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© 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

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Page 1: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

Virtualization Security Best PracticesIBM Institute for Advanced Security

November, 2010November, 2010

Page 2: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization Security Best Practices

Moderator

Charles Palmer, Director of the Institute for Advanced Security, IBM

Expert Panelists

Edward L. Haletky, Analyst, The Virtualization Practice, LLC - virtualizationpractice.com

David Abercrombie, Senior Product Manager, Server Protection Solutions - IBM

Ajay Dholakia, Senior Technical Staff Member, System x - IBM

Page 3: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Agenda

Introduction and Overview of Virtualization – Charles Palmer

Virtualization: The Basics - Edward L. Haletky virtualizationpractice.com

Virtualization Approaches – David Abercrombie

Virtualization Requirements and Imperatives – Ajay Dholakia

Questions & Answers

Page 4: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

4 10/04/10

The Virtualization Journey

Consolidate Resources• Improved efficiency and

utilization of IT resources with simple virtualization tools

Manage Workloads• Improved IT staff productivity with

integrated systems management dashboard for physical and virtual resources

Automate Processes• Consistent and repeatable

processes based on best practices, business priorities and service level agreements with simple virtualization tools

Optimize Delivery• Self provisioned by users based

on business imperatives, unconstrained by physical barriers or location.

ManageWorkloads

AutomateProcesses

OptimizeDelivery

Consolidate Resources

Increased AgilityNetworkStorage

Server

Page 5: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

Virtualization Security ReviewEdward L. Haletky

Page 6: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Page 7: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Hardware Layer

Page 8: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Page 9: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Kernel Layer

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Page 10: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Virtual Machine Manager

Kernel Layer

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Page 11: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Guest OS Layer

Virtual Machine Manager

Kernel Layer

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Page 12: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Application LayerGuest OS Layer

Virtual Machine Manager

Kernel Layer

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Page 13: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Application LayerGuest OS Layer

Virtual Machine Manager

Kernel Layer

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Page 14: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

The HypervisorThe Hypervisor

Application LayerGuest OS Layer

Virtual Machine Manager

Kernel Layer

Driver/Module Layer

Hardware Layer

Hypervisor

Page 15: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Hypervisor Basics

How the Hypervisor Protects Itself

or

Internal Workings of a Hypervisor

Page 16: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to CPU

Hypervisor Controls CPUHypervisor Controls CPU

Page 17: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to CPU

Hypervisor Controls CPUHypervisor Controls CPU

Page 18: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to CPU

Hypervisor Controls CPUHypervisor Controls CPU

Page 19: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel

Memory

Page 20: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory

VM

Page 21: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Page 22: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

Page 23: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

Page 24: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

.vswp

Page 25: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

MemoryPage

Memory

Page

Page 26: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

.vswp

MemoryPage

Compare

Memory

Page

Page 27: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

.vswp

MemoryPage

Compare

Ptr

Page

Memory

PagePtr

Page 28: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understand Hypervisor Security: Access to Memory

vmkernel VM

Memory MemoryMemory

VM

Memory

Memory

Memory

.vswp

MemoryPagePtr

Page

Memory

PagePtr

Page 29: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch

Page 30: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 31: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 32: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 33: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAMXX

Page 34: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

PG-100 PG-200

XX

Page 35: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

PG-100 PG-200

XX

XX

Page 36: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

PG-100 PG-200

XX

Page 37: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

PG-100 PG-200

XXXX

Page 38: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch

Page 39: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 40: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 41: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 42: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 43: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 44: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAMNexus 1000V

Page 45: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAMXX

Page 46: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAMXX

Page 47: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAMXX

Page 48: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Understanding Hypervisor Security: ESX Network Protections

L2-Switch CAM

Page 49: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment

Threats

Two Sets

Page 50: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Page 51: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 52: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 53: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 54: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 55: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 56: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 57: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

Page 58: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

NewThreat Vectors

VM EscapeIntrospection

APIs

NewThreat Vectors

VM EscapeIntrospection

APIs

Page 59: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

NewThreat Vectors

VM EscapeIntrospection

APIs

NewThreat Vectors

VM EscapeIntrospection

APIs

Page 60: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtual Environment ThreatsVirtual Environment Threats

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

NewThreat Vectors

ManagementUSB over IP

Backup Server

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

Existing ThreatVectors

WormsTrojansVirusSpamDDoS

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

ExistingThreat Vectors

NetworkAttacks

NewThreat Vectors

VM EscapeIntrospection

APIs

NewThreat Vectors

VM EscapeIntrospection

APIs

Page 61: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

Virtualization Security Best PracticesDavid Abercrombie

All information represents IBM's current intent, is subject to change or withdrawal without notice, and represents only IBM ISS’ goals and objectives. By providing this information, IBM is not committing to provide this capability.

Page 62: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Security Must Evolve

Static Dynamic

SECURITY

69

Physical

Blocks threats and attacks at the perimeterBlocks threats and attacks at the perimeter

Secures each physical server with protection and reporting for a single agent

Secures each physical server with protection and reporting for a single agent

Patches critical vulnerabilities on individual serversPatches critical vulnerabilities on individual servers

Policies are specific to critical applications in each network segment and server

Policies are specific to critical applications in each network segment and server

Network IPSNetwork IPS

Server ProtectionServer Protection

System PatchingSystem Patching

Security PoliciesSecurity Policies

Virtualized

Should protect against threats at perimeter and between VMs

Should protect against threats at perimeter and between VMs

Securing each VM as if it were a physical server adds time, cost and footprint

Securing each VM as if it were a physical server adds time, cost and footprint

Needs to protect against vulnerabilities that result from VM state changes

Needs to protect against vulnerabilities that result from VM state changes

Policies must be able to move with the VMsPolicies must be able to move with the VMs

Network IPSNetwork IPS

Server ProtectionServer Protection

System PatchingSystem Patching

Security PoliciesSecurity Policies

Page 63: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Integrated Protection vs. Host-based Protection

70

Host-Based Agent

Firewall functions only in the context of the VMFirewall functions only in the context of the VM

Requires agent to be presentRequires agent to be present

Security is impacted by VM state changeSecurity is impacted by VM state change

Policy is enforced only within the VMPolicy is enforced only within the VM

Isolation Isolation

Attack Prevention

Attack Prevention

VM StateVM State

Security PoliciesSecurity Policies

Virtual Server Protection

Firewall enforces virtual network-wide policyFirewall enforces virtual network-wide policy

Secures all virtual machines automaticallySecures all virtual machines automatically

Security is not impacted by VM state changeSecurity is not impacted by VM state change

Policy is enforced outside of the VM and irrespective of the VMs location

Policy is enforced outside of the VM and irrespective of the VMs location

IsolationIsolation

Attack Prevention

Attack Prevention

VM StateVM State

Security PoliciesSecurity Policies

Page 64: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

IBM Confidential

ESX Server

VM VM VM VM SVM

vSwitchVMSafe

vSwitch

•Firewall•I ntrusion Prevention•Virtual I nfrastructure Auditing•Rootkit detection•Discovery

Integrated Security Benefits

71

Page 65: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

IBM Confidential

Regain Lost Visibility and Control

Identify VMs that are invisible to traditional discovery tools

Control unauthorized crossing of trust zones Ensure VMs that come online do not introduce

vulnerabilities Quarantine unauthorized VMs

– VMs that are not considered trusted are given limited network access

72

Virtual Network

Page 66: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

ESX ServerESX Server

Dynamic Environment Protection

VMVM VMVMSVMSVM

vSwitchvSwitchVMSafeVMSafe

vSwitchvSwitch

VMVM VMVM SVMSVM

vSwitchvSwitchVMSafeVMSafe

vSwitchvSwitch

SiteProtector

Policy

Events

Updates

Maintain security posture irrespective of the physical server on which the VM resides

Abstraction from underlying physical servers provides dynamic security optimized for mobility

73

Page 67: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

ESX ServerESX Server

Dynamic Environment Protection

VMVM VMVMSVMSVM

vSwitchvSwitchVMSafeVMSafe

vSwitchvSwitch

VMVM VMVM SVMSVM

vSwitchvSwitchVMSafeVMSafe

vSwitchvSwitch

VMVM

SiteProtector

Policy

Events

Updates

Maintain security posture irrespective of the physical server on which the VM resides

Abstraction from underlying physical servers provides dynamic security optimized for mobility

74

Page 68: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

IBM Confidential

Defense In Depth

75

Host-Based Agent

Access Management

Security/Configuration Management

Malware Detection/Prevention

File Integrity Monitoring

Encrypted Traffic Inspection

Security Virtual Machine

Firewall

Intrusion Prevention

Malware Detection/Prevention

Access Monitoring

Access Control

Network-Based Appliance

Firewall

Intrusion Prevention

Network Policy Enforcement

Data Loss Prevention

Host-Based Agent

Firewall

Intrusion Prevention

Access Management

Security/Configuration Management

Malware Detection/Prevention

File Integrity Monitoring

Encrypted Traffic Inspection

Page 69: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

IBM Confidential

Evolution of Secure Virtualization solutions

Today…Security Virtual Machines take over some key functions from host-based agents– Host-level firewall, IPS/IDS, guest security configuration, some anti-malware functions– Fewer resources (CPU, memory) consumed – Less intrusive (kernel drivers)– Guest OS-independent

More to come…– Hardware-level root-of-trust (TPMs)– Maturity of virtual machine introspection– Security component collaboration & automated remediation

Page 70: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

IBM Confidential

Summary

Virtualization does impact security posture “Legacy” tools are still relevant New products adapted for virtual environments are available No single product provides adequate protection

77

Page 71: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

Virtualization Security Best Practices Ajay Dholakia

All information represents IBM's current intent, is subject to change or withdrawal without notice, and represents only IBM ISS’ goals and objectives. By providing this information, IBM is not committing to provide this capability.

Page 72: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Security complexities raised by virtualization

Complexities

Dynamic relocation of VMs

Increased infrastructure layersto manage and protect

Multiple operating systems and applications per server

Elimination of physical boundaries between systems

Manually tracking software and configurations of VMs

Maintenance of virtual images

Image sprawl (proliferation)

Virtual appliances (Trojan Horse)

Public Cloud risks

–“Black box” sharing in clouds reduces visibility and control

–Privacy and accountability regulations

• 1:1 ratio of OSs and applications per server

• 1:Many ratio of OSs and applications per server

• Additional layer to manage and secure

After VirtualizationBefore

Virtualization

Page 73: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization security – Driving requirements

RequirementsSecure platforms & engineering processThreat and vulnerability management

–Internal / external threat mitigationPrivileged access

–Role segregation & access controlData confidentiality and integrity

–Data @ rest ( storage ) data in transit (network) Regulatory complianceMulti-tenancy / isolation

–Isolation management of Virtual Servers Image / virtual appliance securityConsolidated systems security

–Consolidated server, storage, net. security mgmt.Systems Integrity Management

–Trusted software / firmware / hardware

Page 74: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization security – Imperatives … The Low Hanging Fruit

Easy steps you can follow

7. Do not use Paravirtualized drivers within DMZ based VMs, or any that hold sensitive data unless there is an absolute performance requirement to do so, and then only use the specific driver instead of installing them all.

Page 75: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization security – Imperatives … The Low Hanging Fruit

Easy steps you can follow

7. Do not use Paravirtualized drivers within DMZ based VMs, or any that hold sensitive data unless there is an absolute performance requirement to do so, and then only use the specific driver instead of installing them all.

6. Use a centralized directory service to provide authentication

5. Use a centralized tool to provide authorization.

4. Use a centralized syslog/log server for collecting audit and standard log data for analysis

3. Analyze/Review your log data daily for issues.

Page 76: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization security – Imperatives … The Low Hanging Fruit

Easy steps you can follow

7. Do not use Paravirtualized drivers within DMZ based VMs, or any that hold sensitive data unless there is an absolute performance requirement to do so, and then only use the specific driver instead of installing them all.

6. Use a centralized directory service to provide authentication

5. Use a centralized tool to provide authorization.

4. Use a centralized syslog/log server for collecting audit and standard log data for analysis

3. Analyze/Review your log data daily for issues.

2. Ensure only the hypervisor can access any LUN assigned to a hypervisor.

Page 77: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization security – Imperatives … The Low Hanging Fruit

Easy steps you can follow

7. Do not use Paravirtualized drivers within DMZ based VMs, or any that hold sensitive data unless there is an absolute performance requirement to do so, and then only use the specific driver instead of installing them all.

6. Use a centralized directory service to provide authentication

5. Use a centralized tool to provide authorization.

4. Use a centralized syslog/log server for collecting audit and standard log data for analysis

3. Analyze/Review your log data daily for issues.

2. Ensure only the hypervisor can access any LUN assigned to a hypervisor.

1. Firewall your virtualization management tools from the rest of your network

Page 78: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Virtualization Security wrap up

• Important to understand the inner workings of a hypervisor and how it protects itself

• Type of threats that virtual environments are vulnerable to

• Security posture impacted by virtualization and no single product provide adequate protection but…

• Firewall tools are a good start to protect your virtual environment

Virtualization Security wrap up

• Important to understand the inner workings of a hypervisor and how it protects itself

• Type of threats that virtual environments are vulnerable to

• Security posture impacted by virtualization and no single product provide adequate protection but…

• Firewall tools are a good start to protect your virtual environment

Summary

Page 79: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Questions & Answers

Page 80: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

Thank you!

For more information on Virtualization Security, visit,

IBM Institute for Advanced Security: www.instituteforadvancedsecurity.com

The Virtualization Practicehttp://www.virtualizationpractice.com/blog/?page_id=2

All information represents IBM's current intent, is subject to change or withdrawal without notice, and represents only IBM ISS’ goals and objectives. By providing this information, IBM is not committing to provide this capability.

Page 81: © 2010 IBM Corporation Virtualization Security Best Practices IBM Institute for Advanced Security November, 2010

© 2010 IBM Corporation

IBM Internet Security Systems

Seed Questions

Ed– How do we handle antivirus, patching and malware?– Should we be using VLANs? Are they secure?– Do I have to worry about ‘escaping VM’ attacks?– Can you virtualize a DMZ?

Dave– Performance-wise, how do security virtual machines impact the virtual environment?– Can security virtual machines be integrated with platforms other than VMware?

Ajay– Does virtualization improve security or makes it more challenging?– Does security of physical end-points interact with security for virtual end-points? Or does

it remain separate?