, democracy, authoritarianism, and federalism
TRANSCRIPT
๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๊ถ์์ฃผ์,๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Federalism
์กฐ๋ฌดํ
์์ธ๋ํ๊ต๊ตญ์ ๋ฌธ์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ์
2021๋ 1์ 14์ผ
๋น๊ต์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ (์ด์ฅ์ฐ๊ต์๋)ํน๊ฐ
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๊ฐ์ฌ์๊ฐ
์กฐ๋ฌดํ
Duke University์ ์นํ๋ฐ์ฌ์์ธ๋ํ๊ต์ธ๊ตํ๊ณผํ์ฌ,์์ฌ
์ธ๋ถ์ ๊ณต:๋น๊ต์ ์น,์ ์น์ ๋,๊ถ์์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์
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๋ณธํน๊ฐ์์ ๊ทผ๋ฒ
1 ๊ฐ๋ณ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์์ฌ๋ก๋ฅผ์ดํด๋ณด๊ธฐ๋ณด๋ค๋๋น๊ต์ ์น์ผ๋ฐ์ด๋ก
(์ ์น์ ๋,์ ์น์ฒด์ ๋ฑ)์๊ด์ ์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ๊ฒํ ํจ.
2 ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ์ด๋ ํํ์์์์ธ์ด๋๋ โ๋ ๋ฆฝ๋ณ์โ๋ก์ดํดํ๊ณ ,์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ๋ฏธ์น๋์ ์น์ ยท๊ฒฝ์ ์ ํจ๊ณผ๊ฐ๋ฌด์์ธ์ง๋ฅผ์ดํด๋ด.
I 1์ 14์ผ(๋ชฉ):๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๊ถ์์ฃผ์,๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์I 1์ 15์ผ(๊ธ):๊ฒฝ์ ์ฑ์ฅ๊ณผ๋ถํ๋ฑ,๊ทธ๋ฆฌ๊ณ ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์
3 ๊ณ๋์ ์ ๊ทผ:๋ฐ์ดํฐ์ํต๊ณ๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผํตํ์ดํด๋ฅผ๋๋ชจํจ.
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์ค๋์์ฃผ์
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์
(2)
(1)
(1) ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์ด๋ค์ํฅ์๋ฏธ์น๋๊ฐ?I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ตญ๊ฐ๋๋น์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ณด๋ค๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ ์ธ๊ฐ?์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์์ด๋ ํ์์ฑ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฐ์ ์๊ธฐ์ฌํ๋๊ฐ?
(2) ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์๋์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์์ด๋ค์ํฅ์๋ฏธ์น๋๊ฐ?I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฐ์ ์๊ธฐ์ฌํ๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์ ,์ ๋์ ์กฐ๊ฑด์๋ฌด์์ธ๊ฐ?์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋๊ถ์์ฃผ์์ฒด์ ์์๋๋ฐ์ ํ๊ธฐ์ด๋ ค์ด๊ฐ?
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์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๊ด๊ณ
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์ฌ์ด์์นํ์ฑ์์ด์
Every single long-standing democracy in a territorially basedmultilingual and multinational polity is a federal state. Althoughthere are many multinational polities in the world, few of them aredemocracies. Those multinational democracies that do exist,however (Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and India), are allfederal. Alfred Stepan (1999, p. 20)
I ๊ทธ๋ฌ๋์ด๋ฌํ๊ด๋ จ์ฑ์ด์ธ๊ณผ๊ด๊ณ(์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์โ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์)์์ํ๊ฒ์ธ์ง,์๋๋ฉด๋จ์ํ์ฐ์ฐ์์ผ์น์์ํ๊ฒ์ธ์ง๋ฅผ์ค๋ช ํ์ง๋๋ชปํจ.
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์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๊ด๊ณ
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์ํ์ ํ์ด๋ผ๊ณ ๋ณด๋๊ด์
It is thus possible to consider federalism as a particular type ofdemocracy: a pluralist democracy based on a constitutional systemof delegated, reserved, and/or shared powers between relativelyautonomous, yet interrelated, structures of government, whosemultiple interactions aim to serve the sovereign will of the federaldemos.
Dimitris Chryssochoou (1998, p. 18)
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์์ด๋ ํ์์ฑ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์ฐ๊ด๋๋๊ฐ?
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์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๊ด๊ณ
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ์ฐ๊ณ์ํค๋๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ:๋ค์์ฃผ์(pluralism)์๋ถ๊ถํ(decentralization)
Democracy depends upon multitudinous communities operating asself-governing collectivities having recourse to overlapping andconcurrent instrumentalities of government.
Vincent Ostrom (1991, p. 23)
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์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ์ดํดํ๋๋๊ฐ์ง์ฐจ์
1 ๊ตฌ์กฐ๋ก์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์(federalism in structure):
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ๊ณต์์ ์ผ๋กํ๋ฒ์๋ช ์๋จ.์ ๋์ ์ธ,๋ฒ๋ฅ ์์(de jure)์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์
I Yes or no์๋ฌธ์ :์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ์ธ๊ฐ๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ์ธ๊ฐ?
2 ์ค์ ๋ก์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์(federalism in practice):
์ ์ฑ ๊ฒฐ์ ์๊ถํ์ด์ค์์ ๋ถ์์ง๋ฐฉ์ ๋ถ์ค์ด๋์์๋๊ฐ์
๋ฌธ์ .์ฌ์ค์์(de facto)์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์โ๋ถ๊ถํ(decentralization)I ์ฌ์ ์ (fiscal),์ ์น์ (political),ํ์ ์ (administrative)๋ถ๊ถํI ์ ๋(degree)์๋ฌธ์ :์ผ๋ง๋งํผ๋ถ๊ถํ๋์ด์๋๊ฐ?
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์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋ฅผ์ดํดํ๋๋๊ฐ์ง์ฐจ์
์ถ์ฒ: Clark, Golder, & Golder (2017, Chapter 15)
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์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๊ด๊ณ:๋๊ฐ์์ฐ๊ตฌ
1 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson. 2005. โThe Riddle of Federalism:Does Federalism Impact on Democracy?โ Democratization Vol.12No.2. pp. 163-182.
2 Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova. 2013. โFederalism, Democracy,and Democratization.โ in Arthur Benz and Jorg Broschek (eds.)Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties ofFederalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-184
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Lane & Ersson (2005):์ฐ๊ตฌ์ค๊ณ
I 144๊ฐ๊ตญ์๋์์ผ๋กํํต๊ณ๋ถ์
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์
I ์์ธ(๋ ๋ฆฝ๋ณ์):์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์
1 ์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ(de jure federalism)์ฌ๋ถ{1 ์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ (30๊ฐ๊ตญ)0 ๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ (114๊ฐ๊ตญ)
2 ๋ถ๊ถํ(de facto federalism)์์คI ์ฌ์ ์ :๊ตญ๊ฐ์ด์ง์ถ/์์ ๋๋น์ง๋ฐฉ์ ๋ถ์ง์ถ/์์ ์๋น์คI ์ ์น์ :์ง๋ฐฉ๋จ์์ ๊ฑฐ์์กด์ฌ์ฌ๋ถI ํ์ ์ :ํ์๊ตญ๊ฐ๋จ์์ธ์ ์์์ธ๊ธ๊ณผ์ด์ ๊ธ์์๋์ ์ค์์ฑ
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Lane & Ersson (2005):์ฐ๊ตฌ์ค๊ณ
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์
I ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ(์ข ์๋ณ์):๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์I ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์งํ (Freedom House, 1995-2003๋ ์ํ๊ท ๊ฐ):
1(์ต์ )โ10(์ต๊ณ )
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ณด๋ค๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์งํ๊ฐ์ด๋์๊ฐ?
๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์งํ๊ฐํ๊ท
์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ(30๊ฐ๊ตญ) 7.33๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ(114๊ฐ๊ตญ) 6.01
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Lane & Ersson (2005):์๊ด๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ
I ๋ถ๊ถํ์์ค์ด๋์์๋ก๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์งํ๊ฐ์ด๋์๊ฐ?
various model specifications for the broadest set of countries for which we have data(N ยผ 144). Second, we analyse the various indicators of formal federalism and theirimpact on democracy โ employing the model identified in the first step โ in variouscontexts as expressed in the number of cases regressed on. Finally we estimatethe impact of the decentralization indicators on democracy for two sets of countries,one broad and one narrow. In all three steps the focus is on the parameters estimatedfor the federalism variables. At issue is whether we can find a significantpositive impact of federalism on democracy during the time period studied โ thelate 1990s.
The findings from the first step of the analysis are displayed in Table 2 below. Inaddition to Wattsโs (1999) indicator of formal federalism the model contains popu-lation size (natural logarithm), the presence of an ombudsman institution, the ageof modernized leadership, as well as gross national product per capita (natural logar-ithm). The five models estimated are ordered in a step-wise fashion; models 1โ3 allshow significance for the federal variable, although it is only with the addition of theombudsman variable that we arrive at a reasonably high adjusted r-square. On adding
FIGURE 3
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY
Note: dark points refer to unitary states whereas light points refer to federal states; only federal states arespelled out by name.
Source: see Appendix.
172 DEMOCRATIZATION
the modernization and the affluence variables to the model, the predictive powerof the model increases at the same time as the federal variable declines in significance.This also holds true for models 4 and 5 when applying alternative robust estimators.
When estimating what appears to be a well-specified model, the federal variable isfound to be positively related to democracy, but the coefficients estimated do not meetstandard criteria for significance.
The second step utilizes model 5 and estimates it with different indicators measur-ing the formal federalism variable; these model estimates are also applied on threevarying set of countries ranging from a broad set of countries containing all theones used in Table 2 (N ยผ 144), over a data set for which the decentralizationmeasures are available (N ยผ 65), to a narrow set of countries containing the set ofmember countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) for which the decentralization variable (to be estimated later in Table 4) isavailable (N ยผ 24). The reason for varying the number of cases is to enquire intohow robust the federalism variable is with respect to changing contexts; this issomething we must do if we want to make use of the decentralization indicators.
FIGURE 4
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY
Note: dark points refer to unitary states whereas light points refer to federal states; only federal states arespelled out by name.
Source: see Appendix.
DOES FEDERALISM IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY? 173
(a)์ฌ์ ์ ๋ถ๊ถํ (b)์ ์น์ ๋ถ๊ถํ
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Lane & Ersson (2005):ํต๊ณ๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฏธ์น๋์ํฅ
๊ณ์ p-value ํต๊ณ์ ์ ์์ฑ (p < 0.05)
์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ 0.571 0.19 No์ธ๊ตฌ โ0.446 0.00 Yes์ด๋ถ์ฆ๋งจ์ ๋ 1.411 0.00 Yes๊ทผ๋ํ์ดํํ์ 0.014 0.00 Yes1์ธ๋น GNP 0.415 0.03 Yes๊ด์ฐฐ๊ตญ๊ฐ์ 144
I ํด์:์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ผ๋๊ฒ์ด๊ทธ๊ตญ๊ฐ์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์์ค์โํต๊ณ์ ์ผ๋ก์ ์ํ์ ๋์โ๊ธ์ ์ ์ธ์ํฅ์๋ฏธ์น์ง๋์์.
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Lane & Ersson (2005):ํต๊ณ๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ
I ๋ถ๊ถํ์์์ค์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฏธ์น๋์ํฅ
(1) (2) (3)์ฌ์ ์ ๋ถ๊ถํ ๊ณ์ โ1.342
p-value 0.13ํต๊ณ์ ์ ์์ฑ No
์ ์น์ ๋ถ๊ถํ ๊ณ์ 2.284p-value 0.00ํต๊ณ์ ์ ์์ฑ Yes
ํ์ ์ ๋ถ๊ถํ ๊ณ์ 0.271p-value 0.72ํต๊ณ์ ์ ์์ฑ No
ํต์ ๋ณ์ํฌํจ์ฌ๋ถ Yes Yes Yes๊ด์ฐฐ๊ตญ๊ฐ์ 65 65 65
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Lane & Ersson (2005):ํจ์
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฏธ์น๋๊ธ์ ์ ์ํฅ์๋ํดํ์์
I โ๊ตฌ์กฐโ๋ก์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ทธ์์ฒด๋ณด๋ค๋ โ์ค์ โ๋ก์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์,ํนํ์ ์น์ ๋ถ๊ถํ์์ ๋๊ฐ๊ทธ๊ตญ๊ฐ์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์ค์
๋ฐ์ ์์์ด์์ค์ํ์์ธ์์๊ฐ์กฐ
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์ธ์๋ค๋ฅธ์ ๋์ ์์ธ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋์ฐํธ์ ์ธ
์ํฅ์๋ฏธ์นจ:ํ์ ๋ถ๋ฅผ๊ฐ์ยท๊ฒฌ์ ํ๋๋ฒ์ฒด์ ๋ฐ์ด๋ถ์ฆ๋งจ์ ๋,์์๋ด๊ฐ์ (์ ๋ถํํ),๋น๋ก๋ํ์ (์ ๊ฑฐ์ฒด์ )๋ฑ
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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):์ฐ๊ตฌ์ค๊ณ
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ง์์ฑ
I ์์ธ(๋ ๋ฆฝ๋ณ์):์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋
1 ์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ์์ฌ๋ถ: 1(์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ), 0(๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ)2 ์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋:์ต๊ทผ์์ ์น์ฒด์ ๋ณํ์ดํํ์3 ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋: (์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ์์ฌ๋ถ)ร(์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋)
I ๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ = 0ร(์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋) = 0I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ = 1ร(์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋) = (์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋)
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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):์ฐ๊ตฌ์ค๊ณ
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์ ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์
์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ง์์ฑ
I ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ(์ข ์๋ณ์):๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์ธ๊ฐ์ง์งํ
1 ์ ์น์ฐธ์ฌ์๊ฒฝ์์ฑ:์ ์ฑ ๊ณผ๋ฆฌ๋์ญ์๋์์ ์ ํธ๊ฐ์ ์น์์ญ์์์ถ๊ตฌ๋ ์์๋๊ฐ (0-5)
2 ์ ์น์ ๋ค์์ฃผ์์์ฐธ์ฌ:์ ๋น์กฐ์ง์๊ถ๋ฆฌ,๊ฒฌ์คํ์ผ๋น์์กด์ฌ,์ธ๋ถ์์๋ ฅ์ผ๋ก๋ถํฐ์์ ๋ก์ด๊ฐ์ธ์์ ์น์ ์ ํ๋ฅ๋ ฅ,์์์์๋ํ์ ์น์ ๊ถ๋ฆฌ๋ณด์ฅ๋ฑ (0-16)
3 ์ ๋ํ๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์:์ ์น์ฐธ์ฌ์๊ฒฝ์์ฑ,ํ์ ๋ถ์ฑ์ฉ์๊ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฑ๊ณผ๊ฒฝ์์ฑ,ํ์ ๋ถ์๋ํ๊ฒฌ์ (0-10)
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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):ํต๊ณ๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ง์๊ธฐ๊ฐ์ด๊ธธ์ด์ง์๋ก,์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋ผ๋์์ฑ์ด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฐ์ ์๊ธ์ ์ ์ธ์ํฅ์๋ฏธ์นจ.
์ ์น์ฐธ์ฌ์๊ฒฝ์์ฑ ์ ๋ํ๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์ ๋ค์์ฃผ์์์ฐธ์ฌ
1990-2007 1990-2007 2005์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ โ0.504โโโ โ0.369โโโ โ1.065โโ
(0.107) (0.108) (0.417)์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋ โ0.014โโโ โ0.008โโโ โ0.012โโ
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ง์์ฐ๋ 0.012โโโ 0.016โโโ 0.019โโโ
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)ํต์ ๋ณ์ํฌํจ์ฌ๋ถ Yes Yes Yes๊ด์ฐฐ์ฌ๋ก์ 2,484 2,484 143
โp<0.1; โโp<0.05; โโโp<0.01
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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):ํต๊ณ๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ
analyses are regional fixed effect controls to capture what geographic, histor-ical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors might be common to those regions.As expected, several of the control variables have consistently strong effectsacross the various specifications. Per capita income is positive and highlysignificant in each of themodels. Similarly, latitude of the capital city is alwayssignificant and positive in all models. Muslims as percentage of population isalways statistically significant and negative. Other control variables are signifi-cant in some specifications but not in others.Where they are statistically significant, the control variables exert effects
that are consistent with the findings of previous research. Thus, level ofeconomic development (measured by log of income per capita) and the distancefrom the equator (measured by latitude of the capital city) are estimated to havea positive effect. On the other hand, ethnic fragmentation is estimated to have anegative effect.Finally, Figure 8.1 shows the quantitative relationship between federalism
and level of democracy when controlling for the age of regime as a proxy forthe availability of the complex competitive structures able to prevent polariz-ing political mobilization. We use the Clarify software of Tomz, Wittenberg,and King (2003) to show the substantive meaning of the statistical estimates.The figure plots simulated predicted probabilities of the competitiveness
Estim
ated
Pro
babi
lity
0
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
10 20 30 40 50Regime Durability in Years
Federal Regimes Non-Federal Regimes
Figure 8.1. Regime durability and probability of the two highest levels of competitive-ness of political participation, 1990โ2007Note: The figure illustrates probability estimates of the two highest values of the Competitivenessof Political Participation Index. The simulations were performed using Clarify software (Tomz,Wittenberg, and King 2003). Clarify simulations were run on the equation IV (Table 8.2).
Timing, Sequencing, and Historical Evolution
180
I ์ ์น์ฒด์ ์์ง์๊ธฐ๊ฐ(x์ถ)์ด๊ธธ์ด์ง์๋ก์ ํ์๋์ ์น๊ฒฝ์์ด๋ฐ์ํ ํ๋ฅ (y์ถ)์ด์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ์์๋๋์์ง๋๋ฐ๋ฉด๋น์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ(๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ)์์๋๊ฐ์ํจ.
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Filippov & Shvetsova (2013):ํจ์
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฏธ์น๋๊ธ์ ์ ์ํฅ์๋ํ์กฐ๊ฑด๋ถํด์
I โ์์ ์ ์ธ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์ +๋์์์ค์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์โ๋ผ๋์ด์์ ์ธ์กฐํฉ์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ญ์ฌ๊ฐ์ด๋์ ๋๊ธธ์์๋๊ฐ๋ฅํจ.
I ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์์ญ์ฌ๊ฐ์งง๊ฑฐ๋์ง์์ฑ์ด๋ฎ์๊ฒฝ์ฐ,์ฐ๋ฐฉ๊ตญ๊ฐ๋๋จ์ผ๊ตญ๊ฐ์๋นํด๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์๋ฐ์ ์น๊ฒฝ์์์์ค์ด๋ฎ์์์์.
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ํ ๋ก ํ๋(1):๊ฒฝํ์ ์ฐ๊ตฌ์๋ํํ๊ฐ์์ ์ฑ ์ ์ ์ธ
์์์ดํด๋ณธ Lane & Ersson (2005)๊ณผ Filippov & Shvetsova (2013)์์ฐ๊ตฌ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผ๋ฐํ์ผ๋ก์๋์์ง๋ฌธ๋ค์๋ํดํ ๋ก ํด๋ด ์๋ค.
I ์์์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ค์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์๋ฏธ์น๋๊ธ์ ์ ์ธ์ํฅ์๋ํ
ํ์๋ก ๋ด์ง๋์ ์ค๋ก ์์ ์ํ๋ค.์ ์๋ค์์ฃผ์ฅ๊ณผ๋ถ์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์๋ํด์ด๋ป๊ฒํ๊ฐํ๋๊ฐ?์ด๋ค์์ฃผ์ฅ์์๊ณ ๋ คํ์ง๋ชปํ์ค์ํ๋ถ๋ถ์ด์๋ค๋ฉด๊ทธ๊ฑด๋ฌด์์ธ๊ฐ?
I A๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์ ์ฐฉ๊ณผ๋ฐ์ ์ด๋ชฉํ์ธ์ ์๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์๊ตญ๊ฐ์์ง๋์์ด๋ค. A๋์ด๋ฌํ๋ชฉํ๋ฅผ์ํด์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ๋ฅผ์ค์ํ๊ฑฐ๋์ฌ์ /์ ์น/ํ์ ์์ฐจ์์์์ผ์ ์์ค์๋ถ๊ถํ๊ฐํ์์ํํ๋๋ฐฉ์์
๊ฒํ ํ๊ณ ์๋ค.๊ทธ๋์์์ ์์๋ฐฐ์ด๋ด์ฉ๊ณผ์ค๋์ดํด๋ณธ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ค์๊ฒฐ๊ณผ๋ฅผํ์ฉํ์ฌ,๋น์ ์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๋ํ์ ๋ถ์์๋ฌธ์์์ผ๋ก์ A์๊ฒ์ด๋ค์ ์์ํ๊ฒ ๋๊ฐ?
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ํ ๋ก ํ๋(2):๋ฐ์์ฑ,์ฑ ์์ฑ,์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์๊ดํ์ผ๋ถ์ฐ๊ตฌ๋ค์์๋์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์ ์์ฑ์ด์ ์น์ง๋์์
๋ฐ์์ฑ(responsiveness)๊ณผ์ฑ ์์ฑ(accountability)์๋์์ผ๋ก์จ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์ ๋ํ์ฑ์์คํ์๋์ฉ์ดํ๊ฒํ๋ค๊ณ ์ฃผ์ฅํฉ๋๋ค.๋๊ฐ๋ ์๋ํ์ ์๋ฐ์๋์๊ทธ๋ฆผ์ํ์ฉํ์ฌ,์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๊ฐ์ด๋ค๋ฉ์ปค๋์ฆ์ํตํด์ ์น์ง๋์์๋ฐ์์ฑ๊ณผ์ฑ ์์ฑ์๋์ด๋์ง(ํน์๋์ด์ง์๋์ง)ํ ๋ก ํด๋ด ์๋ค.
I ๋ฐ์์ฑ:์ ๋ถ๊ฐ์๋ฏผ๋ค์ด์ ํธํ๋ค๊ณ ์ ํธ๋ฅผ๋ณด๋ธ์ ์ฑ ์์ฑํํ๋๊ฒI ์ฑ ์์ฑ:์๋ฏผ๋ค์ด๋ํ์ฑ์ด์๋๋ํ์/์ ๋ถ๋ฅผ์๋ณํ๊ณ ์ ์ฌํ๋๊ฒ
(ex.์ ๊ฑฐ๋ฅผํตํ์ฌํ)
์ ํธ
Preferences์ ํธ
Signals์์
Mandates์ ์ฑ
Policies๊ฒฐ๊ณผ
Outcomes
๋ฐ์์ฑ
์ฑ ์์ฑ
์ถ์ฒ: Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin (1999, p. 9)23 / 26
ํ ๋ก ํ๋(3):๊ถ์์ฃผ์๊ตญ๊ฐ์์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์
์๋์๋ฏธ๋ฆฌํธ,๋ง๋ ์ด์์,์ํฐ์คํผ์๋ฑ์๊ถ์์ฃผ์์ด๋ฉด์๋์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ๋ฅผ์ฑํํ๊ณ ์๋๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์ ๋๋ค.์ด๋ค๊ตญ๊ฐ์คํ๊ณณ์๊ณจ๋ผ์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ๊ฐ์ด๋ป๊ฒ์ด์๋๊ณ ์๋์ง๋ฅผ์ดํด๋ณด๊ณ ์๋์์ง๋ฌธ๋ค์๋ํดํ ๋ก ํด๋ด ์๋ค.
I ๊ถ์์ฃผ์ํต์น์ยท์ ๋ถ๊ฐ์์์ ์ธ๊ถ๋ ฅ์๋ ์ ํ๋ฉฐ๊ณ์์ง๊ถํ๋๊ฒ์์ ํธํ๋ค๋ฉด,๊ถ๋ ฅ๊ณผ์ ์ฑ ๊ฒฐ์ ๊ถํ์์ง๋ฐฉยทํ์์ ๋ถ์์ด์ํ๋์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์๋ถ๊ถํ๋๊ทธ๋ฌํ์ ํธ์๋ฐฐ์น๋๋๊ฒ์ด์๋๊ฐ?
I ๊ทธ๋ผ์๋์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ๋ฅผ์ด์ํ๊ณ ์๋ค๋ฉด๊ทธ์ด์ ๋๋ฌด์์ธ๊ฐ?
I ์ด์ ์์์ ๋ค์์์ดํด๋ณธ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์๊ตญ๊ฐ๋ค์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์๋น๊ตํ์๋,์ ํํ๊ตญ๊ฐ์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์๊ตฌ๋ณ๋ ๋งํํน์ง์ด์๋๊ฐ?๋ง์ฝ์๋ค๋ฉด๊ทธํน์ง์๊ถ์์ฃผ์ํต์น์์์ฑ์์๋น๋กฏ๋๊ฒ์ธ๊ฐ?
I ๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์์์นํ์ฑ์์๊ฐํด๋ณผ๋,๊ถ์์ฃผ์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ฃผ์๋๊ฐ๋ฑ์์ด์๋ฆฝ๊ฐ๋ฅํ๊ฐ?๊ถ์์ฃผ์๊ตญ๊ฐ์์์์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ๋๋ฏผ์ฃผ์ฃผ์๋ก์ดํํ๊ธฐ์ํ๊ฐ๋ฅ์ฑ์์ํํ๊ณ ์๋๊ฐ?๋ฐ๋๋ก์ฐ๋ฐฉ์ ์ ์์ฑ์ด๊ถ์์ฃผ์ํต์น์์์ ์ฑยท์ง์์ฑ์๊ธฐ์ฌํ๋๊ฐ?
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์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ
I Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. 1998. โFederalism and Democracy Reconsidered.โRegional & Federal Studies Vol. 8, No. 2: 1-20.
I Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona Nadenichek Golder. 2017. Principlesof Comparative Politics (3rd Edition). CQ Press.
I Lane, Jan-Erik, and Svante Ersson. 2005. โThe Riddle of Federalism: DoesFederalism Impact on Democracy?.โ Democratisation Vol. 12, No. 2: 163-182.
I Mikhail Filippov and Olga Shvetsova. 2013. โFederalism, Democracy, andDemocratization.โ in Arthur Benz and Jorg Broschek (eds.) Federal Dynamics:Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism. Oxford University Press.167-184.
I Ostrom, Vincent. 1994. The Meaning of American Federalism: Constituting aSelf-governing Society. ICS Press.
I Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, (eds.) 1999. Democracy,Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge University Press.
I Stepan, Alfred. 1999. โFederalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model.โ Journalof Democracy Vol. 10, No. 4: 19-34.
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๊ฐ์ฌํฉ๋๋ค.
https://www.moohyungcho.com
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