has not, happily, been deflected

from the determination to stand by law and justice which she so

strikingly brought into play when confronted with the painful conduct of

her British and French allies [pver Suezl.,,35

However, initial elation at the American stand in the Security

Council soon gave way to disappointment when, in the later proceedings

of the Security Council, the United States seemed to yield to Indian and

Russian pressure by supporting an innocuous resolution to send Security

Council President Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden to India and Pakistan on a

mission to seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. The United States,

Britain, Australia and Cuba earlier had called for the same Jarring

mission to the Indian subcontinent but had specified that the aim was

34nawn, January 26, 1957.

35Dawn , January 27, 1957.

121

to examine with the Governm~nts of India and Pakistanproposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contributeto the achievement of demilitarization or to theestablishment of other conditions for progress towardsthe settlement of the dispute, having regard to theprevious resolutions of the Security Council and of theUnited Nations Corr~ission for India and Pakistan, andbearing in mind the statements of the representatives ofIndia and pakistan and the proposal for the use of atemporary United Nations Force. 36

The proposal for a United Nations Force was put forward by the Pakistani

Foreign Minister, Firoz Kahn Noon, in a speech to the Security Council

on January 16, 1957.

While the earlier Western resolution had not been entirely

satisfactory to Pakistan, especially because it did not refer to any

positive action to be taken to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, still, for

Pakistan, it did "mark an advance from the stalemate which Bharat

[India"] desired.,,37 However, as a result of the Soviet's vetoing38 of

the earlier Western resolution, the United States, Britain and Australia

now placed a new resolution before the Security Council proposing to

send Gunnar Jarring to India and Pakistan, but making no reference to

demilitarization, plebiscite or a U. N. Force, to which the Indian and

Soviet delegates had expressed vehement opposition. The second, watered-

down Western resolution was the "innocuous" resolution to which

reference has been made above. The watered-down resolution passed the

36nawn , February 16, 1957.

37nawn , February 17, 1957.

38This was the first veto cast by the Soviet Union, on the questionof Kashmir, to prevent a resolution, favorable to Pakistan and opposedby India, from being passed.

122

Security Council, with the Soviet Union abstaining.

Public opinion in Pakistan expressed great disappointment over the

toning down of the initial resolution moved by the Western Powers. The

Pakistanis had expected th~t a Soviet veto would lead to the reference

of the Kashmir issue to the General Assembly. They expected the full

support of the Western Powers for such a move, especially in the light

of the Western stand on the resolution on Kashmir adopted on January 25.

The Pakistanis, therefore, looked upon the modification of the original

mild four-Power resolution as a betrayal at the hands of their allies.

Mian Mumtaz Dau1tana, the Muslim League spokesman on foreign-affairs,

speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on February 23, 1957,

contended that the new watered-down resolution sponsored by the United

States and other Western Powers had proved that the Pakistan

Government's foreign policy had not been fruitful; for, had it been so,

the United States and other Western allies of Pakistan would have gone

straight to the General Assembly after the Soviet veto. Referring to

Prime Minister Suhrawardy's statement of the previous day that "It is

fortunate for this country that we have allies who have stood by us in

times of crisis.l,,39 Dau1 tana said that such action by Pakistan's allies

in the Security Council showed also that "our friends have not stood by

us," contrary to what the Prime Minister claimed. 40

The failure of Gunnar V. Jarring to break the Indo-Pakistani

deadlock on Kashmir, led Pakistan to request another meeting of the

39Dawn , February 23, 1957.

40Dawn , February 24, 1957.

123

Security Council to discuss Jarring's report and to take further action

on the matter. On November 16, 1957, the United States, Britain,

Australia, Cuba and the Philippines submitted a resolution to the

Council authorizing Dr. Frank Graham to visit the subcontinent once more

in order to make recommendations to the two parties, and to formulate

within three months "an early agreement on demilitarization procedures."

The resolution, in addition to the emphasis on "a reduction of forces on

each side of the cease-fire line to a specific number, arrived at on the

basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions," also pointed out

that both India and Pakistan "recognize and accept" their commitments

under the 1948 and 1949 resolutions which envisaged the holding of a

plebiscite in Kashmir. 41

The Soviet Union threatened to veto the resolution, which it said

served only Pakistan's interests. On November 27 Jarring of Sweden, in

an effort to overcome Soviet and Indian objections and with the

concurrence of the sponsors of the resolution, submitted amendments

which avoided the use of the word "demilitarization." The resolution,

as amended, directed Dr. Graham to make every possible recommendation to

India and Pakistan for a peaceful settlement of the implementation of

the resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949. 42 The

resolution was adopted in this form by ten votes to zero, with the

Soviet Union abstaining. Pakistani Foreign Minister Noon stated after

the vote that his country would offer Dr. Graham its fullest cooperation,

41U• N. Security Council, Official Documents, S/3911, November 16,1957.

42U• N. Security Council, Official Documents, S/3920, November 27.1957.

124

but it was obvious that Pakistan was not happy over another resolution

that would not guarantee any positive steps toward the plebiscite in

Kashmir.

The influential Da~~, following the threat made by the Soviet Union

that it would veto the Five Power resolution, gave expression to popular

resentment against the proposal to water do~~ the Five Power resolution

regarding Dr. Graham's terms of reference. Writing editorially under

the caption IINo More Surrender," it said,

Now is the time for our Government to take a firm stand andinsist that, veto or no veto, the five-Power resolution shallbe pressed to a vote and, if the Soviet Union does carry outits threat, the Kashmir issue shall immediately be taken tothe General Assembly for its consideration. We ought to makeit quite clear to our Western "friends" that we refuse to bepushed about any more and pay the penalty for being on theirside without any recompense as far as our most vital problemof-Kashmir is concerned. The Russians have at least thecourage to support to the utmost extent those countries thatare allied to them or have come under the Soviet sphere ofinf1uence--and who but simpletons can now fail to realisethat Bharat (India) is one of them? In contrast with this,the Western Powers show a strange coolness towards theirfriends that can only result in ultimately alienating most ofthe 1atter. 43

After the passage of the amended resolution in the Security Council

concerning the Graham mission, the United States and other Western

allies of Pakistan received even harsher treatment in the pages of Dawn.

In an editorial, under the caption IILet-Dm~ at the U. N.,II it wrote:

The people of this country who have been fed on hopes that allbut the Communists would support Pakistan's stand on Kashmirand that in the United Nations the Western Powers will standfirmly by Pakistan, have a right to know why the latter seem

43Da~~, November 23, 1957.

125

to have let us down. They had taken the lead in sponsoringthe five-Power resolution but faced with the threat of theSoviet veto, they made an inglorious retreat • • • The thingthat repeatedly hurts Pakistani sentiments is the ficklenessof our so-called friends of the Western world whose sense ofright and wrong seems to get hopelessly confused and whosecourage fails whenever Mr. N~hru or his envoys roll theireyes in anger • • • This [Soviet support for its allies andfriends] is in such sharp contrast to the timidity of theWestern Powers when it comes to supporting even the justcauses of their own friends and allies, that more and morepeople are beginning to wonder whether it is wise to remaincontinually tied to Western apron strings. 44

The Graham Mission again ended in failure. Dr. Graham, after

consultations in New York, Karachi and New Delhi, recommended the

introduction of a U. N. Force on the Pakistani side of Kashmir after the

withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the lIAzad" area. Pakistan agreed to

both the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and the introduction of U. N.

troops into IIAzad" Kashmir without insisting on a synchronization with

the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces from Kashmir, as laid down

in Part II of the UNCIP resolution of August 1948. India, however,

turned down the proposal, as it was unwilling to accept foreign troops

on any part of Kashmir territory, including that of IIAzad ll territory,

which it claimed was legally a part of India.

The failure of the Graham mission added to the bitterness in

Pakistan against its \V'estern allies, and more especially the United

States. There was a feeling in Pakistan that a precious year was lost

in sending out missions which were doomed to fail. Pakistan also felt

that India had been allowed to use this year further to integrate

Kashmir into the Indian Union and strengthen its hold on the territory.

44nawn, December 6, 1957.

126

Pakistan felt that its Western allies had contributed to Kashmir's

further amalgamation into India by failing to take a more positive stand

on the issue and in not putting pressure on India, both inside and

outside the United Nations, to come to an amicable settlement of the

dispute, preferably on the basis of a plebiscite. Pakistan laid the

major share of the blame for the lack of action of the U. N. machinery

at the door of the United States and the other Western Powers. In fact,

according to Pakistan, the Western Powers have contributed to Indian

intransigence by giving India massive economic aid without extracting

from it a commitment concerning a plebiscite in Kashmir.

Pakistan's resentment toward the West, and especially the United

States, was expressed, even before the announcement of the' failure of

the Graham mission, by Firoz Khan Noon, now Prime Minister of Pakistan,

in a debate on Kashmir in the Pakistan National Assembly. Speaking on

March 8, 1958, Prime Minister Noon said that the time was coming when

Pakistan might have to revise its policy toward the West. He went on to

say that he thought the people of Kashmir would become Communist unless

freed from Indian domination. He warned the Western nations that they

were wrong in thinking that Muslims could not become Communists, for if

Muslims "were given the choice between living under Hindu domination or

Communists, they would prefer the Connnunists." Noon also warned that

unless the U. N. mediator, Dr. Frank P. Graham, did something by the end

of April to further a settlement of the Kashmir problem, Pakistan would

consider revising its foreign policy.45

45New York Times, March 9, 1958.-----

127

After Graham's announcement, on March 28, 1958, of the failure of

his efforts, Dawn, advocating a return of the question to the Security

Council as soon as possible, wrote editorially:

In saying so [that the matter should be immediately raisedin the Security Council once morel we do not forget for amoment that the attitude of the United States and Britainhaving definitely veered round to a pro-Bharati pro-Indian position over the Kashmir issue since the matterwas last debated in the Security Council, there is littlechance that any further progress will be made in that forum.Nevertheless, let our so-called allies come forward openlyand say that they have abandoned the cause of the people ofKashmir and decided to underwrite the aggression of theirnew-found patron, Mr. Nehru. 46

The episodes relating to the Security Council's consideration of

the Kashmir issue and covering a period of a year or more from 1957 to

1958 demonstrated once again, that the United States had not been able

to be as responsive to Pakistani demands as the latter had expected.

Pakistan's hopes had been raised temporarily by the stand taken in the

Security Council initially by the United States in regard to the

Srinagar Assembly's decision to integrate Kashmir into India; but as the

proceedings of the Security Council progressed, it became more and more

clear that the United States was not ready to support any drastic

measure which might force a plebiscite o~ ~ndia against its wishes and,

thus, damage Indo-American relations irreparably. However justified

this might have been from the point of view of America's global

interests, it did contribute to the increasing lack of warmth in

American-Pakistan relations. Pakistan felt that it deserved the

46Dawn , April 5, 1958.

128

complete support of its allies, and especially that of the United States

as the leader of the Western alliance, on the question of Kashmir.

Pakistan expected such support not only because it thought that the

Pakistani case on Kashmir was just, but because it considered such

support a duty on the part of Pakistan's allies, especially on a

question which had by now become embroiled in cold war issues, as

evidenced by the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

Pakistan's feeling of disappointment and frustration at ti1e lack of

American and other Western support for the Pakistani position on Kashmir

is well-sulTh-narized in tne follO\oJing quotation from an editorial of the

Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, written shortly after President

Ayub had come to power in pakistan as a result of a coup d'etat:

Pakistan has no doubt come to be taken for granted both byher friends and her opponents. Thus far the blame lies onthe ousted politicians. But Pakistan's allies must alsosee that they llaVe not staunchly stood by her in her justcauses. Pakistan is certainly not ungrateful for economicaid and food gifts. But these--and even sound ideologicaldoctrines and valuable regional alliances--are no substitutefor the political and moral support needed by her on hervital question of Kashmir . . • Having alienated some Powersby her friendship for others, Pakistan feels landed in theunenviable predicament of having to appease even her friends. 47

About a year 1ate.c the same newspaper expressed similar disappointment

at the lack of American responsiv.eness to Pakistan's demands regarding

Kashmir:

Relations between the United States and Pakistan aredescribed as those of friendship and alliance. Thisrelationship means little witaout mutual loyalty. UnlessPakistan's conception of friendship is deficient in

4·7pakistan News Digest, VI (November 1, 1958), p. 3.

129

intellectual or moral perception, she is wholly justifiedin expecting unflinching American support for her justcauses. This friendship is more than neutralised whenAmerican appeasement of India carries with it tacitacceptance of India's sordid designs on Kashmir. 48

President Eisenhower's visit to Pakistan in December, 1959, as a

part of his eleven-nation tour, once again made the Pakistanis

optimistic. The Pakistanis expected that in a face to face meeting

between the American President and Pakistan's soldier-President, Ayub

Khan, the former might be won over to, if not outright support for the

Pakistan stand on Kashmir, at least a line of policy by which the United

States would take the initiative in putting some pressure on India to

come to an amicable settlement of the kashmir dispute with Pakistan.

The Pakistanis had expected President Eisenhower to use his influence

and good offices on his visit to New Delhi with the Government of India

in trying to persuade India that the Kashmir problem should be settled

once and for all, and, the Pakistanis expected, on terms more favorable

to Pakistan than the existing status guo.

Dawn, welcoming President Eisenhower to Pakistan, made it clear

that Pakistan expected the American President to take more effective

steps toward the solution of the Kashmir problem:

Glad and proud though we are to have in our midst the FreeWorld's greatest personality, we would be lacking in candourwere we not to tell him at the same time that so long as fourmillion people in one part of this sub-continent remaindeprived of freedom and justice, his message of freedom,justice and peace cannot be expected to carry the. degree ofconviction it should. May we not on this unique and historicoccasion, look forward to an "Eisenhower Doctrine" for thesolution of the Kashmir question?49

48 pakistan News Digest, VII (August 1, 1959), p. 3.

49 Dawn, December 7, 1959.

130

During President Eisenhower's short stay in Karachi, the Pakistani

leaders made it clear to him that they hoped he would use his good

offices over Kashmir in his talks in New Delhi with Prime ~1inister Nehru

of India. They presented to him a long memorandum setting forth the

Pakistani position on Kashmir. President Eisenhower's reaction,

however, appeared to be somewhat less encouraging than the Pakistani

President and his advisers had hoped. Eisenhower's position became

clear froIn the statement made by the White House Press Secretary, James

C. Haggerty, in Karachi on December 9, 1959, after the American

President had attended a five-hour conference session with President

Ayub Khan. Haggerty declared that President Eisenhower would be "happy"

to discuss with the Indian Prime Minister issues between India and

Pakistan, if India w'anted to do so. But, Haggerty went on to explain,

the initiative must come from India. James Haggerty emphasized the fact

that President Eisenhower had explained before leaving washington that

he was not on a negotiating tour, and therefore he was not going to take

the initiative in any such discussions. 50

To the Pakistanis, Eisenhower's reaction to their request came as a

great disappointment. They were doubtful that Prime Minister Nehru

would raise the Kashmir issue himself. An official spokesman of the

Pakistan Government, Brigadier F. R. Khan, when asked whether pakistan

would welcome a "more sympathetic attitude," replied in a definitive

tone: "yes, sir." He went on to say that Pakistan had expected that

50New York Times, December 9, 1959.

131

"a friend will use his good offices. ,,51 Brigadier Khan's statement

reflected clearly Pakistan's disappointment at President Eisenhower's

refusal to take the initiative in discussing Kashmir with the Indian

leaders in New Delhi and offering his good offices for the solution of

the Kashmir problem.

A lack of responsiveness on the part of the United States toward

Pakistan's demands regarding Kashmir continued through the last year of

the Eisenhower Administration. Pakistani criticisms of Eisenhower's

policies were toned down, however, during 1960, as the Pakistanis did

not seem to want to embarrass the Republicans during the election year.

The Pakistani attitude was prompted by their dislike of the Democratic

Presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy, who had been closely

identified ~.;rith the "India Lobby" in the Senate, and who ~.;ras perceived

to be sympathetic toward the neutral countries in general and India in

particular.

The resentment among the Pakistanis against the lack of American

support for PakistanIs case on Kashmir, which had been increasing over

the past year, came to the surface during Vice President Lyndon B.

oJohnson's trip to Pakistan in May 1961. The Pakistanis, the press and

the public more than government circles, were disappointed that the new

American Vice President had no words of support for Pakistan on the

question of Kashmir. the joint connnunique released after talks between

President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Vice President Johnson of

the United States did not even mention Kashmir. But Johnson stated at a

SINew York Times, December 9, 1959.

"j. 0-

132

news conference in Karachi that the Pakistani President had broached the

question early in their talks and at great length. The American Vice

President added, however, that his instructions from President Kennedy

were to "listen and learn" and that he could only relay President Ayub's

views to President Kennedy.52

While official circles in Pakistan were not too disappointed at

Johnson's statement, because they were aware that he had no au~hority to

make a commitment on the issue, great disappointment was expressed in

the press, led by the semi-official Dawn. l'Jriting under the caption "He

are Disappointed, II Dawn said: "Mr. Johnson spoke nice and pleasant

words about America's friendship and alliance with Pakistan and of

mutual cooperation for the good of the world and the economic and social

uplift of our nation, but there was not even a try to butter the Kashmir

parsnip with one sweet word. His orders, said the Vice-President, were

to keep his mouth tightly shut on Kashmir, and only his ch~e~, President

Kennedy, could say anything on the subject if he so wished."53

President Kennedy was no more responsive than his Vice President to

Pakistan's request for American support in regard to the dispute over

Kashmir. In a joint communique issued at the end of President Ayub's

visit to Washington in July 1961, President Kennedy merely "affirmed the

desire of the United States to see a satisfactory solution of the

Kashmir issue and expressed the hope that progress toward a settlement

52New York Times, May 22, 1961.

53Dawn , May 23, 1961.

133

would be possible at an early date." 54 At the end of talks between the

Presidents, American sources indicated that, in spite of President

Ayub's request that the United States help solve the long-standing

dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, President Kennedy

declined to take an active role in settling the dispute. The same

sources went on to say that the American President restated United

States~ backing for a United Nations-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir,

but then, at the same time, he urged President Ayub not to bring up the

matter at the next meeting of the General Assembly. Pakistan Government

sources had hinted earlier that such a step was under consideration.

President Kennedy, it was reported, went on to tell the Pakistan

President that

the United States considers all parts of the Indiansubcontinent of equal importance and was unwilling to takeaction to upset the balance. The President told PresidentAyub that he thought United States influence in the dispute[over Kashmir] was limited, especially since Prime MinisterJawahar1al Nehru of India and the Pakistan President hadbeen unable to get together. Mr. Kennedy, it was understood,suggested that such talks be started between Pakistan andIndia. He added that he would make a similar suggestion toMr. Nehru. 55

One of the main reasons for Pakistan's decision to raise the

Kashmir question once more in the Security Council was the United

States' refusal to take an active part in putting pressure on India to

come to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Pakistan's

desire to reopen discussion over Kashmir in the Security Council was

54New York Times, July 14, 1961.

55New York Times, July 15, 1961.

134

reflected in President Ayub's declaration on November 25, 1961, that

Pakistan was left with no alternative but to return to the United

Nations "to seek a just solution of the Kashmir issue." Answering a

question put to him by reporters, he said that the issue would be raised

in the Security Council "in the immediate future.,,56 President Ayub's

statement was followed by a letter sent to the President of the Security

Council on January 11, 1962, by Sir Zafrulla Khan, Pakistan's Permanent

Representative at the U. N., asking for an early meeting of the Council

to consider the question.

The United States came into the picture once more, when President

Kennedy, while the Pakistani request for a meeting of the Security

Council on Kashmir was pending, sent letters to President Ayub and Prime

Minister Nehru on January 16, 1962, "with the ol;>j~ct of exploring with

the Gove.rnments of India and Pakistan the outlines and prospects which

might lead to a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir question."

President Kennedy asked both the Governments to indicate whether they

would be agreeable to accept the good offices of a person mutually

acceptable to both countries. 57 This person, as was disclosed later,

was Eugene Black, President of the Horld Bank, who had successfully

mediated the Canal Waters dispute between India and Pakistan.

Though President Ayub accepted the offer of mediation in his reply

to the American President on January 18, 1962, President Kennedy's

action in offering the good offices of Eugene Black at this time was

56Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XIII (1961-1962), p. 18472.

57Dawn, January 24, 1962.

135

interpreted in Pakistan as an effort to put pressure on Pakistan "to

forego . .• (the) forthcoming debate on Kashmir before the Security

Council and make a fresh effort to settle the problem by direct

negotiations." Connnenting on Kennedy's offer, Dawn pointed out that

"The American efforts seem to be ideally suited to India's designs for a

sine die postponement of the requested Council meeting.,,58 Dawn, in an

editorial on January 25, called the Kennedy offer "embarrassing11 to

Pakistan because of its timing, and w'ent on to say that it was "heavily

loaded in favour of India.,,59 The offer came to nothing, however, since

Prime Minister Nehru of India rejected it on January 29. Nehru

explained on February 2, 1962, that India disliked as a matter of

principle any third party becoming arbitrator or mediator on the issue.

He went on to say that although Eugene Black had done excellent work in

settling the canal waters dispute, "a third party cannot come in v]here

this issue of sovereignty is involved. In these matters only the two

parties concerned can talk about it.,,60

President Kennedy's offer of a mediator at the time when Pakistan

had asked for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the problem

of Kashmir, illustrated once again a lack of responsiveness on the part

of the United States to Pakistan's demands concerning Kashmir.

Kennedy's offer was interpreted in Pakistan as a pro-Indian move to try

to keep the issue from coming up before the Security Council. This

58~, January 19, 1962.

59~, January 25, 1962.

60Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XIII (1961-1962), p. 18943.

136

in~erpretation of Kennedy's offer gained added strength from the fact

that the Indian representative at the United Nations, C. S. Jha, had

informed the Security Council on January 16, 1962, that his Government

was opposed to any meeting of the Security Council on the eve of the

Indian general elections. 6l The American move was interpreted in

Pakistan as an attempt to save India from being embarrassed in the

Security Council, where the question of reaffirming the Council's

resolutions regarding a plebiscite in Kashmir was bound to come up,

which, would be unpalatable to India. At the same time, the Pakistanis

argued, the United States wanted to save itself the embarrassment of

having to take an open stand once more in the Security Council on the

question of Kashmir. Pakistan, even while accepting President Kennedy's

offer, had made it clear that Pakistan's acceptance of this offer would

in no way reflect upon Pakistani plans to raise the question in the

Security Council. Official sources in Pakistan commenting on Kennedy's

offer had pointed out simply: "Our plans (for a debate in the Security

Council] stand. 1162

The Security Council met on February 1, 1962, to discuss Kashmir.

After hearing the representatives of India and Pakistan, a decision was

made to postpone discussion of the question until after the Indian

general elections in March. The adjournment move was made jointly, on

the request of the Indian representative, by the United States and the

Soviet Union. To the Pakistanis, the postponement of the discussion was

61Ibid., p. 18943.

62nawn , January 19, 1962.

137

another instance of United States' partiality toward India and a lack of

enthusiasm for what they considered the right of self-determination of

the people of Kashmir as well as for the sense of urgency felt by its

ally, Pakistan, regarding the fate of the territory.

The lack of a sense of urgency on the part of the United States as

well as the other Western Powers regarding the settlement of the Indo­

Pakistani dispute over Kashmir was demonstrated once again to the

Pakistanis, when the Security Council reconvened to take up the dispute

on April 27. After the Indian and Pakistani representatives presented

their case to the Council once more, and the Soviet delegate had spoken

in full support of the Indian point of view, the American, British and

French delegates informed the Council that their governments would need

some time to consider the statements of the Indian and Pakistani

representatives. The Security Council, therefore, adjourned the debate

sine die, and the debate was not resumed until June 15, 1962.

The move on the part of the Western Powers to adjourn debate on

Kashmir was resented in Pakistan as an effort to put the Kashmir dispute

in cold storage once more. The adjournment also was interpreted as a

maneuver to urge India and Pakistan to negotiate the dispute on a

bilateral basis, rather than force a solution through the machinery of

the Security Council, which India had declared did not any longer have

jurisdiction in the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan argued, on the other

hand, that bilateral negotiations would be useless since the status quo

favored India, which was in no mood to come to a settlement of the

'cispute, and the only way to force India to accept a solution was

through the pressure of world opinion expressed in the United Nations

138

and, if that failed, through the enforcement machinery of the world

body. Commenting on Pakistan's frustration regarding the Kashmir

dispute, the New York Times' correspondent in Pakistan reported, that

liThe Ayub Government is known to feel that it has been 'let down' by

Washington on the sensitive subject of Pakistan's conflict with India

over the strategic princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Efforts by the

Kennedy Administration to get India and Pakistan to negotiate the

dispute on a bilateral basis were unpopular with Pakistanis. They felt

that Washington leaned toward India's terms for such negotiations, which

would leave out the plebiscite wanted by Pakistan. ,,63

Even before the Security Council had reconvened in June to take up

the Kashmir question once more, official American thinking on the

problem of Kashmir was revealed by President Kennedy in a rather

undiplomatic manner, as far as the Pakistanis were concerned. The

pmerican President, on May 22, 1962, referring to a report published in

the Christian Science Monitor mentioning "complicating tendencies of

other nations to use American pmver for their own interests, II pointed

out that IIPakistan's request for help in the Kashmir problem--involving

India--demonstrates an effort to borrow U. S. power for other

nationalistic purposes.,,64

There was immediate reaction to Kennedy's statement in Pakistan.

The semi-official Dawn characterized the statement as lIye t another

instance of American misconception of Pakistan's policy on Kashmir,

6~ew York Times, May 13, 1962.

64nawn, May 23, 1962.

139

deliberate or otherwise.,,65 Two days later Dawn wrote editorially:

Kashmir is a problem which is our touchstone for testing theprofessions of friendship from whatever quarter they corne.Kashmir is not a problem that has erupted suddenly. It wasthere pending with the Security Council much before the UnitedStates entered into pacts and alliances with us. Pakistannever made any secret of its stand that if any country wants"to borrow" Pakistan I s po~ver--the power of its geographicallocation, of the fighting quality of its men and theirsincerity in friendship--for its own interests, that countrymust also undertake to lend its power, for whatever it isworth, to Pakistan. If these arrangements have led to any"complications," America is not the only partner which isfacing them. Our pacts with the United States have involvedus in, goodness knows, how many grievous "complications."We have earned the enmity of Russia and the annoyance ofChina, our great neighbour, for no reason at all. And thisis costing us dear in the context of our "other nationalisticpurposes."66

A week later Dawn returned to the same theme, and '\vrote editorially:

"To gain our objective--the liberation of Kashmir--we should readily

accept aid or friendship from '\vhatever quarter it comes. Hhat does it

matter if our new friendship does not suit the 'nationalistic purposes'

of our allies. As we have said again and again, Pakistan regards only

those as its real friends who stand by us on the crucial question of

Kashmir.,,67

American statements in the Security Council, when the debate on

Kashmir was resumed finally, though not pro-Indian or anti-Pakistani,

did not go far enough to satisfy Pakistani aspirations regarding the

dispute. The chief American delegate at the United Nations, Adlai

65Dawn , May 23, 1962.

66Davrn , May 25, 1962.

67Dawn , June 2, 1962.

140

Stevenson, declared that the best starting-point for settling the

Kashmir problem seemed to be the UNCIP resolutions of August 13, 1948,

and January 5, 1949, providing for demilitarization and a plebiscite in

Kashmir. vJhi1e the Pakistanis welcomed the American delegate's

declaration, they were disappointed when he did not lend his support to

any concrete action on the part of the Security Council to bring about

demilitarization and a plebiscite in Kashmir; Adlai Stevenson merely

went on to say that t:he U. S. A. ~vas II convinced that a high-level

conference between India and Pakistan would enable the parties to

ascertain the precise areas of disagreement . • • and induce a spirit of

compromise. 1168

The Irish delegate introduced a resolution on June 22, 1962, which

noted the two parties' pledges not to resort to force and reminded them

of the principles contained in the Security Council's resolution of

January 17, 1948, and the UNCIP's resolutions of August 12, 1948, and

January 5, 1949. In its operative part, the resolution urged them to

enter into negotiations at the earliest convenient time with a view to

an ultimate settlement. The resolution was supported by the United

States and six other countries but was vetoed by the Soviet Union

because of India's opposition. Pakistan considered the outcome of the

debate in the Security Council as a limited victory because the majority

of the Council did reaffirm support for a plebiscite in Kashmir under

international auspices as envisaged by the earlier Security Council and

UNCIP resolutions. The Pakistani Foreign Minister duly thanked those

68united Nations Security Council, Official Records, 1012th meeting,June 15, 1962.

141

governments which had supported the Irish resolution, but there was

great dissatisfaction in Pakistan that no concrete proposals for U. N.

action toward a settlement of the dispute had emerged from the

discussions in the Security Council.

Pakistan was extremely critical of the Soviet Union for casting a

veto against what was, for all practical purposes, a resolution merely

calling upon India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations. Foreign

Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan bitterly denounced the "Indo-Soviet

axis ~hatJ has succeeded through power politics and pressure tactics in

persuading neutral countries to withhold support on such an important

question,,,69 yet the larger part of the blame for the lack of effective

action on the Kashmir question on the part of the Security Council was

laid at the door of the Western Powers, especially the United States.

Pakistani opinion was reflected in an editorial of the Pakistan Times,

the formerly left-leaning newspaper but run under the supervision of the

Pakistan Government following the coup of 1958 and the coming to power

of President Ayub. Writing under the caption "The Soviet Veto," the

Pakistan Times said: '~e should spare our energy on getting angry with

the Soviet Union for its veto. If there is anyone to be angry with, it

is our friends and allies. Not only have they done precious little to

stand by us diplomatically, they are competing with the Soviet Union in

wooing India. ,,70

To most Pakistanis the casting of the Soviet veto was further

69Keesing's Contemporary Archives, XIII (1961-1962), p. 18945.

70pakistan Times, June 25, 1962.

142

evidence of the Soviet Union's unshirking support for its friend, India,

against the West's ally, Pakistan. The Soviet action put into sharper

relief the United States' lukewarm attitude toward Pakistan's case. It

also reflected adversely, from Pakistan's point of view, on the value of

an alliance with the United States, which, for reasons that seemed

irrelevant to the Pakistanis, had tried to playa neutral role between

an ally and a "neutral" on a question that the ally considered to be of

vital importance to it. The attitude of the United States in the

Security Council during the discussion of the Kashmir question by that

body in 1962 can be considered a major instance of a lack of

responsiveness on the part of the United States to Pakistan's demands

concerning Kashmir.

Pakistan's harshest criticism of the United States was, however,

the result of American military aid to India following the outbreak of

large-scale hostilities on the Sino-Indian border in the fall of 1962.

As an American author points out, lIPakistan insisted throughout this

period • • . that aid to India should not be of such a magnitude as to

upset the balance between them, and more importantly, that the Kashmir

dispute should be settled as the guid pro guo for shoring up the defense

of India.,,71 Pakistan felt that India's need for Western military aid,

following the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war in October 1962, presented

Pakistan's Western allies with a most opportune moment to apply pressure

on India to corne to a settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir--a

settlement which would be more favorable to Pakistan than the prevailing

71Frank N. Trager, "The United States and Pakistan: A Failure ofDiplomacy," Orbis, IX (Fall, 1965), p. 625.

143

status guo. Moreover, in return for a settlement of the Kashmir

question acceptable to it, Pakistan was ready to offer a disengagement

of forces on the Indo-Pakistan border, thus enabling India to

concentrate its forces on the Chinese border.

But the Pakistanis made it clear that they were not ready to give

any assurances to India without a prior settlement over Kashmir. The

Pakistani position was openly publicized in the press and in statements

by its leaders. Referring to Western efforts to make Pakistan give some

sort of an assurance to India that it would not make any hostile moves

in Kashmir in this hour of India's greatest danger, the Pakistan Times

\Yrote editorially under the heading "Holier Than Thou":

That we should raise the Kashmir issue now, admittedly in thehour of India's peril, is perfectly natural. For years wehave been denied justice by the Indian force of arms and byher long-handed diplomacy no less than by the connivance ofother Powers, notably Western. We hope that danger mightawaken Mr. Nehru to reality if his sense of justice has sofar failed to do it. But surely he will not be awakened toit unless we help him in the process. The way we can helphim is by withholding assurances that Pakistan will notembarrass India during her engagement with China. Let himtake the first step towards a Kashmir solution and we shalldo the rest. But not before. 72

~~estern efforts to extract an assurance from Pakistan that it will

not make any move in Kashmir, as long as Sino-Indian hostilities lasted,

which might adversely affect India's power-position vis-~-vis China,

began with President Kennedy's letter to President Ayub at the end of

October 1962. The American President implied in this message to his

Pakistani counterpart that he hoped the Pakistanis would not make any

72pakistan News Digest, X (December 1, 1962), p. 3.

144

new moves at that time in their long-standing dispute with India over

Kashmir. Kennedy urged that the two countries--India and Pakistan--draw

together in what he said was a moment of common peril. 73 In reply to

the communication from the American President, President Ayub was

reported to have taken a "firm line" vis-~-vis the American military aid

to India and to have declined to give assurances on Kashmir. 74

While Pakistan expected its Western allies to pressure India into a

settlement of the Kashmir dispute as a precondition for Western military

aid to India, the Western Powers, for their own reasons, which did not

seem very plausible to the Pakistanis, were hesitant to do so. As the

New York Times' correspondent from Karachi pointed out, the Western

attitude led to "acute disappointment in the Government and among the

people (Of pakista~ that the U. S. and Britain failed to put pressure

on India at the opportune moment to reach a settlement with Pakistan of

the emotional dispute over the control of Kashmir. ,,75

The Western Powers, realizing the importance of some sort of an

agreement between India and Pakistan on Kashmir which could lead to

disengagement of forces on their common borders and which could increase

the fighting potential of the Indian armed forces against the Chinese,

did make attempts to bring the two countries to the conference table to

discuss the question of Kashmir. The Commonwealth Secretary of Britain,

Duncan Sandys, and the U. S. Assistant Secretary of State, Averell

73~ York Times, October 31, 1962.

74Dawn, November 8, 1962.

75New York Times, November 19, 1962.

145

Harriman, were the two Western diplomats engaged in the effort to

arrange such a conference. As a result of their talks in New Delhi and

Rawalpindi with Prime Minister Nehru and his ministers and President

Ayub and his Cabinet, respectively, a draft statement announcing that

talks on the Kashmir question would open shortly was issued from both

the capitals. The statement declared:

The President of Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minister haveagreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolveoutstanding differences between their two countries onKashmir and other related matters so as to enable India andPakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship. Inconsequence they have decided to start discussions at anearly date with the object of reaching an honourable andequitable settlement. These will be conducted initially atthe ministerial level. At an appropriate stage direct talkswill be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub. 76

The ministerial talks between the Pakistani delegation led by Z. A.

Bhutto and the Indian delegation headed by Sardar Swaran Singh failed

after six rounds of discussions held alternately in India and Pakistan.

The discussions, which began on December 27, 1962, lasted until May 16,

1963. Pakistan blamed Indian intransigence for the failure of the

talks, and assessed the reason for Indian intransigence in terms of the

views of the United States and Britain. It felt that the two Western

Powers had failed to engage in the necessary spadework for a settlement

of the dispute favorable to pakistan. As Frank N. Trager has put it:

'~he Pakistani argue, with considerable justification, that Pakistan's

allies, to whom she has been loyal over many years, should have tried

more vigorously to bring about a solution of the "root cause" of

79zeesing ' s Contemporary Archives, XIV (1963-l96L~), p. 19541.

146

Indo-Pakistan tension--especially in 1962-1963 when they had

considerable leverage.,,77 Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto,

speaking before the Pakistan National Assembly on July 17, 1963, on the

failure of the Indo-Pakistan ministerial talks on Kashmir, criticized

the Western Powers for not agreeing to Pakistan's request to link

military aid to India to the settlement of the Kashmir problem. He

blamed Indian intransigence at the ministerial talks on the attitude of

the United States and Britain. The Pakistani Foreign Minister declared:

When we agreed to negotiations with India over the Kashmirproblem, we had said that it was necessary for the WesternPowers to link up military assistance to India with anhonourable settlement on Kashmir. Now there should be nomisunderstanding about it. It was not that we were tryingto take advantage of the situation that had been createdfor India. In terms of political realism and morality ourplea was justifiable and righteous. We were making a requestwhich, if agreed to, would have yielded positive andsubstantial results. 78

Even while the ministerial meetings were in progress, there were

certain incidents regarding the United States' stand on the question of

Kashmir which aroused resentment in Pakistan. One of these was a report

published in the Washington Post stating that the United States would

help India build an all-weather highway from Srinagar to Leh through

Kargil and that for this purpose American equipment and technicians were

to be imported into Kashmir. Dawn, quoted "know'ledgeable diplomatic

circles" in Karachi as interpreting the American decision to build an

all-weather road in Indian Kashmir as a "rejection" of Pakistan's claims

77Frank N. Trager, £E. cit., p. 626.

78Z• A. Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, (Karachi, 1964), p. 74.

147

to the Kashmir Valley.79 The highway, it should be pointed out, linking

Srinagar with the Ladakhi capital, would have been of strategic military

value in India's confrontation with China.

An even more important event was the visit of Walter W. Rostow,

Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, to India and

Pakistan during the first week of April 1963. The semi-official Dawn

reported on April 6, 1963, that Rostow made it clear in the course of a

75-minute meeting with President Ayub in Dacca on April 5 that the

United States would go ahead with its military aid program to India

irrespective of a settlement of the Kashmir problem. Rostow was

believed to have told Ayub that while the United States desired an early

settlement of the Kashmir problem it could not delay military aid tor

India indefinitely. The American attitude concerning military aid to

India assumed very great importance in the eyes of the Pakistanis in the

light of the fact that four rounds of Indo-Pakistan ministerial talks

over Kashmir had failed to produce a solution. A fifth round was about

to be held in a few days but prospects for an early settlement of the

problem did not seem favorable. Moreover, from the Pakistani point of

view, Rostow's "lightning mission to Pakistan has left the impression

here that chances of a Kashmir settlement now appear dimmer in view of

the fact that India now knows fully well that she would get all arms she

wants from the USA with or without a solution of the Kashmir problem.

Mr. Rostow may have thus doomed the fifth round on Kashmir to be held in

79Dawn , February 24, 1963.

148

Karachi later this month. 1180

The New York Times of April 8, 1963, carried a report, quoting

well-informed sources, concerning the reason for Rostow's visit to India

and Pakistan. According to the newspaper's New Delhi correspondent,

Rostow visited the subcontinent

to talk and listen in the context of the solution Washingtonenvisions as most feasible to end the IS-year dispute overthe state of Jammu and Kashmir; partition that would dividethe vale of Kashmir northwest of Srinagar, so that the state'scapital would remain under Indian control. The basic reasonfor the reported Washington view is that any greater concessionby India would vitiate the purpose of the new effort to settlethe problem: That is, to strengthen India's hand in herconflict with Communist China. 8l

The dispatch went on to explain that probably the most crucial area in

India's confrontation with China was Ladakh, and the only military

supply route to Leh, the capital of Ladakh, ran through Srinagar.

Therefore, India could not defend Ladakh if it conceded Srinagar to

Pakistan. The strategic importance o~ the Ladakh-Srinagar road to the

United States can be gauged from the fact that negotiations were in

progress between India and the United States to improve the road so that

it could serve as an all-weather military artery. These negotiations,

as the Pakistanis were quick to point out, were taking place about

territory which was claimed by an ally of the United States, Pakistan.

From the report published in the New York Times it also became clear

that while the United States was averse to any settlement that would

concede Srinagar to Pakistan, it did believe that a fair solution in

80Dawn , April 6, 1963.

SINew York Times, April 8, 1963.

149

Kashmir would have to give both India and Pakistan "substantial

positions in the Vale." The only lI substantial position" left for

Pakistan, therefore, would be the northwestern end of the Valley beyond

Srinagar. The dispatch went on to say that "On the basis of what is

known of the 'final bargaining position' of each side, Washington's

ideas of a solution appear to be slightly closer to the reported Indian

position than that of Pakistan.,,82

To Pakistan, the partition plan was anathema, especially since it

left the major part of the Kashmir Valley, with its overwhelming Muslim

population, as well as the capital city of Srinagar, in Indian hands.

That Pakistan's ally, the United States, was considering sponsoring such

a plan added insult to injury. The Americans never did present the plan

formally to the tW? countries for consideration at the ministerial-level

conferences. However, the mere rumor that they intended to do so at the

sixth conference if the fifth, which was to be held in Karachi shortly,

failed to find a solution, was enough to bring upon the Americans con­

demnation and charges of betrayal in Pakistan.

Dawn commented that Pakistan would "categorically and summarily"

reject the American plan for the partition of Kashmir. The American

plan, according to Dawn, "totally ignored the interests as well as the

wishes of its [Kashmir's} inhabitants and ... also did not meet

Pakistan's strategic needs." The leading Pakistan daily characterized

the plan as II a heartless New Frontier joke, II warning at the same time

82New York Times, April 8, 1963.

150

that "Should Pakistan's 'allies' refuse to see reason, very far-reaching

changes are expected to take place not only in Pakistan's foreign re­

lations and alignments but also in her economic thinking and p1anning.,,83

Even though the United States did not present its partition plan

formally to India and Pakistan, the fact that the State Department 'ivas

trial ballooning on the lines of a partition which 'irou1d leave Srinagar

and the major part of the valley with India was enough to infuriate

Pakistan, especially since it considered itself an ally of the United

States. American thinking, though it may have been sound from the point

of view of global strategy, constituted a fundamental lack of responsive­

ness to PakistanIs needs and objectives regarding Kashmir.

Following an announcement on May 16, 1963, of the failure of the

Indo-Pakistani ministerial talks on Kashmir, the United States and

Great Britain apparently decided to put into effect their decision to

go ahead with military aid to India irrespective of a settlement of the

Kashmir problem. A joint communique, issued at the end of a meeting

between President Kennedy of the United States and Prime Minister

Macmillan of Great Britain, announced that the two countries reaffirmed

their "policy of continuing to help India by providing :f;urther military

aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed Chinese

Communist attack."84

The Anglo-American decision brought forth a sharp rejoinder

from the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, who declared on

83~, April 17, 1963.

84Dawn, July 1, 1963.

151

July 10, 1963, that "the United States-United Kingdom joint communique

offering further arms assistance to India had 'gravely disappointed'

pakistan as it had ignored the necessity for solving the Kashmir

problem to preserve peace in the region." Bhutto added that by omitting

in the communique the need for an honorable settlement of the Kashmir

problem the United States and the United Kingdom had "attempted to

confuse the basic situation.,,85 President Ayub expressed the same view

a few months later when he said: "Continuance of large-scale military

aid to India from the United States and the United Kingdgm.has served

only to embolden India in her defiant stand on Kashmir and in her deter­

mination to trample under foot the rights of the people of Kashmir.,,86

Pakistan's worst fears had come true, since the United States now had

decided to continue arms aid to India indefinitely, not merely on an

emergency basis, without making the solution of the Kashmir problem

an essential precondition, as Pakistan had desired.

Pakistan, once again, decided to raise the Kashmir issue in the

United Nations Security Council. The Pakistani decision was based on

various reasons one of which was the refusal of the United States to

make a settlement of the Kashmir issue a precondition for continued

military aid to India. Other reasons included the unrest in Indian

Kashmir following the theft of a holy Muslim relic from its shrine at

Hazratbal, and the decision of the Kashmir Assembly in Srinagar to push

85Dawn, July 11, 1963.

86~~ Times, October 6, 1963.

152

through some new measures for the constitutional integration of the

State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union. Reports, however,

appeared in the Pakistani newspapers that the United States was "peeved"

at Pakistan's decision to take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations

once again. ~,in a dispatch datelined washington, D.C., reported

that "Indications available here suggest that far from being sympathetic

to the cause of Kashmir's subjugated people Washington is making it

clear that it did not favour the idea of U.N. taking up the Kashmir

problem once again • • During the coming round of the Kashmir

debate the U.S. can be expected to take a markedly cool attitude to

U.N. efforts for a Kashmir settlement."S7 Pakistan was so convinced

that the United States would show partiality to India over the question

of Kashmir in the Security Council, since America deemed it necessary

as a part of its global strategy that. the valley remain a part of India,

that the semi-official Dawn editorialized, even before the Council met

to discuss the issue, that

It is primarily for P~esident Johnson and his State Departmentto decide what line ~hey are going to take when the SecurityCouncil meets to hear Pakistan's present complaint. We shallmake no appeal to them to do what is right, nor shall weentertain any hope that they will do what is right. We havehad enough experience in the past year or two of the conceptof American and British morality and sense of internationalor human justice to indulge in further wishful thinking. 88

When the Security Council met to consider the issue, the American

delegate, Adlai Stevenson, supported Pakistan's argument that the future

87~, January 30, 1964.

88Dawn, January 22, 1964.

153

status of Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite in line with the

Security Council IS resolutions. But he did not press for any action

on the part of the U.N. machinery, as Pakistan desired, to enforce a

settlement based on the Security Council resolutions which had laid

down that the future of Kashmir could be decided only by a plebiscite.

On the other hand, I~e called on India and Pakistan • • • for a fresh

effort to resolve their dispute over Kashmir • • • [Stevenspnl advised

the quarreling Asian neighbors to ~ccept outside mediation. He sug-

gested possible help by Secretary General Thant. Mr. Stevenson ob-

served that the attack on Indials border by Communist China made it all

the more imperative that the old dispute ••• should be settled now."89

Pakistan not only resented the attitude taken by the United States but

its semi-official mouthpiece went on to criticize the United States for

preventing a resolution, favorable to PakistanIs stand, from being

sponsored in the Council. According to ~,

For the first time in 16 years, one Great Power went all outto prevent a resolution being sponsored. It used persuasionas well as threats on other members, specially the representativesof the smaller nations, "to dissuade them from even moving amotion for voting on any Pakistan resolution. That GreatPower was the United States •••• The U.S. was unfriendliestin the lobbies where Americans used all they had to defeateven an honest consensus reflecting the gist of the debate. 90

While~ might have indulged in overstatement, the American

delegatels attitude in the Security Council was far from enthusiastic

concerning the passage or even the introduction of a resolution calling

89~~ Times, February 15, 1964.

90Dawn, February 21, 1964.

154

for a plebiscite in Kashmir, which w~s what Pakistan desired. It was,

therefore, not at all surprising that there was harsh criticism in

Pakistan of the American attitude in the Security Council. The Council

having since February 3, 1964, begun, adjourned, resumed, recessed and

reopened debate, adjourned on May 18, 1964, without any resolution

having been proposed, and after merely appealing to India and Pakistan

for restraint and new talks. A Pakistani correspondent at the United

Nations headquarters summed up the changed American attitude toward the

question of Kashmir in the following words: I~O Americans the over­

riding consideration in Kashmir remains the containment of China which

in turn called for continued presence of Indian defenc~ forces in

Kashmir. If the state were to accede to pakistan the American strategy

in the area would be thrown overboard, fears washington in view of

Pakistan's friendly relations with China. 1I9l

It should be pointed out that during the visit of Premier Chou

En-lai to Pakistan in February 1964, China switched from a neutral

position on Kashmir to open support for Pakistan's demand that a

plebiscite be held to d~cide the future of the State. The joint

communique issued at the end of Chou En-lai's talks with President Ayub

stated that the two leaders lIexpressed the hope that the Kashmir dis­

pute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of

Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan. 1I92

91~, May 5, 1964.

92~ York Times, February 24, 1964.

•

155

The view held in Pakistan that the United States for reasons of its

own global strategy wanted Kashmir to remain a part of India, was

strengthened as a result of a dispatch datelined New Delhi published

in the Washington~ of February 29, 1964. A similar report date-

lined Washington was published in the Times £i India on March 2. Both

accounts contained the gist of a "new plan" for a Kashmir settlement,

which, it was hinted, was being supported by the American State Depart-

mente The Indian newspaper stated categorically: '~he State Department

now favours a solution without p1ebiscite.,,93 The timing of the dis-

patches, which appeared when the Security Council was taking a recess

during the Kashmir debate as well as their practically simultaneous

publication in New Delhi and Washington, led the pakistanis to ask:

'~o not all this prove that the plot has been hatched by New Delhi and

Washington in mutual collusion?,,94

The new plan envisaged that instead of an overall plebiscite in the

entire territory of Jarr~u and Kashmir, the future of different areas of

the State would be differently determined. According to the plan,

Janunu and Ladakh 'tvere to be allotted to India without a plebiscite,

while Hunza, Gilgit, and other parts of the "Northern Area" as well as

a part of Poonch were to be allotted to Pakistan on the same basis. The

Valley and the rest of "Azad" Kashmir 'tvere then to be constituted into

an independent entity of sorts. While there was no official reaction

to this plan in Pakistan, since it was not presented at an official

93Times 2i India, March 2, 1964.

94~, March 3, 1964.

156

level, the semi-official~ called the plan '~icked, mischievous and

irrational." It went on to say that the plan "is meant to provide an

escape from the path of honour not only to India but also to the now

backsliding powers who are equally committed to plebiscite. More

specifically, it is meant to extricate the United States from its

dilemma between Honour and Dishonour. fl95

Pakistani distrust of American motives over Kashmir continued

through 1965, especially since the United States was less than enthusi-

as tic about Pakistan's plans to raise the Kashmir issue once again in the

Security Council in the early part of 1965. Pakistan intended to raise

the Kashmir question once again in the Security Council as a result of

further Indian moves to integrate Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian

Union constitutionally and administratively. The Washington correspond-

ent of~ reported that, "One chief factor behind American reluctance

to bringing the Kashmir dispute before the U.N. is the fact that

publicly the United States is committed to a settlement of the Kashmir

dispute which would take into account the wishes of the people of

Kashmir. But privately the Americans are afraid to displease India

specially at a time when Washington and New Delhi are enjoying a

. 96period of honeymoon." Dawn's statement, when stripped of its

polemical overtones, comes very close to illustrating the policy of the

United States on the question of Kashmir. Lack of American support was

one of the reasons that led Pakistan to desist from requesting another

95Dawn , March 3, 1964.

96Dawn, January 15, 1965.

157

meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Kashmir issue.

American lack of support to the Pakistani case on Kashmir continued

during and after the Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir in August-September

1965. In addition to the stoppage of all military and economic aid to

India and Pakistan, lithe United States flatly rejected the Pakistani

view that there must be an agreement to let the Kashmiris decide their

future before an effective cease-fire can take place and one which would

be durable. Jl97 The United States favored an immediate cease-fir~ and

,

restoration of the August 5 status quo without making it conditional

on a political settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan, on the other

hand, argued that the fighting was the direct result of the non-settle­

ment of this political dispute and, therefore, a cease-fire should also

involve a political solution of the Kashmir problem, which, according

to Pakistan, meant India's agreement to a plebiscite in the territory.

In spite of the fact that the American Secretary of State, Dean

Rusk, in an interview with the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, G.

Ahmed, on September 13, 1965, told the latter that the United States

thought a plebiscite in Kashmir should be considered as part of an

overall India-Pakistan settlement, lithe impression in diplomatic circles

here [washington) was still that the United States favoured an im­

mediate cease-fire in the fighting over Kashmir and once this was

achieved the Security Council could take up the substance of the

Kashmir problem • • • .The United States appears reluctant to link up

97~, September 10, 1965.

158

the two questions for U. S. officials fear that the war would be pro-

longed if modes of a"Kashmir settlement were attempted prior to a

cease-fire. ,,98

Pakistan, in the absence of a political solution of the Kashmir

problem, reluctantly accepted a cease-fire between India and Pakistan

on September 23, 1965. Even after the cease-fire, however, the general

feeling, according to Jacques Nevard of the New York Times, persisted in

Pakistan that the

United States, because it has refused to pressure India intoaccepting the Kashmir plebiscite demanded by Pakistan, tisl. . .really lined up against Pakistan in the struggle with India.The idea that the United States could be neutral is in­conceivable here [in Pakistanl•••• It was clear that ifthe United Nations failed to bring off a Kashmir plebiscite-­something it has been unable to achieve in 17 years--thePakistani Government was going to do nothing to try toconvince its people that Pakistan had not been tricked by theUnited States. 99

Although the United States might have acted in an effort to be

neutral in the Indo-Pakistani dispute and because it desired an early

end to the hostilities, Pakistan looked upon the American attitude as

hostile to its interests. The status guo to which a return was

envisaged in the Security Council resolution of September 1965 was

considered by Pakistan to be favorable to India. Also, Pakistan still

labored under the impression that a formal ally, the United States,

should have thrown greater support behind Pakistan's efforts to make the

holding of a plebiscite an essential precondition for a cease-fire in

98nawn, September 15, 1965.

99Ne\V York Times, Supplementary Material from the New York TimesNews.Service broadcast on WQXR, September 26, 1965.

159

Kashmir.

President Ayub's visit to the United States in December 1965 and

his talks with President Johnson may have helped to finally divest

Pakistan of the belief that it still had some special claim on the

United States for support in its case over Kashmir. That such may be

the case is illustrated by a report published in the New York Times,

on the occasion of the Pakistani President's visit to Washington, in

which it was stated that, while President Ayub declined to support

the American policy in Viet Nam, President Johnson, on his side,

"remained non-conunita1" on Kashmir, "expressing a desire to remain

neutral and to contribute to a peaceful solution." Johnson's

declaration according to the report, came in reply to President Ayub's

request for "an expression of support for his side in the Kashmir dis­

pute in favor of mediation or arbitration with India and some assurance

that the United States wou,ld press India into serious negotiation." lOO

1{hi1e President Johnson's statement on Kashmir might lead to more

balanced thinking on the part of Pakistan on the question of the United

States' position on Kashmir, such a change in Pakistan's future evalu­

ation of American policies cannot detract from the fact that during the

period under consideration in this study American lack of responsiveness

to Pakistan's demands regarding Kashmir has remained high and has thus

adversely affected the state of the Pakistan-American alliance.

lOONew York Times, December 17, 1965.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC AID AND THE ALLIANCE

Attraction of economic aid into the country is one of the three

funda~ental objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy mentioned in

Chapter I. As is the case with most other developing nations,

Pakistan is heavily dependent upon foreign capital, skill and equipment

for economic development. In this chapter we will study to what extent

Pakistan's demands for economic aid have been met by the United States

and with what results.

A major reason for Pakistan's entry into the alliance relationship

with the United States, as has been pointed out in Chapter II, was

Pakistan's desire for economic aid. In the early years of Pakistan's

independence (and this continues to be true to this day) the United

States, more than any other country, was in a position to supply the

capital and equipment necessary for Pakistan's economic development.

As has been pointed out in the second chapter of this study~ the

Pakistani leadership realized the value of American aid as early as

1949. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Pakistani Prime Minister, success­

fully maneuvered an invitation to visit the United States. He availed

himself of this invitation and visited the United States in May 1950.

The visit was of great publicity value to Pakistan inas~uch as it was

the first time that IrroSt Americans interested in foreign affairs became

aware of the problems as well as the goals and aspirations of this

newly indepen0ent country of South Asia, which had so far been over­

shado~ved in the American press and public discussions by its better

161

known neighbor on the Indian subcontinent.

Liaquat Ali Khan, realizing the value of American economic aid in

the future development of his country, abandoned a projected trip to

Moscow. He did not want to jeopardize the chances of American aid by

making a trip to Moscow at a time when the cold war was in its initial

stages and the American policy of the containment of the Soviet Union

had just been launched. The Prime Minister of Pakistan made the

decision to go to Washington and not avail himself of the Russian

invitation in spite of the fact that he himself had announced on the

morrow of Pakistan's independence that "I wish it to be clearly known

abroad that Pakistan starts on its career without any narrow and

special commitments and without any prejudices in the international

sphere. III As Sarwar Hasan points out in an article written shortly

after the death of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan,

But, the statesman that he was, Mr. Liaquat Ali ~Lan was nota doctrinaire politician. He was a realist, whose aim was toraise the living standards of the poverty stricken masses ofhis people. This could only be done through large scaleeconomic development, for which there was neither capital,nor plant nor technical skill in Pakistan. These could onlycorne from the West. So that he was actually dependent uponthe West for the vital economic needs of the country • • • •There was great enthusiasm in Pakistan for Mr. Liaquat AliKhan's projected visit to Russia. He had to postpone-- ineffect--to abandon it and instead go to the United States,only on account of priorities that have been mentioned above. 2

lQuoted in K. Sarwar Hasan, liThe Foreign Policy of Mr. Liaquat AliKhan," Pakistan Horizon, IV (December, 1951), p. 184.

2Ibid ., pp. 185-186.

162

However, it was not until after the signing of the MDAP by Pakistan

and the United States that massive economic aid from the United States

began to flow into Pakistan. The first major instance depicting a

sharp increase in American economic aid to Pakistan was the announcement

in October 1954, at the.end of a visit to the United States by Prime

Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, that Pakistan was to receive $105

million in economic aid over the next year. This announcement meant

almost a quadrupling in the economic aid previously planned for the

year under discussion and was approximately five times greater than the

$23 million worth of economic aid given to Pakistan during the previous

year. 3

Figures for the economic aid given to Pakistan4 until the end of

the American fiscal year 1965 are estimated between $2.5 billion5 and $3

billion. 6 The sharp increase in the amount of economic aid to Pakistan

from the pre-JIDAP to the post-l':IDAP period can be discerned from the fact

that "foreign assistance, which made a small contribution till 1955,

increased to 5 per cent of the GNP in~1959-60 and to 6.3 per cent in

3New York Times, October 21, 1954.

4No single set of authoritative figures with a yearly breakdown ofthe amount of aid exists because of different methods used by differentsources to calculate foreign aid. While some figures are based on theamount pledged or committed by the aid-giving country, others are basedon the amount actually disbursed in the aid-receiving country.

5New York Times, August 30, 1965.

6Norman D. Palmer, "India and Pakistan: The Major Recipients, II

Current History, XLIX (November, 1965), p. 263.

163

TABLE I. ROLE OF FOlillIGN ASSISTANCE

(Million Rupees; 1959-60 prices)

19L~9-50 195Lf-55 1959-60 1964·-65

Gross investment 1,120 2,200 3, i.30 6,390

Gross domesticsavings 1,120 1.,900 1,850 3,830

Foreign assistance 300 1,580 2,560

Foreign assistanceas a per cent of:(a) Gl"OSS national ,

product 1.1 5.0 6.3(b) Total invest-

ment 13 .6 4·6.1 ~.O.O

Source: Government of Pakistan, The Third Five year Plan, 1965, p. 8.

The United States' contribution to overall economic aid to Pakistan

can be divideci into two periods w~ich we can for t~e sake of convenience

call the pre-Consortium and the Consortium periods. The Pakistan

Consortium (Aid-to-Pakistan Club) was organized in 1960 under the aegis

of the Horld Bank. Nine countries plus the World Bank and its af-

filiate, the International Development Authority (IDA) constituted the

Aid-to-pakistan Club. The Consortium has accounted for most of

Pakistan's foreign aid requirements for the Second Five year Plan

7Government of Pakistan, The Third~~ Plan, (1965), p. 8.

164

(1960-1965).

Although the Consortium was organized in 1960, its first TIleeting

being held in October 1960, no pledges for economic aid to Pakistan

were made by the participating countries until the second meeting of

the Consortium in June 1961. Althouyl June 1961 would have been the

logical date separating the pre-Consortium from the Consortium periods,

we have decided to include the period up to December 31, 1961 into the

pre-Consortium pe~iod, since consolidated figures are not available

until June 30, 1961. However, in considering the Consortium period we

have included the pledges made in June 1961, even though these pledges

fall within the period ending December 31, 1961. The June 1961 pledges,

being the first in a series of Consortium pledges, form an integral

part of the Consortium period. Moreover, these pledges, though they fall

within the period ending December 31, 1961, have not been included in

calculating the amount oi aid given to Pakistan during the pre-Consor­

tium period. The June pledges have not been included in the pre­

Consortium period because, in contrast to the figures of the Consortium

period which are based on pledges of aid made in the Consortium or out­

side, the figures for the pre-Consortium period are based on the actual

allocation or disbursement of aid in Pakistan. These figures, therefore,

exclude ~ere pledges of aid which have not been allocated or disbursed.

In the pre-Consortium period, i.e. the period beginning on

August 14, 1947, (the day Pakistan came into existence) and ending on

December 31, 1961, $1,728.95 million were allocated to Pakistan by

different countries, the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies

165

and tae Ford Foundation. Of this amount, $1,383.61 million was

utilized by Pakistan during the sailie period. Of this overall econonic

aid to Pakistan, the United States alone allocated $1,525.83 million,

of which $1,213.46 million was utilized by the aid-receiving count:cy.

Therefore, the United States' share, calculated in percentages or the

overall economic aid to Pakistan for the period ending December 31,

1961, was 38.2 ge~ cent of all economic aid allocated to Pakistan and

87.7 per cent of the aid actually utilized in that country (Table II).

In the Consortium period FY 1962 through FY 1965,S $1318.; million

'Has pledged in foreign aid to Pakis tan through the Pakistan Consortium.

The United States' share of the Consortiulll pledges amounted to $925.0

million, 50.9 per cent of the total (Table III).

Although the oven~!elming portion of foreign aid to Pakistan in

the Consortium perioci was pledged by the Consortium countries, $174

f.1illion of economic aid ~'7as also pledged by countries not meI!lbers of the

Aid-to-Pakistan Club (Table IV).

The American share of the total foreign aid to Pakistan from both

. the ConsortiUJ:l and non-Consortium SO'JrCes during the Consortium period

is 46.4 per cent, a considerable decrease from the pre-Consortium

period, when the American share of total foreign economic aid to

Pakistan was appro~dmately 83 per cent. A decrease in America's share

of economic aid to Pakistan does not mean, however, that the absolute

amount of American aid to Pakistan in dollars decreased in the Consortium

Ru~Y stands for United States Fiscal Year, i.e., July 1 to June 30;

e.g., FY 1962 means the period from July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962.

TABLE II. FOREIGN ECONOHIC AID TO PAKISTAN

(As of December 31, 1961; in million $)

166

country of Agency Allocation Utilization

United States 1,525.33 1, 213 .L~6

Canada 121. 56 (a) 104.15(a)

Australia 25.00 23.lj·l

United Kingdom 5.7Lr.(a) 5.7 LI(a)

New Zealand 5.6S(a) 5.68 (a)

Japan, ceylon, l1a1aya, Singapore0.21(b) a.2l(b)and India

"lest Gennany 2.52 2.52

Sweden 0.63 0.63

United Nations and SpecializedAgencies 20.52 10.31

Ford Foundation 21.26 17.21

Grand Total 1,728.95 1,333.61

(a) As of June 30, 1961. (0) As of June 30, 1960.

Source: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Rawalpindi,Foreign Economic Aid: ~ Review of Foreigrr Economic Aici 1£Pakistan, 1962, pp. 110-111.

167

TABLE III. CONSORTIill1 PLEDGES FOR AID TO PAKISTAN

(In million $)

Country 1961-62 1962 -63 1963 -6Lj· Total

19.6 20.0

150.0 350.0

./ Of • i:- 132.0

320.0 625.0

Belgiuin

Canada

Fran::e

Germany

Italy

Japan

Netherlands

Unite(~. States

Hodel Dankand IDA

Total

18.0

10.0

25.0

20.0

20.0

15.0

55.0

25.0

10.0

19.0 23.6

10.0 10.0

~I·O • () 30.1

10.0 1Ci.0

30.0 30.U

8.8 L•• 1,

22.ll· 22.l:.

212.5 21Z.S

:30.0 00.0

l/(.2. i <",31. U

10.0

80.6

£:·5.0

15S.1

20.0

105.0

13 .2

ns.o

1,01:";."1

SOUl:ces: IB~ill ~ l;.elease 6 /2·;, Jll1y 16, 196L" ana P1anninL AcivisoryStaff, Office of ii-sS st9.nt Director fa;: Develo l)l,lent P1annin6'USAID, Karachi, Stat stical Fact book: Selecte(\ Econor,lic andSocial Data .QE. Pakistan, Hay 1965, Table 10.2.

168

TABLE IV. PLEDGES FOR AID TO PAKISTANBY NON-CONSORTIUM COUNTRIES

(As of March 31, 1965; in million $)

Country

China (Communist)

USSR

Yugoslavia

Czechoslovakia

Poland

Switzerland

Denmark

Total

Amount Pledged

60

41

25

14

10

10

174

Source: Economic Advisor to the Gove~nment of Pakistan, Ministry ofFinance, Ra,valpindi, Pakis tan Economic Survey, 1964-65,Table 96, p. 19/.

169

period. In fact, the amount of American aid to Pakistan continued to

increase during the entire period under review (1954-65). American

cormnitment for econoQic assistance to Pakistan rose from $62.5 million

in FY 1955, the first year following the signing of the }IDAP, to $213.9

million in FY 1964, nearly a four-fold increase in a decade. Moreover,

American economic aid to Pakistan continued to increase when calculated

as a percentage of the total economic aid doled out by the United

States. Pakistan's share of American economic aid, when calculated as

a percentage of total economic aid granted by the United States, rose

from 3.4 per cent in FY 1955 to 10.0 per cent in FY 19~4 (Table V).

TABLE V. COl1MITHENTS FOR ECONOHIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

(In thousands of $)

year

(a)U.S. Assistance

to paldstan

(b)Total U.S. Foreign

Assistance

(c)U.S. Assistance to Paki­

stan as Per Cent of TotalU.S. Foreign Assistance

FY 1955 62,503 1,818,812 3. Lr

FY 1958 92,885 1,628,060 r: -i;) • I

FY 1961 12<'r,161 2,010,393 6.1

FY 1963 1"14,300 2,296,4.00 7.5

FY 196L\. 213,900 2,135, -;00 10.0

Source: Statistical Abstract for the United States, 1959, Table 1163,p. 880; 1963, Table 1200,--P:- 364·; 1964, Table 1217, p. 862;1965, Table 1233, p. 866.

170

It has been establisned so far in this chapter that Pakistan

received the major part of foreign aid for economic development from

the United States. It has also been establisl1ed that while the share

of American economic aid in the total economic aid received by Pakistan

in the Consortium period has decreased, Pakistan's share of the total

economic aid given by the United States during this period as well as

the absolute amount of aid in dollars llas continued to increase both

during the Consortium and pre-Consortiuul periocis. Before we go on to

discuss the reasons for the decline in the American share of the total

economic aid received by Pakistan during the Consortium period, we will

look at the facts we have established from the point of view of our

responsiveness hypothesis. From the figures presented in Tables II, III

and V it becomes evident that the American responsiveness to Pakistanis

demands for economic assistance has been at a very high level throughout

the entire period beginning with FY 1955 and ending with FY 1965. The

United States has been by far the largest single contributor to Pakistan's

program for economic development. In the pre-Consortium period, the

American share of all economic assistance rendered to Pakistan was as

high as 83 per cent. Even in the Consortium period, when the American

share of the total economic assistance rendered to Pakistan fell con­

siderably, American aid to Pakistan continued to rise as a percentage of

total United States foreign economic assistance. In FY 1964, American

economic assistance to Pakistan formed 10 per cent of all foreign

economic assistance rendered by the United States. Moreover, American

aid to Pakistan rose from $124.1 million in FY 1961 (the last FY of

the pre-Consortium period) to $213.9 million in FY 196L!. (Table V).

171

Two main reasons account for the decrease in the American share of

the total economic aid received by Pakistan during the Consortium

period. One reason for the decrease in the American share seems to be

the increasing role played by economic assistance from the countries

of Western Europe and Japan in the overall economic assistance program

to Pakistan. During the pre-Consortium period, that is, the greater

part of the 1950's, most Western European countries as well as Japan had

not recovered fully from the devastations of World War II; busy re­

building their economies, they were unable to offer aid to less developed

countries. However, by the time the Pakistan Consortium was formed, the

Western European countries and Japan had completed the rebuilding of

their ovm economies and were in a position to extend aid to less develop­

ed countries such as Pakistan. In fact, one of the reasons that prompted

the establishment of the India and pakistan Consortia was to pool the

resources of the developed countries in the free world and utilize them

in the best possible manner in extending economic aid to India and

Pakistan. It also should be noted that in the pre-Consortium period

no economic assistance had been received by Pakistan from the countries

of the Socialist bloc. In the Consortium period, however, economic aid

from the Socialist countries (China, the Soviet Union, Poland,

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), though not included in the Consortium,

amounted to $154 million (Table IV).

The second, and probably the more important reason for the decrease

in American share of the total economic aid to Pakistan granted in the

Consortium period is the participation of the World Bank and its

172

affiliate, the IDA, in the foreign aid to Pakistan program under the

Consortium. The Consortium was organized under the auspices of the

World Bank; World Bank and IDA pledges to Pakistan during the Con­

sortium period amounted to $369 .L~ million. The World Bank and IDA

pledges constituted 20.3 per cent of the total amount of pledges made

by the Consortium and were the second largest in amount. (Table III.)

The World Bank and the IDA had not participated in the program for

economic assistance to Pakistan during the pre-Consortium period. It

should be pointed out here that the United States is a major contri­

butor to the funds of the World Bank and the IDA, so the World Bank

and IDA pledges to Pakistan amount to indirect economic aid by the

United States.

As has been noted earlier in the chapter, figures quoted in this

chapter have established the fact that American responsiveness to

Pakistani demands for economic assistance has been at a high level.

However, some problems have arisen as a result of the donor-recipient

relationship between the United States and Pakistan. These problems

have led to a great deal of criticism in Pakistan of the American

economic assistance program to that country. Pakistani criticisms

include those against the presence of the large number of American

technical advisers in Pakistan, the lavish payment of such advisers, the

"Buy American" policy of the American Government, and the yearly ap­

propriation of American economic aid by the United States Congress.

However, the two most important criticisms leveled by the Pakistanis

against American aid to that country are more political in nature. The

173

first of these criticisms i3 related to the feeling in pakistan that the

United States has not paid adequate attention in the disbursement of

foreign aid to PakistanIs role as a military and political ally. The

second major criticism leveled against American aid to Pakistan accuses

the United States of using its economic aid to Pakistan as a political

instrument to influence PakistanIs foreign policy. These criticisms

have tended to detract from the high level of American responsiveness

to PakistanIs demands for economic assistance as illustrated in the

figures presented in Tables II, III and V. Before we go on to discuss

the two most important criticisms leveled by Pakistan against American

economic aid, we will consider the other problems and criticisms,

mentioned above, that have resulted from the donor-recipient relation-

ship between the United States and Pakistan.

One of the problems has been the presence of a large number of

American advisers in Pakistan to assist in the implementation of

projects financed entirely or partially with the help of American aid.

As John D. Montgomery has pointed out, "It C:oreign aid] is usually

administered on behalf of the donor country by men and women who are

cultural strangers, and received by a government that wavers between

intellectual gratitude and emotional resentment.,,9 When the donor

country is the United States and the recipient is an Asian country that

is relatively underdeveloped but with a growing and politically conscious

urban middle class, the situation is bound to become complicated.

9John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid, (New York, 1962),p. 5.

174

Arnold Toynbee writing on this problem has said that, '~merica is being

defeated by the American standard of living, which, of course, is much

higher than that of even Western Europe. This insulates the Americans

from the peoples whom they are aiding econ0~ically and with whom they

\'/:i.sh to cooperate politically as w'ell as e(;onomically. ,,10 American

officials in Pakistan continue to maintain the standard of living to

\yhi~h they are accustomed at home; since their standard of living is much

higher than that of Pakistani officials with whom they are supposed to

cooperate, resentment among the Pakistani officials results. Since the-

recipient nation is responsible for the payluent of the American officials,

who are paid lavishly judged from Pakistani stanaards, a great deal of

criticism is leveled against what the Pakistanis consider a ivaste of

the aid money that goes into the payment o{ the American officials.

Lavish payment to the American officials was criticized by the

For::d.:..:~ Aid Review Conunittee appointed uy the Pakistani Finance Hinister.

It'-; \"'i)Urt published in 1958 pointed out that each American expert

employed in Pakistan under the aid program cost that country $25,000 in

American currency and 24,000 in Pakistani rupees a year. The average

cost, the report said, of employing an American expert was approxi-

m<:Ltely 12,000 rupees ($2,250) per ulonth. The report also \Vent on to

say that the task of carrying out projects had become more difficult

because the services of the technical experts could not be fully

lOArno1d Toynbee, "Impressions of Afghanistan and Pakistan's North­west Frontier in Relation to the COU1ll1unist World," InternationalAff:'lirs, XXXVII (April, 1961), p. 16i;..

175

utilized, sometimes because of the lack of field experience of the ex-

perts, and sometimes because of lack of coordination between American

aid officials and the local Pakistani technicians. ll Another pakistan

government agency, the State Bank ot Pakistan, supported the Foreign

Aid Review Committee's report, pointing out that in commodity aid

agreements with the United States sumS ranging from 5 to 20 per cent

--had to be provided from counterpart rupee funds for the expenditure of

A · .. . Pl' t 12mer1can m~ss~ons ~n a<~s an.

A second criticism concerning the American aid to Pakistan is

directed against the "Buy .1-\.rl1erican" policy, "('7hich came into effect in

October 1958. One source has pointed out that 94 per cent of the aid

given through the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) in

FY 1965 "('las spent in the United States. The corresponding figures

for FY 1964 and FY 1963 were 87 per cent and ~9 per ~ent respectively.13

Even before the "Buy American ll policy had corL1e into efieet there Has

criticism in Pal:istan that lithe effe~tiveness of U.S. aiel had been

greatly reduced by the conditions lai~ clown for tne purchase and trans-

port of naterial, II as \'las mentioneC::. in Lie i·e~:ol·t of tlle Foreign Aid

Review Con®ittee referre~ to above. The report went on to amplify this

statement by illsntioning that frequently the source of the purcnase Has

lLtli teu to tlle Uni ted States, anc cont'cae ts a":COHLing to lau we:.:'e to :)e

g,iven to A~';lelic..an fil:ms only. Ti1e repol't aclc.iec.: that Unitecl States j?rices

llNe"('1 York Times, August 20, 1953.

12State Bank or Pakistan, Keport ££ Currency and Finance, 1956-57,1). 79.

13Dawn, february 18, 1~65.

176

generally were higher than the 'voLld market price. 14

Similar criticism was leveled against the program by means of which

surplus agricultural co~nodities were made available to Pakistan. As

one Pakistani author points out,

These conmlodities are made available to Pakistan as to othercountries, from the stocks of the USA Commodity CreditCorporation, which is an agency holding stocks under pricesupport schemes in the USA. The book value of the agricultu­ral commodities held with C.C.C. is much higher than theirworld prices. Therefore, the actual value of agriculturalcommodities obtained from the USA under aid prograrmaes, issometimes considerab1r less than their value as recordedunder aid statistics. 5

It will be interesting to note that the first U.S. aid agreement

with any country containing the controversial "Buy American" clause ,vas

a $22 million loan to pakistan in December 1959 for purposes of railway

16development. One of the major criticisms leveled against the policy

of the American Government that American aid should be used primarily

for the purchase of goods and the employment of services from U.S.

sources, is that it has reduced considerably the value of American aid

in real terms even though in terms of dollars it may have remained the

same or even increased. As one Pakistani 'vriter pointed out in 1959,

immediately after the. coming into effect of this policy, "There is.

definite evidence that some of the goods that Pakistan would be forced

14 4

•

New X£!k Times, August 20, 1958.

l5parvez Hasan, "Pakistan's International Economic Relations," in G.W. Choudhry and parvez Hasan, Pakistan's External Relations, (Karachi,1958), p. 47.

16~~ Times, December 8, 1959.

177

to buy from the U.S. are considerably higher in price in that country

than elsewhere . . . . Buying American goods would mean a net loss for

Pakistan, for there would be less available to s pend on somethip.g_ else .,,17

Criticism of the "Buy American" policy has been well-summed up in the

influential~: '~ctually what is happening is that the U.S. Govern-

ment is subsidizing Some sections of its manufacturing industry which

find it difficult to compete in the world market, their prices being

forty per cent or more higher. American aid programme is now being

increasingly geared to help some industrial sectors in the country as it

has been doing to U.S. agriculture for several years past.,,18

As a secondary effect of the "Buy American" policy, Pakistanis

argue, Pakistan will be spending less in other countries, mostly West

European, from whom it previously had been purchasing goods and services.

The decrease in Pakistani spending in Western Europe will, in turn,

affect the trade relationship of Pakistan with the countries of Western

Europe. The Pakistanis argue that as a result of such a decrease in

Pakistani spending in the West European countries, these countries will

reduce the purchase of goods which they have been importing from

Pakistan. The Pakistanis do not consider such a decrease in their im-

ports to Western Europe as a desirable state of affairs for their

country's international trade. 19

A third criticism of American economic aid has been leveled against

17Mir Hustufa Ali Khan, "Impact of American Aid on Pakistan,"Pakistan Horizon, (December, 1959), p. 354.

18Dawn, February 18, 1965.

19Mir Mustufa Ali Khan, ~. cit., p. 355.

178

the yearly basis on which it is granted. The yearly appropriation of

foreign aid by the United States Congress has led to a great deal of

uncertainty among the aid-receiving countries as to the amount and

timing of the aid they expect from the United States, especially since

the appropriations depend a great deal on the attitudes of Senators and

Congressmen, who do not always follow the same order of priorities as

does the Executive branch of the American Government. As Montgomery

has pointed out, 'What continuity there is in American foreign aid

programing has been more a function of bureaucratic perseverance than

a resul t of deliberate policy. ,,20

Moreover, American legislators sometimes indulge in what may be

termed undiplomatic criticism of foreign aid. Such criticism, which

usually is publicized widely and circulated among the ruling elite of

the recipient nation does much to tarnish the image of the aid-giving

country and neutralizes the goodwill created in the recipient country as

a result of the economic assistance rendered to it. An excellent example

of undiplomatic criticism of foreign aid to a particular country was

the outburst against economic aid to Paki&tan on the part of Senator

Wayne Morse of Oregon on the floor of the Senate during the debate on

the foreign aid bill in 1959. Senator Morse opposed the granting of any

economic aid to pakistan on the grounds that much of the U.S. assistance

to that country would "fall into Russian hands if the Russian juggernaut

decides to move.,,21 Dawn of Karachi was not far from the truth when it

20John D. Montgomery, ~. cit., pp. 235-36.

21~, July 12, 1959.

179

characterized such statements as the one made by the Senator from

Oregon as '~howing an astonishing lack of knowledge on the part of

people who are supposed to be among the best informed in the world. 1l22

We turn next to the two most important criticisms leveled by

Pakistan against American economic aid. These will form the fourth and

fifth in the list that we have drawn up of Pakistani criticisms of

American economic aid to that country.

The fourth criticism leveled by pakistan against American economic

aid to that country has been the complaint that the United States has not

paid adequate attention to Pakistanis role as a military and political

ally in the disbursement of foreign aid. This complaint primarily re-

fleets, once again, the rivalry between India and Pakistan. By the end

of 1965, according to the figures presented by Norman D. Palmer,

Pakistan had received close to $3 billion in economic aid. The cor­

responding figure for India was ~6 billion. 23 Since Pakistan's [Jopu-

lation is only about one quarter of that of its larger neighbor, it has

received about twice as much per capita in American economic aid as has

India. Pakistan has, however, contin~ed to complain that because of

America's policy of giving massive aid to India the difference uetween

a faithful ally and a non-aligned .count:cy has been obliterated, anLl

therefore an alliance with the United States does not 1101d any attraction

any mOi:E:.

22D....E:llil, July 12, 195~ .

23Norman D. Palmer, "India and Pakistan: The Naj or Recipients, II

Current History, XLIX (November, 1965), p. 263.

180

Pakistani complaints against American aid being too little and too

slow starteo as early as the middle of 1955. A number of editorials in

influential Pakistani newspapers dwelt on the sloivness and paucity of

American economic aiel to Pakistan. The same vieiv ivas also expresseO;:; by

important Pai~istani ofiicia1s such as Prime Ninister Honam,,"'ued Ali and

. -, 2'"Law Minister H. S. Sunrawaray. ~ By the Leginning of the next year A.

1>1. Rosenthal ivas ivri ting in the New 1.2.!k Times that in Pakis tan American

aid "has turned out to be a long, unromantic, unciramatic job, anti in

Karachi there is a meacure of disappointment. II He ivent on to give the

rnain reason for Pakistan's lack of warmth for the United States in spite

of the generous aiel that it had received from that country. j:\.osenthal

pinpointed this reason as the IIfeeling (in Pakistanl that by giving

25aid to India the United States has made neutrality pay. II

Such criticism in Pakistan led the American Ambassador in that

country, Horace A. Hidreth, to make a nation-wide broadcast, the ~irst

of its kind, in ivhich he pointed out that Ilneu tralism did not pay so far

as economic aid from the United States 'YJas concerned. 'I Ambassador

Hildreth gave a breakdown of economic aid given during the fiscal year

1956 to sixteen of 21 countries from Egypt to Japan. Hildreth's report

showed that the ten countries aligned with the United States through

mutual defense assistance agreements received on a per capita basis

twelve times more economic aid than was given to the eleven countries

2Lj· T' 19 1955~ York unes, June , C •

25~ York Times, January 23, 1956.

181

that had not signed such defense agreements. 26 Reports from Karachi

indicated, however, that Pakistani officials did not appreciate this

monetary reminder by the American Ambassador. The Pakistani reaction

to Hildreth I s speech was something to this effect: "If the United

States is really our friend why doesn't it cut dOvffi on economic aid to

India? Nehru ••• is playing both sides and apparently with success.

Why shouldn't we?,,27

As Pakistani criticism continued, more counter-arguments and

figures were presented by American officials. At a closed session of

the SEATO Council in Karachi on March 6, 1956, American Secretary of

State, John Foster Dulles, presented figures to show that the Asian

members of SEATO had over the last two years received $300 million in

economic aid from the United States. The aid to Thailand, Pakistan and

the Philippines, Dulles pointed out, was four times as much as those

countries had received in the previous two years. Dulles also added

that, while the overall U.S. aid program had remained constant, aid to

the allies had increased. 28

Pakistani attacks on American aid to neutralist nations in general

and to India in particular continued unabated, however. At the meeting

of the Baghdad Pact countries in Ankara in January 1958 Pakistan's Prime

Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, made a frontal attack on the policy of

Western countries in giving large-scale aid to the neutralist countries

26New York Times, January 24, 1956.

27 New York Times, January 25, 1956.

28New York Times, March 7, 1956.

182

and urged a reappraisal of this trend. The Pakistani Prime Minister

declaimed: "People of Baghdad Pact countries are bewildered when they

find that some of these so-called neutralists are recipients of large-

scale aid not only from the Communist countries but also from Western

countries whose policies they are constantly attacking. Unless dif-

ferentiation can be made between friends and neutralists, distinction

between friends and foes is in grave danger of being blurred.,,29 A few

weeks later he repeated his charge in the Pakistan National Assembly

during a debate on Kashmir, when he criticized the United States for

giving large-sc~le economic aid to India, alleging that it enabled

India to release a larger proportion of the country's resources for

arms. 30

In addition to the resentment in Pakistan over the massive economic

aid to India, there grew a feeling that since neutralist countries

derived benefits from both the power blocs in matters of economic aid,

Pakistan should not continue to be tied to the apron strings of the

western Powers, and especially of the United States, since this had

deprived it of aid for economic development from other sources --

especially from the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. had been offering

economic aid to pakistan without any strings as early as the beginning

of 1958. In January of that year a Soviet delegation headed by Ivan

A. Benediktov, Minister for Agriculture in the largest Republic of the

29Dawn, January 28, 1958.

30~ York Times, March 9, 1958.

183

Soviet Union, the Russian Republic, visited Pakistan. The visit of the

Soviet delegation seemed to be the first move in a concerted effort on

the part of tile Soviet Union to woo Pakistan. Benediktov, in a series

of speeches in Pakistan, which were prominently displayed in Pakistani

newspapers, proclaimed that the Soviet Union was prepared to assist

Pakistan economically by helping to cope with food and agricultural

problems and by installing a steel mill in that country as it had done

at Bhi1ai in India. 31

The question of the steel mill created great interest in Pakistan,

especially since there had been a great controversy going on in that

country during the previous yeer over the establishment of a steel

plant. The Cabinet had practically split on this question; while a

strong section of the leadership and public opinion clamored for the

setting up of a steel mill in Pakistan, Finance Minister Amjad Ali was

of the opinion that the country could not afford such a project. Amjad

Ali's view was su~ported also by the American foreign aid officials in

Pakistan. The American attitude had led to dissatisfaction with the

United States for its reluctance to help Pakistan in the establishment

of a steel plant, which had become almost a hallmark for industriali­

zation in the developing nations.

However, it was not until March 1961 that Pakistan signed its first

aid agreement with the Soviet Union. It was a $30 million loan for

Soviet financial and technical assistance in the exploration of oil anci

for the training of Pakistani personnel both in Pakistan and the Soviet

31New York Times, January 31, 1958.

184

Union. Z. A. Bhutto, then Pakistani Hinister for Natural Resources,

'ilho signed the agreement on behalf of Pakistan, characterized it as

lithe :..'irst ventu:ce in economic collaboration and nOl"J"ilalization in

Pakistan-Soviet relations.,,32 It should be noted that Soviet aid to

Pakistan seened paltry when compal-ed to tilat of the United States during

the Secono. Plan periocl. As of l-:iarclt 31, 1965, the Soviet Union hac!

pledged only $41 million to Pakistan's second plan needs. It pledged

another $30 million for earthiuoving rt12•.:.:.hinery, etc., C:urin::; President

Ayub's visit to the Soviet Union in Ap:..-il 1965.:3J As ;,::ol'.Ipm:ed to

Soviet econo3dc aid t~e Unite~ States ~urins the last [ou~ yealS of

Pal~istan's second plan pled.::;E::d $925 i,'lillion till-ough the Conso:ctiul.l

Pakistan Conso·,:"tiulll did not ilh:1ucle American ~ontributioTl to the fil"st

yea;.;' of Pakistan I s Second Five yeaj: Plan us wl::!ll as to the InC:us :Gasin

project. Even tiuring the Consortiu~ periocl the Unite~ States continued

to :.:hannel some ai,; to Pakis tan outside tile Consortium machinery. The

Indus project, for \vhi,,"h the first aid instalLnent valued at $200

1',1i11ion \·ms appropriated. by the U.S. Congress in 1960 ;(01' FY 1961,

was expectecl to cost over a billion dollars, and the American share of

32New York Times, March 1, 1961.

33T,[ E ., , , f 'P 1 . '1' . f r."1e 'conOffi1S AaV1ser, Government O' _a~1stan, ~1n1stry a ~1nance,

l~a\vall?indi, Paldstan E~onoll1ic Survey, (196£;.-65), p. 19i.

34planning Advisory Staff, Office of the Assistant Director forDevelopment Planning, DSAID, Karachi, Statistical !££! Look: SelectedEconomic and Social Data ££ Pakistan, (1965), Table 10.2.

185

this project had been set around $515 million. 35

Pakistan's receptivity to aid offers from non-American and non­

ivestern sources continued to increase as the feeling grew in the country

that aid fro~ United States and Western sources was insufficient es­

pecially ,~len compared to the generous aid being given to non-aligned

India. The feeling that Pakistan was being neglected in matters of

economic aid, especially when cornpared to India, reached new heights

during the middle of 1961 when the Consortium co~~itted itself to only

$320 million of aid to Pakistan for the following year, FY 1962.

Pakistan was disappointed, since it had asked for $945 million to be

pledged [or the next two years, or around $450 million for one year.

What added to Pakistan's resentment at the action of the Aid-to-Pakistan

Club was the fact that the same countries through the Aid-to-India

Consortium had pledged $2.25 ~illion, a few days ago, for the first two

years of India's third plan. The Pakistan Times described the Con­

sortium aid offer as IIscant" and called it another indication of the

Kennedy Administration's bias in favor of India. 36

Pakistani Finance Minister, Moha~ned Shoaib, generally considered

to be one of the more pro-Western members of the Pakistani Cabinet, also

declared that he was disappointed with the response from the Aid-to­

Pakistan Consortium of Western nations to Pakistan's request for

financial assistance for her Second Five year Plan. Shoaib, who was

speaking on his arrival in Karachi after having attended the Consortiurn

35nawn , June 1L1., 1960.

36pakistan Times, June Iii 1961.

186

meeting in Washington, said, however, that he would rather pursue

further assistance from the Consortium countries than seek Soviet aid

since the Consortium arrangement "las preferable because "it is without?-.

strings and assures continuity."JI However, in a later statement, at a

news conference in Rawalpindi, the interim Pakistani capital, Finance

Minister Shoaib expressed the view that Pakistan would consider offers

of assistance to finance its Second Five year Plan from all friendly

countries. When he was asked whether Pakistan would accept Soviet aid

for this purpose, Shoaib replied: I~et them first make the offer and

then we will consider it.,~8

Similar views were expressed by other top Pakistani officials,

including M. H. H. Zuberi, Secretary of the Ministry of Power, Fuel and

Natural Resources, then Z. A. Bhutto's second-in-(tonunand. Zuberi de-

clared that Pakistan will seek economic aid "from anywhere." He '-lent on

to say that Pakistan "las "in a hurry" and had therefore come to accept the

idea that development plans should be divorced from international

'J 9politics .J

Although Pakistan's request for $9L~5 million in credits for the

first two years of its Second Five Year Plan was granted at a meeting

of the Consortium on January 25, 1962, Pakistani complaints of neglect

and indifference on the part of the United States continued. These

complaints pron~ted American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to point out

37New Yo~k Times, June 15, 1961.

38New York Times, June 16, 1961.

39New York Times, November 2, 1961.

187

at ~ meeting of the GENTO Powers in Karachi on May 1, 1963, that the

United States had provided more than $9 billion in economic and military

aid to the three Asian members of CENTO, of which Pakistan alone had

received over $3 billion. 40

Starting from the fall of 1962, following the Sino-Indian border

war and American military aid to India, Pakistan's complaints against

the United States' pro-Indian bias in matters of economic aid, and the

consequent indifference toward Pakistan in the sphere of economic assist-

ance, ,vas overshadovled by the resentment and hysteria created in

Pakistan over the question of American military assistance to India,

which was teruled as a betrayal of the loyal American ally, Pakistan.

American military aid to India and the consequent resentment in Pakistan

led to Pakistan's increasing "normalit.:ation" of relations 'vith Com-

munist China and a general shift a'l7ay from the West. The change in

Pakistan's policy, in its turn, led to certain actions on the part of

the American Administration ~l7hich v,ere interpreted in Pakis tan as undue

pressure on the part of the United States in the sphere of economic

assistance to make Pakistan's foreign policy conform to American

~

strategy in this part of the world, especially vis-~-vis COllliuunist

China.

Pakistan's resentment against American actions following Pakistan's

efforts to "normalizell relations with Corrnnunist China form the core of

Pakistan's fifth and final criticism against American economic aid to

that country. The Pakistanis criticized the Uniteci States rOi." using

40New York Times, May 2, 1963.

188

its aid to Pakis tan as a po li tical lever to influence Palds tan I s foreign

policy. They went on to point out that A~erican economic aid to

Pakistan was, therefore, not free of political strings as the United

States had claimed. The first major instance that touc.:hed off this

criticism in major proportions Ivas the American decision to defer a

$4.3 million loan to Pakistan to help Dui1d a new airport at Dacca, the

East Pakistani capital. Orders not to sign the loan agreement were sent

out following the Civil Aviation Agreement between Pakistan and Com-

munis t China. The loan agreement ,'las sched.u1ed to be signeel in Kal"achi

on the morning of August 30. W'as'ilington, it shoulci be pointed out, had

characte·L'h;ed. the nC,-lS about tile imjJel1Ling signing 0:1: the Civil c~viation

AgJ.:eelnent Letween C~lina anci Pakistan as lIan unfortunate In:eadt of f:cee

The fi~st of~icial reaction in Pakistan to the ~usrension u~ the

ai:q)ort loan ~:ar,le il'Oil1 }-il.1c:~nce h.iniste·j: Shoaio. COlllulentillZ on ttlC sus-

:)ension of t:.le loan, tile Pakistani Finance Uiniste,: ('e(;la:cet~ in ~..awal-

pindi: '1£ it tu~ns out that political considerations were ai~8cting

fOl:eign economic.: aiG, the \vL101e si.tuation \vill ll,,:ve to Ge l'evic'i]eti. 11

signing 0:-; the $£,.3 million Cli;::.:eel:lent for [t;'LCi.:a airpol.·t. Tl1is Gove::.:n-

[l'tent ilas ahoiays ,,;a.intainc(, thai: the ei.:onomic ai6 SilOuJ.c1 not be subject

to political In his statement ShoaiiJ iU;:JIiecl tnc:.t t',le

L{lNe~'i York TLues, August 31, 1963.

189

United States action haa falsified the impression in Pakistan that

lullerican economic aid did not have political strings attachec'. to it.

The postponement of the ai:.:port loan came a few days befo):e the

visit of American Under Secretary of State, George Ball, to Pakistan.

Ball arrived in Pakistan on September 3, 1963, as a special :cepresenta­

tive of President Kennedy, for three ciays of talks with F-resiclent Ayub

and other high Pakis tani officials. His aim ,vas to find out hO"J far

Pakistan intended to carry its "normalization ll of relations with Com­

munis t China. George TJall, however, returned frma Pakis tan "Jithout

having achieved any concrete results as far as the improve~ent of

American-Pakistani relations was concerned. COlnmenting on the forth­

coming visit to Pakistan by the American Under Secretary of State, the

New York Times had written in its issue of September 1, 1963, that'the

United States was concerned at the growing friendship between China

and Pakistan, and U.S. officials believed that Pakistan was playing with

fire in inviting the Inilitant Communist nation to the doorsteps of the

South Asian subcontinent. It went on to suggest that in the backgrounci

of gro\ving Sino-Pakistani friendship lies "the issue of United States

aid to Pakistan, which has totaled $3 billion since 1951 and is running

at nearly $500 million a year. These figures do not include military

aid.,A3 However, as the same newspaper wrote less than a month later,

in spite of the importance of American economic aid to Pakistan, lithe

Government of Presidenc Hoharrunad Ayub Khan made it clear that it would

43New~ Times, September 1, 1963.

190

continue its policy of seeking improved relations with the Communist

44bloc."

Improved relations included barter and trade agreements with the

various Co~nunist nations of Eastern Europe as well as with China and

the Soviet Union, culminating, in the economic sphere, in an announce-

ment on July 31, 1964, from Pakistan that it \-lould accept the "generous

offer" made by Communist China of a $60 million long-term, interest free

loan. The Chinese loan, the Pakistani Commerce MinisteL, Wahid-uz-

Zaman, announced woulci be used to pay for imports from China of machinery,

cement and sugar mills. The Pakistani Minister, who had recently re-

turned from a tour of Communis t China, 'vent on to say trwt the Chinese

Government would not even place a service charge on the loan, and that it

d d d ' L~5was prepare to accept repayment in jute, cotton an manufacture 9';000S.·

Pakistan came in for strong criticism during the hearings on the

196L:. Foreign Aid Bill in the Senate Appropriations Committee. The at-

tack was leo by two Democratic Senators, John O. Pastore of Rhode Island

and Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana. Senator Pastore, during his question-

ing of the American Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South

Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot, declaimed:

Here we are dumping a lot of money into Pakistan and \le aredoing it only for the obvious purpose that we don't want theChinese to infiltrate. Then these very same people go aheadand they make agreements, economic agreements and otheragreements, ,'lith the very peop le ivhom ,ve are afraid might take

44New York Times, September 29, 1963.

45New York Times, August 1, 1964.

191

them over. How do we reconcile that in our minds, if thesituation between Red China and Pakistan is such that theycan get together and sit do~vn and make mutual agreementsbetween themselves, what are we worrying about: ~fuo arewe trying to stop from coming in? Hhy do He have to be inthere with out money?

Pastore went on to suggest his own remedy to the problem:

If we had gone to the Pakistanis and said: We are not goingto interfere with your sovereign rights, and if you want tomake this agreement with Peking, go ahead, that is a fineidea, in so far as you are concerned, you have made thatdetermination, but the American people now feel that we can­not give you (deleted) this year, we are only going to giveyou 20 cents. You bet your life that agreement wouldn'thave been made. That is the trouble, we are not tough. {Jesit back and we just take it.

To this Senator Ellender added ruefully: "That is ~vhy they take ad­

vantage of us. ,,46

The Johnson Administration apparently decided to take Senator

Pastore's advice and adopt in 1965 a "get tough ll policy with Pakistan

on matters of economic aid. The "get tough" policy was adopted in spite

of the fa~t that American Administration officials had upheld Pakistan

as an "example in Asia of vlhat a developing country can do with wise

planning and foreign assistance.,,47 As the New York Times pointed out a

few months later, the tough American attitude toward Pakistan stemmed

"from the Administration's calculated desire to prove to ther nations

that they must not take American aid for granted and that even commend-

able economic performance will be insufficient if it is accompanied by

46Dawn, October 16, 1964.

47Da~vn, April 2, 1965.

significant political opposition. II

192

It should be mentioned here that

Pakistan's rate of economic growth durins the Second Plan period was

striking. The national income rose at an annual rate of 4.8 per cent,

keeping comfortably ahead of the population growth estimated at 3.2 per

cent. The Third Five year Plan, in its original form, projects an even

higher rate of annual gro~"th in the national income -- 5.L:. per cent. 49

American displeasure at Pakistan's increasing intimacy ~vith China

was manifested on the ciiplomatic level by the abrupt cancellation of

President Ayub!s visit to the United States by President Johnson a few

days before the Pakistani President was due in Washington in April 1965.

In the splLere of economic aiel this manifestation took the shape of the

.Ame:dcan request that the meeting of the Aid-to-Pakistan Club schec~uled

for July 27, 1965, ~e postponed for two months. The meeting of the

ConsortiuiH Vias expected to ?led~e $500 l:lillion for the first year of

Paldstan's Third Five year Plun (1965-66). The American share oF: this

al'.10unt vietS e:'~l)ected to i.-ange cll:ouml $250 ,tlillion. In a pre-Consortiul,l

~rinci~le t~~ figure o[ $500 million as Pakistan's external aid re-

(~uil'ements f01" tlle first ye2i' OJ: its Thin~ Plan. Ho~veve::, trie nine

Consol-tiul.l countries al1C~ the \·JorlC·. ]JanL am: its c.f.dliate, tile lD..:-:.., \-je:C2

£,.GNew York Tiit,es, August 30, lS:65.

SODawn, June 6, 1~65.

193

T~e news that the Uniteci States had requeste~ a postponement of the

Conso~tiuul lneeting was announced on July 13, 1965, by Pakistani Foreign

Hinister, Z. A. Bhutto, in a s~eech to the Pakistan National Assembly.

Bhutto inforoed the Assembly that President Johnson had sug3ested post-

ponement of the Consortium meeting LJy t,JO monti1s on the ground t~1at

Congressional authorization had not yet ta~en place and that pending

such authorization the Administration was not in a position to pledge

financial aid to Pakistan for the iirst year of its Third Plan. Ehutto

ex:)lained that on July 3 the Amei.-ican Ambassador had met Presi6ent Ayub

ane delivered a messaGe to him to this effect from President Johnson.

The American President I s message had also suggested that if Paldstan so

,visheci. it could discuss llcertain othel- problems" ,'lith the United States

. .~, .,. ~ th Ct' . 1 t C' t' 51 TJhour1ng ~ne per10a belare e an80r 1UU uet 1n a e ~ep emDer. ~ at

made the post?onement request look so sinister to the Pakistanis was the

fact that even if the United States had pledged funds at the Consortium

meeting this would have been subject to Congressional approval, and,

therefore, there \Vas no reason £01' requesting a p9stponement just be-

cause the Congress had not yet appropriated funds. Moreover, the United

States had already pledBed funds to India through the Aid-to-India Club

for the next year, without prior Congressional approval or appropriation.

The American p ledge of economic aid to India \l7ithou t Congressional

~?proval coupled Hith the reference to Ifcertain other problems" in

President Johnson's message to President Ayub was enough to convince the

Pakistanis that the United States \-,as using ei..:onomic aid as a political

5lDavm , July lfl-, 1965.

194

lever to influence Pakistan's relations with other countries. It was the

American request for the postponement of the Consortium meeting that

seemed to have motivated the Pakistan Foreign Minister's outburst in the

Pakistan National Assembly on July 13, 1965. Foreign Minister Bhutto,

initiating the debate on foreign policy, declared that under no circum­

stances would Pakistan subject itself to economic or political domination

from any Great Power. Bhutto said: '~e will undergo miseries but will

not barter away our sovereignty which we achieved after the valient

struggle and sacrifice." He 't'1ent on to say that Pakistan was not going

to accept dictation from any Power, and that no inducement motivated by

economic assistance or rnilitary aid could allure Pakistan into subjecting

itself to alien domination. 52

President Ayub Khan echoed the same sentiments the next day in his

speech at a meeting of the Council of the Pakistan Muslim League, the

ruling party in Pakistan. He declared that Pakistan would jealously

guard its sovereignty and under no circumstances would agree to barter

away its independence or accept domination in any form from any power.

President Ayub said, amid loud cheers, that Pakistan "is seeking f.ciends

and not masters." He went on to say that Pakistan wanted friendly

relations with the United States as well as with its great neighbors,

China and the Soviet Union. He said, however, that "If the friendship

impinges on the sovereignty and independence of our country we no longer

desire such friendship. We are prepared to undergo trials and

52nawn , July 14, 1965.

195

tribulations but we will not allow our sovereignty to be eroded.,,53 The

meeting of the Pakistan Muslim League Council unanimously adopted a

resolution deploring the postponement of the Consortium meeting. It

called upon the World Bank and the members of the Aid-t~-Pakistan Club,

including the United States, to uphold the principle of the non­

political nature of economic cooperation and assistance. 54

The American "ge t tough" policy was, however, unable to achieve

its objective in Pakistan. Pakistani national pride was offended, and

as a resul t there was more talle about further improving relations lvith

Co~nunist China and even of giving diplomatic recognition to North Viet

Nam. Two lnajor Pakistani newspapers, the Urdu daily Anjam, published by

the Government-controlled National Press Trust, and the foremost

Opposition paper, the pakistan Observer of Dacca, published reports con-

cerning the possible recognition of the Hanoi Government. Moreover, the

Pakistani President in his speech before the Pakistan ivluslim League

lI seemed to endorse the contention of the Vietcong that it was fighting

to bring55

'in<.lepenclence' to the Soutn Vietnamese peop le." President

Ayub had said that IIPaldstan lvoulci. li:~e to see this [the Vietna'ilesel

dispute settlecl !Jy peaceful means and the people 01: Vietnam attain their

in<.iependen-:':G. ,,56

53 July 15, 1965.DavID,

5L~_July 15, 1965.~,

55New York Times, July 16, 1965.---56 July 15, 1965.~,

i.96

The Karachi correspondent of the New York Times summed up th~ situ­

ation in Pakistan, resulting from the American decision to postpone the

Consortium meeting, in the following words: IIVirtually every articulate

segment of Pakistani society has condemned the delay in aid as naked

dollar diplomacy aimed at ha:'ting the leftward swing in P:!.kistan's

foreign policy. Even perf'ons ,.1 iJrmally critical of the Government are

telling American friends that, as a result of the aid delay, ·-.0 Pakistani

Government could risk a policy that did not seem to run counter to

washington's wishes. 1157

In his first-of-the-month broadcast in August 1965, President Ayub

himself summed up Pakistan's reaction to the postrcnen~2.nt oj ,:he Con­

sortium meeting. He said that though the economic progress and prosperity

of the people were of the utmost importance, Pakistan's security and

independence remained paramount. Referring specifically to th('

American request for a delcy in the pledging of aid to Pakistan,

President Ayub pointed out that certain Congressional and procedural

difficulties were cited as the "ostensible" reason for the postponement

of the meeting. But, he went on to say, these difficulties did not

prevent the United States from pledging assistance to India well in ad­

vance of Congressional authorization. The Pakistani President went on

to declare that "The distinction \.,as as obvious as it was invidious. II

Referring to the American suggestion for the discussion of 1I0 ther

matters," President Ayub said that enough had been mentioned to show

that they belonged to the realm of politics. He added that 'My reaction

57New York Times, July 12, 1965.

197

to all these was as simple as that of any patriotic Pakistani who

values his nation's honour and security more than anything e1se."58

As a footnote to the incident concerning the postponement of the

Consortium meeting, we should add that the meeting of the Pakistan

Gonsortium, which was now expected to be held on September 27, 1965,

was postponed indefinitely as a result of the Indo-Pakistani war, which

broke out in September 1965.

u.S. economic aid to both India and Pakistan was halted due to

the outbreak of hostilities in September 1965 between the two neighbors.

The question of economic aid was not even discussed during the visit

of the Pakistani President to Washington in December 1965. The Pakistani

decision not to raise the question of the resumption of American aid

during President Ayub's visit strengthened the hands of the Pakistani

President during his talks with President Johnson, for, as the London

Times pointed out, the Pakistani President went to the White House "in

the role of a complainant rather than a petitioner or one coming to be

chided. II The Times had predicted that "President Ayub will not even

be mentioning economic aid, unless his host brings it up." As the

Times special correspondent reported from Rawalpindi: '~merican

influence over pakistan is derived from the military and economic aid

that the United States has been providing for the past decade. Both

are suspended now, but for the short term at least Pakistan has been

able fairly painlessly to adjust to both deprivations, and President

58Dawn, August 2, 1965.

198

Ayub will, therefore, be able to say that he seeks from Mr. Johnson

nothing more than understanding. 1159

The Times' observation was confirmed, when President Johnson, at

the end of the Pakistani President's visit, summed up their talks in the

following words: "President Ayub came here asking for nothing save

understanding and he is carrying that back with him. 1160 Commenting on

the outcome of President Ayub's talks with the American President, Dawn

stated: IIPakistan' s enemies might find comfort from the absence of any

definite ~~erican commitment to restore U.S. economic and military aid

to Pakistan {But] by putting the Pakistan-American ties on a

natural and political plane rather than on the economic and military

spheres, President Ayub probably has ensured a more realistic and, there­

fore, more lasting relationship between Pakistan and the USA. 1I61

In spite of the recent difficulties that have developed over the

question of American economic aid to Pakistan, figures quoted in the

first part of this chapter are sufficient to prove that Pakistan's

demands concerning aid for economic development have been met favorably

by the United States to a very great extent. Some of the criticisms

leveled by Pakistan against the administration of economic aid by the

United States, have been simply the result of the nature of the problem

of economic aid to any country and therefore do not detract from the

value of this aid. Major difficulties, which eventually led to the

59The ~, London, December 10, 1965.

60Dawn , December 17, 1965.

61Dawn , December 18, 1965.

199

postponement of American aid in 1965, were, however, the result of prob­

lems external to the question of American responsiveness to Pakistan's

demands falling in the category of aid for economic development. They

were, essentially, by-products of the lack of American responsiveness

to Pakistan's demands concerning its objective of security. The lack

of American responsiveness led Pakistan to commit certain acts, such as

the lInormalizationll of its relations with Communist China, which, in

turn, influenced American attitudes and policies toward Pakistan. As

it turned out, some of these attitudes and policies, such as the post­

ponement of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium meeting, were related to

the question of American economic aid to Pakistan.

CHAPTER VI

THE DISRUPTION OF THE ALLIANCE

-Lack .Qi American Responsiveness !2. IIS ecurity"~ "Kashmir ll

From our stuciy of the three major categories of Pakistani demands

listed in the last three chapters, and especially from the study of the

events and reasons that led to the suspension of American economic aid

to pakistan in 1965, we come to the conclusion that Pakistan's funda­

mental objectives of security and Kashmir take precedence in the eyes

of the Pakistani policy-makers over the objective of economic aid. This

conclusion is based on the study of Pakistan's reactions to the lack of

American responsiveness to its demands relating to security and Kashmir.

Although Pakistan complained continuously about the lack of

American responsiveness to its demands relating to its fundamental ob­

jectives of security and Kashmir, it was not until 1962, following

American military aid to India, that Pakistan was fully convinced that

it could not rely upon the United States to meet its demands concerning

security and Kashmir and that it would have to look elsewhere for

support to fulfil these two fundamental objectives of its foreign

policy.

Both these objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy -- security and

Kashmir --, it should be pointed out, are related intimately to

Pakistan's power-position vis-~-vis India. That such is the case is

illustrated by the fact, as has been demonstrated in Chapters II and III,

that Pakistan looks upon India as the primary source of threat to its

201

security. As far as Kashmir is concerned, it has been demonstrated in

Chapters II and IV that the problem of Kashmir is the most important

dispute between India and pakistan that has defied solution for the past

nineteen years. Because of the intimate connection between the Pakistani

objectives of security and Kashmir and Pakistan's relations with India,

it is logical to assume that American responsiveness to pakistani

demands relating to its objectives of security and Kashmir would depend

on th~ importance attached to India by the United States.

The degree of India's importance to the United States iolas determined

by American glo!:la1 strategy and the United States' confrontation ivith

China in Asia. As long as India did not aSSume a paramount position in

the global strategy of the United States, Pakistan could continue to

hope that it might be possible to increase American responsiveness to

its demands by convincing the United States of Pakistan's importance as

an ally. But as India began to gain more and more importance in the

global strategy of the United States, and especially in American

policies relating to the containment of China in Asia, Pakistan's

chances of convincing the United States to increase its responsiveness

to Pakistan's demands relating to security and Kashmir declined. Such

an increase in American responsiveness to Pakistan's demands would have

affected adversely not only India's power-position in Asia, but might

have irreparably damaged Indo-American relations to the detriment of

American global strategy.

India's importance in American policy became increasingly evident

in the later part of the 1950's, especially following the initial

202

clashes on the Sino-Indian border, the Tibetan revolt and India's grow-

ing disenchantment from, and distrust of, Communist China. India's

increasing importance in American global strategy reached its climax

during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. The paramount importance

attained by'India in ~merican strategy as a result of the Sino-Indian

war of 1962 was illustrated by the immediate airlift of American

military aid to India_following the outbreak of hostilities on the

Sino-Indian barder. The United States did not hes·itate to supply

military aid to India in spite of the fact that such an action was

interpreted by Pakistan as affecting adversely Pakistan's fundamental

objective of security vis-~-vis India. The great importance that India

had came to attain in the United States' policy in Asia was illustrated

further by the lukewarm attitude of the United States toward 'Pakistan's

case for a plebiscite in Kashmir during the debates in the Security

Council in 1%2 and 1964. It \'las also demonstrated Dy tile United

States' refusal to put any pressure on India during the Sino-Indian

border \Var to come to a settlement on the Kashmir question with

Pakistan (on terms more favorable to Pakistan than the existing status

quo) as a guid pro quo for American lli1itary aid to India. Tbe events

of tiH~ 1960's convincel' the paidstanis that as far as tlll:.;il' objectives

of security nnu Kashmir were concerneo an alLiance with the United

States \'las VlOl:th litLle. Pakistan, accordingly, turned to anotller

source--China--for help in the attaiUlilent of its twin objectives of

security and Kashmir.

Pakistani Objectives and Demands An Order of Priorities

203

The very fact that Pakistan turned to China -- America's chief

antagonist in Asia -- for help in achieving its fundamental objectives

of security and Kashmir is illustrative of the fact that for Pakistan

these t,vo objectives of security and Kashmir rank higher than its

objective of economic aid. Pakistan did not hesitate to launch a

program to normalize relations with China in spite of the fact that it

realized fully well, as has been demonstrated in Chapter III, that such

an act might have extremely adverse effects on the massive knerican

economic aid program to Pakistan.

Althougu w'e ilave separated t,le objective of Kashmir from tlle ob­,

jective of Pakistan's security vis-a-vis India for analytical purposes,

Pakistan's goals regarding Kashmir may be considered in actual practice

to fall wit~lin the overall objective of Pakistan's security. Kasl'1mir

forms one, though the most important, aspect of Pakistan's constant

searci1 for secu:ri ty agains tits larger and more powerful neighbor.

Pakistan, as we have tried to S,10W in Chapters III and IV of this study,

constantly is preoccupied in a po,ver-struggle with India on tlle Indian

subcontinent. This power-struggle has ~een the legacy of the partition

of the subcontinent in 1947 into India and Pakistan and the enmity and

bloodshed that accompanied the partition. The problem of Kashmir is a

part of the legacy of the partition. In addition, as has been pointed

out in Chapter II, Kashmir is very important to the Pakistanis in the

context of their overall security, especially since, according to the

pakistanis, the major threat to their country is posed by India.

Pakistan feels extremely insecure with India in, what it considers,

204

forcible occupation of the greater part of Kashmir, which includes the

headwaters of most of the important riv~rs that flow through and

irrigate \~est Pakistan. Pakistan is alarmed at the prospect of India

diverting the waters of these rivers, in case of a further deterioration

in relations of the two neighbors. Such an action would convert West

Pakistan, for all practical purposes, into a desert. Though the Canal

Waters Agreement arrived at between India and Pakistan through the good

offices of the World Bank has to SOme extent assuaged Pakistani fears,

Pakistan continues to harbor doubts regarding Indian intentions. More­

over, the Indian military presence in Kashmir brings India dangerously

close, in Pakistani eyes to a number of important Pakistani military

installations and civilian centers, t~e foremost arnong them being

Rawalpindi, the interim Pakistani capital and a very important base

of the Pakistani army. It also brings Indian military might dangerously

close to the airbase at Peshawar and to the Northwest Frontier region

of Pakistan, which had been for years troubled by Afghan irredentist

lllovements. The Indian presence in Kashmir permits an easy link up

of Indian forces with Afghanistan, another neighbor which has been

hostile toward Pakistan since the establishment of the latter

country. In short, Kashmir constitutes a part of the overall security

problem of pakistan. This does not mean, however, that there are no

non-security implications in the problem of Kashmir. The ideological

basis of Pakistan's existence, as has been pointed out in Chapter II of

this study, is closely involved with the problem of Kashmir. In addition

to the fact that the Pakistanis look upon Kashmir as a test case for

f

205

Jinnah's "two nation" theory, Indian presence in the valley of Kashmir

is a constant reminder to them of their "inferior" position vis-l-vis

India on the subcontinent and may be considered the psychological

aspect of pakist.:lu's involvement in Kashmir.

Pakistan turned to China in its search for security after it was

convinced that it could not rely upon the United States for support in

its search for security against a presumed threat from India. Pakistan's

normalization of relations with China, as has been described in Chapter

V, adversely affected Ataerican responsiveness to its demands concerning

economic aid. But Pakistan was willing to take this risk. Pakistan's

attitude was summed up in very pro-Pakistani terms by Richard V. Weekes.

Writing in 1964, Weekes said,

Since independence in 1947, Pakistanis have made giant stepsforward in the development of their military, economic andsocial institutions. And no one in the country is more awarethan President Ayub that this advancement can continue onlywith the aid of the industrialized countries of Europe andAmerica. But many Pakistanis have lived for years with lessrnaterially than they have now, what is more real to them thanmachines and foreign technicians are the intangibles of lifetheir religion, their self-respect, their independence.Pakistanis seek friends who understand these emotions. Theyhope that with such understanding will come not only Kashmir,but the tangible tools of progress. l

President Ayub Khan of Pakistan articulated a similar view in his

first-of-the-month broadcast in August 1965, following the American

decision to request the postponement of the Aid-to-Pakistan Club meeting

which had been scheduled for July 27, 1965. In his broadcast, President

lRichard V. Weekes, Pakistan; Birth and Growth of ~ Muslim Nation,(Princeton, N.J., 1964), p. 264.

206

Ayub declared that though the economic progress and prosperity of the

people of Pakistan were of the utmost importance, Pakistan's security

and independence took precedence over these goals. The Pakistani

President went on to declare, '~ile countries strive for freedom in

order to develop, they'will not seek development at the cost of

fre~dom. 112

That Pakistan valued its security, especially in the context" of

its power relations vis-~-vis India over and above any other objective,

including that of economic development, became clear during the visit

of President Ayub Khan to the United States in December 1965. The

Pakistani President did not mince words when he told President Johnson

that as far as Pakistan was concerned lIits political independence and

security were its primary concern and in keeping with this objective it

\vaS rudimentary that pakistan establish and maintain the best of relations

with her oio- neinhbors."3 In other words, the Pakistani President madeo b

it clea~ that [lis country was not willing to sacrifice im?roved relations

with the two COlllinunist Great Powers--and especially China--in order to

obtain economic assistance from the United States.

The attitudes adopted and the policies followed by Pakistan in the

1960's illustrate our contention that the objective of economic assist-

ance and the del11ancis connected \'lith the objective of economic aid are

tertiary to Pakistan's objectives of security anci Kashmir. As has been

2Dawn , August 2, 1965.")

JDa\~1, December 18, 1965.

207

sh01l7n earlier in this section Kashmir forms a part of Pakistan's overall

objective of security in the context of its power relations with India.

Consequently, the demands relating to Kashmir also can be considered as

a part of the overall security demands of Pakistan.

We have been able to establish so far that, as far as Pakistan is

concerned, its objectives of security and Kashmir (and the demands

generated by these objectives) take precedence over its objective of

economic aid (and the demands generated by this objective). We have

also been able to establish as a result of our study of the three cate-

gories of Pakistani demands and American reponsiveness to these demands,

that while the United States has shown fuller responsiveness to Paki-

stan's demands relating to economic assistance (at least until 1964),

it has not been able to be responsive to any appreciable extent to

Pakistan's demands relating to security and Kashmir. While we might

say that the order of priorities set by the Pakistani policy-makers is:

(2) Kashmir )

(1) security )co-equa14

(3) economic assistance,

the order of American responsiveness has been:

(1) economic as s is·tance

(2) security )co-equal

(3 ) Kashmir )

4we have used the term "co-equal" to denote that ,ole have not beenable to demonstrate conclusively if one of these demands takesprecedence over the other.

208

The rough orders of priorities (of Pakistan's demands and of American

responsiveness) that we have drawn up demonstrate that the order in

which th~ United States has been responsive to Pakistan's demands has

been the inverse of the order of priorities attributed to its demands

by Pakistan.

American Capabilities for Responsiveness

The United States has not been adequately responsive to Pakistan's

demands concerning security and Kashmir because American capabilities

of responsiveness to these demands have fallen far short of the loads

put on the United States' decision centers by Pakistan in connection

with these two demands. The inadequacy of American capabilities of

responsiveness has been primarily the result of the contradictory

nature of Pakistan's demands relating to security and Kashmir with other

demands made on the United States' decision centers. The demands which

have come into direct conflict with Pakistan's demands relating tv secur-

ity and Kashmir have been made by India on the American decision

centers. Indlan demands have been based on India's objective relating

to its security, i.e., the Indo-Pakistan power relationship in the sub-

continent, and to India's goals regarding Kashmir. Indian demands have

been able tel neutraliz~ 8ffectively Pakistani demands relating to

security and Kashmir because the United States has been reluctant to

gratify Pakistani demands which have run counter to Indian demands.

Pakistani demands relating to economic assistance have not run

counter either to any significant Indian demands or to the exigencies of

American global strategy. Therefore, Pakistani demands for economic

209

assistance have been met to a much fu11p.r extent by the United States

than have the demands made by Pakistan relating to security and Kashmir.

\~en Pakistan's demands relating to economic assistance have not been

met by the United States; as was the case in 1965, such lack of American

responsiveness has been the result of certain actions undertaken by

Pakistan as a reaction to the lack of responsiveness on the part of

the United States to its demands relating to security and Kashmir.

A discussion of the preoccupation of the American policy-makers

with global strategy and of pakistani policy-makers with their funda-

.. mental objectives of foreign policy leads uS to the conside~,ation of

another factor which has resulted in the inadequacy of American

capabilities of responsiveness to cope with the loads put upon American

decision centers by Pakistan. The factor mentioned above has been

termed "mutual identification'1- by Bruce H. Russett. 5 Nutual identifica-

tion can be described, in an alliance situation, as the existence of

"we feeling" between the two allies as a result of the identity of goals

and objectives of the partners in the alliance. As has been pointed

out in Chapter II, Pakistan and the United States entered into the al-

liance with different goals and objectives in view, and, except for very

limited purposes, did not identify themselves or their policies with

those of the other country.

Lack of mutual identification coupled with the contradictory

nature of Pakistani demands relating to security and Kashmir with other

5Bruce M. Russett, Community ~ Contention, (Cambridge, Mass.,1963), p. 27.

210

demands made on the United States' decision centers meant that American

capabilities for responsiveness to the two major categories of

Pakistani demands continued to remain at the pre-MDAP level throughout

the years 1954-65. American responsiveness to Pakistan's demands

relating to security and Kashmir continued to be at a very low level,

and finally a stage was reached at which the Pakistani policy-makers

decided that such an alliance was of no use as far as the achievement

of their goals regarding security and Kashmir were concerned. Pakistan,

therefore, turned to new sources -- China foremost among them -- for

support in an effort to attain its goals regarding security and Kashmir.

As a result of Pakistanis improvement of relations with COlnmunist China,

American responsiveness to Pakistan's demands concerning economic

assistance also was affected adversely in 1965. That such was the case

was demonstrated by the American decision to postpone the July 27

meeting of the Aid-to-Pakistan Club which was expected to pledge $500

million in economic aid to Pakistan for the year 1965-66.

Conclusion

We have dealt in this study with the subject of the Pakistan­

American alliance from the point of view of Pakistani demands and

American responsiveness to these demands. Pakistan, as the junior

partner in the alliance, was usually willing to go along with the

global objectives of the senior partner if its demands based on the

fundamental objectives of its foreign policy were met adequately by the

senior partner~ That Pakistan was willing to abide by the global ob­

jectives of the United States and remain loyal to the anti-Communist

211

alliance system as late as the early 1960's is illustrated by two state-

ments made by the highest ranking Pakistani leaders in 1960. Manzur

Qadir, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, declared on March 11, 1960,

in an address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, "There

are certain attitudes which are inherent and implicit in the fact that

we have chosen to be the allies of the West. Those attitudes will con-

tinue to manifest themselves, because alliance with the West is the

sheet anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy. If there are any implications

arising from it, or ramifications flowing from it, they are there.,,6

In an article published in July of the same year, the Pakistani

President, Mohammed Ayub Khan, echoed the views of his Foreign Minister.

Writing in the American journal, Foreign Affairs, President Ayub stated

that,

In the context of'the present-day world politics Pakistan hasopenly and unequivocally cast her lot with the west, andunlike several other countries around us,. we have shut our­selves off almost completely from the possibility of anymajor assistance from the Communist bloc. We do not believein hunting with the hound and running with the hare. Wewish ~o follow, and are following, a clear and unambiguouspath .'

With pakistan willing to follow the American lead in matters of

global strategy (as has been illustrated by the statements quoted here),

it had become the responsibility of the senior partner, the United

~anzur Qadir, "The Foreign Policy of pakistan," Pakistan Horizon,-_ XIII (First Quarter, 1960), p. 12.

7M.ohal'nmed Ayub Khan, "Pakistan perspective," Foreign Affairs,XXXVIII (July, 1960), p. 555.

212

States, to fulfill the de~ands of the junior partner if it desired to

keep the alliance relationship alive. However, the lack of responsive-

ness on the part of the United States to the demands made by Pakistan

forced the latter to adopt policies which ran counter to the global

interests and objectives of the United States. These policies were

adopted by Pakistan in the course of its effort to find new friends

who might help pakistan achieve its goals regarding security and

Kashmir. The policies and attitudes adopted by pakistan which ran

counter to the objectives of the United States led, in their turn~ to a

further diminishing of responsiveness on the part of the United States.

The further decrease in responsiveness was the result of a reaction on

the part of the senior partner to the policies of the junior partner

which were hostile to the former's global interests. The status of the

alliance thus tended to deteriorate further until it reached a stage

in 1965 where the alliance, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.

A study of the Pakistan-American alliance, involving a Great

power and a smaller power (respectively the senior and junior partners

to the alliance relationship), leads us to venture a few opinions about

such alliance relationships in general. The Pakistan-American case

demonstrates that one of the necessary conditions for the successful

functioning of such an alliance relationship is the presence of, if not

identical, at least complementary and mutually beneficial motives and

objectives that prompt, or have prompted, the formation of such an

alliance. If such is not the case, or if objectives, which looked as

if they were complementary in the initial stages of the alliance, turn

213

out later to be contradictory, then the status of the alliance is likely

to deteriorate rapidly until a stage is reached where the alliance

relationship, for all practical purposes, ceases to exist.

Such a situation might be averted, however, if the Great power is

willing to give primacy to the junicr partner's regional and local ob­

jectives over its own global objectives in the regional sphere. Such

an action on the part-of the senior partner would entail a high degree

of responsiveness on its part to the junior partner's demands which

are generated by the fundamental objectives of the latter's foreign poli­

cy. Since the junior partner will not have global objectives (because

once it does it will take on the character of a Great Power), its funda­

mental objectives of foreign policy 'vill be primarily of a regional and

local nature. The junior partner is usually willing to remain loyal

to the global objectives of the senior partner if, in return, the senior

partner fulfills the junior partner's demands relating to its regional

and local objectives. However, if the junior partner's local and

regional objectives come into headlong collision with the major global

interests of the Great Power (so major that the Great Power is not

willing to sacrifice them even at the risk of the disruption of the

alliance), then there is scant chance that a rapid ~,~terioration in the

status of the alliance can be prevented.

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