· the following equipment is out -of-service: the 1a s/g porv is isolated and its actuator is...

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Final (Rev_040615)

Facility: McGuire Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N15-1

Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2, “B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test” upon taking the shift.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type* Event Description

1 LOA HW012

C-RO C-SRO

RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip

2 PLP

089 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst

3

REM NV0035A

C-BOP C-SRO

Letdown Valve 1NV-35A fails CLOSED

4 MAL

SM029 N(TS)-SRO TD CA Pump Inoperability

5 PLP 014

C-RO C-SRO

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations/Failure of Exciter Limiter

6 LOA

IPB001 IPB002

R-RO N-BOP N-SRO

IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower

7 MAL

DCS1418 DCS1479 DEH003A DEH003B

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO

Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in AUTO and MANUAL

8 MAL

IPE004H SM004A

NA C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN

9 MAL

CA004A EP008B

NA 1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout

10 MAL

SM007D NA 1D Steam Break in Containment

11 MAL

SM029 NA TD CA Pump is Restored

* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

- 1 -


McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2, “B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test” upon taking the shift. Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test.” During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the “Control Room Expectation Manual,” to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1EMF48, “Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor,” will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD-2/C-3, “1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad,” and implement AP/1/A/5500/18, “High Activity in Reactor Coolant.” The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity.” Next, 1NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, “Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection,” and establish Excess Letdown. Shortly afterwards, the Unit 1 TDCA Pump Stop Valve will trip CLOSED. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-5/F-3, “TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN,” and attempt to reset the valve locally. Local attempts to reset the valve will be unsuccessful, and the operator will need to declare the TDCA Pump inoperable. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.” Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV, and simultaneously the main Generator Exciter Limiter will fail to function. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, “Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances,” and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage. Following this, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, “Rapid Downpower.” During the downpower, both CF Pumps will rollback to LOW Speed causing a low level condition in all Steam Generators. On the ensuing Rx Trip, the Main Turbine will fail to trip in both Auto and Manual, and the operator will need to manually close the Governor Valves. On the trip, the Steam Dumps will fail to actuate due to a C-9 failure and the SG PORVs will open to control steam pressure. Since the 1A SG PORV is isolated, a 1A SG Safety Valve will open instead, and stick about 60% open. Simultaneously, a lockout will occur on 1ETB and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start either automatically or manually and result in a total loss of CA flow. 30 seconds later a Major Steam Line Break will occur on the 1D Steamline in Containment.

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The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation; and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, “Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,” based on no CA flow. When 3 of 4 Steam Generator Wide Range levels are < 36%), the operator will initiate NCS Feed and Bleed. Once NCS Feed and Bleed is established, the TDCA Pump Stop Valve will be able to be reset, and the pump may be returned to service. The operator will restore CA flow to the 1B and/or 1C Steam Generator per Step 7 of FR-H.1. The scenario will terminate at Step 39 of FR-H.1, with the crew feeding at least one Steam Generator to restore Wide Range Level to > 12% (17% ACC). Critical Tasks: Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to completing the Immediate Actions of E-0 Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality/Integrity Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not or may not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS. Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases. Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a “Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.” Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover. Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1. Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to remain in RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

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(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, “BB DEMIN PNL TRBL,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No.

Malf. No.


1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO

Power Increase w/Simple Dilute

2 MAL

DCS1214 C-RO C-SRO

Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO

3

REM

RN0018B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES

4 MAL

DCSSLIM06D/G

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN

5 MAL

LF003B IRE009 SG001A

C-RO C-BOP C-SRO

1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual

6 REM

SM007AB MAL

IPE001A/B IPE002A/B SG001A SM004A

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO

1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR

7 MAL

CA004A CA005

C-BOP C-SRO

TD CA Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO


- 1 -


McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, “BB DEMIN PNL TRBL,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.19, “Simple Dilution,” of OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control,” and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, “Turbine-Generator Load Change.” After the load increase is started, the Control Rods will fail such that rods are moving outward in AUTO. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction.” The control rods will subsequently remain in MANUAL. After this, the 1B RN Pump Suction Isolation valve will inadvertently CLOSE. The operator will respond using one or more Annunciator Response Procedures and ultimately enter AP/1/A/5500/20, “Loss of RN,” to place the standby train in service. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, “Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS),” and LCO 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating.” Next, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, “Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.” Subsequently, the 1B CF Pump will trip causing the turbine to automatically runback to 55%. Simultaneously, a 40 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur in the 1A Steam Generator. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, “Load Rejection.” During the runback the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the plant is stabilized or AP10 is entered to mitigate the SGTL, the 1A MSIV will inadvertently CLOSE, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, the low set Safety Valve on the 1A Steam Generator will lift and stick fully OPEN. Additionally, the TD CA Pump will trip on overspeed on auto start, and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, “Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.” During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will continuously drive rods in manually, successfully trip the Reactor locally, and manually start the 1A MDCA Pump and establish 450 gpm of flow the Steam Generators. The Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a tube rupture in the 1A Steam Generator when the reactor is locally tripped.

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After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, “Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.” After the 1A Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, “Steam Generator Tube Rupture.” The scenario will terminate at Step 6 of E-3 after the operator has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-3.1, “SGTR with Subcooled Recovery Desired,” or at Step 9 of E-3 upon initiating an NCS cooldown. Critical Tasks: Manually close the Failed OPEN Pzr Spray Valve before the Pressurizer pressure drops to ≤ 1945 psig. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect NCS pressure control. Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2). Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. Start the 1A MD CA Pump before transition out of FRS-.1, unless the transition is made to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS. Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition. Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before an unwarranted Red Path occurs on Subcriticality or NCS Integrity. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

- 3 -




(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-12, E-2, “A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No.

Malf. No.



Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute

2 MAL

IRE009 C-RO C-SRO

Control Rods fail to Move in Auto

3 REM NV0461

C-BOP C-SRO

1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm

4 MAL

SM001D C-RO C(TS)-SRO

SG 1D PORV fails OPEN

5 MAL NCP008B

C(TS)-SRO #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP

6 MAL

DEH001 C-RO C-SRO

Inadvertent Turbine Trip

7 MAL NCP008B NCP016C NCP015C

C-BOP #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades

8 MAL IRE010

C-BOP C-SRO

4 Control Rods fail to Fully Insert on Rx Trip

9

MAL EP002A EP002B DG001B

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO

Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START


- 1 -


McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 40% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A SG PORV is leaking and isolated. The PORV has been declared inoperable and maintenance is being planned. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-12, E-2, “A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, “Alternate Dilute,” of OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control,” and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, “Turbine-Generator Load Change.” During the power increase, the operator will discover that the Control Rods will not respond in AUTO. The crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction,” and control rods in MANUAL. Because the crew may control the power increase such that an auto rod demand does not occur, this event may not be diagnosed until later. Shortly after starting the power increase, AD-7/B-2, “NC Pump B No. 2 Seal S-Pipe Lo Level,” will alarm. The operator will address the Annunciator Response Procedure, and then use Enclosure 4.3, “Filling and Draining NC Pump Standpipe,” of OP/1/A/6150/002A, “Reactor Coolant Pump Operation,” to refill the standpipe. After this, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will fail OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, “Steam Leak,” and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, “Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs),” and may enter LCO 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.” Subsequently, a #1 seal leak will develop on the 1B NCP such that #1 Seal leakoff flow is 5.0-5.5 gpm. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/08, “Malfunction of NC Pump,” and address Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” The control operators will be directed on the action to take should the #1 Seal Leakoff flow degrade to > 6 gpm (which will occur subsequently). Shortly afterwards, the Main Turbine will inadvertently trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, “Turbine Generator Trip.” The RO will need to operate the control rods manually. While the crew is in AP-2, the 1B Hi Vibration alarm will occur and the #1 seal leak flow on the 1B NCP will rise to 6 gpm. The operator go back to Step 8 of AP-8 (Continuous Action Step), and close the 1B NCP Pzr Spray Valve, manually trip the reactor and stop the 1B NCP when reactor power is < 5%. The crew will perform Enclosure 2, “NC Pump Post Trip Actions For #1 Seal Failure,” of AP8, while subsequently performing E-0.

- 2 -


The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip. On the reactor trip four control rods will fail to fully insert. The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, “Reactor Trip Response,” and emergency borate per AP/1/A/5500/38, “Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution.” Immediately following the initiation of Emergency Boration, a loss of the Unit 1 Switchyard will occur, and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to start. The operator will immediately transition to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, “Loss of All AC Power.” The operator will restore power to 1ETA per Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB per Enclosure 14 “Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2 - SATA or SATB.” The scenario will terminate when one ESF Bus has been re-energized. Critical Tasks: Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%. Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates “mis-operation” or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS). Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes “mis-operation” or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s). Since the conditions existed to re-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

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(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 4% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 12-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed.

Event No.

Malf. No.



Raise Power from 4% to 12-18%

2 MAL KC010B

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

1A2 KC Pump trip

3 MAL

EMF-34L LOA BB019

I-RO I-SRO

1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to Auto CLOSE

4

MAL

EDA350 I(TS)-SRO DRPI Failure

5 MAL NV019B

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment

6 MAL IRE006B6 IRE006P10

C-RO C-SRO

Sequentially Dropped Rods

7 MAL ISE001B

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO

Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation

8 MAL

ND001B

BOP 1B ND Pump fails to start in AUTO


- 1 -


McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 4% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 12-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 12-18% starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, “Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, “Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.” Subsequently, 1EMF-34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, will fail HIGH, however, one of the SG Blowdown Control Valves will NOT automatically close. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, “Annunciator Response for 1RAD-1,” C3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD, and manually close the valve. The operator may enter Case I of AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The crew will determine that the alarm is due to a failure, and NOT an actual high radioactivity condition. Just after this, the DRPI for Control Rod M-12 will fail and indicate the rod on the bottom. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-2/D-10, “RPI Urgent Failure,” and address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, “Rod Position Indication.” Shortly afterwards, a 50-75 gpm leak will occur on the Letdown Line, in the Aux Building, upstream of the Letdown Heat Exchanger. The operator will enter Case II of AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The operator will place the Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service per Enclosure 4.4 of OP/0/A/6450/011, “Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage,” and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” Just after the leak isolation, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, “RPI at Bottom Rod Drop” and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction.” Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. Upon the reactor trip, the B Train of Safety Injection will inadvertently actuate with the exception that the 1B ND Pump will fail to start in AUTO. This pump will be manually started. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation, actuating the A Train of SI in the process. The crew will reset SI and stop all ECCS Pumps except for one NV Pump within 15 minutes. Ultimately, the crew will transition to step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, “Safety Injection Termination.”

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The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 at Step 14.m RNO after the CRS determines to establish Excess Letdown. Critical Tasks: Trip the Reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod. Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant form challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod. Terminate SI by closing 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B within 15 minutes of SI actuation. Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500oF. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

- 3 -




(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT,” has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating).

Event No.

Malf. No.


1

REM

SA0048 ABC

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

TDCA Pump starts inadvertently

2 MAL

DCS17E/G

C-RO C-SRO

FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure

3 MAL

NC007D C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

NCS Leak


Rapid Downpower

5 MAL

DEH008B C-RO C-SRO

Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL

6 MAL NC005D4

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO

Rod Ejection/SB LOCA

7 MAL

NV029B

NA 1B NV Pump Trip

8 MAL

EQB001A NA EDG A Sequencer Failure 9 MAL

NI001B C-BOP C-SRO

1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO

10 MAL NC005F14

NA 2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA


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McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT,” has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating). Shortly after taking the watch, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A/6250/002, “Auxiliary Feedwater System.” The operator may use AP/1/A/5500/1, “Steam Leak,” to diagnose the failure. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,” and SLC 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” Next, the 1B SG FRV Controller will fail to MANUAL and the FRV Bypass valve will fail fully open resulting in the Feedwater Control Valve for the 1B SG closing and causing SG Level to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/06, “S/G Feedwater Malfunction,” and control the 1B SG Level manually. Following this, a 70-90 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube. The crew will implement AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage.” Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/4, “Rapid Downpower.” During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, “Turbine Generator Load Change.” After this, Control Rod D-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA. The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.” On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG A Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1B NV Pump will trip, and the 1B NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1B NI Pump manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, “Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.” At that time a second Control Rod (F-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E-1.

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Critical Tasks: After a failure of the 1B SG FRV Controller in AUTO, Take manual control of the controller and stabilize the 1B SG Narrow Level before a Reactor Protection System actuation occurs. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the controller and stabilize the SG Narrow Level before a Reactor Protection System actuation occurs, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the SG Narrow Level. A failure to stabilize the SG Narrow Range Level, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect performance which could lead to incorrect NCS temperature control and an unnecessary challenge to the NCS Heat Sink Critical Safety Function. Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-0. Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition. Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1) Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

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PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-1 REFERENCES: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, “Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG

PORVs)” (Amendment 221/203) 2. PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test” (Rev 46) 3. Control Room Crew Expectations Manual (Rev 8/8/12) 4. OP/1/A/6100/010R “Annunciator Response for Panel 1RAD-2” (Rev 39) 5. AP/1/A/5500/18, “High Activity in Reactor Coolant” (Rev 5) 6. OP/1/A/6200/001 A, “Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown” (Rev 53) 7. Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity” (Amendment 266/246) 8. AP/1/A/5500/12, “Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection” (Rev 24) 9. OP/1/A/6100/010F “Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-5” (Rev 58) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System” (Amendment

221/203) 11. AP/1/A/5500/05, “Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances” (Rev 13) 12. OP/1/A/6100/010L “ Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-11” (Rev 78) 13. AP/1/A/5500/04, “Rapid Downpower” (Rev 27) 14. OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control” (Rev 126) 15. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection” (Rev 34) 16. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, “Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink” (Rev 18) Validation Time: 117 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________ Rev. 040615

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Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1



(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2, “B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test” upon taking the shift.

Event No.

Malf. No.


1 LOA HW012

C-RO C-SRO


2 PLP

089 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst

3

REM NV0035A

C-BOP C-SRO


4 MAL

SM029 N(TS)-SRO TD CA Pump Inoperability

5 PLP 014

C-RO C-SRO


6 LOA

IPB001 IPB002

R-RO N-BOP N-SRO


7 MAL

DCS1418 DCS1479 DEH003A DEH003B

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO


8 MAL

IPE004H SM004A

NA C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN

9 MAL

CA004A EP008B

NA 1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout

10 MAL

SM007D NA 1D Steam Break in Containment

11 MAL

SM029 NA TD CA Pump is Restored


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McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2, “B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test” upon taking the shift. Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test.” During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the “Control Room Expectation Manual,” to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1EMF48, “Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor,” will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD-2/C-3, “1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad,” and implement AP/1/A/5500/18, “High Activity in Reactor Coolant.” The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity.” Next, 1NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, “Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection,” and establish Excess Letdown. Shortly afterwards, the Unit 1 TDCA Pump Stop Valve will trip CLOSED. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-5/F-3, “TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN,” and attempt to reset the valve locally. Local attempts to reset the valve will be unsuccessful, and the operator will need to declare the TDCA Pump inoperable. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.” Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV, and simultaneously the main Generator Exciter Limiter will fail to function. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, “Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances,” and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage. Following this, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, “Rapid Downpower.” During the downpower, both CF Pumps will rollback to LOW Speed causing a low level condition in all Steam Generators. On the ensuing Rx Trip, the Main Turbine will fail to trip in both Auto and Manual, and the operator will need to manually close the Governor Valves. On the trip, the Steam Dumps will fail to actuate due to a C-9 failure and the SG PORVs will open to control steam pressure. Since the 1A SG PORV is isolated, a 1A SG Safety Valve will open instead, and stick about 60% open. Simultaneously, a lockout will occur on 1ETB and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start either automatically or manually and result in a total loss of CA flow. 30 seconds later a Major Steam Line Break will occur on the 1D Steamline in Containment. - 3 -


The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation; and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, “Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,” based on no CA flow. When 3 of 4 Steam Generator Wide Range levels are < 36%), the operator will initiate NCS Feed and Bleed. Once NCS Feed and Bleed is established, the TDCA Pump Stop Valve will be able to be reset, and the pump may be returned to service. The operator will restore CA flow to the 1B and/or 1C Steam Generator per Step 7 of FR-H.1. The scenario will terminate at Step 39 of FR-H.1, with the crew feeding at least one Steam Generator to restore Wide Range Level to > 12% (17% ACC). Critical Tasks: Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to completing the Immediate Actions of E-0 Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality/Integrity Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not or may not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS. Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases. Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a “Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.” Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover. Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1. Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to remain in RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

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SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

Sim. Setup Rod Step On

Reset to Temp IC 238 (Originally 39).

T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-39): Insert 11_eg_MAL_7 = TRUE (Failure of Exciter OEL Limiters)

Insert REM-SV0027 = 0 (Close 1SV-27 [1A S/G PORV Isolation])

Insert LOA-SV001= Racked_Out (SG PORV Breaker Racked Out)

H_X02_087_3 = 0 (1A PORV Controller LEFT lamp)

H_X02_087_4 = 0 (1A PORV Controller RIGHT lamp)

Insert LOA-SV014=0 (SM PORV A LOCAL OPERATION)

insert XMT- KFTT5130 = 0 (Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Failure)

insert OVR-1AD9_E02 = ON (MCB Annunciator 1AD9/E2)

From IC-238

Per Lesson Plan 2015 NRC Exam Scenario 1

insert MAL-DEH003A = True (Failure of Auto Turbine Trip Signal) insert MAL-DEH003B = True (Failure of Manual Turbine Trip Signal)

MAL-IPE004H = True cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (C-9 fails Conditional on Rx Trip)

MAL-SM004A1 = 60 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (1A SG Safety Valve Conditional on Rx Trip)

MAL-CA004A = BOTH cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (1A MDCA Pump fails to start Conditional on Rx Trip)

MAL-EP008B = ACTIVE cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (1ETB Lockout Conditional on Rx Trip)

insert MAL-SM007D = 2021250 No Ramp, Delay = 30 seconds, cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (SLB in Containment Conditional on Rx Trip)

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RUN

Reset all SLIMs

Place Tagout/O-Stick on: 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2 (O-stick)

Update Status Board, Setup OAC

NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.

Freeze.

Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.

Fill out the AO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.

Prior to Crew Briefing

RUN

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Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide crew with a copy of PT/1/A/4600/001 marked up for scenario as follows:

• Step 7.1 initialed. • Step 8.1 Initialed. • Step 8.2 initialed. • Step 8.3 NA initialed. • Note prior to Step 12 checked. • Step 12.1 Checkbox checked. • Step 12.2 initialed. • Step 12.3 NA initialed. • Step 12.4 Person Notified is John Weber. • Step 12.5 Section 12.6 Checkbox is checked.

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. 5. Retain a copy of OP/1/A/6200/001A which will need to be provided to the crew during Event 2.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period

At direction of examiner

Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N15-1-1.


Event 1

insert LOA-HW012 = Racked_Out insert H_X13_059_3=1 Conditional to HW012



Event 2

insert PLP-089 = 300 RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst NOTE: This malfunction requires ≈ 2-3 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.


Event 3

insert REM-NV0035A = 0.0 Ramp = 10 seconds



Event 4

Insert MAL-SM029 = 0


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Event 5

insert PLP-014=480 delay=0 ramp=120 seconds

Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations


Event 6

insert LOA-IPB001 = OFF

insert LOA-IPB002 = OFF



Event 7

insert MAL-DCS1418

insert MAL-DCS1479

insert MAL-DEH003A

insert MAL-DEH003B


Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0

Post-Rx Trip Event 8

insert MAL-IPE004H = True

insert MAL-SM004A = 60

C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve sticks OPEN

Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0, conditional on Rx trip.


insert MAL-CA004A = True

insert MAL-EP008B = True

1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout



insert MAL-SM007D 2021250.000000 No Ramp, Delay = 30 seconds

1D Steam Break in Containment


After Bleed and Feed is

initiated

Event 11

Insert MAL-SM029 = 1 Ramp = 60 seconds

TD CA Pump is Restored

Note: This action must be inserted upon direction of the CRS.

Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner

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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 62 Event Description: RCCA Withdrawal Test/1C3 HDP Trip

Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test.” During the course of the surveillance, the 1C3 Heater Drain Pump will trip. The operator will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO), and use the “Control Room Expectation Manual,” to immediately reduce Turbine load as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. Booth Operator Instructions: WHEN SD Bank B has been inserted 10

steps insert LOA-HW012 = Racked_Out (See Page 11) Indications Available: • Turbine load starts to lower. • OAC Alarm 1HW45, 1C3 Heater Drain Tank Hi Level Dump Not Closed • 1C3 HDP Green status light is LIT. • 1C3 HDP amps indicates 0 • NIS power slightly higher than 100%.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

PT/1/A/4600/001, RCCA MOVEMENT TEST

RO (Step 12.6) Rod Movement Surveillance in Modes 1 or 2

RO (Step 12.6.1) IF AT ANY TIME it becomes necessary to move rods to stabilize the plant, complete the following:

NOTE: The RO will perform this ACTION after the secondary plant transient occurs.

• (Step 12.6.1.1) Restore any individual bank to initial position.

• (Step 12.6.1.2) Select “MANUAL” with “CRD Bank Select”.

RO (Step 12.6.2) Record position of Shutdown Bank A demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will record 225.

• (Step 12.6..2.1) Select “SDA” with “CRD Bank Select”. (Pause between each bank selected).


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • (Step 12.6.2.2) Check lit “GRP

SELECT C” on the following: NOTE: The RO will contact IAE. Booth Instructor: as IAE, acknowledge, and report that required lights are LIT.

• Power Cabinet 2AC

RO • Power Cabinet 1AC

• (Step 12.6.2.3) IF Rod Control Cabinet “GRP SELECT C” dark, stop…

• (Step 12.6.2.4) Insert rods at least 10 steps as shown on demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will insert the Control Rods.

• (Step 12.6.2.5) IF required to reposition rods due to misalignment….

• (Step 12.6.2.6) Check each individual rod responded to control signal by checking position against DRPI and OAC DRPI and record data on Enclosure 13.1 (Control Rod Drive Movement Data Sheet).

• (Step 12.6.2.7) Restore rods to position recorded in Step 12.6.2 and check individual rods follow demand.

NOTE: The RO will withdrawal the control rods.

RO (Step 12.6.3) Record position of Shutdown Bank B demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will record 225.

• (Step 12.6.3.1) Select “SDB” with “CRD Bank Select”

• (Step 12.6.3.2) Check lit “GRP SELECT C” on the following:

NOTE: The RO will contact IAE. Booth Instructor: as IAE, acknowledge, and report that required lights are LIT.

• Power Cabinet 2BD

• Power Cabinet 1BD

• (Step 12.6.3.3) IF Rod Control Cabinet “GRP SELECT C” dark…


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • (Step 12.6.3.4) Insert rods at least 10

steps as shown on demand step counters.

NOTE: The RO will insert the Control Rods.

Booth Operator Instructions: AFTER the RO has inserted Shutdown Bank B 10 steps into the core, insert LOA-HW012 = Racked_Out

CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL

RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred – immediately reduce 20MWe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 MWe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced. TPBE on the OAC updates once per minute. Other indications (PR meters and Delta T meters) will indicate reactor response more quickly and will enable the operators to control the plant even more precisely. (This combines the Operator Fundamentals of Conservatism and Controlling Plant Evolutions Precisely).

NOTE: The RO will restore any individual rod bank to its initial position, place control rods in manual (and/or AUTO). NOTE: The crew may diagnose an overpower condition and adjust turbine load per the Crew Expectation Manual.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to investigate the HDP. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report Pump is stopped and hotter than the others. If the crew investigates further and dispatches an AO to Switchgear, acknowledge as AO, and report A Breaker Overcurrent relay has operated.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may call

WCC/IAE to address the HDP. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2. Examiner Note: The Event 2 malfunction requires ≈ 2-3 minutes to build in, prior to the first indication.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 62 Event Description: RCS High Activity due to Crud Burst

As a result of the plant transient, a Crud Burst will occur and 1EMF48, “Reactor Coolant Water Radiation Monitor,” will alarm. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1RAD-2/C-3, “1EMF 48 Reactor Coolant Hi Rad,” and implement AP/1/A/5500/18, “High Activity in Reactor Coolant.” The operator will raise Letdown flow at the request of Chemistry and address Technical Specification 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity.” Booth Operator Instructions: insert PLP-089 = 300 (This Malfunction requires ≈ 2-3 minutes to

build in, prior to the first indication.) Indications Available: • 1EMF-48 in TRIP 2 • Subsequently, 1EMF-18 in TRIP 2 • MCB Annunciator 1RAD-2/C-3 1EMF 48 REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD • MCB Annunciator 1RAD-3/C-3 1EMF 18 REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A


NOTE: The BOP may address either or both ARPs, prior to entering AP18.

OP/1/A/6100/010 R, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1RAD-2 C-3, 1EMF 48 REACTOR COOLANT HI RAD

CRS (Step 1) Go To AP/1/A/5500/018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).

(Step 2) Notify Chemistry.

(Step 3) Notify RP.

NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-18.

OP/1/A/6100/010 S, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1RAD-3 D-3, 1EMF 18 REACTOR COOLANT FILTER 1A

CRS (Step 1) If an expected alarm or testing in progress, no further action required.



CRS (Step 2) IF a valid alarm:

• Notify RP.

• IF conditions warrant, evacuate area.

• Monitor area EMFs.

CRS (Step 3) IF primary system leak,… NOTE: There is no NC System leak.

CRS (Step 4) IF high activity in reactor coolant, go to AP/1/A/5500/018 (High Activity in Reactor Coolant).

CRS (Step 5) IF NC filter high radiation,… NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-18.

AP/1/A/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT

BOP (Step 1) Place one Outside Pressure Filter train in service PER Enclosure 1 (Pressurizing the Control Room).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 1. Other Examiners follow AP18 Actions, Step 2, on Page 16.

AP/1/A/5500/18, HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT ENCLOSURE 1, PRESSURIZING THE CONTROL ROOM

BOP (Step 1) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 1 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

• Ensure at least one of the following groups of air intake valves are OPEN:

• Unit 1 air intake valves:



• 1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1)


• 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol From Unit 1)


OR

• Unit 2 air intake valves:





BOP (Step 2) IF A train VC/YC selected, ….. NOTE: The B Train of VC/YC is selected.

BOP (Step 3) IF B train VC/YC selected, THEN place “B TRAIN CR OUTSIDE AIR PRESS FAN” to “ON”.

BOP (Step 4) Depress “MAN” for the following:

• “#1 CRA OUTSD AIR FAN”

• “#2 CRA OUTSD AIR FAN”

BOP (Step 5) Depress “OFF” for the following:

• CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Fans Damper)

• CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Fans Damper)




Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

BOP/RO

(Step 2) Check 1NV-127A (L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Temp Cntrl) – ALIGNED TO DEMIN.

CRS (Step 3) Check Dose Equivalent Iodine – PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED TO EXCEED ACTION LEVEL 3 LIMIT PER NSD 306, NUCLEAR FUEL RELIABILITY.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

CRS (Step 5) Determine cause of high activity as follows:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the cause of high activity. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry. As Chemistry (Time Compression) report that you suspect a Crud Burst, DEI is 1.2 μc/gm.

• Request Chemistry to check decontamination factor of mixed bed demineralizer.

• Notify Chemistry to perform an NC System isotopic analysis to determine if high activity is from a crud burst or failed fuel.

Booth Instructor As Chemistry (Time Compression) report that you suspect a Crud Burst, DEI is 1.2 μc/gm.



BOP (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that high activity is from crud burst, THEN raise letdown flow to 120 GPM PER OP/1/A/6200/001 A (Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown), Enclosure 4.5 (Establishing Maximum Normal Letdown).

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.5. Other Examiners follow AP18 Actions, Step 7, on Page 19.

Floor Instructor: Provide a previously prepared copy of OP/1/A/6200/001A to BOP after BOP locates Simulator Copy of procedure.

OP/1/A/6200/001 A, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LETDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.5, ESTABLISHING MAXIMUM NORMAL LETDOWN

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 4.5 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

CRS/BOP

(Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC to address the R&Rs. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none.

BOP (Step 3.2) Notify RP that Letdown is being changed and may affect dose rates in affected areas.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC/RP to address letdown flowrate change. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

BOP (Step 3.3) IF Cation Bed Demineralizer is service,…

NOTE: The Cation Bed Demineralizer is NOT in service.



BOP (Step 3.4) Evaluate NC Filter ΔP prior to increasing letdown flow.

NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to evaluate filter ΔP. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report ΔP normal (5-15 psid), and acceptable to raise flow.

BOP (Step 3.5) Perform the following sections applicable:

• Section 3.6, Increasing Normal Letdown to less than or equal to 120 gpm using 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl)

BOP (Step 3.6) Increasing Normal Letdown to less than or equal to 120 gpm using 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl)

BOP • IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually control charging flow, place 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) in manual.

BOP • IF AT ANY TIME it is desired, place 1KC-132 (U1 LD Hx KD Otlt Temp Cntrl) manual loader to manual and control temperature as required.

BOP • IF 1NV-459 (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) NOT in service…

NOTE: 1NV-459 is in service.

BOP • Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in manual.

BOP • Adjust 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to reduce letdown pressure to 150-250 psig.

BOP • Perform the following concurrently:

• Slowly open 1NV-459 ((Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) increasing letdown flow to desired flow rate.

• Adjust 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain letdown pressure less than 500 psig.



BOP • Adjust 1NV-241 (Seal Injection Flow Control) to maintain NC Pump Seal Injection flow.

BOP • IF NC System at normal operating temperature and pressure, adjust 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) to maintain 200-375 psig letdown pressure.

NOTE: NC System is at normal operating temperature and pressure.

• Ensure 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) setpoint at actual letdown pressure.

• Place 1NV-124 (Letdown Pressure Control) in auto.

BOP • IF NC System at reduced temperature and pressure,…

NOTE: NC System is at normal operating temperature and pressure.

BOP • IF 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) in manual,…

NOTE: 1NV-238 is in AUTO.

• Ensure 1KC-132 (U1 LD Hx KC Otlt Temp Cntrl) manual loader adjusted to desired setpoint and in auto.



CRS (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME it is determined that high activity is from failed fuel,…

NOTE: The high activity is NOT from failed fuel.

CRS (Step 8) Notify Radwaste to ensure VCT H2 purge flow is established.

CRS (Step 9) REFER TO Tech Spec 3.4.16 (RCS Specific Activity).



CRS (Step 10) WHEN station management determines Control Room pressurization no longer required, THEN secure PER OP/1/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).


TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.16, RCS SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

CRS LCO 3.4.16 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be within limits.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, and 2.

CRS ACTIONS

CRS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION

COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A must be entered. A. DEI-131 not

within limit. A.1 Verify DEI-

131 ≤60µCi/gm.

AND A.2 Restore DEI-

131 to within limit.

Once per 4 hours 48 hours


At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 21 of 62 Event Description: Letdown Valve 1NV-35 fails CLOSED

Next, 1NV-35, Variable Flow Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve, will fail Closed. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/12, “Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection,” and establish Excess Letdown. Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-NV0035A = 0.0 (Ramp = 10

seconds) Indications Available: • Letdown flow (1NVP5530) indicates 0 gpm. • 1NV-35A Green status light is LIT. • Pzr Level trending upward. • Charging flow (1NVP5630) starts to lower.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-

12.

AP/1/A/5500/12, LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING OR SEAL INJECTION

BOP (Step 1) Check if charging is aligned to Regenerative Hx as follows:

• Charging flow – GREATER THAN 20 GPM

NOTE: The BOP may take MANUAL control of 1NV-238 to control Charging flow.

• 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) – THROTTLED OPEN

• 1NV-244A (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - OPEN

• 1NV-245B (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol) – OPEN.

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr Level – LESS THAN 96%.

CRS (Step 3) Stop any power or temperature changes in progress.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/

BOP (Step 4) Announce occurrence on paging system.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 5) IF this AP entered due to loss of letdown only, THEN GO TO Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Ensure the following valves are CLOSED:

• 1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L.D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol)

• 1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol)

• 1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

NOTE: 1NV-35 has failed CLOSED.

BOP (Step 38) Ensure NC System makeup controller is auto.

BOP (Step 39) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

NOTE: The BOP may take MANUAL control of 1NV-238 to control Charging flow.

BOP (Step 40) Check “LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP” alarm (1AD-7, I-4) – HAS REMAINED DARK.

BOP (Step 41) Check 1NV-21A (U1 NV Supply to U1 Aux PZR Spray Isol) – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 42) Operate Pzr heaters as follows:

• Check A, B, and D Pzr heater group supply breakers on vertical board – CLOSED.

• Check normal Pzr spray – AVAILABLE.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Place the following Pzr heater groups in

manual and “ON” to maximize spray flow:

• A

• B

• D

BOP (Step 43) Check the following valves – OPEN:

• 1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx)

• 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

CRS (Step 44) GO TO Step 49.

BOP (Step 49) Establish normal letdown as follows:

NOTE: Although attempts will be made, Normal Letdown will NOT be able to be established.

• Ensure 1NV-459 (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Flow Cntrl) is CLOSED.

• Place 1NV-124 (U1 Letdown Press Control) in manual with output between 40-45% OPEN.

• Check OAC – IN SERVICE.

• Check valve position on OAC for 1NV-124 – INDICATING THROTTLED.

• Check the following valves – OPEN:


• 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hs).

• Establish cooling to Regenerative Hx by performing the following concurrently:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Establish at least 65 GPM charging

flow by THROTTLING OPEN 1NV-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) or raising PD pump speed.

NOTE: The BOP will take MANUAL control of 1NV-238 to control Charging flow.

• THROTTLE 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) to establish approximately 8 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

• OPEN letdown line isolation valves as follows:

• OPEN 1NV-7B (U1 Letdown Cont Outside Isol).

• OPEN 1NV-1A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

• OPEN 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

• OPEN 1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

NOTE: 1NV-35A cannot be opened.

CRS (Step 49g RNO) GO TO Step 52 NOTE: Although attempts will be made, Normal Letdown will NOT be able to be established.

BOP (Step 52) Establish excess letdown as follows:

• Adjust charging to minimum while maintaining the following:

NOTE: The BOP will take MANUAL control of 1NV-238 to control Charging flow.

• NC pump seal injection flow greater that 6 GPM.

• Pzr level at program level.

• IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot be established, THEN observe Note prior to Step 53 and GO TO Step 53 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head Vents.

• OPEN the following valves:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1KC-315B (U1 Excess L/D Hx KC

Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

• 1KC-305B (U1 KC To Excess L/D Hx Cont Outside Isol).

BOP • Ensure 1NV-27B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) selected to “VCT” position.

• OPEN 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl

• Wait 2 minutes.

• CLOSE 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).

• Check the following valves – OPEN:

• 1NV-94AC (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Inside Isol)

• 1NV-95B (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Outside Isol).

• OPEN 1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

• OPEN 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

• Check the following:

• Reactor - CRITICAL

• 1NV-27B – ALIGNED TO VCT.

RO • Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

• Slowly OPEN 1NV-26B while maintaining excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200°F.

CRS • GO TO Step 52.r.

• Notify Primary Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.

NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

• Adjust charging flow as desired while maintaining the following:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • NC pump seal injection flow greater

than 6 GPM

• Pzr level at program level.

• Operate Pzr heaters as desired.

BOP • WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document the following transients:

NOTE: The CRS may call Engineering. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Engineering.

• Letdown isolation

• Potential charging nozzle transient

• IF NV Aux Spray was in service…

• Check 1NV-27B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) = ALIGNED TO “VCT”.

• IF AT ANY TIME VCT level needs to be lowered….


• WHEN normal letdown available… NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

• WHEN desired to isolate excess letdown…


• RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the failed valve. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.



Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 62 Event Description: TD CA Pump Inoperability

Shortly afterwards, the Unit 1 TDCA Pump Stop Valve will trip CLOSED. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-5/F-3, “TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN,” and attempt to reset the valve locally. Local attempts to reset the valve will be unsuccessful, and the operator will need to declare the TDCA Pump inoperable. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System.” Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SM029 = 0, delay=0 ramp = 0

(TDCA Pump Stop Valve Trips) Indications Available: • OAC Alarm: U1 CA PUMP TURBINE STOP VALVE INDICATING NOT OPEN • MCB Annunciator 1AD-5/F-3, TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN


OP/1/A/6100/010F, ANNUNCIATOR PROCEDURE FOR 1AD-5

F-3, TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN CRS (IA Step 1) IF CA is supplying the S/Gs,

ensure 1A(1B) CA Pumps are maintaining S/G level.

NOTE: The CA is NOT supplying S/Gs.

CRS (SA Step 1) IF TDCA pump stop valve is required to be reset, reset per one of the following:

• IF Emergency or Abnormal event, reset per Generic Enclosures EP/1/A/5000/G-1, Enclosure 24 (Resetting TD CA Stop Valve). (Copy located in satellite file in CA Pump room.)

OR

• IF normal operation, reset per OP/1/A/6250/002 (Auxiliary Feedwater System).

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to investigate and reset as needed. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. Wait 2 Minutes and report that the U1 TD CA Pump Stop valve cannot be reset.



NOTE: The CRS will coordinate with the WCCS to repair the TDCA Pump. Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCS.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM

CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3; MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B must be entered. B. One AFW

train inoperable in MODE 1, 2 or 3 for reasons other than Condition A

B.1 Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status.

72 hours AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7, STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS

The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Security to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of discovery. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Security.



A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7-1.

A.1 Verify the FUNCTINALITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table 16.9.7-1

AND A.2 Restore the

component to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour 7 days

NOTE: The TDCA Pump is an SSS required component (See Table 16.9.7-1). Consequently the CRS will identify that ACTION A.1 and A.2 must be entered.



Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 30 of 62 Event Description: Electrical Grid Voltage Oscillations/Failure of Exciter Limiter

Subsequently, electrical disturbances cause grid voltage to drop to 216 KV, and simultaneously the main Generator Exciter Limiter will fail to function. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/05, “Generator Voltage and Electrical Grid Disturbances,” and make adjustments of Main Generator voltage. Booth Operator Instructions: insert PLP-014 = 480, delay=0 ramp=120

(Grid Disturbance) Indications Available: • OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR X PHASE AMPS • OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR Y PHASE AMPS • OAC Alarm: U1 GENERATOR Z PHASE AMPS • OAC Alarm: 230 KV Y BUS VOLTS • OAC Alarm: 230 KV R BUS VOLTS • Main Generator MVARs rise to outside of Generator Capability Curve • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/C-5, EXCITATION LIMITER IN ACTION (≈5 minutes after event)


AP/1/A/5500/05, GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRICAL GRID DISTURBANCES

CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2

RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Ensure dispatcher is aware of problem.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact SOC. Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge. As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

CRS (Step 3) Notify Unit 2 to evaluate implementing AP/2/A/5500/05 (Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances).

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO, acknowledge.



RO (Step 4) Check Unit 1 Generator – TIED TO GRID.

CRS (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine load to maintain reactor power less than 100%.


RO (Step 6) Check Unit 1 Generator frequency- GREATER THAN 58.5 Hz.

RO (Step 7) Monitor Generator Capability Curve as follows:

NOTE: The RO or BOP will most likely place Curve on OAC Screen.

• Check Generator voltage – LESS THAN 24 KV.

NOTE: The Generator voltage will be ≈22 KV.

• Check OAC – IN SERVICE.

• Monitor Generator Capability Curve PER OAC turn on code “GENCAP”.

RO (Step 8) Check Generator MVARs – WITHIN LIMITS OF GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE.

NOTE: The MVARs will NOT be within the capability curve.


RO (Step 11) Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve by performing one of the following:

• Depress “LOWER” on the “VOLTAGE ADJUST” to reduce lagging MVARs.

NOTE: This adjustment should be effective at controlling MVARs.

OR

• Depress “RAISE” on the “VOLTAGE ADJUST” to reduce leading MVARs.



RO (Step 12) Check Generator MVARs – WITHIN LIMITS OF GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE.

NOTE: The adjustment of the Voltage Regulator in AUTO occurs slowly and the operator may interpret the adjustment as ineffective. If so, MANUAL adjustment may be made using the Step 12 RNO. Regardless, adjustment of the Voltage Regulator in AUTO and/or MANUAL will return MVARs to within the limits of the Capability Curve.

RO (Step 12 RNO) IF actions in Step 11 do not restore MVARs, THEN perform the following:

• IF voltage regulator in “AUTO”, THEN perform the following:

• Place voltage regulator in “MAN”.

• Adjust MVARs to within the capability curve.

• IF unable to maintain MVARs within curve, …

NOTE: IF needed, the MVARs will be able to be adjusted with the Voltage Regulator in MANUAL.

RO (Step 13) Monitor Generator frequency as follows:

• Check generator frequency – BETWEEN 59.9 – 60.1 Hz.

• IF AT ANY TIME generator frequency is abnormal OR TCC/SOC reports abnormal grid frequency condition, THEN GO TO Step 13d.


CRS • GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 16) Check if voltage regulator malfunction has occurred:

• Generator MVARs – FLUCTUATED WITHOUT A KNOWN GRID DISTURBANCE IN EFFECT



• OAC turn on code "MAINGEN" - INDICATES PROBLEM WITH VOLTAGE REGULATOR

• "VOLTAGE REGULATOR COMMON TROUBLE" alarm (1AD-1, D-4) - LIT.


CRS (Step 20) Check if TCC or SOC has reported any of the following:

• “Real Time Contingency Analysis” (RTCA) indicated that switchyard voltage would not be adequate should the unit trip.

OR

• “Real Time Contingency Analysis” (RTCA) indicates that switchyard voltage would not be adequate if further grid degradation occurs.

OR

• Red grid condition exists or is predicted within the next 24 hours.

OR

• Degraded 230 KV switchyard (grid) voltage or frequency condition exists.

NOTE: if NOT already done, As SOC, Booth Instructor report Electrical Grid voltage disturbances are occurring.

CRS (Step 21) Notify Work Window Manager or STA to perform the following in electronic risk assessment tool:

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the Voltage regulator failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

• Enter PRA code OSSA_GRID for expected duration of event.

• Evaluated results.



CRS (Step 22) Evaluate rescheduling work on the following equipment during degraded grid condition time frame:

NOTE: The CRS will determine that there are no effects on this equipment.

• Emergency D/Gs

• Vital or Aux Control Power Systems

• SSF equipment

CRS (Step 23) Evaluate the following:

• Stopping any ongoing surveillance testing.

• Stopping any ongoing maintenance activities.

• Returning systems to normal/functional status.

RO (Step 24) Check Unit 1 Generator – TIED TO GRID.

CRS/RO

(Step 25) IF AT ANY TIME TCC reports that “Real Time Contingency Analysis” (RTCA) indicates 230 KV switchyard (grid) voltage would not be adequate should Unit 1 trip, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (RTCA Actions with Unit One On-line).


CRS (Step 26) IF AT ANY TIME offsite power is inoperable, THEN REFER TO the following Tech Specs:


CRS (Step 27) WHEN conditions return to normal, THEN perform the following:


• Check Generator frequency – HAS REMAINED GREATER THAN 58.5 HZ.

• Check Unit 1 Generator – TIED TO GRID.



• Ensure Unit 1 Generator Bus Voltage is adjusted PER Data Book, Enclosure 4.3, Table 3.1.3, “Generator Voltage Operating Schedule”, including any operational restrictions.

CRS Exit this AP. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

NOTE: It is possible that the crew will initiate a down power to clear the high Generator Amperage alarms on the OAC.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 36 of 62 Event Description: IPB Fan Failure/Rapid Downpower

Following this, both IPB Fans will fail. The crew will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE, and perform a rapid downpower in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/04, “Rapid Downpower.” Booth Operator Instructions: Insert LOA-IPB001 and IPB002 = OFF Indications Available: • MCB Annunciator 1AD11/I-5; IPB TROUBLE • MCB Annunciator 1AD11/J-5; IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE • OAC Alarm 1A IPB Blower OFF • OAC Alarm 1B IPB Blower OFF


ARP1AD-11/J5, IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE

CRS (Step 1) IF load rejection… NOTE: A load rejection is NOT occurring.

CRS/BOP

(Step 2) Send operator to IPB Alarm Panel to determine and acknowledge the alarm.

BOP (Step 3) IF a zone lockout occurred, …. NOTE: A Zone Lockout has NOT occurred.

BOP (Step 4) IF both fans off, perform the following within 15 minutes:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to take this action. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge. Within 2 min report that neither IPB Fan will start.

• Place fan in “AUTO” to “MAN”.

• IF neither fan will start, go to AP/1/A/5000/004 (Rapid Down Power) and reduce Turbine Generator until the following obtained:

• 20,000 amps for double Busline (Approximately 700 MWs, 58% RTP)


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 10,000 amps for single Busline

(approximately 350 MWs, 30% RTP)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4.

AP/1/A/5500/04, RAPID DOWNPOWER

RO/ BOP

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

Uncontrolled Cooldown (If Tavg < 551°F and lowering…..Not Expected)

Power Factor (Adjust power factor during load reduction to maintain power factor between 0.9 to 1.0 lagging, using "VOLTAGE ADJUST" pushbutton)

NOTE: The RO will adjust MVARS as needed.

Manual Rod Control Criteria ( < C-5, Not Expected)

Turbine Shutdown (Turbine Load < 15 MWe Not Expected)

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control – IN AUTO.

RO (Step 4) Check “MW LOOP” – IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress “MW IN/MW OUT” pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 – DESIRED.

CRS (Step 5 RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 8 and GO TO Step 8.



CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power reduction rate (MW/min).

NOTE: The CRS will reduce load at ≈30-60 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods – IN AUTO. NOTE: The Control Rods may or may not be in AUTO. If not, the RO will perform the Step 9 RNO and place the Control Rods in AUTO.

RO (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:

• IF auto control available, THEN perform the following:

• Place control rods in auto.

• GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

• Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS • Check unit to be shutdown – VIA REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

NOTE: It is normal practice to shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.

BOP • Determine boration amount based on the following:

• Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

• Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

• Total Power change (%).



• Record calculated boration amount: NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is ≈ 500-700 gallons.

RO • Check auto or manual rod control – AVAILABLE.

BOP • Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.7. Other Examiners follow AP-4 Actions, Step 13, on Page 40.

OP/1/A/6150/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING 1NV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)

BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Evaluate energizing additional pressurizer heaters per OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation) to enhance system mixing when changing NC System boron concentration. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:

• Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid

BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid

• Ensure one of the following running:

• 1A BA Trans Pump

OR

• 1B BA Trans Pump



• Determine length of time 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.)

BOP • IF using Table 4.7-1 (Time 1NV-265B Full Open With One BAT Pump Running), record time 1NV-265B full open from table:_____sec.

• IF using equation, perform the following:

• Calculate time 1NV-265 is to to be Full Open.

• Open 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

• HOLD until 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

• IF 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) will NOT close…

• IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:

• Ensure the following off:



• Ensure one of the following selected to “AUTO”:


OR






RO (Step 13) Check control rods – MOVING IN AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN T-AVG AT T-REF.

RO (Step 14) Display Rod Insertion Limits on OAC by entering turn on code “RIL”.

CRS (Step 15) IF AT ANY TIME "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, B-9) is lit, THEN perform one of the following to comply with Tech Spec 3.1.6 (Control Bank Insertion Limits)


• Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

OR

• Initiate boration as necessary within one hour to restore control rods above insertion limits.

CRS (Step 16) IF AT ANY TIME during this procedure C-7A is received, THEN ensure Transient Monitor freeze is triggered.


CRS (Step 17) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

• RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency)

• RP/0/A/5700/010 (NRC Immediate Notification Requirements).

CRS (Step 18) Notify Reactor Engineer on duty of load reduction.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RE to address the load reduction. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE.



Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration. If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration and then proceed to the next event.

RO (Step 19) Check target load ‑ LESS THAN 1000 MW.

RO (Step 20) Check Unit 2 available to supply aux steam as follows:

• Unit 2 Reactor power ‑ GREATER THAN 15%

• Unit 2 2AS‑12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol) ‑ OPEN

• Unit 2 ‑ AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS HEADER.

RO (Step 21) Check SM flow on all S/Gs ‑ GREATER THAN 25%.

RO (Step 22) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure the following valves ramp CLOSED:

• 1CF‑104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF‑105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF‑106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF‑107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass).

RO/ CRS

(Step 23) WHEN P/R instruments indicate less than 48%, THEN check "P‑8 HI PWR LO FLO RX TRIP BLOCKED" status light (1SI‑18) ‑ LIT.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #7-11.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 7, 8, 9, 10 &

11 Page 43 of 62

Event Description: Both CF Pumps Roll Back to Low Speed/Turbine fails to Trip in

AUTO and MANUAL/ C-9 fails to Actuate/1A Safety Valve Sticks OPEN/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO/Man/1ETB Lockout/1D Steam Break in Containment/ TD CA Pump is Restored

During the downpower, both CF Pumps will rollback to LOW Speed causing a low level condition in all Steam Generators. On the ensuing Rx Trip, the Main Turbine will fail to trip in both Auto and Manual, and the operator will need to manually close the Governor Valves. On the trip, the Steam Dumps will fail to actuate due to a C-9 failure and the SG PORVs will open to control steam pressure. Since the 1A SG PORV is isolated, a 1A SG Safety Valve will open instead, and stick about 60% open. Simultaneously, a lockout will occur on 1ETB and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start either automatically or manually and result in a total loss of CA flow. 30 seconds later a Major Steam Line Break will occur on the 1D Steamline in Containment. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation; and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, “Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,” based on no CA flow. When 3 of 4 Steam Generator Wide Range levels are < 36%), the operator will initiate NCS Feed and Bleed. Once NCS Feed and Bleed is established, the TDCA Pump will be returned to service, and the operator will restore CA flow to the 1B and/or 1C Steam Generator per Step 7 of FR-H.1. The scenario will terminate at Step 39 of FR-H.1, with the crew feeding at least one Steam Generator to restore Wide Range Level to > 12% (17% ACC). Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-DCS1418 insert MAL-DCS1479 Indications Available: • Feed Flow indication on all SGs less than Steam Flow indication. • MCB Annunciator 1AD4-C1(-4), S/G A(-D) FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW • 1A CF Pump speed is lowering. • 1B CF Pump speed is lowering.


EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION

RO/ BOP

(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page. NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• All rod bottom lights – LIT


11 Page 44 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Reactor trip and bypass breakers –

OPEN

• I/R power – GOING DOWN.

RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• All throttle valves – CLOSED.

RO (Step 3 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action

• Trip turbine

• IF turbine will not trip, THEN perform the following:

• Place turbine in manual.

• CLOSE governor valves in fast action.

• IF governor valves will not close, THEN….

Critical Task: Manually trip the Main Turbine prior to completing the Immediate Actions of E-0 Safety Significance: Failure to trip the Main Turbine when required causes a challenge to the Subcriticality/Integrity Critical Safety Function that otherwise would not or may not exist. This mis-operation by the operator necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates an inability by the operator to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.

BOP (Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB – ENERGIZED.

Immediate Action

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:

• IF both busses de‑energized, THEN…. NOTE: Bus 1ETA is energized.


11 Page 45 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore

power to de‑energized bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure.

RO/ BOP

(Step 5) Check if S/I is actuated: Immediate Action

• “SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED” status light (1SI-18) – LIT.

• Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) – LIT.

CRS/RO/ BOP

Foldout Page:

NC Pump Trip Criteria

CA Suction Sources

Position Criteria for 1NV‑150B and 1NV‑151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

Ruptured S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria

Faulted S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria

CRS (Step 6) Announce “Unit 1 Safety Injection”. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) – LIT.


11 Page 46 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A “RESET” lights –

DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):

• Groups 1, 2, 5 – DARK.

• Group 3 – LIT.

• Group 4 – LIT AS REQUIRED.



RO/ BOP

(Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

• MD CA pumps – ON. NOTE: Both MD CA Pumps are OFF, and cannot be started.

RO/ BOP

(Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to evaluate the MD CA Pumps. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. Wait 3 Minutes and report that neither pump is running.

RO/ BOP

• N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs – GREATER THAN 17%.

RO/ BOP

(Step 10.b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump on. NOTE: The TD CA Pump is OOS.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps – ON.


11 Page 47 of 62





• Start pumps.

• IF all KC pumps running, THEN….

• IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD‑6, THEN stop all NC pumps.

NOTE: The BOP will stop the NCPs.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps – ON.


• Start pump(s).

• IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following:

• IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN…..

CRS • IF affected train is deenergized, AND its D/G is off, THEN GO TO Step 13.

CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report “2A RN Pump is running.”

• Start 2A RN pump.

• THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant condition.

Booth Instructor: insert LOA-RN087 (Start 2A RN Pump) insert LOA-RN083 8050.000000 delay=0 ramp=10 (Unit 2 Train A Demand Flow)

RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures – GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

NOTE: The 1D S/G as a minimum will be < 775 psig.


11 Page 48 of 62





• Check the following valves closed:

• All MSIVs

• All MSIV Bypass Valves

• All SM PORVs.

• IF any valve open, THEN……

BOP (Step 15) Check Containment Pressure – HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

NOTE: Containment Pressure is > 3 psig.


• Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit

• IF Group 7 window is dark on energized train(s), THEN…..

• Stop all NC pumps while maintaining seal injection flow.

• Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off.

• Energize H2 Igniters by depressing "ON" and "OVERRIDE".

• Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G‑1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De‑energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use LOA-NF016 = STOP.

• WHEN time allows, THEN check Phase B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 2 (Phase B HVAC Equipment).

NOTE: The CRS may direct the U2 BOP to perform this. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

BOP (Step 16) Check S/I flow:


11 Page 49 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Check “NV PMPS TO COLD LEG

FLOW” gauge – INDICATING FLOW.

• Check NC pressure – LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

BOP (Step 16b RNO) Perform the following:

• Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:

• 1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)

CRS • IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.

CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.

RO/ BOP

(Step 18) Check CA flow:

• Total CA flow – GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

NOTE: There is NO CA flow.

RO/ BOP

(Step 18 RNO) Perform the following:

• IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% (32% ACC), THEN perform the following:

• Ensure correct valve alignment.

• Start CA pumps.

• IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% (32% ACC) AND feed flow greater than 450 GPM cannot be established, THEN perform the following:


11 Page 50 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Implement EP/1/A/5000/F‑0 (Critical

Safety Function Status Trees).

• GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FR‑H.1 (Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FR-H.1.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

CRS (Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 GPM due to operator action, THEN RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

CRS (Caution prior to Step 2) If a non‑faulted S/G is available, then feed flow should only be established to non‑faulted S/G(s) in subsequent steps.

NOTE: When feed flow becomes available, the CRS will ensure that feed is initiated to the 1B or 1C S/G ONLY.

RO/ BOP

(Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is required:

NC pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE.

Any NC T-Hot - GREATER THAN 350°F (347°F ACC).

RO/ BOP

(Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.

• NC System Feed and Bleed Criteria (Applies after Step 2 in the body of the procedure)

• IF W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs goes below 24% (36% ACC), THEN GO TO Step 22 in the body of the procedure.

NOTE: This Criteria will most likely apply at this time.

• Cold Leg Recirc Switchover Criteria


11 Page 51 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • CA Suction Sources

BOP (Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps - AVAILABLE:

1A NV pump

OR

1B NV pump

RO/ BOP

(Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:

• Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs LESS THAN 24% (36% ACC).

CRS • GO TO Step 22. NOTE: This Criteria will most likely apply at this time.

CRS (Step 22) Perform Steps 23 through 27 quickly to establish NC heat removal by NC feed and bleed.

BOP (Step 23) Ensure all NC pumps - OFF. NOTE: The NCPs should be OFF at this time.

BOP (Step 24) Initiate S/I. NOTE: SI is already actuated.

BOP (Step 25) Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" - INDICATING FLOW.

BOP (Step 26) Establish NC System bleed path as follows:


11 Page 52 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Check all Pzr PORV isolation valves -

OPEN. NOTE: There is no power available to the Train B PORV Isolation valves, however each of these valves were OPEN prior to the loss of power to 1ETB (OAC will indicate that ALL PORV isolation valves are OPEN).

• Select "OPEN" on two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve.

• Align N2 to Pzr PORVs by OPENING the following valves:

• 1NI-430A (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1NC-34A)

• 1NI-431B (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1NC-32B & 36B).

• Check power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves - AVAILABLE.

NOTE: There is no power available to the Train B PORV Isolation valves.

BOP (Step 26.d RNO) Perform the following:

• Evaluate cause of power loss and initiate actions to restore power to affected isolation valve(s).

• WHEN power is restored, THEN perform the following:


• OPEN Pzr PORV isolation valves.

• Ensure two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve are OPENED.

BOP (Step 27) Check two Pzr PORVs and associated isolation valves - OPEN.


11 Page 53 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task: Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases. Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a “Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.” Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

BOP (Step 28) Isolate NV Recirc flowpath as follows:

• CLOSE the following valves:

• 1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

• 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol).

• Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.

RO/ BOP

(Step 29) Establish containment H2 mitigation as follows:

Check EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS) - HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

CRS (Step 29.a RNO) GO TO Step 29.c.


11 Page 54 of 62




RO/ BOP

Check EP/1/A/5000/FR-C.1 (Response To Inadequate Core Cooling) – HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

CRS (Step 29.c RNO) GO TO Step 29.e.

BOP (Step 30) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:

• Place A, B, and D Pzr heaters in manual and off.

• Open "C PZR HTR GRP SUP BKR".

BOP • Energize H2 Igniters by depressing "ON" and "OVERRIDE".

• Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).


RO/ BOP

(Step 31) Have another licensed operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 15 (Subsequent S/I Actions) while continuing with this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO to perform this action. If so, RO Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 15. Other Examiners follow FR-H.1 Actions, Step 32, on Page 57.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK ENCLOSURE 15, SUBSEQUENT S/I ACTIONS

RO/ BOP

(Step 1) Check 1ETA and 1ETB - ENERGIZED.


11 Page 55 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • IF both busses de-energized, THEN

• WHEN time allows, THEN try to restore power to de-energized bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power) while continuing with this procedure.

RO/ BOP

(Step 2) Check Phase A "RESET" lights - DARK.

RO/ BOP

(Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):





• GO TO Step 4.

RO/ BOP

(Step 4) Check all KC pumps - ON.

RO/ BOP


• Start pumps.


• IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD‑6, THEN stop all NC pumps.

NOTE: All NCPs are OFF.

RO/ BOP

(Step 5) Check both RN pumps - ON.


11 Page 56 of 62




RO/ BOP


• Start pump(s).

• IF any RN pump off, THEN perform the following:

• IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN…..

• IF affected train is deenergized, AND its D/G is off, THEN GO TO Step 6.

RO/ BOP

(Step 6) Notify Unit 2 to perform the following:

• Start 2A RN pump. NOTE: The RO/BOP will ask the U2 operator to report the status of the U2 RN System. Floor Instructor: Report the 2A RN Pump is running, and that flow has been throttled to MINIMUM.

• THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant conditions.

RO/ BOP

(Step 7) Check all S/G pressures – GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.

RO/ BOP


• Check the following valves closed:

• All MSIVs

• All MSIV Bypass Valves

• All SM PORVs.


11 Page 57 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • IF any valve open, THEN……

RO/ BOP

(Step 8) Reset Phase A Isolation.

RO/ BOP

(Step 9) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I).

EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 32) Maintain NC System heat removal by performing the following:

• Maintain S/I flow.

• Maintain two Pzr PORV flowpaths - OPEN.

BOP (Step 33) Reset the following:

• S/I.

• Sequencers.

• IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on.


BOP (Step 34) Check containment pressure:

• Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 34.a RNO) Perform the following:

• Check Monitor Light Panel Group 7 lit.


11 Page 58 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • IF Group 7 window is dark on energized

train(s), THEN…..

• Reestablish VI to containment as follows:

• Ensure Phase B reset.

• OPEN the following valves: NOTE: These valves are powered by B Train and have no power. However, the valves were open prior to the Loss of Power, and VI header pressure is normal.

• 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)

• 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol)

• 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

• IF VI header pressure is less than 85 PSIG, THEN….

• IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure a Phase B reoccurs, THEN perform the following:

• Reset Phase B.

• OPEN 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

• OPEN 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

• OPEN 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).

• Ensure all RV pumps are in manual and off.

• Check Phase B HVAC equipment PER Enclosure 16 (Phase B HVAC Equipment).

NOTE: The CRS will direct the BOP to perform Enclosure 16 (Not-Scripted – Checks ONLY).

• IF AT ANY TIME containment pressure is greater than 20 PSIG…..

CRS • GO TO Step 36


11 Page 59 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Booth Operator Instructions: As WCCS call the CRS and report that

the TD CA Pump Stop Valve is ready to be reset, and that personnel are standing by take this action.

When directed by CRS, Insert MAL-SM029 = 1, ramped over 60 seconds.

BOP (Step 36) Check containment H2 concentration:

• Ensure Operator dispatched to stop Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).


• Check H2 analyzers - IN SERVICE.

CRS (Step 36.b RNO) Perform the following:

• Dispatch operator to place H2 analyzers in service PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 5 (Placing H2 Analyzers In Service).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

• WHEN H2 analyzers in service, THEN complete Steps 36.c and 36.d.


• GO TO Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Align CA control valves as follows, to ensure flow will be reestablished in a controlled manner:

• Reset CA modulating valves.

• CLOSE all CA flow control valves from MD and TD CA pumps.

CRS (Step 38) Continue attempts to establish secondary heat sink in at least one S/G:


11 Page 60 of 62



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • CA flow PER Step 7 NOTE: The CRS attempt to

start the TD CA Pump using Step 7.

RO/ BOP

(Step 7) Attempt to establish CA flow to at least one S/G as follows:

• Check power to both MD CA pumps - AVAILABLE.

• IF 1ETA OR 1ETB deenergized, THEN restore power to the affected essential bus PER AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power).

• IF the essential bus is energized, THEN dispatch operator to determine cause of breaker failure.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

• Ensure control room CA valves aligned PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment).

NOTE: The CRS will direct the BOP to perform Enclosure 4 (Not-Scripted – Checks ONLY).

• Start all available CA pumps.

• Check TD CA pump - RUNNING. NOTE: The CRS will coordinate with the WCCS to start the TDCA Pump. Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCS. Insert MAL-SM029 = 1, ramped over 60 seconds.

• Check total flow to S/G(s) – GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 7.e RNO) Perform the following:

• IF only one MD CA pump is on,…..

• IF any CA pump is started, AND Step 37 has been implemented, THEN GO TO Step 7.h.


11 Page 61 of 62




RO/ BOP

• Check any S/G W/R level - LESS THAN 12% (17% ACC).

• Check core exit T/Cs - STABLE OR GOING DOWN.

NOTE: It is likely that CETs are rising. If NOT, the crew will perform Step 7.j, scripted below.

• Perform the following:

• THROTTLE OPEN CA control valve to one S/G to establish flow rate required to lower core exit T/Cs.

• IF core exit T/Cs continue to go up, THEN THROTTLE OPEN CA control valve to feed another S/G as required to lower core exit T/Cs.

RO/ BOP

(Step 7.j) Slowly THROTTLE OPEN CA control valve to one S/G to establish feed flow less than or equal to 100 GPM.

NOTE: If the CETs are stable or lowering above, this step will be pereformed.

Critical Task: Establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator before transition out of FR-H.1. Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow into at least one Steam Generator results in the crew having to rely upon the lower-priority action of having to remain in RCS Bleed and Feed to minimize the possibility of core uncovery. Failure to perform this task, when able to do so, constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

UNIT 1 STATUS:

Power Level: 100% NCS [B] 935 ppm Pzr [B]: 935 ppm Xe: Per OAC

Power History: At this power level for 178 days Core Burnup: 250 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/003 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:

• The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to

continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: • The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. • 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-9, E-2, “B COLD LEG ACCUMULATOR ABNORMAL PRESSURE,”

has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating).

Crew Directions: • The crew will perform PT/1/A/4600/001, “RCCA Movement Test” upon taking the shift,

starting with the movement of Shutdown Bank A and continuing in the order identified in Section 12.6 of PT/1/A/4600/001.

• IAE Technician Ralph is standing by at the Rod Control Power Cabinets to assist at X2608. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB) Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)


PORVs)” (Amendment 221/203) 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System” (Amendment

221/203) 3. OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation” (Rev 196) 4. OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control” (Rev 126) 5. OP/1/A/6300/001A, “Turbine Generator Load Change” (Rev 12) 6. AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction” (Rev 16) 7. AP/1/A/5500/20, “Rod Control Malfunction” (Rev 33) 8. Technical Specification 3.7.7, “Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)” (Amendment

184/166) 9. Technical Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources - Operating” (Amendment 184/166) 10. AP/1/A/5500/11, “Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies” (Rev 11) 11. Technical Specification 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from

Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits” (Amendment 219/201) 12. AP/1/A/5500/03, “Load Rejection” (Rev 30) 13. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection” (Rev 34) 14. EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, “Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS” (Rev 15) 15. EP/1/A/5000/E-2, “Faulted Steam Generator Isolation” (Rev 10) 16. EP/1/A/5000/E-1, “Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant” (Rev 16) 17. EP/1/A/5000/E-3, “Steam Generator Tube Rupture” (Rev 24) Validation Time: 107 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________ Rev. 040615

- 1 -




(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, “BB DEMIN PNL TRBL,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No.

Malf. No.




2 MAL

DCS1214 C-RO C-SRO


3

REM

RN0018B C-BOP C(TS)-SRO


4 MAL

DCSSLIM06D/G

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO


5 MAL

LF003B IRE009 SG001A

C-RO C-BOP C-SRO


6 REM

SM007AB MAL

IPE001A/B IPE002A/B SG001A SM004A

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO


7 MAL

CA004A CA005

C-BOP C-SRO



- 2 -


McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, “BB DEMIN PNL TRBL,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.19, “Simple Dilution,” of OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control,” and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, “Turbine-Generator Load Change.” After the load increase is started, the Control Rods will fail such that rods are moving outward in AUTO. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction.” The control rods will subsequently remain in MANUAL. After this, the 1B RN Pump Suction Isolation valve will inadvertently CLOSE. The operator will respond using one or more Annunciator Response Procedures and ultimately enter AP/1/A/5500/20, “Loss of RN,” to place the standby train in service. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, “Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS),” and LCO 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating.” Next, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, “Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.” Subsequently, the 1B CF Pump will trip causing the turbine to automatically runback to 55%. Simultaneously, a 40 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur in the 1A Steam Generator. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, “Load Rejection.” During the runback the operator will need to drive rods in manually. When the plant is stabilized or AP10 is entered to mitigate the SGTL, the 1A MSIV will inadvertently CLOSE, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, the low set Safety Valve on the 1A Steam Generator will lift and stick fully OPEN. Additionally, the TD CA Pump will trip on overspeed on auto start, and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, “Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.” During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will continuously drive rods in manually, successfully trip the Reactor locally, and manually start the 1A MDCA Pump and establish 450 gpm of flow the Steam Generators. The Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a tube rupture in the 1A Steam Generator when the reactor is locally tripped. - 3 -


After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, “Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.” After the 1A Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, “Steam Generator Tube Rupture.” The scenario will terminate at Step 6 of E-3 after the operator has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-3.1, “SGTR with Subcooled Recovery Desired,” or at Step 9 of E-3 upon initiating an NCS cooldown. Critical Tasks: Manually close the Failed OPEN Pzr Spray Valve before the Pressurizer pressure drops to ≤ 1945 psig. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect NCS pressure control. Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2). Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. Start the 1A MD CA Pump before transition out of FRS-.1, unless the transition is made to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS. Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition. Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before an unwarranted Red Path occurs on Subcriticality or NCS Integrity. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

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T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-37): insert LOA-CA010 = RACKED OUT; insert LOA-CA010A = RACKED OUT; (1B MDCA Pump is OOS)







insert OVR-1AD3_F05 = OFF (MCB Annunciator 1AD3/F5)

From IC-239


Insert MAL-IPE001A = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPE001B = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPE002A = TRUE (ATWS)

Insert MAL-IPE002B = TRUE (ATWS)

insert MAL-CA004A = AUTO (1A MDCA Pump Start Failure [auto]) insert MAL-CA005 TRIP cd='H_X02_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (TDCA Overspeed Trip occurs on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light)

insert SM004A3 = 100 cd='H_X02_070_3 EQ 1' delay=0 (Safety Valve on 1A SG sticks OPEN on A MSIV CLOSE Indicating Light)

insert MAL-SG001A = 300 cd='H_X01_094_2 EQ 1' delay=0 (300 gpm SGTR occurs on 1A SG on Reactor Trip Breaker Open Indicating Light)

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RUN

Reset all SLIMs

Place Tagout/O-Stick on: 1B MDCA Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5 (O-stick)


NOTE: RMWST DO = >1000 ppb.

Freeze.




RUN

Crew Briefing


2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003 marked up as follows:

• Step 2.3 initialed. • Note prior to Step 3.1 checked. • Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.2 initialed. • Step 3.3 initialed. • Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.37.10 is entered. • Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.3.4 Initialed. • Step 3.37.12 is NA. • Step 3.37.13 is NA.

4. Provide the crew with OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control) and OP/1/A/6300/1 A

(Turbine-Generator Load Change). 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

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Event 1



Event 2

insert MAL-DCS1214 = TRUE



Event 3

insert REM-RN0018B_1=0, Ramp = 30 seconds



Event 4

insertMAL-DCSSLIM06G BUTTON_DEPRESSED

insertMAL-DCSSLIM06D BUTTON_DEPRESSED

deleteMAL-DCSSLIM06G = 2, delay 10 seconds

deleteMAL-DCSSLIM06D = 2, delay = 30 seconds



Event 5

insert MAL-LF003B = TRUE

insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO

insert MAL-SG001A = 40, Ramp = 600 seconds


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Event 6

insert REM-SM007AB =0.0 Ramp = 10 seconds

insert: MAL-IPE001A MAL-IPE001B MAL-IPE002A MAL-IPE002B insert MAL-SM004A = 1

Insert MAL-SG001A = 300


Note: Malfunctions inserted at T = 0.



Note: Malfunctions inserted at T = 0.


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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 64 Event Description: Power Increase w/Simple Dilute

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.37.10 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.19, “Simple Dilution,” of OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control,” and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, “Turbine-Generator Load Change.” Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA


OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATIONS ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE

CRS (Step 3.37.10) Prior to increasing to greater than 75% RTP, check all governor valves open.

NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.

RO/ BOP

(Step 3.37.11) WHEN 77-80% RTP, enable, OTDT DCS alarming as follows:

NOTE: Based on the extent of the power increase, this action may or may not be taken.

• On DCS graphics, select “MAINTENANCE MENU”.

• Select “TAVG, DELTA T INPUTS & ALARM CHECKING” graphic.

• Select “ON” for the following:

• NCAA 5422

• NCAA 5462

• NCAA 5502

• NCAA 5542

• OTDELTAT-FAIL

(Step 3.37.12) IF startup from refueling outage…..


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.37.13) IF performing

Generator/Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) testing at 78% RTP…

OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.19, SIMPLE DILUTE


NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.


BOP (Step 3.5) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.3. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.6) Select “DILUTE” on “NC Sys M/U Controller”.

BOP (Step 3.7) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.7.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.7.2) Select “HUT” on 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Contrl).

NOTE: The BOP may do this at any time to lower VCT level.

(Step 3.7.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.

(Step 3.7.4) AFTER desired level achieved, select “AUTO” on 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3.8) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.8.1) Place “NC System Make Up” to

“STOP”. (R.M.)

(Step 3.8.2) IF 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to “AUTO”.

BOP (Step 3.9) Momentarily select “START” on “NC System Make Up”. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.10) Check “NC System Make Up” red light lit.

BOP (Step 3.11) Check 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.12) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

BOP (Step 3.13) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

BOP (Step 3.14) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.15) HOLD until one of the following occurs:

• Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added

OR

• Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated

BOP (Step 3.16) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.16.1) IF in “AUTO”, ensure the

following off:

• 1A Rx M/U Water Pump

• 1B Rx M/U Water Pump

BOP (Step 3.16.2) Ensure the following closed:

• 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)

• 1NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl)

BOP (Step 3.17) Ensure 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in “AUTO”.

BOP (Step 3.18) IF desired to flush blender…. NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

BOP (Step 3.19) Select “AUTO” for “NC Sys M/U Controller”.

BOP (Step 3.20) Momentarily select “START” on “NC System Make Up”.


BOP (Step 3.22) Ensure the following reset to zero: (R.M.)

• Total Make Up Flow Counter

• Boric Acid Flow Counter

BOP (Step 3.23) Record in Narrative Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.



OP/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE

RO (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in “OPERATOR AUTO”, perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within “Calculated Capability Curve”.

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

(Step 3.5.1.3) Depress “LOAD RATE”.

(Step 3.5.2.4) Enter desired load rate in “VARIABLE DISPLAY”.

NOTE: the RO will select 2 MWe/Min loading rate.

(Step 3.5.1.5) Depress “ENTER”.

(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress “REFERENCE”.

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in “VARIABLE DISPLAY”.


(Step 3.5.1.9) Depress “GO”

(Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.


CRS (Step 3.37.13) Continue power increase to 95% RTP.

NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 64 Event Description: Uncontrolled outward Rod Motion in AUTO

After the load increase is started, the Control Rods will fail such that rods are moving outward in AUTO. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction.” The control rods will subsequently remain in MANUAL. Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-DCS1214 = TRUE Indications Available: • Rods stepping out continuously with no demand.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: When the malfunction

is diagnosed the CRS may go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION

RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped or misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN…..

Immediate Action NOTE: No control rods dropped during this event.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action

RO (Step 3) Check rod movement – STOPPED. Immediate Action NOTE: There was no rod motion when the Rods were taken to Manual.

RO (Step 4) Check all rods – ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 5) Check “ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE” alarm (1AD-2, A-10) – DARK.

RO (Step 6) Check “T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP” alarm (1AD-2, B-7) – DARK.

RO (Step7) IF this AP entered due to unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, THEN GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).

NOTE: The SRO will transition to AP-14, Enclosure 3.



AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS ROD MOVEMENT

CRS (Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system.

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS (Step 2) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Rod Control malfunction. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 3) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:

• Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur

• Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactor’s response.

RO (Step 4) Check T-Ref indication – NORMAL.

RO (Step 5) Do not move rods until IAE determines rod motion is permissible.

RO (Step 6) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of programmed T-Ref as follows:

• Adjust Turbine load NOTE: The RO will adjust Turbine Load as needed to maintain T-avg.

OR

• Borate/dilute NC System.



RO (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME a runback occurs while in this procedure, THEN observe the following guidance:


• IF IAE has determined that it is permissible to move rods, THEN respond to the runback PER AP/1/A/5500/03 (Load Rejection).

• For all other circumstances, assume rod control is not available and respond to the runback as follows:

• Trip Reactor.

• GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).

RO (Step 8) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure a unit shutdown is required AND rods cannot be moved, THEN perform the following:


• Borate as required during shutdown to maintain T-Avg at T-Ref.

• Monitor AFD during load reduction.

• IF AT ANY TIME AFD reaches Tech Spec limit AND reactor power is greater than 50%, THEN perform the following:

• Trip Reactor.


NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. After 5 minutes, report that the Control Rods must be kept in MANUAL, and that they can move rods in MANUAL as needed.



RO (Step 9) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:



Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 64 Event Description: 1B RN Pump Suction Valve inadvertently CLOSES

After this, the 1B RN Pump Suction Isolation valve will inadvertently CLOSE. The operator will respond using one or more Annunciator Response Procedures and ultimately enter AP/1/A/5500/20, “Loss of RN,” to place the standby train in service. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, “Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS),” and LCO 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating.” Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-RN0018B_1 = 0, Ramped = 30

seconds Indications Available: • OAC Alarm M1Q0180, 1RN18B RN PUMP SUCTION ISOL, alarms. • Numerous MCB Annunciator 1AD12 alarms associated with RN. • 1RN-18B Green status light is LIT. • Low flow in RN header.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: If the load increase has

been restarted, the RO will likely stop the load increase.

AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN

BOP (Step 1) Check for potential loss of LLI as follows:

• Check Unit 2 RN pump(s) that are aligned to LLI – OPERATING PROPERLY.

Floor Instructor: If asked, As U2 RO report “2A RN Pump is running properly.”

• Check suction flowpath – AVAILABLE.

NOTE: The crew should recognize that the LLI flowpath is available, but that the Suction Valve to the 1B RN Pump has closed, and continue to Step 2.

CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-20 has been entered. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.



BOP (Step 3) Check Any RN pump – ON. NOTE: The crew should recognize that the 1B RN Pump is operating with its suction valve closed and stop the pump. This will result in both RN pumps being OFF.


• IF strainer fouling has not occurred, THEN GO TO Step 6.

BOP (Step 6) Place RN train in service as follows:

• Check both RN pumps ‑ OFF.

• Check idle RN train – AVAILABLE TO START.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO.

• Start one train of RN as follows:

• To start 1A RN pump perform the following:

• Ensure flowpath available.

• Place manual loader for 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to 10% OPEN.

• Start 1A RN pump. NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A RN Pump.

• Ensure the following valve for train being started – OPEN.

• 1RN-86A (A KC Hx Inlet Isol).

• Check the following cross-tie valves – OPEN:

• 1RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol)

• 1RN-41B (Train B TO Non Ess Hdr Isol)


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess

Hdr Isol).

• Ensure malfunctioning RN pump is off.

BOP • Check if local venting of RN pump has been performed PER one of the following:

NOTE: Local venting of RN pump has NOT been performed.

• Enclosure 5 (1A RN Pump Venting)

OR

• Enclosure 6 (1B RN Pump Venting).

CRS (Step 6.g RNO) GO TO Step 6.i.

BOP • Check Enclosure 7 (NV Pump Cooling Via Gravity Drain To Sump) – HAS BEEN PERFORMED.

NOTE: Enclosure 7 has NOT been performed.

CRS (Step 6.i RNO) GO TO Sep 6.k

BOP • Check Case II (Loss of Low Level or RC Supply Crossover) – HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

NOTE: Case II has NOT been performed.

CRS (Step 6.kj RNO) GO TO Step 7.

BOP (Step 7) Ensure cooling to KC as follows:

BOP • Check 1A KC pump(s) – RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train of KC is operating.

CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.h.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP • Check 1B KC pump(s) – RUNNING.

BOP • Ensure 1B KC pumps aligned to reactor bldg non essential header as follows:


• 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

• 1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).


• 1KC-230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

• 1KC-3A (Trn A Rx bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

BOP • Check 1B RN pump – OFF.

BOP • Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) – LOCALLY THROTTLED DURING THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: 1RN-187B has NOT been locally throttled.

BOP (Step 7.k RNO) Perform the following:

• • IF VI header pressure is less than 60 PSIG, THEN….

• • Place 1RN-187B “MODE SELECT” switch to manual.

• OPEN 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol).

• THROTTLE 1RN‑89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to maintain 1A RN pump discharge pressure greater than 50 PSIG.

• IF 1A RN pump discharge pressure is greater than 50 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 8.

BOP (Step 8) Maintain RN flow within operating limits as follows:

• Check VI header pressure ‑ GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

• Check 1A RN pump ‑ RUNNING


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • THROTTLE 1RN‑89A (RN to A KC Hx

Control) to maintain 1A RN pump discharge pressure greater than 50 PSIG.

• Check 1A RN pump flow ‑ LESS THAN 14,000 GPM.

• Check 1B RN pump ‑ RUNNING.

BOP (Step 8.e RNO) GO TO Step 9.

BOP/CRS

(Step 9) Investigate reason for loss of RN train as follows:

• Dispatch operator to check RN pump.

• Dispatch operator to check RN pump breaker.

• Check suction flowpath alignment.

• Check discharge flowpath alignment. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction, and request that the 1B RN Pump Breaker be racked out. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and indicate that the 1B RN Pump Breaker will be Racked Out. Use: LOA-RN006 = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump BKR) LOA-RN006A = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump Cntrl Pwr)


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 10) Ensure Control Room Area Chiller

in service PER Enclosure 2 (VC/YC Operation).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO to perform this action, or have the BOP perform these actions prior to continuing with Step 11. If actions are performed in parallel, Appropriate Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2. Other Examiners follow AP-20 Actions, Step 11, below.

AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 2, VC/YC OPERATION

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 3 if RO is assigned by CRS to perform.

RO/ BOP

(Step 1) Check train selected Control Room Area Chiller – ON.

NOTE: The Chiller is expected to be ON. If not, the RO/BOP will take action per the RNO to restart the Chiller.

AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN CASE I, LOSS OF OPERATING RN TRAIN

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 11) Align operating train of equipment with running RN pump as follows:

• Check 1A RN pump – ON.

• Check the following equipment – ON:

• 1A1 and 1A2 KC pumps - ON

CRS (Step 11.b RNO) GO TO Step 11.i


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11.i) Perform one of the following as

necessary to align operating RN train with train of equipment cooled by RN:

• Swap operating equipment to opposite train as follows:

• IF desired to swap KC trains, THEN perform Enclosure 1 (Shifting KC Trains).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to Enclosure 1.

AP/1/A/5500/20, LOSS OF RN ENCLOSURE 1, SHIFTING KC TRAINS

BOP (Step 1) Limit KC flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in subsequent steps.

BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

• 1RN-40A (Train A To Non Ess Hdr Isol) - OPEN

• 1RN-41B (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) - OPEN

• 1RN-43A (Train B To Non Ess Hdr Isol) - OPEN

• Any KC pump – RUNNING. NOTE: The B Train KC Pumps are operating.


BOP (Step 5) Check both ND pumps – OFF.

CRS (Step 6) Perform the following:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • IF shifting from 1A KC Train to 1B KC

Train,… NOTE: The crew will be shifting from 1B KC Train to 1A KC Train.

OR

• IF shifting from 1B KC Train to 1A KC Train, THEN GO TO Step 22.

BOP (Step 22) THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to establish desired flow to 1A KC Hx, while maintaining 1A RN pump discharge pressure greater than 50 psig.

BOP (Step 23) Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the “AUTO” position.

BOP (Step 24) Ensure 1KC-51A OPENS.

BOP (Step 25) Start 1A1 KC pump. NOTE: The CRS may contact the AO to start the pumps. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO.

BOP (Step 26) Start 1A2 KC pump.

BOP (Step 27) Align Reactor Bldg header to 1A Train as follows:


• 1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol)



• 1KC-228B (Trn B Rx Bldg non Ess Sup Isol)


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1KC-18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess

Ret Isol).

BOP (Step 28) Check both ND pumps – OFF.

BOP (Step 29) Place 1RN-187B “MODE SELECT” switch to auto.

BOP (Step 30) Check 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 31) WHEN RN flow through the 1B KC Hx begins to go down, THEN THROTTLE OPEN 1RN-89A (RN to A KC Hx Control) to achieve desired flow rate while maintaining the following:

• 1A RN pump discharge pressure ‑GREATER THAN 50 PSIG

• 1A RN pump flow ‑ LESS THAN 14,000 GPM.

BOP (Step 32) Place 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in “CLOSE”.

BOP (Step 33) Ensure 1KC-54B is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 34) Stop the following pumps:

• 1B1 KC pump

• 1B2 KC pump.

BOP (Step 35) Ensure NC pump thermal barrier isolation valves are OPEN.

BOP (Step 36) RETURN TO step in effect in body of this procedure.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will return to

the main body of AP-20. Examiner NOTE: Because there are still AP-related actions to take with this procedure, the CRS may NOT address the TS at the time. Consequently, it may be necessary to move to next event, and address the TS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

CRS 3.7.7 Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)

CRS LCO 3.7.7 Two NSWS trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. A. One NSWS

train inoperable.

A.1 Restore NSWS train to OPERABLE status.

72 hours

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES - OPERATING

CRS 3.8.1 AC Source - Operating

CRS LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Two qualified circuits between the offsite

transmission network and the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power System AND

• Two diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying the Onsite Essential Auxiliary Power Systems AND

• The automatic load sequencers for Train A and Train B shall be OPERABLE.


CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1, B.2, B3.1 or B.3.2 and B.4 must be entered.

B. One DG

inoperable.

B.1 Perform

SR 3.8.1.1 for the offsite circuit(s).

AND B.2 Declare

required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine

OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to

1 hour AND Once per 8 hours thereafter 4 hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours



common cause failure.

OR

B.3.2 Perform

SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.

AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status.

24 hours 72 hours * AND 6 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO *


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 30 of 64 Event Description: Pzr Spray Valve (1NC-27) Controller fails OPEN

Next, the Pzr Spray Valve Controller, 1NC-27C A Spray, demand will fail to full output. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/11, “Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.” Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-DCSSLIM06G BUTTON_DEPRESSED insertMAL-DCSSLIM06D BUTTON_DEPRESSED deleteMAL-DCSSLIM06G = 2, delay 10 seconds deleteMAL-DCSSLIM06D = 2, delay 30 seconds Indications Available: • NCS/Pzr pressure lowers • OAC Alarm: U1 PZR PRESS I through IV • 1NC-27C SLIMs LS indication 50 or 100% • MCB Annunciator 1AD6/C-6 PZR LO PRESS CONTROL


NOTE: The BOP may take all the necessary actions in the Immediate Actions, before CRS reads AOP.

AP/1/A/5500/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ANOMALIES

BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr pressure – HAS GONE DOWN.

Immediate Action

BOP (Step 2) Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED. Immediate Action

BOP (Step 3) Check Pzr spray valves - CLOSED Immediate Action

BOP (Step 3 RNO) CLOSE Pzr spray valve(s).


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task: Manually close the Failed OPEN Pzr Spray Valve before the Pressurizer pressure drops to ≤ 1945 psig. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect NCS pressure control.

BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr spray valves – CLOSED.

NOTE: IF the BOP has already used the EMERG SWITCH, the CRS may answer YES, and continue to Step 6. If NOT, the Step 5 RNO will be performed.

CRS (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray to PZR Isol) – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 8) Check the following Pzr heaters – ON:

• 1A

• 1B

• 1D

BOP (Step 9) Check 1C Pzr heaters – ON.



BOP (Step 10) Check “PZR PRESS MASTER” – IN AUTO.

BOP (Step 11) Check “1NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE” switch – SELECTED TO “NORMAL”.

NOTE: In order to close the malfunctioning Spray Valve, the BOP had to take the EMERG SWITCH to CLOSE.

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Notify station management to ensure switch restored to “NORMAL” once spray valve is repaired.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Station Management to address the switch position. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

BOP (Step 12) Check “1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE” switch – SELECTED TO “NORMAL”.

BOP (Step 13) Check Pzr pressure – GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.

CRS (Step 14) Exit this procedure. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.


TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS

CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

NOTE: If NC System Pressure drops to < 2216 psig on the failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.



CRS ACTIONS

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION

COMPLETION TIME

A. Pressurizer pressure or RCS average temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

A.1 Restore DNB parameter(s) to within limit.

2 hours


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 34 of 64 Event Description: 1B CF Pump Trip/SGTL/Turbine Runback w/rods in Manual

Subsequently, the 1B CF Pump will trip causing the turbine to automatically runback to 55%. Simultaneously, a 40 gpm Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur in the 1A Steam Generator. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, “Load Rejection.” During the runback the operator will need to drive rods in manually.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-LF003B = TRUE Insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO Insert MAL-SG001A = 40

Indications Available: • 1B CF Pump Trips. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, D6, DEH TURBINE RUNBACK, alarms. • Turbine Generator MWe lowering. • MCB Annunciator 1RAD-1, C-1, 1EMF 71 S/G A LEAKAGE HI RAD • MCB Annunciator 1RAD-1, D-1, 1EMF 72 S/G B LEAKAGE HI RAD • MCB Annunciator 1RAD-1, D-2, 1EMF 73 S/G C LEAKAGE HI RAD • MCB Annunciator 1RAD-1, D-3, 1EMF 74 S/G D LEAKAGE HI RAD


AP/1/A/5500/03, LOAD REJECTION

RO (Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto. Immediate Action NOTE: Rods are in MANUAL from a previous malfunction and will NOT work in AUTO.

RO (Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:

• Check Generator – TIED TO GRID.

• Check Generator output – GOING DOWN AS REQUIRED.

RO (Step 3) Check control rod response as follows:

• Check control banks – MOVING IN AS REQUIRED.

NOTE: Rods are in MANUAL from a previous malfunction and will NOT work in AUTO.



RO (Step 3a RNO) IF no rods will move in auto; THEN perform the following:

• Place Control Rods in manual.

• Insert rods to reduce T-avg equal to programmed T-Ref.

• If no rods will move, THEN….. NOTE: The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.

RO • Check all rods – ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 3b RNO) IF two or more control rods are misaligned greater that 24 steps…

BOP (Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

• Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps – RUNNING.

• 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass control) – OPEN.

RO (Step 5) IF runback to 56% power in effect, THEN ensure turbine inlet pressure going down to less than or equal to 500 PSIG.

CRS (Step 6) Announce: “UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG”.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-3 has been entered. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check P/R meters – LESS THAN 20%.



CRS / RO


• Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

• IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will designate the RO to observe this action.


RO (Step 9) Check condenser dump valves – MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 10) Check “IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE” alarm (1AD-11, J-5) – DARK.

BOP (Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control response as follows:

• Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.

• Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

NOTE: 1NC-27C is NOT in AUTO due to a previous malfunction.

• Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.

• Check Pzr spray control valves - CLOSED

RO (Step 12) Check load rejection – DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

NOTE: The load rejection was due to a Loss of CF Pump.

CRS (Step 13) Dispatch operator as necessary to determine cause of CF pump trip.




BOP (Step 14) Ensure in service CF pump properly responds in auto as follows:

• Monitor in service CF pump discharge pressure.

• "1A CF PUMP DISCHARGE PRESS" (OAC point M1A1108).

OR

• "1B CF PUMP DISCHARGE PRESS" (OAC point M1A1114).

• Monitor S/G N/R Levels.

• IF AT ANY TIME any of the following occurs:


• "CF PUMP DISCHARGE HI PRESS" 1AD‑8, A‑4 alarms (Setpoint at 1335 PSIG),

OR

• S/G N/R level approaches Hi Hi level (83%),

OR

• S/G N/R level approaches Lo Lo level (17%).

• THEN take manual control of in service CF pump as follows:

• Place low pressure governor control in manual.

• Place high pressure governor control in manual

• Adjust CF pump speed to maintain CF header pressure 100‑120 PSIG above steam header pressure.

• Do not continue until the following are satisfied:

• In service CF pump discharge pressure is stable.

• S/G levels are at setpoint.

RO (Step 15) Check turbine inlet pressure – LESS THAN 340 PSIG.




• IF AT ANY TIME turbine inlet pressure drops to less than 340 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 16.


RO (Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:

• Check Generator Breakers – EITHER GENERATOR BREAKERS CLOSED.

• Check Generator – TIED TO GRID.

• Check generator power factor – 0.9 TO 1.0 LAGGING.


CRS (Step 20) Ensure the following have been implemented:




RO (Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may enter AP10 to address the SGTL at any point once it is determined that the transient is over. If so, move to Events 6-7.

• Check reactor power – GREATER THAN 40%.

• Check the following on in service CF pump(s):

• Low pressure governor control – IN AUTO

• High pressure governor control – IN AUTO.



• Check SM flow on all S/Gs – LESS THAN 75%.

NOTE: SM flow is ≈ 60%.

• Check SM flow on all S/Gs – LESS THAN 25%.

NOTE: SM flow is ≈ 60%.

RO (Step 21d RNO) Perform the following:

• Check the following CF control bypass valves – CLOSED:

• 1CF-104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED

• 1CF-105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED

• 1CF-106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED

• 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass) - CLOSED

RO • IF any CF control bypass valve is open… NOTE: All CF control bypass valves are closed.

CRS • GO TO Step 21.f.

BOP • Slowly CLOSE 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.

NOTE: The BOP will close 1CM-420.

• WHEN 1CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn on code “CM”).

• Reposition manual loader for 1CM-420 to 100% OPEN.

NOTE: The BOP will open 1CM-420.

• IF thermal power is greater than 15%, THEN within 4 hours of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.

• Check T-Avg – GREATER THAN 561°F.



• Check “CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT” alarm (1AD-2, B-9) – DARK.

• Check “CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT” alarm (1AD-2, A-9) – DARK.

NOTE: 1AD-2, A-9 may be LIT. If so, the operator will perform Step 21.I RNO.

RO (Step 21.l RNO) Ensure the “CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT” alarm clears as Xenon builds in.

RO (Step 22) Check load rejection – DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.

NOTE: The load rejection was NOT due to a Loss of CF Pump.


BOP (Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running plant equipment as follows:

BOP • Condensate Booster pumps and place in auto.

NOTE: The BOP may stop one Condensate Booster Pump.

• Hotwell pumps and place in auto. NOTE: The BOP may stop one Hotwell Pump.

• IF desired to secure, THEN dispatch operator to shutdown PER OP/1/B/6250/004 (Feedwater Heater Vents, Drains and Bleed System) Enclosure 4.2 (System Shutdown) the following:


• Unit 1 C Heater Drain Tank pumps

• Unit 1 G Heater Drain Tank pumps.



CRS (Step 25) IF power change greater than 15% in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to perform required Tech Spec sampling.

NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry to address the power decrease. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

RO (Step 26) WHEN condenser dump valves closed AND no longer required for temperature control, THEN reset C-7A using “STEAM DUMP SELECT” switch.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 & 7 Page 42 of 64 Event Description: 1A MSIV fails CLOSED/ 1A SG SV fails OPEN/ATWS/SGTR/ TD CA

Pump Overspeed Trip/1A MD CA Pumps fails to start in AUTO

When the plant is stabilized or AP10 is entered to mitigate the SGTL, the 1A MSIV will inadvertently CLOSE, and the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually. Additionally, the low set Safety Valve on the 1A Steam Generator will lift and stick fully OPEN. Additionally, the TD CA Pump will trip on overspeed on auto start, and the 1A MDCA Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and then transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, “Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.” During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will continuously drive rods in manually, successfully trip the Reactor locally, and manually start the 1A MDCA Pump and establish 450 gpm of flow the Steam Generators. The Steam Generator Tube Leak will degrade to a tube rupture in the 1A Steam Generator when the reactor is locally tripped. After completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition back to E-0, and then to EP/1/A/5000/E-2, “Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.” After the 1A Steam Generator is isolated, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, “Steam Generator Tube Rupture.” The scenario will terminate at Step 6 of E-3 after the operator has transitioned to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-3.1, “SGTR with Subcooled Recovery Desired,” or at Step 9 of E-3 upon initiating an NCS cooldown. Booth Operator Instructions: Insert REM-SM007AB (MSIV

Closure) Insert MAL-SG001A 300

delay=20 ramp=60 (S/G 1A Tube Rupture)

Indications Available: • 1SM7AB Green status light is LIT. • 1A SG Steam Flow lowering. • 1A SG Feedflow lowering. • 1A SG Narrow Range Level is lowering.



RO/ BOP







• Reactor trip and bypass breakers – OPEN

• I/R amps – GOING DOWN.


• Trip reactor.

RO • IF reactor will not trip, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to locally trip the reactor. If so, Booth Instructor After 30 seconds insert: LOA-IPE011=TRIP (Rx Trip Bkr 1A) LOA-IPE012=TRIP (Rx Trip Bkr 1B) As an Alternate Insert: LOA-IRE001A = OPEN (MG Set 1A Gen Output Bkr) LOA-IRE002A = OPEN (MG Set 1B Gen Output Bkr)

• Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS • GO TO EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1 (Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FR-S.1.

EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS


• All rod bottom lights - LIT

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers - OPEN





Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Trip the reactor.

• IF reactor will not trip, THEN manually insert rods.

NOTE: The RO will manually drive Rods inward.

Critical Task: Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2). Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine Trip:


RO/ BOP


Cold Leg Recirc Switchover Criteria

CA Suction Sources


BOP (Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:

• MD CA pumps – ON. NOTE: The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS. The 1A MDCA Pump has failed to AUTO start.

BOP (Step 4.a RNO) Start pumps. NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A MDCA Pump.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP • Check N/R Level in at least 3 S/Gs –

GREATER THAN 17%.

Critical Task: Start the 1A MD CA Pump before transition out of FRS-.1, unless the transition is made to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, and then before the NCPs are manually tripped to limit heat input to the RCS. Safety Significance: Failure to establish a Secondary Heat Sink through the initiation of CA flow unnecessarily challenges both the HEAT SINK and the CORE COOLING Critical Safety Functions. Additionally, the FSAR Safety Analysis results are predicated on the assumption that at least one train of safeguards actuates and delivers a minimum amount of AFW flow to the Steam Generators. Failure to perform this task, when the ability to do so exists, results in a violation of the Facility License Condition and places the plant in an unanalyzed condition.

BOP (Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System as follows:

• Ensure one NV pump - ON

• Align boration flowpath as follows:

• Open 1NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps).

• Start both boric acid transfer pumps.

• Check emergency boration flow – GREATER THAN 30 GPM.

• Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:

• 1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) – OPEN.

• 1NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) – OPEN.

• Ensure charging flow is greater than emergency Boration flow.

• Check Pzr pressure – LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:

• CLOSE 1VQ-1A (U1 Cont Air Release Inside Isol)

• CLOSE 1VQ-6A (U1 Cont Air Addition Inside Isol)

• CLOSE 1VQ-2B (U1 Cont Air Release Outside Isol)

• CLOSE 1VQ-5B (U1 Cont Air Addition Outside Isol)

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:


• Have another Licensed Operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3 (Subsequent S/I Actions).

CRS • Continue with this procedure.

RO (Step 8) Check if the following trips have occurred:

• Reactor trip.

• Turbine trip.

RO (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:

• P/R channels – LESS THAN 5%

• W/R Neutron Flux – LESS THAN 5%

• I/R SUR – NEGATIVE.

CRS (Step 10 ) GO TO Step 17.

RO (Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin as follows:



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Obtain current NC boron concentration

from Primary Chemistry. NOTE: The CRS/RO may call Chemistry. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

• WHEN current NC boron concentration is obtained, THEN perform shutdown margin calculation PER OP/0/A/6100/006 (Reactivity Balance Calculation).

NOTE: The CRS may ask the U2 RO to perform this action. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

• WHEN following conditions satisfied, THEN NC System boration may be stopped:


• Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.

• Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped.


• RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).


CRS (Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS will transition back to E-0.


RO/ BOP












Immediate Action

RO/ BOP




Examiner NOTE: SI will most likely NOT be actuated at this time, however, plant conditions will not permit SI to be avoided. If the crew transitions to ES-0.1, observe crew activities and continue with the script when SI is actuated.

RO/ BOP

Foldout Page


CA Suction Sources






Faulted S/G Aux Feedwater Isolation Criteria NOTE: The BOP will diagnose that 1A S/G is faulted and isolate CA flow to the S/G.

• IF all of the following conditions met, THEN stop CA flow to affected S/G:

• S/G pressure going down in an uncontrolled manner or completely depressurized

• Only one S/G is diagnosed as faulted

• Secondary heat sink:

• N/R level in at least one S/G ‑ GREATER THAN 11%(32% ACC)

OR

• Total feed flow to S/Gs ‑ GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 6) Announce “Unit 1 Safety Injection”. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) – LIT.

BOP (Step 8) Check Phase A “RESET” lights – DARK.

BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on Energized train(s):







• Group 6 – LIT. NOTE: Group 6 lights may NOT be LIT due to the previously failed RN Pump.


RO (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

• MD CA pumps – ON.

BOP (Step 10.a) Start pumps. NOTE: The BOP will start the 1A MDCA Pump.

BOP • N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs – GREATER THAN 17%.

BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps – ON.

BOP (Step 12) Check both RN pumps – ON. NOTE: The 1B RN Pump may have been rendered inoperable due to a previous malfunction. If not, the CRS may contact the WCCS/dispatch an AO to stop the pump by opening the breaker. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and indicate that the 1B RN Pump Breaker will be Racked Out. Use: LOA-RN006 = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump BKR) LOA-RN006A = Racked_Out (1B RN Pump Cntrl Pwr)


• Start pump(s).




• IF 1A RN pump is off, THEN….

• IF affected train is deenergized, AND it’s D/G is off, THEN……

• Reset the following on affected train:

• S/I.

• Sequencer.

• Dispatch operator to stop affected D/G using emergency stop pushbutton.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as the AO, and use LOA-DG004 = STOP_DG to stop the 1B D/G.

• Monitor affected RN cooled components and shut down as necessary.




• THROTTLE Unit 2 RN flow to minimum for existing plant condition.



NOTE: 1A S/G is faulted, and may be less than 775 psig (Crew may perform RNO).


NOTE: Containment Pressure is normal.





• Check “NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW” gauge – INDICATING FLOW.



• Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) OPEN:


• 1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).




RO/ BOP



RO/ BOP

(Step 18.a RNO) Perform the following:

• IF N/R level in all S/Gs is less than 11% (32% ACC), THEN…..

BOP • Check VI header pressure – GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO/ BOP

• WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.





RO (Step 19) Check NC temperatures:

• IF any NC pumps on…

OR

• IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds – STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

(Step 19 RNO) Perform the following based on plant conditions:

• IF temperature less than 557°F AND going down, THEN attempt to stop Cooldown PER Enclosure 3 (Uncontrolled NC System Cooldown).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO (BOP) to perform this action. If so, RO (BOP) Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 3. Other Examiners follow E-0 Actions, Step 20, on Page 55.

EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ENCLOSURE 3, UNCONTROLLED NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 1) Check steam dump valves – CLOSED.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 2) Check all SM PORVs – CLOSED.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 3) Check MSR “RESET” light - LIT

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 4) Check any NC pump – ON.




RO/ (BOP)

(Step 5) Check NC T‑Avg ‑ GOING DOWN.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 6) Control feed flow as follows:

• IF S/G N/R level is less than 11% (32% ACC) in all S/Gs, …

• WHEN N/r level is greater than 11% (32% ACC) in at least one S/G, THEN THROTTLE feed flow further to:

• Minimize cooldown

• Maintain at least one S/G N/R level greater than 11% (32%ACC).

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 7) Check MSIVs – ANY OPEN.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 8) CLOSE 1SM-15 (U1 SM to MSR 2nd Stg Tube Bundles Isol).

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 9) Check any NC pump – ON.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 10) Check NC T‑Avg ‑ STABLE.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 10 RNO) IF cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE the following valves:

• All MSIVs

• All MSIV Bypass Valves.

RO/ (BOP)

(Step 11) Notify Control Room Supervisor of the following:




• NC temperature trend

• Status of MSIV and Bypass Valves.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO(BOP) continue HERE.


BOP (RO)

(Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:

• All Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.

• Normal Pzr spray valves – CLOSED. NOTE: 1NC-27 is most likely closed using the Emergency CLOSE Switch.

BOP (RO)

(Step 20.b) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

• CLOSE spray valve(s)

• IF spray valve(s) cannot be closed, THEN…..

BOP (RO)

• At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve-OPEN.

BOP (RO)

(Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F.

BOP (RO)

(Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

• All S/G pressures – STABLE OR GOING UP

• All S/Gs – PRESSURIZED.

CRS (Step 22 RNO) IF any S/G is faulted, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The 1A S/G is faulted.




• Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

• GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-2 (Faulted Steam Generator Isolation).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-2.

EP/1/A/5000/E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION

RO/ BOP


Cold Leg Recirc Switchover Criteria

CA Suction Sources

Position Criteria for 1NV-150B and 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

CRS (Step 2) Maintain any faulted S/G or secondary break isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for NC System cooldown.

RO (Step 3) Check the following – CLOSED:

• All MSIVs

• All MSIV bypass valves.

RO (Step 4) Check at least one S/G pressure – STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Although all SG pressures may be decreasing slowly, the operator will report stable based on plant conditions (i.e. faulted SG). Otherwise a transition to ECA-2.1 will be made.

RO/ BOP

(Step 5) Identify faulted S/G(s): NOTE: The 1A SG is Faulted.




• Any S/G pressure – GOING DOWN IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

OR

• Any S/G – DEPRESSURIZED.

RO (Step 6) Maintain at least one S/G available for NC System cooldown in subsequent steps.

RO (Step 7) Check faulted S/G(s) SM PORV – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 8) Reset CA modulating valves.

RO/ BOP

(Step 9) Isolate faulted S/G(s) as follows:

RO/ BOP

• For 1A S/G:

• Check “S/G A FDW ISOLATED” status light (1SI-4) – LIT.

• Close 1CA-66AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol).

• Close 1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol).

• Check BB valves – CLOSED:

• 1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control)

• 1BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

• Close 1SM-83 (A SM Line Drain Isol).



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task: Isolate CA flow to the Faulted Steam Generator before an unwarranted Red Path occurs on Subcriticality or NCS Integrity. Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a Faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to the Critical Safety Functions that may not otherwise occur. Failure to isolate flow could result in an unwarranted Orange or Red Path condition on NC Integrity and/or Subcriticality (if cooldown is allowed to continue uncontrollably).

RO (Step 10) Close 1AS-12 (U1 SM To AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol).

RO/ BOP

(Step 11) Check S/G tubes intact as follows:

• Check the following EMF’s – NORMAL: NOTE: 1EMF-24 is likely in TRIP2.

• 1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)

• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)

• 1EMF-25 (S/G B)

• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)

• 1EMF-27 (S/G D).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture)

NOTE: The CRS will transition to E-3.

EP/1/A/5000/E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

RO/ BOP



S/I Reinitiation Criteria




Secondary Integrity Criteria

Cold Leg Switchover Criteria

CA Suction Sources

Multiple Tube Rupture Criteria:

Position Criteria for 1NV-150B and 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation)

BOP (Step 2) Identify ruptured S/G(s):

• Any S/G N/R level – GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

OR

• Chemistry or RP has determined ruptured S/G.

NOTE: The CRS may contact Chemistry for sampling. Booth Instructor: Acknowledge as appropriate.

OR

• Any of the following EMFs – ABOVE NORMAL:

NOTE: 1EMF-24 is likely in TRIP2.

• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)

• 1EMF-25 (S/G B)

• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)

• 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

RO (Step 3) Check at least one S/G – AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.

RO (Step 4) Isolate flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows:

• Check ruptured S/G(s) PORV – CLOSED.

• Check S/Gs 1B and 1C – INTACT. NOTE: The 1A SG is NOT Intact.




RO • Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured S/G/(s) – CLOSED.

• For 1A S/G:

• 1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control)

• 1BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).

BOP • CLOSE steam drain on ruptured S/G(s)

• 1SM-83 (A SM Line Drain Isol)

RO • CLOSE the following valves on ruptured S/G(s):

• MSIV

• MSIV bypass valve.

RO (Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows:

• Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level – GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

BOP • Isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):

BOP (Step 5.a) Perform the following:

• IF any ruptured S/G is also faulted, THEN do not establish feed flow to the ruptured S/G unless needed for NC System cooldown.

NOTE: The 1A S/G is NOT needed for cooldown.

• IF any ruptured S/G is non‑faulted OR is required for cooldown, THEN….





RO (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s) pressure – GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.

Examiner NOTE: The 1A S/G may be less than 280 psig. IF so, the crew will transition to ECA-3.1, at which time the Exam should be terminated. If not, continue in E-3 until the NCS cooldown is started.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump – RUNNING.

BOP (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG.

RO (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:

CRS • Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured S/G pressure:

300 - 399 psig - 362°F 280 - 299 psig - 353°F

NOTE: The CRS will likely determine the target temperature to be 362 or 353oF.

RO • Check the following valves on ruptured S/G(s) – CLOSED:

• MSIV

• MSIV bypass valve.

RO • Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV – CLOSED.

RO • Check S/G(s) 1B and 1C – INTACT. NOTE: The 1A SG is ruptured.

RO (Step 9.e) Check condenser available:

• “C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP” status light (1SI-18) – LIT

• MSIV on intact S/G(s) ‑ OPEN.




RO (Step 9.e RNO) GO TO RNO for Step 9.h.

CRS (Step 9.h RNO)

Perform the following:

BOP • Ensure at least one Pzr PORV isolation valve is OPEN

• IF VI is lost, OR a Phase B Isolation has occurred, THEN…..

NOTE: VI is NOT lost.

• IF Pzr pressure is greater than 1955 PSIG, THEN depressurize to 1900 PSIG using Pzr PORV.

NOTE: Pzr pressure may be greater than 1955 psig. If NOT, not depressurization will be made.

• Depress "BLOCK" on Low Pressure Steamline Isolation block switches.

• Maintain NC pressure less than 1955 PSIG.

• Ensure Main Steam Isolation reset.

• Ensure SM PORVs reset.

• IF any intact S/G SM PORV isolation valve is closed, AND associated SM PORV is operable, THEN perform the following:

• OPEN SM PORV isolation valve.

• IF isolation valve will not open,……

• Dump steam using all intact S/G(s) SM PORVs at maximum rate as follows:

• CLOSE SM PORV manual loader on ruptured S/G(s).

• Place intact S/G SM PORV manual loaders at 50%.

• Select "MANUAL" on "SM PORV MODE SELECT".



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Adjust manual loaders on

intact S/G SM PORVs as required to control intact S/G depressurization rate at approximately 2 PSIG per second.


UNIT 1 STATUS:




continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: • The 1B MDCA Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in

accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 ACTION B. • The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. • 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-3, F-5, “BB DEMIN PNL TRBL,” has alarmed spuriously several times

over the last hour, and has currently failed OFF (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-2, KG PANEL TBL, is in alarm due to a field local panel alarm

relay. Crew Directions: • The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift, starting with Step 3.37.10 of

OP/1/A/6100/03. • Raise Turbine load at 2MWe/minute. • RE has recommended a 200 gallon initial Simple Dilution. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB) Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-3 REFERENCES: 1. Technical Specification 3.8.1, “AC Sources – Operating” (Amendment 221/203) 2. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, “Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG

PORVs)” (Amendment 221/203) 3. OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation” (Rev 196) 4. OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control” (Rev 126) 5. OP/1/A/6300/001A, “Turbine Generator Load Change” (Rev 12) 6. AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction” (Rev 16) 7. OP/1/A/6100/010 H “Annunciator Response For Panel 1AD-7” (Rev 65) 8. OP/1/A/6150/002A, “Reactor Coolant Pump Operation” (Rev 65) 9. AP/1/A/5500/01, “Steam Leak” (Rev 18) 10. Technical Specification 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from

Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits” (Amendment 219/201) 11. AP/1/A/5500/08, “Malfunction of NC Pump” (Rev 14) 12. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System” (Rev 145) 13. AP/1/A/5500/02, “Turbine Generator Trip” (Rev 28) 14. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection” (Rev 34) 15. EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, “Reactor Trip Response” (Rev 41) 16. AP/1/A/5500/38, “Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution” (Rev 11) 17. EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, “Loss of All AC Power” (Rev 35) Validation Time: 145 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________ Rev. 040615

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(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-12, E-2, “A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift.

Event No.

Malf. No.




2 MAL

IRE009 C-RO C-SRO


3 REM NV0461

C-BOP C-SRO


4 MAL

SM001D C-RO C(TS)-SRO


5 MAL NCP008B

C(TS)-SRO #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP

6 MAL

DEH001 C-RO C-SRO


7 MAL NCP008B NCP016C NCP015C

C-BOP #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades

8 MAL IRE010

C-BOP C-SRO


9

MAL EP002A EP002B DG001B

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO



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McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 40% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. The 1A SG PORV is leaking and isolated. The PORV has been declared inoperable and maintenance is being planned. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-12, E-2, “A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, “Alternate Dilute,” of OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control,” and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, “Turbine-Generator Load Change.” During the power increase, the operator will discover that the Control Rods will not respond in AUTO. The crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction,” and control rods in MANUAL. Because the crew may control the power increase such that an auto rod demand does not occur, this event may not be diagnosed until later. Shortly after starting the power increase, AD-7/B-2, “NC Pump B No. 2 Seal S-Pipe Lo Level,” will alarm. The operator will address the Annunciator Response Procedure, and then use Enclosure 4.3, “Filling and Draining NC Pump Standpipe,” of OP/1/A/6150/002A, “Reactor Coolant Pump Operation,” to refill the standpipe. After this, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will fail OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, “Steam Leak,” and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, “Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs),” and may enter LCO 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.” Subsequently, a #1 seal leak will develop on the 1B NCP such that #1 Seal leakoff flow is 5.0-5.5 gpm. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/08, “Malfunction of NC Pump,” and address Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” The control operators will be directed on the action to take should the #1 Seal Leakoff flow degrade to > 6 gpm (which will occur subsequently). Shortly afterwards, the Main Turbine will inadvertently trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, “Turbine Generator Trip.” The RO will need to operate the control rods manually. While the crew is in AP-2, the 1B Hi Vibration alarm will occur and the #1 seal leak flow on the 1B NCP will rise to 6 gpm. The operator go back to Step 8 of AP-8 (Continuous Action Step), and close the 1B NCP Pzr Spray Valve, manually trip the reactor and stop the 1B NCP when reactor power is < 5%. The crew will perform Enclosure 2, “NC Pump Post Trip Actions For #1 Seal Failure,” of AP8, while subsequently performing E-0.

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The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip. On the reactor trip four control rods will fail to fully insert. The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, “Reactor Trip Response,” and emergency borate per AP/1/A/5500/38, “Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution.” Immediately following the initiation of Emergency Boration, a loss of the Unit 1 Switchyard will occur, and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to start. The operator will immediately transition to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, “Loss of All AC Power.” The operator will restore power to 1ETA per Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB per Enclosure 14 “Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2 - SATA or SATB.” The scenario will terminate when one ESF Bus has been re-energized. Critical Tasks: Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%. Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates “mis-operation” or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS). Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes “mis-operation” or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s). Since the conditions existed to re-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.

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T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-18): insert MAL-EPQ001A ACTIVE (Loss of D/G A Control Power) insert LOA-DG020 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Control Power Fuses) insert LOA-DG011 RACKED_OUT (1A D/G Output Breaker Racked Out)







From IC-240


insert MAL-IRE010N9 (Shutdown Bank B-3 Stuck at original position) insert MAL-IRE010N11 (Shutdown Bank D-3 Stuck at original position) insert MAL-IRE010P10 Control Bank B-3 Stuck at original position) insert MAL-IRE010P12 Shutdown Bank A-3 Stuck at original position)

RUN

Reset all SLIMs

Place Tagout/O-Stick on: 1A EDG (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-12, E-2 (O-stick)



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Freeze.




RUN

Crew Briefing


2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003 marked up as follows:

• Step 2.3 initialed. • Note prior to Step 3.1 checked. • Step 3.1 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.2 initialed. • Step 3.3 initialed. • Step 3.3.1 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.3.2 Checkbox is checked, Step 3.35.14 is entered. • Step 3.3.3 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.3.4 Initialed. • Step 3.35 circled. • Step 3.35.1 Checkbox is checked. • Note prior to Step3.35.2 is checked. • Step 3.35.2 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.35.3 is NA. • Step 3.35.4 is initialed (Person Notified/Today’s time and date filled in). • Step 3.35.5 is circled. • Step 3.35.6 is initialed (Person Notified/Today’s time and date filled in). • Step 3.35.7 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.35.8 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.35.9 All four bullets initialed. • Step 3.35.10 Initialed, all three Checkboxes checked. • Step 3.35.10.1 Checkbox checked. • Step 3.35.10.2 Checkbox checked. • Step 3.35.11 Initialed. • Step 3.35.12 Initialed • Step 3.35.13 is initialed. • Step 3.35.13.1 Initialed, A&B Checkboxes checked, C initialed.

- 6 -



• Step 3.35.13.2 Checkbox checked. • Note prior to Step 3.35.14 is checked. • Step 3.35.14 Initialed, all four Checkboxes checked (Person Notified/Today’s time and date

filled in). • Step 3.35.15 Initialed • Step 3.35.15.1 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.35.15.2 Both Checkboxes checked. • Step 3.35.15.3 Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.35.15.4 Initialed. • Note prior to Step 3.35.15.5 is checked. • Step 3.35.15.5 Initialed. • Step 3.35.15.6 Initialed. • Step 3.35.15.7 Initialed. • Step 3.35.15.8 Initialed. • Notes prior to Step 3.35.15.9 are checked. • Caution prior to Step 3.35.15.9 is checked. • Step 3.35.15.9 A Three Checkboxes are checked. • Step 3.35.15.9 B Initialed. • Step 3.35.15.9 C Initialed. • Note prior to Step 3.35.15.10 is checked. • Step 3.35.15.10 LP GOV CNTRL is fully open Checkbox is checked. • Step 3.35.15.11 Initialed. • Step 3.35.15.11 A Initialed. • Step 3.35.15.11 B NA’d. • Step 3.35.15.12 NA’d. • Step 3.35.16 Initialed. • Caution prior to Step 3.35.17 is checked. • Step 3.35.15.17 NA’d. • Step 3.35.15.18 NA’d.

4. Provide the crew with OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control) and OP/1/A/6300/1 A

(Turbine-Generator Load Change). 5. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.





Event 1



Event 2

insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO


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Event 3

insertREM-NV0461 = 1.0 (Open Standpipe Drain Valve) delIA REM-NV0461 = 0.0 cd ‘cd ‘x10_152_5 =1 delay = 60 seconds (Closed Standpipe Drain Valve when MCB Annunciator 1AD-7 B-2L is LIT)



Event 4

insert MAL-SM001D = 100, ramp=10



Event 5

insertMAL-NCP008B=12, Ramp = 10 minutes

#1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP


Event 6

Insert MAL-DEH001



Event 7

Change Severity MAL-NCP008B=15 Ramp = 120 seconds insertMAL-NCP016C = 16 Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration) insertMAL-NCP015C = 11 Ramp = 120 seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration) H_X10_171_3 EQ1 (NCP 1B Breaker Green Status light ON), delIA MAL-NCP016C and 015C

#1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades

- 8 -



Rx Trip Event 8

Insert MAL-IRE010N9 MAL-IRE010N11 MAL-IRE010P10 MAL-IRE010P12


These malfunctions are inserted at T=0.

Post-Immediate Boration

Event 9

Insert MAL-EP002 AND EP002B = TRIP

Insert MAL-DG001B = TRUE



- 9 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 65 Event Description: Power Increase w/Alternate Dilute

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will commence a load increase to 100% starting with Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” The operator will dilute the NC System Boron concentration in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, “Alternate Dilute,” of OP/1/A/6150/009, “Boron Concentration Control,” and raise Turbine load in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001 A, “Turbine-Generator Load Change.” Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA



CRS (Step 3.35) Increase power to 50% RTP. NOTE: The power increase will be at 2 Mwe/minute.

RO/ BOP

(Step 3.35.19) Prior to 50% RTP, perform the following concurrently:

• Ensure proper secondary water chemistry for operation greater than 50% RTP.

• Evaluate air ejector off gas and nozzle operation per OP/1/B/6300/006 (Main Vacuum and Vacuum Priming System).

• Record highest value:

• 1A Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor

• Pilot Valve Counter

• 1B Main Generator Breaker Air Compressor

• Pilot Valve Counter

• Date/Time of counter readings

• Notify Engineering to calculate Main Generator Breaker air leakage using counter readings from Step 3.33.19 and Step 3.35.19.3.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Notify TCC (Transmission Control

Center) (382-9401 or 382-9402) to check amperage output balanced on both busses to switchyard.

• Maintain AFD within target band per OP/1/A/6100/022 (Unit 1 Data Book), Enclosure 4.3, Graph(s) 1.1.

• IF Power Range detectors have been replaced…..

• IF Initial Cycle Startup,…..

• IF NOT Initial Cycle Startup, check QPTR less than or equal to 1.02.

• Check "P-8 Hi Pwr Lo Flo Reactor Trip Blocked" dark. (1SI-18).

Booth Operator Instructions: After the first Alternate Dilute and the Turbine is being loaded, insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO

OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DILUTE

NOTE: The BOP may repeat this task as needed during the power increase.

BOP (Step 3.6) Determine amount of reactor makeup water needed to obtain desired boron concentration using McGuire Data Book, OAC, Reactor Group Guidance, or plant parameters (T-Ave, Steam Pressure, Xenon worth, etc.). (R.M.)

• Total Reactor Makeup Water: NOTE: Total makeup is 200 gallons.




BOP (Step 3.8) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.6. (R.M.)



BOP (Step 3.9) Select “ALTERNATE DILUTE” on “NC Sys M/U Controller”.

BOP (Step 3.10) IF desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control), select “CLOSED” on 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control).

BOP (Step 3.11) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow, adjust “Rx M/U Water Flow Control” setpoint to achieve desired flowrate.

NOTE: It is NOT desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow.

BOP (Step 3.12) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:

(Step 3.12.1) Place “Rx M/U Water Flow Control” in manual.

(Step 3.12.2) Adjust “Rx M/U Water Flow Control” output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.

BOP (Note prior to Step 3.13) IF desired to dilute with a constant flow rate as advised by engineering to minimize VCT +temperature decrease, it is preferred to allow 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filter Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) to auto divert on high level.

BOP (Step 3.13) IF AT ANY TIME it is desired to lower VCT level, perform the following:

(Step 3.13.1) Monitor Letdown Pressure.

(Step 3.13.2) Select “HUT” on 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Contrl).

NOTE: The BOP may do this at any time to lower VCT level.

(Step 3.13.3) IF Letdown Pressure increases greater than 20 psig, notify CRS.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.13.4) AFTER desired level achieved,

select “AUTO” on 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3.14) IF AT ANY TIME plant parameters require termination of dilution, perform the following:

(Step 3.14.1) Place “NC System Make Up” to “STOP”. (R.M.)

(Step 3.14.2) IF 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) was placed to HUT, place to “AUTO”.

BOP (Step 3.15) Momentarily select “START” on “NC System Make Up”. (R.M.)


BOP (Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control) open.

BOP (Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl) open or throttled as required.

BOP (Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control) in “AUTO”, check 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) open.

NOTE: 1NV-171A is NOT in AUTO.

BOP (Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.

BOP (Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.22) HOLD until one of the following

occurs:

• Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.6 added

OR

• Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated

BOP (Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)

(Step 3.23.1) IF in “AUTO”, ensure the following off:



BOP (Step 3.23.2) Ensure the following closed:

• 1NV-175A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Outlet Control)

• 1NV-252A (RX M/U Water Supply To U1 BA Blender Cntrl)

• 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender To VCT Inlet Control)

BOP (Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A (U1 Boric Acid Blender to VCT Inlet Control) in “AUTO”.

BOP (Step 3.25) Ensure “Rx M/U Water Flow Control” in “AUTO”. (R.M.)

BOP (Step 3.26) IF “Rx M.U Water Flow Control” adjusted per Step 3.11…

NOTE: The Rx M.U Water Flow Control was NOT adjusted.

BOP (Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filters Otlt to VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) in “AUTO”.



BOP (Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender…. NOTE: It is NOT desired to flush the blender.

BOP (Step 3.29) Select “AUTO” for “NC Sys M/U Controller”.

BOP (Step 3.30) Momentarily select “START” on “NC System Make Up”.





BOP (Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.

OP/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STARTUP/SHUTDOWN ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE

RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load

(Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in “OPERATOR AUTO”, perform the following:

(Step 3.5.1.1) Ensure desired change within “Calculated Capability Curve”.

(Step 3.5.1.2) IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

NOTE: The BOP will notify the Load Dispatcher.

(Step 3.5.1.3) Depress “LOAD RATE”.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 3.5.1.4) Enter desired load rate in

“VARIABLE DISPLAY”. NOTE: the RO will select 2 Mwe/Min loading rate.


(Step 3.5.1.6) Depress “REFERENCE”.

(Step 3.5.1.7) Enter desired load in “VARIABLE DISPLAY”.


(Step 3.5.1.9) Depress “GO”

(Step 3.5.1.10) Check load changes at selected rate.

WHEN the Auto Rod Control Failure is diagnosed, move to Event 2 OR, At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 17 of 65 Event Description: Control Rods fail to Move in Auto

During the power increase, the operator will discover that the Control Rods will not respond in AUTO. The crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction,” and control rods in MANUAL. Because the crew may control the power increase such that an auto rod demand does not occur, this event may not be diagnosed until later. Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-IRE009 = FAIL_OF_AUTO Indications Available: • White “RODS OUT” Rod Control Status light is LIT • Outward Rod direction arrow on the rod motion demand signal indicator. • OAC Alarm M1P1367, U1 TAVG-Tref HI 1.5°F

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The RO may go to

HOLD on the Turbine.


RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN……

Immediate Action NOTE: No control rods dropped or mialigned during this event.

RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action NOTE: The RO placed the rods in manual during the downpower when the malfunction occurred.

RO (Step 3) Check rod movement – STOPPED. Immediate Action

RO (Step 4) Check all rods – ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 5) Check “ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE” alarm (1AD-2, A-10) – DARK.

RO (Step 6) Check “T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP” alarm (1AD-2, B-7) – DARK.



RO (Step 7) IF this AP entered due to unwarranted rod insertion or withdrawal, THEN….

NOTE: The CRS entered AP14 because the Rods were NOT moving when required.

CRS (Step 8) IF this AP entered due to a failure of rods to withdraw or insert when required, THEN GO TO Enclosure 2 (Failure Of Rods To Move On Demand).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-14, Enclosure 2.

AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCTION ENCLOSURE 2, FAILURE OF RODS TO MOVE ON DEMAND



RO (Step 2) Maintain T-Avg within 1°F of T-Ref using any of the following methods:

NOTE: The RO will adjust Turbine Load to maintain Temperature and/or perform additional Alternate Dilutions. Later, after IAE has permitted the use of Manual Rod Control, the Crew will use a combination of Rods, Alternate Dilute and Turbine adjustments to maintain Tavg-Tref within the 1.5°F band.

• Borate/dilute NC System

OR

• Adjust Turbine load.



CRS (Step 3) Notify IAE to investigate problem. NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Rod Control malfunction. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 4) Check if rod control system failure has occurred as follows:

• ‘ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE” alarm (1AD-2, A-10) – LIT.

NOTE: The Urgent Failure light is DARK.


• If Manual Rod Control available, THEN rods can be used to maintain T-avg within 1oF of T-Ref.

Booth Instructor: as IAE, report that the use of Manual Rod Control ONLY is permitted.

• IF AT ANY TIME control rods do not move correctly in manual, THEN GO TO Step 5.



CRS (Step 8) Check if reactor control system failure has occurred as follows:

• “T-AVG/T-REF FAILURE ROD STOP” alarm (1AD-2, B-7) – LIT.

CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.

CRS (Step 9) WHEN rod control problem is repaired, OR Engineering determines that rod control malfunction will not affect auto rod motion, THEN ……

Examiner NOTE: IAE will NOT be able to fix the Auto Rod Control Malfunction. The rods will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 20 of 65 Event Description: 1B NCP Standpipe Low Level Alarm

Shortly after starting the power increase, AD-7/B-2, “NC Pump B No. 2 Seal S-Pipe Lo Level,” will alarm. The operator will address the Annunciator Response Procedure, and then use Enclosure 4.3, “Filling and Draining NC Pump Standpipe,” of OP/1/A/6150/002A, “Reactor Coolant Pump Operation,” to refill the standpipe. Booth Operator Instructions: insertREM-NV0461 = 1.0 (Open

Standpipe Drain Valve) (will take ≈ 3-4 min, to alarm)

delIA REM-NV0461 = 0.0 cd ‘x10_152_5

=1 delay = 60 seconds (Closed Standpipe Drain Valve when MCB Annunciator 1AD-7 B-2L is LIT)

Indications Available: • OAC Alarm: 1B NC Pump Standpipe Level Low • MCB Annunciator 1AD-7/B-2L NC PUMP B NO.2 SEAL S-PIPE LOW LEVEL


OP/1/A/6100/010 H, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD-7

B2, NC PUMP B NO. 2 SEAL S-PIPE LO LVL

BOP (Step 1) IF drain was inadvertently opened, ensure it is closed.

BOP (Step 2) Check the following NC pump parameters stable:

• Lower bearing Temperature

• Number 1 seal outlet temperature

• Number 1 seal leakoff flow

BOP (Step 3) IF any NC pump parameter listed in Step 2 abnormal,…

NOTE: All listed parameters are normal.

BOP (Step 4) Make up to standpipe as necessary per OP/1/A/6150/002A (Reactor Coolant Pump Operation).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to the OP to refill the standpipe.



OP/1/A/6150/002 A, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION

BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs that may impact performance of the procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

• Section 3.3, Filling NC Pump Standpipes

BOP (Step 3.3) Filling NC Pump Standpipes

• Check Reactor Makeup Water System aligned per OP/1/A/6200/012 (Reactor Makeup Water System).

• Check 1NC-56B (PRT Spray Cont Outside Isol) open.

• Open Applicable valve(s):

• 1NV-55B (B NC Pump Standpipe Fill)

• IF required, start one of the following: NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will need to start a Rx M/U Water Pump.


OR


• WHEN applicable “NC Pump No. 2 Seal S-pipe Lo Lvl” alarm clears, perform the following:

• IF pump started in Step 3.3.4, stop applicable pump:


OR


• Close applicable valve.



• 1NV-55B (B NC Pump Standpipe Fill)

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.



Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 23 of 65 Event Description: SG 1D PORV fails OPEN

After this, the 1D Steam Generator PORV will fail OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/01, “Steam Leak,” and isolate the PORV. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, “Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves (SG PORVs),” and may enter LCO 3.4.1, “RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits.” Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-SM001D 100 delay=0 ramp=10

(S/G PORV 1SV1 SGD fails OPEN) Indications Available: • 1SV-1AB Red status light LIT • 1SV-1AB Black needle indication at 100% • OAC Alarm: TM FREEZE – MID3478-VLVSV1D SM PORV OPEN • OAC Alarm: U1 SV-PORV/SAFETY VLV OPEN –T/D CA PMP ON • OAC Alarm: 1SV-1AB 1D SM PORV • Core ΔTs rising • Rx Power rising • Steam flow on 1D steam line rising

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the

operator will take actions to isolate the 1D SG PORV prior to being directed by the CRS. (Step 13)

CONTROL ROOM CREW EXPECTATIONS MANUAL

RO Transient load changes: Manual is preferred – immediately reduce 20Mwe and then reduce as needed to maintain Rx power less than pre-transient condition. After the initial 20 Mwe load reduction, it is preferred that the operators use multiple and diverse indications to determine how much more load should be reduced.

NOTE: The crew may diagnose an overpower condition and adjust turbine load per the Crew Expectation Manual.

AP/1/A/5500/01, STEAM LEAK

CRS (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Manual Reactor Trip Criteria: (IF any of the

following occur: (1) Steam leak is jeopardizing personnel safety or plant equipment, (2) T-Avg is less than 551°F AND going down, or (3) UST level is less than 1 ft – NOT Expected).

NOTE: Manual Reactor Trip Criteria is NOT expected to be utilized.

RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

• Excore NI’s – LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

• NC Loop D/T’s – LESS THAN 60°F D/T

• T-Avg – AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry – IN PROGRESS.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.


BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event – GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr level – STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.




Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 12) Announce occurrence on paging

system. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-1 has been entered. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

• (Step 13a) Check SM PORVs – CLOSED.

NOTE: The 1D SG PORV is Open.

RO (Step 13a RNO) IF S/G pressure is less than 1092 PSIG, THEN perform the following:

• Close affected S/G SM PORV manual loader.

NOTE: Closing the Manual Loader will have no effect.

• IF SM PORV is still open, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The 1D SG PORV Isolation Valve will need to be closed.

• Close SM PORV isolation valve.

• IF SM PORV isolation valve still open……

NOTE: The PORV Isolation valve is closed.

RO • (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves – CLOSED.

BOP • (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions – NORMAL:

• Containment temperature

• Containment pressure

• Containment humidity

• Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO / BOP

• (Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump – OFF.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP • (Step 13.e) Check valves on “STEAM

LINE DRAIN VALVES” board (1MC-9) – CLOSED.

NOTE: One or more of these valves may be cycling. The RNO will direct closing the valves.

CRS • (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) “STEAM HEADER PRESSURE” – GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO for AS Header pressure. If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is ≈1000 psig.

CRS • (Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check for leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks. If so, Floor Instructor: acknowledge. Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the SM PORV opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level – STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:

• Check unit status – IN MODE 1 OR 2.

• Determine if unit shutdown or load reduction is warranted based on the following criteria:

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/Management to address the startup. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

• Size of leak

• Location of leak

• Rate of depletion of secondary inventory

• IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve…


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak

(such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak…

• Check unit shutdown or load reduction – REQUIRED.

NOTE: Shutdown/Load Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

• Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

• Exit this procedure.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and using Time Compression report that 1SV1AB is stuck fully open (and cannot be moved even using the Manual handwheel).


NOTE: The CRS will address Tech Specs based on plant response.

Booth Operator Instructions: While the CRS is checking Tech Specs, insertMAL-NCP008B=12 Ramp = 10 minutes

(NOTE: The malfunction for Event 5 takes several minutes to develop)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.4, STEAM GENERATOR POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (SG PORVs)

CRS LCO 3.7.4 Three SG PORV lines shall be OPERABLE.



CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: After evaluation, the CRS will determine that two PORVs are inoperable and Action A must be entered.

A. One required SG PORV line inoperable.

A.1 Restore required SG PORV line to OPERABLE status.

7 days

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS

CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified in Table 3.4.1-1.

NOTE: If NC System Pressure drops to < 2216 psig on the failure, then TS 3.4.1 might be entered and exited during the transient.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

A. Pressurizer pressure or RCS average temperature DNB parameters not within limits.

A.1 Restore DNB parameter(s) to within limit.

2 hours NOTE: The CRS may determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 29 of 65 Event Description: #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP

Subsequently, a #1 seal leak will develop on the 1A NCP such that #1 Seal leakoff flow is 5.0-5.5 gpm. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/08, “Malfunction of NC Pump,” and address Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” The control operators will be directed on the action to take should the #1 Seal Leakoff flow degrade to > 6 gpm (which will occur subsequently).

Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-NCP008B=12 Ramp = 10 minutes (NOTE: This malfunction was mostly likely

inserted during the completion of Event 4).

Indications Available: • 1B NC Pump #1 Seal leakoff flow is rising on the OAC. • OAC Alarm: 1B NCP Seal Flow > SSF Limit. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-7/E3, NCP PMP CNTRL LEKAGE HI FLOW


AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP CASE I, NC PUMP SEAL OR PUMP LOWER BEARING MALFUNCTION

BOP (Step 1) Check abnormal NC pump parameter – KNOWN TO BE VALID.

NOTE: The operator may address Enclosure 1 per the RNO.

BOP (Step 2) Check NC pump parameters within operating limits:

• All NC pump lower radial bearing temperatures – LESS THAN 225°F

• All NC pump number 1 seal outlet temperatures – LESS THAN 235°F

• All NC pump number 1 seal D/Ps – GREATER THAN 200 PSID.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME, any operating limit in Step 2 is exceeded, THEN GO TO Step 5.





BOP (Step 6) Check if seal cooling available to affected pump:

• Seal injection established (Normal or SSF Supply)

• KC to Thermal Barrier established.

BOP (Step 7) Check any NC pump number 1 seal leakoff – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 6 GPM.

NOTE: It is likely that by the time the crew arrives at this step the leakoff flow will be rising, but will NOT have exceeded 6 GPM.


• IF seal leakoff slowly going up, THEN contact station management for further guidance.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/SM to address the seal failure with station management. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/SM.

• Continue to monitor NC pump seal leakoff flow.

CRS • IF AT ANY TIME seal leakoff flow goes up to 6 GPM, THEN GO TO Step 8.



BOP (Step 9) Check affected NC pump(s) seal return valve – OPEN:

• 1NV-50B (B NC Pump Seal Return Isol)

BOP (Step 10) Check NC pressure – GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG.

BOP (Step 11) Check any NC Pump number one seal leakoff - LESS THAN 0.8 GPM.



CRS (Step 11 RNO) Perform the following:

• IF seal leakoff slowly going down, THEN….

• Continue to monitor NC Pump seal leakoff flow.

• IF AT ANY TIME seal leakoff flow goes below 0.8 GPM, THEN RETURN TO Step 10.



BOP (Step 17) Check for number two seal failure without a number one seal failure as follows:

• Number one seal leakoff - LESS THAN NORMAL OR GOING DOWN.

NOTE: #1 Seal Leak off Flow is higher than Normal.


CRS (Step 18) Check for number three seal failure as follows:

• High number three seal leakoff as indicated by frequent filling of seal standpipe with standpipe drains closed.

• Assume number three seal failure.

• Monitor NC Pump parameters.

• Continue NC Pump operations.

• Repair seal as soon as practical.



BOP (Step 20) Check NC Pumps - ANY RUNNING.

NOTE: All NCPs are running.

BOP (Step 21) Check the following NC Pump temperatures - STABLE OR GOING DOWN:



• All NC Pump lower radial bearing temperatures

• All NC Pump number one seal outlet temperatures.

CRS (Step 22) Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 Condition C limit and immediately notify security if SSF is inoperable.

NOTE: The CRS may ask the OSM to evaluate SLC 16.9.7. If so, Floor Instructor, indicate that another SRO is NOT available.










COMPLETION TIME

Examiner NOTE: Because of the transitory nature of the plant, the evaluation of this SLC may be delayed until after the exam. The CRS will identify that Actions C.1 and C.2 must be taken immediately; and that C.2 requires Actions A.1 and A.2.

C. Total Unidentified LEAKAGE, Identified LEAKAGE, and reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 20 gpm.

OR Total reactor

coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

OR Any reactor

coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff > 4.0 gpm.

C.1 Declare the Standby Makeup Pump inoperable.

AND C.2 Enter

Condition A.

Immediately

A. One or more required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7-1.

A.1 Verify the FUNCTINALITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table 16.9.7-1

AND A.2 Restore the


1 hour 7 days


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 34 of 65 Event Description: Inadvertent Turbine Trip

Shortly afterwards, the Main Turbine will inadvertently trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/02, “Turbine Generator Trip.” The RO will need to operate the control rods manually. Booth Operator Instructions: MAL-DEH001 Indications Available: • Turbine Trip Valves closed • Turbine Governor Valves closed • Rx does NOT trip (Rx Trip Breakers closed) • Steam Dump Valves open


NOTE: The CRS will enter AP-02.

AP/1/A/500/02, TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP

RO (Step 1) Check Turbine Trip:


RO (Step 2) Check P/R meters – LESS THAN 20%.

NOTE: PR indication is > 20%.


• Ensure control rods moving in to reduce T-Avg.

NOTE: The rods must be moved in MANUAL.

• Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.

NOTE: The CRS will designate the RO.

• WHEN reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform the following:


• Place control rods in manual.

• Perform Step 3 to stabilize reactor power.

NOTE: The RO will stabilize reactor power at about 12-15%.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME reactor power

goes below 5%, THEN perform the following: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

RO • Do not pull control rods.

• Insert control rods as necessary to maintain negative SUR on I/R startup rate meters.

RO (Step 5) Check “C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP” status light (1SI-18) – LIT.

BOP (Step 6) Check any CF pump – IN SERVICE. NOTE: The 1A CF Pump is in service.

RO (Step 7) Check both generator breakers – OPEN.

RO (Step 8) Check “EXCITATION” – OFF.

RO (Step 9) IF AT ANY TIME T-Avg is less than 551°F AND going down, THEN perform the following:


• Trip reactor.


RO (Step 10) Check all control rods – ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.

RO (Step 11) Check MSR “RESET” light – LIT.

CRS (Step 12) Announce the following: “Unit 1 Turbine trip, non-essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine bldg”.




RO (Step 13) Check “UNBLOCK” light for “AMSAC ACTUATION BLOCK/UNBLOCK” switch (1MC-2) – DARK.

RO (Step 14) Check condenser dump valves – MODULATING OPEN.

BOP (Step 15) Check Pzr pressure control response:

• Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.

• Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.

• Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.

• Check Pzr spray control valves – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 16) Check Pzr level –TRENDING TO PROGRAM.

RO (Step 17) Ensure Bearing Lift pump in “AUTO”.

RO (Step 18) WHEN bearing oil pressure goes down to 11-12 PSIG, THEN ensure AC Bearing Oil pump starts.

RO (Step 3) Stabilize reactor power as follows: NOTE: This Continuous Action will be taken by the RO when power level is less than 20%.

• Place control rods in manual.

• Check P/R meters ‑ GREATER THAN 5%.

• Stabilize reactor power, as indicated on P/R meters, between 12%‑15% with control rods in manual.


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • WHEN reactor power is stabilized

between 12%‑15%, THEN maintain I/R startup rate at "0" to ensure a constant power level.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 65 Event Description: #1 Seal Leak on 1B NCP Degrades/4 Control Rods fail to Fully

Insert on Rx Trip/Loss of Switchyard to Unit 1/1B EDG fails to START

While the crew is in AP-2, the 1B Hi Vibration alarm will occur and the #1 seal leak flow on the 1B NCP will rise to 6 gpm. The operator go back to Step 8 of AP-8 (Continuous Action Step), and close the 1B NCP Pzr Spray Valve, manually trip the reactor and stop the 1B NCP when reactor power is < 5%. The crew will perform Enclosure 2, “NC Pump Post Trip Actions For #1 Seal Failure,” of AP8, while subsequently performing E-0. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip. On the reactor trip four control rods will fail to fully insert. The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, “Reactor Trip Response,” and emergency borate per AP/1/A/5500/38, “Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution.” Immediately following the initiation of Emergency Boration, a loss of the Unit 1 Switchyard will occur, and the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to start. The operator will immediately transition to EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, “Loss of All AC Power.” The operator will restore power to 1ETA per Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB per Enclosure 14 “Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2 - SATA or SATB.” The scenario will terminate when one ESF Bus has been re-energized. Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-NCP008B = 15, Ramp = 120

seconds (1B NCP #1 Seal Failure) insertMAL-NCP016C = 16 Ramp = 120

seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration) insertMAL-NCP015C = 11 Ramp = 120

seconds (1B NCP Hi Vibration) Indications Available: • MCB Annunciator 1AD6/E-11, NC PUMP HI VIBRATION • 1B NC Pump #1 Seal leakoff flow is rising on the OAC to 6 gpm.


NOTE: The CRS will go back and implement Step 8 of AP-8.


CRS (Step 8) Stop affected NC pump as follows:

• IF A or B NC pump is the affected pump, Then CLOSE associated spray valve:

BOP • 1NC-29C (B NC Loop PZR Spray Control).



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS • Have any available RO perform

Enclosure 2 (NC Post Trip Actions for #1 Seaal Failure as crew performs the following steps:

NOTE: The CRS may direct the Unit 2 BOP to perform this action. If so, Floor Instructor: report that the U2 BOP (or any other RO) is NOT available.


RO • Trip reactor

BOP • WHEN reactor power less than 5%, THEN stop affected NC pump.

Critical Task: Trip the Reactor prior to stopping the NCP during a high vibration condition, and trip the NCP only after Reactor power level has dropped to less than 5%. Safety Significance: The P-8 interlock allows one NCP to be stopped less than 48% power. If a NCP is stopped in Mode 1 or 2, Tech Spec 3.4.4 requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. In addition, T-ave for the idle loop may violate Tech Spec 3.4.2, minimum temperature for criticality. In this case, the unit must be sub-critical within 30 minutes. The transient placed on the unit when a NCP is secured at power can challenge both reactor protection and control systems. Furthermore, an added burden is placed on the operator to stabilize the unit and shut down within 6 hours (possibly 30 minutes) to comply with Tech Specs. Even though the plant is designed and analyzed to operate in this configuration for a short time, station management has decided that the conservative approach to dealing with this transient is to trip the reactor anytime a NCP malfunction warrants stopping a pump in Mode 1 or 2. Guidance is given to wait until reactor power is less than 5% before stopping the NC pump. This will ensure the NC pump will provide adequate flow/core cooling until reactor power is sufficiently low enough to preclude a challenge to fuel integrity. If the action can be taken, and is not taken, this demonstrates “mis-operation” or incorrect operation that could unnecessarily challenge a fission product barrier (NCS). NOTE: The CRS will direct

the BOP to perform Enclosure 2, and continue in AP-8 with the RO. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2. Other Examiners follow AP-8 Actions on Page 41.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP/1/A/5500/08, MALFUNCTION OF NC PUMP

ENCLOSURE 2, NC PUMP POST TRIP ACTIONS FOR #1 SEAL FAILURE


BOP (Step 1) Record time of NC pump shutdown.

BOP (Step 2) Check if seal cooling available to affected pump:

• Seal injection established (Normal or SSF Supply)

• KC to Thermal Barrier established.

BOP (Step 3) Check if any NC Pump number 1 seal leakoff flow – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 6 GPM.

BOP (Step 4) Maintain seal injection flow greater than 9 GPM to affected pump(s).

BOP (Step 5) WHEN affected NC pump has been off 3 minutes, THEN immediately perform the following:

• CLOSE affected NC pump seal return valve:

• 1NV-50B (B NC Pump Seal Return Isol)

NOTE: The BOP will close this valve approximately three minutes after stopping the 1B NC Pump.

• OPEN all of the following valves:

• OPEN 1KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

• OPEN 1KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • OPEN 1KC-364B (B NC Pump

Therm Bar Otlt)

• OPEN 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)



CRS • Continue with this AP as time allows.

CRS • GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).


RO/ BOP



• All rod bottom lights – LIT NOTE: There will be four rods that failed to fully insert on the Rx Trip.




• Trip reactor.

• IF reactor will not trip… NOTE: The reactor will trip manually.







Immediate Action

RO/ BOP



NOTE: SI will NOT be actuated.


RO/ BOP

(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following: Immediate Action

Check if S/I is required:

• Pzr pressure less than 1845 PSIG

OR

• Containment pressure greater than 1 PSIG.

IF S/I is required,…..

NOTE: SI will NOT be required.

RO/ BOP

IF S/I is not required, THEN perform the following:

Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS GO TO EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1 (Reactor Trip Response).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-0.1.

EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/

BOP (Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.

S/I Actuation Criteria

CA Suction Sources

BOP (Step 2) Check the following:

• VI pressure - GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.

• Any Unit 1 6900V bus - ENERGIZED.

CRS (Step 3) Announce: "Unit 1 Reactor trip, non-essential personnel stay out of Unit 1 turbine bldg".

NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 4) Check any NC Pump ‑ ON. NOTE: The 1A, 1C and 1D NCPs will be ON.

RO (Step 5) Check NC temperatures as follows:

• IF any NC Pump on, THEN check NC T‑Avg ‑ STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.

RO (Step 6) Continue to monitor NC temperature as follows:

• Check any NC Pump ‑ ON. NOTE: The 1A, 1C and 1D NCPs will be ON.

• IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure either of the following occurs, THEN perform Step 5:

• NC T‑Avg is less than 557°F and going down

OR

• NC T‑Avg is greater than 557°F and going up.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 7) REFER TO the following: NOTE: The CRS may ask

OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.



RO (Step 8) Check Main Generator as follows:

• Check both generator breakers ‑ OPEN.

• Check "EXCITATION" ‑ OFF.

RO (Step 9) Check MSR "RESET" light ‑ LIT.

RO (Step 10) Check NC T‑Avg ‑ GREATER THAN 553°F.

RO (Step 11) Check feedwater status:

• Check any CA Pump ‑ ON.

• Check total feed flow to S/Gs ‑ GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

CRS (Step 12) WHEN time and manpower allow, THEN dispatch operator to perform Enclosure 5 (MSR Second Stage Drain Tank Isolation).

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks. If so, Floor Instructor: acknowledge.

RO (Step 13) Check if shutdown margin adequate:

• All control rods ‑ FULLY INSERTED. NOTE: There will be four rods that failed to fully insert on the Rx Trip.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following:

• IF all rod position indication is lost, OR greater than 5 rods not fully inserted, THEN…..

• IF 2 to 5 rods not fully inserted, THEN emergency borate 2300 gallons of 7000 PPM boron solution for each rod not fully inserted PER AP/1/A/5500/38 (Emergency Boration And Response To Inadvertent Dilution).

NOTE: The BOP will borate 9200 gallons of Boric Acid per AP/1/A/5500/38, while the crew continues with ES-0.1.

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure AP38. Other Examiners follow ES-0.1 Actions, Step 13.b, on Page 48.

AP/1/A/5500/38, EMERGNCY BORATION AND RESPONSE TO INADVERTENT DILUTION

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with AP38 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.

BOP (Step 1) Check if boron dilution - SUSPECTED.


• IF unit in Mode 1 or 2, THEN…..

• GO TO Step 12.

BOP (Step 12) Initiate emergency boration as follows:

• Check 1A or 1B NV pump - AVAILABLE.

• Check any NV pump - ON.

• Check the following boric acid system components - AVAILABLE.

• Boric Acid Storage Tank



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP • Boric Acid Transfer pump.

• OPEN 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol).

• Ensure a boric acid transfer pump is running.

• Check boration flow using one of the following methods:

• IF 1NV-265B is open, THEN check "EMERGENCY BORATION FLOW" - ESTABLISHED.

OR

• IF 1NV-269 is open, THEN…..

BOP (Step 13) IF AT ANY TIME boration no longer required, THEN GO TO Step 20.

BOP (Step 14) IF AT ANY TIME a higher boration flowrate is desired, THEN evaluate performing the following as required:

• Start a second boric acid transfer pump.

• Align NV pump suction to FWST as follows:


• 1NV-221A (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol)

• 1NV-222B (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).


• 1NV-141A (U1 VCT Outlet Isol)

• 1NV-142B (U1 VCT Outlet Isol).

BOP (Step 15) Align Normal Charging flowpath as follows:

• Ensure one of the following NC loop isolation valves is OPEN:

• 1NV-13B (U1 NV Supply To 1A NC Loop Isol)

OR



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1NV-16A (U1 NV Supply To 1D NC

Loop Isol).

• Check both of the following valves - OPEN:

• 1NV-244A (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

• 1NV-245B (U1 Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 16) Establish desired charging flowrate to the NC System as follows:

• THROTTLE OPEN 1NV-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) and 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) to establish desired charging flow, not to exceed 200 GPM.

• IF required to compensate for higher charging flowrate, THEN raise letdown to a maximum of 120 GPM.

BOP (Step 17) Check if boric acid flow to NC System is adequate:

• Reactor power - STABLE OR GOING DOWN

• NC temperature - STABLE OR GOING DOWN

• Control Rods - STABLE OR STEPPING OUT.

BOP (Step 18) Check NV pump suction - ALIGNED TO VCT.

BOP (Step 19) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level approaches water solid, THEN evaluate performing the following:

• Raise charging flow.

• Raise letdown flow as required to compensate for higher charging flow.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Ensure 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filter Otlt To

VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) diverts to the RHT as required.

BOP (Step 20) WHEN emergency boration no longer required, THEN……

EP/1/A/5000/ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE


RO (Step 13.b-d) Stop any dilutions in progress.

• Check all NC T‑Colds ‑ GREATER THAN 538°F.

• IF AT ANY TIME any NC T‑Cold goes below 538°F, THEN perform Step 13.c.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make the RO aware.

RO (Step 14) Check Pzr level control:

• Check VI pressure ‑ GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

• Pzr level ‑ GREATER THAN 17%.

• Check charging and letdown ‑ IN SERVICE.

• Check Pzr level trending to program "PZR LEVEL SETPOINT".

RO (Step 15) Check Pzr pressure ‑ GREATER THAN 1845 PSIG.

RO (Step 16) Check NC loop flow instruments on 1MC‑5 ‑ ALL LOOPS INDICATING GREATER THAN 90% FLOW.

RO (Step 17) Check Pzr pressure ‑ STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 18) Control S/G levels as follows:



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Check N/R level in any S/G ‑ GREATER

THAN 11%.

• THROTTLE feed flow to maintain S/G N/R levels between 11% and 50%.

Booth Operator Instructions: Insert MAL-EP002 AND EP002B = TRIP

Insert MAL-DG001B = TRUE Indications Available: • Control Room lights dim. • 1B EDG does NOT start as required.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ECA-0.0.

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER NOTE: Crew will carry out

Immediate Actions of ECA-0.0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

CRS (Step 1) CSF Status trees should be monitored for information only. EPs referenced by them should not be implemented.

RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION

• All rod bottom lights – LIT NOTE: DRPI is NOT available on the LOOP.



RO (Step 3) Check Turbine Trip: IMMEDIATE ACTION


CRS (Step 4) Establish NC pump seal injection from the SSF as follows:



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS • Immediately dispatch operator to SSF to

perform the following: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to complete Enclosure 2. Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after ten minutes insert ECA-0.0 (Enclosure 2 SSF Actions) and report that Enclosure 2 is complete.

• Obtain Brown Folder at SSF and complete Enclosure 2 (Unit 1 SSF - ECA-0.0 Actions).

CRS • Dispatch operator to 1ETA room as follows:

• Check if operator will enter aux bldg – FROM MG SET ROOM.

• Give operator dosimeter from Unit 2 SRO desk.

CRS • Dispatch operator to perform Enclosure 3 (Unit 1 ETA And ETB Rooms – ECA-0.0 Actions).

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to complete Enclosure 3. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate. Booth Instructor: wait 2 minutes, then insert ECA-0.0 ENCLOSURE 3, then report that Enclosure 3 is complete.

CRS • Use any of the following to notify security to immediately dispatch officer with key to SSF to ensure operator can access SSF:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch a Security Officer to the SSF. Booth Instructor: Acknowledge as Security.

• Security ringdown phone (located on Unit 2 SRO desk)



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 2688

• 4900. Floor Instructor: If asked, U2 does NOT have normal power, and both DGs are running.

RO/ BOP

(Step 5) Monitor Foldout Page

Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater (applies after Step 8 in body of the procedure)

Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power

Low Decay Heat Temperature Control

CA Suction Sources (applies after Step 11 in body of the procedure)

BOP (Step 6) Check NC System – ISOLATED:

BOP • Check the following letdown orifice isolation valves – CLOSED.

• 1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

• 1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

• 1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).

BOP • CLOSE the following valves:


• 1NV-2A (U1 NC L/D Isol To Regenerative Hx).

BOP • Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.

BOP • Check the following excess letdown isolation valves – CLOSED:



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess

L/D Hx Isol)

• 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

BOP • Check 1NV-121 (U1 ND Letdown Control) – CLOSED.

RO (Step 7) Check total CA flow – GREATER THAN 450 GPM.

BOP (Step 8) Try to restore power to 1ETA or 1ETB as follows:

• Place both trains D/G mode select switches to control room.

• Perform the following for any D/G(s) that are off:

• Depress, then release, “RESET” on sequencer.

• Start D/G.

• Check both D/Gs – RUNNING.

BOP (Step 8.c RNO) Perform the following:

• Initiate S/I

• Notify Unit 2 to immediately ensure flow path for 2B RN pump PER Enclosure 5 (Unit 2 Actions).

NOTE: The CRS will notify U2. Floor Instructor: Acknowledge as U2 RO.

CRS • IF at least one D/G starts, THEN … NOTE: The 1A D/G is OOS, and the 1B D/G will NOT start.

CRS • GO TO Step 9



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 9) Ensure the following have been

implemented: NOTE: The CRS may ask OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.



RO/ BOP

(Step 10) Control intact S/G levels as follows:

• Check N/R level in any intact S/G - GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

• THROTTLE CA control valves to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

• IF AT ANY TIME CA flow control is lost, THEN perform RNO for Step 10.b


CRS (Step 11) Monitor CA Storage Tank (water tower) level and ensure CA suction source as follows:

• Check if external event that has the potential to damage CA Storage Tank (water tower) (such as seismic or tornado) ‑ HAS OCCURRED.

CRS (Step 11.a RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 11.c and GO TO Step 11.c.

BOP (Step 11.c-e) Monitor CA Storage Tank (water tower) level using available Control Room indication.

• IF AT ANY TIME CA Storage Tank (water tower) level indication is lost (invalid reading), THEN dispatch operator to locally monitor level PER EP/1/A/5000/G‑1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 31 (Local CA Storage Tank (Water Tower) Level Monitoring).




Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Ensure CA Suction Sources is monitored

on Foldout Page.

CRS (Step 12) Have Unit 2 perform Enclosure 5 (Unit 2 Actions).

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

RO (Step 13) Check unit status ‑ IN MODE 3.

RO/ BOP

(Step 14) Stabilize S/G pressures using SM PORVs as follows:

NOTE: Only the 1B and 1C SG PORVs are available.

• Reset Main Steam Isolation.

• Reset SM PORVs.

• Close all SM PORV manual loaders.

• Place SM PORVs in manual.

• Control S/G pressure between 1000 and 1100 PSIG using SM PORVs.

BOP (Step 15) Ensure VC/YC cooling available as follows:

• Check VC/YC alignment using Unit 1 status board ‑ AT LEAST ONE OPERABLE VC/YC TRAIN ALIGNED TO AN ENERGIZED UNIT 2 4160V BUS.

• Notify an available operator to initiate EP/1/A/5000/G‑1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 13 (VC and VA System Operation) within 30 minutes of loss of power.

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge

CRS (Step 16) IF event has occurred that could have caused damage to mechanical systems internal to plant (seismic, tornado, etc), THEN….

NOTE: No such event has occurred.




RO/ BOP

(Step 17) Check if S/I is actuated as follows: NOTE: SI was actuated in an attempt to start the 1B D/G.

• "SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI‑18) ‑ LIT.

• Reset S/I.

CRS (Step 18) Dispatch operator to open the following breakers to sequencer DC control power:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after three minutes insert MAL-EQB002A and EQB002B = FAILURE and report that the Sequencer DC Control Breakers have been opened.

• A Train ‑ 1EVDA Breaker 6

• B Train ‑ 1EVDD Breaker 8.

CRS (Step 19) IF AT ANY TIME operator dispatched to perform Enclosure 3 (Unit 1 ETA And ETB Rooms ‑ ECA‑0.0 Actions) determines that lockout exists, THEN perform the following:


• Have IAE clear or isolate fault from bus.

• WHEN fault cleared or isolated from bus, THEN reset lockout.

CRS (Step 20) Restore power to 1ETA or 1ETB using any of the following while continuing with this procedure:

• Local reset and start of D/G PER Enclosure 12 (Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus With D/G)

OR



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Unit 1 offsite power PER Enclosure 13

(Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 1)

OR

• Unit 2 6900V busses through SATA or SATB PER Enclosure 14 (Energizing Unit 1 4160V Bus From Unit 2 ‑ SATA or SATB).

NOTE: This is the only option for re-powering either 1ETA or 1ETB.

The CRS will address Enclosure 14.

EP/1/A/5000/ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER ENCLOSURE 14, ENERGIZING UNIT 1 4160V BUS FROM UNIT 2 – SATA OR

SATB

CRS (Step 1) Perform one of the following:

• IF 1ETA is to be energized from Unit 2, THEN observe Note prior to Step 22 and GO TO Step 22.

Examiner NOTE: If the CRS elects to re-energize 1ETA, proceed to Step 22 on Page 60.

OR

• IF 1ETB is to be energized from Unit 2, THEN observe Note prior to Step 2 and GO TO Step 2.

Examiner NOTE: If the CRS elects to re-energize 1ETB, proceed to Step 2 BELOW.

BOP (Step 2) Ensure SATB is not supplying Unit 2 2ETB.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATB Feeder Breaker is not supplying Unit 2 2ETB.

BOP (Step 3) Check the following 4160V breakers ‑ OPEN.

• 1ETB Normal Breaker

• 1ETB Standby Breaker

• 1ETB Emergency Breaker.




CRS (Step 4) Have Unit 2 RO check Unit 2 SATB Feeder Breaker ‑ CLOSED.

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATB Feeder Breaker is CLOSED.


CRS (Step 8) Dispatch operator to 1ETB room to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after three minutes insert ECA-0.0 (Enclosure 14) and report that 1ETB-1 has been racked out, and 1ETB-2 has been racked in.

• Obtain a copy of OP/0/A/6350/008 (Operation of Station Breakers), Enclosure 4.2 (Operation of 4.16KV Essential Switchgear Breakers) to bring to 1ETB room.

• Check 1ETB‑1 (Incoming Breaker Fed From Norm Transf. No. 1ATD) ‑ RACKED IN.

• Rack out 1ETB‑1 PER OP obtained in Step 8.a.

• Remove kirk‑key from 1ETB‑1 as follows:

• Push plunger (located below kirk‑key) toward back of cubicle and hold.

• Rotate kirk‑key to extend bolt.

• Remove kirk‑key.

• Release plunger.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Insert kirk‑key (removed from 1ETB‑1)

into 1ETB‑2 (Incoming Breaker Fed From Stby. Transf. No. SATB), making sure number on key matches number on lock.

• Check kirk‑keys in 1ETB‑2 ‑ TWO INSERTED.

• Operate kirk‑key device inside 1ETB‑2 as follows:

• Push plunger (located below kirk‑keys) toward back of cubicle and hold.

• Rotate both kirk‑keys to retract bolt.

• Release plunger and allow it to move outward.

• Pull plunger outward as necessary to ensure fully extended.

• Rack in 1ETB‑2 breaker PER OP obtained in step 8.a.

CRS (Step 9) Do not continue until the following is performed:

• Ensure Steps 2 through 8 are completed.

• Ensure operators are away from breakers.

CRS (Step 10) Have Unit 2 RO check Unit 2 SATB Feeder Breaker ‑ CLOSED.

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATB Feeder Breaker is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 11) Check if S/I is actuated as follows:


NOTE: SI was previously reset.




Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 12) Check "SEQ B LOSS OF

CONTROL PWR" alarm (1AD‑11, E‑2) ‑ LIT.

BOP (Step 13) Open 1B CA pump breaker.

BOP (Step 13 RNO) Open breaker by depressing 1B CA pump "START" and "STOP" at same time.

RO/ BOP

(Step 14) Open the remaining pump breakers:

• 1B NV pump

• 1B ND pump

• 1B NI pump

• 1B1 KC pump

• 1B2 KC pump

• 1B RN pump

• 1B KF pump

• 1B NS pump

BOP (Step 15) Open the following 600 V essential load center feeder breakers:

• 1ELXB

• 1ELXD

• 1ELXF

BOP (Step 16) Check 1B D/G Mode Select switch ‑ IN CONTROL ROOM POSITION.

BOP (Step 17) Close 1ETB Standby Breaker.

BOP (Step 18) Place 1B D/G Mode Select switch to "AUTO" position.




BOP (Step 19) Check 1ETB bus ‑ ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 20) Notify Control Room Supervisor to GO TO Step 47 in body of this procedure.

Critical Task: Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes “mis-operation” or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s). Since the conditions existed to re-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers. Examiner NOTE: If 1ETB

has been re-energized, Terminate the Exam.

Examiner NOTE: Follow the steps below if the crew has elected to re-energize 1ETA from SATA.

BOP (Step 22) Ensure SATA is not supplying Unit 2 2ETA.

NOTE: The CRS/BOP will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker is not supplying Unit 2 2ETA.

BOP (Step 23) Check the following 4160V breakers ‑ OPEN.

• 1ETA Normal Breaker



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1ETA Standby Breaker

• 1ETA Emergency Breaker.

CRS (Step 24) Have Unit 2 RO check Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker ‑ CLOSED.

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker is CLOSED.


CRS (Step 28) Dispatch operator to 1ETA room to perform the following:

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as appropriate, after ten minutes insert ECA-0.0 (Enclosure 14) and report that 1ETA-1 has been racked out, and 1ETA-2 has been racked in.

• Obtain a copy of OP/0/A/6350/008 (Operation of Station Breakers), Enclosure 4.2 (Operation of 4.16KV Essential Switchgear Breakers) to bring to 1ETA room.

• Check 1ETA‑1 (Incoming Breaker Fed From Norm Transf. No. 1ATC) ‑ RACKED IN.

• Rack out 1ETA‑1 PER OP obtained in Step 28.a.

• Remove kirk‑key from 1ETA‑1 as follows:

• Push plunger (located below kirk‑key) toward back of cubicle and hold.

• Rotate kirk‑key to extend bolt.

• Remove kirk‑key.

• Release plunger.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Insert kirk‑key (removed from 1ETA‑1)

into 1ETA‑2 (Incoming Breaker Fed From Stby. Transf. No. SATA), making sure number on key matches number on lock.

• Check kirk‑keys in 1ETA‑2 ‑ TWO INSERTED.

• Operate kirk‑key device inside 1ETA‑2 as follows:

• Push plunger (located below kirk‑keys) toward back of cubicle and hold.

• Rotate both kirk‑keys to retract bolt.

• Release plunger and allow it to move outward.

• Pull plunger outward as necessary to ensure fully extended.

• Rack in 1ETA‑2 breaker PER OP obtained in step 28.a.

CRS (Step 29) Do not continue until the following is performed:

• Ensure Steps 22 through 28 are completed.

• Ensure operators are away from breakers.

CRS (Step 30) Have Unit 2 RO check Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker ‑ CLOSED.

NOTE: The CRS will ask U2 to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP, and report that Unit 2 SATA Feeder Breaker is CLOSED.

BOP (Step 31) Check if S/I is actuated as follows:


NOTE: SI was previously reset.




Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 32) Check "SEQ A LOSS OF

CONTROL PWR" alarm (1AD‑11, B‑2) ‑ LIT.

BOP (Step 33) Open 1A CA pump breaker.

BOP (Step 33 RNO) Open breaker by depressing 1A CA pump "START" and "STOP" at same time.

RO/ BOP

(Step 34) Open the remaining pump breakers:

• 1A NV pump

• 1A ND pump

• 1A NI pump

• 1A1 KC pump

• 1A2 KC pump

• 1A RN pump

• 1A KF pump

• 1A NS pump

BOP (Step 35) Open the following 600 V essential load center feeder breakers:

• 1ELXA

• 1ELXC

• 1ELXE

BOP (Step 36) Check 1A D/G Mode Select switch ‑ IN CONTROL ROOM POSITION.

BOP (Step 37) Close 1ETA Standby Breaker.

BOP (Step 38) Place 1A D/G Mode Select switch to "AUTO" position.




BOP (Step 39) Check 1ETA bus ‑ ENERGIZED.

BOP (Step 40) Notify Control Room Supervisor to GO TO Step 47 in body of this procedure.

Critical Task: Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus From Unit 2. Safety Significance: Failure to energize an AC Emergency Bus when able to do so constitutes “mis-operation” or incorrect performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the Critical Task may result in a needless challenge and/or degradation of a fission product barrier at the point of the remaining intact RCP Seals, and will result in the inability to add inventory through the ECCS during the existing and potentially subsequent small break LOCA(s). Since the conditions existed to re-energize an ESF Bus from Unit 2 via the SATA or SATB, not taking this action constitutes incorrect performance that leads to degradation of the RCS and/or fuel cladding fission product barriers.


UNIT 1 STATUS:



• The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue

for the next 12 hours. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, E-1, GENERATOR AUXILIARY PANEL TROUBLE, is in alarm due to a

GENERATOR HYDROGEN PRESSURE - LOW alarm at the local panel. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, is in alarm due to low power

and transient conditions. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: • The 1A EDG is OOS for bearing replacement. ACTION has been taken in accordance with

Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B. • The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. • 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-12, E-2, “A RN PUMP ABNORMAL FLOW,” has alarmed spuriously

several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-2, KG PANEL TROUBLE, is in alarm due to a failed local panel alarm

relay. Crew Directions: • The off-going BOP is performing a 60 gallon Alternate Dilute every 10 minutes to maintain current

plant conditions. • The crew will raise power to 100% after taking the shift, starting from Step 3.35.19 of Enclosure

4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003. • Raise power at 2MWe/minute. • The RE recommends that the BOP perform a 200 gallon Alternate Dilute to initiate the power

increase. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB) Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)


PORVs)” (Amendment 221/203) 2. OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation” (Rev 196) 3. AP/1/A/5500/21, “Loss of KC or KC System Leakage” (Rev 10) 4. Technical Specification 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System” (Amendment

184/166) 5. OP/1/A/6100/010 C, “Annunciator Response For Panel 1AD-2” (Rev 64) 6. Technical Specification 3.1.7, “Rod Position Indication” (Amendment 184/166) 7. OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, “Annunciator Response For Panel 1RAD-1” (Rev 66) 8. AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within The Capacity Of Both NV Pumps” (Rev 23) 9. OP/0/A/6450/011, “Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System” (Rev 98) 10. Technical Specification 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage” (Amendment 237/219) 11. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System” (Rev 145) 12. AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction” (Rev 16) 13. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection” (Rev 34) 14. EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, “Safety Injection Termination” (Rev 27) Validation Time: 117 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________ Rev. 040615

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(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 4% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 12-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed.

Event No.

Malf. No.




2 MAL KC010B

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

1A2 KC Pump trip

3 MAL

EMF-34L LOA BB019

I-RO I-SRO


4

MAL

EDA350 I(TS)-SRO DRPI Failure

5 MAL NV019B

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO


6 MAL IRE006B6 IRE006P10

C-RO C-SRO


7 MAL ISE001B

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO


8 MAL

ND001B

BOP 1B ND Pump fails to start in AUTO


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McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 4% power (BOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION,” has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). The crew will raise power to 12-18% and stabilize reactor power, and making preparations to synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed. Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 12-18% starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, “Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, “Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.” Subsequently, 1EMF-34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, will fail HIGH, however, one of the SG Blowdown Control Valves will NOT automatically close. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, “Annunciator Response for 1RAD-1,” C3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD, and manually close the valve. The operator may enter Case I of AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The crew will determine that the alarm is due to a failure, and NOT an actual high radioactivity condition. Just after this, the DRPI for Control Rod M-12 will fail and indicate the rod on the bottom. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-2/D-10, “RPI Urgent Failure,” and address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, “Rod Position Indication.” Shortly afterwards, a 50-75 gpm leak will occur on the Letdown Line, in the Aux Building, upstream of the Letdown Heat Exchanger. The operator will enter Case II of AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The operator will place the Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service per Enclosure 4.4 of OP/0/A/6450/011, “Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage,” and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” Just after the leak isolation, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, “RPI at Bottom Rod Drop” and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction.” Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. Upon the reactor trip, the B Train of Safety Injection will inadvertently actuate with the exception that the 1B ND Pump will fail to start in AUTO. This pump will be manually started. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation, actuating the A Train of SI in the process. The crew will reset SI and stop all ECCS Pumps except for one NV Pump within 15 minutes. Ultimately, the crew will transition to step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, “Safety Injection Termination.”

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The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 at Step 14.m RNO after the CRS determines to establish Excess Letdown. Critical Tasks: Trip the Reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod. Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant form challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod. Terminate SI by closing 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B within 15 minutes of SI actuation. Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500oF. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

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T = 0 Malfunctions (From IC-13): insert LOA-CM056 = Racked Out; insert LOA-CM056A = Racked Out; (1A Hotwell Pump is OOS)







insert OVR-1AD1_F09 = ON (MCB Annunciator 1AD1/F9)

From IC-241


insert MAL-ISE001B cd=X01_099_2 =1 (Train B SI triggered off of Reactor Trip Breaker OPEN light)

insert MAL-ND001 = AUTO cd = X01_010G02_1 = 1 (1B ND Pump fails to Auto Start triggered off SI Train B actuation)

RUN

Reset all SLIMs

Place Tagout/O-Stick on: 1A Hotwell Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9 (O-stick)



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Freeze.




RUN

Crew Briefing


2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.8 of OP/1/A/6100/003 (Blank). 4. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.14 of OP/1/A/6100/003 (Blank).

5. Provide crew with Enclosure 4.5 of OP/1/A/6100/SU-19 filled out as follows:

1.6 1.0 0.6 4.0 1.5 2.5 5.0 0 5.0 1.5 0 1.5

6. Provide Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003, marked up as follows:

• Step 2.2 – Initialed. • Step 3.1 – Checkbox checked. • Step 3.2 – Initialed. • Step 3.3 –Initialed. • Step 3.3.1 - Checkbox checked. • Step 3.3.2 – Record 3.25. • Step 3.3.3 - Checkbox checked. • Step 3.3.4 – NA/Initialed.

7. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.


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Event 1



Event 2

Insert MAL-KC010B = TRUE

1A2 KC Pump trip


Event 3

insert MAL-EMF-34L = 107

insert LOA-BB019 = TRUE

insert:

REM-BB0123=0 delay = 2 seconds REM-BB0124=0 delay = 2 seconds REM-BB0125=0 delay = 2 seconds



Event 4

insert MAL-EDA350 = 1

DRPI Failure


Event 5

insert MAL-NV019B = 50



Event 6

insertMAL-IRE006B6 STATIONARY_GRPPR

insertMAL-IRE006P10 STATIONARY_GRPPR, delay = 45 seconds


On Rx Trip Event 7

insert MAL-ISE001B


This malfunction is inserted at T=0.

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Post-SI Actuation

Event 8

insert MAL-ND001B = AUTO

1B ND Pump fails to start in AUTO

This malfunction is inserted at T=0.


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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 62 Event Description: Raise Power from 4% to 12-18%

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 12-18% starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1, Power Increase, of OP/1/A/6100/003, “Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation.” Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA


OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLING PROCEDURE FOR UNIT OPERATION ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCREASE

BOP (Step 3.25) WHEN at 4%, perform the following:

• (Step 3.25.1) HOLD at 4% RTP (3.5-4.0%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Examiner NOTE: The plant has been at 4% power for 30 minutes. If the crew wants to conduct a 10- minute HOLD, use Time Compression and tell the CRS that when he is comfortable with plant conditions, he may move on in the procedure.

• (Step 3.25.2) Using “Plant Mode Change & Alarm Look Ahead”, change the OAC to “Mode 1.”

• (Step 3.25.3) On the DCS Workstation, change the DCS Modal Alarming to Mode 1 as follows:

• (Step 3.25.3.1) Access DCS “PLANT MODE SELECTION” Screen (6012).

• (Step 3.25.3.2) Select “MODE 1.”

• (Step 3.25.3.3) Select “ACCEPT MODE.”

• (Step 3.25.3.4) Check “MODE 1 is displayed in “CURRENT PLANT MODE.”



RO (Step 3.26) Increase reactor power to 6% RTP (6.0-6.5%).

RO (Step 3.27) HOLD at 6% RTP (6.0 - 6.5%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Examiner NOTE: Use Time Compression and tell the CRS that when he is comfortable with plant conditions, he may move on in the procedure.

BOP (Step 3.28) WHEN any S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand (output) indicates between 50 - 60% open, place the associated S/G CF Cntrl Valve in service as follows:

NOTE: It is expected to reach these conditions before moving on to event 2.

BOP • Ensure the following S/G CF Control Bypass valves in auto:

• 1CF-104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF-105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF-106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass)

BOP • IF AT ANY TIME all of the following conditions exist, isolate the associated S/G CF Control Valve being placed in service and notify CRS:

• S/G CF Control Bypass Valve in auto

• S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 0%

• S/G CF Control Valve demand at 0%

• S/G level increasing

BOP • WHEN A S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50-60 %, perform the following:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU-19 (Heatup

to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by.

• Ensure 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

• Check 1CF-33 (A S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol) open.

• Open 1CF-31 (A S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol).

• Check 1A S/G level stable.

• Place 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in auto.

BOP • WHEN B S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50-60 %, perform the following:

• Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU-19 (Heatup to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by.

• Ensure 1CF-23AB (1B S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

• Check 1CF-24 (B S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol) open.

• Open 1CF-22 (B S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol).

• Check 1B S/G level stable.

• Place 1CF-23AB (1B S/G CF Control) in auto.

BOP • WHEN C S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50-60 %, perform the following:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU-19 (Heatup

to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by.

• Ensure 1CF-20AB (1C S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

• Check 1CF-21 (C S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol) open.

• Open 1CF-19 (C S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol).

• Check 1C S/G level stable.

• Place 1CF-20AB (1C S/G CF Control) in auto.

BOP • WHEN D S/G CF Control Bypass Valve demand at 50-60 %, perform the following:

• Refer to OP/1/A/6100/SU-19 (Heatup to 557°F), Enclosure 4.5 (Determining S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by While in Mode 3), Table 4.5-1(S/G CF Control Bypass Valve Demand Difference) for information regarding potential S/G CF Control Valve Leak-by.

• Ensure 1CF-17AB (1D S/G CF Control) in manual and closed.

• Check 1CF-16 (D S/G CF Cntrl Inlet Isol) open.

• Open 1CF-18 (D S/G CF Cntrl Outlet Isol).

• Check 1D S/G level stable.

• Place 1CF-17AB (1D S/G CF Control) in auto.

RO (Step 3.29) Increase Rx Power to 8% RTP (8.0 - 8.5%).



RO (Step 3.30) WHEN at 8% RTP (8.0 - 8.5%), perform the following:

HOLD at 8% RTP (8.0 - 8.5%) for a minimum of 10 minutes.

Examiner NOTE: Use Time Compression and tell the CRS that when he is comfortable with plant conditions, he may move on in the procedure.

Notify Secondary Chemistry to verify secondary water chemistry acceptable for operation to 15% RTP.

IF required for S/G cleanup,…..

CRS (Step 3.31) Resume cycling of 1HM-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser) as follows:

• Cycle 1HM-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser) per OP/1/A/6250/006 (Main Steam System), Enclosure 4.7 (Manual Operation of 1HM-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser)).

NOTE: The CRS may contact AO (bob) to assist in cycling 1HM-45. If so, Floor Instructor/Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry and RP.

• WHEN all of the following are greater than 100 psig, secure cycling of

• 1HM-45 (Unit 1 HM System Piping Drain Control to Condenser):

• M1A1388 (1A2 MSR 2nd Stage Press)

• M1A1400 (1B2 MSR 2nd Stage Press)

• M1A1412 (1C2 MSR 2nd Stage Press)

RO (Step 3.32) Increase Reactor Power to 10 - 12% RTP as follows:

• Begin power increase to 10 - 12% RTP.

• WHEN Reactor Power reaches 10% RTP, perform the following:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Check on 1SI-18:

• "P-10 Nuclear at Power" lit

• "P-7 Lo Power Reactor Trips Blocked" dark

• Block the IR high level trip and rod stop by depressing both "Intermediate Range Block" pushbuttons.

• Check lit on 1SI-18:

• I/R Train A Trip Blocked

• I/R Train B Trip Blocked

• Block PR low setpoint trip by depressing both "Power Range Block" pushbuttons.

• Check lit on 1SI-18:

• P/R Lo Setpoint Train A Trip Blocked

• P/R Lo Setpoint Train B Trip Blocked


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 15 of 62 Event Description: 1A2 KC Pump trip

Next, the 1A2 KC Pump will trip. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/21, “Loss of KC or KC System Leakage.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, “Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.” Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-KC010B Indications Available: • 1A2 KC Pump Green Status light LIT • 1A2 KC Pump amps go to 0 • MCB Annunciator 1AD-6, B1 through B4, A (B, C, and D) NC PUMP UPPER MTR BRG LO

KC FLO, alarms • MCB Annunciator 1RAD1 1EMF 46A, LOSS OF TRN A KC SAMPLE FLO (Delayed) • MCB Annunciator 1RAD1 1EMF 46B, LOSS OF TRN B KC SAMPLE FLO (Delayed)


NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to check out the 1A2 KC Pump. If so, Booth Instructor, wait 3 minutes, and then report that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker shows a 51/50 Relay has operated, and the pump is NOT running.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-21.

AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE

BOP (Step 1) Check any KC pump – ON. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.

RO/ BOP


KC header isolation criteria (KC Surge Tank level goes below 2 ft due to KC System leak – Not expected)

NC Pump trip criteria (NC Pump motor bearing temperature reaches 195°F – Not expected)



ND Pump trip and flow isolation criteria (Applies if ND aligned for RHR) (ND Pumps OFF – Not expected)

KC Pump trip criteria (KC Surge Tank level goes below 0.5 ft and valid – Not expected)

VCT high temperature (IF "VCT HI TEMP" alarm (1AD-7, D-1) is received – Not expected)

BOP (Step 3) Secure any dilution in progress.

BOP (Step 4) Check ND – IN RHR MODE. NOTE: ND is NOT in the RHR Mode.



NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement that AP-21 has been entered. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

BOP (Step 8) Check both train’s KC Surge Tank level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 9) Start standby KC train as follows:

• Check standby KC train – AVAILABLE TO START.

• Check standby KC Surge Tank Level – GREATER THAN 2 FT.

• Start standby KC train PER one of the following enclosures:

• To start 1B Train, GO TO Enclosure 5 (Startup of 1B KC Train).



AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE ENCLOSURE 5, STARTUP OF 1B KC TRAIN

BOP (Step 1) Check 1KC-81B (1B ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 2) Check 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 3) Check 1A Train KC pumps – OFF. NOTE: The 1A1 KC Pump is ON, and running properly.


BOP (Step 5) Check 1B Train KC pumps – OFF.

BOP (Step 6) IF voiding of 1B KC Train is suspected….

NOTE: Voiding is NOT suspected.

BOP (Step 7) Close the following:

• 1KC-53B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

• 1KC-2B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).



BOP (Step 8) Start 1B RN pump.



BOP (Step 9) Ensure 1RN-187B (B KC Hx Inlet Isol) OPENS.

BOP (Step 10) Place control switch for 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) in the “AUTO” position.

BOP (Step 11) Ensure 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol) OPENS.

BOP (Step 12) Start 1B1 KC pump.

BOP (Step 13) Check 1KC-12 (1B1 KC Pump Disch Isol) – LOCALLY THROTTLED IN STEP 6.

NOTE: 1KC-12 was NOT locally throttled in Step 6.

BOP (Step 13 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AO to check out the B Train KC Pumps. If so, Booth Instructor, as AO report that both pumps are operating normally.

• Start 1B2 KC pump.


BOP (Step 17) Check ND pumps – ANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are and have been OFF.


BOP (Step 20) Check KC leak – HAS OCCURRED.

NOTE: A KC System Leak has NOT occurred.




• Limit KC pump flow to 4000 GPM per operating KC pump in next step.






• 1KC-3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

• Open the following valves:


• 1KC-53B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).


BOP (Step 25) Check 1A ND pump – OFF.

BOP (Step 26) Check 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol) – CLOSED.

BOP (Step 27) Place control switch for 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) in the “CLOSE” position.

BOP (Step 28) Ensure 1KC-51A (Train A Recirc Isol) closes.

BOP (Step 29) Stop 1A1 and 1A2 KC Pumps. NOTE: The BOP will stop the 1A1 KC Pump.



BOP (Step 30) Check KC flow – LESS THAN 4000 GPM PER OPERATING KC PUMP.

BOP (Step 31) Check ND pumps – ANY ON PRIOR TO ENTERING THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: BOTH ND Pumps are and have been OFF.


BOP (Step 37) Check KC System leak – HAS OCCURRED.

NOTE: A KC System Leak has NOT occurred.

CRS (Step 37 RNO) GO TO Step 41 in body of this procedure.

AP/1/A/5500/21, LOSS OF KC OR KC SYSTEM LEAKAGE

BOP (Step 41) Check any letdown path – IN SERVICE.

NOTE: Normal Letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 42) Check NC pump thermal barrier valves – OPEN:

• 1KC-394A (A NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

• 1KC-345A (C NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

• 1KC-364B (B NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt)

• 1KC-413B (D NC Pump Therm Bar Otlt).

BOP (Step 43) Check KC to Aux Bldg Non-essential header – ESTABLISHED.



BOP (Step 44) Check NM valves (on 1MC-8) – PREVIOUSLY CLOSED BY THIS PROCEDURE.

NOTE: NM Valves have NOT been previously Closed by this procedure.


CRS (Step 46) Check KC Surge Tank makeup – HAS BEEN INITIATED.

NOTE: KC System makeup has NOT occurred.

(Step 46 RNO) GO TO Step 48. NOTE: There is NO NEED for KC System Feed and Bleed.

BOP (Step 48) Check both trains RN suction – ALIGNED TO LLI.

CRS (Step 49) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Pump malfunction, and request that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker be racked out. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and indicate that the 1A2 KC Pump Breaker will be Racked Out. Use: LOA-KC026A = Racked_Out (1A2 KC Pump BKR) LOA- KC026B = Racked_Out (1A2 KC Pump Cntrl Pwr)

NOTE: The CRS will likely address Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM



CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.


CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. A. One CCW

train inoperable.

A.1 Restore CCW train to OPERABLE status.

72 hours


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 23 of 62 Event Description: 1EMF-34 fails HIGH/Failure of SG Blowdown Flow Control Valve to

Auto CLOSE

Subsequently, 1EMF-34, S/G Sample Radiation Monitor, will fail HIGH, however, one of the SG Blowdown Control Valves will NOT automatically close. The operator will respond in accordance with OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, “Annunciator Response for 1RAD-1,” C3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD, and manually close the valve. The operator may enter Case I of AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The crew will determine that the alarm is due to a failure, and NOT an actual high radioactivity condition. Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-EMF-34L = 107

insert LOA-BB019 = TRUE

insert:

• REM-BB0123=0 delay = 2 seconds • REM-BB0124=0 delay = 2 seconds • REM-BB0125=0 delay = 2 seconds

Indications Available: • MCB Annunciator 1RAD1/C-3, 1EMF SG SAMPLE HI RAD, alarms • MCB Annunciator 1RAD1/F-2, 1EMF34 LOSS OF S/G SAMPLE FLOW, alarms • 1EMF 34 Amber TRIP 1 light is LIT • 1EMF 34 Red TRIP 2 light is LIT • 1EMF 34 indication off-scale high


OP/1/A/6100/010 Q, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR 1RAD-1

C-3, 1EMF 34 S/G SAMPLE HI RAD RO (IA Step 1) Ensure blowdown flow secured. NOTE: The 1D S/G Blowdown

Throttle Valve has remained OPEN.

RO (IA Step 2) Close the following manual loaders:

• 1BB-123 (1A S/G BB Flow Control)

• 1BB-124 (1B S/G BB Flow Control)

• 1BB-125 (1C S/G BB Flow Control)

• 1BB-126 (1D S/G BB Flow Control) NOTE: The RO will close the Manual Loader to stop Blowdown flow.


Auto CLOSE


CRS (IA Step 3) Notify the following of possible S/G Tube Leakage. Inform them of EMF in alarm and to implement their Response Procedure.

• RP Shift NOTE: The CRS may call RP to address the Rad Monitor failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP. After ten minutes report back that there is no abnormal radiation and that it is believed that 1EMF-34 has failed high.

• Primary Chemistry NOTE: The CRS may call Primary Chemistry to address the Rad Monitor failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Primary Chemistry.

• Secondary Chemistry NOTE: The CRS may call Secondary Chemistry to address the Rad Monitor failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry. . After 15 minutes report back that there is no abnormal radiation and that it is believed that 1EMF-34 has failed high.

CRS (IA Step 4) Contact Secondary Chemistry to secure blowdown to HR Tank by closing 1BB-194 (1BB Flow to Heater Tank).

NOTE: The CRS may call Secondary Chemistry to secure blowdown. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry.

NOTE: The CRS may enter AP-10 believing that a SGTL exists.


Auto CLOSE


AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS, CASE I

BOP (Step 1) Check Pzr level - STABLE OR GOING UP.

NOTE: Pzr level will bbe stable.

CRS/BOP

(Step 2) IF AT ANY TIME Pzr level goes down in an uncontrolled manner OR cannot be maintained greater than 4%, THEN perform Step 1.


RO/ BOP

(Step 3) Identify affected S/G as follows:

• Any S/G N/R level - GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

NOTE: No SG level will be rising uncontrollably.

OR

• Check any of the following EMFs- ABOVE NORMAL:

NOTE: No increase in radiation level will be indicated on any of these radiation monitors.

• 1EMF-24 (S/G A Steamline Hi Rad)

• 1EMF-25 (S/G B Steamline Hi Rad)

• 1EMF-26 (S/G C Steamline Hi Rad)

• 1EMF-27 (S/G D Steamline Hi Rad)

• 1EMF 71 (S/G A Leakage Hi Rad)

• 1EMF 72 (S/G B Leakage Hi Rad)

• 1EMF 73 (S/G C Leakage Hi Rad)

• 1EMF 74 (S/G D Leakage Hi Rad)

OR

• Check CF Flow - LOWER IN ANY S/G COMPARED TO ALL.

NOTE: No SGTL will be indicated.

OR


Auto CLOSE


• Secondary Chemistry or RP has determined affected S/G by sampling or evaluation of available EMF data.

NOTE: The CRS may call Secondary Chemistry/RP to evaluate data. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Secondary Chemistry and RP.

OR

• Notify RP to frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns (CT Lab) to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

NOTE: The CRS may call RP to evaluate data. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP. After 2 minutes report that there is no higher radioactivity on any cation column.


CRS (Step 5) REFER TO the following:



CRS (Step 6) IF AT ANY TIME NC leakage exceeds Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:


• Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).


Auto CLOSE


• Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify Security if SSF is inoperable.

CRS (Step 7) Check if unit shutdown or reactor trip required as follows:

• Check VCT makeup - IN PROGRESS.

CRS (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.c.

BOP (Step 7.c) Check S/G tube leak size - LESS THAN 90 GPM.

• Leakage in one S/G - GREATER THAN 125 GPD (GALLON PER DAY).

CRS (Step 7.d RNO) Perform the following:

• IF unit shutdown required per PT/1/A/4150/001C (Primary to Secondary Leakage Monitoring), THEN……

• IF station management desires to exit procedure, THEN exit procedure at this time.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCCS/SM to evaluate the plant data. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCCS/SM, and report that AP10 should be exited.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 28 of 62 Event Description: DRPI Failure

Just after this, the DRPI for Control Rod M-12 will fail and indicate the rod on the bottom. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-2/D-10, “RPI Urgent Failure,” and address Technical Specification LCO 3.1.7, “Rod Position Indication.” Booth Operator Instructions: Insert MAL-EDA350 = 1 Indications Available: • 1AD-2/D-9, “RPI at Bottom Rod Drop.” • 1AD-2/E-10, “RPI Non-Urgent Failure.” • M-12 Red Bar on DRPI, with DRPI Screen flashing. • No accompanying NCS Temperature Change.

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may go to

AP-14. If so, this procedure will indicate that it will not handle RPI problems.

OP/1/A/6100/010C, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE FOR PANEL 1AD-2 D10, RPI URGENT FAILURE

RO (IA Step 1) Check to see which rod(s) is affected.

NOTE: Rod M-12 is affected.

CRS (IA Step 2) IF Unit is in Mode 2 (pulling rods toward criticality), 3, 4, or 5…

NOTE: Unit is in Mode 1, CRS recognizes NOT applicable.

CRS (IA Step 3) IF actual rod misalignment exists or rod control system malfunctions, go to AP/1/A/5500/014 (Rod Control Malfunction).

NOTE: Actual Rod Misalignment does NOT exist. Examiner NOTE: If the crew misdiagnoses and goes to AP14, allow crew time to determine that they do NOT have a Dropped Rod. If crew goes to AP14, when RE asked to conduct Flux Map, Booth Instructor: report as RE, a Rod has NOT dropped.

CRS (IA Step 4) IF in Mode 1-2:


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • IF failure on only one Data train (either

Data A or Data B)… NOTE: The failure has affected BOTH Trains.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/SE to address. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/SE as appropriate.

CRS (IA Step 5) IF both channels of DRPI and OAC Rods indication lost, refer to TS 3.1.7.

NOTE: CRS will refer to TS 3.1.7.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/IAE to address. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/IAE as appropriate.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/RE to address. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RE as appropriate.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.7, ROD POSITION INDICATION

CRS 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication

CRS LCO 3.1.7 The Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLCIABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME



A. One DRPI per group inoperable for one or more groups.

A.1 Verify the position of the rods with in-operable position indicators by using movable incore detectors.

OR A.2 Reduce

THERMAL POWER to ≤ 50% RTP.

Once per 8 hours 8 hours

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A must be entered.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 31 of 62 Event Description: Letdown Line Leak Outside Containment

Shortly afterwards, a 50-75 gpm leak will occur on the Letdown Line, in the Aux Building, upstream of the Letdown Heat Exchanger. The operator will enter Case II of AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The operator will place the Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service per Enclosure 4.4 of OP/0/A/6450/011, “Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System.” The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage,” and Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.”

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NV019B = 50

Indications Available: • MCB Annunciator 1RAD2/A-2, 1EMF36 UNIT VENT GAS HI RAD, alarms • 1EMF36(L) Red TRIP 2 light is LIT • 1EM36(H) Amber TRIP 1 light is LIT • MCB Annunciator 1RAD1/B-3, EMF41 AUX BLDG VENT HI RAD, alarms • Letdown flow lowers to 0 gpm with normal letdown isolation valves OPEN.


NOTE: The crew may address one or more Annunciator Response Procedures prior to entering AP10.

Examiner NOTE: The crew may misdiagnose this as a Loss of Letdown, rather than a leak, and use AP-12, rather than AP-10. If so, the Crew may be successful in isolating normal thereby isolating the leak, without realizing that a leak has occurred. If so, proceed to next event and use following question post-exam.



NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to the Aux Building to look for leaks. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge, wait 5 minutes and report that there is a leak in the Aux Building. If CRS requests location of the leak, report that the location cannot be determined due to steam in the building.

AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS, CASE II

BOP (Step 1) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.


NOTE: Pzr level will be lowering.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:

• Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

• Ensure 1NV-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) OPENING.

• OPEN 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC Pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

BOP • Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: Letdown flow has lowered to 0 gpm, because the leak is downstream of the pressure control valve.

• Start additional NV Pump.

• IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow, THEN perform the following:



• IF in mode 3 or above, with CLAs in service (aligned to NC System), THEN perform the following:

• Trip reactor.

• WHEN reactor tripped OR auto S/I setpoint reached, THEN ensure S/I initiated.


• IF in mode 3 with CLAs isolated…

• IF T-Avg is less than 200°F…

CRS (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN perform Step 2.


BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure – STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 5) Check main steam line intact as follows:

• Reactor power – AT TURBINE POWER.

NOTE: The Turbine is not synched to the Electrical Grid yet. If Tavg is NOT stable, the Crew may perform the RNO. However, the crew will remain in AP-10.

• NC Loop T-Avg – STABLE.




RO/ BOP

(Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the following methods:

NOTE: The leak may no longer be present. If it is the estimate will be 30-90 gpm.

• Monitor OAC NV graphic

OR

• Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow

OR

• Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point M1P1271).






• Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System). Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

NOTE: The CRS may elect to take this action even if the leak has been isolated, or it may have already been performed in an ARP.

• Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify security if SSF is inoperable.


NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.4. Other Examiners follow AP10 Actions, Step 10, on Page 37.



OP/0/A/6450/011, CONTROL AREA VENTILATION/CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

Examiner NOTE: Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 4.4 if BOP is assigned by CRS to perform.


BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections as applicable:

• Section 3.3, Pressurize Control Room Using Outside Air Pressure Fans

• Section 3.4, Securing Pressurization of Control Room

BOP (Step 3.3) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

BOP

(Step 3.3.1) Ensure at least one of the following groups of intake valves open:

• 1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)


• 1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)


OR

BOP • 1VC-9A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 2)






BOP (Step 3.3.2) IF A Train VC/YC operating, place “A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan” to “ON”.

BOP (Step 3.3.3) IF B Train VC/YC operating, place “B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan” to “ON”.

BOP (Step 3.3.4) Depress “MAN” for the following (to ensure fans off):

• #1 CRA Otsd Air Fan

• #2 CRA Otsd Air Fan

BOP (Step 3.3.5) Depress “OFF” for the following:

• CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper)

• CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper)

RO/ BOP

(Step 3.3.6) Check the following dark:

• CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) “OPEN” light.

• CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) “OPEN” light.




BOP/RO

(Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% (“VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL” alarm (1AD-7, D-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV Pump suction to FWST as follows:


• OPEN 1NV-221A (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

• OPEN 1NV-222B (U1 NV Pump Suct From FWST Isol).

• CLOSE 1NV-141A (U1 VCT Outlet Isol).

• CLOSE 1NV-142B (U1 VCT Outlet Isol).

• Check Reactor Trip Breakers – OPEN.

BOP/RO

(Step 11) IF AT ANY TIME Containment pressure exceeds Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG), THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in “HIGH” to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.


BOP/RO

(Step 12) Check seal leakoff on all NC Pumps – LESS THAN 6 GPM.

BOP/RO

(Step 13) Check NC Pump Thermal Barriers intact as follows:

NOTE: Previous KC System failures may cause the crew to mis-diagnose a leak in the Thermal Barrier. The CRS will recognize that this step is trying to identify a leak in the Thermal Barrier, that none exists, and NOT take the RNO action.

• All NC Pump Thermal Barrier Outlet Valves – OPEN.

• NC Pump Thermal Barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic – NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC Pumps)

• KC Surge Tank level rates on OAC KC graphic - NORMAL



• KC Surge Tank level - NORMAL

• 1EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)- NORMAL

• 1EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling) – NORMAL.

.

CRS (Step 14) GO TO Step 16

BOP/RO

(Step 16) Check leak – SUSPECTED ON LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

NOTE: A leak is NOT suspected near the Demineralizers.


BOP/RO

(Step 18) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

NOTE: A leak is known to be on the Normal Letdown Line.

BOP (Step 19) Isolate leak as follows:

Check leak - KNOWN TO BE DUE TO LETDOWN LINE RELIEF OPEN.

NOTE: The leak is NOT due to a Letdown Line Relief Valve.

CRS (Step 19.a RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 19.f and GO TO Step 19.f.

CRS/ BOP

(Step 19.f) Check letdown isolation - DESIRED.

NOTE: Normal Letdown Line isolation is desired.

BOP (Step 19.g) CLOSE the following letdown isolation valves:

• 1NV-458A (U1 75 GPM L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

• 1NV-457A (U1 45 GPM L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).

• 1NV-35A (U1 Variable L/D Orifice Otlt Cont Isol).



BOP (Step 19.h) Check leak - ISOLATED. NOTE: The Letdown Line leak is isolated with the valves CLOSED.

BOP (Step 19.i) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.

BOP (Step 19.j) IF tube leak is suspected on Letdown Hx, THEN….

NOTE: A Letdown HX Tube Leak is NOT suspected.

BOP (Step 19.k) Check leak - ISOLATED. NOTE: The Letdown Line leak is isolated.

BOP (Step 19.l) Place 1NV-137A (U1 NC Filter Otlt To VCT 3-Way Diversion Cntrl) to "HUT" to ensure VCT is isolated from leak.

BOP (Step 19.m) Establish excess letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures),Enclosure 2 (Establishing Excess Letdown).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action, while the crew continues with AP-10. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 2. Other Examiners follow AP-10 Actions, Step 19.n, on Page 42.

EP/1/A/5000/G-1, GENERIC ENCLOSURES ENCLOSURE 2, ESTABLISHING EXCESS LETDOWN


BOP (Step 1) Check KC System alignment:

• Containment pressure – HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.



• All KC pumps – ON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump has previously tripped.

BOP (Step 1.b RNO) IF either train KC pumps off, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The A Train KC Pumps are OFF.

• CLOSE from Control Room or dispatch operator to CLOSE the following valves on idle train:

A Train:

• 1KC‑230A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol) (aux bldg, 750+12, JJ‑55, above north end of KC HX 1A).

• 1KC‑3A (Trn A Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol) (aux bldg,733+8, HH‑55, north of column HH‑55).

• WHEN idle train isolated from reactor bldg header per step above, THEN OPEN the following valves on operating train:

B Train:

• 1KC‑18B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).

• 1KC‑228B (Trn B Rx Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

BOP • Do not continue until KC aligned to reactor bldg header.

BOP • OPEN 1KC‑305B (U1 KC To Excess L/D Hx Cont Outside Isol).

• Check KC Surge Tank levels ‑ STABLE.

• OPEN 1KC‑315B (U1 Excess L/D Hx KC Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).

BOP • Check containment pressure – HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.

BOP (Step 2) Pressurize excess letdown line as follows:

• Place 1NV-27B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet 3-Way Cntrl) to “VCT” position.



• OPEN 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).

• Wait 2 minutes.

• CLOSE 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).

BOP (Step 3) Check the following valves – CLOSED:

• 1NV-94AC (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Inside Isol)

• 1NV-95B (U1 NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont Outside Isol).

BOP (Step 3 RNO) IF both valves open, THEN GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) Check reactor – SUBCRITICAL.

BOP (Step 10 RNO) IF reactor critical, THEN perform the following:

• Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 11) OPEN the following valves:

• 1NV-24B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol)

• 1NV-25B (1C NC Loop To Excess L/D Hx Isol).

BOP (Step 12) Slowly OPEN 1NV-26B (U1 Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl) while maintaining Excess letdown Hx temperature less than 200°F.

BOP (Step 13) Check the following valves – CLOSED.



• 1NI-185A (1A ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol)

• 1NI-184B (1B ND Pump Suction From Cont Sump Isol).

BOP (Step 14) Notify Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.

BOP (Step 15) WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document transients on letdown and charging.



CRS (Step 19.n) Power operation may continue as long as NC System activity and chemistry requirements are met.

CRS (Step 19.o) GO TO Step 29.

CRS (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

RO (Step 30) Check normal letdown – IN SERVICE.

CRS (Step 30 RNO) IF normal letdown must remain isolated for greater than 4 hours, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to ensure zinc addition is secured.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address Normal Letdown OOS. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.



CRS (Step 31) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Station Management to address the leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Station Management. Report that they will respond back to the Control Room in ten minutes (Should be Tripped in 10 Minutes).

CRS (Step 32) Check unit shutdown - REQUIRED.

CRS (Step 35) WHEN leak less than Tech Spec limits, THEN perform the following:

• Check VCT - INTACT.

• Check NV Pump suction - ALIGNED TO VCT

• IF Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service, THEN contact station management to evaluate securing filter train PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

• IF VL AHU mode select switches were placed to "HIGH" in Step 11, THEN…..

Examiner NOTE: Based on the transient nature of evaluating this TS, the Examiner may need to question the CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

• 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE



CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will recognize that during this event the plant was in Action A.1 when the leak was occurring, and out of this Action when the leak was isolated.

A. RCS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.

4 hours









COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will recognize that during this event the plant was in Action C.1 and C.2 when the leak was occurring, and out of this Action when the leak was isolated.


OR Total reactor

coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.

OR Any reactor

coolant pump No. 1 seal leakoff > 4.0 gpm.


AND C.2 Enter

Condition A.

Immediately


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 46 of 62 Event Description: Sequentially Dropped Rods

Just after the leak isolation, one Control Bank D Control Rod will drop into the core. The operator will respond in accordance with ARP1AD-2/D-9, “RPI at Bottom Rod Drop” and will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, “Rod Control Malfunction.” Shortly after this, a second Control Rod will drop requiring that the operator manually trip the reactor. Booth Operator Instructions: insertMAL-IRE006B6

STATIONARY_GRPPR insertMAL-IRE006P10

STATIONARY_GRPPR (45 Seconds Delayed)

Indications Available: • MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, B-10, ROD CONTROL NON-URGENT FAILURE, alarms. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-9, RPI AT BOTTOM ROD DROP, alarms. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, D-10, RPI URGENT FAILURE, alarms. • MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, E-9, RPI AT BOTTOM > 1 ROD DROPPED, alarms. • DRPI indication that Control Rod B6 is on the bottom. Subsequently: • DRPI indication that Control Rod P10 is on the bottom.



RO (Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Immediate Action

• Trip Reactor. NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.


RO (Step 2) Place control rods in manual. Immediate Action

RO (Step 3) Check rod movement – STOPPED. Immediate Action



(Step 4) Check all rods – ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK,


• IF misaligned rod(s) due to DRPI indication failure only, THEN exit this procedure.

• IF T-Avg has gone down, THEN lower Turbine load as necessary to restore T-Avg to T-Ref.

• GO TO Enclosure 1 (Response To Dropped or Misaligned Rod).

NOTE: Upon recognition of the 2nd dropped rod, the RO will perform Step 1 which now applies.

RO (Step 1) IF two or more rods are either dropped OR misaligned by greater than 24 steps, THEN perform the following:

Immediate Action

• Trip Reactor. NOTE: The rods will drop sequentially so the action of tripping the reactor will be delayed, but Immediate upon observation.



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task: Trip the Reactor upon recognition of the second dropped rod Safety Significance: Multiple dropped control rods are a significant reactivity transient that can have a serious effect on plant parameters under certain operating conditions, and may result in power distribution limits being exceeded. The guidance to trip the reactor is a conservative action to prevent the plant form challenging the Pzr low pressure trip setpoint, etc.; and is consistent with the conservative nature of the industry. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.19 states that it is a management expectation that the operator trip the reactor within 30 seconds of a second dropped rod.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7 & 8 Page 49 of 62 Event Description: Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation/1B ND Pump fails to start in

AUTO

Upon the reactor trip, the B Train of Safety Injection will inadvertently actuate with the exception that the 1B ND Pump will fail to start in AUTO. This pump will be manually started. The operator will enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection,” and verify reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation, actuating the A Train of SI in the process. The crew will reset SI and stop all ECCS Pumps except for one NV Pump within 15 minutes. Ultimately, the crew will transition to step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1, “Safety Injection Termination.” The scenario will terminate in EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 at Step 14.m RNO after the CRS determines to establish Excess Letdown. Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-ISE001B (Occurs on Rx

Trip) insert MAL-ND001B = AUTO (Occurs

on SI Actuation)

Indications Available: • SI actuation light is LIT on the B Train

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE:

Mark Time of SI Actuation (To the Minute): ____________

NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.

E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION









AUTO



Immediate Action

RO / BOP




NOTE: Only the B Train LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light is LIT.

RO/ BOP

(Step 5.b RNO) Initiate S/I.

Foldout Page


CA Suction Sources




CRS (Step 6) Announce “Unit 1 Safety Injection”. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) - LIT



AUTO


BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):

• Groups 1,2,5 – DARK.


• Group 4 – LIT AS REQUIRED. NOTE: If the BOP has NOT manually started the 1B ND Pump, the status light will be DARK. The BOP will notice that the 1B ND Pump is NOT running and take the RNO action (Manually start the 1B ND Pump).


RO / BOP

(Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

• MD CA pumps – ON.


BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps ‑ ON. NOTE: The 1A2 KC Pump has previously tripped.


• Start pumps.


• IF any NC pump KC low flow annunciator lit on 1AD‑6, THEN…





AUTO

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Start 2A RN pump.



RO (Step 14) Check all S/G pressures – GREATER THAN 775 psig.


NOTE: Containment Pressure is ≈0.15 psig.


• Check “NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW” gauge – INDICATING FLOW.

NOTE: NV Flow is ≈320 gpm.

• Check NC pressures – LESS THAN 1600 PSIG.

NOTE: NC System pressure is ≈ 2250 psig, and the Pzr PORVs may be lifting.


• Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:




CRS (Step 17) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.


AUTO


RO / BOP



• Check VI header pressure – GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

• WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R level between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.


• IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg – STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F

NOTE: All NC Pumps will be ON.

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:


• Normal Pzr spray valves – CLOSED. NOTE: depending on NC System pressure the Spray Valve may be OPEN.

BOP • At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve – OPEN.

BOP (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F.

NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be ≈80-90oF.

RO (Step 22) Check if main steamlines intact:

• All S/G pressure – STABLE OR GOING UP

NOTE: All SG Pressures are ≈1100psig.



AUTO

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact: NOTE: 1EMF34(L) has

previously failed, however, no other indications of a SGTR exist.

• The following secondary EMFs – NORMAL:


• 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))

• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)

• 1EMF-25 (S/G B)

• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)

• 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

• S/G levels – STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

BOP (Step 24) Check if NC System intact: NOTE: All EMF instrumentation reads normal.

• 1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) - NORMAL

• 1EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) - NORMAL

• 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) - NORMAL

• Check containment pressure – LESS THAN 1 PSIG

NOTE: Containment Pressure is ≈0.20 psig.

• Check containment sump level – NORMAL.

RO / BOP

(Step 25) Check S/I termination criteria:

• NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F.

• Secondary heat sink:


AUTO


• N/R level in at least one S/G – GREATER THAN 11%

OR

• Total feed flow to S/Gs – GREATER THAN 450 gpm.

• NC Pressure – STABLE OR GOING UP.

• Pzr level – GREATER THAN 11%.


• S/I

• Sequencers.

BOP (Step 27) Stop all but one NV pump.

BOP (Step 28) Check NC pressure – STABLE OR GOING UP.

BOP (Step 29) Isolate NV S/I flowpath as follows:

• Check NV pumps miniflow valves – OPEN:

• 1NV-150B (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol)

• 1NV-151A (U1 NV Pump Recirc Isol).


• 1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV)

• 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).

BOP (Step 29.b RNO) Perform the following:

• IF S/I is reset on affected train, THEN perform the following:

• IF 1NI‑9A closed and reopened, THEN…..

• IF 1NI‑10B closed and reopened, THEN…..

NOTE: 1NI-10B has NOT closed and re-opened.


AUTO


• IF S/I reset light is dark on affected train, THEN…..

NOTE: The SI Reset light on the B Train is LIT.

• IF EP/1/A/5000/G‑1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 23 (Local Reset of S/I Signal) initiated, THEN…..

NOTE: Generic Enclosure 23 has NOT been initiated.

• Dispatch operator to CLOSE affected valve(s):

• 1NI‑10B (aux bldg, 733+4, JJ‑51, room 730, VCT hallway 1 ft south of JJ‑51).

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge. After 2 Minutes, insert CLOSE 1NI-10B LOCALLY, and report that 1NI-10B has been closed locally.

• Do not continue until both 1NI‑9A and 1NI‑10B are closed.

Examiner NOTE: Mark Time of 1NI-9A Closure and the dispatch of the AO to close 1NI-10B (To the Minute): ____________

Critical Task: Terminate SI by closing 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B within 15 minutes of SI actuation. Safety Significance: An inadvertent SI rapidly injects inventory into the NCS causing Pzr Level, and correspondingly, Pzr Pressure to increase. Prolonged recovery unnecessarily challenges the Pzr Code Safety valves. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.6 states that when at NOP/NOT conditions, the FSAR commitment is to have SI terminated within 15 minutes (The Safety Analysis CANNOT credit the cycling of the Pzr PORVs since auto PORV operation can only be assured during LTOP Operation). The Safety Analysis assumes that the Pzr Code Safeties will lift and reseat ONLY if they are cycled for a short time and Pzr liquid temperature remains > 500oF. If this action is not taken, the conclusions of the Safety Analysis are invalid, and violates a License Condition.

BOP (Step 30) Establish charging as follows:


AUTO



• THROTTLE 1NV-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) to maintain 6-10 GPM seal injection flow to each NC pump.

BOP • Close 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control).

• Check one of the following valves – OPEN:

• 1NV-13B (U1 NV Supply to 1A NC Loop Isol).

NOTE: 1NV-13B is OPEN.

OR

• 1NV-16A (U1 NV Supply to 1D NC Loop Isol).

• Check 1NV-21A (U1 NV Spray to U1 Aux PZR Spray Isol) – CLOSED.

• Open the following valves:

• 1NV-244A (Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol)

• 1NV-245B (Charging Hdr Cont Outside Isol).

CRS • WHEN controlling NV flow in subsequent steps, THEN maintain flow within the following limits while THROTTLING charging and seal injection control valves:


• Charging flow – LESS THAN 200 GPM.

• Seal injection flow to each NC pump – 6-10 GPM.

BOP (Step 31) Control charging flow as follows:

• Control charging flow as required to maintain Pzr level stable.

• Check Pzr level – STABLE OR GOING UP.


AUTO



• Phase A Isolation

• Phase B Isolation.

BOP (Step 33) Establish VI to containment as follows:


• 1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

• 1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol).

• 1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non-Ess Cont Outside Isol).


CRS (Step 34) Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).

CRS (Step 35) WHEN EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination) is implemented in next step, THEN monitor its Foldout page.

CRS (Step 35) GO TO Step 9 of EP/1/A/5000/ES-1.1 (Safety Injection Termination).

NOTE: The CRS will transition to ES-1.1 Step 9.

ES-1.1, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION

BOP (Step 9) Check if NI pumps should be stopped:

Examiner NOTE: After transition to ES-1.1, terminate Exam at Lead Examiner discretion.

BOP • Check NC pressure -

• STABLE OR GOING UP.


AUTO


• GREATER THAN 1600 PSIG.

• Stop NI pumps.


BOP (Step 10) Check if ND pumps should be stopped:

• Check any ND pump – ON.

• Check running ND pumps suction – ALIGNED TO FWST.

• Stop ND pumps.

RO (Step 11) Check S/I flow not required:


NOTE: NC System Subcooling will be ≈65-85oF.

BOP • Pzr level – GREATER THAN 11% (29% ACC).

NOTE: Pzr Level will be 60-90%.

RO (Step 12) Check steam dumps:

• Check condenser available as follows:

• “C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP” status light (1SI-18) – LIT.

• MSIVs on intact S/Gs – OPEN.

• Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:

• Place “STM PRESS CONTROLLER” in manual.

• Adjust “STM PRESS CONTROLLER” output to equal “STEAM DUMP DEMAND” signal.

• Place “STEAM DUMP SELECT” in steam pressure mode.

• Check “P-12 LO-LO TAVG” status light (1SI-18) – DARK.


AUTO

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Control steam dumps to maintain NC T-

Hots – STABLE.

RO • IF AT ANY TIME “STEAM HEADER PRESSURE” is between 1090-1095 PSIG AND auto control desired, THEN perform the following:


• Ensure “STM PRESS CONTROLLER” setpoint at 1090-1095 PSIG.

• Place “STM PRESS CONTROLLER” in auto.

• Ensure steam dumps control steam header pressure between 1090-1095 PSIG.


RO (Step 13) Check NC T-Hots – STABLE.

RO/ BOP

(Step 14) Check if letdown can be established:


• Pzr level – GREATER THAN 25%

• Check ND pumps – OFF.


• 1KC-1A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Ret Isol).


• Monitor the following while aligning KC to aux bldg non essential header:

• KC surge tank levels

• KC System flow.

• Place the following in “AUTO” for the operating KC train(s):


AUTO

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1KC-54B (Train B Recirc Isol).

• Check 1KC-1A – OPEN.

• Perform the following concurrently:

• CLOSE 1KC-56A (1A ND Hx KC Inlet Isol)

• As flow goes down, OPEN 1KC-50A (Trn A Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

• Check 1KC-2B – OPEN.

BOP • Perform the following concurrently:

• CLOSE 1KC-81B (1B ND Hx KC Inlet Isol)

• As flow goes down, OPEN 1KC-53B (Trn B Aux Bldg Non Ess Sup Isol).

• Reset modulating valves using reset buttons on RN control board.


• 1EMF-51A (Containment Train A (Hi Range)) – LESS THAN 25 R/HR

• 1EMF-51B (Containment Train B (Hi Range)) – LESS THAN 25 R/HR.

• Establish letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 1 (Establishing Normal Letdown) while continuing in procedure.

NOTE: The CRS will recognize that Normal Letdown previously had a leak, and proceed to the RNO to establish Excess Letdown.


UNIT 1 STATUS:


Power History: At this power level for 30 minutes Core Burnup: 25 EFPDs CONTROLLING PROCEDURE: OP/1/A/6100/003 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME THE SHIFT:


continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: • The 1A Hotwell Pump is OOS for bearing replacement. • The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. • 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCTION,” has alarmed

spuriously several times over the last hour, and has currently failed ON (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-2, KG PANEL TROUBLE, is in alarm due to a failed local panel

alarm relay. Crew Directions: • The plant has been stabilized at 4% power for 30 minutes. • The crew will raise power to 12-18% and stabilize reactor power, and make preparations to

synch the Turbine to the Grid while maintenance is completed; starting with Step 3.25 of Enclosure 4.1 of OP/1/A/6100/003.

• There are no fuel conditioning limitations. • An operator (Bob) is standing by to cycle HM-45 when required during the startup. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB) Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

PROGRAM: McGuire Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 31 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N15-1-5 REFERENCES: 1. OP/1/A/6250/002, “Auxiliary Feedwater System” (Rev 127) 2. AP/1/A/5500/01, “Steam Leak” (Rev 18) 3. Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System” (Amendment 221/203) 4. Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System” (Revision 145) 5. AP/1/A/5500/06, “S/G Feedwater Malfunction” (Rev 19) 6. AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps” (Rev 23) 7. Technical Specification 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage.” (Amendment 237/219) 8. AP/1/A/5500/04, “Rapid Downpower” (Rev 27) 9. OP/1/A/6300/001A, “Turbine Generator Load Change” (Rev 12) 10. EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection” (Rev 34) 11. EP/1/A/5000/E-1, “Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant” (Rev 16) Validation Time: 97 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: ________________________ Rev. 040615

- 1 -




(RO)

(BOP)


Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT,” has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating).

Event No.

Malf. No.


1

REM

SA0048 ABC

C-BOP C(TS)-SRO


2 MAL

DCS17E/G

C-RO C-SRO


3 MAL

NC007D C-BOP C(TS)-SRO

NCS Leak


Rapid Downpower

5 MAL

DEH008B C-RO C-SRO


6 MAL NC005D4

M-RO M-BOP M-SRO


7 MAL

NV029B

NA 1B NV Pump Trip

8 MAL

EQB001A NA EDG A Sequencer Failure 9 MAL

NI001B BOP 1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO

10 MAL NC005F14

NA 2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA


- 2 -


McGuire 2015 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT,” has failed to OFF (IAE is investigating). Shortly after taking the watch, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A/6250/002, “Auxiliary Feedwater System.” The operator may use AP/1/A/5500/1, “Steam Leak,” to diagnose the failure. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,” and SLC 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.” Next, the 1B SG FRV Controller will fail to MANUAL and the FRV Bypass valve will fail fully open resulting in the Feedwater Control Valve for the 1B SG closing and causing SG Level to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/06, “S/G Feedwater Malfunction,” and control the 1B SG Level manually. Following this, a 70-90 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube. The crew will implement AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage.” During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, “Turbine Generator Load Change.” After this, Control Rod D-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA. The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.” On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG B Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1A NV Pump will trip, and the 1A NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1A NI Pump manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, “Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.” At that time a second Control Rod (F-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E-1. Critical Tasks: After a failure of the 1B SG FRV Controller in AUTO, Take manual control of the controller and stabilize the 1B SG Narrow Level before a Reactor Protection System actuation occurs. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the controller and stabilize the SG Narrow Level before a Reactor Protection System actuation occurs, under the postulated plant conditions, - 3 -


results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the SG Narrow Level. A failure to stabilize the SG Narrow Range Level, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect performance which could lead to incorrect NCS temperature control and an unnecessary challenge to the NCS Heat Sink Critical Safety Function. Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-0. Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition. Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1) Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.

- 4 -





Reset to Temp I/C 244 (Originally IC-39).

T = 0 Malfunctions: (From IC-39) insert LOA-RV005 = RACKED_OUT (RV Pump 1A Breaker Rackout)

Insert H_X1L_367_5=0 (RV Pump 1A OFF Lamp)







insert H_X01_001F09_1 = 0 = OFF (1AD-1/F-9 failed OFF)

From IC-244:


Insert MAL-DEH008B= TRUE (Turbine Fails to MAN) cd=H_X01_280_4 = 1 (MOV-265 OPEN)

Insert MAL-NV029B = TRUE (NV Pump B Trips on Overcurrent) cd = H_X01_094_2 = 1 (Rx Trip Breaker Open Light)

insert MAL-EQB001A = 0_1 (EDG A Sequencer Failure)

insert MAL-NI001B = AUTO (1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO)

RUN

Reset all SLIMs

Place Tagout/O-Stick on: 1A RV Pump (Tagout) 1SV-27 (Tagout) 1KFP-5130 (O-Stick) MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/F-9 (O-stick)

- 5 -





Freeze.




RUN

Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements.

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.





Event 1

insert REM-SA0048ABC = 1.0


- 6 -




Event 2

InsertMAL-DCSSLIM17G BUTTON_ DEPRESSED Delete 1A MAL-DCSSLIM17G = 2 InsertMAL-DCSSLIM17E BUTTON_ DEPRESSED Delete 1A MAL-DCSSLIM17E = 2 insertREM-CF0105AB = 1


NOTE: This malfunction will take about 2-3 minutes to develop.


Event 3

insert MAL-NC007D = 0.29

NCS Leak

Upon direction in AP-10

Event 4

Rapid Downpower

MOV-265 is OPEN

Event 5

Insert MAL-DEH008B= TRUE


This malfunction is in at T=0


insert MAL-NC005D4 = 1000 delay=0 ramp=0



1B NV Pump Trip

This malfunction is in at T=0.

Post-SI Act Event 8

EDG A Sequencer Failure


Post-SI Act Event 9

1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO


- 7 -



Transition to E-1

Event 10

insert MAL- NC005F14 = 2000

2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA

This malfunction will occur on Transition to E-1.


- 8 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 56 Event Description: TDCA Pump starts inadvertently

Shortly after taking the watch, the Turbine Driven CA Pump will inadvertently start causing the plant to cooldown and reactor power to rise. The crew will recognize that the pump should not be running and stop the pump using OP/1/A/6250/002, “Auxiliary Feedwater System.” The operator may use AP/1/A/5500/1, “Steam Leak,” to diagnose the failure. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.7.5, “Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,” and SLC 16.9.7, “Standby Shutdown System.”

Booth Operator Instructions: insert REM-SA0048ABC = 1.0

Indications Available: • 1SA48ABC Red status light is LIT. • TDCA Pump Turbine Speed rising • MCB Annunciator 1AD-5/F1 TURBINE DRIVEN CA PUMP LO SUCTION PRESSURE • Reactor power starts to rise


CONTROL ROOM EXPECTATIONS MANUAL RO/

BOP CA Operation above 10% power.

IF CA Auto start at greater than 3% power and Main Feedwater is providing flow to the steam generators, then CA flow should be throttled/isolated as soon as practical. This will make the affected CA pumps inoperable due to the control valve not being fully open above 10% as required by the CA Surveillance Requirements.

NOTE: The BOP will throttle CA flow from the TDCA Pump, rendering the CA Pumps inoperable.



Manual Reactor Trip Criteria: (IF any of the following occur: (1) Steam leak is jeopardizing personnel safety or plant equipment, (2) T-Avg is less than 551°F AND going down, or (3) UST level is less than 1 ft – NOT Expected).

NOTE: Manual Reactor Trip Criteria is NOT expected to be utilized.

- 9 -



RO (Step 2) Reduce turbine load to maintain the following:

NOTE: The RO will need to reduce load to limit reactor power.

• Excore NI’s – LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

• NC Loop D/T’s – LESS THAN 60°F D/T

• T-Avg – AT T-REF.

CRS (Step 3) Check containment entry – IN PROGRESS.

NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.


BOP (Step 5) Check Pzr pressure prior to event – GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).


NOTE: Pzr level is expected to be stable, however, it may be lowering. If so, perform Step 6 RNO. Otherwise continue with Step 7.


• Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

• Ensure 1NV-238 (U1 Charging Hdr Control) OPENING.

• OPEN 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

• Reduce or isolate letdown.

• Start additional NV pump.

IF Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow…

NOTE: It is expected that the BOP will be able to control Pzr level.

- 10 -



BOP (Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, THEN RETURN TO Step 6.





RO (Step 13) Identify and isolate leak on Unit 1 as follows:

• (Step 13a) Check SM PORVs – CLOSED.

RO • (Step 13.b) Check condenser dump valves – CLOSED.

• (Step 13.b RNO) IF steam dumps required to be closed…

NOTE: The Steam Dumps are likely to be closed.

BOP • (Step 13.c) Check containment conditions – NORMAL:

• Containment temperature

• Containment pressure

• Containment humidity

• Containment floor and equipment sump level.

RO / BOP

• (Step 13.d) Check TD CA pump – OFF.

NOTE: The TDCA Pump is running.

- 11 -



• (Step 13.d RNO) IF operation of TD CA pump is causing uncontrolled cooldown AND flow from TD CA pump not required, THEN stop TD CA pump PER OP/1/A/6250/002 (Auxiliary Feedwater System) Enclosure 4.4 (Manual Operation of #1 TD CA Pump)

Examiner NOTE: CRS may direct that the TDCA Pump be stopped per the OP. If so, continue as scripted. If NOT, continue with the remaining steps of AP-1 on Page 13.


NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

OP/1/A/6250/002, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, MANUAL OPERATION OF #1 TD CA PUMP


NOTE: The CRS/BOP may call WCC/IAE to address the R&Rs on the TDCA Pump. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and report none exist.

BOP (Step 3.2) Ensure that a pre-job briefing has been performed that includes discussion of reactivity management concerns with this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.3) IF #1 TD CA Pump to be operated locally…

NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.

BOP (Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:

• Section 3.6, Stopping #1 TD CA Pump

BOP (Step 3.6) Stopping #1 TD CA Pump

• IF stopping pump following EP/AP, check "TURB" depressed on the following:

NOTE: The CRS may decide to take this action if the OP was entered from AP1.

- 12 -



• CA Modulating Valves Reset Train A

• CA Modulating Valves Reset Train B

• IF operating #1 TD CA Pump locally… NOTE: The pump is NOT to be operated locally.

BOP • Ensure the following closed:

• 1CA-64AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1A S/G Control)

• 1CA-52AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1B S/G Control)

• 1CA-48AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1C S/G Control)

• 1CA-36AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch to 1D S/G Control)

BOP • Ensure “RESET” lit on “TD CA Pump Auto Start Reset.

BOP • Place “#1 TD CA Pump” in “STOP”.

• Ensure the following closed:

• 1SA-48ABC (1C S/G SM Supply To U1 TD CA Pump Turb Isol)

NOTE: The CRS will recognize that 1SA-48ABC has failed OPEN. Because of this the CRS may dispatch an AO to locally close the upstream isolation valve 1SA-1. The only other choice is to leave the TDCA Pump running. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as AO. Booth Instructor: Wait 3 minutes and Insert REM-SA0001 = 0.0; then call as AO and report that 1SA-1 is CLOSED.

• 1SA-49AB (1B S/G SM Supply To U1 TD CA Pump Turb Isol)



- 13 -



Examiner NOTE: Continue here if the OP is NOT used to stop TDCA Pump.

BOP • (Step 13.e) Check valves on “STEAM LINE DRAIN VALVES” board (1MC-9) – CLOSED.

NOTE: One or more of these valves may be cycling. The RNO will direct closing the valves.

CRS • (Step 13.f) Check opposite Unit (Unit 2) “STEAM HEADER PRESSURE” – GREATER THAN 200 PSIG.

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO for AS Header pressure. If so, Floor Instructor report as U2 RO that U2 Steam Header pressure is ≈1000 psig.

• (Step 13.g) Dispatch operator to check for leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks. If so, Floor Instructor: acknowledge. Booth Instructor: Report back in 3-5 minutes that there are no leaks.

NOTE: The CRS may NOT dispatch AOs to look for leaks because it is understood that the Steam Dump valve opening was the reason that AP-1 was entered.

BOP (Step 14) Check UST level – STABLE OR GOING UP.

CRS (Step 15) Evaluate unit shutdown as follows:


• Determine if unit shutdown or load reduction is warranted based on the following criteria:

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/Management to address the startup. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

• Size of leak

• Location of leak

• Rate of depletion of secondary inventory

- 14 -



• IF steam is leaking from a secondary heater relief OR MSR relief valve, THEN reducing turbine load….

NOTE: No Relief Valve is leaking.

• IF turbine trip will isolate steam leak (such as feedwater heater leak or MSR leak)…

NOTE: A Turbine Trip is NOT needed to isolate the steam leak.

• Check unit shutdown or load reduction – REQUIRED.

NOTE: Shutdown/Load Reduction will NOT be required.

CRS (Step 15.c RNO) Perform the following:

• Maintain present plant conditions until leak can be isolated or repaired.

• Exit this procedure.


NOTE: The CRS may address Tech Specs based on plant response.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.5, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM

CRS LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, And 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

CRS ACTIONS

- 15 -




COMPLETION TIME

A. One steam supply to turbine driven AFW pump inoperable

A.1 Restore steam supply to OPERABLE status.

7 days AND 10 days form discovery of failure to meet the LCO

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A Only if 1SA-1 has been isolated and flow control valves have been re-opened.

B. One AFW train inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore AFW train to OPERABLE status.

72 hours AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B Only if 1SA-1 remains OPEN (TDCA Pump remains running), and flow control valves have been closed.


CRS COMMITMENT The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be FUNCTIONAL.





- 16 -




COMPLETION TIME

NOTE: The CRS will determine that SLC 16.9.7 ACTION A is applicable. A. One or more

required SSS components identified in Table 16.9.7-1 non-functional.

A.1 Verify the FUNCTIONALITY of fire detection and suppression systems in the associated areas identified in Table16.9.7-1.

AND A.2 Restore the


1 hour 7 days


- 17 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 18 of 56 Event Description: FRV Controller and Bypass Valve Failure

Next, the 1B SG FRV Controller will fail to MANUAL and the FRV Bypass valve will fail fully open resulting in the Feedwater Control Valve for the 1B SG closing and causing SG Level to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/06, “S/G Feedwater Malfunction,” and control the 1B SG Level manually. Booth Operator Instructions: InsertMAL-DCSSLIM17G BUTTON_ DEPRESSED Delete 1A MAL-DCSSLIM17G = 2 InsertMAL-DCSSLIM17E BUTTON_ DEPRESSED Delete 1A MAL-DCSSLIM17E = 2 insertREM-CF0105AB = 1

Indications Available: • DCS Computer Alarm: S/G B FCV IN MANUAL MODE • 1B SG Feed Flow lowers • 1B FCV starts to close • 1B FCV Bypass Valve fully opens


AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALFUNCTION

RO (Step 1) Check all CF control and bypass valves – OPERATING PROPERLY.

NOTE: The 1B FRV is NOT operating properly in AUTO.

RO (Step 1 RNO) IF valve has failed, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The RO will place the 1B FRV in MANUAL and restore level to program.

• Place affected valve(s) in manual.

• Restore S/G level to program.

- 18 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task: After a failure of the 1B SG FRV Controller in AUTO, Take manual control of the controller and stabilize the 1B SG Narrow Level before a Reactor Protection System actuation occurs. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the controller and stabilize the SG Narrow Level before a Reactor Protection System actuation occurs, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the SG Narrow Level. A failure to stabilize the SG Narrow Range Level, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect performance which could lead to incorrect NCS temperature control and an unnecessary challenge to the NCS Heat Sink Critical Safety Function.

RO (Step 2) Check both CF pumps – OPERATING PROPERLY.

RO (Step 3) Check unit status as follows:

• Reactor trip breakers - CLOSED

• Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).

CRS (Step 4) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:


• Trip reactor



RO (Step 6) Check reactor power – GREATER THAN 3%.

- 19 -



RO (Step 7) Check CM/CF – PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.

RO (Step 8) Check S/G levels – STABLE OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

RO (Step 9) Check NC temperature as follows:

• IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg – STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.

RO (Step 10) Check all S/G CF control valves – IN AUTO.

NOTE: The 1B FRV will be in MANUAL.

NOTE: The 1B FRV will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

CRS (Step 10 RNO) WHEN automatic control desired AND affected S/G level(s) at program level, THEN place affected CF control valve(s) in automatic.


RO (Step 11) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves – IN AUTO.

RO (Step 11 RNO) WHEN automatic control desired AND affected S/G level(s) at program level, THEN place affected CF control bypass valve(s) in automatic.

NOTE: The 1B Bypass will remain in MANUAL throughout the remainder of the scenario.

RO (Step 12) Check the following on running CF pumps:

• On DCS workstation, Feedpump Overview graphic, check "AUTO" (located below "AUTO/SPD" select button on running CF pump(s)) - INDICATED

• CF pump low pressure governor control - • IN AUTO

- 20 -



• CF pump high pressure governor control • - IN AUTO.

RO (Step 13) Check all CA pumps - OFF.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the failed controller. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.



- 21 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 22 of 56 Event Description: NCS Leak

Following this, a 70-90 gpm leak will develop on the reactor head from a Control Rod Guide Tube. The crew will implement AP/1/A/5500/10, “NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps.” The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, “RCS Operational Leakage.”

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL-NC007D = 0.29

Indications Available: • 1AD-13/B-3, CONT PRESS ALERT HI. • 1RAD-1/E-2, 1EMF CONTAINMENT PARTS. • Containment Pressure increases. • Pzr Level decreases.


AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE

BOP (Step 1) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE IN THE AUX BUILDING.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be in the Aux Building.

SRO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:

• IF containment entry is in progress,…. NOTE: A Containment Entry is NOT in progress.

• IF in Modes 1-4, OR no-mode, THEN GO TO Step 2.



BOP • Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.

• Ensure 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) opening.

- 22 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Open 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow

Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.

• Reduce or isolate letdown. NOTE: The BOP may reduce letdown flow to 45 gpm, or isolate it altogether.

• Start additional NV pump. NOTE: The BOP will NOT need to start an additional NV Pump.

BOP • IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow….

NOTE: The Pzr level is NOT < 4%, or decreasing with maximum Charging flow.

BOP (Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure Pzr level cannot be maintained stable, …...


BOP (Step 4) Check Pzr pressure – STABLE OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

RO (Step 5) check main steam line intact:

• Reactor power – AT TURBINE POWER

• NC Loop T-Avg – STABLE.

SRO (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO / BOP

(Step 7) Estimate leak rate using any of the following methods:

• Monitor OAC NV graphic

OR

• Compare charging flow to letdown flow plus seal return flow

OR

- 23 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Monitor VCT level trend (OAC point

M1P1271). NOTE: The leak should be estimated to be 30-90 gpm.

CRS (Step 8) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM.



• Ensure Outside Air Pressure Filter train in service PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions).

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 BOP to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP. Examiner NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of OP/0/A/6450/011 Enclosure 4.4. Other Examiners follow AP-10 Actions, Step 10, on Page 24.

• Have another SRO evaluate if leakage exceeds SLC 16.9.7 condition C limits and immediately notify security if SSF is inoperable.

NOTE: CRS may ask OSM to address, OR call Security on their own If OSM is asked, Floor Instructor acknowledge as OSM. If the CRS calls Security, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Security.

OP/1/A/6450/011, CONTROL AREA VENTILATION/CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ENCLOSURE 4.4, CONTROL ROOM ATMOSPHERE PRESSURIZATION DURING

ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

- 24 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.1) Evaluate all outstanding R&Rs

that may impact performance of this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.2) Perform the following sections as applicable:

• Section 3.3, Pressurize Control Room Using Outside Air Pressure Fans

• Section 3.4, Securing Pressurization of Control Room

BOP (Step 3.3) Pressurize Control Room using Outside Air Pressure Fans as follows:

BOP (Step 3.3.1) Ensure at least one the following groups of intake valves open:

1VC-1A (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)


1VC-3B (VC Otsd Air Intake Isol from Unit 1)


OR





BOP (Step 3.3.2) IF A Train VC / YC operating, place "A Train CR Outside Air Press Fan" to "ON".

BOP (Step 3.3.3) IF B Train VC / YC operating, place "B Train CR Outside Air Press Fan" to "ON".

- 25 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.3.4) Depress "MAN" for the following

(to ensure fans off):

#1 CRA Otsd Air Fan

#2 CRA Otsd Air Fan

BOP (Step 3.3.5) Depress "OFF" for the following:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper)

CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper)

BOP (Step 3.3.6) Check the following dark:

CRA-OAD-4 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) "OPEN" light

CRA-OAD-3 (CR Area Otsd Air Fans Damper) "OPEN" light


AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE

SRO (Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME VCT level goes below 16% (“VCT ABNORMAL LEVEL” alarm (1AD-7, D-3) low setpoint), THEN align NV pump suction to FWST


BOP (Step 11) IF AT ANY TIME Containment pressure exceeds Tech Spec limit (0.3 PSIG), THEN evaluate placing all 4 VL AHU mode select switches in “HIGH” to prevent them from cycling around 0.5 PSIG.


BOP (Step 12) Check seal leakoff on all NC pumps – LESS THAN 6 GPM.

BOP (Step 13) Check NC pump thermal barriers intact as follows:

- 26 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • NC pump thermal barrier KC outlet flows

and temperatures on OAC KC graphic NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC pumps).

• KC surge tank level rates on OAC KC graphic – NORMAL.

• KC Surge Tank level – NORMAL.

• 1EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling) – NORMAL.

• 1EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling) – NORMAL.


BOP (Step 16) Check leak – SUSPECTED ON LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT suspected to be on the Letdown Line near the Demineralizers.


BOP (Step 18) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the Normal Letdown Line.


BOP (Step 20) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE ON VCT.

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the VCT.


BOP (Step 22) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL CHARGING LINE DOWNSTREAM OF 1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol).

NOTE: The NCS leak is NOT known to be on the Normal Charging Line downstream of 1NV-244A.

- 27 -




BOP (Step 24) Check the following indications – NORMAL:

• Pzr safeties:

• “PZR RELIEF VALVE TEMP”

• “PZR RELIEF LINE NO FLOW” acoustic indication light.

• Pzr PORVs:

• “PZR RELIEF VALVE TEMP”.

• PRT conditions:

• Pressure

• Level

• Temperature

BOP (Step 25) check all CLA levels – NORMAL.

BOP (Step 26) Check the following NCDT parameters:

• Level – NORMAL

• Temperature – NORMAL

• “PUMP FLOW” – AT “RECIRC FLOW”.

BOP (Step 27) Check Containment floor and equipment sumps – NORMAL.

BOP (Step 27 RNO) IF level going up AND Containment is accessible, THEN check inputs to CFAE sumps per PT/1/A/4150/001D (identifying sump leakage).

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to address. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and respond as appropriate.

- 28 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 28) Check leak location – HAS BEEN

IDENTIFIED. NOTE: The NCS leak location has NOT been identified.

CRS (Step 28 RNO) Perform the following steps as necessary to identify location of leak:

• IF leak is inside containment, THEN evaluate isolating letdown and charging PER Steps 19 and 23 to see if leak exists on these headers.

NOTE: Letdown is likely isolated.

• Notify WCC SRO to review recent changes in plant status:

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to address the leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and respond as appropriate.

• Any equipment removed from service

• Any equipment returned to service

• Any venting or draining in progress.

BOP • Notify Radwaste Chemistry to check the following tanks and sumps for excessive input:

NOTE: CRS may call RW to address the leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RW, and respond as appropriate.

• ND/NS sump

• RHT

• Waste Drain Tank

• WEFT

• FDT

• Spent Resin Storage Tank.

• IF affected tank or sump readily identified,……

NOTE: The NCS leak location has NOT been identified.

BOP • IF affected tank or sump not identified, THEN check all tanks and sumps in next steps.

• Check inputs to desired tanks and sumps PER PT/1/A/4150/001D (Identifying NC System Leakage).

NOTE: CRS may ask U2 BOP to perform. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 BOP.

- 29 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP • IF necessary to check inputs to FDT or

WEFT, THEN …….. NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

• IF leakage suspected through 1NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) to RHT, THEN ………

NOTE: The NCS leak location is known to be in the Containment.

CRS (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location and size of leak.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC/RP to address the NCS leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

BOP (Step 30) Check normal letdown - IN SERVICE.

NOTE: Letdown will either be reduced or isolated.

CRS (Step 31) Contact station management to evaluate need to shutdown.

NOTE: CRS may call WCC to contact management. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC, and as Station Management direct that the plant be taken off-line within 1 hour.

CRS (Step 32) Check unit shutdown – REQUIRED.

CRS (Step 33) Shutdown PER one of the following:

• OP/1/A/6100/003 (Controlling Procedure For Unit Operation), Enclosure 4.2 (Power Reduction)

OR

• AP/1/A/5500/04 (Rapid Downpower). NOTE: The CRS will transition to AP-4.

- 30 -


Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS

will acknowledge that the Technical Specification for leakage has been exceeded, but not stop to assess. Examiner NOTE: May seek to discuss with CRS after the scenario.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

CRS 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

• No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;

• 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;

• 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE;

• 389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and

• 135 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.

CRS ACTIONS


COMPLETION TIME

- 31 -



A. RCS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.

A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE within limits.

4 hours NOTE: The CRS will determine that LCO 3.4.13 is NOT met, and that Condition A is applicable, during the course of the transient. Examiner NOTE: Believing that the leakage cannot be corrected within 4 hours, OR believing that the leakage is Pressure Boundary Leakage (Which is NOT without inspection), the CRS may elect to enter ACTION B.1 and B.2 (Follow-up Question needed to determine that the evaluation is made properly).

SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENT 16.9.7 STANDBY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

CRS 16.9.7 Standby Shutdown System

CRS COMMITMENT: The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) shall be operable.


CRS REMEDIAL ACTIONS:

• The SRO should ensure that security is notified 10 minutes prior to declaring the SSS inoperable. Immediately upon discovery of the SSS inoperability, Security must be notified to implement compensatory measures within 10 minutes of the discovery.

NOTE: The CRS may have already handed this off the OSM, however, the remedial action of notifying Security within 10 minutes must be identified by the CRS.

- 32 -



• If inoperable SSS component is located inside containment, repairs shall be made at the first outage which permits containment access.


COMPLETION TIME


OR Total

reactor coolant pump seal leakoff > 16.3 gpm.


AND C.2 Enter

Condition A.

Immediately

When directed to perform a shutdown in AP-10 move to Event #4.

- 33 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 34 of 56 Event Description: Rapid Downpower

Ultimately, the crew will enter AP/1/A/5500/4, “Rapid Downpower.”

Booth Operator Instructions: NA

Indications Available: NA.



RO/ BOP


CRS (Step 2) Announce occurrence on page. NOTE: The CRS may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 3) Check turbine control – IN AUTO.

RO (Step 4) Check “MW LOOP” – IN SERVICE.

RO (Step 4 RNO) Depress “MW IN/MW OUT” pushbutton.

CRS (Step 5) Check shutdown to Mode 3 – DESIRED.

CRS (Step 6) Check if "Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power" appropriate:

• Shutdown Via Reactor Trip from 15% Power – DESIRED

• At least two CA pumps - OPERABLE.

- 34 -


CRS (Step 7) Enter target load of 180 MW in

turbine control panel.

CRS (Step 8) Determine the required power reduction rate (MW/min).

NOTE: The CRS will reduce load at ≈15-30 MWe/minute.

RO (Step 9) Check control rods – IN AUTO.

BOP (Step 10) Notify SOC of load reduction (red dispatcher phone).

Booth Instructor: as SOC, acknowledge.

RO (Step 11) Initiate turbine load reduction to desired load at desired rate.

BOP (Step 12) Borate NC System as follows:

• Energize all backup Pzr heaters.

CRS • Check unit to be shutdown – VIA REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% POWER.

NOTE: It is normal practice to shut down the reactor by driving rods, rather than tripping from 15%.

CRS (Step 12b. RNO) GO TO Step 12.d.

BOP • Determine boration amount based on the following:

• Power Reduction Rate (MW/min)

• Present NC System Boron Concentration (ppm)

• Total Power change (%).

• Record calculated boration amount: NOTE: Based on the rate of load reduction the total boration is ≈ 800-1200 gallons.

RO • Check auto or manual rod control – AVAILABLE.

BOP • Perform boration in 4 equal additions during load reduction PER OP/1/A/6150/009 (Boron Concentration Control), Enclosure 4.7 (Boration Using 1NV-265B (Boric Acid to NV Pumps)).

NOTE: The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Enclosure 4.7. Other Examiners follow AP-4 Actions, Step 13, on Page 35.

- 35 -


OP/1/A/6150/009 BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ENCLOSURE 4.7 BORATION USING 1NV-265B (BORIC ACID TO NV PUMPS)



BOP (Step 3.3) Perform following sections, as applicable:

• Section 3.6, Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid

BOP (Step 3.6) Adding Greater Than 20 Gallons of Boric Acid

• Ensure one of the following running:


OR


• Determine length of time 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open as follows: (R.M.)

BOP • IF using Table 4.7-1 (Time 1NV-265B Full Open With One BAT Pump Running), record time 1NV-265B full open from table:_____sec.

• IF using equation, perform the following:

• Calculate time 1NV-265 is to to be Full Open.

- 36 -


• Open 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric

Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.) Examiner NOTE: When MOV-265 is OPEN, the Turbine will shift to MANUAL. Move forward to Event 5.

• HOLD until 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) full open time elapsed, THEN close 1NV-265B (U1 NV Pump Boric Acid Sup Isol). (R.M.)

• IF 1NV-265B (U1 NV Boric Acid Sup Isol) will NOT close…

• IF BA Trans Pump started in Step 3.6.1, perform the following:

• Ensure the following off:



• Ensure one of the following selected to “AUTO”:


OR








- 37 -


• Ensure alarm clears within one hour as

Xenon builds in.

OR









Examiner NOTE: The CRS may proceed past Step 18 of AP4 while waiting for the BOP to complete the first boration. If so, wait until the BOP is complete with the first boration an then proceed to the next event.

When The Turbine fails to MANUAL, move to Event #5.

- 38 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 39 of 56 Event Description: Turbine Control Unit fails to MANUAL

During the downpower, a failure will occur in the Turbine Control Unit causing the unit to shift from Operator Auto to Manual control. The operator will address 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL, and control the Turbine manually during the downpower in accordance with OP/1/A/6300/001A, Enclosure 4.1, “Turbine Generator Load Change.” Booth Operator Instructions: (Turbine Control Fails to MANUAL) Set in

initial conditions. Triggered from 1NV-265B open light ON.

Indications Available: • Turbine MWe indication stabilizes • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1/F-4, TURBINE IN MANUAL


NOTE: The CRS will continue in AP-4 while the ARP/OP are addressed.

MCB ANNUNCIATOR 1AD-1/F4, TURBINE IN MANUAL

RO Immediate Action: Ensure Turbine/Generator operation stabilizes in either Load or Speed Modes of operation.

NOTE: The Turbine will stabilize in LOAD Mode.

CRS (Step 1) Determine cause and effect, then notify IAE of any malfunction.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/IAE to address the Turbine Control failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 2) Refer to OP/1/A/6300/001 A (Turbine-Generator Load Change) for manual operation of Turbine Generator.

NOTE: The RO will continue the load reduction in MANUAL.

CRS (Step 3) WHEN available and desired, return DEH to “OPER AUTO”.

OP/1/A/6300/001 A, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR LOAD CHANGE

- 39 -



RO (Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load

RO (Step 3.5.1) IF Turbine in “OPERATOR AUTO”…

RO (Step 3.5.3) IF Turbine in “MANUAL” perform the following:

• Ensure desired change within “Calculated Capability Curve”.

• If turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.

• IF raising load, …

• IF decreasing load, depress “GV LOWER”.

Examiner NOTE: The CRS may be at any one of the following AP4 steps after addressing the Turbine in MANUAL event.






• Ensure alarm clears within one hour as Xenon builds in.

- 40 -



OR









(Step 19) Check target load – LESS THAN 1000 MW.

(Step 20) Check Unit 2 available to supply aux steam as follows:

• Unit 2 Reactor power – GREATER THAN 15%

NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO for status. Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is at 100% power.

- 41 -



• Unit 2 AS-12 (U2 SM to AS Hdr Control Inlet Isol) – OPEN

NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO for valve position. Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 AS-12 is OPEN.

• Unit 2 – AVAILABLE TO SUPPLY AS HEADER.

NOTE: CRS will ask U2 RO for AS availability. Floor Instructor: Report as U2 RO that Unit 2 is available to supply AS Header.

(Step 21) Check SM flow on all S/Gs – GREATER THAN 25%.

(Step 22) WHEN all SM flows are less than 75%, THEN ensure the following valves ramp CLOSED:

• 1CF-104AB (1A S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF-105AB (1B S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF-106AB (1C S/G CF Control Bypass)

• 1CF-107AB (1D S/G CF Control Bypass)

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-10.

- 42 -

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N15-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 Page 43 of 56 Event Description: Rod Ejection/SB LOCA/1B NV Pump Trip/EDG A Sequencer

Failure/1B NI Pump fails to Start in AUTO/2nd Rod Ejection/SB LOCA

After this, Control Rod D-4 will be ejected from the core causing a 1000 gpm Small Break LOCA. The operator will trip the Reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, “Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.” On the Safety Injection actuation the EDG A Sequencer will fail to automatically sequence, and the operator will need to manually start ECCS loads. Additionally, the 1B NV Pump will trip, and the 1B NI Pump will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to start the 1B NI Pump manually. Upon completion of E-0, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-1, “Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.” At that time a second Control Rod (F-14) will be ejected from the core causing the Small Break LOCA to degrade to the point at which the NC Pumps will need to be tripped. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 of E-1, after the crew has been directed to return back to the beginning of E-1. Booth Operator Instructions: insert NC005D4 (1000 gpm) Indications Available: • Control Rod D-4 Red Rod Bottom Light flashes on DRPI • Containment Pressure starts to rise • Charging flow starts to increase • Pzr level starts to lower


NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the CRS addressing the EP.


RO/ BOP



• All rod bottom lights – LIT NOTE: The Ejected Rod does NOT indicate on the Bottom.



- 43 -





• Trip reactor.

• IF reactor will not trip, …




Immediate Action

RO/ BOP




RO/ BOP

Foldout Page

NC Pump Trip Criteria NOTE: It is expected that NCP Trip Criteria will eventually apply.

CA Suction Sources




- 44 -



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) Announce “Unit 1 Safety Injection”. NOTE: The CRS may ask

the U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as U2 RO.

RO (Step 7) Check all Feedwater Isolation status lights (1SI-4) – LIT.

NOTE: The 1B FRV Bypass Valve is OPEN.

RO (Step 7 RNO) Initiate Feedwater Isolation.


BOP (Step 9) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):



• Group 4 – LIT AS REQUIRED. NOTE: Several lights will be DARK (1B NV Pump has tripped, 1B NI Pump has failed to start, EDG A Sequencer has failed to operate). The BOP will need to manually start train A equipment and the 1B NI Pump.

• (Step 9.c RNO) Align or start components as required.

• Group 6 – LIT. NOTE: The 1B FRV Bypass Valve is OPEN

• (Step 9.d RNO) GO TO Step 9.f.


• OAC ‑ IN SERVICE

- 45 -



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • LOCA Sequencer Actuated

status light (1SI‑14) on energized train(s) ‑ LIT.

• Perform the following on energized train(s):

• Check OAC Monitor Light Program ("MONL") for Group 6 windows that are dark.

• Align valves as required, while continuing in this EP.

Critical Task: Establish flow from at least one high-head ECCS Pump before transition out of E-0. Safety Significance: Failure to establish flow from the NV System after failure of the automatic actuation constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to recognize a failure and/or correct a failure of an ESF System or component. The FSAR analyses of response to high energy line breaks assume that at least one train of safeguards actuates. If the minimum assumed ESF components are NOT actuated the Safety Analyses results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions in the FSAR is part of the facility license, failure to comply constitutes a violation of the license condition.

BOP (Step 10) Check proper CA pump status:

• MD CA pumps – ON NOTE: The 1A MDCA will need to be manually started

(Step 10.a RNO) Start pumps.


BOP (Step 11) Check all KC pumps - ON


- 46 -



Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump. Floor Instructor: As U2

RO report “2A RN Pump is running.”






NOTE: Containment pressure is ≈2.5 psig, and slowly rising due to the LOCA.


BOP • Check “NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW” gauge – INDICATING FLOW.


NOTE: NCS pressure could be greater than or less than 1600 psig. If pressure is greater than 1600 psig, then perform RNO.

BOP (Step 16.b RNO) Perform the following:

• Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:



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Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS • IF valve(s) open on all running ND

pumps, THEN GO TO Step 17.



BOP (Step 18) Check CA flow:



• WHEN each S/G N/R level is greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain that S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. NOTE: The use of adverse Containment numbers is required if Containment Pressure is > 3 psig.


• IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Avg – STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557ºF.

BOP (Step 20) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:


• Normal Pzr spray valves - CLOSED

• At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve – OPEN.

RO (Step 21) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0ºF.

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RO/ BOP

(Step 23) Check if S/G tubes intact:

• The following secondary EMFs – NORMAL:



• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)

• 1EMF-25 (S/G B)

• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)

• 1EMF-27 (S/G D)

• S/G levels – STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.

RO/ BOP

(Step 24) Check if NC System intact as follows:

NOTE: 1EMF-38L is in TRIP 2.

• 1EMF-38(L) (Containment Particulate (LR)) - NORMAL

• 1EMF-39(L) (Containment Gas (Lo Range)) - NORMAL

• 1EMF-40 (Containment Iodine) - NORMAL

• Check containment pressure – LESS THAN 1 PSIG

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Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • Check containment sump level -

NORMAL


• IF H2 Igniters are off, THEN perform the following:

NOTE: The H2 Igniters are OFF.

• Energize H2 Igniters by depressing “ON” and “OVERRIDE”.

• Dispatch operator to stop all Unit 1 NF AHUs PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 28 (De-energizing Ice Condenser AHUs).

NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge insert LOA-NF016 STOP (Ice Condenser AHU Start/Stop)

CRS • IF AT ANY TIME both of the following conditions exist, THEN perform Enclosure 4 (VX Manual Start And Isolating RV Cooling).

NOTE: These conditions may exist. If so, it is likely that the CRS will assign the BOP to perform Enclosure 4.

• Containment pressure has remained less than 3 PSIG.

• Containment pressure is between 1 PSIG and 3 PSIG.

• Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees),

• GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-1 (Loss Of Reactor Or Secondary Coolant).

NOTE: CRS will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Booth Operator Instructions: insert MAL- NC005F14 = 2000

Indications Available: • Control Rod F-14 Red Rod Bottom Light flashes on DRPI • Containment Pressure starts to rise again • Charging flow starts to increase. • Pzr level starts to lower.

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Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: NC

Subcooling will be lost on this 2nd SBLOCA. The five minute Clock to stop the NC Pumps should start WHEN subcooling is 0°F/NEGATIVE. Record Time: __________

EP/1/A/5000/E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT

RO/ BOP


• NC Pump Trip Criteria: NOTE: The NCPs will be tripped.

• S/I Reinitiation Criteria:

• Secondary Integrity Criteria:

• SGTR Transition Criteria:

• FWST Level Pre-Lo Alarm Actions:

• Cold Leg Switchover Criteria:

• CA Suction Sources:

• Position Criteria for 1NV-150B and 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation):

RO (Step 2) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F.

RO (Step 2 RNO) IF any NV OR NI pump is on, THEN perform the following:

• Ensure all NC pumps are off.

• Maintain seal injection flow.



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Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • All S/Gs – PRESSURIZED.

(Step 4) Control intact S/G levels:

RO • Check N/R level in any intact S/G – GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).

NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers may be used.

BOP • Check VI header pressure – GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.

RO • THROTTLE feed flow to maintain all intact S/G N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.

NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers may be used.

CRS (Step 5) Check secondary radiation normal as follows:

• Check all S/Gs – INTACT.

• Notify RP to perform the following: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/RP to address the switch position. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/RP.

• Frisk all Unit 1 S/G cation columns to determine if activity level is significantly higher for any S/G.

• Notify Control Room of survey results.

CRS • WHEN survey results reported, THEN perform the following:


• Check all S/G(s) activity levels – NORMAL.

BOP • Check secondary EMFs – NORMAL:



• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)

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Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • 1EMF-25 (S/G B)

• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)

• 1EMF-27 (S/G D).

BOP (Step 6) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation valves:

• Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves – AVAILABLE.


• At least one Pzr PORV isolation valve – OPEN.

• IF AT ANY TIME any Pzr PORV opens due to high pressure, THEN after pressure goes below 2315 PSIG, ensure PORV closes or is isolated.


RO/ BOP

(Step 7) Check S/I termination criteria:


NOTE: The NCS is NOT subcooled.

Critical Task: Trip NC Pumps within 5 minutes of loss of SCM (4600/113/E13.1) Safety Significance: Failure to trip all NCPs on a loss of subcooled margin can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200oF. PT/0/A/4600/113, Enclosure 13.1 states that McGuire is committed to having NC Pumps tripped within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. The Safety Analysis recommends that the NC Pumps be tripped within 2 minutes to limit the depth and duration of core uncovery. It is a management expectation that the NC Pumps be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes of a loss of subcooling. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition. Record Pump Stop Time: __________ subtract time recorded at time of the loss SCM on page 49 _____ = _____ minutes.

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BOP (Step 7.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.f.

RO/ BOP

• Monitor S/I termination criteria PER Enclosure 2 (S/I Termination Criteria) while in the procedure.

• IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure S/I termination criteria is met, THEN RETURN TO Step 7.


BOP (Step 8) Check if ND pump should be stopped:

• NC pressure – GREATER THAN 275 PSIG.

NOTE: The ND Pumps are both ON.

• NC pressure – STABLE OR GOING UP. NOTE: The NCS pressure is likely rising at this time.

• Any ND pump ‑ ON.

• Running ND pumps suction ‑ALIGNED TO FWST.

• Reset the following:

• S/I.

• Sequencers.

• Stop ND pumps.

• IF AT ANY TIME a B/O signal occurs, THEN restart S/I equipment previously on.


• IF AT ANY TIME NC pressure goes below 275 PSIG in an uncontrolled manner, THEN restart ND pumps.


BOP (Step 9) Check NC and S/G pressures:

• All S/G pressure – STABLE OR GOING UP.

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Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments • NC pressure – STABLE OR GOING

DOWN. NOTE: The NCS pressure is likely rising at this point, and the CRS will return to Step 1.


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UNIT 1 STATUS:



• The area has experienced severe weather over the last 24 hours, and this is expected

to continue for the next 12 hours. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: • 1A RV Pump is OOS for motor replacement. • The 1A S/G PORV is isolated and its actuator is currently removed for maintenance. • 1KFP-5130, Spent Fuel Pool Temperature, failed last shift (IAE is investigating). • MCB Annunciator 1AD-1, F-9, “DEH/MSR SYSTEM MALFUNCT,” has failed to OFF

(IAE is investigating). Crew Directions: • Maintain present power level. Work Control SRO/Offsite Communicator Jim Plant SRO Joe (FB) NLO's AVAILABLE Unit 1 Unit 2 Aux Bldg. John Aux Bldg. Chris Turb Bldg. Bob (FB) Turb Bldg. Mike (FB) 5th Rounds. Carol Extra(s) Bill (FB) Ed (FB) Wayne (FB) Tanya Gus (RW)

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· the following equipment is out -of-service: the 1a s/g porv is isolated and its actuator is...

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