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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
REVIEW PETITION (L) NO. 15 OF 2019
IN
COMMERCIAL SUIT NO. 316 OF 2018
ALONG WITH
NOTICE OF MOTION COMMERCIAL DIVISION (L) NO.2118 OF 2018
Leitz Tooling Systems India Private )Limited, Carrying on business as )Company, having its registered office at )No.486/C, IV Phase, 14th Cross, Peenya )Indul Area, Bangalore – 560 058. )And also at Plot No.R-324, 1st Floor, )T.T.C. Industrial Area, Behind IPCL, )MIDC, Rabale, Thane-Belapur Road, )Navi Mumbai – 400 701. ) Petitioner / Org.Def.
IN THE MATTER OF :
Bharat Bhogilal Patel )
Hindu, Indian Inhabitant of Bombay, )aged about 51 years, residing at 1/43, Juhu )Gold Mist, Gulmohar Road, JVPD Scheme, )Vileparle (W), Mumbai – 400 049 )And carrying on business from B/118, Gambhir )Industrial Estate, Off Aarey Road, Behind )Pravasi Industrial Estate, Goregaon (East), )Mumbai – 400 063. ) Plaintiff
Versus
Leitz Tooling Systems India Private )Limited, Carrying on business as )Company, having its registered office at )
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No.486/C, IV Phase, 14th Cross, Peenya )Indul Area, Bangalore – 560 058. )And also at Plot No.R-324, 1st Floor, )T.T.C. Industrial Area, Behind IPCL, )MIDC, Rabale, Thane-Belapur Road, )Navi Mumbai – 400 701. ) Defendant
Mr. Rashmin Khandekar alongwith Mr. Shashwat Rai instructed by KeystonePartners for the Petitioner/Original Defendant.Mr. Nausher Kohli instructed by Mr. K.R. Parekh for the Plaintiff.
CORAM : S.J. KATHAWALLA, J.
DATED : 1ST JUNE,2019
(IN CHAMBERS)
JUDGEMENT:
1. The present Review Petition has been filed by the Petitioner seeking a
review of the Judgment dated 27th February, 2019 passed by this Court in Axis Bank
Limited vs. Mira Gehani & Ors.1
2. Subsequent to the Judgment being delivered, the Petitioner filed a Praecipe
dated 7th March, 2019, which read as under :
"1. By an order dated 20th August, 2018, this Hon'ble Court
framed the following question of law :
"Whether in view of the amendment to the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 by a Commercial Court, Commercial
Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Court's
Act, 2015 (4 of 2016), the Defendant can be allowed to file the
Written Statement after 120 days from the date of service of
1 2019 SCC Online Bom. 358
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Writ of Summons in a Commercial Suit".
2. Pursuant to the above mentioned Order, this Hon'ble Court
was pleased to decide the above issue by an Order dated 27th
February, 2019.
3. In this regard, the Defendant seeks to approach this
Hon'ble Court for speaking to the minutes to the said Order
dated 27th February, 2019 to the extent that contention of the
Defendant with respect to the provisions of the CPC, 1908 as
amended by the Commercial Courts Act not being applicable
to a commercial dispute below a stipulated specified value is
left open."
3. On the Praecipe, the following order came to be passed by this Court on 8th
March, 2019 :
“XXX
2. Though the contention of the Defendant finds place in
Clause 5.25 to 5.32 of the Written submissions, no arguments
were advanced qua the same. The learned Advocate
appearing for the Defendant states that he had made oral
submissions towards the end. My notings speak otherwise. In
view thereof, the question of speaking to the Minutes as
sought does not arise. However, the Defendant may move an
Application seeking Review."
4. The present Review Petition has therefore been filed pursuant to the liberty
granted by this Court in the above order. According to the Petitioner, in the Judgment,
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this Court did not decide a limited contention of the Petitioner viz. that the
amendments introduced to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) by the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”) are only applicable to a
Commercial Dispute of a Specified Value and not commercial disputes not of a
Specified Value. Section 2 (i) of the Commercial Courts Act prescribes that the
Specified Value in respect of a commercial dispute shall not be less than Rupees Three
Lacs.
5. In the present Suit, the Plaintiff has determined the Specified Value of its
suit at Rupees Twenty Thousand i.e. below the Specified Value as prescribed under
the Commercial Courts Act.
6. In view of the above, the question of law being decided by this Order is
whether the amendments introduced to the CPC by the Commercial Courts Act apply
to Commercial Disputes not of a Specified Value but nonetheless heard by a
Commercial Division in view of the proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts
Act ?
7. It is clarified that the present Order is restricted to only answering the
question of law recorded in paragraph 6 above and disposal of Notice of Motion (L)
No.2118 of 2018. Necessary orders will therefore have to be passed on the other
applications seeking condonation of delay at the time of hearing of each of such
application on its own merits.
8. For adjudication of the question of law as above, it would be necessary to
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briefly set-out the legislative background leading to the enactment of the Commercial
Courts Act as also certain relevant provisions thereof :
8.1. The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate
Division of High Courts Ordinance, 2015 was promulgated on 23rd October, 2015.
Subsequently, the Commercial Courts Act was enacted on 31st December, 2015 and is
deemed to have come into force from 23rd October, 2015.
8.2. The Commercial Courts Act came to be enacted pursuant to the
recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its 188 th Report and 253rd
Report.
8.3. The primary aim and object of the Commercial Courts Act, as can be
discerned from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, was to provide speedy disposal
of commercial disputes in order to reduce the pendency of cases and improve our
country’s image from the perspective of ease of doing business in India.
8.4. Under Section 4 of the Commercial Courts Act, Commercial Divisions were
constituted in this Court for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction and powers
conferred under the Commercial Courts Act. Section 4 of the Commercial Courts Act
reads as under :
“ 4. Constitution of Commercial Division of High
Court.
(1) In all High Courts, having ordinary original civil
jurisdiction, the Chief Justice of the High Court may, by
order, constitute Commercial Division having one or more
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Benches consisting of a single Judge for the purpose of
exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it under
this Act.
(2) The Chief Justice of the High Court shall nominate such
Judges of the High Court who have experience in dealing with
commercial disputes to be Judges of the Commercial
Division.”
8.5. The Commercial Courts Act establishes Commercial Courts at the District
level and Commercial Divisions in various High Courts (including those having
ordinary original civil jurisdiction) across India. The Specified Value, as defined by the
Commercial Courts Act, stood earlier at Rupees One Crore. However, the
Commercial Courts Act came to be amended in 2018 by the Commercial Courts,
Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts
(Amendment) Act, 2018. Amongst other amendments, the Specified Value stood
reduced to Rupees Three Lakhs as against the earlier Rupees One Crore.
8.6. Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, which has a bearing on the issues
at hand, provides for the jurisdiction of Commercial Divisions and is reproduced
hereunder :
“ 7. Jurisdiction of Commercial Divisions of High
Courts.
All suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a
Specified Value filed in a High Court having ordinary original
civil jurisdiction shall be heard and disposed of by the
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Commercial Division of that High Court:
Provided that all suits and applications relating to
commercial disputes, stipulated by an Act to lie in a
court not inferior to a District Court, and filed or
pending on the original side of the High Court, shall be
heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of
the High Court:
Provided further that all suits and applications transferred to
the High Court by virtue of sub-section (4) of section 22 of
the Designs Act, 2000 or section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970
shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of
the High Court in all the areas over which the High Court
exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
(emphasis supplied)"
8.7. As can be seen from the above Section, whilst Section 7 mandates that all
suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a Specified Value filed in a
High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction shall be heard and disposed of by
the Commercial Division of that High Court, its first proviso carves out an exception.
The first proviso to Section 7 provides that all suits and applications relating to
Commercial Disputes, stipulated by an Act to lie in a court not inferior to a District
Court, and filed or pending on the original side of a High Court, shall be heard and
disposed of by the Commercial Division of that High Court. The suits and
applications covered under the first proviso are those which cannot be filed in a court
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below the District Court or before a High Court. These are matters we refer to as
Intellectual Property Rights matters. These includes matters pertaining to trademarks
and copyright etc. The provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Copyright Act,
1957 contain provisions mandating that suits under these Acts should not be filed and
cannot be entertained by courts below a District Court. The relevant provisions in this
regard are Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62 of the Copyright
Act, 1957. These provisions have been interpreted by this Court to entitle such suits to
be filed on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court irrespective of their pecuniary
jurisdiction.
8.8. Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act introduced certain amendments to
the CPC. Section 16 reads as under :
" 16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
in its application to commercial disputes.
(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall,
in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial
dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as
specified in the Schedule.
(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall
follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as
amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a
commercial dispute of a Specified Value.
(3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High
Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, by the State Government is in conflict with the
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provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended
by this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by this Act shall prevail. "
8.9. Amongst other amendments introduced to the CPC by the Commercial
Courts Act, an amendment was introduced mandating that a Written Statement in a
Commercial Courts Act cannot be filed after 120 days from the service of writ of
summons. The Apex Court, in its decision in M/s SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. vs.
K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.2 and this Court, in its decision in Axis
Bank Limited vs. Mira Gehani & Ors.3 have held that in Commercial Suits, a written
statement by the Defendant cannot be taken on record after the expiry of 120 days
from the date of service of the Writ of Summons.
9. The present Order therefore decides whether or not this mandatory period
of 120 days will apply to Commercial Suits/Commercial Disputes not of a Specified
Value.
10. Appearing for the Petitioner, Advocate Mr. Rashmin Khandekar submitted
that Section 16 (1) of the Commercial Courts Act makes it clear that the provisions of
the CPC stood amended only in respect of Commercial Disputes of a Specified Value.
He submitted that this Court ought to literally interpret Section 16 for its language is
plain and unambiguous. Therefore, as the Plaintiff in the present suit has computed
the Specified Value at Rs.20,000/-, the amended provisions of the CPC including the
2 2019 SCC Online SC 226 3 2019 SCC Online Bom 358
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mandatory proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 mandating that a Written Statement shall be
filed within 120 days will not apply to this Suit. He further submitted that the whole
scheme of the Commercial Courts Act makes it clear that there is a link between
Commercial Disputes and Specified Value under the Act. Mr. Khandekar placed
reliance on the decisions in Indian Overseas Bank vs. Jason Deckor P. Ltd.4;
Nagarjuna Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited vs. Tecnimont SpA & Ors.5; Invoke
Medical System Pvt. Ltd. vs. Kunal Structure (India) Pvt. Ltd.6; Samsung Leasing
Ltd. & Ors. vs. Samsung Electronic Co. Ltd. & Anr.7 and OCI Corporation vs. Kandla
Export Corporation & Ors8. It was further submitted that while interpreting any
provision of a statute, the plain meaning has to be given effect to. If the language used
in a section gives a simple meaning and message, it should be interpreted in such a
way. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation
must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. Reliance was also placed by
him on the decisions in Prakash Nath Khanna & Anr. vs. Commissioner of Income
Tax & Anr.9; Union of India vs. National Federation of Blind10; Tata Power Company
Ltd. & Ors. vs. Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors.11; and Ajay
Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi12. Mr. Khandekar
4 MANU/GJ/1383/2018 5 MANU/HY/0448/2018 6 MANU/GJ/0227/20197 2018 (167) DRJ 654 8 2016 SCC Online Guj 59819 (2004) 9 SCC 686 10 (2013) 10 SCC 77211 MANU/SC/0932/200912 ILR (1972) 2 Del 629
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therefore concluded that the question of law be answered to exclude the applicability
of the CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act in respect of Commercial
Disputes not of a Specified Value and that the un-amended CPC be applicable to
matters which pertain to Commercial Disputes but not of a Specified Value.
11. As opposed to the aforesaid arguments of Mr. Khandekar, I have heard
Advocate Mr. Nausher Kohli appearing for the Plaintiff. According to Mr. Kohli, the
Petitioner’s argument that the amendments to the CPC as introduced by the
Commercial Courts Act apply only to ‘commercial disputes’ of a ‘Specified Value’
and not merely ‘commercial disputes’ is converse to the mandate, purpose and
legislative intent behind the Commercial Courts Act. In support of his argument, Mr.
Kohli relied upon the Preamble, Section 4, Section 7, the marginal note/heading to
Section 16 and the Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act.
12. Relying on the Preamble, Mr. Kohli submitted that the Commercial Courts
Act does not restrict itself only to ‘commercial dispute of a Specified Value’. It is also
concerned with “matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. Relying on
Section 4, he submitted that as per the mandate of Section 4 of the Commercial
Courts Act, this Commercial Division has been constituted for exercising the
jurisdiction and powers conferred on it under the Commercial Courts Act. Such
jurisdiction and power would necessarily include the power to enforce, apply and
implement the Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act which introduces
amendments to the CPC. Section 4 does not carve out a distinction between
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‘commercial disputes’ and a ‘commercial dispute of a Specified Value’. According to
him, this evidences that the legislature did not intend to create any distinction so far as
the applicability of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act is concerned. He
submitted that the Commercial Courts Act, the Law Commission Reports and the
discussions on the bill by members of the Parliament do not refer to a distinct
application of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act. According to him, it
would be akin to absurdity to apply the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act in a
chaotic and irregular manner as both the types of matters require expeditious
resolution in order to attain the objective for which the Commercial Courts Act was
promulgated.
13. Placing reliance on the marginal note/heading of Section 16 and the
Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act, Mr. Kohli submitted that the Commercial
Courts Act refers to ‘commercial disputes’ and not ‘commercial disputes of a
Specified Value’ in the marginal note/heading of Section 16 and in the Schedule; the
amendments introduced to Sections 35, Order VI, Rules 3 and 15 and Order XIII-A of
the CPC. Whilst arguing, in fairness, he conceded that a marginal note/heading
cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing a section, however, he submitted
that a marginal note/heading can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of a
section or to show what the section is dealing with. In this respect, he placed reliance
on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Varghese vs.
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Income Tax Officer & Anr.13 According to him, had the legislature intended to create
any distinction, there was no reason for the legislature to omit reference to
‘commercial dispute of a Specified Value’ in the Schedule and marginal note/title to
Section 16. Instead, the Schedule and marginal note/title to Section 16 clarifies that it
applies to ‘commercial disputes’ whether of a ‘Specified Value’ or not. Hence, there is
admittedly a conflict between Section 16 on the one hand and (i) the Schedule to the
Commercial Courts Court and (ii) the marginal note/title to Section 16 on the other
hand. In view of the apparent anomalies/inconsistencies/conflicts within the
Commercial Courts Act itself, Mr. Kohli submitted that this Court ought to interpret
Section 16 in a purposive manner and not in a restricted manner as Mr. Khandekar
would have it. According to him, interpreting Section 16 literally would lead to
erroneous and unintended consequences. Hence, this Court ought to interpret the
words ‘commercial disputes of a Specified Value’ in Section 16 to mean and include
‘commercial disputes’ covered under the first proviso to Section 7 as well. In this
context, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of
India vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama14; Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs
Chaudhari Devilal University, Sirsa15; Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta
vs National Taj Traders16; Shailesh Dhairyawan vs Mohan Balkrishna Lulla17 and
13 (1981) 4 SCC 17314 1990 (1) SCC 27715 2008 (9) SCC 28416 1980 (1) SCC 37017 2016 (3) SCC 619
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Indian Performing Rights Society vs Sanjay Dalia18.
14. Mr. Kohli’s second leg of argument was that if Mr. Khandekar’s arguments
are accepted, there would be a resultant absurdity in the application of the
Commercial Courts Act. Illustratively, the office of this Court would hence forth be
required to assess not only whether or not a suit filed in this Court is a ‘Commercial
Suit’ but would also have to enquire into the valuation of every Intellectual Property
Rights matter to govern whether or not it falls within the ‘Specified Value’ or not.
Upon such assessment, the office of this Court would next have to assess if the said
Plaint so filed is in compliance with the Commercial Courts Act (if it is of a ‘Specified
Value’) or conversely, if the said plaint is in compliance with the CPC as un-amended
by the CPC (if it is not of a ‘Specified Value’). In the latter case, the office of this
Court will direct that a Commercial Suit not of a ‘Specified Value’ will not be
accompanied by a Statement of Truth etc. but would yet be titled as a ‘Commercial
Suit’ in its cause-title. This, according to him, is an extreme absurdity resulting from
Mr. Khanderkar’s interpretation of Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act. Further,
he submitted that whilst Intellectual Property Rights matters above the ‘Specified
Value’ will be heard by this Commercial Division and these matters would be
governed by the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act in toto, an Intellectual
Property Rights matter not of a Specified Value will not be governed by all the
18 2015 (10) SCC 161
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provisions of the Commercial Courts Act even though the said matter is being :
i. Adjudicated by the same forum (Commercial Division);
ii. Adjudicated under the Commercial Courts Act;
iii. Is a Commercial Suit; and
iv. Is a Commercial Suit in relation to an Intellectual Property Rights matter.
This, according to him, could never have been the intent of the legislature. The
Commercial Court Act, having created a separate class of proceedings labelled as
‘Commercial Suits’, its procedure must apply in the trial of all such suits whether of a
Specified Value or not. The objective of the Commercial Courts Act would be
defeated if one category of cases i.e. those filed under the first proviso to Section 7 of
the Commercial Courts Act, are merely registered as ‘commercial suits’ in their
cause-title but are not governed by major provisions of the Commercial Courts Act.
This, according to Mr. Kohli would create a backlog in the Commercial Division, the
very mischief for which the Commercial Courts Act was promulgated, and eventually
dampen and cripple the very objective of the Commercial Courts Act.
15. Mr. Kohli further submitted that if Mr. Khandekar’s arguments are
accepted, an order/decree passed in matters such as the present suit would continue to
be heard by the Commercial Appellate Division despite not being governed by the
procedure under the Commercial Courts Act. This would render Section 13 otiose as
well. The Commercial Courts Act is designed to expedite such suits and in the
absence of such procedure, matters filed in the Commercial Division emanating from
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the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act would be effectively
governed by the rules and procedures applicable to non-commercial matters, defeating
the very purpose for which the Commercial Division was created. In other words, if
the submissions of the Petitioner are anything to go by, the Commercial Division
would hear such matters without the aid of the provisions of the Commercial Courts
Act, yet requiring that the Commercial Division dispose of matters at an expedited
pace, resulting in an acute absurdity.
16. Mr. Kohli also submitted that if Mr. Khandekar’s arguments are given any
credence, it would lead to the creation of a further sub-class within a class as the sub-
class of matters under the first proviso to Section 7 would be separated from the class
of other matters under the Commercial Courts Act without any intelligible differentia.
This would be unconstitutional in the very least as the creation of a sub-class within a
class would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. In this context, reliance was placed
by him on the Apex Court’s decision in Sansar Chand Atri vs. State of Punjab 19.
17. Mr. Kohli concluded that the phrase ‘commercial disputes of a Specified
Value’ used in Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act ought to be interpreted to
also include ‘commercial disputes’ governed under the first proviso to Section 7 of the
Commercial Courts Act. This, according to him, would be a proper, rational,
consistent and purposive interpretation of the Commercial Courts Act.
18. I have considered the aforesaid arguments canvassed by Mr. Khandekar and
19 (2002) 4 SCC 154
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Mr. Kohli. I have also considered the various decisions of the Apex Court and various
High Courts as cited by them. However, prior to dealing with their respective
arguments, it would be necessary even at the cost of repetition to once again set-out
the subject provision viz. Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act :
“ 16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 in its application to commercial disputes.
(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall,
in their application to any suit in respect of a commercial
dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as
specified in the Schedule.
(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall
follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as
amended by this Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a
commercial dispute of a Specified Value.
(3) Where any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High
Court or any amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, by the State Government is in conflict with the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended
by this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by this Act shall prevail."
19. A bare reading of Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act begs the
interpretation that the provisions of the CPC shall, in their application to any suit in
respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner
as specified in the Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act and that this Commercial
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Division, shall follow the provisions of the CPC as amended by the Commercial
Courts Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified
Value.
20. Whilst I agree with Mr. Kohli in his argument that as per the mandate of
Section 4 of the Commercial Courts Act, this Commercial Division has been
constituted for exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it under the
Commercial Courts Act, in my view, such jurisdiction ought to be exercised within the
four corners of the Commercial Courts Act. An express provision such as Section 16
cannot be ignored in such manner. It was also Mr. Kohli’s argument that Section 4
does not carve out a distinction between a ‘commercial dispute’ and a ‘commercial
dispute of a Specified Value’. While this may be so, Section 16 clearly does so.
21. In so far as Mr. Kohli’s reliance on the marginal note/heading to Section 16
is concerned, I believe the extent of reliance this Court can place on a marginal
note/heading of a provision is no longer res integra. In this context, it would be
appropriate to reproduce the following findings of the Apex Court in its decision
rendered in Karnataka Rare Earth vs. Deptt. of Mines & Geology20 :
"14. In support of the submission that the demand for the
price of mineral raised and exported is in the nature of
penalty, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied on
the marginal note of Section 21. According to Justice Singh,
G.P.: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (8th Edn., 2001,
at p. 147), though the opinion is not uniform but the weight of
20 (2004) 2 SCC 783
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authority is in favour of the view that the marginal note
appended to a section cannot be used for construing the
section. There is no justification for restricting the section by
the marginal note nor does the marginal note control the
meaning of the body of the section if the language employed
therein is clear and spells out its own meaning. In Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Schildkamp[(1969) 3 All ER 1640 :
(1970) 2 WLR 279 (HL)] Lord Reid opined that a sidenote is
a poor guide to the scope of a section for it can do no more
than indicate the main subject with which the section deals
and Lord Upjohn opined that a sidenote being a brief précis of
the section forms a most unsure guide to the construction of
the enacting section and very rarely it might throw some light
on the intentions of Parliament just as a punctuation mark."
22. The following judgments and observations contained therein, relied upon by
Mr. Khandekar with respect to the reliance upon a marginal note in interpreting a
section are also relevant:
a. Prakash Nath Khanna & Anr. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax
& Anr. 21
“16. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus omissus and the
other in regard to reading the statute as a whole — appear to be well settled. Under
the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of
clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself
but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that
21 (2004) 9 SCC 686
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purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every
clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses
thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent
enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a
particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have
been intended by the legislature. “An intention to produce an unreasonable result”,
said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou [(1966) 1 QB 878 : (1965) 3 All ER
539 : (1965) 3 WLR 1011 (CA)] (All ER p. 544 I), “is not to be imputed to a statute if
there is some other construction available”. Where to apply words literally would
“defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable
result”, we must “do some violence to the words” and so achieve that obvious
intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC [1963 AC
557 : (1963) 1 All ER 655 : (1963) 2 WLR 559 (HL)] where at AC p. 577 he also
observed: (All ER p. 664 I) “This is not a new problem, though our standard of
drafting is such that it rarely emerges.”]
17. The heading of the section or the marginal note may be relied upon to clear
any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the
legislative intent. In CIT v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co. [AIR 1950 SC 134] after
referring to the view expressed by Lord Macnaghten in Balraj Kunwar v. Jagatpal
Singh [ILR (1904) 26 All 393 : 31 IA 132 : 1 All LJ 384 (PC)] it was held that marginal
notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the
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purpose of construing the statute. Similar view was expressed in Board of Muslim
Wakfs, Rajasthan v. Radha Kishan [(1979) 2 SCC 468] and Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai
[(1991) 3 SCC 410 : AIR 1991 SC 1581]. Marginal note certainly cannot control the
meaning of the body of the section if the language employed there is clear. (See
Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani [(1978) 2 SCC 424 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 236 : AIR 1978 SC
1025] .) In the present case as noted above, the provisions of Section 276-CC are in
clear terms. There is no scope for trying to clear any doubt or ambiguity as urged by
learned counsel for the appellants. Interpretation sought to be put on Section 276-CC
to the effect that if a return is filed under sub-section (4) of Section 139 it means that
the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 139 would stand complied with cannot
be accepted for more reasons than one.” (Emphasis Supplied)
b. Union of India vs National Federation of Blind 22
“46. The heading of a section or marginal note may be relied upon to clear any doubt
or ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision and to discern the legislative intent.
However, when the section is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to traverse
beyond those words, hence, the headings or marginal notes cannot control the
meaning of the body of the section. Therefore, the contention of Respondent 1 herein
that the heading of Section 33 of the Act is “Reservation of posts” will not play a
crucial role, when the section is clear and unambiguous.” (Emphasis Supplied)
22 (2013) 10 SCC 772
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c. Tata Power Company Ltd. and Ors. vs Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory
Commission & Ors23
“116. Chapter headings and the marginal note are parts of the statute. They have
also been enacted by the Parliament. There cannot, thus, be any doubt that it can be
used in aid of the construction. It is, however, well settled that if the wordings of the
statutory provision are clear and unambiguous, construction of the statute with the aid
of `chapter heading' and `marginal note' may not arise. It may be that heading and
marginal note, however, are of a very limited use in interpretation because of its
necessarily brief and inaccurate nature. They are, however, not irrelevant. They
certainly cannot be taken into consideration if they differ from the material they
describe.
117. We may notice some authorities on the subject at the outset.
118. In Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, Fifth edition, Section 255, it is
stated:
where general words are preceded by a heading indicating a narrower scope it is
legitimate to treat the general words as cut down by the heading.
119. Section 256 of the said treatise deals with "sidenote, heading or title", wherein it is
stated:
23 MANU/SC/0932/2009
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Use in interpretation - Like anything else in what Parliament puts out as its Acts, a
sidenote or heading is part of the Act, despite dicta to the contrary. It may therefore be
used by the interpreter. `No judge can be expected to treat something which is before
his eyes as though it were not there. However, the sidenote or section heading is of
very limited use in interpretation because of its necessarily brief and therefore possibly
inaccurate nature.
120. It was commented:
If the sidenote contradicts the text this puts the interpreter on inquiry; but the answer
may be that the drafter chose an inadequate signpost, or neglected to alter it to match
an amendment made to the clause during the passage of the Bill. Such facts are
outside the knowledge of the interpreter, who must therefore adopt a rule not
depending on them.
. . .
Modern judges believe it proper to consider sidenotes or headings to sections, and
gather what guidance they can from them. Thus Vinelott J said that the sidenote to
the Income and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970 Section 488 (repealed) was a permissible
and useful guide that threw a light on the mischief at which the section was aimed.
Upjohn LJ gave a precisely accurate indication of the role of the sidenote when he
said:
While the marginal note to a section cannot control the language used in the section ,
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it is at least permissible to approach a consideration of its general purpose and the
mischief at which it is aimed with the note in mind.
The italicised words accurately show the relationship of this component to the
informed interpretation rule. Earlier inconsistent dicta, a selection of which are now
considered, must be treated as erroneous.
121. In Interpretation of Statutes, Fourth Edition, by Vepa P. Sarathi at page 347
it is stated:
The heading of a chapter may be referred to in order to determine the sense of any
doubtful expression in a section ranged under it. But it cannot control unambiguous
expressions.
It is true that a heading cannot control the interpretation of a clause if its meaning is
otherwise plain and unambiguous, but it can certainly be referred to as indicating the
general drift of the clause and affording a key to a better understanding of its meaning.
122. Similarly in Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh,
upon noticing the conflicting opinion, the learned Author states:
The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles prefixed to section or group of
sections can be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature.
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123. Chapter heading, therefore, is a permitted tool of interpretation. It is
considered to be a preamble of that section to which it pertains. It may be taken
recourse to where an ambiguity exists. However, where there does not exist any
ambiguity, it cannot be resorted to. Chapter heading and marginal note, however, can
be resorted to for the purpose of resolving the doubts.
124. It furthermore appears that there is a drift from the old value in recent
times.
125. We may notice that the English decisions whereupon reliance had been
placed by this Court in various judgments and in particular Chandler v. DPP (1962)
All ER 142 , str considered to be a no longer a good law in the country of origin, as
stated in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation Fifth Edition at page 748:
Superseded dicta Phillimore LJ referred to a `general rule of law' to the effect that
marginal notes must be disregarded `upon the principle that those notes are inserted
not by Parliament nor under the authority of Parliament, but by irresponsible persons'.
In fact, with occasional trifling exceptions, the marginal notes in an Act are not
inserted by parliamentary clerks - or even drafters - but are contained either in the Bill
as introduced or in new clauses added by amendment. Furthermore, the clerks are not
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`irresponsible persons', but are subject to the authority of Parliament. Avory J. said
that `marginal notes form no part of a statute'. He added : `They are not voted on or
passed by Parliament, but are inserted after the Bill has become law'. This is not the
case however. The entire Act is passed by Parliament and is entered, or deemed to be
entered, in the Parliament Roll with all non-amendable components included. These
components mostly remain unchanged throughout the passage of the Bill. They are
certainly not inserted after the Bill has become law. Willes J. after asserting that the
marginal notes and other `appendages' are not part of an Act, said of any Act, passed
after the practice of actually engrossing Acts on the Parliament Roll ceased in 1849:
`The Act, when passed, must be looked at just as if it were still entered upon a roll,
which it may be again if Parliament should be pleased so to order; in which case it
would be without these appendages....
126. It is, however, evident from the decision of this Court in Indian Aluminium
Company v. Kerala State Electricity Board MANU/SC/0310/1975 : [1976]1SCR70 ,
that the modern trend is to take into consideration the marginal note. It could be used,
as has been held, in R.S. Joshi, Sales Tax Officer, Gujarat and Ors. v. Ajit Mills
Limited and Anr. MANU/SC/0300/1977 : [1978]1SCR338 . Relevance of marginal
note was also taken note of in Ramesh Chand and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.
MANU/SC/0389/1979 : [1980]1SCR498 .
127. In Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action
Group and Ors. MANU/SC/1197/2006 : AIR2006SC1489 , marginal note has been
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taken into consideration as an intrinsic part of the Section. In Deewan Singh and Ors.
v. Rajendra Pd. Ardevi and Ors. MANU/SC/0207/2007 : AIR2007SC767 it has been
held that the marginal note may be taken into consideration for the purpose of proper
construction of the provision although there is no ambiguity. Sarabjit Rick Singh v.
Union of India (UOI) MANU/SC/0041/2008 : (2008)2SCC417 follows Deewan
Singh (supra).” (Emphasis Supplied)
23. As can be seen from the above findings, it is now settled law that a marginal
note/heading cannot control the plain words of a section. When the words used in a
provision are clear and unambiguous, a marginal note/heading cannot be used to alter
the interpretation of such provision. I am therefore, unable to agree with Mr. Kohli’s
reliance on the marginal note/heading of Section 16. Similarly, I also cannot agree with
Mr. Kohli’s reliance on the Schedule to the Commercial Courts Act. The expressions
used in the Schedule to an enactment cannot control or prevail against the express
enactment and in case of any inconsistency between the Schedule and the enactment,
the enactment is to prevail and if any part of the Schedule cannot be made to
correspond to the Act, it must yield to the Act. In this context, the following findings
of the Apex Court in its decision rendered in Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra24 :
“31. A Schedule in an Act of Parliament is a mere question of
drafting. It is the legislative intent that is material. An
24 (1989) 4 SCC
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Explanation to the Schedule amounts to an Explanation in the
Act itself. As we read in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third
Edn., Vol. 36, para 551 [Ed.: See in Fourth Edition, Vol. 44,
para 822] :
“To simplify the presentation of statutes, it is the practice for
their subject-matter to be divided, where appropriate,
between sections and Schedules, the former setting out
matters of principle, and introducing the latter, and the latter
containing all matters of detail. This is purely a matter of
arrangement, and a Schedule is as much a part of the statute,
and as much an enactment, as is the section by which it is
introduced.”
The Schedule may be used in construing provisions in the
body of the Act. It is as much an act of legislature as the Act
itself and it must be read together with the Act for all
purposes of construction. Expressions in the Schedule cannot
control or prevail against the express enactment and in case of
any inconsistency between the Schedule and the enactment,
the enactment is to prevail and if any part of the Schedule
cannot be made to correspond it must yield to the Act. Lord
Sterndale, in IRC v. Gittus [(1920) 1 KB 563] said: (at p. 576).
“It seems to me there are two principles or rules of
interpretation which ought to be applied to the combination
of Act and Schedule. If the Act says that the Schedule is to be
used for a certain purpose and the heading of the part of the
Schedule in question shows that it is prima facie at any rate
devoted to that purpose, then you must read the Act and the
Schedule as though the Schedule were operating for that
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purpose, and if you can satisfy the language of the section
without extending it beyond that purpose, you ought to do it.
But if in spite of that you find in the language of the Schedule
words and terms that go clearly outside that purpose, then
you must give effect to them and you must not consider them
as limited by the heading of that part of the Schedule or by
the purpose mentioned in the Act for which the Schedule is
prima facie to be used. You cannot refuse to give effect to
clear words simply because prima facie they seem to be
limited by the heading of the Schedule and the definition of
the purpose of the Schedule contained in the Act.”
24. In this regard, the following observations in the case of Ajay Enterprises
(P) Ltd. and Anr. vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi 25 relied upon by Mr.
Khandekar are also relevant-
“There can be no dispute that the various provisions of an enactment are to beso construed as to give a harmonious applicability. But the question to bedetermined is as to what is the effect if the language of the provisions in aschedule is contrary to the provisions contained in the main enactment. Craieson Statute Law (Seventh Edition) at pages 224-225 says, “The schedule is asmuch a part of the statute, and is as much an enactment, as any other part, butif an enactment in a schedule contradicts an earlier clause the clause prevailsagainst the schedule”. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (Eleventh Edition)at page 156 says, “Where a passage in a schedule to a statute was repugnant toone in the body of the statute, the latter was held to prevail, and the merewording of a specimen form in a Schedule to an Act cannot restrict or enlarge aprovision in the Act itself.” Again Maxwell on Interpretation ofStatutes (Twelfth Edition) at page 12 says, “Schedules to statutes are as muchpart of an Act as any other, and may be used in construing provisions in thebody of the Act. Similarly, provisions in a schedule will be construed in the
25 ILR (1972) 2 Del 629 at page 639
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light of what is enacted in the sections”. It is, therefore, evident that provisionsin a schedule are to be construed in the light of what is enacted in the sections.If the words of a section are clear without admitting of any ambiguity, onecannot refuse to give effect to the clear words of the statute, and the positivelanguage of an enactment cannot be dispensed with. That being so, if anenactment in a schedule contradicts the language of the section itself to whichthe schedule is appended, the section prevails against the schedule.
Reference may be made here to The Queen v. Baines, (1840) 12 A. D. & E. 227.In that case Bains took objection to the legality of Ms deprivation on variousgrounds. One of the objection was to the form of the significavite as beingissued by Dean of Arches and not by the Archbishop himself. The contentionraised was that the form of significavite itself as given in the schedule provedthat the jury, i.e., the Bishop was the only person who ought to certify as theform of significavite could only apply to a Bishop. Dealing with the contentionLord Denman, C.J., observed at page 227, “… such form although embodied inthe Act, cannot be deemed conclusive of a question of this nature: we have alsoto consider the language of the section itself to which the schedule isappended; and, if there be any contradiction between the two, which upon fairconstruction there perhaps will not be found to be, upon ordinary principlesthe form, which is made to suit rather the generality of cases than all cases,must give way.” (Emphasis Supplied)
25. Mr. Kohli relied heavily on his submissions that this Court ought to
interpret Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act in a purposive manner. During the
course of arguments, Mr. Kohli relied upon the following decisions and the findings
therein to persuade me in ‘purposively’ interpreting Section 16 as suggested by him :
25.1 Sansar Chand Atri vs. State of Punjab26 :
“9. It is relevant to note here that in the certificate issued by
the Ministry of Defence the appellant has been described as
an ex-serviceman. The provision for reservation in the
Service Rules is meant for the benefit of ex-servicemen. The
26 (2002) 4 SCC 154
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purpose is to provide them with suitable jobs in the civil
services so that they may not face difficulty in adjusting
themselves in civil society after leaving the defence service.
In the context of the scheme of the provision the
provisions in the Rules should be interpreted in a
purposive and reasonable manner so that the intent and
purpose of the provision is served. From the provisions in
the Rules it appears that a distinction has been made for
persons who are released from the army on the ground of
medical disqualification or on the ground of inefficiency or
misconduct. Such distinction is reasonable keeping in view
the purpose of reservation of posts made under the Rules. All
the ex-defence service personnel are to be treated as a class
separate from other candidates for the purpose of offer of jobs
and no differentiation or discrimination can be made amongst
them unless such differences are real and substantial. Testing
the provisions in this context we are of the view that a person
in the army who has earned pension after putting in the
requisite period of service before leaving the army whether at
his own request or on being released by the employer or on
any ground should be treated as an ex-serviceman who has
retired from the army. Such treatment is to be meted out to all
such persons irrespective of whether the nomenclature used
is “released [ As per Corrigendum issued by Supreme Court
of India dated 7-8-2002 No. F.3/Ed. B.J./141/2002] ” or
“discharged” or “retired”. If the contention raised on
behalf of the Service Commission and the State
Government that since the appellant has been
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discharged from the army at his own request, he cannot
be treated as an ex-serviceman, is accepted then it will
create a class within a class without rational basis and,
therefore, becomes arbitrary and discriminatory. It will
also defeat the purpose for which the provision for
reservation has been made.
10. The High Court, in our view, is not justified in placing
reliance on sub-clause (iv) of the definition clause and
excluding the writ petitioners from the eligible category on
that basis. Sub-clause (iv) has no application in the instant
case for the reason that it applies to such of those persons
who are released from service after specific period of
engagement and become entitled to get gratuity. If a person,
who served in the armed forces, is released after being
granted the benefit of pension, the case is taken out of the
purview of sub-clause (iv). The exclusionary words
“otherwise than at his own request” occurring in sub-clause
(iv) cannot, therefore, be relied upon to deny the benefit to
the appellants. Then the question arises, whether such person
would fall under sub-clause (i)? True, according to the
terminology used in the Service Rules governing the
armed forces there is a distinction between retirement
and release/discharge, as pointed out by the High
Court. But, in the context of definition of ex-serviceman
in Rule 2( c )( ii ), the broader meaning has to be given to
the word “retired” occurring in sub-clause ( i ). In
principle and in the light of the considerations set out above,
there is no rational basis for excluding those discharged or
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released from service after earning pension. It is only after
considerable period of satisfactory service a member of the
armed forces becomes entitled to pension. The mere fact that
after such long period of service he voluntarily quit the
service with the consent of the employer should not place him
in a disadvantageous position for claiming the benefit of
reservation for ex-serviceman. Therefore, the expression
“retirement” should be given wider meaning in order to
effectuate the objective behind the Rule .”
[Emphasis supplied]"
25.2. Union of India vs Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama27 :
T he paramount object in statutory interpretation is to
discover what the legislature intended. This intention is
primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in
question. That does not mean the text is to be construed
merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its
nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a
divine revelation. “Words are certainly not crystals,
transparent and unchanged” as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely
and properly warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425
(1918)] ) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he
said: “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of
Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie
behind them.” (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR
547, 553] )
17. Section 30(2) provides that amended provisions of
Section 23(2) shall apply, and shall be deemed to have
27 1990 (1) SCC 277
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applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the
Collector or court between April 30, 1982 and September 24,
1984, or to an appellate order therefrom passed by the High
Court or Supreme Court. The purpose of these provisions
seems to be that the awards made in that interregnum must
get higher solatium inasmuch as to awards made subsequent
to September 24, 1984. Perhaps it was thought that awards
made after the commencement of the Amending Act 68 of
1984 would be taken care of by the amended Section 23(2).
The case like the present one seems to have escaped
attention by innocent lack of due care in the drafting.
The result would be an obvious anomaly as will be
indicated presently. If there is obvious anomaly in the
application of law the court could shape the law to
remove the anomaly. If the strict grammatical
interpretation gives rise to absurdity or inconsistency,
the court could discard such interpretation and adopt an
interpretation which will give effect to the purpose of
the legislature. That could be done, if necessary even by
modification of the language used [See: Mahadeolal
Kanodia v. Administrator General of West Bengal [(1960) 3
SCR 578 : AIR 1960 SC 936] ]. The legislators do not
always deal with specific controversies which the courts
decide. They incorporate general purpose behind the
statutory words and it is for the courts to decide specific
cases. If a given case is well within the general purpose
of the legislature but not within the literal meaning of
the statute, then the court must strike the balance.
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(Emphasis supplied)"
25.3. Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs Chaudhari Devilal University, Sirsa28 :
"12. Mr P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant submitted that in the UGC Regulations for the post
of Lecturer the requirement was a Masters degree in the
relevant subject, whereas the expression “in the relevant
subject” is not mentioned in the qualifications for the post of
Reader. Hence, he submitted that it was not necessary for the
appellant to have a Masters degree in the relevant subject for
appointment to the post of Reader. We regret we cannot agree.
In our opinion, the words “in the relevant subject” has
to be read into the qualification for the post of Reader
also. To take a contrary view would lead to a strange situation
as that would mean that a person who has an MA degree in
Music or History, is qualified to be appointed as Reader in
Political Science.
13. No doubt, the ordinary principle of interpretation is that
words should neither be added nor deleted from a statutory
provision. However, there are some exceptions to the rule
where the alternative lies between either supplying by
implication words which appear to have been
accidentally omitted, or adopting a strict construction
which leads to absurdity or deprives certain existing
words of all meaning, and in this situation it is
permissible to supply the words (vide Principles of
Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., pp.
71-76).
28 2008 (9) SCC 284
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14. Thus, in Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of
Waqf [AIR 1959 SC 198] , the Supreme Court interpreted the
words “any person interested in a waqf” in Section 5(2) of the
U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1936 as meaning “any person
interested in what is held to be a waqf”.
15. Similarly, in State Bank of Travancore v. Mohd. M. Khan
[(1981) 4 SCC 82 : AIR 1981 SC 1744] , while construing
Section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturists' Debt Relief Act, 1970
the Supreme Court interpreted the words “any debt due
before the commencement of this Act to any banking
company” as meaning “any debt due at and before the
commencement of this Act”.
16. Similarly, in Gujarat Composite Ltd. v. Ranip Nagarpalika
[(1999) 8 SCC 675 : AIR 2000 SC 135] the Supreme Court
interpreted the words “grog minerals” to mean “grog and
minerals”. In Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellappan [(1976) 3
SCC 190 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 398 : AIR 1975 SC 2216] the
Supreme Court interpreted the words “any party to an
arbitration agreement” occurring in Section 33 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 to mean “a person who is alleged to be a
party to an arbitration agreement”. (Emphasis supplied)".
25.4. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta vs. National Taj Traders29 :
“10. Two principles of construction — one relating to casus
omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a
whole — appear to be well settled. In regard to the former the
following statement of law appears in Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) at p. 33:
29 1980 (1) SCC 370
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“Omissions not to be inferred.—It is a corollary to the
general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added
to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to
justify the inference that the legislature intended something
which it omitted to express. Lord Morsey said: ‘It is a strong
thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not
there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing
to do’. ‘We are not entitled’, said Lord Loreburn L.C., ‘to read
words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to
be found within the four corners of the Act itself’. A case not
provided for in a statute is not to be dealt with merely because
there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted,
and the omission appears in consequence to have been
unintentional.”
In regard to the latter principle the following statement of law
appears in Maxwell at p. 47:
“A statute is to be read as a whole.—It was resolved in the
case of Lincoln College [(1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58b at p. 59b] that
the good expositor of an Act of Parliament should ‘make
construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only
by itself’. Every clause of a statute is to ‘be construed with
reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as
far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole
statute’.” (Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd.
v.R., 1898 AC 735.)
In other words, under the first principle a casus omissus
cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear
necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners
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of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus
should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the
parts of a statute or section must be construed together and
every clause of a section should be construed with reference
to the context and other clauses thereof so that the
construction to be put on a particular provision makes a
consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be
more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to
manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have
been intended by the Legislature. “An intention to produce an
unreasonable result”, said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v.
Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), “is not to be imputed to a statute
if there is some other construction available”. Where to
apply words literally would “defeat the obvious
intention of the legislation and produce a wholly
unreasonable result” we must “do some violence to the
words” and so achieve that obvious intention and
produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v.
IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: “this is
not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such
that it rarely emerges”.] In the light of these principles we will
have to construe sub-section (2)(b) with reference to the
context and other clauses of Section 33-B.
(Emphasis supplied)".
25.5. Shailesh Dhairyawan vs Mohan Balkrishna Lulla30 :
30 2016 (3) SCC 619
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"31. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the
reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned
Brother, would clearly demonstrate that the provisions of
Section 15(2) of the Act require purposive interpretation so
that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is
achieved thereby. The principle of “ purposive
interpretation ” or “ purposive construction ” is based on
the understanding that the court is supposed to attach
that meaning to the provisions which serve the
“ purpose ” behind such a provision. The basic approach
is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? To put
it otherwise, by interpretative process the court is
supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is
designed to realise. As Aharon Barak puts it:
“Purposive interpretation is based on three components:
language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range
of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a
linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she
chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express
or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component
thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the
interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its
(public or private) language.” [ Aharon Barak, Purposive
Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language,
purpose and discretion “of the court”, insofar as purposive
component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at
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the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals,
interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to
actualise. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation
of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though
the literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was
treated as the “ golden rule ”, it is now the doctrine of
purposive interpretation which is predominant,
particularly in those cases where literal interpretation
may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it
brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of
statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process
thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a
grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place
they offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied
by the courts not only in this country but in many other legal
systems as well. (Emphasis Supplied)".
25.6. Indian Performing Rights Society vs Sanjay Dalia31 :
“27. It was also submitted that Heydon's [Heydon's case,
(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] rule is not applicable where
the words of the statute are clear. Reliance has been placed on
Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P. [(1973) 1 SCC 216] in which
it has been observed that when the provision is unambiguous
and if from the provision legislative intent is clear, the court
need not call into aid the other rule of construction of statutes
31 2015 (10) SCC 161
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such as that of “mischief”. However, we opine, when two
interpretations are possible, the court has to adopt the
one which furthers the object as provided in the statute
itself.
28. Reliance has been placed on Padma Sundara Rao v. State
of T.N. [(2002) 3 SCC 533 : AIR 2002 SC 1334] in which it
has been observed that the intention of the legislature must be
found in the words used by the legislature itself. Reliance has
also been placed on Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of
Customs [(2002) 4 SCC 297] in which it has been observed
that wherever the language is clear, the intention of the
legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While
doing so, what has been said as also what has not been said,
has to be noted. There is no dispute with the aforesaid
proposition. However, the object of the Act and the intention
of the legislature is clear which is to the otherwise.”
xxx
“32. Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, 12th Edn., has observed that regard be had to
the subject and object of the Act. The court's effort is to
harmonise the words of the statute with the subject of
enactment and the object the legislature has in view. When
two interpretations are feasible, the court will prefer the one
which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as
envisioned. The relevant portion is extracted below:
“As stated earlier (Chapter 1, Title 2 ‘Intention of the
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Legislature’, text and Notes 57 to 69, pp. 14 to 17) and as
approved by the Supreme Court:
‘9. … “the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their
meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best
harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object
which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not
so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of
language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in
the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be
attained.”
(Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate [AIR 1958 SC 353] , AIR
p. 356, para 9.) The courts have declined “to be bound by the
letter, when it frustrates the patent purposes of the statute”.
(Cabell v. Markham [148 F 2d 737 (2d Cir 1945)] ), ( Judge
Learned Hand). In the words of Shah, J.:
‘8. … It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that
the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood
in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the
statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature.’
(New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. CST [AIR 1963 SC 1207] ,
AIR p. 1213, para 8.) Therefore when two interpretations are
feasible the court will prefer that which advances the remedy
and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned.
(Carew & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1975) 2 SCC 791] ,
SCC p. 804, para 40.) The Court should adopt an object-
oriented approach keeping in mind the principle that
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legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative
possibility permits. [Busching Schmitz (P) Ltd. v. P.T.
Menghani [(1977) 2 SCC 835] , SCC pp. 843-44, para 17.]
The object-oriented approach, however, cannot be carried to
the extent of doing violence to the plain language used by
rewriting the section or substituting words in place of the
actual words used by the legislature. (CIT v. N.C. Budharaja
and Co. [1994 Supp (1) SCC 280] , SCC p. 288, para 13.)Having regard to the object of the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act,
1953 to implement the Bhoodan movement, which aimed at
distribution of land to landless labourers who were versed in
agriculture and who had no other means of subsistence, it was
held that the expression ‘landless persons’ in Section 14,
which made provision for grant of land to landless persons,
was limited to landless labourers as described above and did
not include a landless businessman residing in a city. (U.P.
Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore [(1988) 4 SCC 274] .)”
33. In Busching Schmitz (P) Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani [(1977) 2
SCC 835] , it has been observed that purposive interpretation
may be made having regard to the object of the provisions and
to avoid any obvious lacuna.
34. The learned author Justice G.P. Singh in Interpretation of
Statutes, 12th Edn. has also observed that it is the court's
duty to avoid hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity
and anomaly while selecting out of different interpretations.
The doctrine must be applied with great care and in case
absurd inconvenience is to be caused that interpretation has to
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be avoided. Cases of individual hardship or injustice have no
bearing for enacting the natural construction. The relevant
discussion at pp. 132-33 and 140-42 is extracted hereunder:
“(a) Hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity and
anomaly to be avoided
In selecting out of different interpretations ‘the court will
adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than
that which is none of those things’ (Holmes v. Bradfield Rural
District Council [(1949) 2 KB 1 : (1949) 1 All ER 381 (DC)] ,
All ER p. 384) as it may be presumed ‘that the legislature
should have used the word in that interpretation which least
offends our sense of justice’. (Simms v. Registrar of Probates
[1900 AC 323 (PC)] , AC p. 335.) If the grammatical
construction leads to some absurdity or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, it may be
departed from so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency.
(Grey v. Pearson [(1857) LR 6 HL Cas 61 : (1843-60) All ER
Rep 21] , HLC p. 106.) Similarly, a construction giving rise to
anomalies should be avoided. (N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G.
Raja Nainar [AIR 1959 SC 422] , AIR SC pp. 427 and 428.)
As approved by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.:
‘7. … Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning
and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest
contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to
some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it
which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
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structure of the sentence.’ (Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh
[AIR 1955 SC 830] , AIR p. 833, para 7.)”
***“Consideration of hardship, injustice or absurdity as avoiding
a particular construction is a rule which must be applied with
great care. ‘The argument ab inconvenienti’, said Lord
Moulton, ‘is one which requires to be used with great
caution’. (Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society of
Compositors [1913 AC 107 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 241 (HL)] .)
Explaining why great caution is necessary Lord Moulton
further observed: (AC p. 130)
‘… There is a danger that it may degenerate into mere judicial
criticism of the propriety of the Acts of legislature. We have
to interpret statutes according to the language used therein,
and, though occasionally the respective consequences of two
rival interpretations may guide us in our choice between
them, it can only be where, taking the Act as a whole, and
viewing it in connection with the existing state of the law at
the time of the passing of the Act, we can satisfy ourselves
that the words can have been used in the sense to which the
argument points.’
(Vacher & Sons Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors [1913
AC 107 : (1911-13) All ER Rep 241 (HL)] .) According to
Brett, L.J., the inconvenience necessitating a departure from
the ordinary sense of the words should not only be great but
should also be what he calls an ‘absurd inconvenience’.
Moreover, individual cases of hardship or injustice have no
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bearing for rejecting the natural construction (Young & Co. v.
Royal Leamington Spa Corpn. [(1883) LR 8 AC 517 (HL)] ),
and it is only when the natural construction leads to some
general hardship or injustice and some other construction is
reasonably open that the natural construction may be
departed from. It is often found that laws enacted for the
general advantage do result in individual hardship; for
example laws of Limitation, Registration, Attestation
although enacted for the public benefit, may work injustice in
particular cases but that is hardly any reason to depart from
the normal rule to relieve the supposed hardship or injustice
in such cases. (Lucy v. W.T. Henleys Telegraph Works Co.
Ltd. [(1970) 1 QB 393 : (1969) 3 WLR 588 : (1969) 3 All ER
456 (CA)] ) ‘It is the duty of all courts of justice’, said Lord
Campbell, ‘to take care for the general good of the
community, that hard cases do not make bad law’. (East India
Co. v. Oditchurn Paul [(1850) 7 Moo PCC 85 : 13 ER 811] .)
‘Absurdity’ according to Willes, J., should be understood ‘in
the same sense as repugnance that is to say something which
would be so absurd with reference to the other words of the
statute as to amount to a repugnance’. (Christophersen v.
Lotingae [(1864) 33 LJ CP 121] .) ‘Absurdity’, said Lord
Greene, M.R., ‘like public policy, is a very unruly horse’.
(Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary Mines Ltd. [1948 Ch
145 : (1948) 1 All ER 21 (CA)] ) He proceeded to add:
‘There is one rule, I think which is clear … that, although the
absurdity or the non-absurdity of one conclusion as compared
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with another may be, and very often is, of assistance to the
court in choosing between two possible meanings of
ambiguous words, it is a doctrine which has to be applied with
great care, remembering that Judges may be fallible in this
question of an absurdity and in any event it must not be
applied so as to result in twisting language into a meaning
which it cannot bear. It is a doctrine which must not be used
to rewrite the language in a way different from that in which it
was originally framed.’
(Grundt v. Great Boulder Proprietary Mines Ltd. [1948 Ch
145 : (1948) 1 All ER 21 (CA)] , Ch pp. 159-60.) The
alternative construction contended for must be such which
does not put an undue strain on the words used; (Kanailal Sur
v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907] ) and does not
require recasting of the Act or any part of it. It must be
possible to spell the meaning contended for out of the words
actually used. (Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate,
Thana [AIR 1952 SC 324 : 1952 Cri LJ 1503] .)
No doubt in cases of ambiguity that construction which better
serves the ends of fairness and justice will be accepted, but
otherwise it is for the legislature in forming its policy to
consider these elements. (IRC v. Mutual Investment Co. Ltd.
[1967 AC 587 : (1966) 3 WLR 740 : (1966) 3 All ER 265
(PC)] ) If no alternative construction is open, the court
cannot ignore a statutory provision ‘to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation; a statute has
to be given effect to whether the court likes it or not’. (Martin
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Burn Ltd. v. Corpn. of Calcutta [AIR 1966 SC 529] .) The
function of the court is to find out what is legal and not what
is right. (Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram
[(1986) 4 SCC 447] .) It is presumed that a legislative body
intends which is the necessary effect of its enactments; the
object, the purpose and the intention of the enactment is the
same; it need not be expressed in any recital or Preamble; and
it is not competent for any court judicially to ascribe any part
of the legal operation of the statute to inadvertence.
(Kariapper v. Wijesinha [1968 AC 717 : (1967) 3 WLR 1460 :
(1967) 3 All ER 485 (PC)] .)
The courts should as far as possible avoid a construction
which results in anomalies. (N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G.
Raja Nainar [AIR 1959 SC 422] .)”
35.Bennion on Statutory Interpretation has mentioned law to
the same effect under Section 312 and has observed that there
is a presumption that absurd result is not intended and in
Section 314 it has been observed that the court has to avoid an
inconvenient result while interpreting a provision. It was
stated that it can be presumed that Parliament intends that
while construing an enactment the court will avoid a
construction that is unworkable or impracticable,
inconvenient, anomalous or illogical as the same is unlikely to
be intended by Parliament. In Rosali V. v. TAICO Bank
[(2009) 17 SCC 690 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 626] , this Court
referring to Halsbury's commonsense construction rule held
that it is a well-settled principle of law that commonsense
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construction rule should be taken recourse in certain cases.
36. This Court in Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co.
Ltd. [Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1
SCC 135 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 28] has also laid down law to
the same effect and has discussed the term “branch office”
used in Section 17(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
in the context of cause of action. Section 17(2) of the said Act
reads thus: (SCC p. 138, para 7)
“7. … ‘17. (2) A complaint shall be instituted in a State
Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction—
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where
there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the
complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on
business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than
one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually
and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch
office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case
either the permission of the State Commission is given or the
opposite parties who do not reside or carry on business or
have a branch office or personally works for gain, as the case
may be, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.’”
This Court while interpreting the provision held that the term
“branch office” as used in the amended Section 17(2)(b) has
to be interpreted to mean only that branch office where the
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cause of action has arisen. Thus, the court departed from the
plain and literal meaning of the words of Section 17(2)(b) of
the Consumer Protection Act in order to avoid absurdity. The
decision in Sonic Surgical [Sonic Surgical v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1 SCC 135 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ)
28] has been approved by this Court in State of M.P. v.
Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC
(Civ) 875] inasmuch as this Court has observed that in case
the natural meaning leads to mischievous consequences, it
must be avoided by accepting other permissible construction.
(emphasis supplied)".
26. Whilst the aforesaid judgments reflect that the courts therein have
purposively interpreted the subject provisions therein, I do not deem it necessary to
depart from the foremost principle of statutory interpretation viz. the literal rule of
interpretation. In this context, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B.
Premanand vs. Mohan Koikal32 and the following findings therein:
“9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and
foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every
system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation.
The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule,
purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when
the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no
intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very
object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are
32 (2011) 4 SCC 266
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absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to
the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide
Swedish Match AB v. SEBI [(2004) 11 SCC 641 : AIR 2004
SC 4219] .
16. Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope for
importing any rule of interpretation (vide Pandian Chemicals
Ltd. v. CIT [(2003) 5 SCC 590] ). It is only where the
provisions of a statute are ambiguous that the court can
depart from a literal or strict construction (vide Nasiruddin v.
Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2 SCC 577 : AIR 2003 SC 1543] ).
Where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous
effect must be given to them (vide Bhaiji v. SDO [(2003) 1
SCC 692] ).
17. No doubt in some exceptional cases departure can be
made from the literal rule of the interpretation, e.g. by
adopting a purposive construction, Heydon [Heydon case,
(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] mischief rule, etc. but that
should only be done in very exceptional cases. Ordinarily, it is
not proper for the court to depart from the literal rule as that
would really be amending the law in the garb of
interpretation, which is not permissible (vide J.P. Bansal v.
State of Rajasthan[(2003) 5 SCC 134 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 605 :
AIR 2003 SC 1405] and State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh
[(2005) 10 SCC 437 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1570 : JT (2004) 10 SC
349] ). It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the
court (vide State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh [(2005) 10
SCC 437 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1570 : JT (2004) 10 SC 349] ).
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18. In Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi [(2003) 1 SCC
730] (SCC p. 733, para 5) this Court observed [Ed.: As
observed in Raghunath Rai Bareja v. Punjab National Bank,
(2007) 2 SCC 230, p. 245, para 48.] :
“48. … The court cannot legislate under the garb of
interpretation.”
Hence, there should be judicial restraint in this connection,
and the temptation to do judicial legislation should be
eschewed by the Courts. In fact, judicial legislation is an
oxymoron.
19. In Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj
Developers [(2003) 6 SCC 659 : AIR 2003 SC 2434] this
Court observed: (SCC p. 669, para 19)
“19. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot
read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and
unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
legislative intent.”
20. Where the language is clear, the intention of the
legislature has to be gathered from the language used (vide
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs [(2002) 4
SCC 297] and Union of India v. Hansoli Devi [(2002) 7 SCC
273] ).
21. In Union of India v. Hansoli Devi [(2002) 7 SCC 273] this
Court observed: (SCC p. 281, para 9)
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“9. … It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that
when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous,
then the court must give effect to the words used in the
statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a
hypothetical construction on the ground that such
construction is more consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act.”
22. The function of the court is only to expound the law and
not to legislate (vide District Mining Officer v. TISCO
[(2001) 7 SCC 358] ). If we accept the interpretation
canvassed by the learned counsel for the private respondents,
we will really be legislating because in the guise of
interpretation we will be really amending Rule 27(c) of the
Rules.
23. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of
Maharashtra [(2001) 4 SCC 534 : AIR 2001 SC 1980] , this
Court observed: (SCC pp. 552-53, para 26)
“26. … it is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute
that the words of a statute must be understood in their
natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to
their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to
some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or
in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The
golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be
given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of
construction that when the words of the statute are clear,
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plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give
effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is
said that the words themselves best declare the intention of
the law-giver. The courts have adhered to the principle that
efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every
word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of
construction to brush aside words in a statute as being
inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in
circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the
statute.”
The same view has been taken by this Court in Harshad S.
Mehta v. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 8 SCC 257 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 1447] (vide SCC para 34) and Patangrao Kadam v.
Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh [(2001) 3 SCC 594 :
AIR 2001 SC 1121] .
24. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there
should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read
the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.
We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is
not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also
followed by the layman in his ordinary life. To give an
illustration, if a person says “this is a pencil”, then he means
that it is a pencil; and it is not that when he says that the
object is a pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an
elephant. In other words, the literal rule of interpretation
simply means that we mean what we say and we say what we
mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation,
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social life will become impossible, and we will not understand
each other. If we say that a certain object is a book, then we
mean it is a book. If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a
horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to
communicate with each other. Life will become impossible.
Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is
simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean.”
27. In my view, literally interpreting Section 16, the interpretation that
follows is that the amendments introduced by Section 16 apply only to Commercial
Disputes of a Specified Value and not Commercial Disputes not of a Specified
Value. This is the letter of law. Section 16, as it reads currently ought to be interpreted
literally. In Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan33, it was held by the Apex Court
that if the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open
to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such
construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the subject Act.
Further, the Apex Court, in its decision rendered in Commr. of Customs v. Dilip
Kumar & Co.,34 has held thus :
“21.The well-settled principle is that when the words in a
statute are clear, plain and unambiguous and only one
meaning can be inferred, the courts are bound to give effect to
the said meaning irrespective of consequences. If the words in
the statute are plain and unambiguous, it becomes necessary
33 AIR 1957 SC 907 34 (2018) 9 SCC 1
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to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.
The words used declare the intention of the legislature.”
28. Additionally, as submitted by Mr. Kohli, there may be certain inefficient
consequences resulting from the literal interpretation of Section 16. Illustratively, the
present Suit is titled a ‘Commercial Suit’ and yet, would be governed by the un-
amended CPC. However, in my view, should the legislature deem fit, it may carry out
an amendment to overcome these consequences and/or may provide a clarification if it
so deems fit. Till such time, I am currently bound by the language of Section 16 and
am inclined to interpret the said section literally.
29. It was also Mr. Kohli’s argument that the creation of a sub-class within a
class would be unconstitutional. If that is so, the Plaintiff’s remedy would be to
challenge the vires of Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act for in its present form,
I am bound with the letter of law written therein and cannot interpret the said
provision as Mr. Kohli would have it.
30. I therefore hold that the amendments introduced to the CPC by the
Commercial Courts Act are only applicable to Commercial Disputes of a Specified
Value and not Commercial Disputes not of a Specified Value such as the present suit.
Consequently, amongst other amendments introduced to the CPC by the Commercial
Courts Act, the amendment to the CPC mandating that a Written Statement in a
Commercial Suit has to be filed within 120 days, will not apply to Commercial
Disputes not of a Specified Value.
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31. The question of law is decided as above. Delay of two days in filing
Written Statement in suit No.316 of 2018 is condoned. Notice of Motion Commercial
Division (L) No.2118 of 2018 is accordingly disposed off.
( S.J.KATHAWALLA, J. )
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