© Michael Lacewing

Religious belief

Michael Lacewingenquiries@alevelphilosophy.c

o.uk

Belief-that

• Standard analysis: content + attitude• Content: what the person believes,

given by a proposition– E.g. ‘He believes that elephants are grey.’

• Belief-that aims at truth:– Beliefs are true or false (unlike desire)– To believe that p is to believe that p is true. – To say ‘I believe that p’ implies that you

take p to be true.

Other types of belief

• ‘I believe him’ = – ‘I believe that what he says is true’– ‘I believe that he is trustworthy/sincere’

• Belief-in– ‘I believe in God’ = ‘I believe that God

exists’?– ‘I believe in love’– Not belief-that (no truth claim), but faith,

trust, commitment

Religious belief

• Does belief in God presuppose belief that God exists?– Yes: you can’t believe in a person if you

think they don’t exist– No: you don’t have believe that love

exists (literally) to believe in love

• What is more basic in religious belief? Should belief-that be analysed as (really) belief-in or vice-versa?

The religious ‘hypothesis’

• Is ‘God exists’ a factual hypothesis about reality?– Presupposes that the claim expresses a

belief-that

• Empirical statements are capable of being false; the meaning of the statement is connected to this.– What circumstances or tests would lead us

to atheism?

Is the test correct?

• A statement can be empirical without us knowing what experiences would show that it is false.

• ‘God exists’ may help explain experience - it is tested not directly by experience but by philosophical argument.

• But philosophy is not what gives ‘God exists’ its meaning.

Does ‘God exist’ state a fact?

• Not tested against empirical experience

• Not purely intellectual• Theism not acquired by argument

or evidence• Religious ‘belief’ is belief-in, an

attitude or commitment, towards life, others, history, morality… a way of living.

Objections

• Different religions can prescribe similar ways of life while arguing for different beliefs about God– Orthodoxy (right belief) has been thought very

important

• What supports or justifies the attitude if not beliefs about how things are?

• Perhaps religions distinguished by their stories– But stories don’t justify commitments

• This approach makes religion too subjective

Wittgenstein on meaning

• To understand language, we must understand how it is used.

• Compare uses of language to ‘games’ - rules that allow or disallow certain moves/meanings

• Surface grammar v. depth grammar– ‘The bus passes the bus stop’ v. ‘The peace of

the Lord passes all understanding’– Asking your boss for a raise v. asking God for

prosperity

• Language is part of life, a ‘form’ of life

Wittgenstein on religious belief

• So religious language takes its meaning from religious life

• Its surface grammar looks empirical, but its depth grammar is very different– God is not a ‘thing’ like any other– ‘a religious belief could only be something

like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.’ (Culture and Value, §64)

Implications

• The ‘Last Judgment’ is not a future event• Prayer is not asking to be given good

things• Talk of ‘God’ only makes sense in the

context of religious belief - God does not ‘exist’ independent of belief in God

• Religious belief cannot be criticized by facts and ‘evidence’, although it must make sense as part of human life

Objection

• This interpretation contradicts what most religious believers believe!

• Suggestion: religious language is both factual and expressive