-- conflict prevention -- theory in pursuit of policy and practice 2 - mat 3

15Conict Prevention: Theory inPursuit of Policy and Practice

M i c h a e l S . L u n d

AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COMEAND GONE?

The world seems to be getting more dan-gerous. Terrorism and the war on terrorismare straining relations between Muslims andthe West. Despite interstate wars being indecline, five attacks by a state on another haveoccurred in the new century. Competitionfor oil and other essential natural resourcesmakes inter-state wars over territory, viewedas a thing of the past (John Mueller, 1989),more imaginable. Confrontations over nuclearweapons have arisen with North Korea andIran. Longstanding arms control regimesare unraveling. Further intra-state conflictscould erupt, as closed regimes face violentoppositions; fledgling democracies destabi-lize; and post-conflict countries fall backinto war (Gurr and Marshall, 2005). Trendssuch as environmental degradation, climatechange, population growth, chronic poverty,globalization, and increasing inequality riskfuture conflicts (e.g., CNA, 2007).

Facing such threats, governments andinternational bodies could be pursuing how to

prevent escalation of emerging tensions intowars, thus avoiding the immense human suf-fering and problems that wars always cause,both for the countries involved and the restof the world.1 Compared to the huge costs ofwar, the costs of preventing it are dramaticallyless.2 Many people are convinced the horrifichuman costs of the current Iraq War wereavoidable. Statistical research on third-partydiplomacy also supports the belief that actingbefore high levels of conflict intensity is betterthan trying to end them (Miall, 1992: 126;Berkovitch, 1986, 1991, 1993).3 To try tohead off more future conflicts seems possible,moreover, for armed conflict has declinedsince the end of the Cold War, in part becauseof an extraordinary upsurge of activism bythe international community that has beendirected to conflict prevention, peacemaking,and peacebuilding (Human Security Report,2005: 155).4 Indeed, conflict prevention isnow official policy in the UN, the EU, the G-8,and many states (Moolak, 2005: G-8). It hasbeen tried in places where the risk of conflictwas present but they were averted, such asSouthAfrica, Macedonia, the Baltics, Crimea,

288 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

and the South China Sea.5 In short, preventionis not simply a high ideal, but a prudent optionthat sometimes works (cf. Jentelson, 1996;Zartman, 2001: 305f; Miall, 2007: 7,16,17).

Given the evidence that inaction is waste-ful and preventive labors can bear fruit,international actors could be collecting andapplying what has been learned from recentexperience to manage the tensions aroundthe world from which future conflicts willemerge: mitigating sources of terrorism andextremism; averting genocides and other massatrocities; buttressing fragile governments;reducing weapons of mass destruction; alle-viating competition over oil and water; anddefusing inter-state rivalries such as ChinaTaiwan and among the major powers. Yetthese actors show little interest in building onrecent accomplishments to reduce the currentrisks (e.g., the deterioration of Zimbabweand possible renewed war between Ethiopiaand Eritrea).6 Why this apparent gap existsbetween the promise of conflict preventionand its more deliberate pursuit is the puzzlethis chapter seeks to unravel.7 The followingsections seek to get beyond conventionalanswers by examining three facets of conflictprevention that define its current status: con-cepts, activities, and impacts. The conclusionsums up the state of the art and offers ideas toadvance it.

WHAT IS CONFLICT PREVENTION?A DISTINCT PERSPECTIVE

As the idea has come into vogue, conflictpreventionand synonyms such as preventivediplomacyand crisis preventionare bandiedabout more loosely. New government unitsand non-governmental organizations havesprung up that tout the term in their logos. Tobe au courant, established organizations addit to mission statements. But though conflictpreventionmay now be heard more often thanthe previously dominant conflict resolution,it is not clear whether the activities carriedout under this new rubric are actually new.Despite the ambiguity due to the ideas rise tofame, however, close analysts have hammered

out a core definition. Knowledge can cumulatewhen people use the same terms for inquiry.

Conflict prevention applies to peacefulsituations where substantial physical violenceis possible, based on typical indicators ofrising hostilities. Everyday spates where noblood is spilled, or public controversies thatget so rancorous that social groups stopcommunicating are socially unhealthy, butmuch less grievous than states or groupsabout to kill each other with deadly weapons.8A coup detat is less grave than the genocideof hundreds of thousands of people.9 Thoughthus narrowed to conflicts with potentiallywide lethality (hereafter conflicts for short),specialists definitions have varied in twomain respects: a) the stage or phase duringthe emergence of violence when preventioncomes into play; and b) its methods ofengagement, which are geared to the differingdrivers of potential conflicts that preventiveefforts address.10

Moments for prevention

Conflict prevention has been distinguishedfrom other approaches to conflict mainly bywhen it comes into play during a conflict,not how it is done. When UN SecretaryGeneral Hammerskjold first coined preven-tive diplomacy in 1960, he had in mind theUN keeping superpower proxy wars in third-world countries from escalating into globalconfrontations. When the end of the Cold Warbrought unexpected intra-state wars such as inYugoslavia, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali extended Hammerskjolds term inan upstream direction to mean not simplykeeping regional conflicts from going global,but from starting in the first place (UN,1992). This conceptual breakthrough shiftedthe moment for taking action back to stageswhen non-violent disputes were emerging buthad not escalated into significant violence orarmed conflict.

Just how far back in the etiology ofconflicts might preventive action go to work?Leaving the pre-violent period open to apossible infinite regress might extend it toto causes as primordial as original sin or

CONFLICT PREVENTION: THEORY IN PURSUIT OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 289

as dispersed as child-rearing practices, thusdooming the concept to impracticality.11To mark a beginning point when pre-emptive actions first become practicable, Peck(1995) usefully delineated early and lateprevention. The former seeks to improve therelationship of parties or states that are notactively fighting but deeply estranged. Leftunaddressed, such latent animosities mightrevert to the use of force as soon as acrisis arose.12 Late prevention pertains towhen fighting among specific parties appearsimminent.

Boutros-Ghali also extended conflict pre-vention downstream to actions to keep violentconflicts from spreading to more places.But because such horizontal escalationseemed to go beyond averting the riseto violence (vertical escalation) and thusto include containing open warfare, someanalysts worried that it implied suppressingphysical violence at any subsequent stagein an armed conflict. This would conflateit too easily with actions in the middleof wars (even though Boutros-Ghali offeredthe separate term peacemaking for those).Bringing prevention into the realm of activewars would eclipse its proactive nature behindthe conventional interventions that occur latein conflicts, for which terms like conflict man-agement, peace enforcement or peacekeepingwere more fitting. This merging would vitiatethe pre-emptive uniqueness of preventioncompared to those other concepts (cf. Lund,1996). It would forego the opportunity totest the central premise that had animatedthis new post-Cold War notion: that actingbefore violent conflicts fully breaks out islikely to be more effective than acting on awar in progress. To think of prevention asoccurring while wars are already waging notonly disregards most peoples connotation ofprevention, but would relegate the interna-tional community to remediating costly warafter costly war in a perpetual game of catch-up, foregoing the chance to ever get aheadof the game. While some analysts continuedto apply prevention to any subsequent levelof violent conflict (Leatherman et al. 1999),most now confine it to actions to avoid the

eruption of social and political disputes intosubstantial violence, keeping the emphasissquarely on stages before, rather than duringviolent conflicts.

In particular, the focus of this chapteris primary prevention of prospective newor virgin conflicts, where a peaceful equi-librium has prevailed for some years, butfundamental social and/or global forces areproducing new controversies, tensions anddisputes.13 However, imperative later inter-ventions are for minimizing loss of life, theyare less humane and likely more difficultbecause the antagonists are organized, armed,and deeply invested in destroying eachother.14 Graph 15.1 locates this particularmoment in conditions of unstable peace anddistinguishes it from actions at other conflictstages.

Methods of prevention

Notions of prevention have also variedwith regard to the means of engagement,but here too a consensus has emerged.The tools used depend on which causesof conflict are targeted, and thus whichproviders of tools get involved. Boutros-Ghalilisted early warning, mediation, confidence-building measures, fact-finding, preventivedeployment, and peace zones. But subsequentUN policy papers of the 1990s (e.g., Agendafor Development) greatly expanded preven-tive measures to a panoply of policies thataddress the institutional, socio-economic, andglobal environment within which conflictingactors operate as diverse as humanitarianaid, arms control, social welfare, militarydeployment, and media.15 It can now involvealmost any policy sector, whether labeledconflict prevention or not. Recent UN usageof preventive action (e.g., Rubin, 2004) isbetter suited to this range of potentially usefulmodalities.

Direct and structural instrumentsTo classify its array of methods, interces-sory initiatives aimed at particular actorsin manifest conflicts are distinguished fromefforts to shape underlying socio-economic


PEACEMAKING(Conflict management)

PEACE ENFORCEMENT(Conflict mitigation)Chechnya,

early 1995cease-fireKenya, 2007

CRISIS DIPLOMACY(Crisis management)

PEACEKEEPING(Conflict termination)

South Ossetia, 2008Bosnia, early 1996

outbreak of violence

settlementNorth Korea, 1994

Greece, Turkey, 1996Kosovo, 1997

PREVENTIVEDIPLOMACY

(Conflict prevention) POST-CONFLICTPEACE BUILDING

(Conflict resolution)

Kosovo, 1993confrontation

rapprochementCambodia, 1995

PEACETIMEDIPLOMACYOR POLITICS

Stages of Peaceor Conflict

WAR

CRISIS

UNSTABLEPEACE

STABLEPEACE(Basic order)

DURABLEPEACE(Just order)

rising tension

reconciliationU.S.-China, 1995

U.S.-Britain, 20th Century

South Africa, 1995

Duration of ConflictMid-conflict Late StageEarly Stage

Graph 15.1 Basic life-history of conicts and the phases of engagement

conditions and political institutions and pro-cesses. The former direct, operational,or light prevention (Miall, 2004) is moretime-sensitive and actor- or event-focused for example, diplomatic demarches, medi-ation, training in non-violence, or militarydeterrence and seeks to keep divisiveexpressions of manifest conflicts from esca-lating, and thus it targets specific partiesand the issues between them.16 Integral alsois structural or deep prevention, mean-ing actions or policies that address deepersocietal conditions that generate conflictsbetween interests and/or the institutional,procedural and policy deficits or capacitiesthat determine whether competing interestsare channeled and mutually adjusted peace-fully. These more basic factors make upthe environment within which contendingactors operate and thus policies toward themcan create constraints or opportunities thatshape what the actors do. Diverse exam-ples are reducing gross regional disparitiesin living standards, reforming exploitativeagricultural policies, and building effectivegoverning institutions.17 These structuraltargets make prevention more than simply

avoiding violence, or negative peace, butrather aspiring to positive peace. In pragmaticterms, it means being able to meet theinevitable arrival of disruptive social andglobal forces with the ability to bring aboutchange peaceably (cf. Miall, 2007). In recentyears, for example, it conflict preventionhas been integral to the larger post-ColdWar agenda of creating peaceful democraticstates out of societies in transition fromauthoritarianism and patrimonialism (Lund,2006).

Accordingly, the actors that may beinvolved in prevention have expanded fromofficial emissaries to a host of third-partygovernmental and non-governmental actors insocial, economic, cultural, and other agencies,such as within the UN system; internationalfinancial institutions; regional organizations;and major governments through bi-lateraldevelopment and security assistance. Noris it limited to the governmental worldbut may include NGOs, the private busi-ness sector through trade, finance, and pri-vate investment (Ouellete), even celebrities.Preferably, prevention starts through theefforts of the government and other actors in


the countries where violent conflicts mightemerge. Secretary General Annan deemedthis multi-tooled, multi-actored, multi-leveledconcept a culture of prevention.18

Ad hoc and A priori instrumentsA less recognized expansion of preventionextends it up from actions directed atspecific countries facing imminent conflicts(ad hoc prevention) to include global- andregional-level legal conventions or othernormative standards, such as in humanrights and democracy. These regimes seekto influence entire categories of countries oragents, where violations might contribute toconflicts although no signs of conflict haveyet appeared (a priori prevention). Whereasthe former actions are hands-on ways (eitherdirect or structural) to respond to country-specific risk factors, the latter are genericinternational principles agreed on by globaland regional organizations as guideposts thatwhole classes of states are expected to staywithin. There are two varieties: a) supra-national normative regimes, such as humanrights conventions, and b) international reg-ulations of goods that may fuel or easeconflict such as arms, diamonds, and othertrade. Examples of a priori direct preventionare the International Criminal Court andWar Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia andRwanda, which are believed effective indeterring future crimes against humanity,not just prosecuting those who have alreadycommitted them; the OASs proscribing ofmilitary or executive coups as threats todemocracy; and international regulation ofarms transfers. Adherence to internationalstandards and rules before any violationsoccur is conflict prevention where suchviolations could lead to violent repression,resistance, and conflict.19 This socializingof governments in international expectationshas been applied most vigorously in easternand southern Europe (e.g., Schneider andWeitzman, 1996; 15), where the EU, NATO,OSCE, and Council of Europe uphold similarstandards.Analogous compacts are being triedthrough NEPAD, the USAs partnership forAfrican Development.

To illustrate the wide range of possiblemethods for conflict prevention, Table 15.1lists illustrative possible prevention instru-ments under these cross-cutting categories.20

Despite this variety of moments andmethods for prevention, a core concept hasemerged. Not a specific instrument, conflictprevention is a distinctly pro-active stancethat, in principle, many actors could taketo respond to unstable, potentially violentsituations before violence becomes the waytensions and disputes are pursued. Not asingle technique, it is a disposition towardincipient stages of conflict that may draw upona repertoire of responses that would help tokeep tensions and disputes from escalatinginto significant violence and armed force, tostrengthen capabilities of parties to resolveissues peacefully, and to progressively reducethe underlying problems that produce seriousdisputes.21 The challenges this expansivenotion poses for timeliness, coherence, andefficacy are discussed in later sections.

Conict prevention, management,resolution, transformationIn the context of the school of conflictresolution that emerged in the 1970s, this post-Cold War concept marked new conceptualground. Differing stages and interventiontools for conflict were implicit but nottheoretically central concepts, and the terms inthat field still tend to be used interchangeablyfor any stage. Founders such as Bouldingenvisioned a global network of social datastations to monitor and warn about emergingconflicts, but in the Cold War context ofthe time, conflict resolution came to meanaddressing already-tense international crises,or active internal wars, rather than keepingthem from starting in the first place.22 Anotherfounder sought to greatly deepen the causesof conflict to include basic human needs(e.g., Burton). Yet, the chief instruments thefield has promoted are confined to inter-active techniques such as problem-solvingworkshops or other direct intercession, allof which engage small groups representingparties already tied up in manifest conflicts.Structural and a priori prevention have placed


Table 15.1 Taxonomy of illustrative conict prevention instruments

A Priori Measures Ad Hoc Measures(Generic norms and regimes for classesof countries)

(Hands on actions targeted to particular placesand times)

Structural Measures(Address basic societal,

institutional and policyfactors affectingconict/peace)

Standards for human rights, goodgovernance

Environmental regimesWorld Trade Organization negotiationsOAS and AUs protocols on protecting

democracyInternational organization membership

or afliations

Economic reforms and assistanceEnterprise promotionNatural resource managementDecentralization, federalismLong-term observer missionsGroup assimilation policiesAid for elections, legislaturesHuman rights and conict resolution educationAid for police and judiciaryExecutive power-sharingSecurity sector reform

Direct Measures(Address more immediate

behaviors affectingconict/peace)

International Criminal CourtWar Crimes TribunalsSpecial Rapporteurs for Human RightsArms control treatiesGlobal regulation of illegal trade (e.g.,

Kimberly Process for conictdiamonds)

EU Lome and Cotonou processes ondemocracy, governance, and humanrights

Human rights capacity-buildingInter-group dialogue, reconciliationConditional budget supportFact-nding missionsArms embargoesPeace radioGood ofces, facilitation, track-two diplomacyMuscular mediationPreventive deploymentEconomic sanctionsThreat of forceRapid reaction forces

this micro-focus within the macro-focus of thelarger processes of nation and state-building,in which interactive techniques are only oneamong a much larger set of instruments.

Prevention by other namesTable 15.1 reveals also that many defacto direct, structural and generic preven-tive instruments may not be recognized assuch because they operate under aliases.Historically, the Congress of Vienna, Leagueof Nations, the United Nations system ofagencies, Marshall Plan, European Union,and NATO and other security alliances wereall established to reduce the potential forfuture inter-state or intra-state conflicts andare thus fundamentally preventive (Lund,1996a, 1997). During the Cold War, dtenteand co-existence, arms control treaties, andthe CSCE sought to keep the tense superpowerrelationship from erupting into conventionalor nuclear war. Since the Cold War, many

other policies and institutions encouragepeaceful management of disputes, suchdemocracy-building and as rule of law pro-grams, nuclear non-proliferation, and regionalorganizations.23 Whether any of these toolsexplicitly bear the term conflict preventionis immaterial, as long as features are builtinto them that perform prevention effectively.Conflict prevention is also at stake in currentdebates over current potential crises, such asIrans nuclear plans, although those wordsare not used (Ignatius, 2006). All in all, oneanswer to our question of why it seems thatprevention is not tried more often is that it mayactually be operating, but under other labels.

WHAT IS BEING DONE? A WELL-KEPTSECRET

The examples so far show that conflictprevention is neither hypothetical nor new.


Although Darfur, the RussiaGeorgia conflict,and other unaverted conflicts reflect a frequentfailure to act when violence is growing, sig-nificant effort has been devoted to preventiveaction and capacity-building, especially sincethe ending of the Cold War.

1. Early warning and advocacy

From Quincy Wright to Paul Collier, leaguesof social scientists have identified causes ofinter-state and intra-state conflict. Databasestrack the global trends and locuses of conflicts(SIPRI, Human Security Report, 2005) andassess the prospects for conflict or peacein particular countries (e.g., the formerConflict Prevention Network). Some countryrisk indicators and early warning systemsare university-based and open-sourced (e.g.,CIDCM, CIFP), and some provide politicalrisk assessments commercially. Helped bythe connectivity of the Internet, NGOs issueperiodic alerts to official bodies and thepublic, with recommended responses (e.g.,International Crisis Group, Human RightsWatch, International Alert, the former Forumfor Early Warning and Early Response[FEWER]). Intergovernmental and bi-lateralagencies have set up in-house systems (UN,OSCE, USAID, CIA, ECOWAS, IGAD).More recently, USAID outlined a fragilestates strategy including a watch list toidentify priority countries for attention. Inshort, what one book foresaw as an emergingglobal watch seems to be gradually takingconcrete shape (Ramcharan, 1991).

Conflict prevention defined above hasbeen taken up by several successive non-governmental programs,24 and was studiedand promoted by the Carnegie Commission.In public advocacy, the Global Partnershipfor Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) isseeking to capacitate NGOs for early warningand peacebuilding. Efforts are being made tosensitize private corporations to the impactstheir commercial activities may have on con-flicts, negatively or positively (Wenger andMckli, 1991). A recent initiative, ENOUGH,is seeking to garner public support for actionin Darfur and other African mass atrocities.25

Though such efforts to rouse public supportfor preventive action are useful in the longrun, they depend on media coverage of remoteevents and a distracted public that is touchedonly by highly emotive material (cf. Kristoff,2007), and so are prone to belated responses,not pro-active ones. Preventive action has tobecome largely a full-time professional andgovernmental endeavor.

Policy agendaSince the 1990s, more and more intra-state conflicts have burdened the UN andother organizations humanitarian caseload,the number of UN peacekeeping missionshas far exceeded all previous ones since theUN was founded, and the financial costsin post-conflict countries have mounted. Asover and over, new conflicts caused humansuffering and diplomatic and peacekeepingtravail, world leaders and organizations wereincreasingly swayed by the appealing argu-ment that it would be more humane and cost-effective to try to keep as many bloody anddevastating wars as possible from occurringat all. Conflict prevention came speciallyto the fore after the embarrassing failuresby the UN, the USA, and others to stemthe massive genocide in Rwanda in 1994.Numerous conferences on particular wars orpeacekeeping issues solemnly concluded thatwhat really ought to have happened wasmore vigorous effort at the outset to avoidsuch conflicts from occurring in the firstplace.

Conflict prevention entered the officialpolicy statements of the USA and other majorgovernments, the UN, the EU, and manyregional bodies. The title of the 1999 annualreport on all the activities of the UN systemsummed them up as Preventing War andDisaster. Conflict prevention was the topicof two UN Security Council discussions in2000 and 2001; a priority urged in July,2000 by the G8 Okinawa Summit; and thefocus of major reports of the UN SecretaryGeneral in June, 2001 and 2006. Since 9/11,the notion that failed states breed extremismand conflict added to this impetus under therubric of preventing state failures, and the


UN has sought to promote more pro-activeattention on conflict and other global threats(e.g., UN High Level Panel Report on GlobalThreats).

Initiatives on the groundPrevention has gone considerably beyondexhortation and policy into actual efforts inspecific countries. Though little-publicized,direct and structural activities have beenapplied in such diverse places threatenedby conflict as Slovakia, Indonesia, andGuyana. These activities range from bi-lateraland regional high-level diplomacy (e.g.,by ECOWAS) to NGO projects in peacebuilding at the local level, such as dialogues,peace radio, and inter-ethnic communitydevelopment programs, to mention a few.The UNDP local community developmentprogram in southern Krygyzstan was explic-itly entitled preventive development.Again,many programs in potential conflict settingsare intended as conflict-preventive but notso labeled, like the UN good offices effortswith the Myanmar regime, and the WorldBank offer in 2000 to help fund land reformin Zimbabwe as its political crisis over landworsened.26

Institutional capacity-buildingOngoing response mechanisms have been setup to trigger actions automatically based onrisk criteria, at least in principle. The UN Sec-retariat, the European Commission, and inter-governmental, regional, and sub-regionalbodies have staffed small units to watch forearly warning signs and consider preventiveresponses. At UN headquarters, the Secre-tariats Interagency Framework Team forCoordinating Early Warning and InformationAnalysisidentifies countries at risk of conflictand applicable UN preventive measures. Inaddition to the most active regional mech-anisms of the OSCE and OAS, all Africansub-regional organizations have agreed toprevention mechanisms (e.g., AU; ECOWAS;IGAD; SADC; ECCAS). Although many arenot fully operational,27 some have been usedto respond to threatening situations, such as inCongo-Brazzaville and Guinea-Bissau.

Ahead of foreign and defense ministries,major development agencies have taken thelead in intra-state conflict prevention. Count-less training workshops have been carriedout by the UN for staff and donor imple-menting partners.28 NGOs and universitiesoffer institutes for training in conflict analysisand peace and conflict impacts assessment.Conflict and peace-building units exist in allmajor development agencies including theWorld Bank. These agencies have supportednumerous assessments of the conflict driversand peace capacities in particular countries.While they have funded unofficial diplomaticinitiatives, such as in Georgia, Uganda,Senegal, and the DRC, their preventiveefforts have been shifting from speciallydedicated activities such as dialogues tomainstreaming conflict and peace-buildingcriteria into all development sectors, suchas agriculture, health, education, economicgrowth, environment, youth, democracy- andstate-building, civil society building, as wellas security sector professionalism, and intothe full programming cycle from assessmentthrough design, monitoring, and evaluation.USAIDs Office of Conflict Mitigation andManagement is producing practical toolkitsthat provide lessons learned about how toaddress typical sources of conflicts arisingfrom issues such as water, minerals, forests,land, youth, human rights, and livelihoods(e.g., CMM). Consultants are tasked withdoing assessments of programs for theireffects specifically on conflicts and peace(e.g., Lund and Wanchek, 2005) and howthey might be improved or at least dono harm by inadvertently exacerbating riskfactors (Anderson, 1999). A host of practicalanalytical tools have been developed for theseassessments and formulating appropriate pro-gram designs,29 published in practical guides.These present the typical sources of conflicts,how to assess the impacts of programs onconflict, and how they might be improved.The UN and some donor and multi-lateralorganizations are also trying to incorporateconflict-sensitive development into country-wide development strategies such as PRSPsand the UNs CCA and DAF.


Changing normsNew international norms appear to be emerg-ing, albeit slowly and tacitly, that affirm aninternational obligation to respond to potentialeruptions of violence, especially genocide.As successive bloody wars have hit theheadlines, one no longer hears that they areinevitable tragedies resulting from age-old hatreds. Instead, concerns are voicedthat the calamity could have been avoided,and about what went wrong and who isresponsible. UN Secretary GeneralAnnan andUS President Clinton both acknowledged thatthey could have acted more vigorously to haltthe 1994 Rwanda genocide. Parliamentarypublic inquiries were held in France andBelgium on the roles that their governmentsmay have played in neglecting or worseningthe genocide, and in the Netherlands aboutthe roles of their forces under the UNduring the atrocities at Sbrenica. In 2001, theInternational Commission on Intervention andState Sovereignty asserted a responsibilityto protect (R2P) ordinary people who areat risk of crisis or conflict.30 This dutyrests first with sovereign governments abouttheir own citizens, but if states are unwillingor unable, the responsibility to intervene toprotect those in harms way devolves to theinternational community.31 R2P may becomea critical impetus for conflict prevention,for the Commission argued that the dutyto protect also implies an accompanyingresponsibility to prevent such threats (ICISS,2001: 19).

Governments in potentially conflict-pronecountries often object to this trend asundue interference in their domestic affairs,especially as it implies possible militaryintervention. But the more that late andpossibly non-consensual armed interventionsare justified and necessary to halt atrocities,the more acceptable earlier and consensualpreventive engagement may become as analternative. Moreover, the norm of outsideresponsibility for avoiding threats to citizensis gaining some hold in such countries aswell. The African Union now includes afifteen-member Peace and Security Councilthat if authorized by the Assembly can deploy

military force in a member state in theevent of genocide, war crimes and crimesagainst humanity. Though such authority tostop an humanitarian calamity or genocideis very late prevention, this moves upstreamin the conflict cycle the point at whichinvolvement is considered legitimate withouta governments consent.32

In sum, conflict prevention is now morecommon. In addition to these explicit efforts,much of it is hidden in plain sight underother rubrics such as nuclear arms control,democratization, non-violent regime change,people power, power-sharing, conditional aid,and counter-terrorism. Though such activitiescan contribute to preventing conflict, they aretaken for granted and not registered in theconflict prevention column. Media tend toreport on wars, not how peace is maintainedmuch of the time.33 The failures to preventin Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo are widelyreported, the successes in Albania (Tripodi)and Romania (Mihailescu) go unnoticed.This lack of awareness outside professionalcircles of advances and achievements maydeflate the preventive enterprise, perpetuatingunwarranted pessimism regarding its value.So another part of the answer to our questionas to why conflict prevention is disregardedis that lack of awareness of what is actuallybeing done keeps it off the table of actionsthat could be taken in current potential conflictsituations. If one does not believe an activityexists, one does not consider it an option ordevote resources to it.34

Obstacles

Despite incremental progress in pro-activism,international actors often fail to applyvigorous measures to unraveling societieswhen they are first significantly threatenedby social turmoil, state breakdown, grosshuman rights violations, and violence. Inone study to ascertain the most activethird parties in the early stages of recentconflicts, the U.N. and the USA led otherthird parties, but the responses occurredat late stages of crisis or actual war andin salient arenas such as the Middle East


(Moller and Svensson, 2007: 17). U.S.foreignpolicy debates constantly dwell only on thenarrow question of how tough to be towardenemies and whether to go to intervenemilitarily here or there, thus totally ignoringthe options available before such adversariesare created and crisis points are reached.Although humanitarian and development aidhave increased, resources earmarked forconflict prevention, with the exception of afew dedicated funds, have not.

Dispersion of willsThe conventional explanation of why majorinternational organizations do not respondto potential conflicts is a lack of politicalwill. But this is vague and does notexplain how it can be that preventive actionssometimes are taken.While it may be assumedthat Western publics are opposed to theuse of force abroad to stop genocide orhumanitarian crises, it is not clear theywould balk at strengthening the capacity toavert crises and avoid later costs. (Jentleson,1996: 14). Public opinion is also not the finalarbiter, for political leaders can circumventor influence it. Several recent preventiondecisions have been taken quietly with littleor no wider consultations (Lund, 1999). In20023, the USAs handwringing throughoutthe 1990s about humanitarian interventionsand disdain for nation-building were quicklyswept aside with regard to Iraq by WhiteHouse arguments justifying the more drasticand costly choice of preventive war andforceful regime change.35

More often, the problem may be that there isan excess of political wills. The major powersand international community are presentextensively in most developing countries,including those vulnerable to conflict. Thispresence takes many forms such as diplo-matic missions, cultural activities, health andeducation and infrastructure development,trade and commerce, military assistance, aswell as efforts to promote democracy, humanrights, and civil society. But this multi-tude of activities building schools, trainingnurses, assisting elections, digging wells,teaching good business practices, you name

it, is pursuing a variety of differing policygoals that are not necessarily supportiveof conflict prevention. If many actors arealready engaged in conflict-prone places,often in sizeable numbers, the problem isnot what is commonly depicted as receivingan early warning from some remote countryand then pressuring international actors torush to it before a crisis erupts. Internationalactors are already there. Yet each missionis expending energy and resources in manydispersed directions other than preventingviolent conflicts. An effective preventionsystem does not operate in potential conflictareas because everyone is busily pursuingother mandates. While some of these conflict-blind activities may help, some enable orworsen conflicts.

Even the most prevention-relevant activ-ities listed above are too segmented. Earlywarning and conflict indicators come upthrough separate reporting channels andprogram desks, such as for human rights,humanitarian aid, and development, arrivingat differing definitions of local problemsand interpretations of conflict causes. Thisinformation is not synthesized to revealpossible overlap and complementarity. Forexample, genocide prevention is advocatedas if it is a separate problem from intra-stateconflict. But most genocides by far occurduring wars (Harff, 2003), and wars are hardto stop, so the best way to prevent genocideis to prevent the wars in which they usuallyarise.

Clash of professionsLying behind the problem of disparate willsare differing values and paradigms of separatedisciplines and professions such as conflictresolution, peace studies, human rights, eco-nomic development, political development,and security studies. Contradictions arise overthe often-inescapable need to make tradeoffsbetween these fields desirable but competinggoals. The prevailing Western liberal modeloften assumes that the democracy, humanrights, rule of law, free markets, and economicgrowth are all compatible with one anotherand with peace. But in many situations,


such compatibility does not hold, yet thereis no common understanding or procedurefor prioritizing goals at differing stages ofconflict.

These value conflicts reflect differingworldviews of diverse professionals regardinghow to conflict. Diplomatic, military, andsecurity communities often ignore the need toaddress underlying, longer-term factors thatcontribute to conflicts, as they pursue pre-dominantly elite-oriented and state-centeredapproaches to already armed conflicts. Onthe other hand, development agencies andNGOs generally fail to recognize the need forsufficient diplomatic clout or other forms ofpower to confront the immediate drivers ofintra-state conflicts, such as political leaderswho can mobilize popular followings andarmed groups. On their part, the humanrights community often takes a legal-juridicalapproach to exposing violations of humanrights principles and punishing the guilty justice over peace whereas the conflictresolution school emphasizes stopping vio-lence, strengthening human relationships andachieving reconciliation.36 But these philo-sophical differences lead the various fields toelevate one value above others and pursuediffering policy goals, thus frustrating theachievement of effective overall preventionstrategies. All good things do not necessarilygo together. Empirically speaking, one kindof leverage without others may have seriouslimits or cause harm (see the followingsection). What is required is recognition thatno one value necessarily can be achievedabsolutely; compromises need to strike bal-ances between competing values in differingcircumstances.

These dissonances may be getting morecrossfield attention, however. Procedurally,efforts to achieve policy coherence arebeing made by country-level coordinatorssuch as the UN Secretary Generals specialrepresentatives and UNDP resident repre-sentatives. Whole-of-government efforts arereflected in such entities as the US StateDepartments new Coordinator for Recon-struction and Stabilization. Inter-agency har-monization is being attempted by the UNs

Peacebuilding Commission, at least forpost-conflict countries.37 Some developmentagencies are funding non-official diplomacyinitiatives that are intended to influencedomestic power politics, while the notionof soft power encourages diplomats andmilitary officials to explore the utility ofdevelopment and other non-coercive policies.In sum, another part of the lack of suffi-cient proactive response is the dispersion ofinternational activities and goals already incountries threatened by violence. The problemis not deploying them anew. A downsideof the expansive notion of prevention isthat these various activities are pursued withno procedures for galvanizing them intoconcerted prevention strategies.Alternatively,a considerable multiplier effect would beachieved if the multiple efforts in a givencountry were each made more conflict-smart, for their aggregate impact would bemore potent. Conflict prevention might belargely a matter of re-engineering the manydiplomatic, development and other programsthat already operate in developing countries sothat they serve conflict prevention objectivesmore directly and in a more concerted way(Lund, 1998a).

WHAT KINDS OF PREVENTION AREEFFECTIVE? GETTING AHEAD OF THECURVE

Much extant research looks at failure: coun-tries that faced potential violent conflict,and where no preventive effort was triedor opportunities were missed (e.g., Zartman,2005). However, the simple antidote to actearly has given way to a deeper concernabout getting those actions right. This isbecause misapplied preventive efforts, evenif timely, may be worse than taking no actionat all. (cf. Lund, 1998a). Thus, the growingresearch on success preventive actions thatwere tried and no escalation occurred isespecially policy relevant. Instruments in thepotential prevention toolbox are not ipso factoeffective, for that hinges on which is appliedwhen, where, and how.


Basic ingredients

The first wave of this research looked mainlyat preventive diplomacy (direct prevention),and thus relatively late stages of confrontation(e.g., Miall, 1992; Manuera, 1994; Lund,1996). It suggests convergence around ele-ments that appear to be associated witheffective avoidance of violence:38

1. Act at an early stage (Miall, 1992: 198)., that isbefore a triggering event (Wallensteen, 1998:15), early, early, early (Jentleson, 2000: 337).

2. Be swift and decisive, not equivocal andvacillating (Wallensteen; Jentleson, 2000: 343;Hamburg, 2002: 146; Harff, 2006: 6).

3. Use talented, inuential international diplomatswho command local respect (Jentleson, 2000:336; Miall, 1992: 193).

4. Convince the parties that the third parties arecommitted to a peaceful and fair solution, andoppose the use of force by any side (Jentleson,2000: 341).

5. Use a combination of responses, such as carrotsand sticks, implemented more or less coherently(Hamburg, 2002: 14647; Wallensteen, 1998:15; Jentleson, 2000: 336; Leatherman, 1999:18294; Zartman, 2005: 14; Byman, 2002: 217).

6. Provide support and reinforcement to moder-ate leaders and coalitions that display non-violent and cooperative behavior Zartman,2000: 310.

7. Build local networks that address the variousdrivers of the conict, but avoid obviousfavoritism and imbalances (Wallensteen: 15;Jentleson, 2000: 336; Hamburg, 2002: 147;Leatherman, 1999: 199).

8. If necessary to deter actors from using violence,use credible threat of the use of force or otherpenalties such as targeted sanctions (Jentleson,2000; Zartman, 2005: 202).

9. Neutralize potential external supporters of oneside or the other, such as neighboring countrieswith kin groups to those in a conict (Miall,2000; Hamburg, 2002: 147).

10. Work through legitimate local institutions tobuild them up (Wallensteen: 15).

11. Involve regional organizations or regionalpowers, but dont necessarily act entirelythrough them (Wallensteen: 15) Jentleson: 339;Miall: 198).

12. Involve major powers that can providecredible guarantees, but use UN or othermulti-lateral channels to ensure legitimacy

(Jentleson: 337; Wallensteen: 15; Hamburg,2002: 147; Leatherman et al. 1999: 216;Zartman, 2005: 13).

The studies also find that certain local andregional conditions significantly enhance thechances of success (e.g., Miall):39

1. Domestic leaders who are relatively secure andfeel a self-interest in stability, and thus areopen to third parties facilitating or mediatingemerging disputes.

2. Major factions that show some mutual ability tomanage societal disputes and carry out publicpolicies that benet all communities.

3. Accommodative policies and procedures such asvoting systems and opportunities for politicalparticipation that blunt the impact of grievancesfelt by one side or the other.

4. Relations between major political groups thathave been peaceful in the recent past.

5. One side is not much more powerful thananother.

6. Weak group solidarity or political mobilizationwithin one of the protagonists, such that theycannot mobilize beyond a certain level.

7. The country is small and relatively dependenton the international community economically,politically, and militarily.

Toward a theory of prevention:timing and sequencing

While very useful, these findings do notreveal the utility of particular instruments atdifferent stages. It is widely accepted thatdifferent interventions are needed at differentmoments (e.g., Lund, 1996: 191; RothchildCAII, 1996: 44). As indicated, it is alsobelieved that several kinds of instruments areneeded. But such a multi-pronged strategycannot mean everyone doing everything inevery stage and place. More is not necessarilybetter. Consequently, the leading currentresearch question being urged for the fieldis which mixes of differing instruments aremost effective in which stages of conflict andcontexts, other things being equal (e.g., Miall,1992; Nicolaides, 1996; Harff, 2005).40 Case-studies and large n quantitative studies havebegun to mine recent experience (e.g., Rubin,


1998, 2004; Nicolaides; Rowsbotham andMiall; Leatherman et al.,)41 to get at thisissue. Differing levels of analysis, typologies,and cases have impeded the task of cumu-lating and verifying findings, and many arepartly deductive rather than empirical (e.g.,Lund, 1997; Leatherman; Kriesberg, 2003:Rothchild, 2003: 45). Nevertheless, gather-ing up what extant findings and groundedreasoning suggest so far can provide usefulheuristic guidelines for policymakers aboutwhich combinations of instruments to applyto the early stages of conflict.42

To explore the available evidence, weexamine below what research suggests aremost useful of the basic types of preventionat each of three distinguishable early phasesof conflicts. These phases lie in the realm ofunstable peace between a peaceful equilib-rium where conflicts are managed predictably,on the one hand, and tensions are beginningto escalate into confrontation, significantviolence or organized armed conflict, onthe other (cf. e.g., Mitchell, 1981; 2006;Lund, 1996; Lund, 1997; Kriesberg, 2003;Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005).43 To frame thefollowing discussion, we pose here a familiarassumption that soft measures must befollowed by hard ones, the more a conflictescalates e.g., diplomacy must precede theuse of force. The UN Charter envisions thatthe procedures in Chapter Six for peaceful set-tlements of disputes may have to be followedby the more coercive measures in ChapterSeven of sanctions and peace enforcement.Others subscribe to this graduated ladder ofprevention (Eliasson). Similarly, regardinginteractive conflict resolution methods, thecontingency model hypothesizes that thegreater the intensity of conflict, the morethat non-assertive techniques of facilitationmust give way to the directive techniquesof mediation, arbitration and adjudication(Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

Latent conicts

These arise when exogenous or endogenouschanges are generating underlying but unac-knowledged strains among societal groups but

they have yet to mobilize to express theirinterests.44

A priori instruments: structural and directAs described earlier, one prominent a prioriinstrument involves global and regionalorganizations promulgating standards or reg-ulations backed by incentives in order toencourage present or prospective memberstates to respect human rights, adopt demo-cratic procedures, settle disputes peacefullywith their own minorities and neighboringstates, or submit to restrictions on termsof trade (e.g., Lund, OECD-DAC, 1998;Jentleson, 2000: 338; Hamburg, 2002: 147;Cortright, 26972).45 The evident effective-ness of this instrument in reducing potentialcauses of conflict seems to derive fromthe conditional incentives offered to leaderswho have already subscribed to particularnorms, at least nominally, and are already inpower before particular conflicts ensue, thusavoiding the difficulties of intervening whereparties have already violated the norms andbecome entrenched in opposed positions onspecific disputes. When agreeing to them, aregimes future stakes are not immediatelyapparent, compliance can be voluntary, thereis time to adjust a countrys policies, andindividual actors cannot argue they are beingsingled out. If the penalties for violationsare significant, the sunk costs borne bythe parties are not so overwhelming asto dwarf the public good provided by theinstitution (Nicolaides: 60, 4648). A possi-ble negative side-effect occurs if the benefitsof incorporating some states into internationalorganizations and excluding their neighborsintensifies tensions between ins and outs(Bonvicini, 1996; 9; Shambaugh, 1996).46

Ad hoc structural instrumentsVigorous structural measures can help specificgovernments to alleviate underlying socio-economic sources of conflicts or institu-tional and policy deficits that keep countriesfrom addressing those problems meaning-fully and peacefully. When in the 1980s,international lending institutions began topressure developing countries to privatize


para-statals, reduce public spending, removeprice subsidies, stabilize monetary systems,and liberalize trade regulations (Muscat,2002: 196), the rationale was not solelyeconomic productivity and growth, but polit-ical stability, an implicit theory of peace. Infact, considerable large n research suggeststhat economic liberalization such as freetrade policies are highly correlated withlower levels of poverty, and that developmentcorrelates with lower levels of conflict (e.g.,Hegre et al., 2002; Goldstone et al., 2003).Failing to enact reforms, on the other hand,is likely to deepen poverty and inequities thatincrease the chances for upheaval.

However, critics argue that structuraladjustment measures can increase politicalinstability and thus risk of conflict, especiallyin the poorest countries by reducing incomeand increasing competition among prospec-tive losers and gainers during de-statalization.In this view, globalization increases vulner-ability to complex humanitarian emergen-cies by liberalizing trade, increasing capitalmobility, raising debt, lowering commodityexport prices, and reducing foreign directinvestment (e.g., Rapley, 2009). In countrieswith governments run by ethnic minoritiessuch as Sri Lanka, for example, elites canhold onto their position by securing accessto privatized industries. If other minori-ties are shut out, the economic inequal-ity, or at least its perception, producesinter-group resentment and tensions (Chua,2003).

This debate revolves in part around differ-ing time frames. To derive the ingredients ofpeace from ahistorical econometric methodsthat pinpoint the highest correlations amongindicators in large numbers of countriesex post facto is not to understand how thesecorrelations came into being over time andthe ways that the variables actually behavedand interacted within particular countries.47Though austerity measures may provokeviolent protests in the short run, the evidenceof political instability is mixed and context-specific (Muscat, 1995). Such adjustmentpolicies may not create fundamental threats toregimes (Bienen, 1986). In fact, early policies

toward natural resources, trade access, diver-sification, corruption, price shocks, and ethnicquotas can boost growth (Collier, 12540).48Whether such policies mitigate or worsenconflict also depends on how these interna-tional and domestic policies are designed,introduced, and implemented.49 Social safety-net programs can be used to compensategroups that are especially hard-hit by short-term effects of economic austerity.50 In anycase, normal policies of international lendinginstitutions applied automatically withouttailoring them to each country context maybe especially destabilizing in the poorest andleast capable states.51 In short, economicreform may have better chances of successat this stage, than when politics are morepolarized, but they need to be conflict-sensitive and accompanied by compensatorymeasures.

As against such conditional aid,52 donorsalso provide outright aid such as in health andeducation to alleviate social needs and thusencourage economic activity. Such supportprograms are believed to have stabilizingeffects because they can create new marketsand increase social interaction (Cortright,1997; Collier, 134). A drawback is that suchassistance is implemented through divisibleprojects and programs, so benefit allocationsmay reflect the differential access of asocietys ethnic groups, causing horizon-tal inequities (Stewart, ), especially whereprebendal or patronage mechanisms distributeresources and life chances as is commonin Africa. When the competitive pressuresof democratization arise, ruling parties haveespecially strong incentives to use socialand economic programs to win and rewardsupporters. Thus, conflict-blind aid intendedto alleviate poverty may actually privilegecertain and identity groups and intensify inter-group rivalries (Graham, 1994).53 Donorsoften find that even well-intentioned supportmay visibly affect the relative position ofpolitically significant groups in a societyand thus exacerbate the sources of conflict(Collier, 138). Where there are politicizedethnic divisions, aid programs may contributemore to conflict than do macro-economic


reforms because they are more or lesslumpy.54 Implementing programs throughmulti-group and locallyrun mechanisms mayhelp to avoid obvious partiality and bridgesuch cleavages (e.g., Anderson).55

Both economic reform and outright aid areless likely to provoke conflict if developingsocieties have institutions that manage thesocial strains and inequalities that global-ization can cause (Rodrik, 1997). As manydonors concluded that structural adjustmentcould not work unless bolstered by effectivegovernance (Stokke, 1995: 26), the latterbecame another entry point for structural con-flict prevention. International agencies nowwidely subscribe to the view that democracy-building is an effective way to achieve domes-tic stability.56 Again, the evidence arises fromstrong cross-sectional statistical associationsin a large number of countries betweendemocracy and peace between and withinnations (e.g., Russett, 1993). At the stageof latent conflict, such support for buildinginstitutions that can regulate emerging socialconflicts is promising (Nicolaides: 53). Somecountries like Indonesia though ethnicallyfragmented have taken genuine steps towardpopular democracy and maintained relativestability.

However, views that any steps toward moredemocracy are gains for conflict reduction(e.g., Diamond, 1996: 408) do not recognizethat democratization also risks destabiliza-tion. Studies of actual dynamics of changein particular countries find that the riskof conflict often rises during periods whenauthoritarian systems are shifting to morepluralistic structures (e.g., Mansfield andSnyder, 1995a,b).57 Alternatively, transition-ing polities may remain partial or illiberaldemocracies (Ottaway, 2003; Zakaria, 1997)in which the regimes hold on power isnot challenged, political and civil rights areabridged, and representation occurs throughinformal power-sharing within cliques. If suchautocratic or oligarchic regimes (anocracies)continue to resist meaningful democraticreform, they could simply stagnate econom-ically as well as politically, inviting statebreakdown and violent conflict.

At the same time, it is unclear whethersuch regimes necessarily lead to stagnationand violent conflict or can evolve grad-ually toward more openness and stability.Informal power-sharing among less thanfully accountable political leaders, thoughfalling short of formal democracy in aWestern sense, does not lead inevitablyto conflict.58 In fact, intra-elite co-optativebargains, though less than ideal by Westernstandards, may be a pre-requisite for politicalstability and thus eventual development(e.g., Rothchild, 2004, Byman). So onceagain, the likelihood of conflict may bedetermined more by whether governmentsmake accommodative adjustments, such asallowing for some political activity (cf.Cramer and Weeks, 2002: 41f).59 Positivediscrimination programs to increase access ofminorities to government jobs and servicescan co-opt group resentments (Rothchild,2004: 47). These diverging scenarios makethe current national politics in authoritariancountries such as Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan,and Egypt, and more pluralistic but weaksystems like Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan,crucial focuses for early warning and conflictprevention.60

Appropriately, especially since 9/11, ana-lysts have looked increasingly to supply-sideprograms that support institutions of the stateto make governments more effective from theinside. Several analysts argue that before rep-resentative democracies can function effec-tively, basic institutions of the state needto operate effectively.61 Fragile and failedstates need to have effective ministries, localauthorities, and judiciaries delivering health,education, roads, sanitation, and justice.62State strengthening includes professionalizinga countrys security forces, both to restrainthem from abusing its citizens and enablethem to provide security.63 National lawsalso need to provide guarantees such asproperty rights (Kapstein, 2004), enforcepolicies governing the economy, establishregulatory agencies such as for banking andtrade, and respect civil and political rightsand criminal laws through courts,64 includingprotections for minorities and other limits


on arbitrary power: constitutional liberalism(Zakaria, 2003).65

On a broader plane, much research hasweighed the utility for preventing ethnicconflicts of constitutional engineering thatallocates political authority through differingoptions: unitary systems versus federalism,autonomy or partition; presidential versusparliamentary systems, and proportional ver-sus plural electoral rules (see e.g., Horowitz;Wimmer, 2004). Federalism is often presentedas a possible means of conflict resolutionor prevention, for devolving policymakingcan shield minorities and be more responsiveto regional or local interests. But decen-tralization has both calmed and dividedsocieties (Siegle and OMahony, 2007).Proportional representation and winner-take-all voting helped in South Africa and not inNorthern Ireland. Again, how such differingarrangements affect the risk of conflict ina given country depends on other particularfactors, such as the political relationshipbetween contending identity groups and thepolitics of change.

In sum, all such economic, political andconstitutional structural changes envisionultimate states of affairs that, if attained,would undoubtedly reduce conflicts signifi-cantly. But the challenge is getting to theseendpoints without destructive conflict. Inthe short run, reforms such as structuraladjustment and majoritarian elections arenot always feasible, and can be counter-productive if applied too quickly or withinsufficient attention to a countrys balanceof power, political economy, and potentialfor backlash and deeper polarization. Liber-alizations that fragment power have to bebalanced by stabilization that consolidatesit (cf. Paris, 2001), such as state andsocietal institutions with authority to reconcilecompeting interests and force compromises.Many ideal liberal-internationalist solutionsset aside the difficulties and pitfalls ofgetting reforms adopted and do not calculatethe risk of destabilization in view of thecapacities of differing societies for peacefulchange.66 Merely prescribing ultimate ide-als is as useful as a doctor advising an

obese patient with heart trouble to loseweight.67

Ad hoc direct instrumentsStructural policies do not necessarily engagethe specific stakeholders in emerging nationalconflicts, although they require consent or atleast toleration by host governments wherethey are applied. Critical to their adoptionand implementation are the processes andchannels through which governing elitesmake decisions about them, steps that affectthe prospects for social conflict. This realitythus calls for direct forms of preventiveengagement even at this stage of latentconflict.68 But despite the frequent obeisanceexpressed to the idea of engendering localownership, structural programs often treatthe leaders in a country not as active agentsof change but automatons who respondto incentives and disincentives in somePavlovian stimulusresponse internationalexperiment.

Obviously, direct prevention is prematureif no conscious sense of a serious prospectiveharm or opportunity is present (Berkovitch;Nicolaides 1996: 52). Where societies see noserious problem that needs fixing, it is hardfor third-party would-be preventors to explainwhy they are needed. Pointing to a conflictof interests might actually destabilize thesituation (Kemp: 50ff).69 Or, if no aggrievedparties have stepped forward, it is unclearwhom one can talk to. But once underlyingproblems are beginning to surface as con-tentious issues, direct engagement fostered bytrusted third parties is best carried out withinexisting institutions and ruling processes, thusgiving standing regimes the chance to respondin ways that do not immediately threatentheir status while allowing them to addressemerging problems. State elites acting earlyon to deal with structural conditions can beeffective prevention (Rothchild, 2003: 46).Whether or not governments have acceptedinter-national standards through agreementsthey have signed, they may take umbrage atcriticism and dismiss outside pressure. Butfact-finding missions from institutions such asthe UN can overcome resistance, especially


if complemented with direct support thataddresses the deficiencies (Rothchild, 2003:467). As it is better to foster compliancethan rely only on ex poste condemnationsof deviations (Nicolaides, 1996: 54), multi-lateral organizations have also moved fromsimply promulgating and pressing standardson a government to hands-on assistance. TheOffice of the UN High Commissioner onHuman Rights, for example, has shifted fromsimply monitoring human rights to help-ing governments comply, through creatingnational institutions that build human rightscapacity. A related approach is the Lomeconsultations the EU holds with governmentsin Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific forincrementally establishing democratic institu-tions, thus allowing for flexibility regardingwhich countries are expected to meet whichbenchmarks by when.

Manifest limited conict

The stakes of conflict increase when widerforces of change elicit awareness of conflict-ing interests and energize affected groups,issues come into the open, and potentiallydiverging positions are decided upon andvoiced (Miall, 2007). Accepted forms ofprotests may be underway as well as irregularacts, including violence. The aim is bothto prevent confrontations that escalate, hard-ening of positions and polarization, risingfears, and mutual defensive measures thatcreate security dilemmas and to find basesfor cooperation. For some, this is the moststrategic moment for prevention, as the tasksof earlier and more basic structural preventionare seen as too demanding and complex(Ottaway and Mair, 2004). Some rawness ofsores of discontent may be needed to expectpositive change to occur (cf. Stedman, 1995).Structural measures continue to be useful but now, less for alleviating the underlyingsources of the conflict than as purchase(Rothchild, 2003), to sweeten an agreement,that purveyors of direct prevention can usetactically.

Direct measures thus become more essential.Opposed groups often have little inclination to

initiate mutual engagement, at least until theyfail to achieve their objectives unilaterallythrough first trying coercive or violent means.Still, some may seek outside help at thisearly stage more often than may be realized(Nicolaides, 1996: 49), as when the Barreregime was under challenge by various clans.Direct methods through which third partiescan intervene peacefully include the classicarray of official and non-official interactivemethods. All these are intended to get partiesin closer contact and communication for moreaccurate information about mutual interestsand needs, dispel ignorance and fear, andexpose them to more options, possibly leadingto agreements (e.g., Rothchild, 2003: 46;Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997).70

One direct approach uses non-bindinginteractions such as various types of conflicttransformation workshops that precede, fol-low or operate under or alongside officialtrack one diplomacy or political processes(Fisher, 2005; cf. Ropers, 2005). Ratherthan take up substantive issues to seeksettlements through adversarial, judgmentalapproaches, these gentler methods or softmediation (Nicolaides, 1996: 51) create anon-threatening milieu to simply facilitateinter-party communication, thus expectingto elicit more committed participation andpave the way to locally decided andowned accommodations (e.g., Zartman andRasmussen). One study found that extensivemutual communication rather than hard bar-gaining has been more effective (Bercovitch,1998: 243). In 2003, for example, UNDP andGuyanese leaders agreed to a whole series ofgovernmental and civil society dialogues thatresulted in the countrys first ever non-violentelections in 2006. Success may depend greatlyon whether they are spearheaded by prominentoutsiders who command respect (Lund andMyers, 2007). Yet, even if a small societyand government is immersed in workshops, ifimproved relationships are not translated intolegal and policy changes that institutionalizeand uphold agreed rules even on stormy days,the usual political styles can return (Lundand Myers, 2006). It is difficult to instill newhabits unless they are embedded in locally


run institutions (Nicolaides, 51). A point isreached when the question is whether a bodypolitic adopts such habits on its own withoutthird-party therapy. Such non-formal methodsare not intended as alternatives to tougherapproaches, but complementary (Fisher, inZartman and Rasmussen, 1997: 241).

A innovative hybrid of a priori, ad hoc,structural and direct engagement that liesbetween non-formal facilitation and formalmediation is the work of the OSCE High Com-missioner on National Minorities (HCNM),an office mandated to become proactivelyengaged in ethnic disputes arising in the1990s. The first able incumbent and hissuccessors have made innumerable visits toEastern Europe and newly independent statesto meet with leaders and minority groups.They facilitate dialogues, recommend policyremedies to chief executives and parliaments,and show how OSCE norms may apply,including drafting model legislation. Onlyvery rarely have they publicly pressured theparties, but crucial to the success that manyanalysts judge this innovation has often hadin reducing divisive tensions and elicitingaccommodation is the eventual reward forgood behavior of economic aid and member-ship in the EU, NATO, and other Westernbodies (e.g., Hopmann, Mychajlyszyn).

Still, leaders in conflict-vulnerable soci-eties and weak states are often disinclined tocompromise and/or they affirm positions andagreements they cannot enforce (Nicolaides,1996: 52). If their recalcitrance breaks offcommunication or thwarts opportunities forjoint problem-solving, third parties may needto get more directive by engaging parties inmuscular mediation or formal negotiationswith teeth (e.g., Jakobsen, 1996: 24), such asproferred aid or coercive diplomacy, such asthreats to cut off aid (Rothchild, 2002: 48f),impose economic sanctions, or use force (e.g.,George, 1994: 199).

Military measures can also be used fordirect prevention, but not yet in the formof a threat or actual use of force. Theusual foreign policy debate over force versusdiplomacy tends to pertain to high levelsof confrontation. But before that stage,

the overlooked but promising instrumentof preventive deployment (Nicolaides, 44f)can act as a deterrent by inter-positioningforces even before any hostile actions haveoccurred. The only clear example has beenUNPREDEP, the UN force that posted1100 troops along Macedonias border withAlbania and Serbia from 1992 until 1999.Though its firepower could not withstand aYugoslav army attack, UNPREDEP createda tripwire that would likely trigger moreforceful responses. Its removal in 1999 wasfollowed two years later by an insurgency thatoriginated in border areas UNPREDEP hadonce patrolled (Lund, 2005). As significant,it had a calming effect on domestic inter-ethnic relations (Lund, 1997).71 Similarly,peace zones secured militarily can containactual or potential conflict by cordoning offspecified areas, with or without the consentof a government (Nicolaides 45), such as inNorthern Iraq under Hussein.72

Escalating violent conicts

Positions are hardening, relationships break-ing off, parties disengaging. Irregular expres-sions of grievances grow into wider violence,foretelling possible organized conflict. Majorhostilities look imminent. The aim is to avoidan irrevocable spiral.

To pre-empt increasing intransigence,invoking and enforcing a priori norms mightstill be effective. Less than totally punitivemeasures can activate those in the countrywho support peaceful resolution. But usingcoercive diplomacy in the absence of a clearpattern of overt violence or gross violations ofnorms may be seen as unfair and illegitimate(Nicolaides, 1996: 44) because it presumesactions would occur for which the evidenceis equivocal. Another mistaken reflex is totry to address the supposed root causes of aconflict such as ethnic or religious differences,economic disparities, or lack of democracy,as if they mainly now drive the violence.But such ad hoc structural measures are lessand less useful as well as feasible, when itis the violence that drives violence. What is


most urgent is to halt the spiral through potentpolitical and military direct prevention.73

The tougher tools of formal diplomacy,though difficult, may arrive at short-termsettlements to buy time such as ceasefires(Nicolaides, 1996: 52; Rothchild, 2002: 54;Heldt, 8). These are more likely to be effectiveto the extent a strong mediator or teamis skillful in instilling the parties with anurgent sense of the costs that can come fromfurther bloodshed (Rothchild, 2002: 55). Theyalso work better if accompanied by potentialrewards that buy off the parties and help themfulfill an agreement, including the offer ofdevelopment aid (Cortright, 1998, Rothchild,2002), and/or punishments that pressure themto agree. Where there is asymmetry in powerbetween the parties, measures to strengthenthe power of the weaker party may budge thestronger.

Where the parties remain obdurate, coer-cive diplomacy such as sanctions or threatof force may be needed to reverse undesiredactions or compel desired actions. Threats ofthe use of force were used when, for example,Presidents Bush and Clinton issued severalwarnings to President Milosevic not to supportany armed activity in Kosovo as he had inBosnia. Such threats are more likely to beeffective if issued before possible escalationsof hostile actions occurs, or if they followimmediately upon initial manifestations ofviolence (Nicolaides, 445), not ex postfacto. Threatening to expel a state from aninternational organization is less effectiveonce significant investment in a violent coursehas occurred. The more that the conflictingparties inflict physical harm on each other,they cannot just back down the ladder theyclimbed up, for mutual hurt and increasingfear remain (Mitchell, 2005; cf. Rothchild,2002: 51). By the same token, indictment bya war crimes tribunal is not likely to preventthe perpetrator continuing to fight, and can becounter-productive, once they are named andbeing hunted down, as they have no incentiveto refrain from fighting, unless some provisionallows amnesty. If sanctions are actually used,they must be comprehensive to be effective(Jentleson, 2000: 337). But such coercive

diplomacy is less applicable when the threatis a breakdown of a state since the source ofthe problem is hard to target (Nicolaides, 42).Similarly, non-targeted sanctions have beenwidely criticized as having considerable neg-ative side-effects for the general populationwhile benefitting well-positioned elites.

One of the few joined debates in thisscattered literature pertains to this stage: whenare conflicts ripe for prevention? Some ana-lysts believe it more propitious to act beforethe outbreak of any significant violence.Violence crosses a Rubicon from which itis very difficult to return (Jentleson, 2000),creating huge challenges for intervenors (cf.Edmead, 1971 cited in Berkovitch, 1996:251). Others believe that some initial fightingthat gets nowhere, a soft stalemate, is neededbefore parties will no longer be tempted totry violence to see if it gets them gains(Berkovitch, 1996: 251). Thwarted violenceor blocked confrontation are thus needed tosoften parties up to compromise.74

Third-party willingness to use force canalso influence the calculations of actorsregarding their use of force. Much discourse inconflict prevention assumes military force tobe antithetical to peace. Some NGOs that firststepped up to undertake conflict resolutionresponsibilities in threatened countries tendto oppose any form of force ideologically,or to downplay the role of any coercion infavor of non-coercive methods and policiessuch as diplomacy and, lately, developmentassistance. But some analysts suggest thatsticks as well as carrots need to be exertedmore or less simultaneously with flexibilityshown regarding what quotients of eachare applied in specific situations (Jentleson,2000; Byman, 2002: 219). while coercionrarely is sufficient for prevention, it often isnecessary (Jentleson, 2000: 5). Deterrencethrough the threat of using force may oftenbe a pre-requisite for effective negotiationsand, by implication, structural initiatives.Threats of force can encourage allies withina country to spring up. Still, threat of forcemust be made clear and credible by clearlyconveying a concrete demand and the cer-tainty that non-compliance will be punished


(Jakobsen, 1996: 3), such as through pos-sessing capabilities and having domestic andinternational backing that can be sustained.They also need to be targeted precisely atspecific actors who might otherwise escalatetheir actions, be potentially more costly tothe parties than their persevering, identify theproscribed behaviors, and be accompaniedby realistic alternative solutions (Nicolaides,424).75 The chances increase if the balanceof power favors the threat sponsor and thevalue to the targeted actor of ignoring thethreat is greater than the costs of compliance(Jakobsen, 1996: 35).76

Alternatively, if the threat of force is notbacked up with credible force when there isnon-compliance, they run the risk of encour-aging aggression by calling the bluff of theinternational actors (Nicolaides, 45).77 A lackof follow-through or half-hearted measurescan embolden their target (Nicolaides, 1996:423) if that party comes to believe that thethreat is empty. Empty threats toward BosnianSerbs had adverse effects when the latter didnot follow through in protecting safe areassuch as in Sbrenica (Jakobsen, 1996: 24).78

Actual use of force may be needed to limitemerging violence such as being visited upona threatened minority group (Nicolaides, 42).Several argue that timely introduction of arelatively small force in Rwanda in May of1994 would have stopped Hutu extremistsfrom continuing to carry out their plans tokill thousands of Tutsi and Hutu moderates(Feil, 1998; Feil (1998) cited in Jentleson,2000: 16; cf. Melander, 10f.). But this has beenquestioned (Kuperman, 2000). The tacticalquestion is what amount is sufficient torestrain or reverse the undesired behavior.79

If violence does cease, security guaranteesare in place and diplomatic processes arein play, neither freezing of the violence nordiplomatic agreement is sufficient by itself tomove the actors to tackle the abiding politicaland socio-economic problems that occasion aconflict. For these, assistance is also neededfor programs in institution building anddevelopment, now that they can operate in anenvironment that is basically stable and notconstantly threatened by violence.

All in all, this quick review supports thenotion that differing kinds of interventionsare needed at particular settings and stages ofconflict, and in certain combinations of hard,soft, and other kinds of measures. However,they complicate the simple sequencing that isoften presumed: that the greater the hostilitiesin a conflict, the more that coercive measuresare needed.

If one looks at the whole early period,the research does support a general picturein which increasingly coercive measures areneeded to the degree a conflict escalates.However, the emerging literature qualifiesthat simple formula and adds altogether newelements to the equation. Before societalstrains become salient, a priori regimes whosespecific implications are unforeseeable buthold out attractive incentives can socializeleaders into international expectations. Ifenforced and resourced, these standards canfoster structural and institutional changes thatmake more likely the peaceful managementof transitional stresses from economic reformand democratization. But such liberalizationneeds to be accompanied by compensatorymeasures. Democratization needs incrementalsteps for effecting peaceful transition suchas power-sharing arrangements, accompaniedby conditional material aid for implementingchanges. As political and policy disputesover such changes inevitably arise, sym-pathetic international envoys or missionswith significant authority can usefully enterthe picture, much earlier than usual, tomidwife their resolution playing goodcop by persuading incumbent leaders toinaugurate changes before they lose control.During such potentially unstable periods contrary to the assumed sequence wherebymilitary power is a last resort following theexhaustion of diplomatic efforts securityassurance may be essential for undergirdingthe ensuing domestic political negotiations.Where regimes choose to resist openingsand move to repress them violently, firmcoercive sanctions and credible threat ofmilitary force can deter them, and actualuse of effective deadly force can halt theirextremes. In short, the conventional scenario


(derived perhaps from a Cold War crisisparadigm in which sovereignty is supremeand engagement comes late in the formof diplomacy or military action) does notsufficiently factor in structural measures,hands-on institutional support and positiveincentives, and deterrent military measures.Regrettably, however, as useful as all theseresearch findings may be as guidelinesto action, they are not followed becausedecisionmakers do not have such lessons attheir fingertips.80

NEXT STEPS: TAPPING THEPOTENTIAL

To answer the puzzle this chapter first posed,conflict prevention is still a relatively marginalinternational concern for several reasons: aplurality of possible instruments and agents;its de facto operation under other names, lackof conceptual closure about stages and typesof interventions; a lack of confidence due inpart to dim awareness of the actual extent ofrecent capacity building and effective actionson the ground; dispersed activism globallyand in a given country by diverse professionsand overstretched governmental and non-governmental international organizations; andscattered research agendas and findings,yielding little usable guidance for would-be preventors. Yet, pro-active responses tohead off potential conflicts are happening, andprima facie evidence suggests that combinedwith certain conducive factors, they can beeffective. To tap the unfulfilled potential ofconflict prevention, this state of the art couldbe advanced through three steps:

1. Consolidate what is known. Lack of suf-ficient knowledge does not excuse why morefrequent and effective responses to incipientconflicts are not undertaken. Policymakerstend to ignore the useful knowledge thatalready exists. Professionals need to gainaccess to top officials to present promisingoptions and evidence of their results. Themain problem is not epistemological butorganizational. We need not wait until social

scientists have found the universally highestcorrelations among the limited set of variablesalready most plausibly known as relevantbefore we continue as in the previous sectionto gather, synthesize, and disseminate theexisting findings among policymakers andfield practitioners. Enough is known toproduce heuristic guidance, for even the mostverified conclusions are cannot be imple-mented mechanically in any particular conflictsetting, but used as action-hypotheses to becombined with astute political judgments.A structured framework could pull togetherthe preventive instruments available withguidelines about which are likely to be mostfeasible and productive in what conditions.

2. Focus the knowledge on emerg-ing conicts. Conflicts do not emerge inWashington, New York or Brussels, but inparticular developing countries at specifictimes. To have practical value, any gatheredpolicy wisdom needs to be applied on theground in real time. Many currently early-warning-identified poor societies and weakstates (e.g., Papua, Kyrygystan, Guinea)would benefit from pro-active and concertedefforts that apply peaceful policies to avoidescalation to crises and violent conflicts. Thecountry level is where the diverse agendas andtools are most clearly juxtaposed and con-cretely reconciled. This requires organizingconsultations through which key actors (USG,UN, EU, regionals, governments, NGOs) canjointly assess the country situations and deviseand implement diagnosis-driven targetedstrategies, both at the field and desk officerlevel. Such processes would (a) apply conflict-sensitive indicators to identify systematicallythe most important short- and long-term risksin a country that are affecting the prospects forescalating conflict as well as its capacities forpeaceful management of conflict; (b) identifywhat actions each actor can contribute withinthe strategy; and (c) consult the lessonslearned from actual experience with variouscombinations of instruments.81 To harnesstheir global influence, leading actors suchas the USA and other governments, theEU, and the World Bank, in cooperation


with agencies in the UN system, could con-vene these multi-lateral country consultationsto develop jointly formulated, analyticallybased, multi-faceted strategies. The processescould be linked to existing country-specificdevelopment planning procedures such asthe PRSP and CAS, but should also involvediplomatic and military agencies as well asinside stakeholders.

3. Conduct more basic prevention research.Though would-be preventors need not beinhibited by overly fastidious methodologicalstandards, existing findings must be treatedas preliminary hypotheses that research needsto test further.82 More rigorous and com-prehensive policy research is still needed toestablish what types of preventive actionsat both a priori and ad hoc levels, in whatcombinations, are likely to have what positiveor negative effects in different stages ofconflicts and contexts.83 Promising structuraland direct instruments have received little ifany research, such as positive incentives togovernments to encourage compliance withaccepted international norms, special envoyswith preventive mandates such as the HCNM,institutional support for strengthening equi-table state service-provision, and preventivedeployment.84

NOTES

1 Describing civil wars as development in reverse,Collier lists the costs for the countries in conictas military and civilian deaths, disease (HIV/AIDS,malaria), physical destruction, population displace-ment, high military expenditures, capital outows,policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma,and landmines. The costs to other nations duringand after conicts include refugees, humanitarian aid,reconstruction aid, disease, increased military expen-ditures and tasks such as peacekeeping, reducedeconomic growth, illicit drugs, and internationalterrorism (Collier, 2003). Africas two dozen internalwars in 23 countries from 19902005 are calculatedto have cost $18 billion a year, which could havegone to HIV/AIDS and other disease protection,education, health, and water infrastructure. AfricaWars Costs Billions, a report by Oxfam can befound at www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/10/11/africa.billions.ap/index.html.

2 Estimates have been made of the costs ofinterventions in recent wars compared with the costsif preventive action had been taken, and of the actualcosts of preventive action taken in vulnerable societiesthat did not break out into wars compared withthe estimated costs had war occurred. All showedhuge possible savings. Prevention was signicantlycheaper in all cases, with the ratios of preventionto war ranging from 11.3 to 1479, an average of159 (Brown and Rosecrance, 1999). In an estimateof Macedonia, the actual cost of UNPREDEP was$255 million, or 0.02% of the estimated cost of$15 billion for a two-year conict (Thayer: 62).Chalmers nds all 12 of the retrospective andprospective conict prevention packages that wereestimated for the Balkans, Afghanistan past andfuture, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uzbekistan to be cost-effective (Chalmers, 2005: 6f.).

3 High fatalities encourage further hostility andcontentious behavior, and these diminish the likeli-hood of mediation effectiveness (just as they diminishthe chances of an agreement in negotiations) (seePruitt, 1981). Dispute complexity, which in any eventis associated with lengthy, protracted conicts andhigher fatalities, also appears to be incompatiblewith successful mediation. dispute duration alsohas a strong inverse relationship with successfulmediation, but only when it combines with fatalitiesand complexity (Bercovitch, 1993: 688689). Theparties discover more and more grievances againsteach other, and more parties may join the fray.

4 The report claims that whatever conict preven-tion policies were being attempted in this period werea dismal failure[because] there were twice as manyconict onsets in the 1990s as in the 1980s the rateof new conict onsets between 2000 and 2005 hasremained higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s(Human Security Center, 2006: 4). Yet, although eachwar since the end of the ColdWar could be consideredfailed prevention, to reach such a conclusion requiresfactoring in all the situations with a high risk of conictthat did not break out due to various preventiveefforts. This is an especially turbulent period. On thesurprisingly low number of ethnic conicts occurringas the Soviet Union broke apart, see Fearon andLaitin, 1996 who attribute the result to local self-regulating mechanisms (cf. Wallensteen and Moller,2003: 15f, 19.).

5 One study counts 47 disputes since the end ofthe ColdWar that had a history or likelihood of conictbut where third parties took action and no armedconicts ensued in the following year (Wallensteenand Moller, 2003: 27).

6 In contrast, governments and institutes devoteimmense resources to learning how to avoid relapseinto war in post-conict situations (e.g., Stedman,1995; Dobbins, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Yet allthat work could be characterized as gloriedambulance-chasing, for it comes into play only after


wars have wreaked great damage. The imbalancedattention to post-conict situations has been fed bythe widely cited belief that the existence of futureconicts is one of the strongest predictors of futurewars. Yet the empirical basis of that claim hasshifted downward from 40 to 50 percent to around23 percent (Suhrke and Samset, 1996). Even acceptingthe upper estimate, over 50 percent of wars are notpreceded by earlier ones. Were prevention done moreoften, the market for the chapters in this volume onpost-conict peacekeeping, reconciliation, intractableconict

-- conflict prevention -- theory in pursuit of policy and practice 2 - mat 3

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