, democracy, authoritarianism, and federalism

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Page 1: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์™€๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜,๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์กฐ๋ฌดํ˜•

์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต๊ตญ์ œ๋ฌธ์ œ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์†Œ

2021๋…„ 1์›” 14์ผ

๋น„๊ต์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์™€์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ (์ด์˜ฅ์—ฐ๊ต์ˆ˜๋‹˜)ํŠน๊ฐ•

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Page 2: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

๊ฐ•์‚ฌ์†Œ๊ฐœ

์กฐ๋ฌดํ˜•

Duke University์ •์น˜ํ•™๋ฐ•์‚ฌ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต์™ธ๊ตํ•™๊ณผํ•™์‚ฌ,์„์‚ฌ

์„ธ๋ถ€์ „๊ณต:๋น„๊ต์ •์น˜,์ •์น˜์ œ๋„,๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜

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Page 3: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

๋ณธํŠน๊ฐ•์˜์ ‘๊ทผ๋ฒ•

1 ๊ฐœ๋ณ„๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜์‚ฌ๋ก€๋ฅผ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๊ธฐ๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š”๋น„๊ต์ •์น˜์ผ๋ฐ˜์ด๋ก 

(์ •์น˜์ œ๋„,์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ๋“ฑ)์˜๊ด€์ ์—์„œ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•จ.

2 ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ์–ด๋– ํ•œํ˜„์ƒ์˜์›์ธ์ด๋˜๋Š” โ€œ๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜โ€๋กœ์ดํ•ดํ•˜๊ณ ,์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”์ •์น˜์ ยท๊ฒฝ์ œ์ ํšจ๊ณผ๊ฐ€๋ฌด์—‡์ธ์ง€๋ฅผ์‚ดํŽด๋ด„.

I 1์›” 14์ผ(๋ชฉ):๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์™€๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜,๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜I 1์›” 15์ผ(๊ธˆ):๊ฒฝ์ œ์„ฑ์žฅ๊ณผ๋ถˆํ‰๋“ฑ,๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜

3 ๊ณ„๋Ÿ‰์ ์ ‘๊ทผ:๋ฐ์ดํ„ฐ์™€ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผํ†ตํ•œ์ดํ•ด๋ฅผ๋„๋ชจํ•จ.

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Page 4: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์˜ค๋Š˜์˜์ฃผ์ œ

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜

(2)

(1)

(1) ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋Š”๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—์–ด๋–ค์˜ํ–ฅ์„๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”๊ฐ€?I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋Š”๋น„์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณด๋‹ค๋”๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ ์ธ๊ฐ€?์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์˜์–ด๋– ํ•œ์†์„ฑ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜๋ฐœ์ „์—๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•˜๋Š”๊ฐ€?

(2) ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋Š”์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์—์–ด๋–ค์˜ํ–ฅ์„๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”๊ฐ€?I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์˜๋ฐœ์ „์—๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•˜๋Š”๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ ,์ œ๋„์ ์กฐ๊ฑด์€๋ฌด์—‡์ธ๊ฐ€?์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋Š”๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜์ฒด์ œ์—์„œ๋Š”๋ฐœ์ „ํ•˜๊ธฐ์–ด๋ ค์šด๊ฐ€?

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Page 5: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜๊ด€๊ณ„

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์‚ฌ์ด์˜์นœํ™”์„ฑ์—์ดˆ์ 

Every single long-standing democracy in a territorially basedmultilingual and multinational polity is a federal state. Althoughthere are many multinational polities in the world, few of them aredemocracies. Those multinational democracies that do exist,however (Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and India), are allfederal. Alfred Stepan (1999, p. 20)

I ๊ทธ๋Ÿฌ๋‚˜์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ๊ด€๋ จ์„ฑ์ด์ธ๊ณผ๊ด€๊ณ„(์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜โ†’๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜)์—์˜ํ•œ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€,์•„๋‹ˆ๋ฉด๋‹จ์ˆœํžˆ์šฐ์—ฐ์˜์ผ์น˜์—์˜ํ•œ๊ฒƒ์ธ์ง€๋ฅผ์„ค๋ช…ํ•˜์ง€๋Š”๋ชปํ•จ.

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Page 6: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜๊ด€๊ณ„

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜ํ•œ์œ ํ˜•์ด๋ผ๊ณ ๋ณด๋Š”๊ด€์ 

It is thus possible to consider federalism as a particular type ofdemocracy: a pluralist democracy based on a constitutional systemof delegated, reserved, and/or shared powers between relativelyautonomous, yet interrelated, structures of government, whosemultiple interactions aim to serve the sovereign will of the federaldemos.

Dimitris Chryssochoou (1998, p. 18)

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์˜์–ด๋– ํ•œ์†์„ฑ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์™€์—ฐ๊ด€๋˜๋Š”๊ฐ€?

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Page 7: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜๊ด€๊ณ„

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ์—ฐ๊ณ„์‹œํ‚ค๋Š”๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜:๋‹ค์›์ฃผ์˜(pluralism)์™€๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”(decentralization)

Democracy depends upon multitudinous communities operating asself-governing collectivities having recourse to overlapping andconcurrent instrumentalities of government.

Vincent Ostrom (1991, p. 23)

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Page 8: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ์ดํ•ดํ•˜๋Š”๋‘๊ฐ€์ง€์ฐจ์›

1 ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋กœ์„œ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜(federalism in structure):

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€๊ณต์‹์ ์œผ๋กœํ—Œ๋ฒ•์—๋ช…์‹œ๋จ.์ œ๋„์ ์ธ,๋ฒ•๋ฅ ์ƒ์˜(de jure)์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜

I Yes or no์˜๋ฌธ์ œ:์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ฐ€๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ธ๊ฐ€?

2 ์‹ค์ œ๋กœ์„œ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜(federalism in practice):

์ •์ฑ…๊ฒฐ์ •์˜๊ถŒํ•œ์ด์ค‘์•™์ •๋ถ€์™€์ง€๋ฐฉ์ •๋ถ€์ค‘์–ด๋””์—์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€์˜

๋ฌธ์ œ.์‚ฌ์‹ค์ƒ์˜(de facto)์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜โ†’๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”(decentralization)I ์žฌ์ •์ (fiscal),์ •์น˜์ (political),ํ–‰์ •์ (administrative)๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”I ์ •๋„(degree)์˜๋ฌธ์ œ:์–ผ๋งˆ๋งŒํผ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”๋˜์–ด์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€?

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Page 9: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋ฅผ์ดํ•ดํ•˜๋Š”๋‘๊ฐ€์ง€์ฐจ์›

์ถœ์ฒ˜: Clark, Golder, & Golder (2017, Chapter 15)

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Page 10: , Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜๊ด€๊ณ„:๋‘๊ฐœ์˜์—ฐ๊ตฌ

1 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson. 2005. โ€œThe Riddle of Federalism:Does Federalism Impact on Democracy?โ€ Democratization Vol.12No.2. pp. 163-182.

2 Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova. 2013. โ€œFederalism, Democracy,and Democratization.โ€ in Arthur Benz and Jorg Broschek (eds.)Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties ofFederalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-184

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Lane & Ersson (2005):์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ค๊ณ„

I 144๊ฐœ๊ตญ์„๋Œ€์ƒ์œผ๋กœํ•œํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜

I ์›์ธ(๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜):์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜

1 ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€(de jure federalism)์—ฌ๋ถ€{1 ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ (30๊ฐœ๊ตญ)0 ๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ (114๊ฐœ๊ตญ)

2 ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”(de facto federalism)์ˆ˜์ค€I ์žฌ์ •์ :๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ด์ง€์ถœ/์ˆ˜์ž…๋Œ€๋น„์ง€๋ฐฉ์ •๋ถ€์ง€์ถœ/์ˆ˜์ž…์˜๋น„์ค‘I ์ •์น˜์ :์ง€๋ฐฉ๋‹จ์œ„์„ ๊ฑฐ์˜์กด์žฌ์—ฌ๋ถ€I ํ–‰์ •์ :ํ•˜์œ„๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋‹จ์œ„์„ธ์ž…์—์„œ์„ธ๊ธˆ๊ณผ์ด์ „๊ธˆ์˜์ƒ๋Œ€์ ์ค‘์š”์„ฑ

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Lane & Ersson (2005):์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ค๊ณ„

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜

I ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ(์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜):๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜I ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ง€ํ‘œ (Freedom House, 1995-2003๋…„์˜ํ‰๊ท ๊ฐ’):

1(์ตœ์ €)โ€“10(์ตœ๊ณ )

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์€๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ณด๋‹ค๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ง€ํ‘œ๊ฐ’์ด๋†’์€๊ฐ€?

๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ง€ํ‘œ๊ฐ’ํ‰๊ท 

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€(30๊ฐœ๊ตญ) 7.33๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€(114๊ฐœ๊ตญ) 6.01

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Lane & Ersson (2005):์ƒ๊ด€๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ

I ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”์ˆ˜์ค€์ด๋†’์„์ˆ˜๋ก๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ง€ํ‘œ๊ฐ’์ด๋†’์€๊ฐ€?

various model specifications for the broadest set of countries for which we have data(N ยผ 144). Second, we analyse the various indicators of formal federalism and theirimpact on democracy โ€“ employing the model identified in the first step โ€“ in variouscontexts as expressed in the number of cases regressed on. Finally we estimatethe impact of the decentralization indicators on democracy for two sets of countries,one broad and one narrow. In all three steps the focus is on the parameters estimatedfor the federalism variables. At issue is whether we can find a significantpositive impact of federalism on democracy during the time period studied โ€“ thelate 1990s.

The findings from the first step of the analysis are displayed in Table 2 below. Inaddition to Wattsโ€™s (1999) indicator of formal federalism the model contains popu-lation size (natural logarithm), the presence of an ombudsman institution, the ageof modernized leadership, as well as gross national product per capita (natural logar-ithm). The five models estimated are ordered in a step-wise fashion; models 1โ€“3 allshow significance for the federal variable, although it is only with the addition of theombudsman variable that we arrive at a reasonably high adjusted r-square. On adding

FIGURE 3

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

Note: dark points refer to unitary states whereas light points refer to federal states; only federal states arespelled out by name.

Source: see Appendix.

172 DEMOCRATIZATION

the modernization and the affluence variables to the model, the predictive powerof the model increases at the same time as the federal variable declines in significance.This also holds true for models 4 and 5 when applying alternative robust estimators.

When estimating what appears to be a well-specified model, the federal variable isfound to be positively related to democracy, but the coefficients estimated do not meetstandard criteria for significance.

The second step utilizes model 5 and estimates it with different indicators measur-ing the formal federalism variable; these model estimates are also applied on threevarying set of countries ranging from a broad set of countries containing all theones used in Table 2 (N ยผ 144), over a data set for which the decentralizationmeasures are available (N ยผ 65), to a narrow set of countries containing the set ofmember countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) for which the decentralization variable (to be estimated later in Table 4) isavailable (N ยผ 24). The reason for varying the number of cases is to enquire intohow robust the federalism variable is with respect to changing contexts; this issomething we must do if we want to make use of the decentralization indicators.

FIGURE 4

POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

Note: dark points refer to unitary states whereas light points refer to federal states; only federal states arespelled out by name.

Source: see Appendix.

DOES FEDERALISM IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY? 173

(a)์žฌ์ •์ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™” (b)์ •์น˜์ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”

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Lane & Ersson (2005):ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”์˜ํ–ฅ

๊ณ„์ˆ˜ p-value ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œ ์˜์„ฑ (p < 0.05)

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ 0.571 0.19 No์ธ๊ตฌ โˆ’0.446 0.00 Yes์˜ด๋ถ€์ฆˆ๋งจ์ œ๋„ 1.411 0.00 Yes๊ทผ๋Œ€ํ™”์ดํ›„ํ–‡์ˆ˜ 0.014 0.00 Yes1์ธ๋‹น GNP 0.415 0.03 Yes๊ด€์ฐฐ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ˆ˜ 144

I ํ•ด์„:์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋ผ๋Š”๊ฒƒ์ด๊ทธ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜์ˆ˜์ค€์—โ€œํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œผ๋กœ์œ ์˜ํ•œ์ •๋„์˜โ€๊ธ์ •์ ์ธ์˜ํ–ฅ์„๋ฏธ์น˜์ง€๋Š”์•Š์Œ.

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Lane & Ersson (2005):ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ

I ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”์˜์ˆ˜์ค€์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”์˜ํ–ฅ

(1) (2) (3)์žฌ์ •์ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™” ๊ณ„์ˆ˜ โˆ’1.342

p-value 0.13ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œ ์˜์„ฑ No

์ •์น˜์ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™” ๊ณ„์ˆ˜ 2.284p-value 0.00ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œ ์˜์„ฑ Yes

ํ–‰์ •์ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™” ๊ณ„์ˆ˜ 0.271p-value 0.72ํ†ต๊ณ„์ ์œ ์˜์„ฑ No

ํ†ต์ œ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ํฌํ•จ์—ฌ๋ถ€ Yes Yes Yes๊ด€์ฐฐ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ˆ˜ 65 65 65

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Lane & Ersson (2005):ํ•จ์˜

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”๊ธ์ •์ ์˜ํ–ฅ์—๋Œ€ํ•ดํšŒ์˜์ 

I โ€œ๊ตฌ์กฐโ€๋กœ์„œ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ทธ์ž์ฒด๋ณด๋‹ค๋Š” โ€œ์‹ค์ œโ€๋กœ์„œ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜,ํŠนํžˆ์ •์น˜์ ๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”์˜์ •๋„๊ฐ€๊ทธ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ˆ˜์ค€์˜

๋ฐœ์ „์—์žˆ์–ด์„œ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ์š”์ธ์ž„์„๊ฐ•์กฐ

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์™ธ์˜๋‹ค๋ฅธ์ œ๋„์ ์š”์ธ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—๋”์šฐํ˜ธ์ ์ธ

์˜ํ–ฅ์„๋ฏธ์นจ:ํ–‰์ •๋ถ€๋ฅผ๊ฐ์‹œยท๊ฒฌ์ œํ•˜๋Š”๋ฒ•์ฒด์ œ๋ฐ์˜ด๋ถ€์ฆˆ๋งจ์ œ๋„,์˜์›๋‚ด๊ฐ์ œ(์ •๋ถ€ํ˜•ํƒœ),๋น„๋ก€๋Œ€ํ‘œ์ œ(์„ ๊ฑฐ์ฒด์ œ)๋“ฑ

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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ค๊ณ„

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์ง€์†์„ฑ

I ์›์ธ(๋…๋ฆฝ๋ณ€์ˆ˜):์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์™€์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„

1 ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜์—ฌ๋ถ€: 1(์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€), 0(๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€)2 ์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„:์ตœ๊ทผ์˜์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ๋ณ€ํ™”์ดํ›„ํ–‡์ˆ˜3 ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„: (์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜์—ฌ๋ถ€)ร—(์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„)

I ๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ = 0ร—(์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„) = 0I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€ = 1ร—(์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„) = (์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„)

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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):์—ฐ๊ตฌ์„ค๊ณ„

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜

์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์ง€์†์„ฑ

I ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ(์ข…์†๋ณ€์ˆ˜):๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜์„ธ๊ฐ€์ง€์ง€ํ‘œ

1 ์ •์น˜์ฐธ์—ฌ์˜๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์„ฑ:์ •์ฑ…๊ณผ๋ฆฌ๋”์‹ญ์˜๋Œ€์•ˆ์ ์„ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€์ •์น˜์˜์—ญ์—์„œ์ถ”๊ตฌ๋ ์ˆ˜์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€ (0-5)

2 ์ •์น˜์ ๋‹ค์›์ฃผ์˜์™€์ฐธ์—ฌ:์ •๋‹น์กฐ์ง์˜๊ถŒ๋ฆฌ,๊ฒฌ์‹คํ•œ์•ผ๋‹น์˜์กด์žฌ,์™ธ๋ถ€์˜์••๋ ฅ์œผ๋กœ๋ถ€ํ„ฐ์ž์œ ๋กœ์šด๊ฐœ์ธ์˜์ •์น˜์ ์„ ํƒ๋Šฅ๋ ฅ,์†Œ์ˆ˜์ž์—๋Œ€ํ•œ์ •์น˜์ ๊ถŒ๋ฆฌ๋ณด์žฅ๋“ฑ (0-16)

3 ์ œ๋„ํ™”๋œ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜:์ •์น˜์ฐธ์—ฌ์˜๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์„ฑ,ํ–‰์ •๋ถ€์ฑ„์šฉ์˜๊ฐœ๋ฐฉ์„ฑ๊ณผ๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์„ฑ,ํ–‰์ •๋ถ€์—๋Œ€ํ•œ๊ฒฌ์ œ (0-10)

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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์ง€์†๊ธฐ๊ฐ„์ด๊ธธ์–ด์งˆ์ˆ˜๋ก,์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋ผ๋Š”์†์„ฑ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜๋ฐœ์ „์—๊ธ์ •์ ์ธ์˜ํ–ฅ์„๋ฏธ์นจ.

์ •์น˜์ฐธ์—ฌ์˜๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์„ฑ ์ œ๋„ํ™”๋œ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜ ๋‹ค์›์ฃผ์˜์™€์ฐธ์—ฌ

1990-2007 1990-2007 2005์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ โˆ’0.504โˆ—โˆ—โˆ— โˆ’0.369โˆ—โˆ—โˆ— โˆ’1.065โˆ—โˆ—

(0.107) (0.108) (0.417)์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„ โˆ’0.014โˆ—โˆ—โˆ— โˆ’0.008โˆ—โˆ—โˆ— โˆ’0.012โˆ—โˆ—

(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์ง€์†์—ฐ๋„ 0.012โˆ—โˆ—โˆ— 0.016โˆ—โˆ—โˆ— 0.019โˆ—โˆ—โˆ—

(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)ํ†ต์ œ๋ณ€์ˆ˜ํฌํ•จ์—ฌ๋ถ€ Yes Yes Yes๊ด€์ฐฐ์‚ฌ๋ก€์ˆ˜ 2,484 2,484 143

โˆ—p<0.1; โˆ—โˆ—p<0.05; โˆ—โˆ—โˆ—p<0.01

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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):ํ†ต๊ณ„๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ

analyses are regional fixed effect controls to capture what geographic, histor-ical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors might be common to those regions.As expected, several of the control variables have consistently strong effectsacross the various specifications. Per capita income is positive and highlysignificant in each of themodels. Similarly, latitude of the capital city is alwayssignificant and positive in all models. Muslims as percentage of population isalways statistically significant and negative. Other control variables are signifi-cant in some specifications but not in others.Where they are statistically significant, the control variables exert effects

that are consistent with the findings of previous research. Thus, level ofeconomic development (measured by log of income per capita) and the distancefrom the equator (measured by latitude of the capital city) are estimated to havea positive effect. On the other hand, ethnic fragmentation is estimated to have anegative effect.Finally, Figure 8.1 shows the quantitative relationship between federalism

and level of democracy when controlling for the age of regime as a proxy forthe availability of the complex competitive structures able to prevent polariz-ing political mobilization. We use the Clarify software of Tomz, Wittenberg,and King (2003) to show the substantive meaning of the statistical estimates.The figure plots simulated predicted probabilities of the competitiveness

Estim

ated

Pro

babi

lity

0

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

.9

10 20 30 40 50Regime Durability in Years

Federal Regimes Non-Federal Regimes

Figure 8.1. Regime durability and probability of the two highest levels of competitive-ness of political participation, 1990โ€“2007Note: The figure illustrates probability estimates of the two highest values of the Competitivenessof Political Participation Index. The simulations were performed using Clarify software (Tomz,Wittenberg, and King 2003). Clarify simulations were run on the equation IV (Table 8.2).

Timing, Sequencing, and Historical Evolution

180

I ์ •์น˜์ฒด์ œ์˜์ง€์†๊ธฐ๊ฐ„(x์ถ•)์ด๊ธธ์–ด์งˆ์ˆ˜๋ก์ œํ•œ์—†๋Š”์ •์น˜๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์ด๋ฐœ์ƒํ• ํ™•๋ฅ (y์ถ•)์ด์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์—์„œ๋Š”๋†’์•„์ง€๋Š”๋ฐ˜๋ฉด๋น„์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€(๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€)์—์„œ๋Š”๊ฐ์†Œํ•จ.

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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):ํ•จ์˜

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”๊ธ์ •์ ์˜ํ–ฅ์—๋Œ€ํ•œ์กฐ๊ฑด๋ถ€ํ•ด์„

I โ€œ์•ˆ์ •์ ์ธ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜ +๋†’์€์ˆ˜์ค€์˜๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜โ€๋ผ๋Š”์ด์ƒ์ ์ธ์กฐํ•ฉ์€์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์—ญ์‚ฌ๊ฐ€์–ด๋Š์ •๋„๊ธธ์—ˆ์„๋•Œ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•จ.

I ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์˜์—ญ์‚ฌ๊ฐ€์งง๊ฑฐ๋‚˜์ง€์†์„ฑ์ด๋‚ฎ์€๊ฒฝ์šฐ,์—ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋Š”๋‹จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์—๋น„ํ•ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋ฐ์ •์น˜๊ฒฝ์Ÿ์˜์ˆ˜์ค€์ด๋‚ฎ์„์ˆ˜์žˆ์Œ.

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ํ† ๋ก ํ™”๋‘(1):๊ฒฝํ—˜์ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์—๋Œ€ํ•œํ‰๊ฐ€์™€์ •์ฑ…์ ์ œ์–ธ

์•ž์„œ์‚ดํŽด๋ณธ Lane & Ersson (2005)๊ณผ Filippov & Shvetsova (2013)์˜์—ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ๋ฐ”ํƒ•์œผ๋กœ์•„๋ž˜์˜์งˆ๋ฌธ๋“ค์—๋Œ€ํ•ดํ† ๋ก ํ•ด๋ด…์‹œ๋‹ค.

I ์œ„์˜์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์€์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์—๋ฏธ์น˜๋Š”๊ธ์ •์ ์ธ์˜ํ–ฅ์—๋Œ€ํ•œ

ํšŒ์˜๋ก ๋‚ด์ง€๋Š”์‹ ์ค‘๋ก ์„์ œ์‹œํ•œ๋‹ค.์ €์ž๋“ค์˜์ฃผ์žฅ๊ณผ๋ถ„์„๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์—๋Œ€ํ•ด์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒํ‰๊ฐ€ํ•˜๋Š”๊ฐ€?์ด๋“ค์˜์ฃผ์žฅ์—์„œ๊ณ ๋ คํ•˜์ง€๋ชปํ•œ์ค‘์š”ํ•œ๋ถ€๋ถ„์ด์žˆ๋‹ค๋ฉด๊ทธ๊ฑด๋ฌด์—‡์ธ๊ฐ€?

I A๋Š”๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์˜์ •์ฐฉ๊ณผ๋ฐœ์ „์ด๋ชฉํ‘œ์ธ์‹ ์ƒ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜์ง€๋„์ž์ด๋‹ค. A๋Š”์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ๋ชฉํ‘œ๋ฅผ์œ„ํ•ด์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ๋ฅผ์‹ค์‹œํ•˜๊ฑฐ๋‚˜์žฌ์ •/์ •์น˜/ํ–‰์ •์˜์ฐจ์›์—์„œ์ผ์ •์ˆ˜์ค€์˜๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”๊ฐœํ˜์„์‹œํ–‰ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐฉ์•ˆ์„

๊ฒ€ํ† ํ•˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค.๊ทธ๋™์•ˆ์ˆ˜์—…์—์„œ๋ฐฐ์šด๋‚ด์šฉ๊ณผ์˜ค๋Š˜์‚ดํŽด๋ณธ์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์˜๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ,๋‹น์‹ ์€์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์—๋Œ€ํ•œ์ •๋ถ€์˜์ž๋ฌธ์œ„์›์œผ๋กœ์„œ A์—๊ฒŒ์–ด๋–ค์ œ์•ˆ์„ํ•˜๊ฒ ๋Š”๊ฐ€?

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ํ† ๋ก ํ™”๋‘(2):๋ฐ˜์‘์„ฑ,์ฑ…์ž„์„ฑ,์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์—๊ด€ํ•œ์ผ๋ถ€์—ฐ๊ตฌ๋“ค์—์„œ๋Š”์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์ ์†์„ฑ์ด์ •์น˜์ง€๋„์ž์˜

๋ฐ˜์‘์„ฑ(responsiveness)๊ณผ์ฑ…์ž„์„ฑ(accountability)์„๋†’์ž„์œผ๋กœ์จ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์ ๋Œ€ํ‘œ์„ฑ์˜์‹คํ˜„์„๋”์šฉ์ดํ•˜๊ฒŒํ•œ๋‹ค๊ณ ์ฃผ์žฅํ•ฉ๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.๋‘๊ฐœ๋…์—๋Œ€ํ•œ์ •์˜๋ฐ์•„๋ž˜์˜๊ทธ๋ฆผ์„ํ™œ์šฉํ•˜์—ฌ,์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๊ฐ€์–ด๋–ค๋ฉ”์ปค๋‹ˆ์ฆ˜์„ํ†ตํ•ด์ •์น˜์ง€๋„์ž์˜๋ฐ˜์‘์„ฑ๊ณผ์ฑ…์ž„์„ฑ์„๋†’์ด๋Š”์ง€(ํ˜น์€๋†’์ด์ง€์•Š๋Š”์ง€)ํ† ๋ก ํ•ด๋ด…์‹œ๋‹ค.

I ๋ฐ˜์‘์„ฑ:์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€์‹œ๋ฏผ๋“ค์ด์„ ํ˜ธํ•œ๋‹ค๊ณ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ๋ณด๋‚ธ์ •์ฑ…์„์ฑ„ํƒํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒI ์ฑ…์ž„์„ฑ:์‹œ๋ฏผ๋“ค์ด๋Œ€ํ‘œ์„ฑ์ด์—†๋Š”๋Œ€ํ‘œ์ž/์ •๋ถ€๋ฅผ์‹๋ณ„ํ•˜๊ณ ์ œ์žฌํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ

(ex.์„ ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผํ†ตํ•œ์‹ฌํŒ)

์„ ํ˜ธ

Preferences์‹ ํ˜ธ

Signals์œ„์ž„

Mandates์ •์ฑ…

Policies๊ฒฐ๊ณผ

Outcomes

๋ฐ˜์‘์„ฑ

์ฑ…์ž„์„ฑ

์ถœ์ฒ˜: Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin (1999, p. 9)23 / 26

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ํ† ๋ก ํ™”๋‘(3):๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜๊ตญ๊ฐ€์—์„œ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜

์•„๋ž์—๋ฏธ๋ฆฌํŠธ,๋ง๋ ˆ์ด์‹œ์•„,์—ํ‹ฐ์˜คํ”ผ์•„๋“ฑ์€๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜์ด๋ฉด์„œ๋„์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ๋ฅผ์ฑ„ํƒํ•˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋Š”๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์ž…๋‹ˆ๋‹ค.์ด๋“ค๊ตญ๊ฐ€์ค‘ํ•œ๊ณณ์„๊ณจ๋ผ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ๊ฐ€์–ด๋–ป๊ฒŒ์šด์˜๋˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋Š”์ง€๋ฅผ์‚ดํŽด๋ณด๊ณ ์•„๋ž˜์˜์งˆ๋ฌธ๋“ค์—๋Œ€ํ•ดํ† ๋ก ํ•ด๋ด…์‹œ๋‹ค.

I ๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜ํ†ต์น˜์žยท์ •๋ถ€๊ฐ€์ž์˜์ ์ธ๊ถŒ๋ ฅ์„๋…์ ํ•˜๋ฉฐ๊ณ„์†์ง‘๊ถŒํ•˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์„์„ ํ˜ธํ•œ๋‹ค๋ฉด,๊ถŒ๋ ฅ๊ณผ์ •์ฑ…๊ฒฐ์ •๊ถŒํ•œ์„์ง€๋ฐฉยทํ•˜์œ„์ •๋ถ€์—์ด์–‘ํ•˜๋Š”์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์™€๋ถ„๊ถŒํ™”๋Š”๊ทธ๋Ÿฌํ•œ์„ ํ˜ธ์™€๋ฐฐ์น˜๋˜๋Š”๊ฒƒ์ด์•„๋‹Œ๊ฐ€?

I ๊ทธ๋Ÿผ์—๋„์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ๋ฅผ์šด์˜ํ•˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋‹ค๋ฉด๊ทธ์ด์œ ๋Š”๋ฌด์—‡์ธ๊ฐ€?

I ์ด์ „์˜์ˆ˜์—…๋“ค์—์„œ์‚ดํŽด๋ณธ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๊ตญ๊ฐ€๋“ค์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์™€๋น„๊ตํ–ˆ์„๋•Œ,์„ ํƒํ•œ๊ตญ๊ฐ€์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์—๊ตฌ๋ณ„๋ ๋งŒํ•œํŠน์ง•์ด์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€?๋งŒ์•ฝ์žˆ๋‹ค๋ฉด๊ทธํŠน์ง•์€๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜ํ†ต์น˜์˜์†์„ฑ์—์„œ๋น„๋กฏ๋œ๊ฒƒ์ธ๊ฐ€?

I ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜์™€์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜์˜์นœํ™”์„ฑ์„์ƒ๊ฐํ•ด๋ณผ๋•Œ,๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜์™€์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์˜๋Š”๊ฐˆ๋“ฑ์—†์ด์–‘๋ฆฝ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•œ๊ฐ€?๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜๊ตญ๊ฐ€์—์„œ์˜์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ๋Š”๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์˜๋กœ์ดํ–‰ํ•˜๊ธฐ์œ„ํ•œ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์„์ž‰ํƒœํ•˜๊ณ ์žˆ๋Š”๊ฐ€?๋ฐ˜๋Œ€๋กœ์—ฐ๋ฐฉ์ œ์ ์†์„ฑ์ด๊ถŒ์œ„์ฃผ์˜ํ†ต์น˜์˜์•ˆ์ •์„ฑยท์ง€์†์„ฑ์—๊ธฐ์—ฌํ•˜๋Š”๊ฐ€?

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์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ

I Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. 1998. โ€œFederalism and Democracy Reconsidered.โ€Regional & Federal Studies Vol. 8, No. 2: 1-20.

I Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. 2017. Principlesof Comparative Politics (3rd Edition). CQ Press.

I Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson. 2005. โ€œThe Riddle of Federalism: DoesFederalism Impact on Democracy?.โ€ Democratisation Vol. 12, No. 2: 163-182.

I Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova. 2013. โ€œFederalism, Democracy, andDemocratization.โ€ in Arthur Benz and Jorg Broschek (eds.) Federal Dynamics:Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism. Oxford University Press.167-184.

I Ostrom, Vincent. 1994. The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting aSelf-governing Society. ICS Press.

I Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, (eds.) 1999. Democracy,Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge University Press.

I Stepan, Alfred. 1999. โ€œFederalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model.โ€ Journalof Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4: 19-34.

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