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Governance in a Partially Globalized World "Presidential Address","American Political Science Association, 2000"Robert O. KeohaneThe American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1. (Mar., 2001), pp. 1-13.Stable URL:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28200103%2995%3A1%3C1%3AGIAPGW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

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